NARAYANAN.K.U. V. KERALA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OP(KAT)/15/2015

AI Insights

The case revolves around the cancellation of an advice memo issued to Narayanan K.U., a Livestock Inspector Grade II, by the KPSC. The memo was cancelled because Narayanan had applied for the same post in multiple districts, contrary to the selection notification which explicitly prohibited such actions. The KPSC's decision to cancel the advice memo was challenged by Narayanan in the Kerala Administrative Tribunal and subsequently in the Kerala High Court. The High Court's decision, which upheld the KPSC's action, was based on the finding that Narayanan had indeed applied to multiple districts and had made false declarations in his application. The court also addressed the legal principles surrounding fraud and mistake in administrative actions, emphasizing that fraud vitiates all actions and can lead to the cancellation of benefits obtained through such deceit.

• Counselvise Citation: [2022] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 760762 (HC-KERALA)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 26-10-2022
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Appukuttan Pillay v. Kerala Public Service Commission, KPSC v. Malini, KPSC v. Hareendran, K.G. Ashok & Ors. v. Kerala Public Service Commission & Ors., A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh, Maharaj Krishnan Bhat & Ans. v. State of J & K & Ors., Hamza Haji v. State of Kerala, Babu v. Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB)
• Laws Referred To: Kerala State & Subordinate Services Rules (KS&SSR Part II), Kerala Public Service Commission Rules of Procedure
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: U P C SASIDHARAN
• Assessee Lawyers: C P PRASAD; NAVEEN T; POOJA SURENDRAN; S RAMESH
• Keywords: Administrative Tribunal; Fraud; Limitation Period; Public service commission; Advice memo cancellation
• Section: 39; 3§-C(); 22(iii)

Judgement Text

"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALEXANDER THOMAS & THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE VIJU ABRAHAM WEDNESDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2022 / 4TH KARTHIKA, 1944 OP(KAT) NO. 15 OF 2015 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN TA 768/2012 OF KERALA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM RA 37/2014 OF KERALA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM PETITIONER/S: NARAYANAN.K.U. AGED 46 YEARS LIVE STOCK INSPECTOR GRADE II, VETERINARY SUB CENTRE, MANGALAM DAM, PALAKKAD DISTRICT. BY ADVS. SRI.C.P.SUDHAKARA PRASAD (SR.) SRI.NAVEEN.T SMT.POOJA SURENDRAN SRI.S.RAMESH RESPONDENT/S: 1 KERALA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OFFICE, PATTOM, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM. 2 DISTRICT OFFICER PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, DISTRICT OFFICE, PALAKKAD, KERALA. 3 DISTRICT ANIMAL HUSBANDRY OFFICER PALAKKAD, KERALA. - : 2 :- 4 DIRECTOR OF ANIMAL HUSBANDRY DEPARTMENT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM. *ADDITIONAL R5 IMPLEADED. 5 ADDL.R5:STATE OF KERALA. REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,ANIMAL HUSBANDRY DEPARTMENT.GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,THIRUVANANTHAPURAM. IS IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED 26/10/2022 IN I.A.714/15 IN OP (KAT) 15/15. OTHER PRESENT: SRI. ASHOK B. SHENOY-AMICUS CURIAE SRIU. P.C.SASIDHARAN-SC THIS OP KERALA ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 26.10.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..1.. (CR) ALEXANDER THOMAS, ANU SIVARAMAN & VIJU ABRAHAM, JJ. ============================================= OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 [arising out of the impugned final order dated 25.11.2014 in T.A. No.768/2012 and the impugned order dated 6.1.2015 in R.A. No.37/2014] ============================================== Dated this the 26th day of October, 2022 J U D G M E N T ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. This case has come up before this Full Bench, consequent to the reference order dated 13.3.2020, rendered by the Division Bench of this Court, in view of the apparent conflict of views in the Division Bench judgments rendered in Appukuttan Pillay v. Kerala Public Service Commission (KPSC) [1984 KLT 880 (DB)] and KPSC v. Malini [1996 (2) KLT 332 (DB)] on the one hand, and that in the case of KPSC v. Hareendran [1999 (2) KLT 63 (DB)] on the other hand. 2. The facts of the case, dealt with by the Division Bench in Appukuttan Pillay's case supra, were relating to the cancellation of advice memo, ordered by the Kerala Public Service Commission (\"PSC\" for short). In that case, the petitioner therein had misrepresented qualifications, regarding experience, in the applications submitted to OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..2.. the PSC, and it was held therein that the period of limitation of one year from the date of the advice, as stipulated in the first proviso to Rule 3(c) of Part II of the Kerala State & Subordinate Services Rules (\"KS&SSR Part II\" for short), would be attracted in such a case for the PSC to cancel the advice, and that, since the cancellation of advice memo was effected in that case beyond the period of one year, the impugned action was illegal and ultra vires. 3. In KPSC v. Malini [1996 (2) KLT 332 (DB)] the Division Bench had considered the case, where the candidate had applied for selection to more than one district, contrary to the stipulations in the selection notification, and she had suppressed the actual fact that she had applied to more than one district, and had tried to take undue advantage. However, it was held therein that the abovesaid period of limitation of one year from the date of advice, as stipulated in the first proviso to Rule 3 (c) of KS & SSR Part II, would be applicable where the PSC takes action to cancel the advice memo, and since the impugned cancellation of the advice memo was rendered after the expiry of the period of limitation of one year from the date of advice, it was held that the impugned action of the PSC is illegal and ultra vires. OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..3.. 4. However, the Division Bench of this Court, in the decision in KPSC v. Hareendran [1999 (2) KLT 63 (DB)], has held that, where the candidate has secured advise memo, issued by the PSC, on account of the fraud played by the candidate on the PSC, then the period of limitation of one year from the date of advice, as stipulated in the first proviso to Rule 3(c), will not apply, inasmuch as Rule 3(c) explicitly applies only in the case where the PSC is constrained to cancel advice, where it is subsequently found that such advice was made under a mistake and so, the said period of limitation would apply only in a case where the PSC takes steps for cancelling the advice, which was made earlier, on the basis of a mistake, and that, where the advice memo was issued, on account of the fraud played by the candidate on the PSC, the said period of limitation in Rule 3(c) will not apply. 5. In the instant case, the PSC has issued advice memo, as per Ext.P-1 dated 6.10.2003, in favour of the petitioner, for appointment to the post of Livestock Inspector Grade-II in the Animal Husbandry Department, Palakkad, and consequent to the appointment order issued by the appointing authority, he had joined duty in the said post on 30.10.2003. Later, the PSC has issued Ext.P-2 show cause notice dated 18.1.2006, directing the petitioner to show cause as to why his advice OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..4.. memo shall not be cancelled, as he has obtained selection and advice for appointment after suppressing the fact that he had applied to more than one district for the above selection in question, contrary to the stipulations in the selection notification, and that he had made a false statement in his application that he has not applied to more than one district. Consequent thereto, after considering Ext.P-3 reply dated 27.1.2006, tendered by the petitioner, the respondent PSC authorities have issued the impugned Ext.P-4 proceedings dated 16.5.2006, cancelling Ext.P-1 advice memo dated 6.10.2003, on account of the above false statement made by the petitioner in the application. In the instant case, the impugned Ext.P-4 advice cancellation order dated 16.5.2006 has been issued after the expiry of the period of limitation of one year from the date of the advice memo, which has been issued as per Ext.P-1 dated 16.10.2003. The Division Bench, while considering the instant case, has referred the matter to the Full Bench as per reference order dated 13.3.2020, noting the conflict of 0pinions of the Division Bench decisions, as above. 6. We have heard Sri.S.Ramesh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri.P.C.Sasidharan, learned Standing Counsel for the Kerala Public Service Commission appearing for R-1 & R-2 (PSC), OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..5.. Sri.Saigi Jacob Palatty, learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for the official respondents 3 & 4 and Sri.Ashok B.Shenoy, learned Amicus Curiae appointed by this Court. 7. During the course of hearing, all the learned Advocates, appearing for the various parties concerned, more particularly the learned counsel for the petitioner, has urged before us that, in view of the long pendency of this matter, inasmuch as the impugned Ext.P-4 advice cancellation order has been issued as early as on 16.5.2006 and interim stay has been granted from 25.5.2006 onwards, this Court, apart from answering the question of law referred, may also finally decide the main matter in the writ petition, in the interest of justice, as empowered in terms of Sec. 7 of the Kerala High Court Act. 8. In view of the abovesaid unanimous plea, made by all the learned Advocates concerned, and also taking into account that, after answering the question of law referred, then the disposal of the main case may not require any further detailed adjudication, we are proceeding to answer not only the reference, but also to finally dispose of the main matter in the WP(C). 9. It may be pertinent to refer to the factual details in this case. The respondent PSC had invited applications for selection to the OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..6.. post of Livestock Inspector Grade-II/Poultry Farm Assistant/Milk Recorder/Store Keeper/Enumerator in the Animal Husbandry Department for all the 14 Districts in the State, through a common selection notification, published in the Gazette dated 16.12.1997. As per the specific conditions in the selection notification, it has been clearly stipulated that the candidates should not send applications to the post to more than one district, and that if the candidate gets selected, by applying to more than one district, his/her selection will be cancelled and disciplinary action will also be taken against him/her. 10. The petitioner had applied for selection to the above post in Palakkad district, as per Ext.R1-(a) application dated 21.1.1998. The objective type written examination was held by the PSC on 4.11.2000, for the above common selection for all the 14 Districts concerned. Later, the petitioner's name was duly included in the ranked list published on 10.12.2002, with Rank No. 13 (Register No. P263) in Category No. IV – Open Quota, in pursuance of the above selection process in Palakkad District. Later, the petitioner was advised by the 2nd respondent-District PSC Officer, Palakkad, for appointment to the post of Live Stock Inspector Grade-II, Animal Husbandry Department, Palakkad, as per Ext.P-1 advice memo dated 6.10.2003. The appointing authority (R-3 – OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..7.. District Animal Husbandry Officer, Palakkad) had issued appointment order dtd. 23.10.2003 to the petitioner, in pursuance of Ext. P-1 advice memo dated 6.10.2003, and the petitioner had joined duty for the above post on 30.10.2003. 11. A perusal of Ext. R-1(a) application dated 21.1.1998 would clearly show that, in Column No. 8(a) of the application, the petitioner has clearly chosen 'Palakkad' as the district office of his choice and, in answer to Column No. 8(b) of Ext. R-1(a), as to whether he has applied to the post to any other district, as per the above selection notification dated 16.12.1997, the petitioner has clearly answered in the negative, affirming that he has not applied to more than one district. 12. Further, from the pleadings and materials on record, it appears that some of the candidates, who were included in the ranked list, but had not secured selection and advice memo, approached this Court, by filing Writ Petition (Civil) No. 16282/ 2005 on 20.5.2005 (copy of which has been produced as Ext.P-5 in the TA), in which the State & PSC authorities were impleaded as official respondents and the petitioner herein (K.U.Narayanan) was impleaded as contesting respondent No. 6 therein. The pleas raised in WP(C). No. 16282/2005 were to the effect that many candidates have made false statements in OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..8.. their applications, that they have not applied to more than one district, but had, in fact, applied to more than one district, contrary to the selection notification, and that such candidates, including the petitioner herein (R-6 therein), have thus been illegally given advice memos and such candidates should be disqualified and that an enquiry in that regard should be conducted by the PSC authorities, etc. 13. It appears that the PSC, on making enquiries, could find out from the document, as per Ext. R-1(b), that the petitioner, apart from submitting Ext. R-1(a) application dated 21.1.1998 for the above post in Palakkad district, had also submitted another application for the very same post in Idukki District, as evident from Ext. R-1(b) document, which would show that the petitioner's other application for Idukki district was registered as J-264, but that he had not appeared in the written test. By then, going by the pleadings in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent PSC authorities, it appears that the eliminated applications, received in Idukki district, for the various posts, during the period from 15.6.1991 to 25.3.2004, were already destroyed by them, after obtaining orders of the Commission, in terms of Sec. 2 of the Kerala Destruction of Records Act, 1991, as such eliminated applications need be retained only for one year from the finalization of the selection. OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..9.. It is thereafter that the respondent PSC authorities have issued Ext. P-2 show cause notice dated 18.1.2006, directing the petitioner to show cause as to why Ext. P-1 advice memo dated 6.10.2003, issued to him for appointment to the above post in Palakkad district, should not be cancelled in terms of Rule 22 (iii) of the Kerala Public Service Commission Rules of Procedure, inasmuch as the petitioner has made a false statement in Ext. R-1(a) application, as per Column No. 8 thereof, that he had applied only to Palakkad district and not to any other district for the very same common selection notification dated 16.12.1997, which is contrary to the stipulations in the selection notification, etc. The petitioner has submitted Ext. P-3 reply dated 27.1.2006 thereto. The respondent PSC authorities have thereafter issued Ext. P-4 order dated 16.05.2006, cancelling Ext. P-1 advice memo dated 6.10.2003 on the ground that the petitioner has contravened the abovesaid conditions in the selection notification, and has made a false statement in Ext. R-1(a) application that he had not applied to any district other than Palakkad district, and that, contrary to it, he has, in fact, also applied to Idukki district, etc. 14. Once the advice memo is cancelled by the PSC, going by the norms, the appointing authority will have to take steps for cancellation OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..10.. of the appointment order. Immediately after the issuance of Ext. P-4 order dated 16.5.2006 and before the appointing authority could take any steps for the cancellation of the appointment order, the petitioner herein has approached this Court by filing the instant Ext. P-1 Writ Petition (Civil), WP(C). No. 13619/2006, on 24.5.2006. This Court admitted the said WP(C) on 25.6.2006 and on the same day granted the order, staying the operation and implementation of Ext. P-4 advice cancellation memo. The PSC authorities have filed Ext. P-2 counter affidavit dated 13.11.2006 in this WP(C), thereby producing the aforesaid documents, as per Exts. R-1(a) and R-1(b), etc. Later, after the establishment of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (\"KAT\" for short), in terms of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the afore Ext. P-1 WP(C). No.13619/2006 was transferred to the KAT for adjudication, wherein the said WP(C) has been re-registered as Transferred Application, T. A. No. 768/2012. 15. The main contention taken up by the petitioner in the abovesaid W.P.(C)./Transferred Application is that, apart from submitting the application for the above post in Palakkad district, he had never submitted any application for the very same post, covered by the very same common selection notification to any other district, OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..11.. including Idukki District, and that the allegation raised in Ext.P-2 show cause memo and the impugned Ext.P-4 order are factually wrong. Further that, the petitioners therein, more particularly, the first petitioner in the aforesaid WP(C) No. 16282/2005 (copy of which has been produced as Ext.P-5 in the instant Ext.P-1 T.A/WP(C). No. 13619/ 2006), are inimical to the petitioner herein (R-6 therein) and that they have made false allegations that the petitioner has applied to more than one district, and that, without conducting any proper enquiry, the PSC authorities have mechanically acted upon the said allegations, etc. 16. The Kerala Administrative Tribunal, after hearing both sides, has rendered the impugned Ext. P-3 final order dated 25.11.2014, whereby the abovesaid Transferred Application, T. A. No. 768/2012, has been dismissed. The Tribunal, as per the impugned Ext. P-3 final order has found that Ext. R-1(a) application dated 21.1.1998 would show that the petitioner had submitted application to the abovesaid post to Palakkad district, wherein he has clearly stated, in Column No. 8(a) thereof, that he has applied only to Palakkad district, and that he has further stated, in Column No. 8(b) thereof, that he has not applied to any other district for the very same common selection notification. Further that, Ext. R-1(b) document would clearly show that, in OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..12.. contravention of the selection notification, the petitioner had, in fact, also applied to the very same post, covered by the very same common selection notification, to Idukki district, wherein his application was duly registered as J-264. Further that, since the written examination for all the districts was conducted on the same day (4.11.2000), the petitioner could appear only in the written examination for Palakkad district and he was absent for the written examination, in relation to Idukki district, as evident from Ext. R-1(b). 17. The Tribunal further found that, going by the above indisputable facts, the dictum laid down by the Apex Court, in the three- Judge decision in K.G. Ashok & Ors. v. Kerala Public Service Commission & Ors. [2001 (5) SCC 419 = 2001 (2) KLT 788 (SC)], would be squarely applicable. In the said decision, the Apex Court dealt with a similar case of selection, conducted by the Kerala Public Service Commission, wherein similar restrictions were imposed, that the candidate concerned should not apply to the post in more than one district, covered by the same selection notification, and that Rule 22(iii) of the KPSC (Rules of Procedure) has exclusively authorized the PSC to invalidate the applications of candidates, who have appeared in the written test and interview, etc. in contravention of the selection OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..13.. notification and after making a false statement in the application that they have not applied to more than one district. 18. Later, the petitioner filed Ext. P-4 review application, R.A.No. 37/2014, before the Tribunal, seeking to review the impugned Ext. P-3 final order, dismissing the above Transfer Application. In Ext.P-4 review application, the petitioner has taken up entirely new pleas, by contending that the Government, in similar cases, where the PSC has cancelled the advice memo of candidates for contravening the condition, not to apply to more than one district, has invoked Rule 39 of KS & SSR Part II, to regularize the appointments of such candidates. That, 7 Annexures were produced along with Ext. P-4 review application and Anxs. RA-1, RA-2 & RA-6 are copies of certain Government Orders, said to have been issued in similar circumstances, whereby the appointments of such candidates, whose advice memos were subsequently cancelled, have been regularized, by taking recourse to Rule 39 of KS & SSR Part II. Anxs. RA-3, RA-4 & RA-5 are copies of judgments of this Court, issued in certain writ petitions, whereby the Government has been directed to consider the case of such candidates for invoking Rule 39 of KS & SSR Part II, pertaining to cases where the advice memos have been subsequently cancelled by the PSC, on the OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..14.. ground of contravention of selection notification, etc. Anx. RA-7 is a copy of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case in Maharaj Krishnan Bhat & Ans. v. State of J & K & Ors. [(2008) 9 SCC 24], wherein the Apex Court found that the State Government had exercised the discretion to relax the rigour of the rules, in the case of certain candidates for selection, and that therefore, the same treatment may be given to the other similarly situated candidates, etc. 19. The Tribunal, after hearing both sides, has rendered the impugned Ext. P-6 final order dated 6.1.2015, dismissing Ext. P-4 R.A. No. 37/2014. In Ext. P-6, the Tribunal has noted that the sole contention raised is that the applicant has the right to move the State Government, under Rule 39 of the KS & SSR Part II, against the cancellation of advice and the consequential termination from service. The Tribunal held that such a contention is not a ground for reviewing the order dismissing the Transferred Application, and accordingly, the Review Application was dismissed. But, it has been held, in Ext. P-6, that the rights, if any, of the applicant, to move the Government under Rule 39 of the KS & SSR Part II, will not be affected by the order dismissing the Transferred Application. It is thereafter that the petitioner has filed Ext. P-7 representation dated 12.1.2015, before the OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..15.. State Government, by placing reliance on the aforesaid documents, produced as Anxs. RA-1 to RA-7, and by pleading that the appointment of the petitioner may be regularized by the State Government by taking recourse to Rule 39 of the KS & SSR Part II, as has been done in similar cases, etc. 20. Ext. P-7 representation is said to have been filed on 12.1.2015, before the State Government, after dismissal of the Review Application, as per Ext. P-6 dated 6.1.2015. It is thereafter that the petitioner has filed the instant Original Petition OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 before this Court with the following prayers: “i) to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction or order calling for the records leading to Ext.P3 and P6 and quashing the same. ii) to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ direction or order asking the respondents to consider and pass orders on Ext.P7 giving similar treatment given to other similarly placed like the petitioner as is evident from Annexures RA-1, RA-2 and RA-6 of Ext. P4. iii) issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ direction or order declaring that the petitioner is entitled to get similar benefits given to others in whose favour in Annexures RA3, RA-4 and RA-5 judgments were pronounced by this Hon'ble Court iv) issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ direction or order declaring that on the basis of law declared in Ext.RA7 judgment reported in 2008 (9) 24 the petitioner is entitled to get similar benefits given to others who applied in 2 districts and got appointment in one district like the petitioner and continued in service. v) to issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ direction or order declaring that the order dated 6.1.2015 in M.A. No. 3378 of 2014 refusing to implead the State Government as a respondent in the T.A. is illegal and unauthorized. v) (sic) and grant such other further reliefs this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.” OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..16.. 21. From the pleadings and materials produced in the Transferred Application, the Review Application as well as in the instant OP(KAT), it can be seen that no specific contention has been urged by the petitioner that the period of limitation of one year from the date of advice memo, as stipulated in the operative portion of Rule 3 (c) of KS & SSR Part II, is applicable, even in the instant case, where the applicant has made a false statement in Ext. RA-1 application that he had not applied to more than one district, and that therefore, the impugned cancellation of advice, as per order dated 16.5.2006 (produced as Ext. P-4 in Ext. P-1 Transferred Application) is illegal and ultra vires, as per Rule 3(c), inasmuch as the same has been rendered after the expiry of one year from the issuance of Ext. P-1 Advice Memo dated 6.10.2003. On the other hand, the main plea set up by the petitioner in the Transferred Application is that he had never submitted application to any district, other than Palakkad district, and that the allegation to the contrary, in the show cause notice and in the advice cancellation order, are factually wrong, and that the PSC has done so without conducting any proper enquiry and verification. The petitioner has not filed any reply or rejoinder to the counter affidavit filed by the PSC, in regard to the aspects borne out from Ext. R-1(a) application for Palakkad district OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..17.. and Ext. R-1(b), which would show that he had also applied to Idukki district. Whereas, the main plea, put up by the applicant, in the Review Application before the Tribunal is that he has the right to move the Government under Rule 39 of the KS & SSR Part II, for regularizing his appointment, despite the cancellation of his advice memo, and the consequential termination of service. 22. The said new pleas are also again reiterated in the present Original Petition. However, the Division Bench has noted the conflict in the views of the Division Bench, as aforesaid and has referred the case to the Full Bench. Accordingly, we are bound to answer the question of law referred to us. Initially, we would proceed to answer the question of law referred to the Full Bench's consideration and thereafter, in view of the unanimous plea made by all the parties, more particularly, the petitioner, the main WP(C) itself shall be finally decided by the Full Bench, in exercise of the powers under Sec.7 of the Kerala High Court Act, in view of the long pendency of the matter. RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE REFERENCE ORDER: 23. Rule 3(c) of KS & SSR Part II was introduced in the statute book with effect from 31.7.1969 and the said provision, as it originally stood at the time it was brought into force, provided as follows: OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..18.. \"Rule 3(c):- Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the Commission shall have the power to cancel the advice for appointment of any candidate to any service, if it is subsequently found that such advice was made under some mistake. On such cancellation, the appointing authority shall terminate the service of the candidate. Provided that the cancellation of advice for appointment by the Commission and the subsequent termination of service of the candidate by the appointing authority shall be made within the period of probation of the candidate.\" The operative portion of Rule 3(c) contains a non obstante clause, with the stipulation that the Public Service Commission shall have the power to cancel the advice or appointment of any candidate to any service, if it is subsequently found that such advice was made under some mistake. Further, it is provided therein that, on such cancellation, the appointing authority shall terminate the service of the candidate. The proviso, as it stood originally, stipulated about the limitation period for invoking the power of cancellation of advice for appointment by the Commission and the subsequent termination from service of the candidate by the appointing authority. It stipulated that such cancellation of advice and consequent termination of service of the candidate by the appointing authority should be made within the period of probation of the candidate concerned. 24. The abovesaid provisions in the unamended Rule 3(c) and its proviso, were the subject matter of consideration for the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case in Kerala Public Service OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..19.. Commission v. Jayadev [1977 KLT 85 (DB)]. The petitioners therein were advised by the PSC for appointment in the category of LDC and show cause notices were issued to them by the Commission, proposing to take action under Rule 3(c) of KS & SSR Part II, as to why their advices for appointment should not be cancelled. At that stage, the petitioners therein had approached this Court, by filing Original Petitions (Writ Petitions), for challenging the said show cause notices. The learned Single Judge found therein that “the mistake referred to in Rule 3(c) must be understood as a mistake arising out of some conduct of the candidate, whose name was advised” and directed that representations of those candidates should be considered by the PSC, in the light of the interpretation so placed by the learned Single Judge on Rule 3(c). Being aggrieved, the PSC had filed Writ Appeals in those matters. The question that arose before the Division Bench in those appeals was as to whether the qualification, added to the word \"mistake\", in the manner suggested in the judgment under appeal, was justified. The Division Bench held therein that a plain reading of Rule 3(c) would give power to the PSC to cancel advice for appointment of any candidate to any service, if it is subsequently found that such advice was made under “some mistake\", and such mistakes can therefore be OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..20.. exclusively that of the PSC. The mistakes relied on by the PSC in the facts of this case, appeared to be mistakes arising exclusively from the acts or omissions of the PSC. The Division Bench held therein that there is nothing in the wording of Rule 3(c) to justify a limited meaning to be given to the word “mistake”, appearing in Rule 3(c), as has been interpreted by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgments therein, by limiting it only to mistakes committed by the PSC on the inducement of the candidate, whose name has been advised. On the other hand, the Division Bench held that the introduction of any such qualification would amount to redrafting of the rule so as to change the amplitude and scope, and it was also found that reading down of Rule 3(c) was also not called for. However, noting the limitation period in the proviso to Rule 3(c), which stipulated that cancellation of advice and the consequential termination from service, could be made within the period of probation of the candidate, the Division Bench opined that considerable hardships would be caused to persons, by the exercise of this rather wide power conferred on the PSC, to cancel the advice made for appointment, especially taking into consideration that the said power can be exercised within a long period of 2 years, which is the period of probation for fresh appointments by direct recruitment, and OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..21.. which period is also allowed by the proviso to Rule 3(c). In the facts of the case, the Division Bench noted that, one of the candidates, based on the advice given to him for new appointment, had resigned from his previous service to take up the new appointment, and if the new appointment is also cancelled, then the candidate may not have the option to join the service from where he had already resigned. Accordingly, the Division Bench opined that it is most essential that such calamitous results should not follow, by the exercise of power, and it goes without saying that the period during which the power can be exercised, must be limited to a far shorter duration for the fairly long period of 2 years, and that this is essential for equality of opportunity in the matter of public employment, as far as services under the State is concerned, as guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the Division Bench observed, in para 1 thereof, that this crucial aspect of the matter should engage the attention of the State Government and appropriate amendments may be made to Rule 3(c) read with the proviso thereto, in order to meet the ends of justice and to ensure that unnecessary and avoidable hardships, which may result from the exercise of power, in regard to a mistake committed by the PSC, long after the mistake has been committed, is cured. It was also OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..22.. observed that it is easy to conceive that within 2 years many persons can get past the age limit within which an advice should be made by the PSC, and advice itself might have given rise to a sense of false security, preventing those advised candidates from sitting for tests in which they could have participated in subsequent appointments. Hence, the Division Bench held that invocation of Rule 3(c) is legally permitted, not only in cases where the mistake is committed by the PSC, on inducement of the candidate, whose name has been advised, but also in respect of mistakes arising exclusively from the acts or omissions of the PSC, and that there is nothing in the wording of Rule 3(c) which would justify a limited meaning to be given to the word \"mistake\". However, the Division Bench has tendered its considered views on the hardships that may arise, on account of the comparatively long period of limitation, permitted in terms of the proviso to Rule 3(c), and had made observations to enable the Government to consider appropriate amendments in that regard. 25. Thereafter, the State Government has amended Rule 3(c) by renumbering the sole proviso, as it stood then, as the first proviso, and also introducing a change in the period of limitation therein and also providing for a second proviso. The said amendment has been made as OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..23.. per G.O.(P) No. 501/1979/GAD dated 10.9.1979, published as SRO No. 1130/1979 in Kerala Gazette No. 39 dated 2.10.1979. So, the said amendment has been made effective with effect from 2.10.1979 onwards. Rule 3(c), along with the two provisos so engrafted thereto, as per the amendment made effective from 2.10.1979, now provides as follows: “Rule 3. Approved Candidates.- (a)....... xxx xxx xxx (c) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules the Commission shall have the power to cancel the advice for appointment of any candidate to any service if it is subsequently found that such advice was made under some mistake. On such cancellation the appointing authority shall terminate the service of the candidate: Provided that the cancellation of advice for appointment by the Commission and the subsequent termination of service of the candidate by the appointing authority shall be made within a period of one year from the date of such advice: Provided further that, a cancellation of advice under this sub-rule shall be made only after giving the candidate concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter.” 26. So, it can be seen that, as per the amendment, made effective from 10.9.1979, the first proviso to Rule 3(c) stipulates that cancellation of advise or appointment by the Commission and the subsequent termination of service of the candidate by the appointing authority shall be made within a period of one year from the date of such advice. The operative portion of Rule 3(c) has not undergone any change, as per the abovesaid amendment. At the outset, it can be seen OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..24.. that Rule 3(c) only deals with cancellation of advice and the consequent termination of service of the candidate concerned in a case where advice is made under a mistake. There is nothing in the wording of the Rule which would justify a limited meaning to be given to the word \"mistake\" occurring in the said Rule and that it would only take in the mistakes arising exclusively from the acts or omissions of the Public Service Commission. But Rule 3(c) does not speak of cases where advices have been secured, due to the fraud played by the candidate. 27. Now, it may be pertinent to refer to some of the case laws, which are very relevant for the purpose of answering the reference: (i) Appukuttan Pillay v. KPSC [1984 KLT 880 (DB)] 28. A reading of para 1 of the said decision would indicate that the PSC had taken action for cancellation of advice of the petitioners therein, who had misrepresented their qualification, regarding experience, in their applications submitted to the PSC. The matter concerned selection and appointment to the post of Assistant Personnel Officers in the Kerala State Cashew Development Corporation Ltd., which stipulated that the candidates should have the requisite prescribed academic qualifications and should also have practical experience of not less than 2 years, after obtaining the academic OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..25.. qualification, in the State Government/Central Government/any other Company registered under the Indian Companies Act. The petitioners therein produced certificates before the PSC, claiming experience for 2 years in 2 companies, and on this basis they were selected and advised for appointments. Later, on receiving complaints, the PSC had referred the matter for investigation by their Vigilance Wing, which revealed that the candidates had misrepresented their qualifications, inasmuch as they were not full time employees of the companies. Show cause notices were issued by the PSC for cancellation of the advice of those candidates. Thereafter, the PSC had passed orders cancelling their inclusion in the ranked list and also cancelling their advice for appointment, which were challenged in the original writ petitions. Para 4 of the said decision would also indicate that one of the specific pleas, taken up by the PSC in their counter affidavit, was that the experience certificates, produced by those candidates, were false. Para 1 of the said decision would also indicate that the main ground in the show cause notice was that the said petitioners had misrepresented their qualifications, regarding experience, in their applications. The Division Bench held that Rule 3(c) would apply in such a case and reliance placed by the PSC on Rule 22 of the KPSC Rules of Procedure, which deals with OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..26.. procedure in regard to candidates, who are found guilty of certain misconducts, may not be appropriate in such cases and that those Rules were, admittedly, not statutory rules and are framed for the guidance of the PSC. Hence, it was viewed by the Division Bench that Rule 3(c) of KS & SSR Part II, which are statutory rules, would regulate the cases for cancellation of advice by the PSC and the consequential termination of service. It was found therein that the impugned order, cancelling the advice memo, was issued beyond the period of one year from the date of advice, as stipulated in the first proviso to Rule 3(c). Hence, it was held by the Division Bench, in para 2 of the said decision that, such a case would be subject to limitation in the first proviso to Rule 3(c) and action, if at all taken, must be within one year. Further, in para 3 of the said decision, the Division Bench interfered in the matter, as the impugned order of cancellation of advice was made beyond the period of one year from the date of advise memo, as stipulated in the first proviso to Rule 3(c). (ii) K.P.S.C. v. Malini [1996 (2) KLT 332 (DB)]: 29. In this case, the petitioner therein had applied for the post of a Lower Division Clerk (LDC), pursuant to a selection notification issued by the Commission. The selection notification clearly insisted that ‘no candidate is to apply for more than one district’. In that case, OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..27.. the petitioner had applied to both Palakkad and Ernakulam districts. The facts stated, in para No. 4 of the said decision, would indicate that, since the petitioner applied for selection in more than one district, she suppressed the actual facts and consequentially tried to take an undue advantage. The Division Bench held that Rule 3(c) would regulate such a case, since the impugned order of cancellation of advice and the consequential order issued by the appointing authority, terminating the candidate from service, have been issued beyond the period of limitation of one year from the date of advice. Therein, the advice memo was issued in favour of the said candidate on 30.08.1990 and the appointment order was issued on 03.10.1990. Show cause notice for the cancellation of the advice was issued on 28.07.1991. The order cancelling the advice was passed by the K.P.S.C. on 29.08.1991 and it was put in the process of communication on 31.08.1991. The order was issued by the appointing authority, terminating the service of the candidate, on 10.10.1991. On the premise that Rule 3(c) would apply in such a case, the Division Bench held that the impugned action of cancellation of advice and the consequential termination from service is illegal and ultravires, inasmuch as the period of limitation, in the first proviso to Rule 3(c), was not complied with. OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..28.. (iii) K.P.S.C. v. Hareendran [1999 (2) KLT 63 (DB)]: 30. In this case, the selection notification clearly insisted that the candidates should not send applications for more than one district and that, if a candidate got selection by applying to more than one district, in the same category, then his/her appointment will be cancelled and disciplinary action would also be taken against him/her by the Commission. The PSC had advised the said candidate for appointment to the post of LDC in Thiruvananthapuram district on 10.08.1990. Later, the Commission received a complaint alleging that the candidate had also applied for the very same post in Wayanad district and was included in the rank list. On enquiry, the PSC found that the said allegation was true. The candidate had specifically filled up, in the relevant column of the application, submitted in respect of the relevant district, that she had not applied to any other district. The Commission found that the candidate had furnished a false statement in the abovesaid application, knowing it to be false. Show cause notice dated 01.08.1991 was issued by the Commission, proposing for cancellation of advice, to which reply was given by the candidate on 19.08.1991, stating that the second application to Wayanad district was made hurriedly, etc. The Commission found that the candidate had played fraud on it and had ordered to delete the name of the said OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..29.. candidate from the rank lists of both the districts, for the post of LDC and had also ordered to cancel her advice for appointment in Thiruvananthapuram district, as per proceedings dated 26.09.1991. The said order dated 26.09.1991, issued by the Commission, cancelling the advice, was challenged in the writ proceedings on the ground that the same has been issued beyond the period of one year from the date of advice, which had expired on 09.08.1991, as stipulated in the first proviso to Rule 3(c). 31. Considering the provisions contained in Rule 3(c), the Division Bench has held, categorically in para No.5 thereof, that a plain reading of Rule 3(c) of KS & SSR Part-II and its first proviso would clearly indicate that the learned Single Judge has misdirected in treating the false information, furnished by the candidate, as a mistake, thereby bringing the case to the scope of Rule 3(c). The Division Bench held that the period of limitation, provided in the first proviso to Rule 3(c), will be attracted only in case of advice made by the Commission under a mistake on its part, in which case the cancellation of advice for appointment shall be made within a period of one year from the date of such advice and will have no application in a case where an applicant has played fraud on the Commission, by furnishing false information, as OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..30.. in the present case. The Division Bench clearly held that the candidate has perpetrated fraud on the Commission, by giving false answer against the relevant column, in the application submitted by him, by falsely stating that he had not applied to more than one district. Accordingly, it was held that, viewed in the context of fraud, the 1st respondent therein (candidate) cannot be heard to contend that the impugned order is barred by the period of limitation, provided under the first proviso to Rule 3(c) of KS & SSR Part-II, as the said bar of limitation applies only to a case of mistake committed by the Commission, etc., and not to a case of fraud being played on the Commission. A party to a fraud cannot be permitted to take advantage of a Rule, providing for limitation on the power of the Commission to cancel an advice, if it is subsequently found that such advice was made under some mistake. The mistake on the part of the Commission and fraud practiced on the Commission are different things, whereas the limitation in Rule 3(c) would apply to the former case of mistake, the same will not apply to the latter case, relating to fraud. Further that, it is well-settled, by a catena of decisions, that all acts of fraud are void and that sometimes, it has been said that the benefit obtained by fraud is a nullity and that it can be set aside. In para.6, the Division Bench noted the specific prohibition in the selection OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..31.. notification, in applying to more than one district for the common selection notification and that, in view of this prohibition, other candidates never applied to more than one district, whereas the writ petitioner therein had applied for two districts and got placement in the ranked list for both the districts. Hence, it was held that, it was only on account of the fraudulent conduct of the writ petitioner therein (1st respondent in the appeal) that he got appointment, which opportunity was denied to others who strictly followed and complied with the instructions and conditions in the notification issued by the PSC. Hence, it was also held that the 1st respondent therein had played fraud on the public and got appointment by a fraudulent conduct and that therefore, no relief should have been granted to him, who played fraud on the Commission as well as on the public and that such a person cannot be permitted to enjoy the benefit of fraud played by him. The further legal consequences, arising out of fraud committed in such cases, has been delineated in para 7 of Hareendran's case supra [1999 (2) KLT 63]. 32. The contentions of the 1st respondent therein (writ petitioner), based on the aforecited decisions in Appukuttan Pillay's case supra [1984 KLT 880] and Malini's case supra [1996 (2) KLT OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..32.. 332], have also been considered in para 9 of Hareendran's case supra [1999 (2) KLT 63]. It was held that the question of limitation, stipulated in Rule 3(c), vis-a-vis fraud played on the Commission by the candidate, was never the subject matter of adjudication or consideration in those decisions and that no discussion or consideration has been made in those judgments about the effect of fraud in public appointments. Further, the rationale for the prohibition and restriction, in not applying to more than one district for the common selection notifications, as issued by the PSC, has been considered in detail in para 10 of Hareendran's case supra [1999 (2) KLT 63]. 33. It will be profitable to refer to para 10 of the decision of the Division Bench in Hareendran's case supra [1999 (2) KLT 63], which reads as follows : “10. Yet another aspect to be considered is the rationale and logic in preventing candidates from applying in two different Districts. This has been explained by the Commission in the statement filed before us as directed. In the statement it has been stated that as per G.O.(MS) No. 154/71/PO dated 27.5.1971, decentralisation of recruitment to the lower ministerial cadres in various departments and teaching posts in General Education Department to the District Level was introduced with a view to avoid administrative inconvenience caused due to dearth of recruits in such cadres in Northern Districts of the State. It was with this intention that Government stipulated conditions restricting inter-district transfers also in G.O. dated 27.5.-1971. However, while implementing the decentralisation a host of practical problems cropped up before the commission. If candidates are allowed to apply to more than one district in response to the same Notification then they have to be allowed to write written tests in different Districts. Subsequently, if they find a place in the ranked list relating to more than one District they would have to be advised for recruitment from more than one District if their turn arises. The candidates who got appointed in one District would tend to leave the same when he OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..33.. gets advised from other Districts in due course, defeating the very purpose of the above mentioned G.O. The circumstances as detailed above would put the Commission in a quite embracing situation and cause administrative difficulties as well. The situation would assume fresh dimensions if it is allowed to prevail in the present day District- wise selections. Therefore, the candidates are permitted to apply for one District only in respect of posts notified for more than one District in one notification. It is, however, pointed out that in order to avoid exigencies as detailed above and to facilitate a feasible selection process, the Commission issued orders to the effect that candidates are prohibited from applying to more than one District for the post notified in one and the same notification. Accordingly, in the notification inviting application for District-wise selection specific instructions are incorporated to the effect that candidates should not send application for the post to more than one District. It is also specified that in case a candidate gets selection by applying to more than one District for the same post his/her selection is liable to be cancelled and that the candidates can also be subjected to disciplinary proceedings. With regard to the condition in the notification restraining the candidates from applying to more than one District it has been pointed out that any applicant is free to choose any District for sending application. Therefore, the choice to apply for the posts is not denied. Only thing is that, the candidate is not entitled to apply for the same post in all the 14 Districts at a time. Here, the right of the candidate is not curtailed as he/she is not prevented from choosing the District of his/her choice. At the same time if every applicant is permitted to apply for all the Districts then the number of applications received by the Commission will be fourteen times the number of applications now being received, with the net result that the Commission will be doing a futile exercise of selection work in thirteen Districts, as a candidate can after all accept appointment only in any one District. It was considering all these aspects that the Commission have imposed the restriction on candidates from applying to more than one District in response to one notification. This according to us is only a reasonable restriction imposed for achieving the purpose of G.O. dated 27.5.1971. This restriction, in our opinion does not amount to denial of opportunity of a candidate to apply to any post. It amounts only to a restriction on applying for the same post for a number of times equal to the number of Districts on the ground that selection is made on District-wise. The above restrictions in the notification are reasonable and conform to the spirit of decentralisation scheme envisaged to the Government order dated 27.5.1971. It is brought to our notice that the District wise selection has been in vogue since 1971 and has stood the test of time. In fact in O.P. No.2490193 a prayer was made to declare that the 'Note' in Ext. PI which prohibits candidates from applying to the post of L.D. Clerk (Various Departments) in more than one District pursuant to the notification as void and unconstitutional. The above prayer was not granted by this Court in the judgment dated 23.2.1993. The above judgment has been upheld by a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in W.A. No. 612 of 1993 and the above judgment have been referred to by the learned single Judge in paragraph 7 of the impugned judgment. It is also relevant to note that in the O.P. the petitioner did not challenge OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..34.. the above provision. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is hereby set aside. The result is that the Writ Petition filed by the first respondent herein stands dismissed. On the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.” (iv) Babu v. Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB) [2010 (1) KLT 435 (DB)] 34. In this case, the writ petitioner/writ appellant had applied for selection to the post of Mazdoor in the Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB), wherein one of the conditions for selection was that the candidates should not have passed SSLC, presumably to ensure that wider opportunities are given, for selection as Mazdoor, to under- qualified candidates. It appears that the appellant suppressed the fact that he had passed the SSLC examination, and was included in the ranked list and was also advised for appointment on 13.09.2002 and had joined duty on 21.12.2002 and was later promoted as Lineman Gr.II on 05.11.2004. It is later that the PSC had issued show cause notice dated 20.01.2005, proposing to cancel his advice, invoking its power under Rule 22 of the KPSC Rules of Procedure, to which he submitted a reply on 10.03.2005, where he had admitted that he had passed SSLC examination as an over-aged private registration candidate. His advice was cancelled by the PSC on 06.06.2005. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, relying on the dictum laid down by the OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..35.. Division Bench of this Court in the aforecited Hareendran's case supra [1999 (2) KLT 63]. Thereafter, the matter came up for consideration before the Division Bench in intra-court appeal. Reliance was placed by the appellant on the aforecited decisions in Appukuttan Pillay's case supra [1984 KLT 880] and Malini's case supra [1996 (2) KLT 332]. The Division Bench, in Babu's case supra [2010 (1) KLT 435 (DB)], after placing full reliance on the dictum laid down by the Division Bench in Hareendran's case supra [1999 (2) KLT 63 (DB)], held that the period of limitation will not apply in a case where the advice was issued by the PSC, on account of the fraud played by the candidate and, after considering the above three cited decisions, the Division Bench held that the dictum laid down in the subsequent decision of the Division Bench, in Hareendran's case supra [1999 (2) KLT 63 (DB)], was based on the correct legal position. The Division Bench observed that if the period of limitation is applied in a case where the candidate had produced a forged qualification certificate and the forgery is discovered much after one year, then, if the limitation period of one year, in the case of mistake, is imputed to such a case of fraud, then such a fraudulently secured advice can never be interfered with, which would result in unreasonable consequences. It was held therein OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..36.. that nothing gained by playing fraud, can attain finality. The Division Bench, in Babu's case supra [2010 (1) KLT 435 (DB)], has placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in cases as in A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of Andhra Pradesh [(2007) 4 SCC 221], Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 550], United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh [(2000) 3 SCC 581], etc. 35. It may be pertinent to note paragraphs 22 to 30 of the decision of the Apex Court in A.V. Papayya Sastry's case supra [(2007) 4 SCC 221], which read as follows : “22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order—by the first court or by the final court—has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings. 23. In the leading case of Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley [(1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502 (CA)] Lord Denning observed : (All ER p. 345 C) “No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud.” 24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading Cases, 13th Edn., p. 644, explaining the nature of fraud, de Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment would be res judicata and not impeachable from within, it might be impeachable from without. In other words, though it is not permissible to show that the court was “mistaken”, it might be shown that it was “misled”. There is an essential distinction between mistake and trickery. The clear implication of the distinction is that an action to set aside a judgment cannot be brought on the ground that it has been decided wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the decision was one which should not have been rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was imposed upon or tricked into giving the judgment. OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..37.. 25. It has been said : fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent). 26. Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilised as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants. 27. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [(1994) 1 SCC 1] this Court had an occasion to consider the doctrine of fraud and the effect thereof on the judgment obtained by a party. In that case, one A by a registered deed, relinquished all his rights in the suit property in favour of C who sold the property to B. Without disclosing that fact, A filed a suit for possession against B and obtained preliminary decree. During the pendency of an application for final decree, B came to know about the fact of release deed by A in favour of C. He, therefore, contended that the decree was obtained by playing fraud on the court and was a nullity. The trial court upheld the contention and dismissed the application. The High Court, however, set aside the order of the trial court, observing that “there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence”. B approached this Court. 28. Allowing the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and describing the observations of the High Court as “wholly perverse”, Kuldip Singh, J. stated : (SCC p. 5, para 5) “The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.” (emphasis supplied) 29. The Court proceeded to state : (SCC p. 5, para 6) “A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party.” 30. The Court concluded : (SCC p. 5, para 5) OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..38.. “The principle of ‘finality of litigation’ cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants.”\" 36. After scanning the above case laws, the Division Bench, in Babu's case supra [2010 (1) KLT 435 (DB)], has categorically held that, in view of the abovesaid authoritative pronouncements, it is clear that not only judicial orders, but also administrative orders, obtained by fraud, can be recalled at any time and in such a case, a candidate cannot be allowed to take shelter behind any time limit under Rule 3(c), which applies only to mistakes and retain the gain obtained by him, by playing fraud on the PSC and accordingly, the writ appeal was dismissed, confirming the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge in that case. (v) K.G. Ashok & Ors. v. Kerala Public Service Commission (KPSC) & Ors. [(2001) 5 SCC 419] 37. The matters involved in the said case were ordered to be placed before the three-Judges' Bench of the Apex Court. The facts of the case are broadly identical or similar to the facts of the present case. The case involved selection to the post of Junior Health Inspector Grade-II, in all the 14 districts of the State of Kerala, pursuant to the selection notification dated 02.04.1996, issued by the Kerala Public Service Commission. The said notification contained specific OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..39.. restrictions and prohibitions, wherein the candidates should not apply to more than one district and that, if applications are made, contrary to the said restriction and the candidate is later selected, his name would be liable to be struck off from the ranked list and disciplinary action would also be taken against him, etc. The application form also contained specific columns, as to whether a candidate has applied only to one district or whether he has applied to more than one district, etc. In contravention of these conditions, the candidates concerned had applied to more than one district and later, it was found that they were guilty of making false statement in the application. Yet another condition clearly stipulated that if the candidate was found guilty of making any false statement in the application, he/she was liable to be debarred from applying to the post, either permanently or for a particular period, and if such a person had already appeared in any written or practical test, that would be considered invalid, etc. Pursuant to the selection notification, about 1270 candidates applied, out of whom 436 candidates applied to more than one district and the written test was conducted on the same day in all the 14 districts. Later, the candidature of all those 436 candidates was rejected, either on the ground that they had applied to more than one district or that they had OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..40.. given false declaration in the application form, that they had not applied to any other district, while, in fact, they had so applied. The writ proceedings, initiated by the appellants concerned, were dismissed by the High Court. In para 7, the Apex Court has noted the provisions in Rule 3, including Rule 3(c), of KS&SSR Part-II. In para 8, the Apex Court has noted the provisions contained in Rule 22(iii) & Rule 40 of the KPSC Rules of Procedure, which read as follows : “Rule 22. Candidates who are found guilty of the following items of misconduct shall be liable for disqualification for being considered for a particular post or department from applying to the Commission either permanently or for any period or the invalidation of their answer scripts or products in a written practical test or the initiation of criminal or other proceedings against them or their removal or dismissal from office or the ordering of any other disciplinary action against them if they have already been appointed, or any one or more of the above. (i)-(ii) * * * (iii) Making of any false statement in the application form or its annexure or any document produced in connection with a selection or suppression of any material fact relevant to the selection from the Commission. * * * Rule 40. Savings.—Nothing contained in Parts I and II of these Rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the power of the Commission to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any of the provisions of the Constitution of India or for the proper discharge of the functions of the Commission: Provided that no such order which has an overriding effect on the provisions contained in Part I of these Rules shall be made by the Commission without the prior concurrence of the Government.” 38. In para 9 of K.G. Ashok's case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419], the Apex Court has noted the specific conditions in the selection notification, which prohibited the submission of application to more than one district and the effect of such contravention. After construing OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..41.. the abovesaid Rules, as in Rule 22 of the KPSC Rules of Procedure, as well as the relevant conditions in the selection notification, regarding prohibition in making application to more than one district, etc., the Apex Court has categorically held, in para 11 thereof, that the said Rules and notifications would make it clear that a person was barred from applying to more than one district, whereby the application could be filed by a person, seeking employment, in any one of the 14 districts of his choice for which vacancies were notified and if a candidate applied to more than one district, his application was also liable to be rejected on that ground alone. Further that, similarly, application of a person was also liable to be rejected if he had applied to more than one district but he had made a false declaration in the application form that he had not so applied. Further that, apart from the rejection of the application on the said grounds, in case such a candidate had appeared in the written test and interview, the same was liable to be declared invalid and in case such a person was appointed, he was liable to be dismissed or removed from service, treating the same to be one of misconduct, over and above any criminal action that may be taken against him. Para 11 of K.G. Ashok's case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419], p.p.425-426 reads as follows : OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..42.. “11. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid Rules as well as the notifications referred to above it would be clear that a person was debarred from applying in more than one district pursuant to the notification dated 2-4-1996, whereby application could be filed by a person seeking employment in any one of the 14 districts of his choice for which vacancies were notified and if a candidate applied for more than one district his application was liable to be rejected on this ground alone. Similarly, application of a person was liable to be rejected also on the ground if he had applied in more than one district but had made false declaration in the application form that he had not so applied. Apart from rejection of the application on the said grounds, in case such a candidate had appeared in the written test and interview the same were liable to be declared invalid and in case such a person was appointed, he was liable to be dismissed or removed from service treating the same to be one of the misconducts over and above any criminal action that may be taken against him.” 39. In paras 6 & 22 of K.G. Ashok's case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419], the Apex Court has noted a previous verdict rendered by a 2-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case in O.N. Omana v. Kerala Public Service Commission [SLP(C) No. 12562/1999 dated 13.09.1999], wherein, in a similar case, the cancellation of advice, on account of contravention of the above prohibition, was upheld by the Apex Court, by concurring with the impugned judgment therein of the High Court, declining relief in the writ proceedings. A specific contention was raised therein that the appellants were misled by a subsequent short notification issued by the PSC in that case and that they were not aware of the penal provisions contained in the conditions imposed by the PSC in the gazette notification. The Apex Court noted that, in the short notification, the PSC had specifically stipulated that the candidate OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..43.. should refer to the detailed notification published earlier in the gazette, which contained all the restrictions and conditions. Accordingly, the said contention was rejected by the Apex Court, in para 21 of K.G.Ashok's case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419]. Yet another specific contention was raised before the Apex Court that in O.N. Omana's case supra [SLP(C) No.12562/1999 dated 13.09.1999], decided previously by a Two-Judges' Bench of the Apex Court, there was a restriction in not applying to more than one district, wherein the written examination was conducted by the PSC for different districts on different days and not on the same day and that the candidates had appeared in the written examination in more than one district. Whereas, in the matters involved in K.G. Ashok's case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419], the written examination was conducted on the same day for all the 14 districts, presumably thereby contending that the appellants therein could not get any undue gain in actually appearing in the written test for more than one district. After noting the said contention, the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court, in para 22 of K.G. Ashok's case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419], held that, though in the said case, written test was conducted in all the 14 districts on the same day, that cannot be a ground for making any distinction and that the applications OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..44.. of some of the applicants had been rejected on the ground that, though they had applied for appointment in more than one district, they made a false declaration that they had not applied in one district only, whereas in other cases, where they did apply to more than one district and stated in the application that they had so applied, the Apex Court clearly held in, para 22 thereof, that, according to the gazette notification, issued by the PSC for the said selection process, both the grounds were independently sufficient for rejection of candidature of the candidates concerned and that the Commission was liberal in simply rejecting their candidature for the time being and had not debarred them from applying for any public post, either for a specified period or permanently, inasmuch as, for making a false declaration, though the applicants were liable to be criminally prosecuted, no such steps were taken against them. Yet another contention was also raised before the Apex Court that the appellants therein had crossed the upper age limit and considering the large number of available vacancies, they may be accommodated without disturbing the already selected candidates and that the appellants may be considered for selection, on the basis of their placement in the ranked list, etc. The said contention has been repelled by the Apex Court, in para 23 of K.G. Ashok's case supra [(2001) 5 OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..45.. SCC 419], by holding that, taking into account the conduct of the applicants, in making a false declaration and applying to more than one district, in contravention of the gazette notification, it is not possible to accede to their prayer, even on equitable grounds. Thus, the Apex Court has clearly held, in para 23 thereof, that such candidates are not entitled to claim any equitable grounds in discretionary jurisdiction. Further, the Three-Judge Bench, in para 24 of K.G. Ashok's case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419], has also held that their Lordships are in respectful agreement with the views rendered earlier by a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in O.N. Omana's case supra. It will be profitable to refer to paras 21 to 24 of the decision of the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court K.G. Ashok's case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419] p.p.429-430, which read as follows : “21. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that out of 1270 candidates 436 persons including the appellants in these appeals applied for more than one district as they were misled by the short notification dated 11-4-1996 and were not aware of the penal provisions contained in Note (2) of the gazette notification dated 2-4- 1996. In this regard, it may be stated that in the concluding portion of the short notification dated 11-4-1996 it was specifically mentioned that for more details a candidate was required to refer to the notification concerned meaning thereby the aforesaid notification dated 2-4-1996. Moreover it has been further stated in the short notification that model application form has been appended in the gazette notification again meaning thereby notification dated 2-4- 1996. In these cases some of the appellants in their application form, in reply to column 8(b), which required a candidate to state whether he had applied in more than one district, had stated ‘No’ and others ‘Yes’, though all of them had applied in more than one district. In view of the language in the short notification a candidate was obliged under law to look into the gazette notification dated 2-4-1996, more so when in the application form which was duly filled up by the OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..46.. appellants, it was specifically enumerated that “candidates should read the relevant gazette notification inviting applications before filling up the application form”. Thus we find no substance in this submission as well. 22. Learned counsel for the appellants also submitted that the decision of this Court in the case of O.N. Omana v. Kerala Public Service Commission [ SLP (C) No. 1562 of 1999 dated 13-9-1999 (SC)] is quite distinguishable as in that case though there was one notification inviting applications for appointment in several districts and similar restriction was there and in contravention of the same application was filed for appointment in more than one district, but written test was conducted in different districts on different dates and not on one date and the candidates appeared in more than one district. In our view, though in the present case written test was conducted in all the 14 districts on one day but that cannot be a ground for making any distinction. Applications of some of the appellants have been rejected on the ground that though they had applied for appointment in more than one district but made a false declaration that they had applied in one district only whereas in other cases they did apply in more than one district and stated in the application that they had so applied. According to the gazette notification both the grounds were independently sufficient for rejection of candidature of a candidate. It appears that the Commission has been liberal in simply rejecting their candidature for the time being and had not debarred them from applying for any public post either for a specified period or permanently inasmuch as for making a false declaration though the appellants were liable to be criminally prosecuted but no such steps have been taken against them. 23. Learned counsel for the appellants lastly submitted that as number of appellants had crossed the upper age limit and number of vacancies are available, without disturbing the already selected candidates, the appellants can be considered for selection on the basis of their placement in the merit list. In our view seeing the conduct of the appellants in making false declaration and applying in more than one district in contravention of the gazette notification, it is not possible to accede to their prayer even on equitable grounds. 24. For the foregoing reasons we are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Omana and the High Court was quite justified in upholding the order of rejection of candidature of the appellants by the Commission.” 40. In paras 12 & 13 of K.G. Ashok's case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419], the Apex Court has dealt with the rationale and objectives in the restriction and prohibition that the candidate should not apply to more OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..47.. than one district, in the common selection notification issued by the PSC in district level recruitments. Paras 12 & 13 of the said decision read as follows : “12. It appears that the Government introduced decentralisation of recruitment to the lower ministerial cadre in various departments and teaching posts in the Education Department to district level vide GO (MS) No. 154/71 dated 27-5-1971 with a view to avoid administrative inconvenience caused due to dearth of recruits in such cadres in the northern districts of Kerala. It was with this intention that the Government stipulated conditions restricting inter-district transfers vide government order dated 27- 5-1971. However, while implementing the decentralisation, a lot of practical problems cropped up before the Commission. If candidates are allowed to apply to more than one district in response to the same notification, they have to be allowed to appear in the tests to be conducted in different districts on different dates and subsequently, if they find a berth in the ranked list relating to more than one district, they will have to be advised for recruitment from more than one district if the occasion arises. A candidate who is appointed in one district will have to forego appointment in another district and the same defeats the very purpose of the aforementioned government order. The circumstances as detailed above would put the Commission in an embarrassing situation and cause administrative difficulties. The situation would assume fresh dimensions if it is allowed to prevail in the present-day districtwise selections. Therefore, the candidates are permitted to apply for one district only in one notification. It is in order to avoid such exigencies and to facilitate a feasible selection process, the Commission issued orders to the effect that candidates are prohibited from applying to more than one district for the post notified in one and the same notification. Accordingly, in the notification inviting applications for districtwise selection, specific instructions are incorporated to the effect that a candidate should not send applications for the post in more than one district and his failure to observe the same would entail rejection of application of such a person apart from taking other actions enumerated above. 13. Though a candidate is prohibited from applying in more than one district, he is free to choose any district of his choice and thus the only thing is that the candidate is not entitled to apply for the same post in more than one district at a time. Here, the right of the candidate is not curtailed as he/she is not prevented from choosing the district of his/her choice. At the same time, if every person is permitted to apply for all districts the number of applications received by the Commission will be 14 times the number of applications now being received with the result that the Commission will be doing a futile exercise of selection work in the OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..48.. other 13 districts, as a candidate can after all accept appointment in only one district. Considering all these aspects the Commission has imposed the restriction on candidates from applying in more than one district in response to one and the same notification. The restriction does not tantamount to the denial of opportunity to a candidate for applying to any post. Distinction between mistake & fraud and its impact on the applicability of Rule 3(c) of KS&SSR Part-II 41. The learned author Kerr in his illuminating treatise on the “Law of Fraud and Mistake” (7th edition), has stated, in Chapter-III, page 133 thereof, that mistake has been said to be some unintentional act, omission, or error, arising from unconsciousness, ignorance, forgetfulness, imposition, or misplaced confidence. Generally, in simple terms, mistake can be construed to be a wrong action or statement proceeding from a faulty decision, inadequate knowledge or inattention. Whereas, fraud is generally understood as either suggestio falsi or suppressio veri. It may be useful to refer to the definition of “fraud”, as contained in Sec. 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which reads as follows : “Sec.17. “Fraud” defined.- “Fraud” means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract: (1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (3) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (4) any other act fitted to deceive; (5) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent. OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..49.. Explanation.- Mere silence as to facts likely to affect the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud, unless the circumstances of the case are such that, regard being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silence to speak, or unless his silence is, in itself, equivalent to speech.” 42. After referring to Kerr on Fraud and Mistake (7th edition, page 23), the Apex Court has held, in para 20 of the decision in Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi & Ors. [(2003) 8 SCC 319] p.327, as follows : “20. In Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, at p.23, it is stated: “The true and only sound principle to be derived from the cases represented by Slim v. Croucher [(1860) 1 De GF & J 518 : 29 LJ Ch 273 : 2 LT 103 : 45 ER 462] is this: that a representation is fraudulent not only when the person making it knows it to be false, but also when, as Jessel, M.R., pointed out, he ought to have known, or must be taken to have known, that it was false. This is a sound and intelligible principle, and is, moreover, not inconsistent with Derry v. Peek [ Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20273 of 2000] . A false statement which a person ought to have known was false, and which he must therefore be taken to have known was false, cannot be said to be honestly believed in. ‘A consideration of the grounds of belief’, said Lord Herschell, ‘is no doubt an important aid in ascertaining whether the belief was really entertained. A man's mere assertion that he believed the statement he made to be true is not accepted as conclusive proof that he did so.’ ” 43. It may be apposite to refer to Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 7th edition, page 416, which reads as follows : \"In applying this rule, it matters not whether the judgment impugned has been pronounced by an inferior or by the highest Court of judicature in the realm, but in all cases alike it is competent for every Court, whether superior or inferior, to treat as a nullity any Judgment which can be clearly shown to have been obtained by manifest fraud, discovered after the Judgment. An innocent party cannot now prove in one Court that a Judgment against him in another Court was obtained by fraud and ask for it to be disregarded, as it would be in his power to apply directly to the Court which pronounced it to vacate it. But however this may be, it is evident that a guilty party would not be permitted to defeat a OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..50.. Judgment by showing that in obtaining it he had practised an imposition on the Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx In order to sustain an action to impeach a judgment, actual fraud must be shown; mere constructive fraud is not, at all events after long delay, sufficient. The Court has Jurisdiction to set aside a judgment obtained by fraud in a subsequent action brought for that purpose, the proper remedy being an original action and not a re- proof that the judgment was obtained by perjury. An action to set aside a judgment in a probate action on the ground of fraud ought not to be allowed to proceed unless the plaintiff can produce evidence showing a reasonable probability of the alleged fraud being established; but such evidence need not necessarily be of such a character that it would be evidence in the action itself.” 44. In Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v. State of Maharastra [(2005) 7 SCC 605], the Apex Court has held, in para 11 thereof, as follows : “11. “Fraud” as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. Fraud is a conduct either by letters or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letters. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by wilfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations, which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. (See Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi [(2003) 8 SCC 319].\" 45. Further, in Shrisht Dawan v. Shaw Bros. [(1992) 1 SCC 534], it has been held by the Apex Court, in para 20 thereof as follows : OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..51.. “20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct. Michael Levi likens a fraudster to Milton's sorcerer, Comus, who exulted in his ability to, ‘wing me into the easy-hearted man and trap him into snares’. It has been defined as an act of trickery or deceit. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary fraud in equity has been defined as an act or omission to act or concealment by which one person obtains an advantage against conscience over another or which equity or public policy forbids as being prejudicial to another. In Black's Legal Dictionary, fraud is defined as an intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or surrender a legal right; a false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. In Concise Oxford Dictionary, it has been defined as criminal deception, use of false representation to gain unjust advantage; dishonest artifice or trick. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, a representation is deemed to have been false, and therefore a misrepresentation, if it was at the material date false in substance and in fact. Section 17 of the Contract Act defines fraud as act committed by a party to a contract with intent to deceive another. From dictionary meaning or even otherwise fraud arises out of deliberate active role of representator about a fact which he knows to be untrue yet he succeeds in misleading the representee by making him believe it to be true. The representation to become fraudulent must be of a fact with knowledge that it was false. In a leading English case [Derry v. Peek, (1886- 90) All ER 1 : (1889) 14 AC 337 : 5 TLR 625] what constitutes fraud was described thus: (All ER p. 22 B-C) “[Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.” But fraud in public law is not the same as fraud in private law. Nor can the ingredients which establish fraud in commercial transaction be of assistance in determining fraud in Administrative Law. It has been aptly observed by Lord Bridge in Khawaja [Khawaja v. Secretary of State for Home Deptt., (1983) 1 All ER 765] that it is dangerous to introduce maxims of common law as to effect of fraud while determining fraud in relation to statutory law. In Pankaj Bhargava [Pankaj Bhargava v. Mohinder Nath, (1991) 1 SCC 556 : AIR 1991 SC 1233] it was observed that fraud in relation to statute must be a colourable transaction to evade the provisions of a statute. “If a statute has been passed for some one particular purpose, a court of law will not countenance any attempt which may be made to extend the operation of the Act to something else which is quite foreign to its object and beyond its scope.” [Craies on Statute Law, 7th edn., p. 79] Present day concept of fraud on statute has veered round abuse of power or mala fide exercise of power. It may arise due to overstepping the limits of power or defeating the provision of statute by adopting subterfuge or the power may be exercised for extraneous or irrelevant considerations. The colour of fraud in public law or administrative law, as it is developing, is assuming different shades. It arises from a deception committed by disclosure of incorrect facts knowingly and deliberately to invoke exercise of power and procure an OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..52.. order from an authority or tribunal. It must result in exercise of jurisdiction which otherwise would not have been exercised. That is misrepresentation must be in relation to the conditions provided in a section on existence or non-existence of which power can be exercised. But non-disclosure of a fact not required by a statute to be disclosed may not amount to fraud. Even in commercial transactions non-disclosure of every fact does not vitiate the agreement. “In a contract every person must look for himself and ensures that he acquires the information necessary to avoid bad bargain.” [ Anson's Law of Contract] In public law the duty is not to deceive. For instance non-disclosure of any reason in the application under Section 21 of the Act about its need after expiry of period or failure to give reason that the premises shall be required by son, daughter or any other family member does not result in misrepresentation or fraud. It is not misrepresentation under Section 21 to state that the premises shall be needed by the landlord after expiry of the lease even though the premises in occupation of the landlord on the date of application or, after expiry of period were or may be sufficient. A non-disclosure of fact which is not required by law to be disclosed does not amount to misrepresentation. Section 21 does not place any positive or comprehensive duty on the landlord to disclose any fact except that he did not need the premises for the specified period. Even the Controller is not obliged with a pro-active duty to investigate. Silence or non-disclosure of facts not required by law to be disclosed does not amount to misrepresentation. Even in contracts it is excluded as is clear from explanation to Section 17 unless it relates to fact which is likely to affect willingness of a person to enter into a contract. Fraud or misrepresentation resulting in vitiation of permission in context of Section 21 therefore could mean disclosure of false facts but for which the Controller would not have exercised jurisdiction.\" 46. The Division Bench of this Court, in the concluding portion of para 5 of the decision in Hareendran's case supra [1999 (2) KLT 63] p.68, has quoted the opinion of Lord Cottenham as follows : “Lord Cottenham said: “It is true that if a case of fraud be established, Equity will set aside all transactions founded upon it, by whatever machinery they may have been effected, and notwithstanding any contrivances by which it may have been attempted to protect them. (See Modern Law Review, Vol.18 Page 441).”” 47. The Apex Court in Hamza Haji v. State of Kerala [(2006) 7 SCC 416], has considered the legal consequences of fraud played on courts. In paras 10 to 14 thereof, the Apex Court has considered various English case laws as well as Kerr on Fraud and OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..53.. Mistake, Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol.49, American Jurisprudence, etc., and has thereafter, held, in para 15 thereof, that the law in India is not different and Sec. 44 of the Evidence Act enables a party, otherwise bound by a previous adjudication, to show that it was not final or binding, because it is vitiated by fraud and that the said provision gives jurisdiction or authority to a court to consider and decide the question whether a prior adjudication is vitiated by fraud. Reference in this connection, could be profitably made to paras 15 to 24 of the decision of the Apex Court in Hamza Haji's case supra [(2006) 7 SCC 416] (see pages 425 to 427 of the SCC report). 48. The legal position, in relation to the impact of fraud in selection processes relating to appointments in services, has been dealt with by the Apex Court in various decisions as in Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. UOI & Ors. [(2007) 4 SCC 54, paras 26 to 28, 34, 35, etc.], Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. v. Anil Kanwariya [(2021) 10 SCC 136, paras 8, 9 14 etc.]. In the light of these aspects, it is crystal clear that there is a world of difference between mistake and fraud and this cardinal aspect of the matter has not been duly taken note of in the previous decisions of the Division Bench of this Court, in cases as in Appukuttan Pillay's case supra OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..54.. [1984 KLT 880] and Malini's case supra [1996 (2) KLT 332]. A mere reading of Rule 3(c) would make it clear that its operative portion is only concerned with empowering the PSC for cancellation of advice and the consequential termination of the appointment, in a case where the advice memo has been issued on the basis of some mistakes. 49. As held by the Division Bench of this Court in Jayadev's case supra [1977 KLT 85], the mistakes referred to in Rule 3(c) could be mistakes arising exclusively from the acts of the Public Service Commission, which led to the issuance of the advice memo or it could also be a mistake of the PSC in issuing the advice memo, on account of the mistakes attributable to others, including the candidates concerned. Even in such mistakes, which has led to the issuance of the advice memo by the PSC, due to the mistakes attributable to the candidates, there should not be any dishonest or fraudulent intention on the part of the candidate. Such mistakes should be construed as unintentional acts, omissions or errors, arising from ignorance, forgetfulness, etc., or any wrong action or proceeding from any inadequate knowledge, inattention, etc. Whereas, fraud stands on an entirely different plane and there has to be either suggestio falsi or suppressio veri, etc., the details of which have already been referred to in the various authorities OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..55.. and case laws mentioned hereinabove. Generally, fraud should be understood as a suggestion of a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true or the active concealment of a fact, by one having knowledge or belief of the fact, etc. 50. Sec. 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with the effect of fraud or mistake. Sec. 17(1) of the Limitation Act stipulates that where, in the case of any suit or application, for which a period of limitation is prescribed by the said Act, then, in the case of (a) the suit or application based upon the fraud of the defendant or respondent or his agent; or (b) the knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or application is founded is concealed by the fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or (c) the suit or application is for relief from the consequences of a mistake; or (d) where any document necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or applicant has been fraudulently concealed from him; then the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it; or in the case of a concealed document, until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of producing the concealed document or compelling its production, etc. 51. Article 113 & Article 137 of the relevant parts of the OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..56.. Schedule appended to the Limitation Act (which deals with suit or application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule), stipulate that the period of limitation in such cases will be three years and the time for which the period begins to run is when the right to sue or right to apply accrues. 52. For the purpose of limitation, Sec. 17 broadly places fraud and mistake at the same level and the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake, as the case may be, or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it, etc. 53. However, in the case of administrative proceedings of the PSC, in issuing advice memos, on account of mistake, as contemplated in Rule 3(c), the period of limitation, as per the pre-amended rules, for taking action for cancellation of the advice as well as the consequential termination from service, should have been completed before the period of probation, after the amendment made to Rule 3(c) with effect from 10.09.1979, the said action should have been completed within a period of one year from the date of such advice. So, the statutory rule making authority has consciously included only mistakes within the ambit of Rule 3(c) and the period of limitation for completing the necessary OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..57.. action is not reckoned from the date of discovery of the mistake, but shall be completed within the requisite period, which is now one year from the date of issuance of the advice memo by the PSC. The rationale for such strict provision for limitation has been dealt with in detail in the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Jayadev's case supra [1977 KLT 85]. 54. The rule making authority has consciously excluded fraud from the ambit of Rule 3(c). It is not as if the rule making authority was never conscious of the substantial and essential difference between mistake and fraud and that many a time, the advice memos could have been issued not only on the basis of mistakes but also due to the fraud played by the candidates. In view of the various aspects, dealt with in Jayadev's case supra [1977 KLT 85], a short limitation period has been imposed for the enforcement of the provisions contained in Rule 3(c). Whereas, it is quite often that fraud may be committed by the person concerned in a concealed and secretive manner and the same may be discovered only after quite some time and therefore, the rule making authority would have consciously decided to exclude fraud from the ambit of Rule 3(c), it may be well-nigh impossible to discover the fraud and then to take necessary action, within such a short period, as is OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..58.. envisaged in Rule 3(c). The impact of fraud, played by candidates, in the selection process conducted by the PSC, has been dealt with in the provisions contained in Rule 22(iii) of the KPSC Rules of Procedure, especially in the making of false statement, etc., by the candidate concerned. The provisions contained in Rule 22(iii) of the KPSC Rules of Procedure has been considered in para 8 of the decision of the Apex Court in K.G.Ashok's case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419]. In para 11 thereof, the Apex Court has held that, apart from the rejection of the application, in such a case, where the candidate has appeared in the written test and the interview, the same are also liable to be declared invalid, apart from taking other action. The Public Service Commissions for the Union and for the States are established in terms of Article 315 of the Constitution of India. The functions and duties of the Public Service Commissions are delineated in Article 320 thereof. Being a constitutional body, the Public Service Commission has the necessary powers, as per the above provisions of the Constitution of India, to frame rules of procedure for regulating its functioning. 55. The present Kerala Public Service Commission Rules of Procedure has been published in Kerala Gazette No. 39 dated 05.10.1976. Rules 1 & 2 thereof comes under the preliminary section OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..59.. thereof. Part-I of the KPSC Rules of Procedure deals with relations of the Commission with Government and subordinate authorities and Part-I thereof is inclusive of Rules 23 to 24A thereof. Part-II of the said Rules deals with internal matters of the Commission and Part-III thereof contains Rule 40. Rule 22, inclusive of clause (iii) thereof, is contained in Part-I of the Rules of Procedure. Rule 39, which deals with amendment of the Rules, clearly stipulate that the Commission shall be competent to make any amendment to those rules, provided that an amendment to the provisions contained in Part-I of the said Rules shall be made with the concurrence of the Government. In other words, the aforesaid Part-I of the Rules, comprised in Rule 3 to Rule 24A thereof, can be amended by the PSC, only with the concurrence of the Government. Rule 22(iii) may be re-produced once again for the sake of easy reference and the same reads as follows : “Rule 22. Candidates who are found guilty of the following items of misconduct shall be liable for disqualification for being considered for a particular post or department from applying to the Commission either permanently or for any period or the invalidation of their answer scripts or products in a written practical test or the initiation of criminal or other proceedings against them or their removal or dismissal from office or the ordering of any other disciplinary action against them if they have already been appointed, or any one or more of the above. (i)-(ii) * * * (iii) Making of any false statement in the application form or its annexure or any document produced in connection with a selection or suppression of any material fact relevant to the selection from the Commission.” OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..60.. 56. True that, the abovesaid KPSC Rules of Procedure have not been framed on the basis of any explicit power conferred as per any enactment, like the Kerala Public Services Act. So, technically, the aforesaid Rules of Procedure may not be “statutory rules” in the strict sense. However, the power to frame the KPSC Rules of Procedure are directly traceable, by virtue of the provisions contained in the Constitution of India, which deals with the establishment and functions of the Public Service Commissions. Moreover, going by the structure of the KPSC Rules of Procedure, the provisions in Part-II thereof, inclusive of Rule 22, can be amended by the Commission only with the concurrence of the State Government, as can be seen from the mandate contained in Rule 39 thereof. The present KPSC Rules of Procedure has come into force from 16.08.1976 and as per Rule 1 thereof, they have been engrafted after the repeal of the previous rules of procedure issued earlier, as per G.O.(Ms.) No.1297/Public dated 28.10.1958, as can be seen from a reading of Rule 38 of the present Rules. So, merely because the rules of procedure may not stricto sensu be statutory rules, the power of the Commission to deal effectively with advice memos, issued by the Commission, on the basis of the fraud played by the candidate on the Commission, will not, in any manner, be whittled or diluted. The OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..61.. observations made by the Division Bench of this Court, in para 2 of Appukuttan Pillay's case supra [1984 KLT 880], as if Rule 3(c) of KS&SSR Part-II will override even Rule 22 of the PSC Rules of Procedure, even in the case of fraud, does not reflect the correct legal position. As a matter of fact, there cannot be any conflict between Rule 3(c) of KS&SSR Part-II and Rule 22(iii) of the KPSC Rules of Procedure. The former deals with the cancellation of advice, etc., in cases where the advice has been tendered on the basis of mistakes, as contemplated in the said Rules. Whereas, the provision contained in Rule 22(iii) deals with scenarios of fraud played by the candidates concerned on the PSC in the selection process. The said provisions operate in two different fields. This is all the more so, in view of the decision of the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in K.G. Ashok's case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419], more particularly paras 8, 11, 22, etc. Going by the specific stipulations in clause (iii) of Rule 22 of the PSC Rules of Procedure, where the candidate makes any false statement in the application form or its annexures or produces any false document, in connection with his selection or there is suppression of any material fact, relevant to the selection by the Commission, then candidates, who are found guilty on those grounds, would be proceeded under that Rule and they are liable OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..62.. to face disqualification, for being considered for a particular post or department, from applying to the Commission, either permanently or for any period, or for the invalidation of their answer scripts or products in a written, practical test, apart from initiation of criminal or other disciplinary action, as held by the Apex Court, in para 11 of K.G. Ashok's case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419]. Apart from rejection of the application on those grounds, in case the candidate has already appeared in a written test and interview, etc., the same are also liable to be declared invalid. In other words, in a case where the fraud, in the submission of the false statement or suppression of vital material fact to the Commission, is discovered only after the issuance of advice memo and appointment order, etc., then, it is not as if the Commission is powerless and in such a scenario, subject to proving the facts regarding the submission of the false statement or suppression of material facts, etc., the candidate would not only be disqualified for future selection, but even the application and the participation in the selection process, including the appearance in the written test, interview, etc., would be invalidated and a consequential action of invalidation of the inclusion in the probability test/short list, ranked list, advice list, etc., could also be made. In other words, Rule 22(iii) clearly empowers the PSC to cancel OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..63.. the advice memo, if the element of fraud or material suppression of facts, etc., are discovered later. But, such action should be taken only on the basis of a due fair process and within a reasonable time limit from the discovery of the fraud. As of now, it appears that there are no specific provisions, placing any period of limitation, for taking action in a case of the present nature. That apart, going by the well-established legal position, regarding the effect of fraud, even in the absence of an explicit provision, a body like the PSC, will have the inherent power to interdict with the benefits enjoyed by a candidate, on the basis of the fraud played by him on the Commission, after the discovery of such fraud. In other words, such action, in terms of Rule 22(iii), has to be taken within a reasonable time limit after the discovery of the fraud. In the instant case, the petitioner has no contention that the PSC has not taken diligent action, in canceling the advice, after the discovery of the fraud. Hence, there is no necessity for us to render any final opinion, as to the reasonable time limit within which such action should be completed by the PSC, after the discovery of the fraud. However, prima facie, we would only venture to say that, in the absence of specific prescriptions in Rule 22(iii), regarding the period of limitation, the legislative policy, enshrined in the provisions of the Limitation Act, OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..64.. would be analogously reckoned. However, there is no necessity to render any final opinion on that point, in view of the abovesaid aspects. 57. In view of the abovesaid aspects, we are clearly of the view that the Division Bench of this Court, in Hareendran's case supra [1999 (2) KLT 63 (DB)], was right in holding that the previous decisions of the Division Bench, in Appukuttan Pillay's case supra [1984 KLT 880] and Malini's case supra [1996 (2) KLT 332], has not considered the crucial aspect, that the period of limitation, stipulated in Rule 3(c) of KS&SSR Part-II, will apply only in the case of mistakes conceived therein and not in a case where the advice memo has been issued by the PSC, on account of the fraud played by the candidate, by making false statements or by the suppression of material facts, etc. In other words, Rule 3(c) has no application in a case where the advice memo is vitiated on account of the fraud played by the candidate and such action for cancellation of advice will have to be finalized by the PSC within a reasonable time limit from the discovery of the fraud. As rightly held by the Division Bench in the subsequent decision in Babu's case supra [2010 (1) KLT 435 (DB)], nothing, gained by playing fraud, attains finality and that therefore, the limitation period in Rule 3(c), which applies only in the case of mistakes, can have no application in the case OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..65.. of fraud played by the candidate on the Commission. This is all the more so, in view of the dictum laid down by the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in K.G. Ashok's case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419], which deals with an almost identical or similar fact scenario of candidates contravening the restriction provided in the selection notification. 58. Though the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, rendered on 26.10.1998 in Hareendran's case supra [1999 (2) KLT 63 (DB)], has not been discussed in K.G. Ashok's case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419], a reading of both the decisions would lead to the conclusion that the Apex Court in K.G. Ashok's case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419] has implicitly approved the dictum laid down by the Division Bench in Hareendran's case supra [1999 (2) KLT 63 (DB)]. So, the view rendered by the Division Bench, in para 2 of Appukuttan Pillay's case supra [1984 KLT 880], that even in a case of fraud, Rule 22(iii) will not apply and such a case will be regulated by Rule 3(c) of KS&SSR Part-II, does not reflect the correct legal position, in view of the aforestated aspects. We have already held that Rule 3(c) of KS&SSR Part-II, which deals with mistakes and Rule 22 (iii) of the KPSC Rules of Procedure, which deals with fraud, operate on different planes and that merely because the PSC Rules of Procedure may not be stricto sensu OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..66.. statutory rules, as the same has not been framed under the provisions of any parent enactment, the said rules of procedure has its own efficacy, in view of the afore provisions of the Constitution of India and it is not as if the PSC is powerless to deal with the scenario of the advice memo being vitiated, on account of the fraud played by the candidate. 59. So, in the light of these aspects, we approve the considered views rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Hareendran's case supra [1999 (2) KLT 63 (DB)]. We also approve the dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the subsequent decision in Babu's case supra [2010 (1) KLT 435 (DB)], but with the small rider, mentioned hereinafter. In para 6 of Babu's case supra [2010 (1) KLT 435 (DB)], the Division Bench has observed that Rule 3(c) of Part-II KS&SSR will apply only in the case of Government services and may not have any application to public sector corporations, whose selections are also within the purview of the PSC. 60. It is true that, going by Rule 1 of Part-II KS & SSR, those rules will apply to all State and subordinate services and holders of all posts, whether temporary or permanent, in any such service, etc., and that it will also apply to all posts in Government services, even though the posts they hold are not classified as coming under a particular OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..67.. service, by including it in Schedule-I or Schedule-II of the KCS (CCA) Rules, 1960, etc. In other words, KS & SSR Part-II, by itself, may not apply to services under public sector corporations and undertakings coming within the purview of the State Government. It may be that some of the State public sector bodies may have adopted the provisions of KS & SSR Part-II, either in its entirety or part thereof, by their resolutions. Even if it is assumed that many or some of the public sector bodies may not have formally adopted the provisions contained in Rule 3(c) of KS & SSR Part-II, still, we are of the view that, where the advice memo of the candidate for appointment to such public sector body has been issued by the PSC, on the basis of mistake, as above, then it is not as if the PSC is totally powerless to deal with such a scenario. It has been clearly held by a learned Single Judge (T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, J.) of this Court, in the case in V.V. Prakasini v. Kerala Public Service Commission and Ors. [1993 (1) KLJ 632], more particularly in para 18 thereof, that such a reserve power to correct mistakes, as envisaged in Rule 3(c) supra, has to be located in every public authority, in the interest of justice, to avoid arbitrariness and that it is not uncommon, in fact, it is a human falling – that errors are committed in the conduct of human affairs and that infallibility is not a human virtue, that being a OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..68.. quality attributable only to the Almighty. That therefore, such a power to correct apparent mistakes is therefore an absolute necessity and has to be found in every authority, even without a specific provision, as has been held in decisions as in Sasidharan v. Reserve Bank of India [1990 (2) KLT 573, para 7], Karunakaran Nambiar v. Director of Public Instruction & Ors. [1966 KLT 290], State of Punjab v. Jagdip Singh [AIR 1964 SC 521], etc. It will be pertinent to refer to the relevant portion of para 18 of the decision in V.V. Prakasini's case supra [1993 (1) KLJ 632], which reads as follows : “18. …........................... Such a reserve power to correct mistakes committed by itself has to be located in every public authority in the interests of justice and to avoid arbitrariness. It is not uncommon in fact it is a human falling that errors are committed in the conduct of human affairs. Infallibility is not a human virtue, that being a quality attributable only to the Almighty. Such a power to correct apparent mistakes is therefore an absolute necessity and has to be found in every authority, even without a specific provision as was held by me earlier In my decision in Sasidharan v. Reserve Bank Of India, (1990 (2) KLT 573), paragraph, 7 relying on the decision in Karunakaran Nambiar v. Director of Public Instruction, 1966 KLT 290 and others. The observations of the Supreme Court in a slightly different context in State of Punjab v. Jagdip Singh, AIR 1964 SC 521) are apposite in this context........................” 61. We are in full agreement with the abovesaid Single Bench verdict in V.V. Prakasini's case supra [1993 (1) KLJ 632]. In other words, even in the absence of Rule 3(c), it is not as if the PSC is powerless to deal with the scenario of dealing with mistakes, in the issuance of advice memos, etc., and therefore, even if Rule 3(c) may not OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..69.. have been adopted in the public sector body concerned, the same may not make any vital difference, as regards the power to correct such mistakes. Of course, in such a scenario, merely because Rule 3(c) may not otherwise strictly apply, still, the action for cancellation of advice memo and termination from service of the incumbent will have to be completed within a reasonable time limit. Going by the dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Jayadev's case supra [1977 KLT 85] as well as the legislative policy of the rule making authority, the action for cancellation of advice memo, in cases of mistakes and consequent termination from service, will have to be finalized within a reasonable time limit, even in such cases where the advice memo was given to the candidate concerned for appointment in public sector unit and such period of limitation will have to be construed as one year from the date of the advice memo. 62. It is also to be noted that, in the abovesaid decision of this Court in V.V. Prakasini's case supra [1993 (1) KLJ 632], it has been clearly held, in paras 5 & 6 thereof, that in the period during which stay of the impugned action under Rule 3(c) was granted by the court and where the petitions are ultimately dismissed, the period during which the stay had operated should be excluded, for computing the period of OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..70.. limitation or reasonable time limit, as the case may be. The said dictum, laid down with reference to the cancellation of advice, due to mistake, are also broadly invokable in a case where action is proposed for cancellation of the advice and consequential termination from service, consequent to the subsequent discovery of the fraud. We say so, as the impugned order dated 16.05.2006, issued by the PSC for cancellation of the advice memo, has been stayed since 25.05.2006. Therefore, while reckoning the reasonable time limit for the consequential action for termination from service, the said long period of stay will have to be excluded, for computing the reasonable time limit for passing consequential orders of termination from service, going by the dictum laid down by this Court in paras 5 & 6 of V.V. Prakasini's case supra [1993 (1) KLJ 632], based on the decision of the Apex Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Calcutta [AIR 1980 SC 656, para 7]. Conclusion on the Reference Issue: 63. The upshot of the above discussion is that, the dictum laid down by the Division Bench in Hareendran's case supra [1999 (2) KLT 63 (DB)], to the effect that the period of limitation in Rule 3(c) of KS & SSR Part-II would apply only in the case of mistakes, as contemplated in the Rules, and not in a case where the advice memo has OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..71.. been issued on account of the fraud played by the candidate on the Commission, reflects the correct legal position and will stand approved by us. Consequently, it is to be held that the contra views, rendered in the earlier decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in Appukuttan Pillay's case supra [1984 KLT 880], Malini's case supra [1996 (2) KLT 332 (DB)], etc., to the extent that the said period of limitation in Rule 3(c) would apply even in cases involving fraud played by the candidate on the Commission, does not reflect the correct legal position and the same, to that extent, will stand overruled. 64. Now, we will have to deal with the disposal of the main matter in this original petition. RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES IN THE O.P. (KAT): 65. We have already dealt with the facts of this case. Ext. P1 advice memo has been issued by the PSC on 06.10.2003, advising the petitioner for appointment as Live Stock Inspector (Gr. II) in the Animal Husbandry Department, Palakkad District. Though a copy of the appointment order has not been produced in this case, we are told that the appointing authority, in this case, is the 3rd respondent-District Animal Husbandry Officer, Palakkad, who has issued Order No. B-7031/ 2001/Estt. dated 23.10.2003, whereby the petitioner has been OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..72.. appointed to the post of Live Stock Inspector (Gr. II), Palakkad District, in pursuance of Ext.P1 advice memo dated 06.10.2003. The petitioner, thereafter, has joined duty in the said post on 30.10.2003. In pursuance of Ext. P2 show cause notice dated 18.01.2006, the respondent PSC authority, after considering Ext. P3 reply dated 27.01.2006, has issued the impugned Ext. P4 order dated 16.05.2006, cancelling the advice of the petitioner for the above post. Ext. P1, W.P. (C) No. 13619/2006 (which led to the instant Transferred Application before the Tribunal), was filed before this Court on 24.05.2006. This Court has admitted the case on 25.05.2006 and has also issued an interim order on the same day (25.05.2006), staying the operation and implementation of the impugned Ext. P4 advice cancellation memo dated 16.05.2006. The said order has been extended until further orders, later. 66. Ordinarily, a proper cause of action will be accrued to the party concerned only after the appointing authority issues the consequential order terminating the service of the incumbent concerned, in pursuance of the advice cancellation memo issued by the PSC. In the instant case, the petitioner has approached this Court, by filing the above W.P.(C) on 24.05.2006, even before the appointing authority had issued orders terminating his service, consequent to OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..73.. Ext.P4. 67. The main ground of cancellation of the petitioner’s advice memo, as per the impugned Ext. P4 order, is that the petitioner, contrary to the conditions in the selection notification, had applied to more than one district and had made a false statement in his application, that he had not applied to more than one district. But that the petitioner, apart from applying to Palakkad District, had also applied to Idukki District for the very same common selection notification. The main defence taken up by the petitioner is that, apart from applying to Palakkad District, he had never applied to any other District, including Idukki District, for the abovesaid selection and that the allegation raised by the respondent PSC, in Ext. P2 show cause memo, are factually wrong and that, if at all any such application is alleged to be received, in any other district, then the same has not been submitted by the petitioner but must have been done at the instance of people inimical to him. So also, the only contention raised in the above writ proceedings, which led to the Transferred Application before the Tribunal, is that the petitioner had never applied to any district other than Palakkad district and that the allegations, to the contrary, are factually wrong, etc. Further that, some persons, inimical to him, have OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..74.. filed W.P(C) No. 16282/2005 before this Court (a copy of which has been produced as Ext. P5 in Ext. P1 W.P.(C)), in which the petitioner herein has been arrayed as the 6th respondent therein. That, the case therein is that the petitioners therein are included in the ranked list for the abovesaid post in Palakkad district and persons, like the 6th respondent (petitioner herein), have been illegally included, eventhough they had applied to more than one district, and that the petitioner herein should be disqualified, etc. That, in response thereto, the PSC has mechanically acted upon such selection and without conducting any verification, through any proper enquiry, the PSC authorities have proceeded, on the premise that the said allegations raised against the petitioner herein are correct and if a proper verification had been done, then it would have been revealed that the petitioner herein had not, in fact, applied to any district other than Palakkad district, etc. In short, the main or the only defence raised in the writ proceedings is that the petitioner has never applied to any other district. On the other hand, the PSC authorities have filed Ext. P2 counter affidavit dated 13.11.2006 in the above case, which led to the Transferred Application, wherein the specific case is that the petitioner had submitted Ext. R1(a) application dated 21.01.1998, for selection to the above post in Palakkad District OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..75.. and that the selection notification contains specific restrictions and prohibitions for applying to more than one district and the penal consequences thereof, including invalidation of the application and disqualification of the selection process, etc. and that, in Column No. 8 of Ext. R1(a) application, the petitioner has specifically represented before the PSC that he had applied only to Palakkad District and that he had not applied to any other district. That, subsequently, on receiving complaints, it was verified and it was found that the petitioner had, in fact, applied for the very same common selection notification to Idukki district as well, where his application has been registered as J-264, as evident from Ext. R1(b) and that since the written test for all the 14 districts was conducted on the same day, he had not appeared for the written test, etc. These specific factual averments in the counter affidavit of the PSC has not, in any manner, been denied or rebutted by the petitioner by filing a reply or rejoinder thereto. 68. Hence, the sheet anchor of the defence of the petitioner, that he had not applied to more than one district, appears to be totally untenable, in the facts of this case. It is in the light of these aspects that the Tribunal has rendered the impugned Ext. P3 verdict on 25.11.2014, with the specific finding that, in view of the indisputable factual aspects, OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..76.. the point raised by the petitioner is fully covered against him by the decision of the Apex Court in K.G. Ashok’s case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419]. Since it is indisputable that the selection notification had contained specific restrictions and prohibitions, that the candidate should not apply to more than one district, and as the petitioner has clearly given a declaration in Ext. R1(a) application that he has not applied to any districts other than Palakkad District, the facts revealed in the pleadings of the PSC would clearly disclose that the petitioner had made a false declaration before the PSC in Ext. R1(a) application, as above. 69. The facts of this case is broadly similar or identical to the factual scenario dealt with by the Division Bench in Hareendran’s case supra [(1992) 2 KLT 63] as well as in the decision of the Apex Court in K.G. Ashok’s case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419]. In view of the specific dictum laid down therein, more particularly, in view of the legal principles enunciated by the Apex Court, in para Nos. 21 to 24 of K.G. Ashok’s case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419], the Tribunal is fully justified to arrive at the findings in the impugned verdict. As already held, the period of limitation of one year from the date of advice, as prescribed in Rule 3(c), is not applicable in the present case, as the impugned action OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..77.. is based on the ground of fraud. So, the impugned action has to be initiated and completed within a reasonable time limit from the discovery of the fraud. Going by the facts narrated hereinabove, the impugned action, rendered by the respondent PSC on 16.05.2006, in cancelling advice memo dated 6.10.2003, has been taken within a reasonable time limit from the date of discovery of the fraud. The petitioner has not taken any pleadings or contentions that the said impugned action has been taken beyond a reasonable time limit from the date of discovery of the fraud. That apart, the petitioner has not raised any contention or ground in the writ proceedings, which led to the transferred application or in the review application filed before the Tribunal or in the present O.P. filed before this Court, that the impugned action of the PSC, in cancelling the advice memo, is regulated by Rule 3(c) and that the time limit of one year from the date of the advice is applicable in the instant case, where the ground for taking the impugned action was based on fraud. So, we are not in a position to reverse the abovesaid well considered verdict, in any manner. 70. The petitioner has thereafter filed a review application, as per Ext. P4 RA No. 37/2015, to review Ext. P3 verdict of the Tribunal. The same has been dismissed by the Tribunal, as per Ext. P6 dated OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..78.. 06.01.2015. A reading of Ext. P4 review application and Ext. P6 order, dismissing the review application, would make it clear that the only contention raised by the petitioner therein is that, in similar circumstances, the Government has invoked the discretionary power under Rule 39 of KS & SSR Part-II, to regularise the appointments of such candidates, whose advice memos were cancelled by the PSC, for contravening similar restrictions, in the matter of not applying to more than one district, for district level selections. 71. Various Government Orders and certain judgments of this Court have been produced as Anxs. RA-1 to RA-6. 72. Such a new plea, put up on the basis of Rule 39 of KS & SSR Part-II, cannot be the ground for reviewing Ext. P4 verdict. 73. Going by the pleadings and materials in the case, the petitioner has challenged the impugned action immediately after the issuance of the order dated 16.05.2006, issued by the PSC, cancelling the advise and without waiting for the appointing authority to issue the consequential order on termination from service. 74. In a way, the challenge was made at the premature stage. Even the validity of the termination from service was not in question in the proceedings before the Tribunal. OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..79.. 75. Therefore, the plea for invocation of Rule 39 discretion by the Government, was never a matter in issue in the proceedings in the writ proceedings, which led to the Transferred Application before the Tribunal. Hence, the Tribunal has rightly held that the totally new plea put up by the petitioner, on the basis of Rule 39 of KS & SSR Part-II, for challenging the cancellation of advice, is not a ground for reviewing the impugned verdict of the Tribunal, dismissing the Transferred Application. However, very guardedly, the Tribunal has also held that the rights, if any, of the applicant therein/petitioner herein, to move the Government under Rule 39 of KS & SSR Part-II, will not be affected by the order dismissing the Transferred Application. 76. It is well established and does not require the citation of any judicial authority that the plea for review would be maintainable only in a narrow band width. The petitioner has no case that the impugned verdict of the Tribunal, dismissing the Transferred Application, is vitiated by any error apparent on the face of the record, or that he could produce any new materials, despite due diligence, he could not have done earlier, which would show that the grounds for cancellation of advice, as per the impugned order, issued by the PSC, was illegal, ultravires or unreasonable. No such ground or material is, in any OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..80.. manner, pleaded or averred in the Review Application. Hence, the Tribunal had no other way but to dismiss the Transferred Application. Very guardedly, the Tribunal has also held that the rights, if any, of the petitioner to move the Government, under Rule 39 of KS & SSR Part-II, will not be affected by the dismissal of the Transferred Application. The question as to whether the petitioner has any rights under Rule 39 of KS&SSR Part-II, does not arise for consideration, in the facts and pleadings of this case. So, the Tribunal has rightly held that, in case, the petitioner has any such rights and that, in case the petitioner moves the Government under Rule 39 of KS & SSR Part-II, the same will not be affected by the dismissal of the Transferred Application. 77. Further, Sri. P.C. Sasidharan, learned Standing Counsel for the KPSC, would submit that the legal principles, regulating the discretion of the State Government, in exercising their power under Rule 39 of KS & SSR Part-II, is well settled and, in that regard, reliance is placed on the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case in T.C. Sreedharan Pillai & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors. [1973 KLT 151 (FB)] and para Nos. 20 & 21 thereof read as follows:- “para 20. Ordinarily, therefore, it is not expected that the power under Rule 39 should be resorted to merely for purpose of getting round the provision contained in any of the general rules or special rules. Rule 39 is to be invoked only to meet exceptional situations where gross injustice or inequity is seen to result from the application of the rules in all their OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..81.. rigour. In such cases and such cases alone, Rule 39 empowers the designated authority to mete out equity and justice by passing appropriate orders in relaxation of the provisions of the rules concerned. Para 21. We may now summarise the conclusions that emerge from the preceding discussion. We hold that Rule 39 is valid and that it does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or excessive delegation. We are of the view that the said Rule does not warrant the passing of any general order with respect to any undefined or large group of persons exempting them from the operation of any existing rule or granting a relaxation of the rules in favour of such a group. The rule only authorises the authority designated therein to deal with any specific case or cases of individual officers and to pass orders in a just and equitable manner after a full application of the mind of the authority to all the relevant facts and circumstances necessary for a proper determination of the question as to what would constitute justice and equity. In exercising this power it is open to the authority to relax the rigour of the rules to such extent as may be necessary to ensure justice and equity,but it cannot completely nullify the operation and effectiveness of the rules in the guise of relaxing their rigour. If, however, special circumstances do exist warranting a valid classification of the particular case or cases it will also be open to the authority exercising the power under Rule 39 to accord a special treatment in respect of such exceptional cases even by exempting the person or persons concerned from the operation of any particular rule. In saying this we consider it necessary to emphasise that such a course will be permissible only in those rare cases where very strong grounds exist justifying a valid classification of the cases of the officers in question for the purposes of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In determining what is ‘just and equitable’ the authority should take into account the overall effect that the proposed order would have in relation not merely to the particular officers whose cases are specifically dealt with by it but also to all others belonging to the same service, category or class. The mere fact that the enforcement of a rule creates hardship to an officer or a group of officers will be no ground for invoking the power under Rule 39, because it must be assumed that the possibility of the causation of any such hardship must have been duly taken into account at the time when the rule in question was made and the rule-making authority has nevertheless thought it fit to enact such a provision.” 78. The learned Standing Counsel for the KPSC would also point out that the Apex Court, in para No. 11 of the decision in A.P. OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..82.. Showkathali & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors. [(2018) 11 SCC 688], has placed reliance on the abovesaid dictum laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in T.C. Sreedharan Pillai’s case supra [1973 KLT 151 (FB)] and has also held, in para No. 14, thereof as follows:- “para 14. The whole purpose of equity jurisdiction is to prevent injustice and to promote justice. In the words of Krishna Iyer, J., in Roshanlal Kuthalia v. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberoi4 (at SCC p. 639, para 29) “ … equity is the moral dimension of law”. Thus, equity shall overpower technicality where human justice is at stake5. There is a lot of difference between the court exercising equity jurisdiction and the lawmaker itself exercising it. As in the instant case, a residuary power is reserved by the lawmaker, namely, the Government, to be used in certain situations which are not otherwise prescribed under law. However, such power does not clothe the Executive to supplement a prescribed provision or to act in violation of the same. As stated by this Court in S.S. Bola v. B.D. Sardana6 (at SCC p. 590, para 88) “Equity steps in where the law has left yawning gaps”. Even for courts, equity jurisdiction is meant to be exercised when there is no law operating in the field.” 79. The learned Standing Counsel for the KPSC would also point out that the scenario of an identical case of the candidate, contravening the selection conditions, in not applying to more than one district and the consequential cancellation of advice memo by the KPSC, has been considered in detail by the Apex Court in K.G. Ashok’s case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419] and that therein also a plea for equity was raised on behalf of the appellants therein, on the ground that they have already crossed the upper age limit and that there are large number of vacancies available and that they may be accommodated, without OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..83.. disturbing the selected candidates, etc. and the said plea was rejected by the Apex Court, in para No. 23 of K.G. Ashok’s case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419], by holding that, in view of the conduct of the appellants therein, in making false declarations and applying to more than one district, in contravention to the gazette notification issued by the KPSC, it is not possible to accede to their prayer, even on equitable grounds. Accordingly, it is contended by the learned Standing Counsel that, in a case where the advise memo has been secured by the candidate, on the basis of a fraud played by him/her on the KPSC and consequently, the KPSC takes action to cancel the advice memo, then the legal basis for seeking any equitable orders, in terms of Rule 39 of KS & SSR Part-II, may not be available and it is well established that those who claim equity should always come with clean hands and therefore equity and fraud are incompatible, etc. He would also point out that the orders passed by the Government as well as the judgments rendered by this Court, produced as Anxs. RA-1 to RA-6, along with Ext. P4 review application, have been rendered without taking note of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court, in para No. 23 of the judgment rendered on 03.01.2001 by the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in K.G. Ashok’s case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419], which has held that, in such OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..84.. cases, there is no question of invoking equitable grounds. Further, it is also pointed out by the learned Standing Counsel that the reliance placed on Anx. RA-7 decision of the Apex Court in Maharaj Krishan Bhatt & Anr. v. State of Jammu And Kashmir & Ors. [(2008) 9 SCC 24] is displaced, inasmuch as the relaxation from the rigour of the Rules considered therein was not, in any manner, connected with any element of fraud committed by the beneficiaries and that the said decision will not apply to the facts of this case, etc. It is also submitted, by the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent KPSC authorities, that the abovesaid submissions are made only to explicate legal position before this Court and that it is for the Government to take into consideration all such relevant aspects, including the law declared by the Apex Court in K.G. Ashok’s case supra [(2001) 5 SCC 419], more particularly in para No. 23 thereof. On being specifically queried, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-KPSC would also point out that, going by the provisions contained in Clause (f) of Regulation 4 of the KPSC (Consultation) Regulation, 1957, promulgated by the Governor of Kerala under Article 320 (3) of the Constitution of India, it has been clearly stipulated therein that it shall not be necessary for the Commission to be consulted, in regard to making of any order by the OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..85.. Government, in exercise of the powers conferred on them by Rule 39 of KS & SSR, Part-II, etc. 80. Sri. S. Ramesh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner has hardly less than 2 years to retire from service and that, taking into consideration the materials, as per Anx. RA-1 to RA-6, produced along with the Review Application, the Government has to consider the case of the petitioner, in the light of those Government Orders and judgments of this Court and that, subsequent to the dismissal of the Review Application, the petitioner has filed Ext. P7 representation dated 12.01.2015 before the State Government, urging them to invoke Rule 39 of KS & SSR, Part-II, to regularise the appointment of the petitioner, notwithstanding the cancellation of advice by the KPSC, in the light of Anxs. RA-1 to RA-6 and that copies of Anxs. RA-1 to RA-6 have also been made available along with Ext. P7, before the State Government, etc. 81. We have specifically queried to the petitioner and the respondent State and departmental authorities, as to whether any consequential steps have been taken by the appointing authority to terminate the service of the petitioner, in pursuance of the impugned advice cancellation memo issued by the KPSC. Both the petitioner and OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..86.. the respondent departmental authorities have not placed any pleadings and materials in that regard, before us. However, the learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that, in the present case, the appointing authority of the petitioner is neither the respondent-Director of Animal Husbandry nor the State Government, but is the 3rd respondent-District Animal Husbandry Officer, Palakkad, who has issued order dated 23.10.2003, appointing the petitioner to the above post in Palakkad District, in pursuance of the advice memo dated 06.10.2003. 82. A statement dated 20.09.2022 has been filed on behalf of the 3rd respondent in this OP, through the learned Senior Government Pleader. Therein, it is stated that, in pursuance of the impugned order dated 16.05.2006, issued by the KPSC, cancelling the advice memo of the petitioner, the respondent-District Animal Husbandry Officer, Palakkad, has issued proceedings dated 27.05.2006, consequentially terminating the service of the petitioner. Further that, the Transferred Application was initially dismissed by the Tribunal for default on 01.11.2014 and thereafter, the Director of Animal Husbandry had issued instructions to ensure the termination of the appointment of the petitioner and thereupon, the appointing authority had issued yet OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..87.. another proceedings dated 15.02.2014, terminating the appointment of the petitioner. But later, the Transferred Application, which was dismissed for default by the Tribunal, was restored and revived and ultimately, the case was dismissed by the Tribunal on 25.11.2014 and the Review Application was also dismissed on 06.01.2015. Further, it is stated, in pages 2 to 4 of the above statement of the 3rd respondent, that the Government has examined the plea of the petitioner, made under Rule 39 of KS & SSR Part-II, presumably in response to Ext. P7 representation and that it was found that this case is not a fit case to invoke Rule 39 discretion. But that orders have not been issued by the Government. 83. The petitioner had also pointed out that, in view of the stay order that was in force all through out, except during the period when the case was dismissed for default by the Tribunal, the petitioner was paid salary continuously but that, salary from 01.02.2016 has not been paid to him, without any reason and that he had filed a representation on 01.03.2016, before the superior officer and that no response has been forthcoming, in spite of various pleas and that the petitioner’s wife is unemployed and he has no other income to support his family, etc. In response there to, the learned Senior Government Pleader has OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..88.. submitted, on the basis of the aforestatement, that the salary was paid to the petitioner till 31.01.2016. But that the annual increments and subsequent revisions and other benefits could not be sanctioned, as the incumbent was continuing only on the strength of the interim stay orders. Further that, from February 2011 onwards, salary of Government employees are being processed only through Service and Payroll Administrative Respiratory for Kerala (SPARK) system and salary is paid online to their Bank accounts. Further, consequent to the implementation of the 10th pay revision, the provision to process salary in the 8th pay revision scale has been discontinued. Further that, due to technical problems in the SPARK, salary could not be processed and has not been paid, etc. Strictly speaking, the matters in relation to the plea of the petitioner, as made out in Ext. P7 representation, before the Government for equitable treatment under Rule 39 of KS & SSR, Part- II, and the non-payment of salary, etc., may not be matters of adjudication in this proceedings. The Tribunal has rightly held that the pleas of the petitioner under Rule 39 of KS & SSR, Part-II, may not be adjudicated on merits, in the present proceedings, going by the nature of the pleadings and the nature of the issues raised. OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..89.. 84. However, we note that, even before the consequential termination of the appointment of the petitioner, he had approached this Court, by filing the W.P.(C), as early as on 24.05.2006, in which interim stay order was granted by this Court 25.05.2006. Later, the case was transferred to the Tribunal, and except during the brief period at which the case was dismissed for default by the Tribunal on 01.11.2014 and its subsequent registration, the petitioner has been continuing only on the basis of interim orders passed by the Tribunal. Later, the present O.P.(KAT) was filed before this Court on 15.01.2015 and this Court, as per order dated 31.01.2015, has admitted the present O.P. and has also granted interim stay on the termination of service of the petitioner and the petitioner has been continuing in service even now. The first consequential order, passed by the appointing authority, terminating the petitioner from service, was on 27.05.2006, which is after the coming into force of the stay order granted by this Court on 25.05.2006. Hence, the said termination order cannot have any legal effect, as it has been issued without adverting to the stay order passed by this Court. The second termination order, passed by the appointing authority on 05.02.2014, may also not have much effect, inasmuch as the same was passed after the dismissal of the Transferred Application for default on OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..90.. 27.01.2014 and later, the case was restored to the file of the Tribunal. 85. We have already held, based on the dictum laid down by this Court in V.V. Prakasini’s case supra [1993 (1) KLJ 632], in para Nos. 5 & 6, that, in cases of this nature, the period of stay granted by the court is liable to be excluded for reckoning the period of limitation or reasonable time limit for the issuance of the impugned proceedings, including the consequential order of termination of service, if ultimately the petitioner's appointment order is terminated. In V.V. Prakasini’s case supra [1993 (1) KLJ 632], this Court has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court, in cases as in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Calcutta [AIR 1980 SC 656, para 7]. As the appointing authority was restrained from terminating the service of the petitioner from 16.05.2006 onwards, the period of stay therefrom will have to be excluded for computing the reasonable period for taking action for the consequential cancellation of appointment. Since all the parties concerned, including the petitioner, urged before us to finally dispose of the main matter, it will be only in the fitness of things that we issue certain directions in the matter, as otherwise there could be unnecessary confusions, especially in the light of the two termination orders passed; one during the currency of the stay order and another after the dismissal of the case for OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..91.. default, but before the restoration of the case by the Tribunal, etc. 86. We have already held that no interference on merits is called for, as regards the verdict of the Tribunal in the Transferred Application and in the Review Application. However, if we leave things as it is there, then it may lead to unnecessary confusions. We have already impleaded the State Government as an additional respondent in this O.P. From the submissions made on behalf of the departmental and State authorities, it appears that the plea of the petitioner, presumably, in terms of Ext. P7 representation, is being examined by the Government. The appointing authority, in this case, is the District Animal Husbandry Officer, who is much lower in rank than the State Government. Going by the provisions contained in Rule 9 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) [KCS(CCA)] Rules, 1960, all appointments to State and subordinate services shall be made by the Government. Proviso thereto stipulates that the Government may, by general or special orders or rules and subject to such conditions as they may specify, delegate to any other Authority the power to make such appointments. Rule 2(a) of the KCS (CC&A) Rules deals with the definition of “Appointing Authority”. Going by the narrow definition of appointing authority, as per Rule 2(a), read with the broader definition OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..92.. of appointing authority, as per Rule 9 of the KCS (CC&A) Rules, the State Government is given the overall power to make appointments to all State and Subordinate services, but the State Government is also empowered to delegate the power of appointment to other lower authorities. In other words, the State Government can exercise the powers of the appointing authority, notwithstanding that the designated appointing authority, going by the delegation, is the District level Animal Husbandry Officer of the District concerned, in the case of the District level post of Live Stock Inspector. We are getting into these matters only because we are now apprised that the consequential decisions of termination of service of the petitioner and the matters in relation to Ext. P7 representation dated 12.01.2015 have not been finalised, in the manner known to law, and are, therefore, still pending. 87. Accordingly, it is ordered that the 4th respondent-Director of Animal Husbandry Department and the 3rd respondent-District Animal Husbandry Officer, Palakkad, may give a detailed report before the 5th respondent-State Government, as to the consequential steps to be taken, in the matter of termination from service of the petitioner, in pursuance of the impugned order of the KPSC, cancelling the advice of the petitioner, issued on 16.05.2006 by the KPSC authorities. OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..93.. 88. This shall be immediately completed within 10 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Thereupon, the State Government will issue notice of hearing to the petitioner. The petitioner may submit his written submissions in the matter and he may also re- forward Ext. P7 representation dated 12.01.2015, along with the Annexures thereto and along with a copy of this judgment to the State Government. The competent authority of the State Government will, thereupon, take a considered decision in the matter, on the report of the respondent-Director of Animal Husbandry Department and the District Animal Husbandry Officer, regarding the consequential steps for termination from service of the petitioner and at that stage, the matters in relation to the claims of the petitioner, made in Ext. P7 representation, may also be duly examined by the Government and, after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the petitioner, either in person or through his authorised representative/counsel, if any, the Government may take a decision on these matters, in accordance with law, without much delay, and also taking note of the decisions of the Apex Court, referred to hereinabove. The decision shall be rendered by the Government without any further delay, preferably within 5 weeks, and at any rate within an outer time limit of 2 months OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..94.. from the date of receipt of the aforesaid report by the Director of Animal Husbandry and the respondent-District Animal Husbandry Officer, Palakkad. 89. We also make it clear that liberty is accorded to the petitioner to raise his grievances, regarding the alleged non-payment of the full pay and allowances and other related issues, for the period in question, by filing separate representations before the competent authority among the respondents and upon which, it is for such an authority to deal with such aspects and render decision thereon, in accordance with law, without much delay. 90. The Secretary to the office of the Advocate General will forward a copy of this judgment to the respondent-District Animal Husbandry Officer, Palakkad, Director of Animal Husbandry and the competent authority of the State Government in the Animal Husbandry Department, for necessary information and immediate compliance. The respondent Departmental and State authorities will bear in mind that the matter has been pending for a very long time, in spite of the issuance of the impugned advice cancellation memo, as early as on 16.05.2006, and therefore, the matter shall not brook any further delay in the matter. We have already held that the impugned verdict of the Tribunal OP(KAT) No. 15 /2015 ..95.. at Ext. P4, dismissing the Transferred Application and at Ext. P6, dismissing the Review Application, does not call for any interdiction, as regards the reasonings and conclusions therein. No other orders and directions are called for. With these observations and directions, the above original petition will stand disposed of. Sd/- ALEXANDER THOMAS, JUDGE Sd/- ANU SIVARAMAN, JUDGE, Sd/- VIJU ABRAHAM, JUDGE sdk+ vgd skk APPENDIX OF OP(KAT) 15/2015 PETITIONER ANNEXURES EXT P-1 A TRUE COPY OF THE WRIT PETITION NO. 13619/06 ALONG WITH THE EXTS. EXT P-2 A TRUE COPY OF THE COUNTER AFFIDAVIT IN THE WRIT PETITION NO. 13619/06 FILED BY THE PSC. EXT P-3 EXT P-4 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DT. 25.11.14 IN TA NO. 768/12. A TRUE COPY OF RA NO. 37/2014 ALONG WITH ANNEXURES A1 TO A7. EXT P-5 A TRUE COPY OF THE MA NO. 3378/14 FOR IMPLEADING THE STATE GOVERNMENT AS ADDITIONAL 5TH RESPONDENT. EXT P-6 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DT. 06.1.15 REJECTING THE REVIEW APPLICATION. EXT P-7 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DT. 12.1.15 SUBMITTED BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT ALONG WITH THE ENCLOSURES. "