Machani Nagaraju, V. The Commissioner of Endowments,

WP/5168/2014

AI Insights

The case revolves around the appointment of the 2nd respondent as the Executive Officer of the Sri Neela Kanteswara Swamy Temple, which was contested by the petitioner, Machani Nagaraju, the hereditary trustee of the temple. The petitioner argued that the appointment was arbitrary, lacked notice, and violated principles of natural justice, as he had been managing the temple for decades without such interference. The respondents, particularly the Commissioner of Endowments, defended the appointment citing mismanagement by the petitioner and the need for better administration. The court examined the legal provisions under the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987, and previous case laws, ultimately dismissing the petition and upholding the appointment.

• Counselvise Citation: [2014] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 741591 (HC-ANDHRA_PRADESH)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 02-06-2014
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: P. Sridhara Rao v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, Executive Officer, T.G. Temples v. Gopal Irani, Sri Kommu Cheruvu Anjaneya Swamy Temple v. Prl. Secretary, Endowments
• Laws Referred To: Madras Endowments Act 2 of 1927, Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious and Endowments Act 1966, Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: GOVERNMENT PLEADER FOR ENDOWMENTS
• Assessee Lawyers: M VIDYASAGAR
• Keywords: Administrative decision; Hereditary Trustee; Natural Justice; Executive Officer appointment; Public religious endowment
• Section: 20(1); 29; 93; 6(c)

Judgement Text

"* THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN + WRIT PETITION NO.5168 OF 2014 % Dated 02-06-2014 # Machani Nagaraju …. Petitioner Vs. $ The Commissioner of Endowments, Boggulakunta, Abids, Hyderabad & ors. …. Respondents ! Counsel for the petitioners: Sri M.Vidyasagar ^ Counsel for 1st respondent: Government Pleader for Endowments Counsel for 2nd respondent : Sri V.T.M.Prasad Counsel for 3rd respondent: N.Niyatha HEAD NOTE: ? Citations: [1] AIR 1996 SC 1334 2 (1996(1) ALD 187 3 Judgment in W.P. No.3122 of 2014 dated 14.02.2014 4 AIR 1981 SC 116 5 (1880) 14 Ch.D. 458 6 (1975) 2 SCC 703 = AIR 1975 SC 2092 7 AIR 1976 SC 578 8 2005(4) Laws (APHC) 106 9 AIR 1982 SC 149 10 (1982) 3 SCC 235: 1982 SCC (L&S) 275 11(1992) 4 SCC 305 12(1988) 4 SCC 226 13(1998) 8 SCC 1 14(2007) 9 SCC 593 15(2009) 2 SCC 630 16(2003) 7 SCC 546 17(1994) III LLJ 1159 Cal 18AIR 1985 SC 1147 19(1970) 3 SCC 359 202002 (2) ALD 477 : 2002 (3) ALT 10 21(2014) 3 SCC 502 22[1988] AC 858 23(1875) 1 Ch D 426 24AIR 1936 PC 253 25AIR 1954 SC 322 26AIR 1964 SC 358 271999 (8) SCC 266 282001 (4) SCC 9 292008 (4) SCC 755 30(2005) 7 SCC 627 31(2008)1 SCC 728 32AIR 1967 S.C. 295 33(1981) 1 SCC 664 34(1990)4 SCC 356 35(2007)2 SCC 181 36AIR 1969 SC 707 37(1989) C.O.D. 466 38(1980) 1 W.L.R. 582, 59 39(1990) 4 SCC 594 40AIR 1969 SC 414 41(2012) 4 SCC 407 42(1991 Supp (1) SCC 414 AIR 1990 SC 2205 43(2010) 9 SCC 496 44(2010) 13 SCC 427 45(1989) 1 WLR 525 46(1991) 3 SCC 38 47(2010) 8 SCC 49 48(1977) 1 SCC 472 49AIR 1963 SC 1612 50(1994) 2 SCC 481 512006(1) ALD 165 522004(5) ALD 180 (DB) 53(2002) 1 SCC 100 54AIR 1955 SC 425 55AIR 1987 SC 2235 56AIR 1987 SC 1972 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN W.P.M.P.No.8414 OF 2014 IN/AND WRIT PETITION NO.5168 OF 2014 COMMON ORDER: The action of the respondents, in appointing the 2nd respondent as the Executive Officer of Sri Neela Kanteswara Swamy Temple, Yemmiganur village and Mandal, Kurnool District, vide proceedings dated 10.01.2014, is questioned in this Writ Petition as being arbitrary and illegal. The subject temple was registered under the provisions of the Madras Endowments Act 2 of 1927, and was declared thereunder as a “public religious endowment”. The petitioner was declared as the hereditary trustee of the subject temple, under Section 20(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious and Endowments Act 1966 (hereinafter called the 1966 Act), by proceedings of the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments, Kurnool dated 25.09.1980; and was given the right to assume charge, as the hereditary trustee, in the line of succession of his late father. It is the petitioner’s case that the subject temple was constructed around 200 years ago by the members of his family with their own personal funds; it was initially meant for the benefit of the family; it was later thrown open to the public; the original temple consisted of the principal deity i.e. Lord Shiva in the form of a sivalingam; it now consists of Ammavaru, Nandeeswara and Vinayaka idols; he has been spending his own money, as the expenditure incurred for the subject temple is much higher than the income derived from various properties belonging to it; their family members have been the hereditary trustees ever since 05.04.1935; from 25.09.1980 onwards he has been functioning as the hereditary trustee; the right of management of the subject temple, by the petitioner’s family, is undisturbed till date; their family has an unblemished record of service as it is they who had endowed valuable properties in favour of the temple for its benefit without depending on public funds; the income of the institution is less than the Rs.2,00,000/-; it, therefore, falls under Section 6(c) of the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (hereinafter called the 1987 Act); in view of the proviso to Section 29 of the 1987 Act, an Executive Officer need not be appointed for the institution whose income is less than Rs.2,00,000/-; the 1st respondent appointed the 2nd respondent as the Executive Officer of the subject temple without any plausible or justifiable reason; an unsuccessful attempt was made earlier by the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments, Kurnool to appoint the very same person as the Executive Officer of the subject institution; this Court passed an interim order suspending operation of the said order; the present attempt by the Commissioner, to appoint the 2nd respondent as the Executive Officer, is with malafide intentions; the order of the Commissioner is in violation of principles of natural justice; neither has the petitioner been put on notice nor have reasons been assigned by the 1st respondent for appointing the 2nd respondent as the Executive Officer of the subject temple; though the impugned proceedings refers to the report of the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments, a copy thereof was not furnished to the petitioner nor was he made aware of its contents; the power conferred on the Commissioner to appoint an Executive Officer must be exercised on relevant facts and material, and not merely by referring to public interest; the discretion vested in the Commissioner, to appoint an Executive Officer, has to be judiciously exercised, and the person in management has to be put on notice; the 1st respondent, while exercising his powers to appoint an Executive Officer, should record reasons in writing for doing so; and, in the absence of such reasons being reflected in the order, the impugned proceedings must be held to be vitiated. Reliance is placed, on behalf of the petitioners, on P. Sridhara Rao v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh[1]; Executive Officer, T.G. Temples v. Gopal Irani[2] and Sri Kommu Cheruvu Anjaneya Swamy Temple v. Prl. Secretary, Endowments[3]. In the counter affidavit, filed on behalf of the 1st respondent, it is stated that the subject temple was published under Section 6(c)(ii) of the Act; it owns landed property of Ac.9.07 cts in Sy. No.101/A and Ac.6.58 cts in Sy. No.88/C; its income, for the last three years, ranges between Rs.3.46 to Rs.4.79 lakhs; the Deputy Commissioner had issued orders on 24.03.2012 posting an Executive Officer to the subject temple; aggrieved thereby the petitioner filed W.P. No.11504 of 2012; this Court, by order in W.P.M.P. No.14567 of 2012 in W.P. No.11504 of 2012 dated 25.04.2012, granted interim suspension on the ground that the Deputy Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to issue the impugned order as he was not the competent authority; while passing the interim order, this Court made it clear that the order did not preclude the Commissioner from taking appropriate action; the President of Kurni Daivachara Sangham, Yemmiganur had submitted a complaint against the petitioner, before the Assistant Commissioner, Endowments Department, Kurnool, with regards mis-management of the institution; the Assistant Commissioner had issued notice to the petitioner to attend the enquiry on 12.09.2012 along with connected records; aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed W.P. No.28414 of 2012; this Court, by its order in W.P.M.P. No.36220 of 2012 in W.P. No.28414 of 2012 dated 11.09.2012, directed that the petitioner be given an opportunity to submit his explanation to any such allegation; this Court also directed that the President of Kurni Daivachara Sangham, Yemmiganur be afforded an opportunity of being heard before proceeding further with the enquiry; this Court, while permitting the enquiry to go on, had directed that it should not be concluded until further orders; pursuant to the directions of this Court, the Assistant Commissioner had issued enquiry notice to the petitioner and to the President of the Kurni Daivachara Sangham, Yemmiganur to attend the enquiry on 29.12.2012 in the said temple; during enquiry, the Assistant Commissioner heard both sides and verified the records; and, on verification of the records, the Assistant Commissioner observed that (a). the hereditary trustee did not submit budget estimates to the department for sanction; (b) he did not submit assessment reports from 1995 onwards till date; (c) he did not pay the departmental contribution from 2003-04 till date; (d) he had allowed outsiders to construct the Renuka Yellamma Temple, in the temple land, without prior permission of the department; (e) he had allowed the Kurni Daivachara Sangham, Yemmiganur to utilise temple land, for using it as a burial ground, without the consent of the department; (f) he did not take any steps to lease out lands and shops by way of public auction, and continued the old tenants; (g) he did not remit receipts of the temple into the bank, and had directly appropriated the amounts; and (h) he did not maintain the D.C.B. Register. It is further stated, on behalf of the 1st respondent, that the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments had submitted a report on 17.12.2013 to the 1st respondent appraising him of all facts; he had requested that, in order to set right the affairs of the temple and to avoid public criticism, an Executive Officer be appointed for the subject temple; accordingly, in the exercise of his powers under Section 29 of Act, he had issued proceedings dated 10.01.2014 keeping the subject temple under additional charge of the Executive Officer of the group temples, for better management and administration of the institution; in the present case, the annual income of the temple is more than Rs.2,00,000/- for the last three years, and it has landed property of Ac.15.65 cts; the petitioner’s contention that the annual income is less than Rs.2,00,000/- is not correct; and the impugned proceedings were issued, under Section 29 of the Act, in the interest of proper administration of the institution, and to protect the property of the temple. In his counter-affidavit the 2nd respondent submits that, in compliance with the orders of the Commissioner dated 10.01.2014, he had assumed charge on 17.02.2014 under a panchanama attested by around 32 villagers, temple staff and the archaka of the temple; the assumption orders were sought to be communicated to the petitioner, through the Inspector, Endowments Department, as per the directions of the Assistant Commissioner; as the petitioner refused to receive a copy thereof, the Inspector, Endowments Department had affixed a copy of the said order on the front gate of the temple, and had pasted copies thereof at various places near the temple and the Mandal Revenue Office; and the Inspector, by his letter dated 22.02.2014, informed the same to the Assistant Commissioner, Endowments. The 2nd respondent has, thereafter, reiterated the contents of the counter- affidavit of the 1st respondent and has referred to the enquiry conducted, and the deficiencies pointed out, by the Assistant Commissioner, Endowments. In his reply affidavit the petitioner admits that the subject temple has landed properties, but denies that the income of the institution exceeds Rs.2.00 lakhs per annum. It is his case that it is not the net assessable income but the specified income which must be taken into consideration in conformity with Section 65 of the 1987 Act; the action taken by the Assistant Commissioner, on the representation submitted by the President of the Kurni Daivachara Sangham, Yemmiganur, is not justified as the said sangham had abused the funds of the subject temple; the President of the Sangham cannot be said to be a “person interested” in the welfare of the subject temple; while an enquiry was caused against the petitioner, the Assistant Commissioner has not caused a similar enquiry against the Kurni Daivachara Sangham which was all through misusing the funds of the temple, and exercising their rights over properties of the temple, as if it was their own personal property; construction of the Renuka Yellamma temple is a very old issue, and such construction has not resulted in any loss being caused to the institution; the land belonging to the temple is being utilised, as a burial ground, by the Kurni Daivachara Sangham for the last 50 – 60 years; inspite of several complaints being made against the Kurni Daivachara Sangham, no action is being taken by the Endowments Department; instead of proceeding against the sangham, the officials were taking action against the hereditary trustee as an act of vengeance; the petitioner is being disrespected and humiliated at the instance of persons who had abused and misused the funds of the temple; the Kurni Daivachara Sangham has been collecting Rs.11,000/- per month from various shops belonging to the temple for the past 12 years; a net amount of around Rs.12 to 14 lakh has been misused by the Kurni Daivachara Sangham; the 1st respondent ought to have enquired and initiated criminal proceedings against the Sangham for their illegal action of collecting money from shops and sites belonging to the temple; instead of acting as a custodian of endowment properties, and effectively supervising and protecting them, the Endowments Department is now aiding and abetting wrong persons; the Commissioner is required to record reasons in writing while appointing an Executive Officer; this is not a mere formality as the right of the hereditary trustee, to manage the subject temple, is being disturbed thereby; there are serious allegations against Machani Raghunath, the President of Kurni Daivachara Sangham, who was acting as if he is the custodian of the temple; Sri Machani Raghunath formed a “Society”, under the name and style of Neela Kanteswara Swamy temple Devastanalu Committee, though the subject temple is a religious institution under the provisions of the Act; the implead petitioner is the General Secretary of the society; the writ petitioner has been acting independently, and is trying to ensure that no loss is caused to the institution; and, instead of coming to the aid of the hereditary trustee/member of the founder family, the authorities were aiding the Kurni Daivachara Sangham – a fraudulent body. I. IS THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE KURNI DAIVACHARA SANGHAM ENTITLED TO BE IMPLEADED AS THE THIRD RESPONDENT IN THIS WRIT PETITION? An application (WPMP No.8414 of 2014) is filed by Machani Venkateswarlu seeking to implead himself as the 3rd respondent in the Writ Petition. It is his case that he belongs to the Kurni community; Sri Neela Kantewswara Swamy temple has been a Kurni community temple from times immemorial; the community had, as a measure of goodwill, made the writ petitioner’s family as the trustee of the temple to look after its affairs; the writ petitioner was made the trustee of the temple on 25.09.1980; the community, placing implicit trust in him, had never interfered with the administration of the temple by the writ petitioner; as the writ petitioner has been committing several irregularities from time to time, around 200 members of the Kurni community submitted a representation to the 1st respondent and the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments requesting them to take action against him; the temple has properties worth Rs.30 Crores; the writ petitioner has not put in any efforts to develop the temple; he has only utilised the income of the temple for his personal gain; he has not made the real income of the temple known to the public; the temple earns income every year as rents from shops and a house, as lease amount from its lands, as contributions for the car festival (Brahmostavalu), as rents from the temporary shops erected during the car festival, from temple Hundi collections, rent from the kalyana mandapam, donations and other sources; the writ petitioner has never maintained accounts for the temple funds; he has failed to submit budget estimates to the department every year for sanction; the shops and houses were not leased through public auction; he has neither given proper receipts nor remitted the amount of the temple into the Bank; the writ petitioner ought to have contributed a part of the temple income to the government, which he failed to; the temple accounts have never been audited nor has the writ petitioner submitted the Balance Sheets and the income and expenditure statements to the Endowments Department as required under law; the writ petitioner had constructed the Renuka Yellamma temple without permission from the endowments department; the municipal authorities had tried to lock the properties of the temple as the writ petitioner failed to pay municipal taxes from the year 2001 to 2010; it is only thereafter were the municipal taxes paid along with penalty; the writ petitioner has never maintained a bank account for the past 33 years ever since his appointment as a trustee; no one is aware of the actual hundi collections of the temple; Sri Machani Raghunath - President, and other members belonging to the Kurni community, submitted a representation to the 1st respondent and the District Collector, Kurnool requesting them to take action against the writ petitioner for the irregularities in administration of the temple; an enquiry was caused thereafter, and the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments found that the writ petitioner had committed several irregularities; the writ petitioner has not spent his own funds for the benefit of the temple; in compliance with the directions of this Court the writ petitioner was given a reasonable opportunity of being heard by the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments; as he is a devotee of the temple, and the members of his family have been staunch devotees of the temple for several years, the implead applicant is entitled to implead himself as a party respondent in the writ petition more so as he is aggrieved by the irregularities and illegal acts committed by the writ petitioner as the trustee of the temple. In his counter-affidavit filed thereto, the writ petitioner contends that the implead application is not maintainable; the implead applicant represents the cause of the Kurni Daivachari Sangham, which is a body established for abusing their position in the name of their caste, claiming to be superior to the institution; the writ petitioner has been subjected to harassment by the implead applicant necessitating his having to approach this Court repeatedly; no explanation is forthcoming as to why the implead applicant, along with 200 others, made a representation to the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments; such action, undertaken by a group of anti-social elements, should not have prompted the Commissioner of Endowments to appoint an Executive Officer; the 1st respondent should not have yielded to the threats, and blackmailing tactics, of persons who are out to rob the institution of its valuable resources; the Kurni Daivachara Sangham is a fraudulent body established only to defraud the subject temple, in the name of the Kurni community; for the past 10 years the Kurni Daivachara Sangham has misappropriated funds of the subject temple collecting rents for its open places; the Sangham is collecting rent of Rs.2,000/- per month from persons who had erected temporary structures in land belonging to the temple in Car street; in addition, the Kurni Daivachara Sangham is collecting Rs.9,000/- per month from six shops, belonging to the subject temple, for the past 12 years; though the writ petitioner has reported these facts to the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments several times, no action has been taken against them; instead, on the mere complaint of the Sangham, an enquiry is being caused against the writ petitioner; copies of certain receipts issued by the Sangham, enclosed along with the counter- affidavit, disclose that the illegal activities of the Kurni Daivacahara Sangham remain unchecked though they are collecting rents from the shops, the vacant places, and the Kalyana Mandapam, belonging to the temple; instead of taking action against them, the official respondents are lending them a helping hand in defrauding the subject temple of its valuable funds; he has submitted all the records for the past 20 years, but no negative report has been submitted by the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments warranting taking over administration of the subject temple; the implead applicant is aggrieved only because the writ petitioner is coming in the way of the so called Kurni Daivachara Sangham defrauding the temple of its valuable resources; and the Executive Officer is being appointed to aid the implead applicant, and to promote their illegal activities. In the reply affidavit filed thereto, the implead applicant states that he comes under the definition of “person having interest” under Section 2(18) of the Act as he and his family members are regular worshippers of the subject temple; the subject temple belongs to Kurni community and it has been a Kurni community temple from times immemorial; the Writ Petitioner also belongs to the Kurni community; the 2nd respondent has rightly appointed the 3rd respondent to the subject temple as the Writ Petitioner has committed several irregularities which were established in the enquiry conducted by the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments; the Assistant Commissioner filed his report before this Court in W.P.No.28414 of 2012, after serving a copy thereof on the writ petitioner; it is only thereafter was an order passed appointing an Executive Officer in the interest of better administration of the endowment institution; Section 29 of the 1987 Act does not require a notice to be issued to “persons interested” before appointing an Executive Officer for the institution in the interest of its better administration or for any other reason to be recorded in writing; appointment of an Executive Officer, for better administration, is reason by itself and no further reasons are required to be recorded under the 1987 Act; the 1st respondent has rightly passed orders appointing an Executive Officer for the temple; the Sangham has been constituted for the welfare and upliftment of the Kurni community; the funds of the Sangham are used for the welfare and upliftment of the Kurni community; allegations have been made by the petitioner, against the Sangham, only with a mala fide intention as the Sangham has not supported the Writ Petitioner in his irregular activities; and it is only on the basis of the report of the Assistant Commissioner has the Commissioner appointed an Executive Officer for the subject temple. The petitioner’s contention that the implead applicant is not a person aggrieved by the impugned order dated 10.01.2014, and lacks locus standi to file the application to implead himself as the 3rd respondent in the Writ Petition, is not tenable. The implead applicant has filed this application requesting that he be impleaded as the 3rd respondent in the Writ Petition to support and sustain the impugned order dated 10.01.2014. He is not aggrieved by the said order dated 10.01.2014. As the Writ Petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner dated 10.01.2014, it is he, and not the implead applicant, who is required to establish that he is a “person aggrieved”. A 'person aggrieved' is a man who has suffered a legal grievance or against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or he has been wrongfully refused something or his title to something has been wrongfully affected. (Thammanna v. K. Veera Reddy[4]; Re Sidebothem[5]; Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar[6]; and J. M. Desai v. Roshan Kumar[7]). As the petitioner has filed this Writ Petition, questioning the validity of the order dated 10.01.2014, it is his locus standi, and not that of the implead applicant, which necessitates examination. The term “locus standi” can be understood as a legal capacity to challenge an act, an order or decision. (Andhra Pradesh Wine Dealers Association v. Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation)[8]). The traditional rule of locus standi is that judicial redress is available only to a person who has suffered a legal injury by reason of a violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by the impugned action of the State or a public authority or any other person or who is likely to suffer a legal injury by reason of threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by any such action. The basis of entitlement to judicial redress is a personal injury to the property, body, mind or reputation arising from violation, actual or threatened, of the legal right or legally protected interest of the person seeking such redress. (S.P. Gupta v. Union of India[9]). The traditional rule of standing has now been jettisoned by Courts, and a new dimension has been given to the doctrine of “locus standi”. (Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India[10]; Andhra Pradesh Wine Dealers Association8). The strict rule of locus standi is relaxed, and a broad rule is evolved which gives the right of locus standi to any member of the pubic acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in instituting an action for redressal of a public wrong or public injury, but who is not a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper. (Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary[11]; Andhra Pradesh Wine Dealers Association8). A member of the public, having no personal gain or oblique motive, is empowered to approach the Court for enforcement of his constitutional or legal rights. (Sheela Barse v. Union of India[12]; Andhra Pradesh Wine Dealers Association8). The application filed by the implead petitioner, seeking to implead himself as the third respondent in the writ petition must be examined not from the stand point of whether he is a “person aggrieved” or whether he has “locus standi”, but whether there is any justification in his claim that he should also be heard in support of the order under challenge in the Writ Petition. Under Section 2(18)(b) of the 1987 Act a “person having interest” has been defined to include, in the case of a religious institution, a person who is in the habit of attending the performance of worship connected with the religious institution. In his affidavit, filed in support of WPMP No.8414 of 2014, the applicant asserts that he and his family members are regular worshippers at the subject temple. He, therefore, comes within the definition of a “person having interest” under Section 2(18)(b) of the 1987 Act. As noted hereinabove, the petitioner filed W.P.No.28414 of 2012 questioning the notice issued by the Assistant Commissioner dated 31.08.2012 asking him to attend the enquiry on 12.09.2012 in connection with the allegations made against him by the Kurni Daivachara Sangham which was arrayed as the 4th respondent in the said Writ Petition. The report submitted by the Assistant Commissioner dated 17.12.2013 refers to the Kurni Daivachara Sangham and 200 others having approached his office on 16.12.2013 requesting him to take action against the petitioner. It is on the basis of the report of the Assistant Commissioner dated 17.12.2013 was an Executive Officer appointed to the subject temple by the impugned proceedings dated 10.01.2014. The implead applicant is the General Secretary of the Kurni Daivachara Sangham. I see no reason, therefore, to reject his request that he be impleaded as the 3rd respondent in the present Writ Petition. WPMP No.8414 of 2014 is allowed, and the implead applicant is hereby impleaded as the third respondent in the Writ Petition. II. IS THE PETITIONER NOT ENTITLED TO INVOKE THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT MERELY BECAUSE HE HAS NOT EXHAUSTED HIS STATUTORY REMEDY OF A REVISION UNDER SECTION 93 OF THE 1987 ACT? The submission of the Learned Government Pleader for Endowments that the petitioner has the remedy, to question the order passed under Section 29 of the 1987 Act, before the Government under Section 93 of the 1987 Act; he has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court without availing the alternative remedy; and the Writ Petition as filed is, therefore, not maintainable; does not merit acceptance. Section 93(1) of the 1987 Act enables the Government, either suo motu or on an application, to call for and examine the record of the Commissioner in respect of any administrative direction taken or order passed under the 1987 Act. Appointment of an Executive Officer is an administrative decision, and the order appointing him is an order passed under the 1987 Act. The petitioner had the remedy under Section 93 of the 1987 Act to make an application to the Government to revise and set aside the order of the Commissioner appointing an Executive Officer to the subject temple under Section 29 of the 1987 Act. The question which necessitates examination is whether existence of the statutory remedy of a revision would disentitle the petitioner from invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without first exhausting the said alternative remedy? The power to issue prerogative Writs, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. The High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has the discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. It has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that, if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, it would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy would not operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been violation of principles of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks[13]; Popcorn Entertainment v. City Industrial Development Corpn.[14]; Mumtaz Post Graduate Degree College v. University of Lucknow[15]; Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan[16]). Where the order, complained against, is alleged to be illegal or invalid, as being contrary to law, a petition at the instance of person adversely affected by it, would lie to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Neither is the jurisdiction of the High Court ousted nor need such a petition be rejected on the ground that an appeal/revision lies to a higher forum. (Philips Worker's Union v. Registrar of Trade Unions[17]; Ram and Shyam Company v. State o f Haryana[18]). The High Court may exercise its writ jurisdiction despite the fact that an alternative remedy is available, inter alia, in a case where the same would not be an efficacious one. (Mumtaz Post Graduate Degree College15). The petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court complaining that the Commissioner had illegally and arbitrarily appointed the 2nd respondent as the Executive Officer of the subject temple contrary to Section 29 of the 1987 Act. As the petitioner complains of violation of his fundamental rights under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and since the Writ Petitioner was elaborately heard on merits, I see no reason to now relegate the petitioner to avail the statutory remedy of revision under Section 93 of the 1987 Act. III. RIGHT OF A HERIDITARY TRUSTEE UNDER THE 1966 ACT IS DISTINCT FROM THE RIGHTS CONFERRED ON A TRUSTEE UNDER THE 1987 ACT: Unlike the 1987 Act which, by way of Section 16, abolished hereditary trustees, the earlier 1966 Act conferred certain rights on them. While considering the provisions of the 1966 Act the Supreme Court, in Kakinada Annadana Samajam v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Hyderabad[19], held, that even if it were to be held that the rights of hereditary trustees constitute “property”, their regulation by the relevant provisions of the 1966 Act would, undoubtedly, be protected by Article 19(5); the restrictions imposed by the provisions of the 1966 Act on the hereditary trustees were reasonable, and in the interest of the general public; adequate safeguards were provided under the Act for ensuring that a hereditary trustee retains his office; he would be the Chairman of the Board; and he has various powers under the provisions of the Act. Following the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in Kakinada Annadana Samajam19, a learned Single judge of this Court, in Uppalapati Venkata Gopalakrishna Rao v. Commissioner of Endowments, Hyderabad[20], held that the restrictions imposed, by the provisions of the Act, on hereditary trustees were reasonable and in the interest of the general public; and the power to appoint non-hereditary trustees, or Executive Officers where there is already a hereditary trustee or trustees, notwithstanding that there is no mismanagement, is only for the purposes of ensuring better and efficient administration and management of the institution or endowment. Section 15 of the 1987 Act relates to constitution of a board of trustees for charitable or religious institution or endowment. Under sub-section (2) thereof, where the income of the institution is between Rs.2 lakhs to Rs.25 lakhs per annum, the Commissioner is required to appoint a board of trustees consisting of five persons. Where the income of the institution is less than Rs.2.00 lakhs per annum, Section 15(2) enables the Deputy Commissioner to constitute a board of trustees, consisting of three persons, for each temple keeping in view the traditions, sampradayams and wishes of the devotees. The first proviso to Section 15(2) enables the Deputy Commissioner, either in the interest of the institution or endowment or for any other sufficient cause or for reasons to be recorded in writing, to appoint a single trustee instead of a board of trustees. Under the third proviso to Section 15(2) where the board of trustees is not constituted for any reason, the recognised founder or member of the founder’s family shall discharge the functions of the board of trustees till a new board of trustees is constituted. Section 16, which relates to abolition of hereditary trustees, stipulates that, notwithstanding any compromise or agreement entered into or any scheme framed or a judgment, decree or order passed by any court, tribunal or other authority or in a deed or other document prior to the commencement of the 1987 Act and in force on such commencement, the rights of a person to hold the office of a hereditary trustee shall stand abolished on the commencement of the 1987 Act. As the 1987 Act came into force on 28.05.1987, appointment of the petitioner as the hereditary trustee, prior thereto on 25.09.1980, stood automatically abolished with effect from 28.05.1987, and thereafter his right, if any, is only to discharge the functions of the board of trustees till a new board of trustees is constituted in terms of the third proviso to Section 15(2) of the 1987 Act. Section 17 prescribes a detailed procedure, and for rules to be made, in calling for application for appointment of trustees and for their appointment as such. Section 17(2) stipulates that every trustee appointed under Section 15, shall hold office from the date of taking oath of office and secrecy. Section 23 relates to the powers of the trustees and, under sub-section (1) thereof, the trustee of every charitable or religious institution or endowment shall administer its affairs, manage its properties and apply its funds in accordance with the usage of the institution or endowment and all lawful directions which a competent authority may issue in respect thereof, and as carefully as a man of ordinary prudence of funds and properties would, if they were of this own. Under Section 23 a trustee is entitled, subject to the provisions of the 1987 Act, to exercise powers incidental to the prudent and beneficial administration of the charitable or religious institution or endowment, and to the performance of the functions entrusted to him. Section 24 relates to the duties of the trustees and, under sub-section (1)(a) thereof, the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, or the Assistant Commissioner, may require a trustee, or any person in possession of or responsible for the custody of any books, accounts, returns, reports or other information relating to the administration of the institution or endowment, its funds, income, monies or other properties connected therewith, to furnish or produce or cause to be furnished or produced for any inspection which may be made under the provisions of the 1987 Act. Section 28 relates to suspension, removal or dismissal of trustees. Section 28(1) enables the authority, competent to appoint a trustee, to suspend, remove or dismiss a trustee in cases where clauses (a) to (f) thereunder are attracted. Under clause (a), the said power can be invoked if the trustee fails to discharge the duties, and perform the functions of a trustee, in accordance with the provisions of the 1987 Act or the Rules made thereunder. Clause (d) is attracted in cases where the trustee commits any malfeasance or misfeasance or is guilty of breach of trust or misappropriation in respect of the properties of the institution or endowment. Where it is proposed to take action under Section 28(1), Section 28(2) requires the authority, competent to appoint the trustee, to frame a charge against the concerned trustee and give him an opportunity of meeting such charge, of testing the evidence adduced against him and of adducing evidence in his favour. Section 28(2) further requires the order of suspension, removal or dismissal to state every charge framed against the trustee, his explanation and the finding on such charge, together with the reasons therefor. Under Section 28(3), pending disposal of any charge framed against a trustee, the competent authority may suspend the trustee and appoint a fit person to discharge the duties and perform the functions of the trustee. It is evident, therefore, that the competent authority not only has the power to suspend, remove or dismiss the trustee as a measure of punishment, he also has the power to suspend a trustee pending enquiry into the allegations levelled against him. IV. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH AN EXECUTIVE OFFICER CAN BE APPOINTED UNDER THE SECOND PROVISO TO SECTION 29 OF THE 1987 ACT: Section 29 of the 1987 Act, which relates to appointment and duties of the Executive Officer, stipulates that there shall be an Executive Officer for every charitable or religious institution or endowment to be appointed by the Government in the case of institutions and endowments having income of Rupees one crore and above, and by the Commissioner in the case of other institutions and endowments included in the list published under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 6 of the 1987 Act. In respect of charitable or religious institutions or endowments, having an income of less than Rupees two lakhs per annum and included in the list published under clause (c) of Section 6 of the 1987 Act, appointment of an Executive Officer is not necessary. Under the first proviso to Section 29, where there is no Executive Officer in respect of any charitable or religious institution or endowment, the Trustee of any institution or endowment, where the income exceeds Rs.2 lakhs but is less than Rs.25 lakhs per anum, duly authorised by the Commissioner in this behalf, shall exercise the powers, perform the functions and discharge the duties of an Executive Officer. The second proviso to Section 29 of the Act enables the Commissioner to appoint an Executive Officer to any institution, having income of less than two lakhs per annum, if there are substantial immovable properties to the institution or if he is satisfied that such appointment is necessary in the interest of better administration of the institution or for any other reason to be recorded in writing. Appointment of an Executive Officer, under Section 29 of the 1987 Act, does not amount to the suspension, removal or dismissal of a Trustee under Section 28 of the Act, as the Executive Officer discharges his functions under the 1987 Act under the lawful directions of the Trustee. Even on the appointment of an Executive Officer, the trustee continues to hold office. Section 29(3)(a) of the Act stipulates that the Executive Officer, appointed under Section 29, shall be responsible for carrying out all lawful directions issued by the trustees from time to time. Section 29 (3)(b) requires the Executive Officer, subject to such restrictions as has been imposed by the Government, to discharge the duties enumerated in clauses (i) to (v) thereunder. Clause (i) of Section 29(3)(b) makes the Executive Officer responsible for proper maintenance and custody of all the records, accounts and other documents and of all the jewels, valuable money, funds and other properties and of the Institution or Endowment. Clause (ii) requires the Executive Officer to arrange for the proper collection of income and for incurring of expenditure. Clause (iv) requires the Executive Officer to deposit the money received by the institution or endowment in such bank or treasury as may be prescribed, and to be entitled to sign all orders or cheques against such moneys. The proviso to clause (iv) disables the Executive Officer from encashing fixed deposit certificates pertaining to any scheme or specific endowment under any circumstances. Clause (v) confers emergency powers on the Executive Officer regarding execution of works or the doing of any act. The proviso to clause (v) requires him to report forthwith to the trustee, any action taken by him under clause (v) and the reasons therefor, and to obtain his approval. Under Section 29(3) (c), the Executive Officer shall institute legal proceedings in the name of the institution or endowment or defend any such legal proceedings only with the prior approval of the trustee. Section 29(3)d) stipulates that the Executive Officer shall be the employee of the Government, and the conditions of his service shall be such as may be determined by the Government; and the salary, allowances, pension and other remuneration of the Executive Officer shall be paid out of the consolidated fund of the State, and shall later be recovered from the endowment administrative fund. While Section 29(3)(d) makes it clear that the Executive Officer is a government employee, he is required, under Section 29(3)(a) and (b), to discharge his functions under the lawful directions of the Trustee. As the first proviso to Section 15(2) enables a single trustee to be appointed, and the third proviso enables the member of the founder’s family to discharge the functions of the board of trustees only till a new board of trustees is constituted, the petitioner cannot claim, as of right, to be heard before an Executive Officer is appointed to the subject temple, more so as he cannot be said to have suffered civil consequences on an Executive Officer being appointed to the subject temple who would function under his lawful directions. V. STATUTORY POWER MUST NOT ONLY BE EXERCISED REASONABLY BUT ALSO IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES: While the Commissioner undoubtedly has the power, under the second proviso to Section 29, to appoint an Executive Officer for the subject temple, public officers must exercise the powers conferred on them in good faith, fairly, for the purpose for which the powers were conferred, without exceeding the limits of such powers and not unreasonably. Statutory power conferred for public purposes is conferred as it were upon trust, not absolutely, that is to say, it can validly be used only in the right and proper way in which the legislature, when conferring it, is presumed to have intended. (Dipak Babaria v. State of Gujarat[21]; R v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council[22]). VI. SATISFACTION OF THE COMMISSIONER, UNDER THE SECOND PROVISO TO SECTION 29, MUST BE BASED ON RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS: It is not in dispute that the subject temple owns immovable properties of an extent of Ac.15.65 cts. The question which necessitates examination is whether appointment of the second respondent, as the Executive Officer of the subject temple, was on the Commissioner being satisfied that such appointment is necessary in the interest of the better administration of the institution. It is only if the Commissioner was so satisfied could he have exercised power under the second proviso to Section 29 of the 1987 Act for it is well settled that where the statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other. If a statute has conferred a power to do an act, and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any manner other than the one prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted. (Dipak Babaria21; Taylor v. Taylor[23]; Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor[24]; Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh[25]; State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh[26]; Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad[27]; Dhananjaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka[28]; and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Essar Power Limited[29]). Formation of opinion must be preceded by application of mind as regards consideration of relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant o n e s . (Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai[30]; Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab[31]). The competent authority is required to form an opinion from circumstances suggesting what is set out in the Act and the Rules. Even if the formation of opinion is subjective the existence of circumstances, relevant to the inference as the sine qua non for action, must be demonstrable. (Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board[32]; Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India[33]). If the satisfaction, in regard to the existence of any of the conditions stipulated in the Act and the Rules, is based on no evidence or on irrelevant evidence or on extraneous considerations, the Court will be justified in quashing such an illegal order. (Swadeshi Cotton Mills33). In the formation of opinion regard must be had to all the factors relevant for the exercise of that power. Formation of opinion must be based on objective considerations. (India Cement Ltd. v. Union of India[34], Rajesh Kumar v. Dy. CIT[35]). There must exist circumstances which, in the opinion of the competent authority, suggest what has been set out in Act and the Rules. Existence of such circumstances is a condition precedent for formation of the required opinion and, if the existence of those conditions is challenged, Courts are entitled to examine whether those circumstances existed when the order was made. (Rohtas Industries Ltd v. S.D. Agarwal[36]). If it is shown that the circumstances do not exist, or that they are such that it is impossible for any one to form an opinion therefrom, the opinion can be challenged on the ground of non-application of mind or perversity or on the ground that it was formed on collateral grounds and was beyond the scope of the Statute. (Barium Chemicals Ltd.32). The impugned proceedings dated 10.01.2014 refers to the report of the Assistant Commissioner (Endowments) dated 17.12.2013. In his order dated 10.10.2014, the Commissioner observes that, in view of the circumstances reported by the Assistant Commissioner, Endowments Department, Kurnool in his report dated 17.12.2013, and in the interest of the better administration of the Endowments institution, the subject temple was kept under the additional charge of the second respondent. The second respondent was directed to assume charge as the Executive Officer of the subject temple, and report compliance. In his report dated 17.12.2013, the Assistant Commissioner stated that he had enquired into the matter and submitted a detailed report dated 07.03.2013 marking a copy thereof to the Commissioner of Endowments; and the Kurni Daivachara Sangham, Yemmiganur, and nearly 200 other persons, had approached his office on 16.12.2013, and had requested him to take action against the petitioner. The Assistant Commissioner recommended that, to avoid criticism and to set-right the affairs of the temple, the second respondent be appointed as the Executive Officer under Section 29 of the 1987 Act in the interest of the public. A copy of the report of the Assistant Commissioner dated 07.03.2013, which refers to the several deficiencies committed by the petitioner as noted hereinabove, was filed along with the counter-affidavit. In his reply affidavit, the petitioner has not denied the allegations made in the report of the Assistant Commissioner dated 07.03.2013 regarding the several deficiencies said to have been committed by him as the Trustee of the temple. Even otherwise, from a reading of the report of the Assistant Commissioner dated 07.03.2013, (which has been referred to by him in his letter addressed to the Commissioner on 17.12.2013 and which, in turn, forms the basis of the impugned proceedings dated 10.01.2014), it cannot be said that the satisfaction of the Commissioner, of the necessity to appoint an Executive Officer in the interest of better administration of the institution, suffers from non-application of mind to the consideration of relevant factors or that no circumstances exist which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, suggest what has been set out in the second proviso to Section 29 of the 1987 Act. The satisfaction, required to be arrived at under the second proviso to Section 29, is that of the Commissioner and not of this Court. This Court would neither substitute its satisfaction for, or sit in appeal over, the satisfaction of the Commissioner in this regard. VII. IS AN ELABORATE ORDER REQUIRED TO BE PASSED BY THE COMMISSIONER, AND COMMUNICATED TO THE TRUSTEE, BEFORE AN EXECUTIVE OFFICER IS APPOINTED? The requirements of the second proviso to Section 29 has been fulfilled as the Commissioner has, in the impugned order dated 10.01.2014, recorded his satisfaction based on the material evidence on record that the appointment of the second respondent, as the Executive Officer, is necessary in the interest of better administration of the subject temple. Would this not suffice as “reasons” for passing the impugned order as the satisfaction of the Commissioner in this regard is based on the material on record including the letter of the Assistant Commissioner dated 17.12.2013 and his earlier report dated 07.03.2013? In P. Sridhara Rao1, the impugned order dated 30.05.1978 was passed with reference to a memorandum dated 14-4-1978 issued by the Assistant Commissioner, Endowments Department, Ongole. The relevant recitals in the impugned order dated 30.05.1978 read as under: “In the circumstances reported by the Assistant Commissioner, Endowments Department, Ongole, and in the interests of public service and for the better management of the Institution, the Executive Officer of Temples, Malakonda, is appointed as Manager in additional charge to Shri Dattatreya Mandiram, Mogilicherla (Village), Kandukur Tq., Prakasam District. The Manager appointed is directed to take over complete charge of records, accounts, moveable and immovable properties etc., from the executive authorities of the Subject Institution.” It is in this context that the Supreme Court held that a mere look at these recitals showed that only on the basis of the memorandum dated 14-4-1978, passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Endowments Department, Ongole, was the impugned order passed; when they wanted to know whether there was anything on record to show that, at the relevant time, the temple was mismanaged or there was any reason for invoking the power for passing the impugned order, and whether the memorandum dated 14-4-1978 issued from the Assistant Commissioner’s Office was on record, the learned counsel for the respondents had fairly stated that there was no such evidence on record; and, in this view of the matter, the conclusion was inevitable that the impugned order was passed without application of mind; and there was no factual basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the competent authority under the relevant Sections of the Act under which the impugned order came to be passed. While holding that the Commissioner could appoint an Executive Officer, for discharging the duties of the subject institution or endowment, for exercising the powers and discharging the duties conferred on him by or under that Act, the Supreme Court observed that the power had to be exercised on relevant data and on necessary facts and material; it could not be exercised just off hand without there being any necessity for appointing an Executive Officer for the temple in public interest; nothing could be pointed out from the record as to why it was in the interest of the public, and for better management of the institution, that an Executive Officer should be appointed; and, only on this short ground, the appeal was required to be allowed. Unlike in P. Sridhara Rao1, there is adequate material on record in the present case, including the report of the Assistant Commissioner dated 07.03.2013, regarding deficiencies in the administration of the temple by the petitioner as its trustee, and the necessity to appoint an Executive Officer for its better administration. In Gopal Irani2, the first respondent was the hereditary trustee of Sri Satyanarayana Swamy Temple, Kakinada and, under a scheme settled by the Madras High Court in A.S, No.87 of 1946 decided on 15th July, 1949, the hereditary trustee of the institution was recognised as the sole trustee, entitled to receive the income, both in cash and kind, and to make the necessary disbursement and also to remain responsible for performance of poojas and services in the Temple. The first respondent-hereditary trustee approached this Court assailing an order appointing the appellant as the Executive Officer in respect of the institution, in directing him to take possession of the records, accounts, movable and immovable properties, etc, and to report compliance. In the counter-affidavit filed by respondent No.2, supporting the impugned order, various negligent acts of respondent No.1 were alleged regarding mismanagement of the temple; and it was contended that such reasons had motivated the appointment of an Executive Officer. It is in this context that the Division Bench of this Court held:- “……Learned counsel for the appellant submits Section 27 in terms as not requiring any notice to be given before the appointment of the executive officer. Admittedly, the respondent No.l has the subsisting right to manage the affairs of the temple, receive all the income and make disbursements, the rights which were allowed to him under the decree of the Madras High Court. The executive officer appointed to manage the affairs of the temple, to take possession of the records, accounts and all the properties, movable and immovable, would undoubtedly severely affect the interests of the respondent No.l adversely. It is now well settled in law that principles of natural justice are required to be mandatorily complied with in all actions taken by administration or statutory authorities unless the requirement can be said to be excluded either by express provision of the statute or by necessary implication. In other words, to all provisions of the statute under which actions are directed to be taken, compliance of the rules of natural justice are to be regarded as in-built provisions in the statute itself, the only exception being express exclusion of the requirement in the provisions of the statute or such exclusion by necessary implication. It is for this reason alone we would agree with the judgment of the learned single Judge that the order was not one properly passed particularly when the occasion for appointment of the executive officer was the alleged mismanagement of the temple. Discretion vested in the Commissioner to appoint the executive officer has to be judiciously exercised and if it was to be exercised because of defective or negligent management by the respondent No.1, he was to have been heard before any adverse action against him was taken. ….” (emphasis supplied) Unlike in Gopal Irani2, the petitioner was issued a notice dated 31.08.2012 by the Assistant Commissioner asking him to attend the enquiry on 12.09.2012 questioning which he filed W.P.No.28414 of 2012. This Court by order in W.P.M.P.No.36220 of 2011 in W.P.No.28414 of 2012 dated 11.09.2012, while permitting the petitioner to appear before the first respondent as required by the impugned memo dated 12.09.2012, directed the Assistant Commissioner to furnish copies of all the communications received from the Kurni Daivachara Sangham (respondent No.4), containing all the allegations against the petitioner, and other material sought to be referred to during the enquiry against the petitioner; and give him a reasonable opportunity of submitting his representation/response/ explanation to any such allegations and material before proceeding further with the enquiry. This Court further held that, during the enquiry thereafter also, the first respondent should give every reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and the fourth respondent and any other person affected or interested; and, while the enquiry thus could go on, it may not be concluded until further orders of this Court. When W.P.No.28414 of 2012 came up for hearing Sri M. Vidyasagar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that copies of the communications had since been furnished; the petitioner had submitted his reply to the notice; an enquiry was held and has been completed; and orders are required to be passed by the competent authority. While noting that it was only because of the interim order passed by this Court, earlier on 11.09.2012, that a final order was not passed though the enquiry had since been completed, this Court considered it appropriate to dispose of W.P. No.28414 of 2012, by its order dated 01.04.2014, permitting the competent authority to pass orders pursuant to the enquiry held against the petitioner earlier. In Sri Kommu Cheruvu Anjaneya Swamy Temple3, this Court held that the power to appoint the Executive Officer for a Section 6[c] temple, (an institution having income of less than Rs.2.00 lakhs per annum), is circumscribed by the following conditions: a) the institution must have substantial immovable properties, or b) the Commissioner must be satisfied that such appointment is necessary in the interest of better administration, or c) for any other reason to be recorded in writing by the Commissioner; the records produced before it did not disclose any of the aforesaid factors having weighed with the Commissioner in appointing the Executive Officer for the subject temple; and the records did not also disclose any reasons having been recorded by the Commissioner for appointing an Executive Officer. It is in such circumstances that appointment of the Executive Officer was set aside. The duty to give reasons for a decision must be distinguished from the fundamental principle of natural justice which imposes an obligation to provide information about the case which a party affected may want to answer. (R. v. Enfield L.B.C. exp. T.F. Union Ltd[37] Cf. Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority[38]; de Smith Woolf & Jowell – Judicial Review of Administrative Action – Fifth Edition). The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority, the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons, for the order passed by the administrative authority, be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case. (S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India[39]). Apart from any requirement imposed by the statute or statutory rule, either expressly or by necessary implication, there is no general principle or a rule of natural justice that an administrative authority should always, and in every case, give reasons in support of its decision. (Som Datt Datta v. Union of India[40]; S.N. Mukherjee39). The emphasis on recording reasons is that, if the decision reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinx”, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. A right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind of the authority before the Court. Except in cases where the requirement to record reasons is expressly or by necessary implication dispensed with, an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision. The inscrutable face of the sphinx is, ordinarily, incongruous with a judicial or a quasi-judicial performance. (Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. Collector[41]; State of W.B. v. Atul Krishna Shaw[42]; S.N. Mukherji39). Keeping in view the expanding horizons of principles of natural justice, the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. (S.N. Mukherji39). The requirement of recording of reasons operates as a valid restraint on arbitrary exercise of even administrative power. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds disregarding extraneous considerations. Reasons are as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” is not to be equated with a valid decision- making process. Transparency in decision-making not only makes decision-makers less prone to error but also subjects them to broader scrutiny. The requirement of recording reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in the decision-making. (Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan[43]; Oryx Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Union of India[44]). “Reasonableness” does not require reasons to be stated. However, if the facts point overwhelmingly to one conclusion, the decision-maker cannot complain if he is held to have had no rational reason for deciding differently and, in the absence of reasons, he is in danger of being held to have acted arbitrarily. (R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry ex.pl. Lonrho Plc.[45]; Administrative Law : HWR Wade & C.F. Forsyth – Tenth Edition). If an order, bereft of reasons, is challenged in judicial review proceedings, the reasons for the decision may be placed before the court. There is no legal obligation to record or communicate reasons for the decision, where the decision neither adversely affects vested rights nor does it have any civil consequences. (Union of India v. E.G. Nambudiri[46]). As absence of reasons and apparent non-application of mind would give the colour of arbitrariness to the State action, it would suffice if the action taken by the State is supported by valid reasons and reflects due application of mind which can be explained by way of affidavits filed before the Court. (Sindhi Education Society v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi)[47]). It cannot be laid down, as a general rule, that an order is a non-speaking order or is bereft of reasons simply because it is brief, and not elaborate. Every case has to be judged in the light of its own facts and circumstances. (Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi[48]; State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit[49]; Som Datt Datta40. As noted hereinabove, the impugned order of the Commissioner dated 10.01.2014 refers to the letter of the Assistant Commissioner dated 17.12.2013 which, in turn , refers to his earlier report dated 07.03.2013. In his report dated 07.03.2013, the Assistant Commissioner has pointed out several deficiencies in the administration of the subject temple by the petitioner –trustee. After referring to the letter of the Assistant Commissioner dated 17.12.2013, the Commissioner observes that, in the interest of better administration of the subject temple, it is necessary for the 2nd respondent to be appointed, and to assume charge, as its Executive Officer. While the reasons assigned in the impugned order dated 10.01.2014 are no doubt brief, they are sufficient to indicate the satisfaction of the Commissioner of the ingredients, of the second proviso to Section 29 of the 1987 Act, being attracted necessitating appointment of an Executive Officer for the subject temple. The impugned order cannot be said to be bereft of reasons. It cannot also be said that the decision of the Commissioner, in appointing an Executive Officer to administer the subject temple, is not informed by reason. The contention of Sri M. Vidyasagar, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the impugned order is bereft of reasons and suffers from non-application of mind, does not merit acceptance. VIII. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA IS DISCRETIONARY: The jurisdiction exercised by this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is discretionary. A writ of mandamus and a writ of certiorari are discretionary unlike a writ of Habeas Corpus which can be sought as a matter of right. One of the principles inherent is that the exercise of discretionary power should be for the sake of justice and, if quashing the order results in greater harm to the society, the Court may then refrain from exercising the power. (State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu[50]; K.S. Sanjeeva Rao v. District Tribal Welfare Officer, Khammam[51]). It is well to remember that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India being discretionary, a Writ is not issued as a matter of course. A writ of mandamus is not a writ of course or a writ of right but is, as a rule, discretionary. (C.R. Reddy Law College Employees' Association, Eluru, W.G. District v. Bar Council of India, New Delhi[52]; K.S. Sanjeeva Rao51). The power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India need not be exercised in every case where there is an error of law. In the name of correcting errors of law, Courts ought not to bring forth a situation which would result in injustice and if justice became the by-product, of an erroneous view of law, Courts are not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting errors of law. (Roshan Deen v. Preetilal[53]; K.S. Sanjeeva Rao51). One of the limitations imposed by this Court, on itself, is that it would not exercise jurisdiction unless substantial injustice has ensued or is likely to ensue. It would not allow itself to be turned into a court of appeal to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice. (Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah[54]; K.S. Sanjeeva Rao51). Even if a legal flaw might be electronically detected, this Court would not interfere save manifest injustice or a substantial questions of public importance is involved. (Rashpal Malhotra v. Mrs. Saya Rajput[55]; Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K.G.S. Bhatt[56]; K.S. Sanjeeva Rao51). The deficiencies pointed by the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments, in his report dated 07.03.2013, suffice for the satisfaction of the Commissioner regarding existence of the conditions stipulated under the second proviso to Section 29 of the 1987 Act and the need for appointment of an Executive Officer for the better administration of the subject temple and to safeguard its properties. I see no reason, therefore, to exercise discretion, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to interfere with the order of the Commissioner of Endowments dated 10.01.2014 appointing the 2nd respondent as the Executive Officer of the subject temple. IX. ALLEGATIONS LEVELLED BY THE PETITIONER AGAINST THE KURNI DAIVACHARA SANGHAM SHOULD ALSO BE ENQUIRED INTO: Before parting with the case, this Court must take note of the serious allegations made against the Kurni Daivachara Sangham by the petitioner. In his counter-affidavit, filed in W.P.M.P.No.8414 of 2014, the petitioner has levelled grave and serious allegations against t h e Kurni Daivachara Sangham of having defrauded the subject temple of its properties and its legitimate revenues. The petitioner is justified in his grievance that, while an enquiry was caused into the alleged irregularities committed by him, no action has even been initiated much less taken against the Kurni Daivachara Sangham, despite several representations having been submitted by him regarding their illegal and unlawful activities adversely affecting the interests of the subject temple. Among the deficiencies pointed out by the Assistant Commissioner, in his report dated 07.03.2013, is that the petitioner had allowed the Kurni Daivachara Sangham to utilise temple land, for using it as a burial ground, without the consent of the Department. Properties of religious institutions and endowments, under the 1987 Act, partake the character of public property and public officials, entrusted with the duty of protecting such properties, must exercise due care and caution to ensure that properties and revenues of religious institutions and endowments are not misappropriated or misutilised by those entrusted with its administration. The 1st respondent shall, with utmost promptitude, cause an enquiry into the allegations levelled by the petitioner against the Kurni Daivachara Sangham; and take suitable action against them, in accordance with law, if they are found to have misappropriated or misutilised the properties and funds of the subject temple. The entire exercise of causing an enquiry into their alleged illegal acts in relation to the subject temple, and taking action against them if they are found guilty thereof, shall be completed at the earliest and in any event not later than four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order. The 1st respondent shall also ensure that any amounts due to the subject temple, from either the petitioner or the Kurni Daivachara Sangham, are recovered and credited, to the bank account of the subject temple, in accordance with law. Subject to the aforesaid directions regarding an enquiry being caused into the alleged irregularities of Kurni Daivachara Sangham, the Writ Petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand dismissed. No costs. _____________________________ RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J Date:02-06-2014 Note: L.R. copy to be marked. B/o MRKR/CS [1] AIR 1996 SC 1334 [2] (1996(1) ALD 187 [3] Judgment in W.P. No.3122 of 2014 dated 14.02.2014 [4] AIR 1981 SC 116 [5] (1880) 14 Ch.D. 458 [6] (1975) 2 SCC 703 = AIR 1975 SC 2092 [7] AIR 1976 SC 578 [8] 2005(4) Laws (APHC) 106 [9] AIR 1982 SC 149 [10] (1982) 3 SCC 235: 1982 SCC (L&S) 275 [11] (1992) 4 SCC 305 [12] (1988) 4 SCC 226 [13] (1998) 8 SCC 1 [14] (2007) 9 SCC 593 [15] (2009) 2 SCC 630 [16] (2003) 7 SCC 546 [17] (1994) III LLJ 1159 Cal [18] AIR 1985 SC 1147 [19] (1970) 3 SCC 359 [20] 2002 (2) ALD 477 : 2002 (3) ALT 10 [21] (2014) 3 SCC 502 [22] [1988] AC 858 [23] (1875) 1 Ch D 426 [24] AIR 1936 PC 253 [25] AIR 1954 SC 322 [26] AIR 1964 SC 358 [27] 1999 (8) SCC 266 [28] 2001 (4) SCC 9 [29] 2008 (4) SCC 755 [30] (2005) 7 SCC 627 [31] (2008)1 SCC 728 [32] AIR 1967 S.C. 295 [33] (1981) 1 SCC 664 [34] (1990)4 SCC 356 [35] (2007)2 SCC 181 [36] AIR 1969 SC 707 [37] (1989) C.O.D. 466 [38] (1980) 1 W.L.R. 582, 59 [39] (1990) 4 SCC 594 [40] AIR 1969 SC 414 [41] (2012) 4 SCC 407 [42] (1991 Supp (1) SCC 414 AIR 1990 SC 2205 [43] (2010) 9 SCC 496 [44] (2010) 13 SCC 427 [45] (1989) 1 WLR 525 [46] (1991) 3 SCC 38 [47] (2010) 8 SCC 49 [48] (1977) 1 SCC 472 [49] AIR 1963 SC 1612 [50] (1994) 2 SCC 481 [51] 2006(1) ALD 165 [52] 2004(5) ALD 180 (DB) [53] (2002) 1 SCC 100 [54] AIR 1955 SC 425 [55] AIR 1987 SC 2235 [56] AIR 1987 SC 1972 "