NITIN GUPTA HUF,DELHI V. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CENTRAL CIRCLE -32, DELHI, DELHI

ITA 4120/DEL/2025

AI Insights

The case involves twin appeals by Nitin Gupta HUF against the assessments made for the assessment years 2014-15 and 2015-16 under section 153C read with section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The primary legal issue was the validity of the second 153C assessments, which were challenged on the grounds that the income escaping assessment did not meet the statutory threshold of Rs. 50 lakhs required for reopening the assessments beyond six years. The Tribunal referenced the decision in the case of Ojjus Medicare (P.) Ltd, which clarified the application of section 153C in similar circumstances.

• Counselvise Citation: [2025] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 824820 (ITAT-DELHI)
• Duration Of Justice: 6 month(s) 2 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 30-12-2025
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Allowed
• Bench Allotted: G
• Assessment Year: 2014-2015
• Appeal Filed On: 27-06-2025
• Other Referred Cases: Collector Land Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors, PCIT v. Ojjus Medicare (P.) Ltd, CIT Vs. Jasjit Singh, CIT v. RRJ Securities Ltd
• Laws Referred To: Income Tax Act, 1961
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: MAHESH KUMAR
• Assessee Lawyers: SUMIT LALCHANDANI
• Keywords: Document seized; Documents seized; Search and seizure; Accommodation entries
• Section: 147; 132; 153A; 15

Judgement Text

"IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DELHI BENCH ‘G’, NEW DELHI Before Sh. Satbeer Singh Godara, Judicial Member & Sh. Manish Agarwal, Accountant Member ITA No. 4120/Del/2025 : Asstt. Year : 2014-15 ITA No. 4121/Del/2025 : Asstt. Year : 2015-16 Nitin Gupta HUF, BT-54, Shalimar Bagh, Delhi-110088 Vs ACIT, Central Circle-32, New delhi-110055 (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) PAN No. AAFHN6836G Assessee by : Sh. Sumit Lalchandani, Adv. Revenue by : Sh. Mahesh Kumar, CIT-DR Date of Hearing: 18.12.2025 Date of Pronouncement: 30.12.2025 ORDER Per Satbeer Singh Godara, Judicial Member: These assessee’s twin appeals ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025, for Assessment Years 2014-15 and 2015-16, arise against the CIT(A)-25, New Delhi’s DIN & order Nos. ITBA/APL/M/250/2025-26/10758852625(1) & 10758853038(1) dated 28.04.2025, in proceedings u/s 153C r.w.s. 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short “the Act”), respectively. 2. Heard both the parties at length. Case files perused. 3. It transpires during the course of hearing that the learned CIT(A) identical lower appellate discussion has refused to condone 29 days delay in filing of the assessee’s twin lower appeals for want of justifiable explanation. Learned CIT-DR Printed from counselvise.com ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 Nitin Gupta HUF 2 could hardly dispute that such a delay on account of various communication gaps etc. could not be altogether ruled out. We thus quote Collector Land Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC) to condone the same. 4. It next emerges that we hardly need to delve with the relevant factual matrix at length so far as the assessee’s first and foremost ground/legal argument challenging validity of both these second 153C assessments dated 31.03.2024; is concerned. This is for the precise reason that the learned CIT(A)’s detailed discussion in assessment year 2016-17 has accepted the very issue in the assessee’s favour that the Assessing Officer’s section 153C satisfaction in issue nowhere recorded that the income escaping assessment forming subject matter of adjudication; satisfied the statutory criteria of Rs.50,00,000/-, in these twin assessment years 2014-15 and 2015-16 and held as under: “7.2 The submission filed by the appellant has been perused and taken into consideration while adjudicating the grounds of appeal in the subsequent paras of this order. Findings / Decision: 8. I have examined the submissions of the appellant, the facts emanating from record as well as the Court judgements in the matter relied upon by the appellant. It is seen from the assessment order that pursuant to a search and seizure operation carried out on Alankit group [stated to be a conglomerate of several group companies with diversified activities], Shri Alok Kumar Agarwal, his son Shri Ankit Agarwal, Alankit Assignments Ltd. and Alankit Ltd. and close associates on 18.10.2019, incriminating evidences revealing a network of accommodation entries involving routing of unaccounted Printed from counselvise.com ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 Nitin Gupta HUF 3 cash through various companies owned/controlled by Shri Alok Kumar Agarwal were found. Incriminating evidences in the name of the appellant were also found, in whose case proceedings u/s 153C of the Act were therefore commenced. In view of the aforesaid, notice u/s 153C of the Act was issued on 29.06.2022 to the appellant. In response, the appellant filed Return of Income (Rol) on 29.07.2022 declaring total income of Rs. 4,55,000/-. Assessment order was subsequently passed by the AO on 31.03.2024 determining the income of the appellant for the year at Rs. 8,35,680/- against the returned income. Against this impugned assessment order, the appellant filed appeal on 07.04.2024 raising as many as 25 (twenty-five) grounds of appeal, invoking both legal issues as well as issues on the merits of the additions made and some general grounds. It would be in the fitness of things to examine the legal issues raised by the appellant at the outset as they go to the root of the matter. 9. In grounds no. 1 and 2 of appeal raised as well as written submission filed (supra), the appellant has raised a specific legal ground contending that the notice issued u/s 153C of the Act for the year and the assessment order passed u/s 153C is time-barred by limitation and hence invalid and bad in law and without jurisdiction and that the jurisdictional requirement as contemplated under the fourth proviso to Section 153A(1) of the Act is not satisfied. It has placed reliance on the provisions of section 153C read with section I53A of the Act, wherein it is stated that in cases where the escaped income is less than Rs. 50 Lakhs, the notice under section 153C of the Act can be issued for up to 6 assessment years preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is carried out or requisition is made, thereby resulting in assessment/reassessment of total income for 7 years in total u/s 153C of the Act. In the judgement in the case of PCIT v. Ojjus Medicare (P.) Ltd. (2024) 465 ITR 101 (Del) delivered on 3rd April, 2024 and relied upon by the appellant, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court clarified the date of search in the case of the person other than searched person as per a legal fiction under the first proviso to section 153C of the Act. Hence, the appellant contended that in the instant case under consideration (AY 2016- 17), the proceedings were barred by limitation. It stated that the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Ojjus Medicare and other connected matters, as well as the instant appeal in its case are arising from the common search conducted on the Alankit group on 18.10.2019. To reiterate, in the instant appeal, the appellant in its submission (supra) has Printed from counselvise.com ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 Nitin Gupta HUF 4 placed reliance on the following judgements of the Hon’ble Courts: - Principal Commissioner of Income-tax (Central-1) v. Ojjus Medicare (P.) Ltd reported in [2024] 465 ITR 101 (Delhi); - CIT Vs. Jasjit Singh 458 ITR 437(SC) - Judgments of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Writ petitions filed in various cases arising out of the Alankit group search, as listed by the appellant in para 14 of its submission (supra). 10. I have considered the aforesaid submissions made by the appellant. It is seen that in the present appeal, the appellant has contended that the income which is alleged to have escaped assessment for the “relevant assessment year” or the aggregate amount in the “relevant assessment years” does not exceed Rs. 50 lakhs, i.e., the prescribed limit, thereby not fulfilling the threshold requirement as prescribed by the Fourth Proviso to Section 153 A of the Act, and accordingly notice issued beyond a period of six years is unsustainable in law. In fact, this issue has been considered by the Hon1 ble jurisdictional High Court in the above-referred case of Principal Commissioner of Income-tax (Central-1) v. Ojjus Medicare (P.) Ltd reported in ¡2024] 465ITR 101 (Delhi). The grounds of appeal raised by the appellant and the judicial position on the facts of the case have been carefully perused. The position of the statute has been clear in so far as the amount of income that has escaped assessment for which the reopening can be done for the ‘relevant assessment years’, i.e. beyond six years and up to ten years, is concerned. In the instant case, there are two issues arising by virtue of these present grounds of appeal, summarized below: i) Relating to the date of reckoning for calculating six AYs backwards that can be thrown open for assessment/reassessment after search/handing over of seized material to the AO of the non-searched person; and ii) Relating to whether the assessment/reassessment can be carried out in the instant case being beyond six years but within ten years of the date of search/handing over of seized documents/material to the AO of the non-searched entity. 11. In this regard, it would be in the fitness of things to examine the provisions of the Act u/s 153 A of the Act, reproduced as under, in respect of the time limit for issuance of notice; Printed from counselvise.com ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 Nitin Gupta HUF 5 ‘153A.[(1)] Notwithstanding anything contained in section 139, section 147, section 148, section 149, section 151 and section 153, in the case of a person1- 0- where a search is initiated under section 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets are requisitioned under section 132A after the 31st day of May, 2003 —[but on or before the 31st day of March, 2021], the Assessing Officer shall— a. issue notice to such person requiring him to furnish within such period, as may be specified in the notice, the return of income in respect of each assessment year falling within six assessment years [and for the relevant assessment year or years] referred to in clause (b), in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if such return were a return required to be furnished under section 139; b. assess or reassess the total income of six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which such search is conducted or requisition is made12[and for the relevant assessment year or years]. Provided that the Assessing Officer shall assess or reassess the total income in respect of each assessment year falling within such six assessment years [and for the relevant assessment year or years]: Provided further that assessment or reassessment, if any, relating to any assessment year falling within the period of six assessment years [and for the relevant assessment year or years] referred to in this [sub- section] pending on the date of initiation of the search under section 132 or making of requisition under section 132A, as the case may be, shall abate: [Provided also that the Central Government may by rules made by it and published in the Official Gazette (except in cases where any assessment or reassessment has abated under the second proviso] specify the class or classes of cases in which the Assessing Officer shall not be required to issue notice for assessing or reassessing the total income for six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted or requisition is made [and for the relevant assessment year or years]:] Printed from counselvise.com ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 Nitin Gupta HUF 6 [Provided also that no notice for assessment or reassessment shall be issued by the Assessing Officer for the relevant assessment year or years unless— (a) the Assessing Officer has in his possession books of account or other documents or evidence which reveal that the income, represented in the form of asset, which has escaped assessment amounts to or is likely to amount to fifty lakh rupees or more in the relevant assessment year or in aggregate in the relevant assessment years. (b) the income referred to in clause (a) or part thereof has escaped assessment for such year or years; and (c) the search under section 132 is initiated or requisition under section 132A is made on or after the 1st day of April, 2017. Explanation 1. —For the purposes of this sub-section, the expression \"relevant assessment year\" shall mean an assessment year preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted or requisition is made which falls beyond six assessment years but not later than ten assessment years from the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is concluded or requisition is made. Explanation 2. – For the purposes of the fourth proviso, “asset” shall include immovable property being land or building or both, shares and securities; loans and advances, deposits in bank account.]” 12. The provisions of the section are further explained stating that the AO shall assess or reassess the total income of six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which such search is conducted ‘and the relevant assessment years.’ The provisions of the above section are to be read in tandem with section 153C of the Act in respect of assessment in the case of a non-searched person. 13. The issue, i.e. what would be the commencement point for the purposes of computation of the six year block and how the six year block will be computed is no more res Integra. In fact, as mentioned earlier, this issue has been considered by the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Ojjus Medicare (P.) Ltd. In the aforesaid judgment, with respect to what would be the commencement point for the purposes of computation of Printed from counselvise.com ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 Nitin Gupta HUF 7 the six and ten year block, the Hon’ble High Court after discussing the statutory provisions and various judicial pronouncements has held as under: “F. IDENTIFICATION OF THE COMMENCEMENT POINT FOR THE PURPOSES OF COMPUTATION OF THE SIX AND TEN YEAR BLOCK 75. The First Proviso to section 15 3C significantly shifts the reference point which is spoken of in section 153A(1) while defining the point from which the period of six AYs' is to be calculated, and which stipulates it to be the date of search or requisition, to the date of receipt of books of account, documents or assets seized or requisitioned by the jurisdictional AO of the non-searched person. The Proviso, thus by virtue of a deeming legal fiction, shifts the commencement point from the date of initiation of search or making of requisition to the date of receipt of books, documents or assets by the jurisdictional AO of the non-searched person. The shift of the relevant date in the case of a. non-searched person thus being governed and regulated by the First Proviso of section 153C(1) is, however, an issue which is no longer res Integra..... ...................... ...................... 80. The aforesaid discussion thus renders a determinative quietus to the identification of the starling post from which the block of six AYs' or the \"relevant assessment year\" would have to be calculated. The contention of the respondents that the said block periods would, have to be reckoned with reference to the date of search thus can neither be countenanced nor possibly accepted. That submission is clearly addressed contrary to a long and consistent line of precedents which have held to the contrary and which unequivocally accepted the point of commencement for the purposes of identifying the six or the \"relevant assessment year\" to be etched from the date of handover of documents, assets or things to the AO of the non-searched party. .............. 84. As would be evident from the above, although the decisions in Sarwar Agency and RRJ Securities were cited, the learned Judge chose to observe that the section 153C(1) Proviso would only be liable to be construed as relevant for the purposes of abatement. We find ourselves unable to sustain that line of reasoning since both Sarwar Agency as well as RRJ Securities have struck a line which is in consonance with the view taken Printed from counselvise.com ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 Nitin Gupta HUF 8 in SSP Aviation and which has since come to be affirmed by the Supreme Court in Jasjit Singh. In any case, the law as enunciated in RKM Powergen would not sustain bearing in mind the express enunciation of the legal position by the Supreme Court as is manifest from a reading of paragraph 9 of Jasjit Singh. 85. That then takes us to the principal question of identifying the point of origin for the purposes of computation of the six AYs' and the \"relevant assessment year\" as defined by section J53A. As is manifest from a plain reading of section 153C, the six AYs' are ordained to he those which immediately precede the A Y relevant to the previous year in which the search may have been conducted or requisition made. The block of six AYs' would thus have to be identified bearing in mind the AY pertaining to the FY in which the search had been conducted or requisition made. The aforesaid AY would thus constitute the anchor point for the purposes of identification of the six AYs'. The statute envisages a similar process to be adopted for the purposes of computation of the \"relevant assessment year\" and where applicable constructs a block of ten AYs'. The significant difference between the two however is that while the six AYs' hinge upon the phrase \"immediately preceding\" the AY pertaining to the search year, the ten AYs' are liable to be computed or reckoned from the end of the AY relevant to the year of search. In our considered opinion, the petitioners have correctly identified the aforesaid distinction as being crucial and determinative for the purposes of reckoning the six and the ten AY block period. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Court also held as below: “..B. Both Sections 153A and 153C embody non-obstante clauses and are in express terms ordained, to override Sections 139, 147 to 149, 151 and 153 of the Act. By virtue of the 2017 Amending Act, significant amendments came to be introduced in Section 153A. These included, inter alia, the search assessment block being enlarged, to ten A Ys consequent to the addition of the stipulation of \"relevant assessment, year\", which was defined to mean those years which would fall beyond, the six-year block period but not later than ten AYs'. The block period for search assessment thus came to be enlarged to stretch up to ten AYs'. The 2017 Amending Act also put in place certain prerequisite conditions which would, have to inevitably be shown to be satisfied before the search assessment could, stretch to the \"relevant assessment year\". The preconditions include the prescription of Printed from counselvise.com ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 Nitin Gupta HUF 9 income having escaped assessment and represented in the form of an asset amounting to or \"likely to amount to\" INR 50 lakhs or more in the \"relevant assessment year\" or in aggregate in the \"relevant assessment years\". C. Section 153C, on the other hand, pertains to the non- searched entity and to whom any material, books of accounts, or documents may have been seized and found to belong to or pertain to a. person other than the searched person. As in the case of Section 153A, Section I53C was also to apply to all searches that may have been undertaken between the period. 01 June 2003 to 31 March 2021. In terms of that provision, the AO stands similarly empowered to undertake and. initiate an assessment in respect of a non-searched entity for the six AYs' as well as for \"the relevant assessment year\". The A Ys which would consequently be thrown open for assessment or reassessment under Section 153C follows lines pari materia with Section 153A. D. The First Proviso to Section 153C introduces a legal fiction based on which the commencement date for computation of the six year or the ten year block is deemed to be the date of receipt of books of accounts by the jurisdictional AO. The identification of the starting block for the purposes of computation of the six and the ten year period is governed by the First Proviso to Section 153C, which significantly shifts the reference point, spoken of in Section J53A(l), while defining the point from which the period of the \"relevant assessment year\" is to be calculated, to the date of receipt of the books of accounts, documents or assets seized by the jurisdictional AO of the non-searched person. The shift of the relevant date in the case of a non-searched person being regulated by the First Proviso of Section 153C(1) is an Issue which is no longer res integra and stands authoritatively settled by virtue of the decisions of this Court in SSP Aviation and RRJ z Securities as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in Jasjit Singh. The aforesaid legal position also stood reiterated by the Supreme Court in Vikram Sujitkumar Bhatia. The submission of the respondents, therefore, that the block periods would have to be reckoned with reference to the date of search can neither be countenanced nor accepted. E. The reckoning of the six AYs’ would require one to firstly identify the FY in which the search was undertaken and which would lead, to the ascertainment of the AY relevant to the previous year of search. The block of six AYs’ would consequently be those which immediately precede the AY relevant to the year of search. In the case of a search assessment undertaken in terms of Section Printed from counselvise.com ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 Nitin Gupta HUF 10 153C, the solitary distinction would be that the previous year of search would stand substituted by the date or the year in which the books of accounts or documents and assets seized are handed over to the jurisdictional AO as opposed, to the year of search which constitutes the basis for an assessment under Section 153A... In the aforesaid judgement, on the issue of the threshold of income having escaped assessment, the Hon’ble Court also held as below: G. Insofar as the thresholds put in place by virtue of the Fourth Proviso to Section 153A are concerned and the argument of the writ petitioners of the condition of INR 50 lakhs being an unwavering precondition, we find ourselves unable to sustain that submission, bearing in mind the indubitable fact that proceedings for search assessment commence upon the issuance of a notice and the AO at that stage having really not had the occasion to undertake a. detailed or in depth examination of (he evidence collected or come to a definitive opinion with respect to the total income which may have escaped assessment. Since the computation and assessment of income that is likely to have escaped assessment would at this stage be provisional, it would be incorrect to strike down initiation of action on a mere ex facie examination of the Satisfaction Note. We also in this regard bear in mind the Fourth Proviso using the expression \"amounts to or is likely to amount\". The usage of the phrase \"likely to\" is indicative of the Legislature being conscious of the provisional character of the opinion that the AO may have formed at that stage. H. However, and at the same time, even if the identified asset at that stage be quantified as less than INR 50 lakhs, the AO must for reasons to be duly recorded, be of the opinion that the ultimate computation of escaped income is likely to exceed INR 50 lakhs. The aforesaid satisfaction would have to be based on an assessment of the material gathered and the potentiality of the same being indicative of the escaped assessment exceeding INR 50 lakhs. The formation of opinion in this respect would have to be based not on mere ipse dixit but reflective of a fair assessment of the quantum of income likely to have escaped assessment as distinct from mere speculation and conjecture. I. We further hold that since the precondition ofINR 50 lakhs or more constitutes a sine qua non for initiating action for the extended ten year block, the aforesaid satisfaction and the reasons in support thereof would have to borne out from the Satisfaction Note itself We are Printed from counselvise.com ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 Nitin Gupta HUF 11 also of the opinion that the precondition ofINR 50 lakhs is not liable to be viewed as being the qualifying criteria for each \"relevant assessment year\" that may be thrown open and that the said condition would stand satisfied if the escaped income cumulatively or in the aggregate meets the minimum benchmark of INR 50 lakhs. J........ K....... L. The legislative intent of those provisions having retroactive application is clearly evidenced from the statue declaring that they would apply to all searches conducted between 3.1 May 2003 to 31 March 2021, and the Fourth Proviso in unambiguous terms extending the applicability of those provisions to all searches conducted post 01 April 2017 and Sections 153A and 15 3C superseding the provisions for reassessment, otherwise appearing in the Act. ......... 14. As referred to in the above judgement itself and as cited by the appellant in appeal, the position of law with reference to date of reckoning for calculating six AYs for reopening post-search has also been, laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Jasjit Singh [2023] 458 ITR 437 (SC) and the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. RRJ Securities Ltd [2016j 380 ITR 612 (Delhi). The relevant extracts of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court are reproduced below: In Jasjit Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: ‘9. It is evident on a plain interpretation of Section 15 3C(1) that the Parliamentary intent to enact the proviso was to cater not merely to the question of abatement but also with regard to the date from which the six year period was to be reckoned, in respect of which the returns were to be filed by the third party (whose premises are not searched and in respect of whom the specific provision under Section 153-C was enacted). The revenue argued that the proviso (to Section 153(c)(1)] is confined in its application to the question of abatement. 10. This Court is of the opinion that the revenue’s argument is insubstantial and without merit. It is quite plausible that without the kind of interpretation which Printed from counselvise.com ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 Nitin Gupta HUF 12 SSP Aviation adopted, the A.O. seized of the materials - of the search party, under Section 132 would take his own time to forward the papers and materials belonging to the third party, to the concerned A.O. In that event if the date would virtually \"relate back\" as is sought to be contended by the revenue, (to the dale of the seizure), the prejudice caused to the third party, who would be drawn into proceedings as it were unwittingly (and in many cases have no concern with it at all), is dis- proportionate. For instance, if the papers are in fact assigned under Section 153-C after a period of four years, the third party assessee’s prejudice is writ large as it would have to virtually preserve the records for at latest 10 years which is not the requirement in law. Such disastrous and harsh consequences cannot be attributed to Parliament. On the other hand, a plain reading of Section 153-C supports the interpretation which this Court adopts... ’ In RRJ Securities (Supra), the Hon’ble Delhi High Court held as under: ‘24. As discussed hereinbefore, in terms of proviso to Section 153C of the Act, a reference to the date of the search under the second proviso to Section 153A of the Act has to be construed as the date of handing over of assets/documents belonging to the Assessee (being the person other than the one searched) to the AO having jurisdiction to assess the said Assessee. Further proceedings, by virtue of Section 153C(1) of the Act, would have to be in accordance with section 153A of the Act and the reference to the date of search would have to be construed as the reference to the date of recording of satisfaction. It would follow that the six assessment years for which assessments/reassessments could be made under Section 153C of the Act would also have to be construed with reference to the date of handing over of assets/documents to the AO of the Assessee. In this case, it would be the date of the recording of satisfaction under Section 153C of the Act, i.e., 8th September, 2010. In this view, the assessments made in respect of assessment years 2003-04 and 2004-05 would be beyond the period of six assessment years as reckoned with reference to the date of recording of satisfaction by the AO of the searched person. It is contended by the Revenue that the relevant six assessment years would be the assessment years prior to the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted. If this interpretation as canvassed by the Revenue is accepted, it would mean that whereas in case of a person searched, assessments in relation to six previous years preceding the year in which the search Printed from counselvise.com ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 Nitin Gupta HUF 13 lakes place can be reopened but in case of any other person, who is not searched but his assets are seized from the searched person, the period for which the assessments could be reopened would be much beyond the period of six years. This is so because the date of handing over of assets/documents of a person, other than the searched person, to the AO would be subsequent to the date of the search. This, in our view, would be contrary to the scheme of Section 153C(1) of the Act, which construes the date of receipt of assets and documents by the AO of the Assessee (other than one searched) as the date of the search on the Assessee, The rationale appears to be that whereas in the case of a searched person the AO of the searched person assumes possession of seized assets/documents on search of the Assessee; the seized assets/documents belonging to a person other than a searched person come into possession of the AO of that person only after the AO of the searched person is satisfied that the assets/documents do not belong to the searched person. Thus, the date on which the AO of the person other than the one searched assumes the possession of the seized assets would be the relevant date for applying the provisions of Section 153A of the Act. We, therefore, accept the contention that in any view of the matter, assessment for AY 2003-04 and AY 2004-05 were outside the scope of Section 153C of the Act and the A O had no Jurisdiction to make an assessment of the Assessee's income for that year.’ 15. The period of six assessment years as per the decision of the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court of Delhi thus means six years prior to the assessment year in which the seized material was handed over to the AO of the ‘other’ (non-searched) person/satisfaction note for proceedings u/s 153C was recorded by the concerned AO. As seen from copies of documents in paper book filed in appeal, the satisfaction note was recorded by the AO of the searched person on 10.05.2022 and by the AO of the appellant on 24.06.2022 and the notice u/s 153C was issued on 29.06.2022, i.e. in the F.Y. 2022-23 relevant to AY 2023-24. Therefore, by this yardstick, six years period as referred to in section 153C(1) of the Act would be from AY 2017-18 to 2023-24, with AYs 2016-17, 2015-16 and 2014-15 being the ‘relevant assessment years.’ 16. To ascertain whether the income escaping assessment in the relevant assessment year or the aggregate of the assessment years amounted to or was likely to amount to Rs. 50 Lakhs or more, the copies of the satisfaction notes recorded, as submitted by the Printed from counselvise.com ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 Nitin Gupta HUF 14 appellant, were perused. Relevant portions of the same are reproduced below: Printed from counselvise.com ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 Nitin Gupta HUF 15 Printed from counselvise.com ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 Nitin Gupta HUF 16 From the above, it is seen that the aggregate of the income having escaped assessment for the ‘relevant assessment years’. i.e. AY 2014-15 (FY 2013-14), AY 2015-16 (FY 2014-15) and AY 2016-17 (FY 2015- 16) as per the satisfaction notes recorded falls short of Rs. 50 lakhs and does not fulfill the threshold requirement as per statute and as per the ratio of decision delivered in the case of Ojjus Medicare. 17. Thus, following the ratio of decision of the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of Ojjus Medicare (supra), the satisfaction notes in the instant case do not show that the income, represented in the form of asset which has escaped assessment, amounts to or is likely to amount to Rs. 50 Lakhs or more in ^e ‘relevant assessment year’ or in aggregate in the ‘relevant assessment years’ in the case of the appellant under consideration. 18. Thus, the condition spelt out in the statute and as interpreted by the Hon’ble Courts for permitting reopening beyond six years was not fulfilled in the instant case. The case of the impugned A.Y 2016-17 falls beyond the period of six years preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the satisfaction notes were drawn / notice u/s 153C was issued. The period of six years that could be reopened by the AO thus terminates with the AY 2017-18. The contention of the appellant therefore bears merit. 19. Relying on the above-mentioned case laws and respectfully following the judgment of the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of Ojjus Medicare (P.) Ltd (supra), it is seen that A.Y. 2016-17 is not covered within six AYs as per section 153C of the Act and the condition/s for assessing it as part of the relevant assessment year/s was not existent. The notice issued for the instant assessment year would thus fall beyond the ambit of six AYs' as provided under section 153C read with section 153 A, and hence the impugned assessment order dated 31.03.2024 passed u/s 153C of the Act for the instant AY in pursuance of such notice would not survive, having no legs to stand, and is thus annulled. 20. As it is held that the Assessing Officer did not have the jurisdiction to assess the appellant’s case for the A.Y 2016-17, therefore, all the other grounds raised by the appellant are rendered academic in nature, and hence not required to be adjudicated upon. There is hence no adjudication on merits in this case.” Printed from counselvise.com ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 Nitin Gupta HUF 17 5. That being the case, we are of the considered view that we ought to quash the impugned twin assessments as well going by the very analogy that the learned Assessing Officer’s section 153C satisfaction had not been recorded as per law. Both these impugned assessments stand quashed therefore. 6. All other pleadings between the parties on merits herein stand rendered academic. 7. These assessee’s twin appeals ITA Nos. 4120 & 4121/Del/2025 are allowed. A copy of this common order be placed in the respective case files. Order Pronounced in the Open Court on 30/12/2025. Sd/- Sd/- (Manish Agarwal) (Satbeer Singh Godara) Accountant Member Judicial Member Dated: 30/12/2025 *Subodh Kumar, Sr. PS* Copy forwarded to: 1. Appellant 2. Respondent 3. CIT 4. CIT(Appeals) 5. DR: ITAT ASSISTANT REGISTRAR Printed from counselvise.com "