ADDL CIT RG 5(1), MUMBAI V. M/S.MONDELEZ INDIA FOODS PRIVATE LIMITED (FORMERLY KNOWN AS M/S.CADBURY INDIA LTD, MUMBAI

MA 182/MUM/2019

• Counselvise Citation: [2019] 117 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 5648 (ITAT-MUMBAI)
• Duration Of Justice: 2 month(s) 8 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Miscellaneous Application
• Pronouncement Date: 15-05-2019
• Appeal Filed By: Department
• Order Result: Dismissed
• Bench Allotted: D
• Assessment Year: 2008-2009
• Appeal Filed On: 07-03-2019
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: ABHI RA MA KARTIKIYEN
• Assessee Lawyers: JASMINE AMALSADVALA
• Keywords: Application of stay; Extension of stay
• Section: 205

Judgement Text

T HE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL J BENCH, MUMBAI BEFORE SHRI SHAMIM YAHYA ( A M) & SHRI RAMLAL NEGI ( J M) M.A. NO. 182/MUM/2019 ARISING OUT S .A. NO. 581 /MUM/ 2018 (ASSESSMENT YEAR 20 08 - 09 ) M.A. NO. 183/MUM/2019 ARISING OUT S.A. NO. 582/MUM/2018 (AS SESSMENT YEAR 2009 - 10) M.A. NO. 184/MUM/2019 ARISING OUT S.A. NO. 583/MUM/2018 (ASSESSMENT YEAR 2010 - 11) M.A. NO. 185/MUM/2019 ARISING OUT S.A NO. 584/MUM/2018 (ASSESSMENT YEAR 2011 - 12) M.A. NO. 186/MUM/2019 ARISING OUT S.A NO. 58 5 /MUM/2018 (AS SESSMENT YEAR 20 12 - 13 ) M.A. NO. 18 7 /MUM/2019 ARISING OUT S.A NO. 58 6 /MUM/2018 (ASSESSMENT YEAR 20 13 - 1 4 ) DCIT/ACIT - 5(1)(2) AAYAKAR BHAVAN M.K. ROAD MUMBAI - 400 020. V S . MONDELEZ INDIA FOODS P. LTD. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS CADBURY INDIA LTD.) UNIT NO. 2001, 20 TH FLOOR TOWER 3 (WING - C), INDIA BULLS FINANCE CENTRE, PAREL, MUMBAI - 400 013. PAN : AAACC0460H ( APPELLANT ) ( RESPONDENT ) ASSESSEE BY SHRI NISHANT THAKKAR & MS. JASMINE AMALSADVALA DEPARTMENT BY SHRI ABHI RAMA KARTIKIYEN DATE OF HEARING 10 .5 . 201 9 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT 15 . 5 . 201 9 O R D E R PER SHAMIM YAHYA (AM) : BY WAY OF THE S E MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATIONS THE REVENUE HAS FILED APPLICATION S U/S. 254(2) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 ('THE ACT 1 FOR SHORT) 2 AGAINST STAY GRANTED BY THIS TRI BUNAL BY A COMMON ORDER TO THE ASSESSEE IN S.A. NOS. 581 TO 587/MUM/2018. 2. THE REVENUES GRIEVANCE IS THAT ITAT HAS EXCEEDED IS JURISDICTION IN GRANTING STAY BEYOND 365 DAYS IN THIS CASE WHICH IS NOT PERMISSIBLE IN VIEW OF 3 RD PROVISO TO SECTION 254 (2) (A) . IN THIS REGARD RELIANCE HAS BEEN PLACED UPON HONBLE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT DECISION IN THE CASE OF ECOM GILL COFFEE TRADING PVT. LTD. FURTHER RELIANCE HAS BEEN PLACED UPON HONBLE APEX COURT DECISION IN THE CASE OF ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY PVT.LTD . ANR. VS. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. 4. PER CONTRA LD. COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE SUBMITTED THAT ITAT HAS POWERS TO GRANTED STAY BEYOND 365 DAYS. HE SUBMITTED THAT THIS ISSUE IS DECIDED BY HONOURABLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS T ATA T ELESERVICES (MAHARASHTRA) LTD. (81. TAXMANN.COM 348). HE SUBMITTED THAT THIS DECISION WAS RENDERED AFTER DUE CONSIDERATION OF THE INTRODUCTION OF 3RD PROVISO TO 254(2A). HE FURTHER SUBMITTED THAT THIS ISSUE IS ALSO FULLY COVERED ALSO BY HONBLE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN THE CASE OF DCIT VS. PEPSI FOODS PVT.LTD, 79 TAXMANN.COM 251 (SC) 5. HE FURTHER SUBMITTED THAT SUPREME COURT DECISION REFERRED BY THE REVENUE IS RENDERED ON A TOTALLY DIFFERENT CONTEXT AND HENCE THE SAME IS NOT APPLICABLE ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE. 6. UPON CAREFUL CONSIDERATION WE MAY GAINFULLY REFER TO THE DECISION OF HONOURABLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF TATA TELE S ERVICES(SUPRA). IN THIS CASE LAW HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT HAS HELD THAT TRIBUNAL HAS POWER UNDER THE ACT TO EXTEND THE STAY OF DEMAND IN AN APPEAL PENDING BEFORE IT BEYOND THE PERIOD OF 365 DAYS EVEN AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF 3RD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A). 3 7. IN THIS REGARD WE MAY GAINFULLY REFER TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE ABOVE ORDER. THE SAME READS AS UNDER: 6.IN ANY CASE THE RATIO OF THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN NARANG OVERSEAS(P) LTD. (SUPRA) WOULD APPLY EVEN TO THE SUBSTITUTED THIRD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A) OF THE ACT. THE BASIS OF THE DECISION INNARANG OVERSEAS (P) LTD. (SUPRA) WAS ON THE BASIS OF T HE FOLLOWING: WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE OBJECT OF THE AMENDMENT AND BEFORE ANSWERING THE ISSUE, LET US CONSIDER THE POSITION OF LAW IN THE MATTER OF GRANT OF INTERIM RELIEF BEFORE THE AMENDMENT. THE POWER TO GRANT INTERIM RELIEF HAS BEEN RECOGN ISED BY THE SUPREME COURT [SEE ITO VS. M.K.MOHAMMED KUNHI (1969) 71 ITR 815 (SC)]. WE MAY GAINFULLY REPRODUCE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH: IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE THAT THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD HAVE LEFT THE ENTIRE MATTER TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES T O MAKE SUCH ORDERS AS THEY CHOOSE TO PASS IN EXERCISE OF UNFETTERED DISCRETION. THE ASSESSEE, AS HAS BEEN POINTED OUT BEFORE, HAS NO RIGHT TO EVEN MOVE AN APPLICATION WHEN AN APPEAL IS PENDING BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL UNDER S.220(6) AND IT IS ONLY AT THE EARLIE R STAGE OF APPEAL BEFORE THE AAC THAT THE STATUTE PROVIDE FOR SUCH A MATTER BEING DEALT WITH BY THE ITO. IT IS A FIRMLY ESTABLISHED RULE THAT AN EXPRESS GRANT OF STATUTORY POWER CARRIES WITH IT BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION THE AUTHORITY TO USE ALL REASONABLE M EANS TO MAKE SUCH GRANT EFFECTIVE (SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, THIRD EDITION, ARTS.5401AND 5402). THE POWERS WHICH HAVE BEEN CONFERRED BY S.254 ON THE TRIBUNAL WITH WIDEST POSSIBLE AMPLITUDE MUST CARRY WITH THEM BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION ALL POWERS AND DUTIES INCIDENTAL AND NECESSARY TO MAKE THE EXERCISE OF THOSE POWERS FULLY EFFECTIVE. THE SUPREME COURT WHILE DISPOSING OF THE APPEAL NOTEDTHAT THE TRIBUNAL IS NOT A COURT, B UT IT EXERCISES JUDICIAL POWERS AND THAT THE TRIBUNAL'S POWERS TO DEAL WIT H APPEALS ARE OF THE WIDEST AMPLITUDE AND HAVE IN SOME CASES BEEN HELD SIMILAR TO AND IDENT ICAL WITH THE POWERS OF AN APPELLATE COURT UNDER THE CPC. THE SUPREME COURTQUOTED WITH APPROVAL WHAT JESSEL M.R. SAID ABOUT THE POWERS OF THE COURT OF APPEAL TO GRA NT STAY IN POLINI VS.GRAY (1879) 12 CH.D. 438 AND WE QUOTE : IT APPEARS TO ME ON PRINCIPLE THAT THE COURT OUGHT TO POSSESS THAT JURISDICTION, BE CAUSE THE PRINCIPLE WHICH UNDERLIES ALL ORDERS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PROPERTY PENDING LITIGATION IS THIS, THAT THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY IN THE LITIGATION, THAT IS THE ULTIMATELY SUCCESSFUL PARTY, IS TO REAP THE FRUITS OF THAT LITIGATION, AND NOT OBTAIN M ERELY A BARREN SUCCESS. THAT PRINCIPLE, AS IT APPEARS TO ME, APPLIES AS MUCH TO THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE BEFO RE THE FIRST TRIAL, AND TO THE COURT OF APPEAL BEFORE THE SECOND TRIAL, AS TO THE COURT OF LAST INSTANCE BEFORE 4 THE HEARING OF THE FINAL APPEAL. IT WOULD, THEREFORE, BE CLEAR THAT THE POWER TO GRANT STAY OR INTERIM RELIEF HAS TO BE READ AS COEXTENSIVE WIT H THE POWER TO GRANT FINAL REL IEF. THE OBJECT BEING THAT IN T HE ABSENCE OF THE POWER TO GRANT INTERIM RELIEF THE FINAL RELIEF ITSELF MAY BE DEFEATE' THIS COURT THEREAFTER FOLLOWED THE DECISION OF THE APEX COURT IN CCE VS. KUMAR COTTON MILLS(P) LTD., (2005 (180) ELT 434 (SC)) AND HELD THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRE - SUBSTITUTED THIRD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A) OF THE ACT THE TRIBUNAL CONTINUES TO HAVE POWERS TO GRANT INTERIM RELIEF. 7. IN THE ABOVE VIEW THEREFORE, THE RATIO OF THE DECISION IN NARANG OVERSEAS ( P) LTD. (SUPRA) WOULD APPLY EVEN IN CASE OF SUBSTITUTED THIRD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A) OF THE ACT 8.IT MAY BE POINTED OUT THAT THE ONLY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE IN THE PRESUBSTITUTED THIRD PROVISO AND SUBSTITUTED THIRD PROVISO TO SECTION254(2A) OF THE AC T IS THE ADDITION OF THE WORDS EVEN IF DELAY IN DISPOSING OF THE APPEAL IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ASSESSEE THESE ADDITIONAL WORDS ADDED IN THE SUBSTITUTED THIRD PROVISO TO SECTION 254(2A) OF THE ACT HAS BEEN STRUCK DOWN BY THE DELHI HIGH COURT IN PEPSI FOODS (P) LTD. VS. ASSTT. CIT[2015]376 ITR 87/57 TAXMANN.COM 337. 9.IN THE ABOVE VIEW, WE SEE NO REASON TO ENTERTAIN THE PETITIONS. ACCORDINGLY, PETITIONS DISMISSED. NO ORDER AS TO COSTS . 8. FURTHERMORE WE NOTE THAT HONBLE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF PEPSI FOOD PVT.LTD (SUPRA) HAS DISMISSED THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION AGAINST HONBLE DELHI HIGH COURT DECISION REFERRED ABOVE 9. IN VIEW OF THE AFORESAID DECISION HONOURABLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT AND THE ABOVE DECISION OF HONBLE SUPREME COURT WE ARE OF THE CONSIDERED OPINION THAT ITAT HAS POWER TO GRANT EXTENSION OF THE STAY BEYOND 365 DAYS IN DESERVING CASE IT. THE REVENUES CASE IS NOT AT ALL OXYGENATED BY THE DECISION OF HONBLE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT REFERRED BY THEM AS ABOVE IN VIEW OF HONBLE JURI SDICTIONAL HIGH COURT AS ABOVE. 10. AS REGARDS THE DECISION OF HONBLE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY PVT.LTD (SUPRA), WE AGREE WITH THE LD. COUNSEL OF THE ASSESSEE THE SAID DECISION WAS REFERRED ON A TO TALLY DIFFERENT CONTEXT AND CAN NOT BE TAKEN AS A BASIS FOR FILING AN APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 254 (2) BEFORE THE ITAT AS IN THE PRESENT CASE. IT IS TRITE THAT CASE LAW HAS TO BE APPLIED CONSIDERING THE FACTS OF THE CASE ON WHICH IT WAS RENDERED. THE ABOVE SAID 5 DECISION OF HONB LE APEX COURT WAS RENDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF STAY PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 19 OF THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988. THE HONBLE APEX COURT HAS RENDERED THE ABOVE DECISION IN THE CONTEXT OF SUPERIOR CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS NAMELY THE HIGH COURTS POWERS IN TERMS OF ARTICLE 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION. 11. WE MAY GAINFULLY REFER TO THE CONCLUDING PORTION WH ICH ACCORDING TO REVENUE MAY HAVE RELEVANCE HERE: 36. THUS, WE DECLARE THE LAW TO BE THAT ORDER FRAMING CHARGE IS NOT PURELY AN INTERLOCUTORY OR DER NOR A FINAL ORDER. JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT IS NOT BARRED IRRESPECTIVE OF THE LABEL OF A PETITION, BE IT UNDER SECTIONS 397 OR 482 CR. P.C. OR ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION. HOWEVER, THE SAID JURISDICTION IS TO BE EXERCISED CONSISTENT WITH THE LEGISLATIVE POLICY TO ENSURE EXPEDITIOUS DISPOSAL OF A TRIAL WITHOUT THE SAME BEING IN ANY MANNER HAMPERED. THUS CONSIDERED, THE CHALLENGE TO AN ORDER OF CHARGE SHOULD BE ENTERTAINED IN A RAREST OF RARE CASE ONLY TO CORRECT A PATENT ERROR OF JURISDICTION A ND NOT TO RE - APPRECIATE THE MATTER. EVEN WHERE SUCH CHALLENGE IS ENTERTAINED AND STAY IS GRANTED, THE MATTER MUST BE DECIDED ON DAY - TO - DAY BASIS SO THAT STAY DOES NOT OPERATE FOR AN UNDULY LONG PERIOD. THOUGH NO MANDATORY TIME LIMIT MAY BE FIXED, THE DECIS ION MAY NOT EXCEED TWO - THREE MONTHS NORMALLY. IF IT REMAINS PENDING LONGER, DURATION OF STAY SHOULD NOT EXCEED SIX MONTHS, UNLESS EXTENSION IS GRANTED BY A SPECIFIC SPEAKING ORDER, AS ALREADY INDICATED. MANDATE OF SPEEDY JUSTICE APPLIES TO THE PC ACT CASES AS WELL AS OTHER CASES WHERE AT TRIAL STAGE PROCEEDINGS ARE STAYED BY THE HIGHER COURT I.E. THE HIGH COURT OR A COURT BELOW THE HIGH COURT, AS THE CASE MAY BE. IN ALL PENDING MATTERS BEFORE THE HIGH COURTS OR OTHER COURTS RELATING TO PC ACT OR ALL OTHER C IVIL OR CRIMINAL CASES, WHERE STAY OF PROCEEDINGS IN A PENDING TRIAL IS OPERATING, STAY WILL AUTOMATICALLY LAPSE AFTER SIX MONTHS FROM TODAY UNLESS EXTENDED BY A SPEAKING ORDER ON ABOVE PARAMETERS. SAME COURSE MAY ALSO BE ADOPTED BY CIVIL AND CRIMINAL APPE LLATE/REVISIONAL COURTS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURTS. THE TRIAL COURTS MAY, ON EXPIRY OF ABOVE PERIOD, RESUME THE PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT WAITING FOR ANY OTHER INTIMATION UNLESS EXPRESS ORDER EXTENDING STAY IS PRODUCED. 37. THE HIGH COURTS MAY A LSO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT AND MONITOR THE SAME SO THAT CIVIL OR CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS DO NOT REMAIN PENDING FOR UNDULY PERIOD AT THE TRIAL STAGE . 12. IN OUR CONSIDER OPINION THE INCOME TAX PROCEEDINGS AT THE ITAT U/S 254 OF THE ACT CANNOT BE E QUATED WITH A CIVIL OR CRIMINAL PROCEEDING PENDING AT THE 6 TRIAL STAGE. IN THIS REGARD WE WILL ALSO REFER DECISION IN THE CASE OF ORACLE FINANCE SERVICES SOFTWARE LTD. VS. DCIT OF HON'BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN W.P NO. 542 OF 2019 VIDE ORDER DATED 28.2.2019. HON'BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT HAS DISTINGUISHED THE DECISION OF HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF ASIAN RESURFING OF ROAD AGENCY PVT. LTD. VS. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND HELD AS UNDER : - 4. WE ARE PRIMA FACIE OF THE VIEW THAT THE REVENUE AUTHORITI ES COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR. AGAINST THE TOTAL DEMAND ARISING OUT OF THE ORDER OF ASSESSMENT OF RS. 205 CRORE, THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAS ALREADY RECOVERED A TOTAL OF RS. 140 CRORES BY NOW THROUGH DIFFERENT MEANS. THERE IS NO ALLEGATION THAT THE PETITIONER I S RESPONSIBLE FOR DELAY IN DISPOSAL OF THE APPEAL BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER. MERELY RELYING UPON THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY PVT LTD (SUPRA), REVENUE AUTHORITIES NOW HELD A BELIEF THAT ANY STAY AGAINST TH E RECOVERY GRANTED WOULD AUTOMATICALLY LAPSE AFTER SIX MONTHS. THIS IS NEITHER THE PURPORT OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT, NOR THE OBSERVATIONS MADE IN THE SAID JUDGMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LITIGATION CAN BE IMPORTED IN PRESENT SET O F QUASI JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. THE POWER OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER TO REVIEW THE SITUATION EVERY SIX MONTHS, WOULD NOT AUTHORIZED HIM TO LIFT THE STAY PREVIOUSLY GRANTED AFTER FULL CONSIDERATION AND INSIST ON FULL PAYMENT OF TAX WITHOUT THE ASSESSEE BEING RE SPONSIBLE FOR DELAY IN DISPOSAL OF THE APPEAL OR ANY OTHER SUCH SIMILAR MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. 13. IN ANY CASE, THE ABOVE CASE PROVIDES THAT STAY SHOULD BE EXTENDED ONLY BY A SPECIFIC SPEAKING ORDER. 14 . NOW LET US EXAMINING THE STAY ORDER G RANTED BY THE ITAT VIDE THE LATEST STAY ORDER. THIS IS AS UNDER: 1. THE PRESENT STAY APPLICATION IS FILED BY THE ASSESSEE FOR EXTENSION OF STAY GRANTED VIDES ORDER DATED 23/03//2018 WHICH HAS EXPIRED ON 19/09/2018. 2. THE LD. SR. COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESS EE SUBMITS THAT WHEN THE STAY WAS EXTENDED ON 23/03/2018 FOR 180 DAYS OR TILL THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER WHICHEVER WAS EARLIER, THE MAIN APPEAL WAS ALREADY HEARD ON 19/01/2018, AND WAS KEPT FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER. HOWEVER, THE APPEAL WAS RELEASED ON 04 /05/2018 FOR HEARING AFRESH AND NOW FIXED FOR HEARING ON 09/10/2018. THERE IS NO DELAY ATTRIBUTED ON PART OF THE 7 ASSESSEE. THE LD. SR. COUNSEL PRAYED FOR EXTENSION OF STAY FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS OR TILL THE DISPOSAL OF APPEAL WHICHEVER IS EARLIER. 3. THE LD. DR FOR THE REVENUE HAS NOT DISPUTED THE FACTUAL CONTENTION SUBMITTED BY LD. SR. COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE ABOUT THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE FROM THE DATE OF EXTENSION OF STAY ON 23RD MARCH, 2018. THE LD. DR FOR THE REVENUE HAS NO OBJECTION I F S.A. NO.418/MUM/2018 - STAR INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED 2 THE STAY IS FURTHER EXTENDED FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTH OR TILL THE DISPOSAL OF APPEAL WHICHEVER IS EARLIER. 4. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE RIVAL CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES. WE HAVE ALSO PERUSED THE ORDER SH EET OF MAIN APPEAL. WE HAVE NOTED THAT THERE IS NO DELIBERATE DELAY ATTRIBUTABLE ON THE PART OF ASSESSEE IN DISPOSAL OF THE APPEAL. CONSIDERING THE FACT AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, WE DEEM IT APPROPRIATE TO EXTEND THE STAY OF OUTSTANDING DEMAND FOR FURT HER SIX MONTH OR TILL THE DISPOSAL OF APPEAL, WHICHEVER IS EARLIER. ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS IF ANY, IMPOSED BY THE BENCH ON EARLIER OCCASIONS, WILL REMAIN SAME. 5. AS A RESULT, THE STAY APPLICATION FILED BY THE ASSESSEE STANDS DISPOSED OFF ACCORDI NGLY. 1 5 . FROM THE ABOVE IT IS NOTED THAT THE STAY IN THE ABOVE CASE WAS GRANTED/EXTENDED ON A SPECIFIC FINDING THAT HEARING OF THE APPEAL COULD NOT TAKE PLACE AND THE DELAY WAS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ASSESSEE. THE LD. DR HAD ALSO NOT DISPUTED THE ABOVE . UPON THESE FINDINGS AND THE ADMISSIONS BY THE LD. DR THE STAY WAS GRANTED/EXTENDED. IT IS NOT THE CASE BEFORE US THAT THE RECORDING OF FACTS BY THE ITAT IN ABOVE SAID STAY ORDER IS WRONG. 1 6 . ACCORDINGLY, IN THE BACKGROUND OF THE AFORESAID DISCUSSION O F PRECEDENTS, THE SE MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION S FILED BY THE REVENUE STAND DISMISSED. ORDER HAS BE EN PRONOUNCED IN THE COURT ON 15 . 5 . 201 9 . SD/ - SD/ - (RAMLAL NEGI ) (SH A MIM YAHYA ) J U DICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER MUMBAI ; DATED : 15 / 5 / 20 1 9 COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO : 8 1. THE APPELLANT 2. THE RESPONDENT 3. THE CIT(A) 4. CIT 5. DR, ITAT, MUMBAI 6. GUARD FILE. BY ORDER, //TRUE COPY// ( ASSISTANT REG ISTRAR ) PS ITAT, MUMBAI