Paresh Dhanji Chedda, Hyderabad, Hyderabad V. DCIT, (Asst), Special Range-2, Hyderabad, Hyderabad

MA 99/HYD/2015

• Counselvise Citation: [2016] 124 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 4494 (ITAT-HYDERABAD)
• Duration Of Justice: 11 month(s) 9 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Miscellaneous Application
• Pronouncement Date: 15-07-2016
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Dismissed
• Bench Allotted: A
• Next Hearing Date: 10-06-2016
• Assessment Year: misc
• Appeal Filed On: 06-08-2015
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: ALL
• Keywords: Period of limitation; Reasonable cause; Right to appeal; Condonation of delay
• Section: 260A

Judgement Text

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL HYDERABAD BENCHES A : HYDERABAD BEFORE SHRI D. MANMOHAN, VICE PRESIDET AND SHRI S. RIFAUR RAHMAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER M.A.NO.99/HYD/2015 ARISING OUT OF IT(SS)A.NO.54/HYD/1996 - BLOCK PERIOD 1985-86 TO 19 95-96 MR. PA RESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD. PAN/GIR NO.D704 VS. DCIT (ASST.) SPECIAL RANGE - 2, HYDERABAD. (APPLICANT) (RESPONDENT) M.A.NO.100/HYD/2015 ARISING OUT OF ITA.NO.684/HYD/2000 - ASSESSMENT YEAR 1996-97 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD. PAN/GIR NO.D704 VS. DCIT (ASST.) SPECIAL RANGE - 2, HYDERABAD. (APPLICANT) (RESPONDENT) M.A.NO.101/HYD/2015 ARISING OUT OF IT(SS)A.NO.55/HYD/1996 - BLOCK PERIOD 1985-86 TO 1 995-96 MR. DHANJI RAMJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD. PAN/GIR NO.J711 VS. DCIT (ASST.) SPECIA L RANGE - 2, HYDERABAD. (APPLICANT) (RESPONDENT) M.A.NO.102/HYD/2015 ARISING OUT OF ITA.NO.685/HYD/2000 - ASSESSMENT YEAR 1996-97 MR. DHANJI RAMJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD. PAN/GIR NO.J711 VS. DCIT (ASST.) SPECIAL RANGE - 2, HYDERABAD. (APPLICANT) (RESPO NDENT) 2 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. M.A.NO.103/HYD/2015 ARISING OUT OF IT(SS)A.NO.92/HYD/1997 BLOCK PERIOD 1985-86 TO 1995-96 M/S. MAHAVEER MARKETING HYDERABAD. PAN/GIR NO.M309 VS. DCIT (ASST.) SPECIAL RANGE - 2, HYDERABAD. (APPLICANT) (RESPONDENT) M.A.NO.104/HYD/2015 ARISING OUT OF ITA.NO.160/HYD/1997 ASSESSMENT YEAR 1993-94 M/S. MAHAVEER MARKETING HYDERABAD. PAN/GIR NO.M309 VS. DCIT (ASST.) SPECIAL RANGE - 2, HYDERABAD. (APPLICANT) (RESPONDENT) M.A.NO.105/HYD/2015 ARISING OUT OF IT(SS)A.NO.93/HYD/1997 - BLOCK PERIOD 1985-86 TO 1995-96 M/S. MAHAVEER COMBINES P. LTD., HYDERABAD. PAN/GIR NO.M1 VS. DCIT (ASST.) SPECIAL RANGE - 2, HYDERABAD. (APPLICANT) (RESPONDENT) M.A.NO.106/HYD/2015 ARISING OUT OF ITA.NO.273/HYD/2002 ASSESSMENT YEAR 1997-98 M/S. MAHAVEER COMBINES P. LTD., HYDERABAD. PAN/GIR NO.M1 VS. DCIT (ASST.) SPECIAL RANGE - 2, HYDERABAD. (APPLICANT) (RESPONDENT) 3 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. M.A.NO.107/HYD/2015 ARISING OUT OF IT(SS)A.NO.94/HYD/1997 BLOCK PERIOD 1985-86 TO 1995-96 M/S. UNIQUE FINANCE & LEASE P. LTD., HYDERABAD. PAN/GIR NO.U6 VS. DCIT (ASST.) SPECIAL RANGE - 2, HYDERABAD. (APPLICANT) (RESPONDENT) M.A.NO.108/HYD/2015 ARISING OUT OF ITA.NO.161/HYD/1997 ASSESSMENT YEAR 1993-94 M/S. UNIQUE PLASTICS P. LTD., HYDERABAD. PAN/GIR NO.U5 VS. DCIT (ASST.) SPECIAL RANGE - 2, HYDERABAD. (APPLICANT) (RESPONDENT) M.A.NO.109/HYD/2015 ARISING OUT OF IT(SS)A.NO.182/HYD/1997 BLOCK PERIOD 1994-95 TO 1995-96 M/S. UNIQUE PLASTICS LTD., HYDERABAD. PAN/GIR NO.U5 VS. DCIT (ASST.) SPECIAL RANGE - 2, HYDERABAD. (APPLICANT) (RESPONDENT) M.A.NO.110/HYD/2015 ARISING OUT OF ITA.NO.336/HYD/2001 ASSESSMENT YEAR 1995-96 M/S. UNIQUE PLASTICS LTD., HYDERABAD. PAN/GIR NO.U5 VS. DCIT (ASST.) SPECIAL RANGE - 2, HYDERABAD. (APPLICANT) (RESPONDENT) 4 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. M.A.NO.111/HYD/2015 ARISING OUT OF ITA.NO.337/HYD/2001 ASSESSMENT YEAR 1996-97 M/S. UNIQUE PLASTICS LTD., HYDERABAD. PAN/GIR NO.U5 VS. DCIT (ASST.) SPECIAL RANGE - 2, HYDERABAD. (APPLICANT) (RESPONDENT) M.A.NO.112/HYD/2015 ARISING OUT OF IT(SS)A.NO.91/HYD/1997 BLOCK PERIOD 1985-86 TO 1995-96 M/S. UNIQUE PLASTICS LTD., HYDERABAD. PAN/GIR NO.U5 VS. DCIT (ASST.) SPECIAL RANGE - 2, HYDERABAD. (APPLICANT) (RESPONDENT) NOTE : ONLY GIR NO. IS AVAILABLE FOR ALL THE ASSES SEES. FOR APPLICANT : MR. SNEHAL THAKKAR FOR REVENUE : MR. M. SITARAM DATE OF HEARING : 10.06.2016 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 15 .07.2016 ORDER PER D. MANMOHAN, V.P. ALL THESE APPLICATIONS WERE FILED AT THE INSTANCE OF THE ASSESSEE. AT THE OUTSET, IT MAY BE NOTICED THAT AS PER THE LAW EXISTING AT THE RELEVANT POINT OF TIME, A M.A. HAS TO BE FILED WITHIN 04 YEARS FROM THE DATE THE TRIBUNAL PASSES A N ORDER. IN THESE MATTERS, M.AS ARE FILED BEYOND THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION AND UNLIKE APPEAL PROCEEDINGS THERE IS NO PROVISION TO CONDONE THE 5 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. DELAY. THEREFORE, THE LIMITED ISSUE BEFORE US IS WH ETHER THE M.AS ARE BARRED BY LIMITATION OR NOT ? IF THEY ARE TREAT ED AS BARRED BY LIMITATION, AUTOMATICALLY THESE M.AS DESERVE TO BE DISMISSED AS UN-ADMITTED. 2. HOWEVER, THE CASE OF THE LD. COUNSEL FOR THE AS SESSEE IS THAT THOUGH THE APPEALS ARE DISPOSED OF BY THE T RIBUNAL THE ORDER PASSED THEREIN CANNOT BE TREATED AS AN ORDER PASSED UNDER LAW INASMUCH AS SECTION 254(1) MANDATES DISPOSAL OF AN APPEAL ON MERITS EVEN IF NO ONE APPEARED FOR THE ASSESSEE WHEREAS THE IMPUGNED ORDER WAS PASSED BY DISMISSING THE APPEAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION. 3. BRIEF FACTS WHICH ARE NECESSARY FOR DISPOSAL OF THESE MATTERS ARE SET-OUT HEREUNDER. THERE ARE TOTAL 17 A PPEALS OUT OF WHICH 14 APPEALS ARE FILED BY THE ASSESSEES AND THR EE APPEALS ARE FILED BY THE REVENUE. SOME OF THE APPEALS WERE FILED WAY BACK IN 1996/1997. SOON-AFTER NUMBERING THE APPEALS , MOST OF THE APPEALS WERE POSTED FOR HEARING IN 1998 AND FRO M THEN ONWARDS, ASSESSEES COUNSELS WERE SEEKING ADJOURNME NTS FROM TIME TO TIME AND ON 22.07.1998 IT WAS SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED THAT THE CASES WOULD BE ADJOURNED FINALLY ON T HE UNDERTAKING OF ASSESSEES COUNSEL THAT HE WOULD NOT BE SEEKING FURTHER ADJOURNMENTS. BUT AGAIN ON 07.08.1998, THE ASSESSEE S SOUGHT ONE MORE ADJOURNMENT AND HENCE THE BENCH ADJOURNED IT SINE DIE BUT AGAIN FROM 2007 ONWARDS APPEALS WERE POSTED FOR HEARING FROM TIME TO TIME BUT A NEW COUNSEL APPEARE D, AGAIN SEEKING ADJOURNMENTS ON SOME PRETEXT OR THE OTHER. AFTER 6 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. SUFFICIENT LAPSE OF TIME, A REQUEST WAS MADE TO CLU B DEPARTMENTAL APPEALS AND OTHER APPEALS AND ACCORDIN GLY, THE APPEALS WERE GROUPED TOGETHER. EVEN THEREAFTER, TH E CASES WERE ADJOURNED ON NUMBER OF OCCASIONS. FINALLY WHEN THE APPEALS WERE POSTED FOR HEARING ON 18.03.2008, THE BENCH RE JECTED THE REQUEST OF THE ASSESSEES FOR FURTHER ADJOURNMENT BY OBSERVING AS UNDER : . . IT IS INDEED A VERY SORRY STATE OF AFFAIRS THAT THE APPEALS, THOUGH VERY OLD, HAVE NOT BEEN DISPOSED OF YET AND FOR WHICH THE MAJOR BLAME GOES TO THE ASSESSEES THE MSELVES. THE EARLIEST APPEAL WAS FILED IN 1996 AND MOST OF T HE OTHER APPEALS ARE FILED AS BACK AS IN 1997. THE EARLIEST ASSESSMENT YEAR INVOLVED IS 1985-86, I.E. ABOUT TWE NTY TWO YEARS BACK FROM NOW. THE LACKADAISICAL APPROACH OF THE ASSESSEE LEADING TO PROCRASTINATION IS EVIDENT AT L EAST FROM TWO INSTANCES WHICH ARE IMMEDIATELY STRIKING FROM T HE RECORDS. WAY BACK IN OCTOBER. 2001, THE HONOURABLE ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT HAD DISPOSED OF A WRIT PETITION IN ONE OF THE GROUP COMPANIES (W.P.NO.15830 OF 2000 IN THE CA SE OF UNIQUE PLASTICS LTD.) DIRECTING THE TRIBUNAL TO DIS POSE OF THE APPEALS PENDING BEFORE IT EXPEDITIOUSLY, PREFERABLY WITHIN A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS. HOWEVER, THE ASSESSEES REMAIN ED UNMINDFUL OF THE DIRECTIONS OF THE HIGH COURT AND K EPT ON SEEKING ADJOURNMENTS IT IS NOT THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS NOT SOUGHT ANY ADJOURNMENT BUT THE ASSESSEES HAVE SOUGH T ADJOURNMENTS ON OVERWHELMINGLY MORE OCCASIONS. ANOT HER INSTANCE IS THAT ONE OF THE DEPARTMENTAL APPEALS IN THE CASE OF SHREE GOURAAVI PLASTICS LTD., (ITA.NO.526/HYD/06 ) WAS POSTED FOR HEARING ON 05.02.2008. ON THAT DATE, THE ASSESSEE SOUGHT ADJOURNMENT STATING THAT THE CASE O F GOURAAVI PLASTICS BE ADJOURNED TO 18.3.2008 FOR HEA RING ALONG WITH OTHER GROUP MATTERS. IN GOOD FAITH, THE BENCH GRANTED THE REQUEST. HOWEVER, ON 18.3.2008 I.E., TO DAY, 7 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. AGAIN A REQUEST HAS BEEN SENT IN FOR ADJOURNMENT AN D THE REASON STATED IS THAT THE COMPANYS MANAGING DIRECT OR AS WELL AS THE CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT ARE OUT OF STATION . IN THE PAST ALSO, MANY ADJOURNMENTS HAVE BEEN SOUGHT ON TH IS AND OTHER FLIMSY GROUNDS. ON EARLIER OCCASIONS, IT HAS BEEN STATED THAT THE CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT IS BUSY IN AUD IT WORK OR IN SOME OTHER PROFESSIONAL WORK. ALL THESE ONLY GO TO SHOW THAT BOTH, FOR THE ASSESSEES AS WELL AS THE CHARTER ED ACCOUNTANT, MATTERS PENDING BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL HAV E THE LAST PRIORITY AMONGST ALL THESE BUSINESS AND PROFES SIONAL ENGAGEMENTS AND FOR TWELVE LONG YEARS NO PRIORITY S TATUS HAS BEEN ACCORDED TO THE TRIBUNAL. AS A MATTER OF F ACT, THE LIBERAL ATTITUDE OF THE TRIBUNAL HAS BEEN TAKEN FOR GRANTED AND THE ASSESSEES ARE STILL STRETCHING IT AS FAR AS THEY CAN WITHOUT REALISING THE TOLERANCE THRESHOLD OF THE TR IBUNAL AND THE LEVEL OF ITS ELASTICITY. THUS, CONSIDERING THE HISTORY OF ADJOURNMENTS AND THE CONDUCT OF THE ASSESSEES, WE R EJECT THE REQUEST FOR ADJOURNMENT AND DISMISS ALL THE APP EALS OF ALL THE ASSESSEES FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION. 4. WHILE DISMISSING THE APPEALS FILED BY THE ASSES SEES THE TRIBUNAL OBSERVED THAT THERE WERE THREE APPEALS FILED BY THE REVENUE ALSO IN THE CASE OF MAHAVEER COMBINES P. LT D., AND UNIQUE PLASTICS P. LTD., WHEREIN THE DEPARTMENT CHA LLENGED THE DELETION OF THE ADDITION MADE ON PROTECTIVE BASIS P ARTICULARLY ON ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT THE ADDITIONS MADE ON SUBS TANTIVE BASIS ARE PENDING BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL. IN THIS REGARD, TH E TRIBUNAL OBSERVED THAT THE ASSESSEES APPEALS HAVING BEEN DI SMISSED BY UPHOLDING THE ADDITIONS MADE ON SUBSTANTIVE BASIS T HE APPEALS RELATING TO THE PROTECTIVE ADDITIONS DO NOT SURVIVE AND ON THAT GROUND THEY WERE ALSO DISMISSED WITH A RIDER THAT IF THE APPEALS OF THE ASSESSEE ARE REINSTATED BY THE TRIBUNAL, THE N THE THREE 8 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. APPEALS OF THE DEPARTMENT SHALL ALSO STAND REINSTAT ED AUTOMATICALLY. 4.1. THOUGH THE ORDERS WERE PASSED ON 18.03.2008, THE ASSESSEES HEREIN PREFERRED TO FILE M.AS ON 06.10.20 15 AFTER LAPSE OF ABOUT 07 YEARS WHEREAS THE STATUTE PERMITS AN AS SESSEE TO PREFER A M.A. WITHIN 04 YEARS. WHEN CALLED-UPON THE LD. COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEE TO EXPLAIN AS T O HOW SUCH M.AS CAN BE ADMITTED, THE LD. COUNSEL VEHEMENTLY CO NTENDED THAT THE ADJOURNMENTS GRANTED ON EARLIER OCCASIONS, FROM 1996 ONWARDS, NEED NOT BE RECONSIDERED AT THIS STAGE SIN CE THE BENCH, AT THAT POINT OF TIME, THOUGH FIT TO GRANT ADJOURNM ENTS BUT CERTAINLY FROM 2005 ONWARDS ON MOST OF THE OCCASION S EITHER THE REVENUE HAS ASKED FOR ADJOURNMENT OR THE BENCH HAS NOT FUNCTIONED AND ONLY ON TWO OCCASIONS THE ASSESSEE S OUGHT ADJOURNMENTS I.E., ON 05.03.2007 AND 22.06.2007 THA T TOO ON ACCOUNT OF ILLNESS OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GROUP OF THE COMPANIES AND ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT HE WAS FACING VARIOUS OTHER COURT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORAT E ETC., AND NON-ATTENDANCE IN SUCH CASES MIGHT HAVE RESULTED IN DETENTION OF THE APPELLANTS/DIRECTORS OF THE ASSESSEES COMPA NIES. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ASSESSEES HEREIN HAD TO SE EK ADJOURNMENT BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL AND THUS THERE WAS A REASONABLE CAUSE FOR NON-APPEARANCE ON THE DATES FI XED FOR HEARING. 4.2. PROVISIONS OF SECTION 254(2) MANDATES THAT A M.A. HAS TO BE FILED WITHIN 04 YEARS FROM THE DATE OF THE OR DER AND IN THE 9 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. ABSENCE OF ANY POWER VESTED IN THE TRIBUNAL TO COND ONE THE DELAY, NO APPLICATION IS MAINTAINABLE BEYOND 04 YEA RS. WHEN THE SAME WAS POINTED OUT TO THE LD. COUNSEL APPEARING O N BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEE, IT WAS SUBMITTED THAT THE IMPUGNED CO NSOLIDATED ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN OR DER PASSED UNDER SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT AND IN SUCH CASES, THE TIME LIMIT PRESCRIBED UNDER SECTION 254(2) DOES NOT APPLY. IN THIS REGARD, HE RELIED ON THE DECISION OF THE HONBLE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF SRI AYYANAR SPINNING & WEAVING MILLS LTD., (2008) 3 01 ITR 434 (SC). IN THE AFORECITED CASE, THE HONBLE SUPREME C OURT OBSERVED THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 254(2) CONSISTS OF T WO PARTS I.E., FIRST PART OF SECTION 254(2) REFERS TO SUO MOTU POWER OF RECTIFICATION BY THE TRIBUNAL WHEREAS THE SECOND PA RT REFERS TO RECTIFICATION AND AMENDMENT OF AN APPLICATION BEING MADE BY THE A.O. OR THE ASSESSEE POINTING OUT THE MISTAKE FROM THE RECORD. THE APPLICATION HAVING BEEN FILED WITHIN 04 YEARS, MERELY BECAUSE THE TRIBUNAL HAD TAKEN TIME TO DISPOSE OF A N APPLICATION THE HIGH COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD THAT THE APPLIC ATION FILED BY THE PARTY CANNOT BE ENTERTAINED BEYOND THE PERIOD O F 04 YEARS. THE APEX COURT ALSO APPROVED THE DECISION OF HONBL E RAJASTAN HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF HARSHAVARDHAN CHEMICAL & MINERALS LTD., VS., UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER (2002) 256 ITR 767 (RAJ.) WHEREIN THE COURT OBSERVED THAT IF AN APPLICATION I S MOVED WITHIN THE PERIOD AS ALLOWED I.E., 04 YEARS, THE TR IBUNAL MAY, AT ANY TIME, DISPOSE OF THE APPLICATION EVEN IF THE TI ME TAKEN IS BEYOND 04 YEARS. LD. COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEES SUBMITS THAT THE AFORECITED DECISIONS REF ERRED TO THE SUO MOTU POWERS OF THE TRIBUNAL TO CONSIDER THE MATTER ON M ERITS 10 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. ANY TIME EVEN AFTER THE EXPIRY OF LIMITATION OF 04 YEARS. HE ALSO SUBMITTED THAT UPON FILING AN APPEAL BEFORE THE APP ELLATE TRIBUNAL, IT IS THE DUTY OF THE TRIBUNAL TO DISPOSE OF THE APPEAL AS PER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 253 OF THE ACT BY PASSING AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WHEREAS, IN THE INSTANT CASE, THE TRIBUNAL HAD NOT PASSED A VALID ORDER SINCE IT IS IN VIOLATION O F RULE 24 OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES AND ALSO CONTRARY TO THE D ECISION OF THE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. S. CHENNIAPPA MUD ALIAR 71 ITR 41 (SC) AS WELL AS THE DECISION OF THE APEX COURT I N THE CASE OF BALAJI STEEL RE-ROLLING MILLS (CIVIL APPEAL NO.1026 5 OF 2014). IN THE SAID CASE, THE APEX COURT OBSERVED THAT THE TRI BUNAL HAS NO POWER TO DISMISS THE APPEAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION . THUS, HE CONTENDED THAT ORDER PASSED IN VIOLATION OF THE SUP REME COURT ORDER IS NON-EST IN THE EYE OF LAW WHICH CANNOT BE TAKEN FORWARD IN APPEAL BEFORE THE HIGHER AUTHORITIES AND THEREFO RE, THE ASSESSEE COULD NOT PREFER AN APPEAL BEFORE THE HIGH COURT. THUS, IT IS NOT TREATED AS AN ORDER PASSED UNDER SECTION 254(1) AND THE QUESTION OF LIMITATION UNDER SECTION 254(2) DOES NO T ARISE AT ALL. IT WAS CONTENDED THAT THE PARLIAMENT, IN ITS WISDOM , HAS NOT ENACTED ANY MANDATORY PROVISION IN THE I.T. ACT OR IN THE I.T. RULES WHEREIN ANY TIME LIMIT WAS PRESCRIBED FOR THE TRIBUNAL TO PASS AN ORDER AND THEREFORE, THE TRIBUNAL IS NOT BA RRED BY ANY LAW TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS OF DISPOSAL OF APPEALS (OUT OF 14 APPEALS FILED BY THE ASSESSEES HEREIN) ON MERITS AT LEAST AT THIS STAGE. HE ALSO RELIED UPON THE DECISION OF THE HON BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORAT ION LTD., VS. ACIT 359 ITR 371 WHEREIN THE COURT OBSERVED THAT AN ORDER PASSED IN VIOLATION OF RULE 24 OF THE I.T. RULES IS IRREGULAR. HE 11 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. ALSO RELIED UPON THE DECISION OF HONBLE SUPREME CO URT IN THE CASE OF STATE OF HARYANA & OTHERS VS. M/S. AGM MANA GEMENT SERVICES LTD., (CIVIL APPEAL NO.2751 OF 2006 DATED 15.06.2006) TO SUBMIT THAT THE TRIBUNAL SHOULD LIMIT ITSELF TO INT ERPRETING THE STATUTE, INSTEAD OF INTERPRETING THE JUDGMENT BY TA KING EACH WORD AS SACROSANCT. IN OTHERWORDS, THE CASE OF THE ASSESSEE IS THAT IN THE LIGHT OF BINDING JUDGMENT OF THE HONBL E SUPREME COURT IN THE CASES OF SRI AYYANAR SPINNING & WEAVIN G MILLS LTD., AND CHENNIAPPA MUDALIAR (CITED SUPRA), THE TRIBUNAL HAS NO POWER TO DISMISS AN APPEAL FOR NON-PROSECUTION IN W HICH EVENT THE TRIBUNAL IS DUTY BOUND TO PASS AN ORDER UNDER S ECTION 254(1) FAILING WHICH THE ASSESSEE IS ENTITLED TO FILE A PE TITION UNDER SECTION 254(2) FOR RECALL OF THE IRREGULAR ORDE R PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL. HE ALSO RELIED UPON THE OBSERVATIONS MADE BY LORD DENNING TO SUBMIT THAT EACH CASE DEPENDS ON ITS FAC TS AND ONE SHOULD AVOID THE TEMPTATION TO DECIDE CASES MATCHIN G COLOUR OF ONE CASE AGAINST THE COLOUR OF ANOTHER. 5. THE LD. D.R., IN HIS WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS CONTEN DED THAT WHEN AN ASSESSEE TAKES A CONSCIOUS DECISION OF NOT PREFERRING AN APPEAL EVEN AFTER LAPSE OF 04 YEARS, HE SHOULD BE TREATED AS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE, IN WHICH EVENT, A PETITION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED. IN TH IS REGARD, HE REFERRED TO THE DECISIONS OF THE ITAT I.E., SS BUIL DERS VS. ITO (210-TIOL-714-MUM.), ITAT HYDERABAD BENCH DECISION IN THE CASE OF T. KISHAN REPORTED IN 23 TAXMANN.COM 383. H E HAS ALSO RELIED UPON VARIOUS DECISIONS OF HIGH COURTS TO SUB MIT THAT IF AN ASSESSEE FOLLOWS LACKADAISICAL APPROACH, BY NOT CHA LLENGING THE 12 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. ORDER WITHIN THE TIME FRAME PRESCRIBED, THE AUTHORI TIES CONCERNED SHOULD NOT EXTEND THE BENEFIT OF CONDONAT ION IN SUCH CASES. HE HAS ALSO HIGHLIGHTED THE REASONS GIVEN BY THE ASSESSEES IN THE M.AS, AS WELL AS IN THE WRITTEN SU BMISSIONS FILED ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEES, TO SUBMIT THAT ASSESSEE S HAVE NOT PROVIDED ANY PROOF TO SHOW THAT THEY HAVE SHIFTED T O A FAR-OFF PLACE ABANDONING THEIR WHOLE INTEREST IN HYDERABAD. THEREFORE, ASSESSEES EXPLANATION FOR THE DELAY CANNOT BE ACCE PTED ON THE FACE OF IT. 5.1. HE FURTHER CONTENDED THAT RULE 24 OF THE I.T. RULES CANNOT HAVE INDEPENDENT APPLICATION SINCE THE SAID RULES ARE FRAMED IN EXERCISE OF THE POWERS CONFERRED IN SUB-S ECTION (5) OF SECTION 255 OF I.T. ACT. HE ALSO DISTINGUISHED LINE OF DECISIONS CITED BY THE LD. COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE BY STATIN G THAT IN THE CASE LAW RELIED UPON BY THE ASSESSEES THE M.AS WERE FILED WITHIN THE TIME FRAME OF 04 YEARS WHEREIN THE DELAY, IN NO T PASSING AN ORDER, IS NOT IN THE CONTROL OF THE PARTIES WHO APP ROACHED THE COURT AND UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE HONBLE RA JASTHAN HIGH COURT OBSERVED THAT DELAY ON THE PART OF THE T RIBUNAL IN DISPOSING OF AN APPLICATION SHOULD NOT COME IN THE WAY OF THE RIGHTS OF THE ASSESSEE. IN OTHERWORDS, IF AN APPLIC ATION IS FILED IN TIME, DELAY IN DISPOSAL OF THE APPLICATION SHOULD N OT BE TAKEN AS A GROUND TO HOLD THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 254 (2) OF THE ACT ARE NOT APPLICABLE. IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL DELAY IN FILING OF THE M.A. AND ASSESSEES HEREIN CO NSCIOUSLY CHOSE NOT TO PREFER ANY APPLICATION BEFORE THE HIGH COURT AGAINST THE ORDERS UNDER SECTION 254(1) OF THE I.T. ACT. TH EREFORE, THE 13 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. M.AS FILED BY THE ASSESSEES DESERVE TO BE DISMISSED , HAVING BEEN FILED BEYOND THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION. 6. WE HAVE HEARD THE RIVAL CONTENTIONS AND PERUSED THE RECORD. WE HAVE ALSO CAREFULLY GONE THROUGH THE CAS E LAW RELIED UPON BY THE LD. COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE AS WELL AS THE LD. D.R. AND ALSO EXAMINED VARIOUS PRECEDENTS ON THIS ISSUE. IT IS NOT IN DISPUTE THAT THE ASSESSEES HEREIN MOVED M.AS UNDER SECTION 254(2) OF THE I.T. ACT, 1961 WHICH IN TURN, REFERS TO AN ORDER PASSED UNDER SECTION 254(1) OF THE I.T. ACT. AT THE SAME TIME, LD. COUNSEL, APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEES, SUBM ITS THAT THE TRIBUNAL HAD NO POWER TO DISMISS THE APPEAL FOR WAN T OF PROSECUTION AND AS A CONSEQUENCE THEREOF EARLIER OR DERS PASSED IN THE YEAR 2008 ARE TO BE TREATED AS NON-EST IN LAW; IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT CAN SAFELY BE SAID THAT THERE IS N O ORDER PASSED UNDER SECTION 254(1) OF THE ACT AND THEREFORE, THE METHOD FOLLOWED IN DISPOSING OF THE APPEALS AND THE SO-CAL LED ORDER DESERVES TO BE RECALLED. 7. IN OUR CONSIDERED OPINION, THE ASSESSEES PLEA DESERVES TO BE REJECTED ON THE FACE OF IT FOR TWO R EASONS. FIRSTLY, IF A PROCEDURE HAS BEEN FOLLOWED BY THE TRIBUNAL - DIS MISSING THE APPEALS FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION - WHICH, IN THE OPI NION OF THE ASSESSEES HEREIN, IS CONTRARY TO THE DECISIONS OF T HE APEX COURT, THE PROPER REMEDY WOULD BE TO CHALLENGE THE SAID OR DER BEFORE THE HONBLE HIGH COURT SINCE TO OUR LIMITED KNOWLED GE ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA EMPOWERS A PARTY T O REQUEST THE HONBLE HIGH COURT TO QUASH ANY ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL 14 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. WHICH IS CONTRARY TO LAW, WHILE EXERCISING ITS SUP ERVISORY JURISDICTION. THE ASSESSEES, FOR THE REASONS BEST K NOWN TO THEM, HAVE NOT CHOSEN TO PREFER EITHER APPEALS OR A WRIT PETITION TO INVOKE THE JURISDICTION OF THE HONBLE HIGH COURT E ITHER UNDER SECTION 260A OF THE I.T. ACT OR UNDER ARTICLE 227 O F THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. IN OTHERWORDS, THE ASSESSEES HAVING NOT CHOSEN TO PURSUE THE REMEDY AVAILABLE, THEY CANNOT - AFTER LONG LAPSE OF TIME - CLAIM THAT THE ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL IS CONTRARY TO LAW. IN THE CASE OF PARSURAM POTTERIES WORKS CO. LTD., VS. ITO (106 ITR 1 AT PAGE-10) THE HONBLE SU PREME COURT OBSERVED THAT STALE ISSUES SHOULD NOT BE RE-ACTIVAT ED BEYOND A PARTICULAR STAGE AND THERE MUST BE A POINT OF FINAL ITY IN ALL THE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS; LAPSE OF TIME MUST INDUCE OR SET AT REST ALL JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL CONTROVERSIES AS IT MUS T IN OTHERS SPHERES OF HUMAN ACTIVITY. A PROPER APPROACH IS TO CHALLENGE THE ORDER BEFORE A HIGHER FORUM, EITHER UNDER SECTION 2 60-A OF THE INCOME TAX ACT OR IN WRIT JURISDICTION, BY TAKING I MMEDIATE STEPS, AFTER DISPOSAL OF THE APPEALS. HERE IS A CAS E WHERE THERE WAS MORE THAN 07 YEARS DELAY AND IN FACT, THE ASSES SEES DID NOT CHOOSE TO PURSUE SUCH A KIND OF REMEDY. AT THE SAME TIME, THE LD. COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEE SUB MITS THAT THE IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL CANNOT BE TREATED AS AN ORDER PASSED UNDER SECTION 254(1) OF THE ACT. SE CTION 254(2) OF THE ACT SPEAKS OF RECTIFYING MISTAKES IN THE ORD ERS PASSED UNDER SECTION 254(1) OF THE ACT AND IF THE ASSESSEE S CLAIM THAT THERE WAS NO ORDER PASSED UNDER SECTION 254(1), THE RE IS NO RIGHT OF FILING A PETITION UNDER SECTION 254(2) OF THE AC T. 15 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. 7.1. THE SECOND ASPECT OF THE MATTER IS THAT THE D ISMISSAL OF APPEAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION - THOUGH ACCORDIN G TO THE ASSESSEES IS ILLEGAL OR CONTRARY TO LAW - IS NEVERT HELESS AN ORDER PASSED UNDER SECTION 254(1) OF THE ACT IN WHICH EVE NT THE REMEDY AVAILABLE TO THE ASSESSEES IS TO FILE A PETI TION BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL TO RECALL THE ORDER WITHIN A PERIOD OF 04 YEARS AS HAS BEEN PRESCRIBED UNDER LAW. IF A M.A. IS FILED BEYON D THE PERIOD OF 04 YEARS IT CANNOT BE ENTERTAINED BY THE TRIBUNAL A ND HENCE, THE REASONS FOR THE DELAY IN FILING M.AS CANNOT BE GONE INTO. APPELLATE TRIBUNAL BEING A CREATURE OF STATUTE CANN OT ACCEPT ANY MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION, WHICH IS FILED BEYOND TH E PERIOD OF LIMITATION PRESCRIBED UNDER STATUTE. 7.2. IN THE CASE OF BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION P . LTD., (SUPRA) AND IN THE CASE OF M/S. CHEMIPOL, MUMBAI VS . UNION OF INDIA, MUMBAI AND ANOTHER (CENTRAL EXCISE APPEAL NO . 62 OF 2009 DATED 17.09.2009) THE HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COUR T RELIED UPON VARIOUS SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURT JUDGMENTS AND EXTRACTED THE OBSERVATIONS OF HIS LORDSHIP CHIEF JU STICE HIDAYTULLAH IN SUNDERLAL MANNALAL VS. NANDRAMDAS D WARKADAS (AIR 1958 MP 260) TO HIGHLIGHT THAT NO COURT OR TRI BUNAL IS SUPPOSED TO CONTINUE A PROCEEDING BEFORE IT WHEN TH E PARTY WHO HAS MOVED IT HAS NOT APPEARED. THIS OBSERVATION OF JUSTICE HIDAYTULLAH WAS APPROVED BY THE HONBLE SUPREME COU RT IN DR. P. NALLA THAMPY THERA VS. B.L. SHANKAR 1984 (SUPP.) SCC 631. IN THE CASE OF NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD., VS. R. SRINIVASAN (2000) 3 SCC 242, THE SUPREME COURT OBSERVED THAT E VERY JUDICIAL BODY OR AUTHORITY INHERENTLY POSSESSES THE POWER TO 16 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. DISMISS A CASE IN DEFAULT. THESE DECISIONS WERE REF ERRED TO BY THE ITAT, MUMBAI BENCH IN THE CASE OF BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD., VS. ACIT (MA.NO.514/MUM/2012) WHE REIN THE TRIBUNAL OBSERVED THAT THE RULES DO NOT CIRCUMSCRIB E THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL CONFERRED BY THE STATU TE AND IF THE ASSESSEE IS HABITUALLY TAKING ADJOURNMENTS, DESPITE GRANTING SUFFICIENT TIME, THE ASSESSEE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TH E DISMISSAL OF THE APPEALS FOR NON-PROSECUTION AND THEREFORE, THE TRIBUNAL CANNOT BE FOUND TO HAVE COMMITTED A MISTAKE. THIS D ECISION WAS AFFIRMED BY HONBLE MUMBAI HIGH COURT (SUPRA). 7.3. IN THE M.AS FILED BEFORE US THE ASSESSEES HAV E FILED THE APPLICATIONS UNDER RULE 24 OF THE I.T. RULES FO R WHICH THE ASSESSEES HAVE TO FURNISH PROPER REASONS FOR NON-AP PEARANCE ON THE DATES FIXED FOR HEARING. THE EXPLANATION GIVEN ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEES IS VERY VAGUE. IT WAS SUBMITTED IN TH E APPLICATION THAT SRI PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA HAS SERIOUS HEALTH PR OBLEMS BECAUSE OF HIS OLD AGE AND HE WAS MEDICALLY ADVICED TO TAKE REST IN HIS NATIVE VILLAGE AT KUTCH IN GUJRAT AND TO TAK E CARE OF HIM THE ENTIRE FAMILY SHIFTED TO KUTCH. IN 2012 WHEN HI S CONDITION FURTHER DETERIORATED HE WAS BROUGHT BACK TO HYDERAB AD IN CRITICAL CONDITION FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. HOWEVER, HE COULD NOT SURVIVE AND ULTIMATELY PASSED AWAY IN 2013. THEREAF TER, THE FAMILY MEMBERS HAD GONE BACK TO THE NATIVE PLACE TO SETTLE SEVERAL THINGS WHICH CAUSED FURTHER DELAY IN FILING M.AS. 7.3.1. IT MAY BE NOTICED THAT THE APPEALS WERE DISM ISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION IN 2008 AND THERE IS NOTHING ON RECORD TO 17 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. SUGGEST THAT ASSESSEES HAVE COMPLETELY SHIFTED LOCK , STOCK AND BARREL FROM HYDERABAD IN 2007 ITSELF. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CASES WERE ADJOURNED AT THE REQUEST OF THE ASSESSEE S IN THE MONTH OF OCTOBER, 2007 AND NOVEMBER, 2007 AND FINAL LY POSTED ON 18.03.2008. THEREFORE, IT IS THE DUTY OF THE ASS ESSEES TO FOLLOW-UP WITH THEIR COUNSELS AS TO WHAT WAS THE LA TEST POSITION ON THE MATTER. ASSESSEES HEREIN HAVE MERELY GIVEN A VAGUE STATEMENT THAT THEY HAVE LEFT IN 2007 AND RETURNED ONLY IN 2012. BE THAT AS IT MAY, EVEN IF THEY HAVE RETURNED IN 20 12, IT IS NOT KNOWN AS TO WHY NO EFFORT WAS MADE TO FILE ANY PETI TION IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. IN OTHERWORDS, REASONS FOR TAKING FURTHER TIME OF 03 YEARS, IN CHOOSING TO FILE M.AS, COULD N OT BE EXPLAINED. THUS EVEN UNDER RULE 24 OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL R ULES IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT ASSESSEES HAD ANY REASONABLE CA USE FOR THE DELAY IN FILING THE M.AS. HOWEVER, IN OUR OPINION, IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR US TO CONSIDER THE REASONABLE CAUSE S INCE THE TRIBUNAL HAS NO POWER TO CONDONE THE DELAY, IN VIEW OF THE MANDATE OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT WHICH PERMITS A PARTY TO APPROACH THE TRIBUNAL WITHIN A P ERIOD OF 04 YEARS IF THERE IS A MISTAKE IN THE ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL. THE RATIO OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS CITED BY T HE LD. COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEES ARE APPLICABLE ONLY WHEN THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE APPROACHED THE TRIBUNAL WITHIN THE PERI OD OF LIMITATION; THE SUPREME COURT WAS OF THE VIEW THAT THE DELAY ON THE PART OF THE TRIBUNAL IN DISPOSING OF THE APPLIC ATIONS SHOULD NOT EFFECT THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES IF M.AS ARE FI LED WITHIN THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION. IN THE PRESENT APPLICATIONS, ADMITTEDLY, THE APPLICATIONS WERE FILED BEYOND PERIOD OF 04 YEARS I N WHICH EVENT 18 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. THE TRIBUNAL HAD NO POWER TO ADMIT THE M.AS IN THE LIGHT OF PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 254(2) OF THE I.T. ACT. 7.3.2. AS ALREADY DISCUSSED HEREINBEFORE, IF THE AS SESSEES SEEK TO CONTEND THAT THESE ARE NOT APPLICATIONS FIL ED UNDER SECTION 254(2) THEN THE REMEDY LIES ELSEWHERE AND T HE ASSESSEES OUGHT TO HAVE CHALLENGED THE ORDERS PASSED UNDER SE CTION 254(1) AT AN APPROPRIATE FORUM. BUT THE ASSESSEES CHOSE NO T TO CHALLENGE THE COMMON ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL. AS RIGHTLY POINTED OUT BY THE HONBLE APEX COURT IN THE CASE O F PARSURAM POTTERIES WORKS CO. LTD., VS. ITO (CITED SUPRA), T HERE SHOULD BE A POINT OF FINALITY IN ALL LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AND STAL E ISSUES SHOULD NOT BE RE-ACTIVATED BEYOND A PARTICULAR STAGE EVEN IF ON A PARTICULAR ASPECT THE COURT MAY HAVE A SYMPATHETIC VIEW ON THE PARTY. 7.4. BEFORE PARTING, WE MAY OBSERVE THAT THE TRIBU NAL IS A FINAL FACT FINDING AUTHORITY AND MATTERS INVOLVING FACTS CAN BE DECIDED ON MERITS ONLY WHEN FACTS ARE PLACED ON REC ORD. IN THESE GROUP OF MATTERS, ADDITIONS WERE MADE CONSEQUENT TO SEARCH ACTION CONDUCTED ON 14.09.1995 JOINTLY IN THE CASE OF MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA. THE ADDITIONS ARE BASED ON CERTAIN M ATERIAL FOUND DURING THE COURSE OF SEARCH. THE A.O. HAS GIV EN A CATEGORICAL FINDING ON THE ISSUES ON HAND AFTER TAK ING INTO CONSIDERATION THE RELEVANT MATERIAL. IF THE ASSESSE ES CHALLENGE THE FINDING OF THE TAX AUTHORITIES IT IS FOR THEM T O FILE PAPER BOOKS TO HIGHLIGHT THAT THE DECISIONS RENDERED BY THE LOW ER AUTHORITIES IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND FACTS. PAPER BOOK , IF ANY, HAS 19 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. TO BE FILED UNDER RULE-18 OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES. RULE 18(6) SAYS THAT ONLY THOSE PAPERS WHICH ARE REFERRE D TO AT THE TIME OF HEARING CAN BE TAKEN AS PAPERS FILED BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL. THE RELEVANT RULE IS EXTRACTED FOR IMMEDIATE REFERE NCE : RULE 18(6) : DOCUMENTS THAT ARE REFERRED TO AND RE LIED UPON BY THE PARTIES DURING THE COURSE OF ARGUMENTS ARE A LONE BE TREATED AS PART OF THE RECORD OF THE TRIBUNAL. 7.5. IN THE APPEALS FILED BEFORE US, ADMITTEDLY, N O MATERIAL WAS REFERRED TO BY THE PARTIES BEFORE US. UNDER THE SE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ONLY COURSE OPEN TO THE TRIBUNAL IS TO HOLD THAT THE ASSESSEES HAVING NOT CHALLENGED THE ORDERS PASSED BY THE LOWER AUTHORITIES BY RELYING UPON PROPER MATERI AL, APPEALS FILED BY THEM DESERVE TO BE DISMISSED. IT IS WELL-K NOWN THAT WITHOUT MATERIAL PAPERS ASSESSEES CANNOT SUPPORT T HEIR STAND AND ORDINARILY, UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE TRIB UNAL DISMISSES APPEALS BY OBSERVING DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION. THE NET EFFECT IS THAT THE APPEALS CA NNOT BE DECIDED ON MERITS IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY MATERIAL PL ACED ON RECORD. IT IS NOT THE CASE OF THE ASSESSEES HEREIN THAT THEY HAVE FILED MATERIAL BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL OR THERE IS ANY SPECIFIC LEGAL ISSUE WHICH CAN BE DISPOSED OF IN THE LIGHT OF SETT LED LEGAL DECISIONS WITHOUT THE AID OF FURTHER FACTS. SUCH BE ING THE CASE, IN OUR OPINION, THE ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL, UNDE R SECTION 254(1) OF THE ACT, IS PROPER AND AS RIGHTLY OBSERVE D BY THE HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF M/S. CHEMI POL, MUMBAI VS. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER (CITED SUPRA) THE TRIBUNAL WILL HAVE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE EXCEPT TO E XERCISE THEIR 20 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. INHERENT POWERS TO DISMISS THE PROCEEDINGS FOR NON- PROSECUTION. IT CANNOT THUS BE SAID THAT IT IS NOT AN ORDER PASS ED UNDER SECTION 254(1) OF THE ACT. RIGHT OF APPEAL OR RIGHT OF FILING A PETITION FOR RECALL IS NOT A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT B UT A RIGHT VESTED UNDER THE STATUTE AND IT HAS TO BE EXERCISED STRICT LY IN CONFORMITY WITH THE LETTER OF THE LAW. THE STATUTE PRESCRIBED PERIOD OF 04 YEARS WITHIN WHICH A M.A. CAN BE FILED BY AN ASSESS EE AND NO POWER IS VESTED IN THE TRIBUNAL TO ADMIT ANY M.A. F ILED BEYOND THE PERIOD OF 04 YEARS. SUCH BEING THE CASE, THE M. AS. FILED AFTER PERIOD OF MORE THAN 07 YEARS AND NEARLY 08 YEARS DE SERVE TO BE DISMISSED AS UN-ADMITTED. 7.6. ON A CONSPECTUS OF THE MATTER, WE HOLD AS UND ER : (1) THE IMPUGNED ORDER WAS PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL UNDER SECTION 254(1) OF THE I.T. ACT AND IN THE GIVEN CIRCUMSTANCES, DISMISSAL OF THE APPEALS IS THE ONLY CONCLUSION THAT CAN BE DRAWN WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN CHALLENGED BY THE ASSESSEES WITHIN A PERIOD OF 04 Y EARS AND BEYOND SUCH PERIOD THE TRIBUNAL HAS NO POWER TO CONDONE THE DELAY AND THEREFORE, THE M.AS ARE NOT MAINTAINABLE. (2) EVEN IF IT IS PRESUMED THAT THE TRIBUNAL HAS GOT TH E POWER TO CONDONE THE DELAY THE REASONS GIVEN BY THE ASSESSEES HEREIN ARE VAGUE AND NOT SUPPORTED BY PRO PER EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE, IT HAS TO BE CONCLUDED THAT THE 21 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. ASSESSEES HAVE NO SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR THE DELAY IN FILING M.AS. (3) IF THE ASSESSEES CLAIM THAT THE COMMON ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL IN 2008, DISMISSING THE APPEALS FOR WA NT OF PROSECUTION, CANNOT BE EQUATED TO AN ORDER PASSED UNDER SECTION 254(1) OF THE I.T. ACT AND THEREFORE, SECTION 254(2) DOES NOT COME INTO PLAY AND CONSEQUENTLY, THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION DOES NOT APP LY, THEN THE REMEDY TO THE ASSESSEES WOULD HAVE BEEN TO APPROACH AN APPROPRIATE FORUM TO CHALLENGE THE ORDE R WHICH IS CLAIMED TO BE INVALID IN LAW. BUT THE ASSE SSEES CHOSE NOT TO PREFER EITHER APPEAL OR WRIT PETITION BEFORE THE HONBLE HIGH COURT AND THUS, BY EFFLUX OF TIME IT HAS ATTAINED FINALITY AND SUCH STALE ISSUES SHOULD NOT BE RE- ACTIVATED AT THIS STAGE IN THE LIGHT OF OBSERVATION S OF THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF PARSURAM POTTERIES WORKS CO. LTD., VS. ITO. IN THE RESULT, THE M.AS FILED BY THE ASSESSEES ARE DISMISSED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 15.07.2016. SD/- SD/- (S. RIFAUR RAHMAN) (D. MANMOHAN) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER VICE PRESIDENT HYDERABAD DATED 15 TH JULY, 2016 VBP/- 22 M.A.NOS. 99 TO 112/HYD/2015 MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS. COPY TO 1. MR. PARESH DHANJI CHEDDA, ALL ARE RESIDENT OF 3-4-6 & 7, 405 ARIHANT ASHIANA, BARKATPURA, HYDERABAD 500 027. 2. MR. DHANJI RAMJI CHEDDA, 3. M/S. MAHAVEER MARKETING 4. M/S. MAHAVEER COMBINES P. LTD., 5. M/S. UNIQUE FINANCE & LEASE P. LTD., 6. M/S. UNIQUE PLASTICS P. LTD., 7. THE DCIT (ASST S .) SPL. RANGE - 2, HYDERABAD. 8. CIT, A.P. HYDERABAD 9. D.R. ITAT A BENCH, HYDERABAD. 10. GUARD FILE