Ms. Nikita Kumari and Shiksha Choudhary and Nikita Keena and Ms. Palak Jangid and Ms. Seema Tanwar and Ms. Shobha Tanwar and Ms. Palak Sharma and Ms. Sanju Saini and Ms. Khushbu Kumawat and Ms. Shyalu and Ms. Palak Yadav V. Union of India and Ministry of Human Resources Development and Ministry of Defence and State of Rajasthan and Central Board of Secondary Education and Sainik School, Chittorgarh

CW/23478/2017

AI Insights

The case involves multiple petitions filed by minor girls through their parents, challenging the exclusion of girls from the pre-entrance examination for admission to Sainik School, Chittorgarh, as advertised by the Principal of the school. The petitioners argued that this exclusion constituted gender discrimination and violated their rights under Article 21-A of the Constitution of India and the Rights to Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009. The Union of India, Ministry of Defence, State of Rajasthan, and other educational authorities were respondents. The primary legal issue was the maintainability of the writ petitions at the Jaipur Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan, given the territorial jurisdiction constraints outlined in the High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order, 1976.

• Counselvise Citation: [2018] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 701884 (HC-RAJASTHAN)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 05-02-2018
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association Vs. Union of India, Om Prakash Srivastava Vs. Union of India, Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India, Nawal Kishor Sharma Vs. Union of India, Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors., State of Rajasthan. and Ors. v. Swaika Properties and Anr., Aligarh Muslim University and Anr. v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. and Anr., Union of India and Ors. v. Adani Exports Ltd. and Anr., National Textile Corporation Ltd. and Ors. v. Haribox Swalram and Ors.
• Laws Referred To: Article 21-A of the Constitution of India, Rights to Children to free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: MAHI YADAV; R D RASTOGI; ASHISH KUMAR
• Assessee Lawyers: SAMEER JAIN
• Keywords: Territorial jurisdiction; Gender discrimination; Pre-entrance examination; Sainik School Chittorgarh
• Section: 226(1); 226(2)

Judgement Text

"1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR BENCH ORDER 1. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.23478/2017) Ms. Nikita Kumari Through Her Parents Shri Vinod Gurjar and Mrs. Kamlesh Devi, R/o Roop Nagar, Village and Post Kotputli, District Jaipur (Raj.) ----Petitioner Versus 1. Union of India, Through Secretary Ministry of Human Resources Development, Shastri Bhavan, Jeevan Deep Building, Parliament Street, West Block No.1, R.K.Puram, New Delhi- 110001 2. Ministry of Defence, Through Secretary, South Block, New Delhi- 110001 3. State of Rajasthan, Through Secretary of Education Department, Jaipur, Raj. 4. Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education, Shiksha Kendra, 2, Community Centre, Preet Vihar, Delhi- 110092 5. Principal/Chief Administrator, Sainik School, Chittorgarh (Raj.) ----Respondents 2 (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 21623 / 2017) Shiksha Choudhary (Minor) Through Her Parents and Natural Guardians Father Shri Jairam Choudhary and Mother Mrs. Meera Devi, R/o Danithalod Ki, Village- Badnagar, Post Office- Paota, Th- Kotputali, Dist- Jaipur, Raj.303106 ----Petitioner Versus 1. Union of India Through Secretary Ministry of Human Resources Development, Shastri Bhavan, Jeevan Deep Building, Parliament Street, West Block No. 1, R.K. Puram, New Delhi-110 001. 2. Ministry of Defence Through Secretary, South Block New Delhi-110001. 3. State of Rajasthan Through Secretary of Education Department, Jaipur, Raj. 4. Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education, Shiksha Kendra, 2, Community Centre, Preet Vihar, Delhi- 110092. 5. Principal/Chief Administrator, Sainik School, Chittorgarh (Raj.) ----Respondents 3. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 21624 / 2017) Nikita Keena (Minor) Through Her Parents and Natural Guardians Father Shri Rajaendra Kumar Jat and Mother Mrs. Santosh Devi, R/o Village Post Pragpura, Th. - Kotputali, Dist - Jaipur, Raj. 303107 ----Petitioner 2 Versus 1. Union of India Through Secretary Ministry of Human Resources Development, Shastri Bhavan, Jeevan Deep Building, Parliament Street, West Block No. 1, R.K. Puram, New Delhi-110 001. 2. Ministry of Defence Through Secretary, South Block New Delhi-110001. 3. State of Rajasthan Through Secretary of Education Department, Jaipur, Raj. 4. Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education, Shiksha Kendra, 2, Community Centre, Preet Vihar, Delhi- 110092. 5. Principal/Chief Administrator, Sainik School, Chittorgarh (Raj.) ----Respondents 4. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 23438 / 2017) Ms. Palak Jangid Through Her Parents Shri Dinesh Jangid and Mrs. Sheetal Devi, R/o. Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur (Raj.) ----Petitioner Versus 1. Union of India, Through Secretary Ministry of Human Resources Development, Shastri Bhavan, Jeevan Deep Building, Parliament Street, West Block No. 1, R.K. Puram, New Delhi-110 001. 2. Ministry of Defence Through Secretary, South Block, New Delhi- 110001. 3. State of Rajasthan, Through Secretary of Education Department, Jaipur. Raj. 4. Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education, Shiksha Kendra, 2, Community Centre, Preet Vihar, Delhi- 110092. 5. Principal/Chief Administrator, Sainik School, Chittorgarh (Raj.) ----Respondents 5. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 23439 / 2017) Ms. Seema Tanwar Through Her Parents Shri Gopiram Tanwar and Mrs. Mamta Devi, R/o. V.P.O. Narehda, Kotputli, District Jaipur (Raj.) ----Petitioner Versus 1. Union of India, Through Secretary Ministry of Human Resources Development, Shastri Bhavan, Jeevan Deep Building, Parliament Street, West Block No. 1, R.K. Puram, New Delhi - 110001. 2. Ministry of Defence, Through Secretary, South Block, New Delhi - 110001. 3. State of Rajasthan, Through Secretary of Education Department, Jaipur. Raj 4. Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education, Shiksha Kendra, 2, Community Centre, Preet Vihar, Delhi - 110092. 5. Principal/chief Administrator, Sainik School, Chittorgarh (Raj.) ----Respondents 3 6. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 23440 / 2017) Ms. Shobha Tanwar Through Her Parents Shri Krishan Singh Tanwar and Mrs. Sannu Kanwar, R/o V.P.O. Nihalpura, Jaipur (Raj.) ----Petitioner Versus 1. Union of India, Through Secretary Ministry of Human Resources Development, Shastri Bhavan, Jeevan Deep Building, Parliament Street, West Block No. 1, R.K. Puram, New Delhi-110 001. 2. Ministry of Defence Through Secretary, South Block, New Delhi- 110001. 3. State of Rajasthan, Through Secretary of Education Department, Jaipur, Raj. 4. Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education, Shiksha Kendra, 2, Community Centre, Preet Vihar, Delhi- 110092. 5. Principal/Chief Administrator, Sainik School, Chittorgarh (Raj.) ----Respondents 7. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 23441 / 2017) Ms. Palak Sharma Through Her Parents Shri Ghan Shyam Sharma and Mrs. Ranji Devi, R/o. Dhani Bagwali, Tehsil Kotputli, Jaipur (Raj.) ----Petitioner Versus 1. Union of India, Through Secretary Ministry of Human Resources Development, Shastri Bhavan, Jeevan Deep Building, Parliament Street, West Block No. 1, R.K. Puram, New Delhi-110 001. 2. Ministry of Defence Through Secretary, South Block, New Delhi- 110001. 3. State of Rajasthan, Through Secretary of Education Department, Jaipur. Raj. 4. Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education, Shiksha Kendra, 2, Community Centre, Preet Vihar, Delhi- 110092. 5. Principal/Chief Administrator, Sainik School, Chittorgarh (Raj.) ----Respondents 8. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 23476 / 2017) Ms.Sanju Saini Through Her Parents Shri Dilip Saini and Mrs. Shashi Devi, R/o Near Bhudhi Ka Hotel, Village and Post Kotputli, District Jaipur (Raj.) ----Petitioner Versus 1. Union of India, Through Secretary Ministry of Human Resources Development, Shastri Bhawan, Jeevan Deep Building, Parliament Street, West Block No.1, R.K. Puram, New Delhi- 110001 2. Ministry of Defence, Through Secretary, South Block, New Delhi- 110001 3. State of Rajasthan, Through Secretary of Education Department, Jaipur Raj. 4. Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education, Shiksha Kendra, 2, Community Centre, Preet Vihar, Delhi - 110092 4 5. Principal/Chief Administrator, Sainik School, Chittorgarh, (Raj.) ----Respondents 9. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 23477 / 2017) Ms. Khushbu Kumawat Through Her Parents Shri Ram Kumar Kumawat and Mrs. Ramkala Devi, R/o Dhani Bhagwali Village and Post Kotputli, District Jaipur (Raj.) ----Petitioner Versus 1. Union of India Through Secretary Ministry of Human Resources Development, Shastri Bhavan, Jeevan Deep Building, Parliament Street, West Block No. 1, R.K. Puram, New Delhi-110 001. 2. Ministry of Defence Through Secretary, South Block New Delhi-110001. 3. State of Rajasthan, Through Secretary of Education Department, Jaipur, Raj. 4. Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education, Shiksha Kendra, 2, Community Centre, Preet Vihar, Delhi- 110092. 5. Principal/ Chief Administrator, Sainik School, Chittorgarh (Raj.) ----Respondents 10. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 23480 / 2017) Ms. Shyalu Through Her Parents Shri Desh Raj Singh and Mrs. Meena Kanwar, R/o Krishna Vihar, Village and Post Kotputli, District Jaipur ----Petitioner Versus 1. Union of India, Through Secretary Ministry of Human Resources Development, Shastri Bhavan, Jeevan Deep Building, Parliament Street, West Block No.1, R.K. Puram, New Delhi- 110001 2. Ministry of Defence, Through Secretary, South Block, New Delhi - 110001 3. State of Rajasthan, Through Secretary of Education Department, Jaipur. Raj. 4. Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education, Shiksha Kendra, 2, Community Centre, Preet Vihar, Delhi - 110092 5. Principal/Chief Administrator, Sainik School, Chittorgarh (Raj.) ----Respondents 11. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 23481 / 2017) Ms. Palak Yadav Through Her Parents Shri Mahesh Kumar Yadav and Mrs. Suman, Kiradod, Praghpura, Tehsil Kotputli, Jaipur (Raj.) ----Petitioner Versus 1. Union of India, Through Secretary Ministry of Human Resources Development, Shastri Bhavan, Jeevan Deep Building, Parliament Street, West Block No.1, R.K. Puram, New Delhi- 110001 2. Ministry of Defence, Through Secretary, South Block, New Delhi- 110001 3. State of Rajasthan, Through Secretary of Education Department, Jaipur Raj. 4. Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education, Shiksha Kendra, 2, Community Centre, Preet Vihar, Delhi-110092 5 5. Principal/Chief Administrator, Sainik School, Chittorgarh, Rajasthan ----Respondents Date of Order: February 05, 2018. PRESENT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK SHARMA Mr. Sameer Jain ] for the petitioners. Ms. Mahi Yadav] Mr. R.D. Rastogi, ASG with Mr. Ashish Kumar, for Union of India. BY THE COURT: REPORTABLE The petitioners impugn the advertisement for Pre-entrance Examination in AY 2018-19 for admission into the Sanik School Chittorgarh as issued by the Principal Sainik School Chittorgarh limited to eligible boys alone and prays for a direction that the respondents impleaded being Union of India, through Secretary Ministry of Human Resources Development and others, the State of Rajasthan and the Principal Sainik School be directed to allow the petitioners, all girl students to participate in the Pre-entrance Examination 2018-19 and seek admission in the Sainik School, Chittorgarh. Aside of the merit of the petitioners' case alleging gender discrimination entailed in the exclusion of girl students from the 6 pre-entrance examination in issue contrary to their rights under the Article 21-A of the Constitution of India as also the Rights to Children to free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 ( hereafter 'the Act of 2009'), this court is required to first address the preliminary objection of Mr. R.D. Rastogi, ASG as to maintainability of the writ petition before the Jaipur Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, on ground of its lack of territorial jurisdiction. The preliminary objection is therefore being first addressed. Under the High Court of Rajasthan (Establishment of a Permanent Bench at Jaipur) Order, 1976 (hereafter `the Order of 1976') a permanent bench of the High Court of Rajasthan was established on 23-12-1976 at Jaipur to exercise the jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court in respect of cases arising in districts of Ajmer, Alwar, Bharatpur, Bundi, Jaipur, Jhalawar, Jhunjhunu, Kotah, Sawai Madhopur, Sikar and Tonk. With reference thereto the Acting Chief Justice of Rajasthan notified that effective 31-1-1977 all cases arising in revenue districts of Banswara, Barmer, Bikaner, Bhilwara, Chittorgarh, Churu, Dungarpur, Ganganagar, Jaisalmer, Jalore, Jodhpur, Nagaur, Pali, Sirohi and Udaipur be disposed of by the court at Jodhpur, while those in the remaining districts by the Jaipur Bench. The order of 1976 and notification dated 23-12-1976 have been interpreted by the Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan High 7 Court Advocates' Association Vs. Union of India and others [(2001)2 SCC 294] to mean a territorial division of the state of Rajasthan for the purpose of exercise of the Rajasthan High Court's jurisdiction. Matters arising in the districts covered by the Jaipur Bench and Principal seat Jodhpur in terms of notification dated 23-12-1976 are to be heard exclusively by respective courts at the Principal seat Jodhpur and Jaipur Bench—except where part of cause of action also arises in a district under the control of the Principal seat or the Jaipur Bench to confer jurisdiction upon it with reference to Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. Thus a matter arising in the districts, as per the territorial division, covered by the Principal seat Jodhpur can be heard at the Jaipur bench only if a part of cause of action in a case set up is shown to have arisen in any of the districts covered by Jaipur Bench in terms of the notification dated 23-12- 1976. Evidently Article 226(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India deal with the jurisdiction of a court exercising its extraordinary equitable jurisdiction. However, the question as to whether a cause of action or a part thereof has arisen in particular territorial jurisdiction is a pure question of fact in each case. Theoretically a cause of action is a bundle of material facts required to be proved by the petitioner to be entitled to the relief claimed. Other facts not 8 material to the relief claimed are not part of a cause of action. Nor is even the evidence which is necessary to prove a material fact constituting a cause of action, or a part of a cause of action. For a detailed discussion on what constitutes a cause of action and by extension a part thereof it would suffice to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Om Prakash Srivastava Vs. Union of India [(2006)6 SCC 207] which has copiously set out its description. It has been held as under:- 9. By \"cause of action\" it is meant every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, a bundle of facts, which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to succeed in the suit. (See Bloom Dekor Ltd. v. Subhash Himatlal Desai and Ors. 10.In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) \"cause of action\" means every fact, which it is necessary to establish to support a right to obtain a judgment. (See Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar). 11. It is settled law that \"cause of action\" consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to claim relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. (See South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.). 12. The expression \"cause of action\" has acquired a judicially 9 settled meaning. In the restricted sense \"cause of action\" means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the reaction. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously, as noted above, the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary, to prove each fact. comprises in \"cause of action\". (See Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Association v. Union of India and Ors. 13. The expression \"cause of action\" has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts, which a plaintiff must prove in order to succeed. These are all those essential facts without the proof of which the plaintiff must fail in his suit. (See Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh). 14. The expression \"cause of action\" is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases of suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person. (See Black's Law Dictionary). In. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary a \"cause of action\" is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In \"Words and Phrases\" (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the phrase \"cause of action\" in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf. (See Navinchandra N. 10 Majithia v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.). 15. In Halsbury Laws of England (Fourth Edition) it has been stated as follows: \"Cause of action has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. 'Cause of action' has also been taken to mean that a particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action.\" Similarly in the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Another [(2004)6 SCC 254] the Apex Court has dealt with the issue at length thus:- Cause of Action: 6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitutes the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily. 11 7. Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads thus: 226\"(2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. \" 8. Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under : \"20 Other Suits to be instituted where defendant reside or cause of action arises—Subject to the limitation aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction - (a)-(b) (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. \" 9. Although in view of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure the provisions thereof would not apply to a writ proceedings, the phraseology used in Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Clause (2) of Article 226, being in pari materia, the decisions of this Court rendered on interpretation of Section 20(c) CPC shall apply to the writ proceedings also. Before proceeding to discuss the matter further it may be pointed out that the entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a decree is the material facts. The expression material facts is also known as integral facts. 10. Keeping in view the expressions used is Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction of cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of the 12 Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter. 11. In Chand Kour v. Partap Singh , it was held: \"[T]he cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.\" 12. This Court in Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors. held that the question as to whether the court has a territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition, must be arrived at on the basis of averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise thereof being immaterial. 13. This Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission's case (supra) held that all necessary facts must form an integral part of the cause of action. It was observed: \"So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action.\" 14. In State of Rajasthan. and Ors. v. Swaika Properties and Anr., this Court opined that mere service of a notice would not give rise to any cause of action unless service of notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The said decision has also been noticed in Oil and Natural Gas Commission (supra). This Court held : \"The answer to the question whether service of notice is. an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend upon the 13 nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. 15. In Aligarh Muslim University and Anr. v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. and Anr.: this Court lamented: \"2. We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction. The contracts in question were executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, even the contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction. The arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to function there. Merely because the respondent was a Calcutta-based firm, the High Court of Calcutta seems to have exercised jurisdiction where it had none by adopting a queer line of reasoning. We are constrained to say that this is case of abuse of jurisdiction and we feel that the respondent deliberately moved the Calcutta High Court ignoring the fact that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that Court. It clearly shows that the litigation filed in the Calcutta High Court was thoroughly unsustainable.\" 16. In Union of India and Ors. v. Adani Exports Ltd. and Anr. it was held that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition it must disclose that the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide the dispute and the entire or a part of it arose within its jurisdiction. 17. Recently, in National Textile Corporation Ltd. and Ors. v. Haribox Swalram and Ors., a Division Bench of this Court held : 12.1. As discussed earlier, the mere fact that the writ petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the 14 correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of action and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the view to the contrary taken by the Division Bench cannot be sustained. In view of the above finding, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.\" 18. The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the court. Mr. Sameer Jain submitted that part of the cause of action in the instant petition to approach the High Court Bench at Jaipur lies in the factum of the petitioners' fundamental rights under Article 21-A of the Constitution of India as also their Rights under the Children to free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 which are being infringed at Jaipur by virtue of the impugned advertisement issued by the Principal, Sainik School Chittorgarh. I am afraid that the said argument flies in the face of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. (supra) wherein it was held as under:- 19. Passing of a legislation by itself in our opinion do not confer any such right to file a writ petition unless a cause of action arises therefor. 21. A parliamentary legislation when receives the assent of the President of India and is published in the Official Gazette, unless specifically excluded, will apply to the entire territory of India. If 15 passing of a legislation gives rise to a cause of action, a writ petition questioning the constitutionality thereof can be filed in any High Court of the country. It is not so done because a cause of action will arise only when the provisions of the Act or some of them which were implemented shall give rise to civil or evil consequences to the petitioner. A writ court, it is well settled, would not determine a constitutional question in a vacuum. It is thus apparent that material fact/s which constitute the cause of action or a part thereof must be established to have happened in the territory over which the court where the petition is filed has jurisdiction. In the instant case the petitioner is aggrieved of the advertisement issued by Principal, Sainik School Chittorgarh for participation in the pre-entrance examination in 2018-19 in so far as it limits applicants to eligible boys to the complete exclusion of otherwise eligible girls. The petitioner is only aggrieved of the advertisement aforesaid issued at Chittorgarh and of no fact occurring in the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur available under the Order of 1976 only to districts mentioned therein which does not include Chittorgarh. In fact the State of Rajasthan through the Secretary of Education department has been mechanically impleaded in the petition fishing for jurisdiction of the Jaipur Bench without as much as an averment as to his responsibility and participation direct or indirect in the holding of the pre-entrance examination 2018-19 as advertised for admission to Sainik school Chittorgarh. Evidently the infraction of 16 the petitioners' fundamental right under Article 21-A of the Constitution of India as also under the Rights to Children to free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 alleged in this petition also to constitute cause of action is not in their implementation by way of the pre-entrance examination within the territorial jurisdiction of this court nor do the petitioners assert any illegality by an act/ omission within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. The petitioners cannot seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the Jaipur Bench on an aggrievement from the mere contravention of their fundamental rights under Article 21-A of the Constitution of India and the Rights to Children to free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 as the Apex court has categorically held that passing of a legislation by itself does not confer any right to file a writ petition unless its implementation at a given place within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned court gives rise to civil or evil consequences to the petitioner. That is absent in the instant case as nothing as to such civil and evil consequences flowing from an act within the jurisdiction of this court has even remotely been averred in the petition. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu and others [(1994)4 SCC 711), the Apex Court held that since averments in the petition did not disclose that even a part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court, the said court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ 17 petition. Similarly in the instant case no factual averments as to even a part of cause of action arising within the territorial jurisdiction of this court have been set out in any of the petitions, and as evident from the prayer clause in the petition no relief is sought against any body/ person at Jaipur qua the consideration for admission to the pre-entrance examination for the Sainik School Chittorgarh. The infraction of the petitioners' right is thus not at Kotputli or Jaipur. Contrarily it is obviously at Chittorgarh from where the offending advertisement confined to calling upon boys alone to seek admission to Sainik School Chittorgarh was issued. The cause of action, in the instant case, in my considered view from the averment in the petition has thus wholly arisen at Chittorgarh within the jurisdiction of Principal seat of this court at Jodhpur. The mere fact that the petitioners read the advertisement within the territorial jurisdiction of this court where they reside or that the alleged discriminatory impact of the advertisement has affected them within the territorial jurisdiction of this court is also of no avail. These aspects are only incidental and not material for the determination of the right of the petitioners for participation in the pre entrance examination 2018-19 for admission to Sainik School Chittorgarh as agitated in this petition. The only material fact which the petitioners have to prove for obtaining the relief prayed for in 18 these petitions is that they have been arbitrarily excluded from the pre entrance examination for admission to Sainik School Chittorgarh in terms of the advertisement issued by the said school. The whole of the cause of action in facts of the case is thus at Chittorgarh within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal seat, Jodhpur in view of the Order of 1976. Mr. Sameer Jain, counsel for the petitioner has however emphatically relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Nawal Kishor Sharma Vs. Union of India [AIR 2014 SC 3607] and submitted that as the petitioners as residents of districts within the jurisdiction of the Jaipur Bench have suffered the consequence of the impugned advertisement within the territorial jurisdiction of this court, atleast a part of cause of action arises here and hence these petitions before the Jaipur Bench are maintainable under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Sameer Jain submitted that in the aforesaid case of Naval Kishor Sharma (supra) the petitioner was an employee of the Shipping Corporation of India at Mumbai and subsequent to his being declared unfit to continue in service returned to his home at Gaya (Bihar) from where he claimed disability pension. That claim was rejected by the Shipping Corporation of India by a communication received by the petitioner at Gaya. The rejection of the claim for disability pension having been 19 so communicated within the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court, a writ petition was laid before the Patna High Court against the Shipping Corporation of India claiming disability pension. The Patna High Court rejected the petition citing lack of its territorial jurisdiction. In a SLP thereagainst, the Apex Court held that the rejection of the petitioner's claim for disability pension communicated to him at Gaya constituted a part of cause of action at Patna and hence the petition laid before the Patna High Court was maintainable. Mr. Sameer Jain submitted that the Apex Court so holding, set aside the judgment of the Patna High court and allowed Nawal Kishor's claim for disability pension. He submitted that on analogy, the petitioners in the instant case having been adversely affected at Jaipur and near about by their exclusion in the impugned advertisement issued by the Principal, Sainik School Chittorgarh, this court has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain these petitions. I am however of the considered view that the case of Nawal Kishor Sharma (supra) turned its own special facts and does not lay down any immutable ratio decidendi binding on this court, more so in view of the Apex Court's ratio decidendi categorically set out in Om Prakash Srivastava (supra) and Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. (supra) referred to above. Paras 20, 21 and 22 of Nawal Kishor Sharma (supra) make it clear that the Apex Court dealt with the case as a special case. Reference to the following paras is apposite:- 20 20. We have perused the facts pleaded in the writ petition and the documents relied upon by the Appellant. Indisputably, the Appellant reported sickness on account of various ailments including difficulty in breathing. He was referred to hospital. Consequently, he was signed off for further medical treatment. Finally, the Respondent permanently declared the appellant unfit for sea service due to dilated cardiomyopathy (heart muscles disease). As a result, the Shipping Department of the Government of India issued an order on 12.4.2011 cancelling the registration of the appellant as a seaman. A copy of the letter was sent to the Appellant at his native place in Bihar where he was staying after he was found medically unfit. It further appears that the Appellant sent a representation from his home in the State of Bihar to the Respondent claiming disability compensation. The said representation was replied by the Respondent, which was addressed to him on his home address in Gaya, Bihar rejecting his claim for disability compensation. It is further evident that when the appellant was signed off and declared medically unfit, he returned back to his home in the District of Gaya, Bihar and, thereafter, he made all claims and filed representation from his home address at Gaya and those letters and representations were entertained by the Respondents and replied and a decision on those representations were communicated to him on his home address in Bihar. Admittedly, appellant was suffering from serious heart muscles disease (Dilated Cardiomyopathy) and breathing problem which forced him to stay in native place, wherefrom he had been making all correspondence with regard to his disability compensation. Prima facie, therefore, considering all the facts together, a part or fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Patna High 21 Court where he received a letter of refusal disentitling him from disability compensation. 21. Apart from that, from the counter affidavit of the Respondents and the documents annexed therewith, it reveals that after the writ petition was filed in the Patna High Court, the same was entertained and notices were issued. Pursuant to the said notice, the respondents appeared and participated in the proceedings in the High Court. It further reveals that after hearing the counsel appearing for both the parties, the High Court passed an interim order on 18.9.2012 directing the authorities of Shipping Corporation of India to pay at least a sum of Rs. 2.75 lakhs, which shall be subject to the result of the writ petition. Pursuant to the interim order, the respondent Shipping Corporation of India remitted Rs.2,67,270/- (after deduction of income tax) to the bank account of the appellant. However, when the writ petition was taken up for hearing, the High Court took the view that no cause of action, not even a fraction of cause of action, has arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. 22. Considering the entire facts of the case narrated hereinbefore including the interim order passed by the High Court, in our considered opinion, the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction. As noticed above, at the time when the writ petition was heard for the purpose of grant of interim relief, the respondents instead of raising any objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction opposed the prayer on the ground that the writ petitioner-appellant was offered an amount of Rs. 2.75 lakhs, but he refused to accept the same and challenged the order granting severance compensation by filing the writ petition. The impugned order, therefore, 22 cannot be sustained in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. (underlining mine) From the perusal of aforesaid paras it is evident that the Apex Court apparently exercised its plenary jurisdiction referable to Article 142 though not expressly so stated, for the petitioner's benefits in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. That was in a situation where subsequent to the filing of the petition by Naval Kishore, the respondents had made certain payments to him and that he was suffering from serious ailments at Gaya (Bihar), which would have made it unjust to require him thereafter to file proceedings in the Mumbai Courts for claiming his disability pension. Having considered the facts of the case, I am of the considered view that whole of the cause of action in the advertisement issued by the Principal, Sainik School Chittorgarh excluding girls from admission to Sainik School Chittorgarh for academic session 2018- 19 occurred at Chittorgarh within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Seat of this court at Jodhpur. No part of cause of action, in the facts of the case, has arisen within the jurisdiction of this court at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur where the petitioners reside. In terms of bifurcation of territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court the Jaipur Bench has no jurisdiction to entertain these petitions. 23 The petitions are therefore liable to be dismissed on the aforesaid ground. Dismissed. (Alok Sharma), J. arn/ 24 All corrections made in the order have been incorporated in the order being emailed. Arun Kumar Sharma, Private Secretary. "