DCIT RG 7(3)(2), MUMBAI V. PIRAMAL ENTERPRISE LTD, MUMBAI

MA 143/MUM/2019

• Counselvise Citation: [2019] 118 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 1030 (ITAT-MUMBAI)
• Duration Of Justice: 11 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Miscellaneous Application
• Pronouncement Date: 15-03-2019
• Appeal Filed By: Department
• Order Result: Dismissed
• Bench Allotted: J
• Assessment Year: 2011-2012
• Appeal Filed On: 05-03-2019
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: RAJEEV GUBGOTRA
• Assessee Lawyers: ROANK DOSHI
• Keywords: Application of stay; Extension of stay
• Section: 205

Judgement Text

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL 'J' BENCH, MUMBAI BEFORE SHRI MAHAVIR SINGH, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SHRI N.K. PRADHAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER MA NO. 143/MUM/2019 (ARISING OUT OF SA NO. 453/MUM/2018) (ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2011-12) DCIT, RANGE 7(3)(2) ROOM NO. 669A, 6TH FLOOR AAYAKAR BHAVAN, M.K. ROAD MUMBAI 400020 VS. M/S. PIRAMAL ENTERPRISE LTD. PIRAMAL TOWER, GANPATRAO KADAM MARG, LOWER PAREL MUMBAI 400013 PAN AAACN4538P APPLICANT RESPONDENT APPLICANT BY: SHRI RAJEEV GUBGOTRA RESPONDENT BY: SHRI ROANK DOSHI DATE OF HEARING: 15.03.2019 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT: 15.03.2019 O R D E R PER MAHAVIR SINGH, JM BY WAY OF THIS MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION FILED BY T HE REVENUE UNDER SECTION 254(2A) OF INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 (HEREINAFTE R 'THE ACT') REQUESTING FOR RECALL OF THE STAY ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL IN STAY APPLICATION NO. 453/MUM/2018 DATED 04.12.2018. 2. THE LEARNED SR. D.R., SHRI RAJEEV GUBGOTRA STATED T HE FACT THAT THE TOTAL DEMAND INVOLVED IN THIS CASE FOR A.Y. 2011-12 IS ` 125.,42 CRORES AND THIS DEMAND HAS BEEN STAYED BY THE TRIBUNAL SIX TIM ES AND BEYOND 2 YEARS, FINALLY GRANTING 6 TH EXTENSION ON 04.12.2018. IT WAS CONTENDED BY THE LEARNED SR. D.R. THAT THE GROUND OF ADDITION MA DE BY THE AO WAS BY DISALLOWANCE UNDER SECTION 80IC OF THE ACT EMANATIN G FROM A.Y. 2008-09 WHEREIN THE ISSUE WAS DECIDED BY THE TRIBUNAL IN FA VOUR OF ASSESSEE ON JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE. FOR ASSESSMENT YEARS 2009-10, 2010-11 AND 2011-12 THE ISSUE IS PENDING ON MERIT BEFORE THE ITAT. NOW THE LEARNED D.R. STATED THAT AS PER THE 3 RD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A) OF THE ACT THE STAY BEY OND ITA NO. 143/MUM/2019 M/S. PIRAMAL ENTERPRISE LTD. 2 365 DAYS CANNOT BE GRANTED BY THE TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIBUNAL HAS NO POWER TO GRANT STAY BEYOND 356 DAYS. HENCE HE REQUE STED FOR VACATION OF STAY AFTER THE EXPIRY OF THIS PERIOD, I.E. 365 DAYS . HE STATED THAT THE TRIBUNAL HAS GRANTED STAY IN THIS CASE VIDE ORDERS AS UNDER: - SL. NO. STAY APPLICATION NO. DATE OF ORDER I 135/MUM/2016 18.03.2016 II 327/MUM/2016 16.09.2016 III 168/MUM/2017 17.03.2017 IV 415/MUM/2017 29.09.2017 V 247/MUM/2018 06.04.2018 VI 543/MUM/2018 04.12.2018 WHEN ASKED BY THE BENCH THE LEARNED D.R. COULD NOT POINT OUT ANY MISTAKE APPARENT FROM RECORD IN THE ORDER OF THE TR IBUNAL GRANTING STAY, FINALLY EXTENDING THE STAY VIDE ORDER DATED 04.12.2 018. HE ONLY REQUESTED FOR VACATION OF STAY IN VIEW OF THE 3 RD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A). FURTHER THE LEARNED D.R. RELIED ON THE REC ENT DECISION OF THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF ASIAN RESURFAC ING OF ROAD AGENCY P. LTD. AND OTHERS VS. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAT ION IN CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1375 & 1376 OF 2013, JUDGEMENT DATED 28 .03.2018. THE LEARNED SR. D.R. ARGUED THAT IN THIS CASE THE HON'B LE SUPREME COURT ORDERED THAT ALL THE CASES HELD UP DUE TO STAY ORDE R WILL AUTOMATICALLY RESTART AT THE END OF SIX MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF T HE ORDER OF THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT. BUT IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES IF THE JUDG E THINKS THAT THE STAY ORDER SHOULD CONTINUE FOR SOME MORE TIME, THE JUDGE WOULD HAVE TO OUTLINE THE REASONS IN A WRITTEN ORDER. THE SIX MON TH RULE WOULD ALSO APPLY TO ALL STAY GRANTING ORDERS GRANTED BY COURTS . IN THIS LINE THE LEARNED SR. D.R. ALSO REQUESTED FOR VACATION OF THE STAY IN THIS CASE. 3. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE ASSE SSEE, MR. RONAK DOSHI, FIRST OF ALL REFERRED TO THE 3 RD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A) OF THE ACT WHICH READS AS UNDER: - ( 2A) IN EVERY APPEAL, THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE, MAY HEAR AND DECIDE SUCH APPEAL WITHIN A PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS FROM THE END ITA NO. 143/MUM/2019 M/S. PIRAMAL ENTERPRISE LTD. 3 OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH SUCH APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) OR SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTION 253 : PROVIDED THAT THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MAY, AFTER CONSIDERING THE MERITS OF THE APPLICATION MADE BY THE ASSESSEE, PASS AN OR DER OF STAY IN ANY PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO AN APPEAL FILED UNDER SUB-S ECTION (1) OF SECTION 253 , FOR A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY DAYS FROM THE DATE OF SUCH ORDER AND THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL SHALL DISPOSE OF THE APPEAL WITHIN THE SAID PERIOD OF STAY SPECIFIED IN THAT ORDER: PROVIDED FURTHER THAT WHERE SUCH APPEAL IS NOT SO DISPOSED OF WITHIN THE SAID PERIOD OF STAY AS SPECIFIED IN THE ORDER O F STAY, THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MAY, ON AN APPLICATION MADE IN THIS BEHALF BY THE ASSESSEE AND ON BEING SATISFIED THAT THE DELAY IN DISPOSING OF THE APPEAL IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ASSESSEE, EXTEND THE PERIOD OF STAY, OR PASS AN ORDER OF STAY FOR A FURTHER PERIOD OR PERIODS AS IT THINKS FIT; SO, HOWEVER, THAT THE AGGREGATE OF THE PERIOD ORIGINALLY ALLOWED AND THE PERIOD OR PERIODS SO EXTENDED OR ALLOWED SHALL NOT, IN ANY CA SE, EXCEED THREE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIVE DAYS AND THE APPELLATE TRIBU NAL SHALL DISPOSE OF THE APPEAL WITHIN THE PERIOD OR PERIODS OF STAY SO EXTENDED OR ALLOWED: PROVIDED ALSO THAT IF SUCH APPEAL IS NOT SO DISPOSED OF WITHIN T HE PERIOD ALLOWED UNDER THE FIRST PROVISO OR THE PERIO D OR PERIODS EXTENDED OR ALLOWED UNDER THE SECOND PROVISO, WHICH SHALL NO T, IN ANY CASE, EXCEED THREE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIVE DAYS, THE ORDER OF STAY SHALL STAND VACATED AFTER THE EXPIRY OF SUCH PERIOD OR PERIODS, EVEN IF THE DELAY IN DISPOSING OF THE APPEAL IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ASSESSEE. THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE, IN VIEW OF T HIS THIRD PROVISO REFERRED TO IN THE DECISION OF THE HON'BLE DELHI HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF PEPSI FOODS (P) LTD. (2015) 376 ITR 87 (DEL) WHEREIN THE HON'BLE DELHI HIGH COURT HAS STRUCK DOWN THE EXPRESSION, EVEN IF THE DELAY IN DISPOSING OF THE APPEAL IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ASSESSEE AS BROUGHT IN BY THE LEGISLATURE IN THE SAID PROVISO. THE LEARNED COUNSE L FOR THE ASSESSEE REFERRED TO THE RELEVANT PARA 24 OF THE ORDER IN TH E CASE OF PEPSI FOODS (P) LTD. (SUPRA) WHICH READS AS UNDER: - 24. FURTHERMORE, THE PETITIONERS ARE CORRECT IN THE IR SUBMISSION THAT UNEQUALS HAVE BEEN TREATED EQUALLY. ASSESSEES WHO, AFTER HAVING OBTAINED STAY ORDERS AND BY THEIR CONDUCT DELAY THE APPEAL PROCEEDINGS, HAVE BEEN TREATED IN THE SAME MANNER I N WHICH ASSESSEES, WHO HAVE NOT, IN ANY WAY, DELAYED THE PR OCEEDINGS IN THE APPEAL. THE TWO CLASSES OF ASSESSEES ARE DISTIN CT AND CANNOT BE CLUBBED TOGETHER. THIS CLUBBING TOGETHER HAS LED TO HOSTILE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE ASSESSEES TO WHOM THE DE LAY IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE FIND TH AT THE INSERTION OF THE ITA NO. 143/MUM/2019 M/S. PIRAMAL ENTERPRISE LTD. 4 EXPRESSION - 'EVEN IF THE DELAY IN DISPOSING OF THE APPEAL IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ASSESSEE'- BY VIRTUE OF THE FIN ANCE ACT, 2008, VIOLATES THE NON- DISCRIMINATION CLAUSE OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. THE OBJECT THAT APPEALS SHOU LD BE HEARD EXPEDITIOUSLY AND THAT ASSESSES SHOULD NOT MISUSE T HE STAY ORDERS GRANTED IN THEIR FAVOUR BY ADOPTING DELAYING TACTIC S IS NOT AT ALL ACHIEVED BY THE PROVISION AS IT STANDS. ON THE CONT RARY, THE CLUBBING TOGETHER OF 'WELL BEHAVED' ASSESSES AND THOSE WHO C AUSE DELAY IN THE APPEAL PROCEEDINGS IS ITSELF VIOLATIVE OF AR TICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION AND HAS NO NEXUS OR CONNECTION WITH TH E OBJECT SOUGHT TO BE ACHIEVED. THE SAID EXPRESSION INTRODUCED BY THE FINANCE ACT, 2008 IS, THEREFORE, STRUCK DOWN AS BEING VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. THIS WOULD REVERT US TO THE POSITION OF LAW AS INTERPRETED BY THE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN NARANG OVER SEAS (SUPRA), WITH WHICH WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT. CONSEQUENTLY, WE HOLD THAT, WHERE THE DELAY IN DISPOSING OF THE APPEAL IS NOT A TTRIBUTABLE TO THE ASSESSEE, THE TRIBUNAL HAS THE POWER TO GRANT EXTEN SION OF STAY BEYOND 365 DAYS IN DESERVING CASES. THE WRIT PETITI ONS ARE ALLOWED AS ABOVE. HE FURTHER REFERRED TO THE DECISION OF THE HON'BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. TATA TELESERVICES (MAHARASHTRA) LTD. (2016) 286 CTR 336 (BOM) WHEREIN REFERRING TO THE DECISION OF THE HON'BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF PEPSI FOODS (P) LTD. (SUPRA) H AS CONSIDERED THIS ASPECT AND NOTED THAT THE HON'BLE DELHI HIGH COURT HAS STRUCK DOWN THE RELEVANT ADDITION AS SUBSTITUTED BY THE 3 RD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A) OF THE ACT WHICH IS IN ADDITION OF THE WORDS EVEN IF D ELAY IN DISPOSING OF THE APPEAL IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ASSESSEE. THE LE ARNED COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE REFERRED TO PARA 8 WHICH READS AS UNDER: - 8. IT MAY BE POINTED OUT THAT THE ONLY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE IN THE PRE-SUBSTITUTED THIRD PROVISO AND SUBSTITUTED T HIRD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A) OF THE ACT IS THE ADDITION OF THE W ORDS EVEN IF DELAY IN DISPOSING OF THE APPEAL IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO T HE ASSESSEE. THESE ADDITIONAL WORDS ADDED IN THE SUBSTITUTE THIRD PROV ISO TO SECTION 254(2A) OF THE ACT HAS BEEN STRUCK DOWN BY THE DELH I HIGH COURT IN PEPSI FOODS () LTD. V. ASSTT. CIT [2015] 376 ITR 8 7/57 TAXMANN.COM 337. THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE ALSO REFERRED TO THE DECISION OF THE HON'BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF NARANG OVE RSEAS (P) LTD. VS. ITAT (2007) 295 ITR 22 (BOM), WHICH WAS ALSO CONSID ERED BY THE HON'BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF TATA TELESERVICES (MAHARASHTRA) LTD. ITA NO. 143/MUM/2019 M/S. PIRAMAL ENTERPRISE LTD. 5 (SUPRA) IN WHICH IT WAS HELD THAT ALTHOUGH THE TRIB UNAL IS NOT A COURT, BUT IT EXERCISES JUDICIAL POWERS AND THAT THE TRIBUNAL' S POWERS TO DEAL WITH APPEALS ARE OF THE WIDEST AMPLITUDE AND HAVE IN SOM E CASES BEEN HELD SIMILAR TO AND IDENTICAL WITH THE POWERS OF AN APPE LLATE COURT UNDER THE CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908. AS REGARDS TO THE LATES T DECISION OF THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF ASIAN RESURFAC ING OF ROAD AGENCY P. LTD. (SUPRA) THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSE E RELIED ON THE HON'BLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT DECISION IN THE CASE OF O RACLE FINANCIAL SERVICES PVT. LTD. VS. DCIT IN WRIT PETITION NO. 542 OF 2019 DATED 28.02. 2019 WHEREIN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT WAS FULLY CONSIDERED AND HELD THAT THIS JUDGEMENT WILL NOT APPLY TO THE PRESENT SET OF QUASI- JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS REVENUE MATTERS BUT THE SAI D JUDGEMENT IS IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LITIGATION. THE HON'B LE BOMBAY HIGH COURT CONSIDERED THIS ISSUE VIDE PARA 4 AS UNDER: - 4. WE ARE PRIMA FACIE OF THE VIEW THAT THE REVE NUE AUTHORITIES COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR. AGAINST THE TOTAL DEMAND ARISING OUT OF THE ORDER OF ASSESSMENT OF RS. 205 CRORE, THE ASSES SING OFFICER HAS ALREADY RECOVERED A TOTAL OF RS. 140 CRORES BY NOW THROUGH DIFFERENT MEANS. THERE IS NO ALLEGATION THAT THE PETITIONER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DELAY IN DISPOSAL OF THE APPEAL BEFORE THE COMMISSI ONER. MERELY RELYING UPON THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN T HE CASE OF ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY PVT LTD (SUPRA), REVENUE AUTHORITIES NOW HELD A BELIEF THAT ANY STAY AGAINST THE RECOVERY GR ANTED WOULD AUTOMATICALLY LAPSE AFTER SIX MONTHS. THIS IS NEITH ER THE PURPORT OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT, NOR THE OBSERVAT IONS MADE IN THE SAID JUDGMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LITIGATION CAN BE IMPORTED IN PRESENT SET OF QUASI JUDICIAL PROCEEDIN GS. THE POWER OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER TO REVIEW THE SITUATION EVERY SIX MONTHS, WOULD NOT AUTHORIZED HIM TO LIFT THE STAY PREVIOUSLY GRAN TED AFTER FULL CONSIDERATION AND INSIST ON FULL PAYMENT OF TAX WIT HOUT THE ASSESSEE BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR DELAY IN DISPOSAL OF THE APPE AL OR ANY OTHER SUCH SIMILAR MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE ALSO ARGUED TH AT THERE IS NO MISTAKE APPARENT FROM RECORD IN THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL E XTENDING STAY EVEN THOUGH FIFTH TIME FOR THE REASON THAT THE REVENUE H AS NOT TAKEN UP OR NEVER ARGUED OR PRESSED THIS ISSUE AT THE TIME OF E XTENSION OF THE STAY BY THE TRIBUNAL AND HENCE MISTAKE APPARENT FROM RECORD CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTABLE AT THIS STAGE. FOR THIS THE LEARNED CO UNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE ITA NO. 143/MUM/2019 M/S. PIRAMAL ENTERPRISE LTD. 6 RELIED ON THE DECISION OF THE COORDINATE BENCH OF T HIS TRIBUNALS AMRITSAR BENCH IN THE CASE OF ACIT VS. J & K BANK LTD. (2007 ) 104 ITD 316 (ASR). 4. WE HAVE HEARD THE RIVAL CONTENTIONS AND GIVEN THROU GH THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE. WE HAVE GONE THROUGH THE SAID ORDER IN THE STAY APPLICATION NO. 453/MUM/2018 FOR A.Y. 2011 -12 DATED 04.12.2018 AND NOTED THAT THE TRIBUNAL HAS CATEGORI CALLY NOTED A FINDING OF FACT THAT APPEALS FOR ASSESSMENT YEARS 2009-10, 2010-11 AND APPEAL FOR A.Y. 2011-12 WAS FIXED FOR HEARING ON VARIOUS D ATED BUT THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED ON ACCOUNT OF WANT OF TIME OR ANY OTH ER REASON. THE ASSESSEE CANNOT BE FAULTED AT THIS STAGE OR NON-DIS POSAL OF APPEAL CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE ASSESSEE. IN TERMS OF THIS THE STAY WAS EXTENDED FOR FURTHER 180 DAYS FROM DATE OF ORDER, I.E. 04.12.201 8 AND THE APPEAL FOR A.Y. 2011-12 WAS FIXED FOR HEARING ON 31.01.2019. T HIS APPEAL WAS ADJOURNED TO 03.04.2019 DUE TO PAUCITY OF TIME AS T HE APPEAL FOR A.Y. 2009-10 WAS HEAD ON THAT VERY DAY AND THE ORDER IS RESERVED AND AWAITED AS INFORMED BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE . WE HAVE GONE THROUGH THE DECISION OF THE HON'BLE DELHI HIGH COUR T IN THE CASE PEPSI FOOD (P) LTD. (SUPRA) AND CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THA T THE HON'BLE DELHI HIGH COURT HAS STRUCK DOWN THE ADDITION OF EXPRESSION BY VIRTUE OF FINANCE ACT, 2008 BY HOLDING THE SAME AS VIOLATIVE OF NON-D ISCRIMINATORY CLAUSE OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. THE SAID E XPRESSION WAS INTRODUCED BY FINANCE ACT, 2008 AND THE EXPRESSION WAS THAT, EVEN IF THE DELAY IN DISPOSING OF THE APPEAL IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ASSESSEE, THE SAME WAS STRUCK DOWN AND THIS WAS FURTHER INTERPRETED BY THE HON'BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF NARANG OVERSEAS (P) LTD. (SUPR A). AS REGARD THE EXTENSION OF STAY BEYOND 365 DAYS THE HON'BLE BOMBA Y HIGH COURT HAS CATEGORICALLY CONSIDERED THIS DECISION IN THE CASE OF TATA TELESERVICES (MAHARASHTRA) LTD. (SUPRA) AND HELD THAT THIS COURT (HON'BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT) HAS CONSISTENTLY TAKEN A VIEW THAT THE TRIBU NAL HAS POWERS TO EXTEND STAY EVEN AFTER SUBSTITUTION OF 3 RD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A) OF THE ACT. EVEN THIS FACT IS CLEAR FROM VARIETY OF CASE L AW REFERRED TO ABOVE AND DISCUSSED ABOVE. AS REGARDS THE DECISION OF THE HON 'BLE SUPREME COURT IN ITA NO. 143/MUM/2019 M/S. PIRAMAL ENTERPRISE LTD. 7 THE CASE OF ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY P. LTD . (SUPRA) WE NOTED THAT THE CONTEXT OF THE ISSUE BEFORE THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT WAS CRIMINAL JURISDICTION REGARDING THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT AND THE CASES PENDING AT TRIAL STAGE AND THE PROCEEDINGS STAYED B Y THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT. THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN DEALT WITH BY THE HON'BL E SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY P. LTD . VIDE PARAS 36 & 37 AS UNDER: - 36. THUS, WE DECLARE THE LAW TO BE THAT ORDER FRAM ING CHARGE IS NOT PURELY AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER NOR A FINAL ORDER. JU RISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT IS NOT BARRED IRRESPECTIVE OF THE LABEL OF A PETITION, BE IT UNDER SECTIONS 397 OR 482 CR.P.C. OR ARTICLE 227 OF THE C ONSTITUTION. HOWEVER, THE SAID JURISDICTION IS TO BE EXERCISED C ONSISTENT WITH THE LEGISLATIVE POLICY TO ENSURE EXPEDITIOUS DISPOSAL O F A TRIAL WITHOUT THE SAME BEING IN ANY MANNER HAMPERED. THUS CONSIDERED, THE CHALLENGE TO AN ORDER OF CHARGE SHOULD BE ENTERTAINED IN A RA REST OF RARE CASE ONLY TO CORRECT A PATENT ERROR OF JURISDICTION AND NOT TO RE-APPRECIATE THE MATTER. EVEN WHERE SUCH CHALLENGE IS ENTERTAINE D AND STAY IS GRANTED, THE MATTER MUST BE DECIDED ON DAY-TO-DAY B ASIS SO THAT STAY DOES NOT OPERATE FOR AN UNDULY LONG PERIOD. THOUGH NO MANDATORY TIME LIMIT MAY BE FIXED, THE DECISION MAY NOT EXCEE D TWO-THREE MONTHS NORMALLY. IF IT REMAINS PENDING LONGER, DURATION OF STAY SHOULD NOT EXCEED SIX MONTHS, UNLESS EXTENSION IS GRANTED BY A SPECIFIC SPEAKING ORDER, AS ALREADY INDICATED. MANDATE OF SPEEDY JUST ICE 37 APPLIES TO THE PC ACT CASES AS WELL AS OTHER CASES WHERE AT TR IAL STAGE PROCEEDINGS ARE STAYED BY THE HIGHER COURT I.E. THE HIGH COURT OR A COURT BELOW THE HIGH COURT, AS THE CASE MAY BE. IN ALL PENDING MATTERS BEFORE THE HIGH COURTS OR OTHER COURTS RELA TING TO PC ACT OR ALL OTHER CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASES, WHERE STAY OF PROCEE DINGS IN A PENDING TRIAL IS OPERATING, STAY WILL AUTOMATICALLY LAPSE A FTER SIX MONTHS FROM TODAY UNLESS EXTENDED BY A SPEAKING ORDER ON ABOVE PARAMETERS. SAME COURSE MAY ALSO BE ADOPTED BY CIVIL AND CRIMIN AL APPELLATE/ REVISIONAL COURTS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE HIG H COURTS. THE TRIAL COURTS MAY, ON EXPIRY OF ABOVE PERIOD, RESUME THE P ROCEEDINGS WITHOUT WAITING FOR ANY OTHER INTIMATION UNLESS EXP RESS ORDER EXTENDING STAY IS PRODUCED. 37. THE HIGH COURTS MAY ALSO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT AND MONITOR THE SAME SO THAT CIVIL OR CRIMINAL PROCEEDI NGS DO NOT REMAIN PENDING FOR UNDULY PERIOD AT THE TRIAL STAGE. THIS WAS ALSO CONFRONTED TO THE LEARNED SR. D.R., W HERE THEY HAVE RAISED THE ISSUE OF EXCEEDING 365 DAYS BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL AT THE TIME OF EXTENSION OF THE SAY VIDE ORDER DATED 04.12.2018, T HE LEARNED SR. D.R. ITA NO. 143/MUM/2019 M/S. PIRAMAL ENTERPRISE LTD. 8 COULD NOT REPLY TO THE SAME. WE NOTED THAT THIS JUD GEMENT OF HON'BLE SUPREME COURT WILL NOT HELP THE REVENUE FOR THE REA SON THAT EVEN THE LEGISLATURE IN THIS PROVISION OF SECTION 254(2A) IN TRODUCED THIRD PROVISO VIDE FINANCE ACT, 2008 AND ALLOWED THE PERIOD FOR G RANTING OF STAY NOT EXCEEDING 365 DAYS IN NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES. HENCE T HE LEGISLATURE WAS CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT THERE ARE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE STAY HAS TO BE GRANTED BEYOND SIX MONTHS AS THE FACTS REQUIRES IN THE EXCEPTIONAL CASES. WE HAVE GONE THROUGH THE SAID ORDER AND NOTICED THA T NO SUCH PLEA WAS PLACED BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL AT THE TIME OF HEARING O R FROM RECORD WE COULD NOT TRACE SUCH ARGUMENTS OR PLEA. HENCE TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, WE ARE OF THE VIEW THAT TH E HON'BLE HIGH COURT HAS STRUCK DOWN THE EXPRESSION, EVEN IF THE DELAY IN DISPOSING OF THE APPEAL IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ASSESSEE AS SUBS TITUTED BY 3 RD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A) OF THE ACT AND TAKEN A VIEW THAT TH E TRIBUNAL HAS POWER TO EXTEND STAY EVEN BEYOND 365 DAYS AND EVEN AFTER THE SUBSTITUTION OF 3 RD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A) OF THE ACT. HENCE, RESPE CTFULLY FOLLOWING THE ABOVE REFERRED DECISIONS, DISCUSSING LEGAL POSITION S, WE DISMISS THIS MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION OF THE REVENUE. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 15 TH MARCH, 2019. SD/ - SD/ - (N.K. PRADHAN) (MAHAVIR SINGH) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER MUMBAI, DATED: 15 TH MARCH, 2019 COPY TO: 1. THE APPELLANT 2. THE RESPONDENT 3. THE CIT(A) -CONCERNED, MUMBAI 4. THE CIT - CONCERNED, MUMBAI 5. THE DR, J BENCH, ITAT, MUMBAI BY ORDER //TRUE COPY// ASSISTANT REGISTRAR ITAT, MUMBAI BENCHES, MUMBAI N.P.