DY CIT CIRCLE- 12(4), BANGALORE V. THOMSON REUTERS INDIAN SERVICE PVT LTD., BANGALORE

MA 165/MUM/2019

• Counselvise Citation: [2020] 110 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 5707 (ITAT-MUMBAI)
• Duration Of Justice: 10 month(s) 25 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Miscellaneous Application
• Pronouncement Date: 31-01-2020
• Appeal Filed By: Department
• Order Result: Dismissed
• Bench Allotted: J
• Assessment Year: 2009-2010
• Appeal Filed On: 06-03-2019
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: SATYA PINISETTY
• Assessee Lawyers: ANUSKA MEHTA
• Keywords: Application of stay
• Section: 251; 22

Judgement Text

M.A. NOS.165 & 166/MUM/2019 (ARISING OUT OF S.A. NOS.458 & 459/MUM/2018) ACIT - 13(3)(2) VS. M/S THOMSON REUTERS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES PVT. LTD. 1 THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL J BENCH, MUMBAI BEFORE SHRI SHAMIM YAHYA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND SHRI RAVISH SOOD, JUDICIAL MEMBER M.A. NOS. 165 & 166/MUM/2019 (ARISING OUT OF S.A. NOS.458 & 459 /MUM/2018 ) (ASSESSMENT YEARS: 2009 - 10 & 2010 - 11 ) ASST. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX - 13(3)(2), ROOM NO. 219/229, 2 ND FLOOR, AAYAKAR BHAVAN, M.K. ROAD, MUMBAI 400 020 VS. M/S THOMSON REUTERS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES PVT. LTD. (SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO M/S THOMSON REUTERS INDIA SERVICES PVT. LTD.) PRISM TOWER, A WING, 8 TH FLOOR, MINDSPACE, OFF NEW LINK ROAD,GOREGAON (W) MUMBAI 4000 62 PAN AAACW1663L (APPLICANT) (RESPONDENT) APPLICANT BY: SHRI SATYA PINISETTY, D .R RESPONDENT BY: SHRI ANUSKA MEHTA, A .R DATE OF HEARING: 22 .11.2019 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT: 31 .01.2020 O R D E R PER RAVISH SOOD, JM: THE PRESENT MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATIONS FILED BY THE REVENUE ON 06.03.2019 ARISES FROM THE RESPECTIVE ORDERS PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL IN THE CASE OF M/S THOMSON REAL ESTATE INTERNATIONA L SERVICES (P) LTD. (SUCCESSOR I N INTEREST TO THOMSON REUTERS INDIA SERVICES PVT. LTD) VS. DCIT, CIRCLE - 12(4), MUMBAI IN S.A. NOS. 458 & 459/MUM/2018, DATED 16.11.2018. 2. IN THE COURSE OF THE HEARING OF THE APPLICATION IT WAS SUBMITTED BY THE LD. DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTATIVE (FOR SHORT D.R ), THAT STAY ON THE RECOVERY OF THE OUTSTANDING DEMAND WAS EARLIER GRANTED BY THE TRIBUNAL VIDE ITS RESPECTIVE ORDERS DATED 06.04.2018 F OR THE AFOREMENTIONED YEARS I.E A.Y. 2009 - 10 AND A.Y. 2010 - 11 FOR A PERIOD OF 180 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF ITS ORDER. ON THE EXPIRY OF THE AFORESAID PERIOD, AS THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE HAD NOT BEEN M.A. NOS.165 & 166/MUM/2019 (ARISING OUT OF S.A. NOS.458 & 459/MUM/2018) ACIT - 13(3)(2) VS. M/S THOMSON REUTERS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES PVT. LTD. 2 DISPOSED, THEREFORE, IT WAS SUBMITTED BY THE LD. D.R THAT T HE TRIBUNAL VIDE ITS ORDER DATED 16.11.2018 HAD EXTENDED THE STAY FOR A FURTHER PERIOD OF 180 DAYS OR TILL THE DISPOSAL OF THE APPEAL, WHICHEVER WAS EARLIER. IT WAS SUBMITTED BY THE LD. D.R THAT AS THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE HAD NOT BEEN DISPOSED OFF, THER EFORE, THERE WAS EVERY LIKELIHO OD THAT THE ASSESSEE WOULD MOVE ANOTHER APPLICATION SEEKING STAY ON THE RECOVERY OF THE OUTSTANDING DEMAND BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL. IT WAS THE CLAIM OF THE LD. D.R THAT AS PER PROVISO 4 AND PROVISO 5 OF SEC.254 OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961, THE PERIOD FOR ANY STAY ORDER WAS NOT TO EXCEED IN ANY CASE A PERIOD OF 365 DAYS, WITHIN WHICH THE APPEAL IS REQUIRED TO BE DISPOSED OFF. IT WAS SUBMITTED BY THE LD. D.R THAT IN CASE THE APPEAL IS NOT DISPOSED OFF WITHIN THE AFORESAID PERIOD AND THE STAY PERIOD EXCEEDS 365 DAYS, THEN THE STAY ORDER SHALL STAND VACATED AFTER T HE EXPIRY OF THE AFORESAID PERIOD. ON THE BASIS OF HIS AFORESAID CONTENTIONS, IT WAS SUBMITTED BY THE LD. D.R THAT THE STAY GRANTED BY THE TRIBUNAL TO THE AFOREMENTIONED ASSESSEE MAY BE VACATED. IN SUPP ORT OF HIS AFORESAID CONTENTION THE LD. D.R HAD RELIED UPON THE JUDGMENT OF THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF M/S ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY PVT. LTD. & AN R. VS. CBI [CR. A. NOS.1375 - 1376 OF 2013]. 3. PER CONTRA, THE LD. AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE (FOR SHORT A.R) FOR THE ASSESSEE SUBMITTED THAT THE TRIBUNAL IS DULY VESTED WITH THE POWER TO GRANT STAY BEYOND A PERIOD OF 365 DAYS. IN ORDER TO DRIV E HOME HIS AFORESAID CONTENTION , THE LD. A.R RELIED ON THE JUDGMENT OF THE HONBLE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. TATA TELE SERVICES (MAHARA SHTRA) LTD. AGAINST [81 TAXMAN.COM 348]. ALSO, RELIANCE WAS PLACED ON THE JUDGEMENT OF THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF DCIT VS. PEPSI FOOD PVT. LTD. [79 TAXMAN.COM 251 (SC)]. 4. WE HAVE HEARD THE AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES FOR BOTH THE PARTIES, PE RUSED THE RECORDS AND GIVEN A THOUGHTFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE ISSUE BEFORE US. ON A PERUSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE HONBLE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. TATA TELE SERVICES (MAHARASHTRA) LTD. [81 TAXMAN.COM 348], WE FIND , THAT THE HONBLE JURI SDICTIONAL HIGH COURT HAD OBSERVED THAT THE TRIBUNAL HAS THE POWER UNDER THE ACT TO EXTEND THE STAY OF DEMAND IN AN APPEAL PENDING BEFORE IT BEYOND THE PERIOD OF 365 DAYS EVEN AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF THE 3 RD PROVISO TO SEC. 254(2A) OF THE ACT. IT WAS OBSERVED BY THE HONBLE HIGH COURT, AS UNDER : 6. UPON CAREFUL CONSIDERATION WE MAY GAINFULLY REFER TO THE DECISION OF HONOURABLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF TATA TELE SERVICES(SUPRA). IN THIS CASE LAW HONBLE M.A. NOS.165 & 166/MUM/2019 (ARISING OUT OF S.A. NOS.458 & 459/MUM/2018) ACIT - 13(3)(2) VS. M/S THOMSON REUTERS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES PVT. LTD. 3 JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT HAS HELD THAT TRIBUNAL HAS POWER UNDER THE ACT TO EXTEND THE STAY OF DEMAND IN AN APPEAL PENDING BEFORE IT BEYOND THE PERIOD OF 365 DAYS EVEN AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF 3RD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A). 7. IN THIS REGARD WE MAY GAINFULLY REFER TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE ABOVE ORDER. THE SAME READS AS UNDER: 6. IN ANY CASE THE RATIO OF THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN NARANG OVERSEAS(P) LTD. (SUPRA) WOULD APPLY EVEN TO THE SUBSTITUTED THIRD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A) OF THE ACT. THE BASIS OF THE DECISION INNARANG OVERSEAS (P) LTD. (SUPRA) WAS ON THE BASIS OF THE FOLLOWING: WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE OBJECT OF THE AMENDMENT AND BEFORE ANSWERING THE ISSUE, LET US CONSIDER THE POSITION OF LAW IN THE MATTER OF GRANT OF INTERIM RELIEF BEFORE THE AMENDMENT. THE POWER TO GRANT INTERIM RELIEF HAS BEEN RECOGNISED BY THE SUPREME COURT [SEE ITO VS. M. K. MOHAMMED KUNHI (1969) 71 ITR 815 (SC)]. WE MAY GAINFULLY REPRODUCE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH: 5 M.A. NO.84/MUM/2019 STAR INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE THAT THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD HAVE LEFT THE ENTIRE MATTER TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES TO MAKE SUCH ORDERS AS THEY CHOOSE TO PASS IN EXERCISE OF UNFETTERED DISCRETION. THE ASSESSEE, AS HAS BEEN POINTED OUT BEFORE, HAS NO RIGHT TO EVEN MOVE AN APPLICATION WH EN AN APPEAL IS PENDING BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL UNDER S.220(6) AND IT IS ONLY AT THE EARLIER STAGE OF APPEAL BEFORE THE AAC THAT THE STATUTE PROVIDE FOR SUCH A MATTER BEING DEALT WITH BY THE ITO. IT IS A FIRMLY ESTABLISHED RULE THAT AN EXPRESS GRANT OF STATUTO RY POWER CARRIES WITH IT BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION THE AUTHORITY TO USE ALL REASONABLE MEANS TO MAKE SUCH GRANT EFFECTIVE (SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, THIRD EDITION, ARTS.5401AND 5402). THE POWERS WHICH HAVE BEEN CONFERRED BY S.254 ON THE TRIBUNAL WITH WIDEST POSSIBLE AMPLITUDE MUST CARRY WITH THEM BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION ALL POWERS AND DUTIES INCIDENTAL AND NECESSARY TO MAKE THE EXERCISE OF THOSE POWERS FULLY EFFECTIVE. THE SUPREME COURT WHILE DISPOSING OF THE APPEAL NOTED THAT THE TRIBUNAL IS NOT A COURT, BUT IT EXERCISES JUDICIAL POWERS AND THAT THE TRIBUNAL'S POWERS TO DEAL WITH APPEALS ARE OF THE WIDEST AMPLITUDE AND HAVE IN SOME CASES BEEN HELD SIMILAR TO AND IDENTICAL WITH THE POWERS OF AN APPELLATE COURT UNDER THE CPC. THE SUPREME COURT Q UOTED WITH APPROVAL WHAT JESSEL M.R. SAID ABOUT THE POWERS OF THE COURT OF APPEAL TO GRANT STAY IN POLINI VS. GRAY (1879) 12 CH. D. 438 AND WE QUOTE : IT APPEARS TO ME ON PRINCIPLE THAT THE COURT OUGHT TO POSSESS THAT JURISDICTION, BECAUSE THE PRINCIPLE WHICH UNDERLIES ALL ORDERS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PROPERTY PENDING LITIGATION IS THIS, THAT THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY IN THE LITIGATION, THAT IS THE ULTIMAT ELY SUCCESSFUL PARTY, IS TO REAP THE FRUITS OF THAT LITIGATION, AND NOT OBTAIN MERELY A BARREN SUCCESS. THAT PRINCIPLE, AS IT APPEARS TO ME, APPLIES AS MUCH TO THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE BEFORE THE FIRST TRIAL, AND TO THE COURT OF APPEAL BEFORE THE SECOND TRIAL, AS TO THE COURT OF LAST INSTANCE BEFORE THE HEARING OF THE FINAL APPEAL. IT WOULD, THEREFORE, BE CLEAR THAT THE POWER TO GRANT STAY OR INTERIM RELIEF HAS TO BE READ AS COEXTENSIVE WITH THE POWER TO GRANT FINAL RELIEF. THE OBJECT BEING THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF THE POWER TO GRANT INTERIM RELIEF THE FINAL RELIEF ITSELF MAY BE DEFEATE ' THIS COURT THEREAFTER FOLLOWED THE DECISION OF THE APEX COURT IN CCE VS. KUMAR COTTON MILLS(P) LTD., (2005(180) ELT 434 (SC)) AND HELD THAT M.A. NOS.165 & 166/MUM/2019 (ARISING OUT OF S.A. NOS.458 & 459/MUM/2018) ACIT - 13(3)(2) VS. M/S THOMSON REUTERS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES PVT. LTD. 4 NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRE - SUBST ITUTED THIRD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A) OF THE ACT THE TRIBUNAL CONTINUES TO HAVE POWERS TO GRANT INTERIM RELIEF. 7. IN THE ABOVE VIEW THEREFORE, THE RATIO OF THE DECISION IN NARANG OVERSEAS (P) LTD. (SUPRA) WOULD APPLY EVEN IN CASE OF SUBSTITUTED THIR D PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A) OF THE ACT. 6 M.A. NO.84/MUM/2019 STAR INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED. 8. IT MAY BE POINTED OUT THAT THE ONLY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE IN THE PRESUBSTITUTED THIRD PROVISO AND SUBSTITUTED THIRD PROVISO TO SECTION254(2A) OF THE ACT IS THE ADDITION OF THE WORDS EVEN IF DELAY IN DISPOSING OF THE APPEAL IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ASSESSEE THESE ADDITIONAL WORDS ADDED IN THE SUBSTITUTED THIRD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A) OF THE ACT HAS BEEN STRUCK DOWN BY THE DELHI HIGH COURT IN PEPSI FOODS (P ) LTD. VS. ASSTT. CIT*2015+376 ITR 87/57 TAXMANN.COM 337. 9. IN THE ABOVE VIEW, WE SEE NO REASON TO ENTERTAIN THE PETITIONS. ACCORDINGLY, PETITIONS DISMISSED. NO ORDER AS TO COSTS. ALSO, WE FIND THAT THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF DCIT VS. PE PSI FOOD PVT. LTD. [79 TAXMAN.COM 251 (SC)] HAD DISMISSED THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION THAT WAS FILED BY THE REVENUE AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT OF THE HONBLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI, WHEREIN A SIMILAR VIEW WAS ARRIVED AT. 5. ON THE BASIS OF OUR AFORESAID OBSERVATIO NS, WE ARE OF THE CONSIDERED VIEW THAT THE TRIBUNAL IS DULY VESTED WITH THE POWER TO GRANT EXTENSION OF THE STAY ON THE RECOVERY OF THE OUTSTANDING DEMAND BEYOND A PERIOD OF 365 DAYS IN DESERVING CASES. AS REGARDS THE JUDGMENT OF THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY PVT. LTD. & ANR. VS. CBI [CR. A. NOS. 1375 - 1376 OF 2013], WE FIND THAT THE SAME WAS RENDERED IN AN ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT CONTEXT. ON A PERUSAL OF THE AFORESAID DECISION OF THE HONBLE APEX COURT, WE FIND, THA T THE SAME WAS RENDERED IN CONTEXT OF THE STAY PROCEEDINGS UNDER SEC. 19 OF THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988. IN FACT, THE HONBLE APEX COURT HAD RENDERED THE AFORESAID DECISION IN CONTEXT OF THE POWERS OF THE HIGH COURTS IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 226 AND ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. IN THE AFORESAID CASE, IT WAS OBSERVED BY THE HONBLE APEX COURT, AS UNDER : 36. THUS, WE DECLARE THE LAW TO BE THAT ORDER FRAMING CHARGE IS NOT PURELY AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER NOR A FINAL ORDER. JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT IS NOT BARRED IRRESPECTIVE OF THE LABEL OF A PETITION, BE IT UNDER SECTIONS 397 OR 482 CR. P.C. OR ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION. HOWEVER, THE SAID JURISDICTION IS TO BE EXERCISED CONSISTENT WITH THE LEGISLA TIVE POLICY TO ENSURE EXPEDITIOUS DISPOSAL OF A TRIAL WITHOUT THE SAME BEING IN ANY MANNER HAMPERED. THUS CONSIDERED, THE CHALLENGE TO AN ORDER OF CHARGE SHOULD BE ENTERTAINED IN A RAREST OF RARE CASE ONLY TO CORRECT A PATENT ERROR OF JURISDICTION AND NOT TO RE - APPRECIATE THE MATTER. EVEN WHERE SUCH CHALLENGE IS ENTERTAINED AND STAY IS GRANTED, THE MATTER MUST BE DECIDED ON DAY - TO - DAY BASIS SO THAT STAY DOES NOT OPERATE FOR AN UNDULY LONG PERIOD. THOUGH NO MANDATORY TIME LIMIT MAY BE FIXED, THE DECISION MAY NOT EXCEED TWO - THREE MONTHS NORMALLY. IF IT REMAINS PENDING LONGER, DURATION OF STAY SHOULD NOT EXCEED SIX MONTHS, UNLESS EXTENSION IS M.A. NOS.165 & 166/MUM/2019 (ARISING OUT OF S.A. NOS.458 & 459/MUM/2018) ACIT - 13(3)(2) VS. M/S THOMSON REUTERS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES PVT. LTD. 5 GRANTED BY A SPECIFIC SPEAKING ORDER, AS ALREADY INDICATED. MANDATE OF SPEEDY JUSTICE APPLIES TO THE PC ACT CASES AS WEL L AS OTHER CASES WHERE AT TRIAL STAGE PROCEEDINGS ARE STAYED BY THE HIGHER COURT I.E. THE HIGH COURT OR A COURT BELOW THE HIGH COURT, AS THE CASE MAY BE. IN ALL PENDING MATTERS BEFORE THE HIGH COURTS OR OTHER COURTS RELATING TO PC ACT OR ALL OTHER CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASES, WHERE STAY OF PROCEEDINGS IN A PENDING TRIAL IS OPERATING, STAY WILL AUTOMATICALLY LAPSE AFTER SIX MONTHS FROM TODAY UNLESS EXTENDED BY A SPEAKING ORDER ON ABOVE PARAMETERS. SAME COURSE MAY ALSO BE ADOPTED BY CIVIL AND CRIMINAL APPELLATE/R EVISIONAL COURTS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURTS. THE TRIAL COURTS MAY, ON EXPIRY OF ABOVE PERIOD, RESUME THE PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT WAITING FOR ANY OTHER INTIMATION UNLESS EXPRESS ORDER EXTENDING STAY IS PRODUCED. 37. THE HIGH COURTS MAY ALSO ISS UE INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT AND MONITOR THE SAME SO THAT CIVIL OR CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS DO NOT REMAIN PENDING FOR UNDULY PERIOD AT THE TRIAL STAGE. 6. IN THE BACKDROP OF OUR AFORESAID OBSERVATIONS, WE ARE OF A STRONG CONVICTION THAT THE PROCEEDINGS BEF ORE THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL WHICH ARE REGULATED UNDER SEC. 254 OF THE ACT CANNOT BE EQUATED WITH A CIVIL OR A CRIMINAL PR OCEEDINGS PENDING AT THE TRIAL STAGE. WE SHALL NOW ADVERT TO THE REASONING GIVEN BY THE TRIBUNAL WHILE GRANTING THE STAY ON T HE RECOVERY OF THE OUTSTANDING DEMAND, VIDE ITS LATEST ORDER DATED 16.11.2018. ON A PERUS AL OF THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL, WE FIND THAT THE ASSESSEE WAS EARLIER GRANTED STAY ON THE RECOVERY OF THE BALANCE OUTSTANDING DEMAND BY THE ITAT, BANGLORE, VIDE ITS O RDER DATED 06.04.2018. IN COMPLIANCE TO THE DIRECTIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL, VIZ. ITAT, BANGLORE, THE ASSESSEE HAD DULY DEPOSIT ED AN AMOUNT IN EXCESS OF 50% O F THE TOTAL OUTSTANDING DEMAND. A LTHOUGH, THE HEARING OF THE APPEAL WAS FIXED BEFORE THE ITAT, BANGLORE ON 07.05.2018, HOWEVER, AS THE APPEALS WERE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING TRANSFERRED TO THE ITAT, MUMBAI, THEREFORE, A DIRECTION WAS GIVEN BY THE ITAT, BANG A LORE TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS OF TRANSFER OF APPEAL BY 24.05.2018. ON A PERUSAL OF THE RECORDS, WE FIND, THAT THE AFORESAID APPEALS COULD NOT BE POSTED FOR HEARING OWING TO CERTAIN PENDING INTERNAL APPROVALS. IN THE BACKDROP OF THE AFORESAID FACTS, THE TRIBUNAL HAD THEREAFTER VIDE ITS LATEST ORDER DATED 16.11.2018 EXTENDED THE STAY ON THE RECOVERY OF THE OUT STANDING DEMAND. IN SUM AND SUBSTANCE, IT CAN SAFELY BE GATHERED THAT THE HEARING OF THE CAPTIONED APPEALS HAD B EEN DELAYED FOR REASONS WHICH BY NO MEANS COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE ASSESSEE. ON BEING CONFRONTED WITH THE AFORESAID FACTUAL POSITION, THE LD. D.R. DID NOT CONTROVERT THE SAME. 7. ON THE BASIS OF OUR AFORESAID OBSERVATIONS, WE ARE OF THE CONSIDERED VIEW, THAT NO MISTAKE LIABLE FOR RECTIFICATION UNDER SEC.254(2) OF THE ACT IS DISCERNIBLE FROM THE ORDE R OF THE TRIBUNAL , DATED 16.11.2018, GRANTING STAY ON THE RECOVERY OF THE OUTSTANDING DEMAND TO THE M.A. NOS.165 & 166/MUM/2019 (ARISING OUT OF S.A. NOS.458 & 459/MUM/2018) ACIT - 13(3)(2) VS. M/S THOMSON REUTERS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES PVT. LTD. 6 ASSESSEE. ACCORDINGLY, FINDING NO MERIT IN THE AFORESAID APPLICATION FILED BY THE REVENUE, WE DISMISS THE SAME. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 31 . 01 .2020 SD/ - SD/ - (SHAMIM YAHYA) (RAVISH SOOD) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER MUMBAI ; DATED: 31 /01/2020 ROHIT, P.S. COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO : 1. THE APPELLANT 2. THE RESPONDENT. 3. THE CIT(A) - 4. CIT 5. DR, ITAT, MUMBAI 6. GUARD FILE . BY ORDER, //TRUE COPY// (SR. PRIVATE SECRETARY) ITAT, MUMBAI