"IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL \"F\" BENCH, MUMBAI SHRI VIKRAM SINGH YADAV, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER SHRI RAHUL CHAUDHARY, JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA No.5216/MUM/2025 (Assessment Year:2014-2015) Umesh A. Mishra 2601/Octavius, Hiranandani Gardens, Next to Heritage Garden, Powai, Mumbai – 400076 Maharashtra. [PAN:AAGPM0190F] …………. Appellant Income Tax Officer Ward 10(3)(1), Mumbai Room No.129A, 1st Floor, Aayakar Bhavan, Maharishi Karve Road, Mumbai – 400020. Maharashtra Vs …………. Respondent Appearance For the Appellant/Assessee For the Respondent/Department : : Shri K. Gopal & Shri Om Kandalkar Shri Manish Ajudiya Date Conclusion of hearing Pronouncement of order : : 26.03.2026 27.03.2026 O R D E R Per Rahul Chaudhary, Judicial Member: 1. The present appeal preferred by the Assessee is directed against the Order, dated 12/08/2021, passed by the National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC), Delhi [hereinafter referred to as the ‘CIT(A)’] whereby Learned CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal against the Assessment Order, dated 16/12/2016, passed under Section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’], for the Assessment Year 2014-2015. 2. There was delay of 1414 days in filing the present appeal before the Tribunal. When the appeal was taken up for hearing Learned Authorized Representative for the Assessee appearing before us Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.5216/Mum/2025 Assessment Year 2014-2015 2 submitted that the delay in filing the present appeal be condoned and in this regard reliance was placed upon the affidavit filed by the Assessee along with application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal which reads as under: “1. That, I have preferred an appeal before the Hon'ble ITAT against the order dated 12.08.2021 passed by the CIT(A) under section 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [hereinafter referred to as \"the Act\"]. 2. That, I had appointed Shri S L Jain, Chartered Accountant to handle my Income Tax matters and appear before the authorities. 3. That, the appeal before the Ld.CIT(A) was filed by Shri Jain against the assessment order for the A.Y. 2014-15 passed in my case. While filing the Form 35, Shri Jain had provided his Email address [i.e. sljain09@gmail.com] for the sake of receiving communication from NFAC. 4. That, before the Ld.CIT(A), Shri S L Jain made a submission on 01.02.2021 giving certain details. However, further notices dated 23.03.2021, 11.06.2021 and 08.07.2021 could not be responded by Mr Jain as he was not regularly attending the office due to ongoing phase of COVID-19 Pandemic. 5. That the Ld.CIT(A) vide order dated 12.08.2021 dismissed the appeal for he A.Y/2014-15. The said appeal order was sent to the E-mail ID of Shri S Jain as his E-mail ID was given in Form 35 and I had no knowledge of the same. 6. That, Shri S L Jain could not check his E-mail and take immediate action against the appeal order as he was going through some health issues. Subsequently, he was completely bed ridden and stopped attending the office. Thus, the order passed by the CIT(A) escaped attention and the appeal before the ITAT could not be filed within due date. 7. That, I was under the bonafide belief that the appeals for the A.Y. 2013-14 and 2014-15 are pending before the CIT(A). On 26.07.2025, I received a recovery notice dated 23.07.2025 from the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer wherein the outstanding demand for several assessment years was mentioned which included the demand of Rs.4,89,640/- for the A.Y. 2014-15. 8. That, immediately after receiving the recovery notices, I approached another tax consultant, who was recently appointed because of Mr. Jain's non-availability due to his health issues. 9. That, the tax consultant, in reply to the above recovery notices, filed response on 30.07.2025 wherein he has submitted year wise reply. In the said reply, he submitted that the demand for Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.5216/Mum/2025 Assessment Year 2014-2015 3 the A.Y. 2011-12 and 2012-13 would ould be substantially reduced in the set aside proceedings pursuant to the THARASHTR ITA Torder/The order giving effect to the ITAT order for the A.Y. 2011-12 and 2012-13 is awaited. With respect to the demands for the A.Y. 2013-14 and 2014-15, he submitted that the same are disputed in the appeal before the d.CIT(A). 10. That, while filing the response to the recovery notice dated 23.07.2025, my tax consultant discovered from my E-filing portal, that the order under section 250 of the Act was passed for the A.Y. 2014-15 dismissing the appeal. 11. That, I came to know about the order passed by the Ld. CIT(A) only on 26.07.2025. Thereafter, I sought advice from the tax professional and immediately file the appeal before the Hon'ble ITAT on 25.08.2025. The appeal filed before the Hon'ble ITAT is barred by limitation by 1414 days. 12. That, the delay in filing the appeal was due to a reasonable cause and beyond our control and the same is not deliberate.” 3. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. vs. Mst.Katiji & Ors.[1987 (2) SCR 387] held that the expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature in the Limitation Act is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court Observed that a liberal approach should be adopted on account of the following: (a) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. (b) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (c) 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. (d) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.5216/Mum/2025 Assessment Year 2014-2015 4 against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay. (e) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 4. In the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [1998 (7) SCC 123] the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the purpose of providing limitation is not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack malafides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. In this context it was observed: “It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in reversional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on whole untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first cut refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior cut would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations in not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.5216/Mum/2025 Assessment Year 2014-2015 5 Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. the object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate” 5. In our view the above judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court come to the aid of the Assessee in the present case. The power to condone the delay in approaching the court has been conferred to enable substantial justice by disposing of matters on merits. In our view, the conduct of the Assessee does not smack of malafides in the present case. A copy of the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of the Assessee for the Assessment Year 2011- 2012 [ITA No.1848/Mum/2018] and Assessment Year 2012-2013 [ITA No.4620/Mum/2019], dated 13/03/2024 has been placed on record wherein Assessee was represented by Shri S. L. Jain. The aforesaid supports the contention of the Assessee that Shri S. L. Jain was taking care of the tax matters and the order passed by the Learned CIT(A) had skipped the attention of the Assessee and the tax consultant on account of prevailing facts as explained in the above affidavit. On receiving recovery notice, dated 23/07/2025, the Assessee got knowledge of the Impugned Order having been passed and thereafter, took steps to file present appeal Tribunal on 25/08/2025. In the present case, the Assessee was not set to gain Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.5216/Mum/2025 Assessment Year 2014-2015 6 anything by delaying the filing of the present appeal. Therefore, accepting the explanation given by the Assessee to be bonafide and reasonable, we hold that in the present case the Assessee was prevented by the sufficient cause from filing the appeal before the Tribunal within the prescribed time. Therefore, keeping in view the above judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and proceed to adjudicate the grounds/additional grounds raised on merits. 6. During the hearing, the Learned Authorized Representative for the Assessee had, at the outset, pressed into service the following Additional Ground raised vide Letter, dated 16/03/2026: “Additional Ground of Appeal The statutory notice issued under section 143(2) of the Act and the consequential assessment proceeding are bad in law. 1. The notice dated 22.09.2015 issued by the Income Tax Officer under section 143(2) of the Act is without jurisdiction and bad in law. The returned income of the Appellant is Rs.60,17,995/- which exceeds Rs.20 Lacs. Thus, in light of the Instruction No.1/2011 [F.No.187/12/2010-IT (A-1), Dated 31.01.2011, the jurisdiction to issue the statutory notices and complete the assessment lies with the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax/Assistant Commissioner of Income. Hence, the notice under section 143(2) of the Act issued by the ITO and consequential assessment proceedings are bad in law and the same may be quashed.” 7. The Learned Authorised Representative for the Assessee submitted that the assumption of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer for framing assessment under Section 143(3) of the Act for the Assessment Year 2014-2015 was bad in law since the notice under Section 143(2) of the Act was issued by Income Tax Officer whereas the jurisdiction has been vested in the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax in terms of Instruction No.1 of 2011 issued by Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT). Reliance was also placed on judicial precedents forming part of the paper-book. 8. Per contra Learned Departmental Representative opposed the admission of the additional ground and submitted that the additional ground was being raised for the first time before the Tribunal. Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.5216/Mum/2025 Assessment Year 2014-2015 7 Learned Departmental Representative submitted that the raise ground was raised belatedly and should not be entertained. 9. In rejoinder, the Learned Authorised Representative reiterated the submission and submitted the legal contention raised by the Assessee did not require inquiry into new facts and therefore, the Tribunal could entertain and adjudicate the same in view of judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Thermal Power Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT: 229 ITR 383. 10. We have considered the rival submissions and have perused the relevant material on record. Keeping in view the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Thermal Power Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT: 229 ITR 383, we admit the additional ground raised by the Assessee since the same is a legal grounds which can be adjudicated on the basis of material on record without inquiring into new facts. 11. On perusal of Instruction No.1 of 2011 issued by CBDT, we find that same provides revised monetary limits for assumption of jurisdiction and/or assigning cases to Income Tax Officers and Deputy Commissioners/Assistant Commissioners and read as under: “References have been received by the Board from the large number of taxpayers especially from moffssil areas, that the existing monetary limits for assigning cases to Deputy Commissioners/Assistant Commissioners and ITOs is causing hardship to the taxpayers. INSTRUCTION NO.1/2011 [F.NO.187/12/2010-IT(A-I)] DATED 31-1-2011 References have been received by the Board from a large number of taxpayers, especially from mofussil areas, that the existing monetary limits for assigning cases to ITOs and DCs/ACs is causing hardship to the taxpayers, as it results in transfer of their cases to a DC/AC who is located in a different station, which increases their cost of compliance. The Board had considered the matter and is of the opinion that the existing limits need to be revised to remove the abovementioned hardship. An increase in the monetary limits is also considered desirable in view of the increase in the scale of trade and industry since Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.5216/Mum/2025 Assessment Year 2014-2015 8 2001, when the present income limits were introduced. It has therefore been decided to increase the monetary limits as under: Income Declared (Mofussil areas) Income Declared (Metro cities) ITOs ACs/DCs ITOs ACs/DCs Corporate returns Upto INR.20 lacs Above INR.20 lacs Upto INR.30 lacs Above INR.30 lacs Non- corporate returns Upto INR.15 lacs Above INR.15 lacs Upto INR.20 lacs Above INR.20 lacs Metro charges for the purpose of above instructions shall be Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Chennai, Delhi, Kolkata, Hyderabad, Mumbai and Pune. The above instructions are issued in supersession of the earlier instructions and shall be applicable with effect from 1-4-2011”. 12. The above Instruction No.1 of 2011 issued by CBDT provided that where income declared by a non-corporate assessee in metro cities (including Mumbai) exceeded INR.20 Lacs, the jurisdiction to frame assessment vests with Deputy Commissioners/Assistant Commissioners of Income Tax. In the present case it is admitted position that Assessee had filed return of income for the Assessment Year 2014-2015 on 31/03/2015 declaring return of INR.60,17,955/- which exceed that threshold limit of INR.20 lacs fixed by Instruction No.1 of 2011 issued by the CBDT. 13. In the case of Ashok Devichand Jain Vs. Union of India (452 ITR 43) (Bom), the Bombay High Court had, after examining the income tax return filed by a corporate assessee, quashed the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act as being without jurisdiction observing that the same was issued by the Income Tax Officer and not by Deputy Commissioner/Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. The relevant extract of the said judgment reads as under: \" Petitioner is impugning a notice dated 30th March, 2019 issued under section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (the Act) for A.Y 2012-13 and order passed on 18th November, 2019 rejecting Petitioner's abjection to reopening on various grounds. 2 The primary ground that has been raised is that the Income Tax Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.5216/Mum/2025 Assessment Year 2014-2015 9 Officer who issued the notice under section 148 of the Act, had no jurisdiction to issue such notice. According to Petitioner as per instruction No. 1/2011 dated 31st January, 2011 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, where income declared/returned by any Non-Corporate assessee is up to Rs 20 lakhs, then the jurisdiction will be of ITO and where the income declared returned by a Non Corporate assessee is above Rs. 20 lakhs, the jurisdiction will be of DC/AC 3. Petitioner has filed return of income of about Rs. 64,34,663/- and therefore, the jurisdiction will be that of DC/AC and not ITO. Mr. Jain submitted that since notice under section 148 of the Act has been issued by ITO, and not by DC/AC that is by a person who did not have any jurisdiction over Petitioner, such notice was bad on the count of having been issued by an officer who had no authority in law to issue such notice 4. We have considered the affidavit in reply of one Mr. Suresh G. Kamble, ITO who had issued the notice under section 148 of the Act. Said Mr. Kamble, ITO, Ward 12(3)(1), Mumbai admits that such a defective notice has been issued but according to him. PAN of Petitioner was lying with ITO Ward (12)(3)(1), Mumbai and it was not feasible to migrate the PAN having returned of income exceeding Rs. 30 lakhs to the charge of DCIT, Circle 1203)(1), Mumbai, as the time available with the ITO 12(3)(1) was too short to migrate the PAN after obtaining administrative approval from the higher authorities by 31st March, 2019. 5. The notice under section 148 of the Act is jurisdictional notice and any inherent defect therein is not curable. In the facts of the case, notice having been issued by an officer who had no jurisdiction over the Petitioner, such notice in our view, has not been issued validly and is issued without authority in law. 6. In the circumstances, we have no hesitation in setting aside the notice dated 30th March, 2019.” 14. In the present case, the notice under Section 143(2) of the Act was issued on 22/09/2015 by the Income Tax Officer, Ward 10(3)(3) Mumbai. It is the case of the Assessee that the very assumption of jurisdiction is bad in law being violative of Instruction No. 1 of 2011 issued by CBDT. During the course of hearing the Learned Authorised Representative had placed reliance upon the decision of Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Monarch & Qureshi Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.5216/Mum/2025 Assessment Year 2014-2015 10 Builders Vs. ACIT [2024] 161 taxmann.com 356. In that case notice issued to a corporate assessee under Section 143(2) of the Act as the same was issued by Income Tax Officer though the return filed by the assessee exceeded the monetary limit of INR.30 Lacs prescribed by Instruction No. 1 of 2011 issued by CBDT in respect of corporate assessees. The Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal quashed the aforesaid notice issued under Section 143(2) of the Act holding that the assumption of jurisdiction by the Income Tax Officer was contrary to Instruction No. 1 of 2011 issued by CBDT and therefore, bad in law. After taking into consideration the above judgment of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Ashok Devichand Jain (supra) and other decision of Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal, the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal held as under: “7. The Assessee further claimed that according to the monetary limits set out by such Instruction No.1/2011 (supra) in the metropolitan cities, the ITOs are empowered to make the assessments of the corporate assesses upto Rs.30 lakhs as declared and above Rs.30 lakhs income declared by the Assessee, only Deputy Commissioners/Assistant Commissioners are empowered to make the assessments. In the instant case, admittedly, the income declared by the Assessee for the year under consideration is Rs.67,99,440/- and, therefore, only DC/AC had the power to issue the notice under section 143(2) of the Act and to make the assessment. Somehow the notice under section 143(2) of the Act dated 31/08/2015 was issued by the Income-tax Officer, Ward 33(2)(3) who was not empowered and infact had no jurisdiction to decide the assessment over and above R.30 lakhs and therefore vitiated the assessment order dated 30/09/2016 passed under section 143(3) of the Act by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle-33(2)(3), Mumbai and hence, the assessment order itself is liable to be quashed. 7.1 The Assessee in support of its contention also relied upon various judgments. For the sake of brevity, we are reproducing below, the dictum laid down by the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Ashok Devichand Jain v. Union of India [2023] 151 taxmann.com 70/452 ITR 43 (Bom.)/[Writ Petition No. 3489 of 2029 decided on 08/03/2012]: xx xx Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.5216/Mum/2025 Assessment Year 2014-2015 11 7.2 We observe that though the Hon'ble High Court has dealt with the notice issued under section 148 of the Act; however, it is a fact that the Hon'ble High Court has also dealt with the Instruction No.1/2011 dated 31/01/2011 issued by the CBDT which is also under consideration before us and notice under section 148 of the Act is also a statutory and jurisdictional notice and, therefore, goes to the root of the assessment. The Hon'ble High Court has clearly held that ITO who had issued the notice under section 148 of the Act had no jurisdiction over the petitioner. The notice under section 148 of the Act is a jurisdictional notice and any inherent defect therein is not a curable one. 7.3 We further observe that the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of Ketan Tokershi Shah v. Dy. CIT [IT Appeal No. 1107 (Mum.) of 2023, dated 26-7-2023] also dealt with the identical issue and the Instruction No.1/2011 (supra) as well and following the judgment in the case of Ashok Devichand Jain (supra) held the assessment completed under section 143(3) of the Act by issuing notice under section 143(2) of the Act by the DCIT, Central Circle-2, Thane as without jurisdiction and consequently quashed the assessment. 7.4 We further observe that the jurisdictional co-ordinate bench in the case of Dy. CIT v. Parmar Built Tech Parmar Estate [IT Appeal No. 4124 (Mum.) of 2012, dated 12-9-2022] also dealt with the identical issue and by following the judgment of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Ashok Devichand Jain (supra), quashed the assessment order in the identical facts. 7.5 We further observe that Hon'ble co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal at Kolkata in the case of Bhagyalaxmi Conclave (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [IT Appeal No. 519 (Kol.) of 2019, dated 3-2- 2011] also dealt with the notice issued under section 143(2) of the Act and ultimately held the notice issued by the DCIT as defective and consequently quashed the assessment by holding that the assessing authority, who passed the order under section 143(3) of the Act i.e. DCIT-13(1), Kolkata has not issued notice under section 143(2) of the Act and also for the reason that the jurisdiction of these cases lies with the ITO and not the DCIT. 7.6 It is trite to say that as per dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Asstt. CIT v. Hotel Blue Moon [2010] 188 Taxman 113/321 ITR 362, the notice under section 143(2) of the Act is mandatory for making the assessment and therefore the same is required to be issued by the Assessing Officer, who has jurisdiction and is empowered to issue the notice under section 143(2) of the Act and to Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.5216/Mum/2025 Assessment Year 2014-2015 12 make the assessment. Hence, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances in totality specific to the effect ITO who issued the jurisdictional notice u/s 143(2) had no jurisdiction and infact was not empowered to make the assessment, and therefore respectfully following the dictum laid down by Hon'ble High Court in Ashok Devichand Jain case (supra) to the effect that \"inherent defect is not curable\", we do not have any hesitation to quash the assessment proceedings. Consequently, the assessment order itself is quashed. 8. xx xx 9. In the result, appeal filed by the Assessee is allowed.” (Emphasis Supplied) 15. The Revenue has failed to bring on record any material to distinguish above judgment/decision either on facts or in law. Therefore, respectfully following the same, we quash notice, dated 22/09/2015, issued by the Income Tax Officer under Section 143(2) of the Act. Consequently, the Assessment Order, dated 22/02/2016 passed under Section 143(3) of the Act for the Assessment Year 2014-2015 is quashed. Thus, Additional Ground No. 1 raised by the Assessee is allowed, while all other grounds raised by the Assessee are dismissed as having been rendered infructuous. The appeal preferred by the Assessee is, thus, partly allowed. We note that identical view was taken by the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of the Assessee for the Assessment Year 2013-2014 [ITA No.6476/Mum/2025, dated 23/03/2026]. 16. In terms of the paragraph 15 above, appeal preferred by the Assessee is partly allowed. Order pronounced on 27.03.2026. Sd/- Sd/- (Vikram Singh Yadav) Accountant Member (Rahul Chaudhary) Judicial Member मुंबई Mumbai; िदनांकDated : 27.03.2026 Milan, LDC Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.5216/Mum/2025 Assessment Year 2014-2015 13 आदेश की Ůितिलिप अŤेिषत/Copy of the Order forwarded to : 1. अपीलाथŎ/ The Appellant 2. ŮȑथŎ/ The Respondent. 3. आयकर आयुƅ/ The CIT 4. Ůधान आयकर आयुƅ/ Pr.CIT 5. िवभागीय Ůितिनिध, आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण, मुंबई/ DR, ITAT, Mumbai 6. गाडŊ फाईल / Guard file. आदेशा नुसार/ BY ORDER, सȑािपत Ůित //True Copy// उप/सहायक पंजीकार /(Dy./Asstt. Registrar) आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण, मुंबई / ITAT, Mumbai Printed from counselvise.com "