MA NOS.: 3 TO 26/JAB/2013 PAGE 1 OF 9 IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL JABALPUR BENCH, JABALPUR [CORAM: PRAMOD KUMAR AM AND C M GARG JM] M.A. NO.03/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.124/JAB/2009) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2007-08 M.A. NO.04/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.591/JAB/1996) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 1994-95 M.A. NO.05/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.472/JAB/1996) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 1995-96 M.A. NO.06/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.303/JAB/2006) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 1999-2000 M.A. NO.07/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.200/JAB/2009) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2007-08 M.A. NO.08/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.258/JAB/2004) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 1997-98 M.A. NO.09/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.257/JAB/2004) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 1996-97 M.A. NO.10/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.08/JAB/2007) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 1998-99 M.A. NO.11/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.305/JAB/2006) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2003-04 M.A. NO.12/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.265/JAB/2000) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 1997-98 M.A. NO.13/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.228/JAB/2005) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 1998-99 MA NOS.: 3 TO 26/JAB/2013 PAGE 2 OF 9 M.A. NO.14/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.229/JAB/2005) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2002-2003 M.A. NO.15/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.230/JAB/2005) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2002-03 M.A. NO.16/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.177/JAB/2004) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 1998-99 M.A. NO.17/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.211/JAB/2008) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2006-07 M.A. NO.18/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.256/JAB/2004) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 1995-96 M.A. NO.19/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.175/JAB/2004) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 1997-98 M.A. NO.20/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.199/JAB/2009) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2006-07 M.A. NO.21/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.88/JAB/2008) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2005-06 M.A. NO.22/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.168/JAB/2007) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2004-05 M.A. NO.23/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.20/JAB/2007) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 1997-98 M.A. NO.24/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.314/JAB/2006) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2003-04 M.A. NO.25/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.259/JAB/2004) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2000-01 MA NOS.: 3 TO 26/JAB/2013 PAGE 3 OF 9 M.A. NO.26/JAB/2014 (IN ITA NO.260/JAB/2004) ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2001-02 ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CIRCLE 2 (1), JABALPUR ...APPELLANT VS. NORTHERN COALFIELD LIMITED .RESPO NDENT SINGRAULI, MADHYA PRADESH [PAN NO. PAN AABCN 4884 H] APPEARANCES BY: DR HARSHVARDHINI BUTY, AND MUNMUM SHARMA FOR THE APPLICANT H S SRIVASTAVA, FOR THE RESPONDENT DATE OF CONCLUDING THE HEARING : SEPTEMBER 26 , 2 014 DATE OF PRONOUNCING THE ORDER : SEPTEMBER 26 , 2014 O R D E R PER BENCH 1. ALL THESE TWENTY FOUR MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATIONS INVOLVE A COMMON POINT, ARISING OUT OF SAME SET OF FACTS AND WERE HE ARD TOGETHER. AS A MATTER OF CONVENIENCE, THEREFORE, ALL THESE APPLICA TIONS ARE BEING DISPOSED OF BY WAY OF THIS CONSOLIDATED ORDER. 2. THE APPLICANT BEFORE US IS THE ASSESSING OFFICER OF THE RESPONDENT ASSESSEE - IS A PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKING. IN ACCOR DANCE WITH HONBLE SUPREME COURTS JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF ONGC VS COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE (104 CTR 31) , THE APPLICANT WAS REQUIRED TO A CLEARANCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISPUTES IN CABINET SECRETARIAT (COD) IN RESPECT OF THE RELATED APPEALS, FILED AGAINST THE ORDERS OF THE CO MMISSIONERS (APPEALS), FILED BEFORE THIS TRIBUNAL. AS THE APPLICANT COULD NOT OBTAIN THESE MA NOS.: 3 TO 26/JAB/2013 PAGE 4 OF 9 CLEARANCES, THE APPEALS FILED BY THE APPLICANT WERE DISMISSED IN LIMINE FOR WANT OF THIS CLEARANCE AND IN TERMS OF HONBLE SUPR EME COURTS DIRECTIONS. THE APPLICANT SUBMITS THAT NOW THAT THI S REQUIREMENT FOR COD CLEARANCE HAS BEEN DISPENSED WITH BY HONBLE SUPREM E COURTS LATER JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF ELECTRONICS CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD VS UNION OF INDIA (332 ITR 58) , ALL THESE APPEALS MAY BE REVIVED BY RECALLING THE SUMMARY ORDERS PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL. 3. LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT VERY GRACIOUS LY DOES NOT OPPOSE THESE RECALL APPLICATIONS AND STATES THAT TH E ENDS OF JUSTICE WILL INDEED BE MET BY RECALLING THE ORDERS PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL SUMMARILY DISMISSING THESE APPEALS. HE ALSO POINTS OUT THAT E VEN THOUGH SOME OF THESE APPLICATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE AFTER THE END OF TIME LIMIT SET OUT IN SECTION 254(2A) BUT AS THE IMPUGNED ORDERS ARE ADMI TTEDLY CONTRARY TO THE LAW LAID DOWN BY HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN THE C ASE OF ELECTRONICS CORP (SUPRA), THIS TIME LIMIT SHOULD NOT COME IN TH E WAY OF THESE RECALL APPLICATIONS BEING ALLOWED. 4. WE FIND THAT A COORDINATE BENCH IN THE CASE OF COAL INDIA LIMITED VS ACIT (MA NO. 50/KOL/2011; ORDER DATED 28 TH DECEMBER, 2012), WHEREIN THE COORDINATE BENCH HAS, INTER ALIA, OBSER VED AS FOLLOWS: . IT IS NOT IN DISPUTE THAT IN VIEW OF HONBLE SUPREM E COURTS SUBSEQUENT JUDGMENT, IN THE CASE OF ELECTRONIC CORP ORATION OF INDIA LTD. VS.- UNION OF INDIA (332 ITR 58), SUCH A CLEARANCE IS NOT NECESSARY. IN THE SAID JUDGMENT, HONBLE SUPREM E COURT HAS, INTER ALIA, OBSERVED AS FOLLOWS:- LEARNED ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS SUBMITTED THAT THE AB OVE ORDERS HAVE OUTLIVED THEIR UTILITY AND IN VIEW OF T HE CHANGED SCENARIO, AS INDICATED HEREINAFTER, THE AFO RESTATED ORDERS ARE REQUIRED TO BE RECALLED. WE FIND MERIT I N THE SUBMISSION MADE BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIA ON BEHALF OF THE UNION OF INDIA FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS. BY ORDER DATED 11.09.1991, REPORTED IN 1992 SUPP (2) SCC 432 (ONGC AND ANR. V. CCE) THIS COURT NOTED THAT PUBLIC SECT OR UNDERTAKINGS OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE UNION OF INDIA SHOULD NOT FIGHT THEIR LITIGATIONS IN COURT. CONSE QUENTLY, MA NOS.: 3 TO 26/JAB/2013 PAGE 5 OF 9 THE CABINET SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WAS CAL LED UPON TO HANDLE THE MATTER PERSONALLY. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY THE ORDER DATED 11.10.1991 IN ONGC. II CASE (SUPRA) WHERE THIS COURT DIRECTED THE GOVERNME NT OF INDIA TO SET UP A COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF REPRESEN TATIVES FROM THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, BUREAU OF PUBLIC ENT ERPRISES AND MINISTRY OF LAW, TO MONITOR DISPUTES BETWEEN MI NISTRY AND MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY AND P UBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS BETWEEN THEMSELVES, TO ENSURE T HAT NO LITIGATION COMES TO COURT OR TO A TRIBUNAL WITHOUT THE MATTER HAVING BEEN FIRST EXAMINED BY THE COMMITTEE AND ITS CLEARANCE FOR LITIGATION. THEREAFTER, IN ONGC-III CASE (SUPRA), THIS COURT DI RECTED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF CLEARANCE FROM THE COMMITTE E OF SECRETARIES(COS), ANY LEGAL PROCEEDING WILL NOT BE PROCEEDED WITH. THIS WAS SUBJECT TO THE RIDER THAT APPEALS AND PETITIONS FILED WITHOUT SUCH CLEARANCE COULD BE FILED TO SAVE LIMITATION. IT WAS, HOWEVER, DIRECTED THAT THE NEEDFUL SHOULD BE DONE WITHIN ONE MONTH FROM SUCH FILING, F AILING WHICH THE MATTER WOULD NOT BE PROCEEDED WITH. BY AN OTHER ORDER DATED 20.07.2007 (ONGC-IV CASE) THIS COURT EX TENDED THE CONCEPT OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY HIGH POWERED COMMITTEE TO AMICABLY RESOLVE THE DISPUTES INVOLVIN G THE STATE GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR INSTRUMENTALITIES. THE IDEA BEHIND SETTING UP OF THIS COMMITTEE, INITI ALLY, CALLED A HIGH-POWERED COMMITTEE (HPC), LATER ON C ALLED AS COMMITTEE OF SECRETARIES (COS) AND FINALLY TER MED AS COMMITTEE ON DISPUTES(COD) WAS TO ENSURE THAT RESOURCES OF THE STATES ARE NOT FRITTERED AWAY IN I NTER SE LITIGATIONS BETWEEN ENTITIES OF THE STATE, WHICH CO ULD BE BEST RESOLVED, BY AN EMPOWERED COD. THE MACHINERY CONTEMPLATED WAS ONLY TO ENSURE THAT NO LITIGATION COMES TO COURT WITHOUT THE PARTIES HAVING HAD AN OPPORTUN ITY OF CONCILIATION BEFORE AN IN-HOUSE COMMITTEE. [PARA 3 OF THE ORDER DATED 7.1.1994 (SUPRA)] WHILST THE PRINCIPLE AND THE OBJECT BEHIND THE AFORESTATED ORDERS IS UNEXCEPTION ABLE AND LAUDATORY, EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT DESPITE BE ST EFFORTS OF THE COD, THE MECHANISM HAS NOT ACHIEVED THE RESULTS FOR WHICH IT WAS CONSTITUTED AND HAS IN FAC T LED TO DELAYS IN LITIGATION. WE HAVE ALREADY GIVEN TWO EXA MPLES HEREINABOVE. THEY INDICATE THAT ON SAME SET OF FACT S, CLEARANCE IS GIVEN IN ONE CASE AND REFUSED IN THE O THER. THIS HAS LED A PSU TO INSTITUTE A SLP IN THIS COURT ON THE GROUND OF DISCRIMINATION. WE NEED NOT MULTIPLY SUCH MA NOS.: 3 TO 26/JAB/2013 PAGE 6 OF 9 ILLUSTRATIONS. THE MECHANISM WAS SET UP WITH A LAUD ATORY OBJECT. HOWEVER, THE MECHANISM HAS LED TO DELAY IN FILING OF CIVIL APPEALS CAUSING LOSS OF REVENUE. FOR EXAMPLE, IN MANY CASES OF EXEMPTIONS, THE INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT GIVES EXEMPTION, WHILE THE SAME IS DENIED BY THE REVENUE DEPARTMENT. SIMILARLY, WITH THE ENACTMENT OF REGULA TORY LAWS IN SEVERAL CASES THERE COULD BE OVERLAPPING OF JURISDICTIONS BETWEEN, LET US SAY, SEBI AND INSURAN CE REGULATORS. CIVIL APPEALS LIE TO THIS COURT. STAKES IN SUCH CASES ARE HUGE. ONE CANNOT POSSIBLY EXPECT TIMELY CLEARANCE BY COD. IN SUCH CASES, GRANT OF CLEARANCE TO ONE AND NOT TO THE OTHER MAY RESULT IN GENERATION OF MO RE AND MORE LITIGATION. THE MECHANISM HAS OUTLIVED ITS UTI LITY. IN THE CHANGED SCENARIO INDICATED ABOVE, WE ARE OF THE VIEW THAT TIME HAS COME UNDER THE ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCES TO RECALL THE DIRECTIONS OF THIS COURT IN ITS VARIOUS ORDERS REPORTED AS (I) 1995 SUPP (4) SCC 541 DATED 11.10.1991, (II) (2004) 6 SCC 437 DATED 7.1.1994 AND (III) (2007) 7 SCC 39 DATED 20.07.2007. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE HEREBY RECALL THE FOLLOWIN G ORDERS REPORTED IN (I) 1995 SUPP (4) SCC 541 DATED 11.10.1991; (II) (2004) 6 SCC 437 DATED 7.1.1994; (III) (2007)( 7 SCC 39 DATED 20.07.2007.. 2. THE AFORESAID MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION HAS BEEN FILED ON 6 TH JUNE, 2011, WHEREAS THE TRIBUNALS ORDER, WHICH IS SOUGHT TO BE RECALLED, WAS PASSED ON 18 TH JANUARY, 2007. IN EFFECT, THUS THE RECTIFICATION PETITION HAS BEEN PASSED AFTER FOUR Y EARS FROM THE DATE OF RELEVANT TRIBUNALS ORDER. IT WAS IN THIS B ACKDROP THAT LEARNED COUNSELS ATTENTION WAS INVITED TO THE PROV ISIONS OF SECTION 254(2) WHICH PROVIDE FOR A LIMITED TIME FRA ME OF FOUR YEARS, FROM THE DATE OF PASSING THE ORDER, FOR AME NDING ANY ORDER TO RECTIFY ANY MISTAKE APPARENT ON RECORD. TH E ASSESSEE WAS THUS REQUIRED TO SHOW-CAUSE AS TO WHY THE MISCE LLANEOUS APPLICATION NOT BE REJECTED AS TIME BARRED. 3. WE HAVE HEARD THE RIVAL CONTENTIONS, PERUSED THE MATERIAL ON RECORD AND DULY CONSIDERED FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE IN THE LIGHT OF APPLICABLE LEGAL POSITION. 4. WE FIND THAT, AS HAS BEEN POINTED OUT BY THE LEA RNED COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE, HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT , IN THE CASE OF KHUSHALCHAND B. DAGA VS.- 4 TH INCOME TAX OFFICER (85 ITR 48), WERE IN SEISIN OF A MATERIALLY SIMILAR SITUATION, I .E. IN WHICH A COORDINATE BENCH OF THIS TRIBUNAL HAD SUMMARILY DIS MISSED AN APPEAL, WITHOUT DISMISSING MERITS OF ISSUES RAISED THEREIN, AND THE ASSESSEES APPLICATION TO RECALL THE SAID ORDER WAS RECEIVED MA NOS.: 3 TO 26/JAB/2013 PAGE 7 OF 9 BEYOND THE TIME LIMIT SET OUT IN SECTION 35 OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1922 WHICH IS IN PARI MATERIA WITH SECTION 254(2) O F THE PRESENT ACT. WE FURTHER FIND THAT, AS IN THE SAID CASE BEFO RE HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT, THE IMPUGNED ORDER HAS BEEN REND ERED ERRONEOUS BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT JUDGMENT OF HONBLE SUPREME COURT. THE SAME IS THE SITUATION BEFORE US INASMUCH AS NOW IN THE CASE OF ELECTRONICS CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. VS.- UNION OF INDIA (332 ITR 58), WHICH HOLDS THAT THE CLEARANCE OF COM MITTEE ON DISPUTES (CABINET SECRETARIAT) IS NOT MANDATORY EVE N IN CASES WHERE A PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKING APPROACHES A COUR T OR TRIBUNAL AGAINST A GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT. ACCORDING LY, THE IMPUGNED TRIBUNALS ORDER IS RENDERED ERRONEOUS BEC AUSE OF SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT. THE OBSERVATIONS MADE BY HONBLE SUPREME COURT, IN THE CASE OF KHUSHALCHAND B. DAGA (SUPRA), FACTS OF WHICH ARE MATERIALLY SIMILAR, ARE IMPORTANT IN THIS CONTEXT :- EVEN IF IT WERE ASSUMED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ARGUMEN T THAT THE TRIBUNALS ORDER DAT4D 24 TH OCTOBER, 1961, WAS NOT A NULLITY BUT AN ERRONEOUS ORDER, IN VIEW OF THE SUPR EME COURT DECISION THAT RULE 24 WAS INVALID AND ULTRA V IRES BEING REPUGNANT TO SECTION 33(4) OF THE ACT, THE TR IBUNAL, IN MY VIEW, OUGHT TO HAVE SET ASIDE THE SAID IMPUGN ED ORDER IN EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT POWERS AND SHOULD HAVE REHEARD THE APPEAL ON MERITS, WITHOUT GOING INTO TH E QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE APPLICATION FOR RECTIFIC ATION OF THE MISTAKE WAS WITHIN TIME OR NOT, FOR, AFTER ALL, NO COURT OR TRIBUNAL CAN ALLOW A PARTY TO SUFFER FOR ITS OWN MISTAKE. THAT THE COURT OR TRIBUNAL HAS SUCH INHERENT POWER TO CORRECT ITS OWN MISTAKE IS WELL-SETTLED. IN SUB-DIV ISIONAL OFFICER (COMPENSATION OFFICER), MIRZAPUR VS. RAJA S RINIVASA PRASAD SINGH, IT HAS BEEN OBSERVED BY THE SUPREME C OURT AS FOLLOWS :- EVERY COURT AND TRIBUNAL IS ENTITLED TO REOPEN A PROCEEDING WHICH HAS PROCEEDED EX PARTE, NOT BECAU SE A PARTY HAS FAILED TO APPEAR BUT BECAUSE A NOTICE HAS NOT BEEN SENT TO THE NECESSARY PARTY. A DECISION REACHE D BEHIND THE BACK OF A NECESSARY PARTY TO WHOM NOTICE MUST B E SENT IS NOT BINDING UPON SUCH A PARTY AND THE COURT MAY IN SUCH A CASE REOPEN THE PROCEEDING TO GIVE THE PARTY A CH ANCE TO STATE ITS CASE. THE DECISION WAS FOLLOWED BY THE ALLAHABAD HIGH COU RT IN THE CASE OF INCOME TAX OFFICER, LUCKNOW VS.- S.B. SINGAR SINGH & SONS, WHERE THE ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT HELD A S FOLLOWS:- EVEN WHEN EXPRESS POWER TO REVIEW ITS ORDERS IS NO T CONFERRED BY A STATUTE, A COURT OR A TRIBUNAL HAS I NHERENT MA NOS.: 3 TO 26/JAB/2013 PAGE 8 OF 9 JURISDICTION TO RECTIFY A WRONG COMMITTED BY ITSELF WHEN THAT WRONG CAUSES PREJUDICE TO A PARTY FOR WHICH TH AT PARTY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE. IT IS TRUE THAT IN THE PRESENT CASE THE PETITIONER OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE DID NOT REMAIN PRESENT ON 24 TH OCTOBER, 1961, IN SPITE OF NOTICE HAVING BEEN SERVED UPON HI M BUT THAT IS BESIDE THE POINT. ON THAT DAY IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL FOR DEFAULT OF APPEARANCE THE TRIBUNAL UNDOU BTEDLY COMMITTED A MISTAKE AS ACCORDING TO THE SUPREME COU RT THE TRIBUNAL HAD NO POWER TO DO SO BUT IT WAS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO DECIDE THE APPEAL ON MERITS UNDER SEC TION 33(4) AND THAT MISTAKE ON THE PART OF THE TRIBUNAL WOULD OBVIOUSLY CAUSE SERIOUS PREJUDICE TO THE PETITIONER IN THE MATTER OF PROSECUTING EFFICIENTLY THE FURTHER REMED IES BY WAY OF REFERENCE TO THE HIGH COURT AND AN APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT. IN MY VIEW, THEREFORE, THE TRIBUNAL OUGHT TO HAVE DIRECTED THE APPEAL TO BE REHEARD ON MERITS, E VEN ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PREVIOUS ORDER DATED 24 TH OCTOBER, 1961, WAS AN ERRONEOUS ORDER OR AN ORDER CONTAINING AN ER ROR APPARENT ON THE FACT OF THE ORDER. 5. THE ABOVE OBSERVATIONS, IN OUR HUMBLE UNDERSTAND ING, ARE EQUALLY APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE AS CRUCIAL F ACTS ARE IN PARI MATERIA. NO CONTRARY DECISION HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO O UR NOTICE. THE IMPUGNED ORDER, THEREFORE, INDEED DESERVES TO B E RECALLED EVEN THOUGH THE ASSESSEE HAS MOVED THE MISCELLANEOU S APPLICATION AFTER THE EXPIRY OF TIME LIMIT SET OUT IN SECTION 254(2) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961. 6. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSIONS, AND HAVING REG ARD TO THE FACT THAT THE IMPUGNED TRIBUNALS ORDER HAS BEEN RE NDERED ERRONEOUS BY THE SUBSEQUENT JUDGMENT OF HONBLE SUP REME COURT INASMUCH AS IT IS NOT CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR US FO R ENTERTAINING AN INCOME-TAX APPEAL FILED BY A PUBLIC SECTOR UNDER TAKING TO SATISFY OURSELVES THAT CLEARANCE OF THE COMMITTEE O N DISPUTES (CABINET SECRETARIAT) HAS BEEN OBTAINED, WE DEEM IT FIT AND PROPER TO RECALL THE ORDER DATED 18.01.2007 PASSED BY US AND DIRECT THE REGISTRY TO FIX IT FOR HEARING ON MERITS , AT THE SOONEST. WE ORDER SO. 5. WE HAVE NOTED THAT EVEN THOUGH SOME OF THE APPLI CATIONS ARE INDEED MADE WELL BEYOND EXPIRY OF FOUR YEARS FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE RELATED ORDERS ARE PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL, IN VIEW OF THE C ONCESSION SO GRACIOUSLY MADE BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL AND IN VIEW OF THE AFORESAID DECISION OF THE COORDINATE MA NOS.: 3 TO 26/JAB/2013 PAGE 9 OF 9 BENCH IN THE CASE OF COAL INDIA LTD (SUPRA), THE TI ME LIMIT SET OUT IN SECTION 254(2A) WILL NOT COME IN THE WAY OF THESE ORDERS BE ING RECALLED. 6. FOR THE REASONS SET OUT ABOVE, WE DEEM IT FIT AN D PROPER TO RECALL ALL THE RELATED ORDERS OF THE TRIBUNAL AS SET OUT ABOVE, DI SMISSING THE APPEALS FOR WANT OF COD CLEARANCE, AND DIRECT THE REGISTRY TO FIX TH ESE APPEALS, ALONGWITH OTHER APPEALS PERTAINING TO THIS ASSESSEE, AT AN EARLY DA TE. WE ORDER SO. 7. IN THE RESULT, ALL THE ABOVE TWENTY FOUR MISCELL ANEOUS APPLICATIONS ARE ALLOWED IN THE TERMS INDICATED ABOVE. IT WAS SO PRO NOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT IMMEDIATELY UPON CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING. SD/- SD/- C M GARG PRAMOD KUMAR (JUDICIAL MEMBER) (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER) DATED: THE 26TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2014 COPIES TO: (1) THE APPELLANT (2) THE RESPOND ENT (3) COMMISSIONER (4) CIT(A) (5) DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTATIVE (6) GUARD FILE BY ORDER ETC INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL JABALPUR BENCH, JABALPUR