"* HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM + I.T.T.A Nos.163 OF 2003 & 189 OF 2003 % 16.09.2014 I.T.T.A. No.163 OF 2003: # M/s. P.V. Mohana Rao and others ..... Appellant And ACIT, Circle-2, Vizianagaram. .....Respondent ! Counsel for the appellant: Sri A.V. Krishna Kaundinya ^ Counsel for respondent : Sri S.R. Ashok < Gist: > Head Note: ? Cases referred: [1] (1998) 231 ITR 50 2. (1996) 217 ITR 746 3. 335 ITR 387 HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM I.T.T.A Nos.163 OF 2003 & 189 OF 2003 COMMON JUDGMENT:- (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice L.Narasimha Reddy) These appeals under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act,1961 (for short, ‘the Act’) are preferred by the assessee, feeling aggrieved by the order dated 30.09.2002 passed by the Visakhapatnam Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (for short, ‘the Tribunal) in I.T.A.Nos.1120/Hyd/97 and 1121/Hyd/97. The facts that gave rise to the filing these appeals are as under: The appellant was doing business in arrack, with two partners. In the assessment year 1991-92, there was a change of composition. In the place of one partner by name Sri D. Appala Narasimha Raju, 17 persons have joined the firm and a deed of partnership dated 05.02.1990. was executed, in that behalf. As required under Sections 184 and 185 of the Act, the appellant filed an application for registration of the firm, before the Assessing Officer. Through an order dated 24.03.1994, the Assessing Officer refused to register the firm. As a consequence thereof, the returns filed by the appellant for the assessment years 1991-92 and 1992-93 in the capacity of a firm were processed by treating them as those filed by ‘association of persons’. The appellant approached the Commissioner (Appeals) feeling aggrieved by the order dated 24.03.1994. The appeal was allowed on 29.03.1996. A direction was issued to the Assessing Officer to register the firm after verifying the relevant facts. Accordingly, the firm was registered and fresh orders of assessment were passed for the two assessment years, by treating the appellant as a firm. The Jurisdictional Commissioner (for short, ‘the Commissioner (J) issued a notice dated 19.09.1996 to the appellant in exercise of power under Section 263 of the Act, requiring it to show-cause as to why the registration, be not cancelled. It was pointed out that the rules framed under the A.P Excise Act, 1968 prohibited admission of new partners without permission of the concerned authority and because such a permission was not existing, the registration is liable to be cancelled. The appellant submitted its explanation and the same was found not satisfactory. Ultimately an order was passed on 14.03.1997 by the Commissioner (J) cancelling the registration of the firm. The said order was challenged in I.T.A.No.1120/Hyd/1997 before the Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. Sri A.V. Siva Kartikeya, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the registration of the firm was done only on the basis of the direction issued by the Commissioner (Appeals) and that being the case, it was not competent for the Commissioner (J) to exercise power under Section 263 of the Act, in relation thereto. He contends that Clause (c) of Explanation to sub section (1) of Section 263 of the Act prohibits such an exercise. He has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Shri Arbuda Mills Ltd.[1] Learned counsel further submits that the Tribunal relied upon certain precedents, wherein the excise licence was held initially by an individual and thereafter the firms were sought to be constituted without the permission of the excise authorities, and that in the instant case, there existed a firm, from the beginning and the registration was only in relation to the reconstitution of the firm. Sri S.R. Ashok, learned Senior Counsel for the Revenue, on the other hand, submits that the subject matter of the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was only about the delay in filing application and there was no occasion for addressing the other aspects such as the permission having not been obtained from the officials of the Excise Department. He further submits that the Clause (c) of Explanation to sub section (1) of Section 263 of the Act does not get attracted since the order passed by the Assessing Authority, registering the firm, was not the subject matter of the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals). He placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bihari Lal Jaiswal and Ors. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax and Ors.[2] and a judgment of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Swarna Bar and Restaurant[3]. The subject matter of the appeal before the Tribunal was an order passed by the Commissioner (J) in exercise of power under Section 263 of the Act. It has already been mentioned that the appellant was doing business in arrack and for the assessment years 1991-92 and 1992-93, the registration under Section 185 of the Act became essential, on account of the reconstitution of the firm. The Assessing Officer rejected the application for registration on 24.03.1994. That resulted in the appellant having been treated as ‘association of persons’. The matter was carried in appeal and the Commissioner (Appeals) passed an order on 29.03.1996, issuing the following directions to the Assessing Officer. “a) To verify from the original postal receipts if the contention of the appellant is correct; b) If so, he may refer to the Receipt Register to see if both the documents were received and duly entered in the same; c) In case there is no entry in the Register for which the appellant normally may not be hold responsible but the circumstantial evidence may be considered to be sufficient cause for condonation of delay.” In compliance with the directions, the Assessing Officer registered the firm and passed orders under Section 185(1) as well as Section 154 of the Act. The Commissioner (J) issued show-cause notice dated 19.09.1996 in exercise of power under Section 263 of the Act, proposing to cancel the registration. The explanation offered by the appellant was not found satisfactory. Ultimately the Commissioner (J) passed an order on 14.03.1997 cancelling the registration. Shorn of details and other introductory facts, the operative portion of the order reads: “4. In the absence of any evidence to show that exclusions of Sri D. Appala Narasimha Raju and inclusion of 17 others was duly authorised by the Excise Authorities, as pointed out in para 2.2 above, the partnership firm of the assessee is against public policy, and, is therefore illegal. It should therefore be assessed in the status of an Association of Persons and should be denied the benefit of registration. 5. The orders granting registration u/s.185 are hereby cancelled for both the assessment years and the Assessing Officer is directed to assess the income of the assessee in the status of A.O.P. for both the years.” That the Commissioner (J) has the power under Section 263 of the Act to call for records of any proceedings under the Act and revise them, if he found them to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue, is beyond any pale of doubt. However, Parliament imposed certain conditions in relation to exercise thereof. The explanation to sub section (1) was added in the year 1988. Together with the explanation, the sub section (1) of Section 263 of the Act reads as under: “(1) The Commissioner may call for and examine the record of any proceeding under this Act, and if he considers that any order passed therein by the [Assessing] Officer is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, he may, after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard and after making or causing to be made such inquiry as he deems necessary, pass such order thereon as the circumstances of the case justify, including an order enhancing or modifying the assessment, or canceling the assessment and directing a fresh assessment. [Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that, for the purposes of this sub-section,— (a) an order passed [on or before or after the 1st day of June, 1988] by the Assessing Officer shall include— (i) an order of assessment made by the Assistant Commissioner [or Deputy Commissioner] or the Income-tax Officer on the basis of the directions issued by the [Joint] Commissioner under section 144A; (ii) an order made by the [Joint] Commissioner in exercise of the powers or in the performance of the functions of an Assessing Officer conferred on, or assigned to, him under the orders or directions issued by the Board or by the Chief Commissioner or Director General or Commissioner authorised by the Board in this behalf under section 120; (b) “record” [shall include and shall be deemed always to have included] all records relating to any proceeding under this Act available at the time of examination by the Commissioner; (c) where any order referred to in this sub-section and passed by the Assessing Officer had been the subject matter of any appeal [filed on or before or after the 1st day of June, 1988], the powers of the Commissioner under this sub-section shall extend [and shall be deemed always to have extended] to such matters as had not been considered and decided in such appeal………” (remaining part of the Section is omitted since it is not relevant for the purpose of this case.) The appellant places reliance on Clause (c) of the Explanation and contends that the exercise undertaken by the Commissioner (J) is contrary to law. The purport of the clause is that if the order proposed to be revised by the Commissioner (J) has been the subject matter of any appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), the same shall stand excluded from the purview of exercise of power under Section 263 of the Act. Had it been a case where the registration of the appellant firm was done by the Assessing Officer on his own accord, there would not have been any occasion to discuss the legality or otherwise of the orders passed by the Commissioner (J). It is not in dispute that the Assessing Officer refused to register the firm, through his order dated 24.03.1994 and that in turn, was challenged before the Commissioner (Appeals). The appeal was allowed on 29.03.1996 and thereafter consequential orders of registration and rectification were passed. But for the order of the appellate authority, the registration would not have materialised. Once the registration is on the basis of an order passed by an appellate authority, the power of a Commissioner under Section 263 of the Act stands excluded, to that extent. In Shri Arbuda Mills Ltd (1 supra), the Supreme Court explained the purport of Clause (c). After extracting the Clause, their Lordships observed: “that the consequences of the said amendment made with retrospective effect is that the powers under Section 263 of the Act, Commissioner shall extend and shall be deemed always to have extended to such matters as had not been considered and decided in an appeal (emphasis supplied)”. It is axiomatic that if the matter has been considered and decided in an appeal, it stands excluded. Once the question of registration was the subject matter of the appeal, the same becomes stand taken out from the purview of Section 263 of the Act. On behalf of the Revenue, it is urged that the subject matter of appeal was only the question of limitation in submitting the application for registration, and the Commissioner (Appeals) did not address the other aspects such as whether the registration could have been effected, without the permission of the concerned authorities of the Excise Department. Reliance is placed upon the judgments in Bihari Lal Jaiswal (2 supra) and Swarna Bar and Restaurant (3 supra). The precedents relied upon by the learned Standing Counsel are in relation to cases where the business in intoxicants was started by individuals and the registration of firm was sought thereafter without there being any specific permission of the authorities of the excise department. The Assessing Officers refused to register the firm and the matters were pursued in hierarchy of appeals. In the instant case, however, the firm was functioning with two partners and the controversy was only about the joining of the other persons in the place of one of them. Therefore, they do not apply to the present case. The contention that the legality of the constitution or reconstitution of the firm, from the point of view of the permission from the concerned authorities of the excise department was not the subject matter of appeal, cannot be accepted. It needs to be observed that the power conferred under Section 263 of the Act is extraordinary in nature and it brings about an exception to the principle that the matters decided by the concerned authorities under an enactment, must be permitted to become final. Therefore, the provisions of that nature need to be considered strictly. Even if two views are possible as to the purport of a provision of that nature, the one which is in favour of the assessee, must be chosen. The expression used in Clause (c) viz., “subject matter” is wide, in its purport. It is not difficult to understand the scope of such expressions, in the context of enforcing an enactment. The subject matter of the order of rejection dated 24.03.1994 passed by the Assessing Officer and the appeal before the Commissioner was, the registration of the firm. That was dealt with by the Commissioner (Appeals), and the orders passed therein resulted in registration of the firm. Therefore, it can safely be held the “subject matter” of the appeal in the instant case was the registration of the firm. Once it is excluded from the purview of Section 263 of the Act, there was no basis for the Commissioner (J) to reopen that issue in exercise of power under that provision. Though the proceedings under the Act need a different and special approach, the cardinal principle that things once decided must be permitted to become final unless appealed against by the aggrieved parties, cannot be ignored totally. The business in intoxicants is from year to year. The financial and other matters are arranged in such a way that the income and expenditure for the concerned year is taken care of to the best possible extent. In case additional liability is fastened by reopening the issue after some years by which time the assessee ceases to be in the business, several complications would arise. This is not to suggest that the proceedings under the Act cannot be initiated on that ground. The effort is to only emphasise that the exercise of powers must be in a cautious and careful manner. If things which have assumed finally and orders on the basis of which the state of affairs have been arranged are permitted to be reopened, the result is not difficult to imagine. It is only when law permits in clear terms, that such a far reaching exercise can be undertaken. Further, the mere existence of power does not provide a justification for exercise thereof. The relevant facts must warrant it. More subjective the power, higher the necessity to justify it. The reasons are required to be cogent and germane to the provision. When decided on the touch stone of these principles, the exercise undertaken by the Commissioner (J) becomes untenable. Further, it is not as if that the Revenue was not without any remedy. Therefore, both the appeals are allowed and the orders passed by the Tribunal as well as the Commissioner (J), are set aside. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in these appeals shall stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. ___________________________ L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J Date:16.09.2014 Note: L.R. Copy to be marked. B/o. ks/gk HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM I.T.T.A Nos.163 OF 2003 & 189 OF 2003 COMMON JUDGMENT:- (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Challa Kodanda Ram) Inasmuch as I am unable to agree with the opinion of my learned brother Justice L. Narasimha Reddy, I venture to set out the reasons. There is a small difference of opinion in respect of the statement of facts. In that view of the matter, I would like to set out the facts as borne out by the record. 2) It is a case where original assessment order came to be passed on 24.03.1994 in relation to assessment year 1991-92 treating the assessee as a unregistered firm. On the same date, the assessing officer also refused to grant registration under Section 185(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short, ‘the Act’) and to accord the status of registered firm to the assessee. The registration was refused by the assessing officer vide its elaborate orders stating as under: “Out of 18 partners, 13 partners have appeared and they have been examined. The rest of 5 partners could not attend due to some other personal problems. The case was discussed with the Authorised Representative Sri B.V. Rao, C.A. he requested to consider the application in form No.11 filed and condone the delay in filing the application. The assessee firm ought to have filed the application in form No.11 and partnership deed in original on or before 31.3.1991. I am not satisfied that the assessee was preferred by sufficient cause infilling the application for registration in form No.11 in time. Accordingly, I am not inclined to accept the claim of the assessee for condoning the delay in filing application for registration in time. Therefore, I refuse to grant registration to the assessee-firm for the Asst. year 1991-92. The status is taken as ‘Un Regd. firm’.” 3) As against this refusal of granting of registration, the assessee filed the appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) who in turn allowed the appeal by observing as under: “5. The learned A.R., Shri B.V. Rao, Chartered Accountant, while arguing the case before me on behalf of the appellant has submitted that of late the appellant could gather evidences for filing of form No.11 along with original deed of partnership before the Asst. Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle-2, Vizag. In support, the learned A.R., has produced before me Xerox copies of form No.11 and postal receipts bearing Nos.2668 and 2669 issuing date being 19.2.1991 – one meant for submission of requisite papers to the Registrar of Firms and the other to the Asst. Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle-2, Visakhapatnam and the appellant holds A.D. for the first but not for the letter which claims to have been misplaced. From the Xerox copies of form No.11 as well as postal receipt copies of which filed before me it appears that probably both the documents were sent by Regd. Post to the Asst. Commissioner, Circle-2, Visakhapatnam. In view of such submission which was not made available before the assessing officer, I think it would be justified to issue the following instructions to the assessing officer:- a) To verify from the original postal receipts if the contention of the appellant is correct; b) If so, he may refer to the Receipt Register to see if both the documents were received and duly entered in the same; c) In case there is no entry in the Register for which the appellant normally may not be hold responsible but the circumstantial evidence may be considered to be sufficient cause for condonation of delay.” 4) Thereafter by orders dated 29.03.1996, the Assessing Officer granted registration of the firm and passed consequential orders treating the assessee as a firm. The Jurisdictional Commissioner finding the order passed by the assessing officer dated 29.03.1996 as erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue, had issued a show-cause notice dated 19.09.1996 to the appellant and others seeking to set aside the order passed under Section 185(1)(a) of the Act as well as direction to rectify the order passed under Section 154 of the Act by the Assessing Officer. By order dated 14.03.1997, the Commissioner (Appeals) found granting the status of the registered firm to the assessee as erroneous on the ground that the carrying out of the liquor business by a partnership firm is not permitted under the A.P. Excise Act, 1968 and thus granting of the status of the registered firm to the assessee would be opposed to public policy and thereby cancelled the registration granted vide order dated 29.03.1996 by the assessing officer. It has also further directed the assessing officer to make consequential assessments treating the assessee as A.O.P. The assessee had filed appeal against the order dated 14.03.1997 of the Commissioner (Appeals) passed under Section 263 of the Act to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and numbered as I.T.A.Nos.1120/Hyd/97 and 1121/Hyd/97. 5) The order of the Commissioner was assailed before the Tribunal principally raising two grounds. The first ground is that the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is erroneous since he had already decided the eligibility or otherwise of the assessee with respect to the registration of the firm. The second ground which was raised against the revision is that the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was passed after three years from the date of the original assessment order i.e., 24.03.1994. The Tribunal considered the rival submissions and taken note of the fact that there was an amendment to that effect from 01.06.1998 to Section 263 of the Act empowering the Commissioner to deal with an order of assessing officer which at earlier point of time was subject matter of the appellate order. The limitation which is being referred to has been confined to the matters which were subject matter before the appellate Commissioner and which in fact have been dealt with by the Appellate Commissioner. 6) So far as the ground of limitation is concerned, it was found to be within the limitation. The Tribunal had also referred to two judgments of the Supreme Court and one judgment of Allahabad High Court referred to in para No.8 of its order. They are: 1) Badrinarayan Kasi Prasad vs. ACIT - 128 ITR 663 2) CIT vs. Smt Durgavathi - 43 ITR 223 3) CIT vs. Amritlal Baghi Lal & Co. - 34 ITR 113 7) Aggrieved by the orders of the Tribunal, the assessee has filed the present appeals under Section 260A of the Act raising the following substantial question of law arising from the orders of the Tribunal. The question is said to be as under: “Whether on facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal is justified in upholding the order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax u/sec.263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 in terms of which the registration granted to the appellant firm was set aside, specially after the registration was granted by the assessing officer intone with the directions given by the first appellate authority.” 8) In the light of the facts narrated above, the question of law above which has been specifically raised is required to be answered. At the out set, from a query from the Bench, the assessee’s counsel had fairly submitted that consequential assessment orders have been passed by the assessing officer pursuant to the order dated 14.03.1997 of the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 263 of the Act and the assessee had not preferred appeals against the said assessment orders and as such they have become final. 9) The learned counsel for the assessee reiterated the arguments that the Commissioner (Appeals) while considering the assessee’s case under Section 185 of the Act had found that the assessee was eligible to be treated as A.O.P and thereby the issue had become final and it was not permissible to a coordinate Commissioner to review the decision which was subject matter of appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Across the Bar, he also tried to raise a ground that such registration of the firm even with respect to liquor business was not opposed to public policy and he tried to distinguish the judgment of the Supreme Court and this Court in Bihari Lal Jajswal and others vs. Commissioner of Income-tax and others[4] and Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Swarna Bar Restaurant[5]. He also further submits that the assessing officer did not raise the objection with regard to registration of the firm on the ground the same was opposed to public policy and thereby suggesting that it was permissible. He also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Shri Arbuda Mills Ltd.[6]. Further, this issue was once again dealt with by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Jayakumar B. Patil[7], by the Gujarat High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Shashi Theatre Pvt. Ltd.[8], Commissioner of Income-tax v. Paushak Ltd.,[9] and by Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Mill Stores (P) Ltd.,[10]. 10) In the light of the above facts and the law enunciated by the judicial precedents, the real question which falls for consideration for the purpose of answering the question of law raised in the present appeals is “Whether the Commissioner (Appeals) in his orders dated 12.09.1994 had dealt with in his appeal any aspect of eligibility of the appellant-assessee to be registered as a firm”. To put it in other words whether what has been considered by the Commissioner (Appeals) was the same subject matter which was infact was the subject matter considered by the Commissioner (Revision) in exercise of power under Section 263 of the Act. The order of the Assessing Officer referred to above in para No.2 and the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) referred to above in para No.3, in my opinion, would leave no manner of doubt that the issue relating to the eligibility or otherwise of the appellant to be registered as a firm with 18 persons was opposed to public policy and contrary to the Excise Law, was never an issue before the Commissioner (Appeals). The Commissioner (Appeals) was only concerned with the aspect whether the delay in filing Form-11 which would ultimately lead to grant of registration under Form-12 has been filed within the time stipulated i.e., 31.03.1991, as it is a requirement under Section 184 of the Act for granting registration of a firm if an assessee desires to be assessed as a firm. This would be clear from Sub Section (2) of Section 184 of the Act. As a matter of fact, the Commissioner (Appeals) merely directed the assessing officer to verify the aspect with respect to postal receipts which reads as under: a) To verify from the original postal receipts if the contention of the appellant is correct; b) If so, he may refer to the Receipt Register to see if both the documents were received and duly entered in the same; c) In case there is no entry in the Register for which the appellant normally may not be hold responsible but the circumstantial evidence may be considered to be sufficient cause for condonation of delay.” 11) In other words, the Commissioner (Appeals) directed the assessing officer to satisfy himself about the eligibility or otherwise of the assessee’s claim for registration and grant registration if the assessee otherwise is eligible. It cannot be said that the Commissioner (Appeals) had dealt with in any manner with regard to the eligibility or entitlement and the assessee to be registered as a firm or otherwise fulfilling the required criteria. In the light of the statutory amendment to Section 263 of the Act as effected in 1988, it was within the power of Commissioner (Appeals), which has not been disputed by the assessee’s counsel, to exercise its powers under Section 263 of the Act. It may also be mentioned that the assessee’s counsel did not contend that the order is not erroneous or prejudicial to the revenue, the only limitation on the exercise of powers by the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 263 of the Act. 12) The appellate authority considered the same subject matter. Even on merits, the appellate authority tried to distinguish the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above. So far as the matters, on merits are concerned, no arguments were advanced before the Tribunal and as such the question of considering the same here does not arise as those issues do not arise from the orders of the Tribunal which is a pre-requisite under Section 260A of the Act to consider such questions by this Court. When we considered and analysed the question of law raised in the present appeals, the main contention of the appellant is that once the Commissioner (Appeals) had directed the Assessing Officer to register the firm by setting aside the order of refusal to register the firm, the Revisional Commissioner under Section 263 of the Act, was not justified in exercising the revisional power by setting aside the registration already granted and the Tribunal erred in not interfering with the orders of the Commissioner (Revision). 13) Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in these appeals shall stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. ____________________________ CHALLA KODANDA RAM, J Date:16.09.2014 Gk/ks [1] (1998) 231 ITR 50 [2] (1996) 217 ITR 746 [3] 335 ITR 387 [4] 217 ITR 746 [5] 334 ITR 387 [6] (1998) 231 ITR 50 [7] (1999) 236 ITR 469 [8] (2001) 248 ITR 126 [9] (1997) 227 ITR 216 [10] (2002) 254 ITR 789 "