M/S. PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL PVT. LTD., SUNDARGARH V. COMMISSIONER (APPEAL), GST, CENTRAL EXCISE AND CUSTOMS, CENTRAL REVENUE BUILDING, BBSR

WP(C)/9943/2025

AI Insights

The case involves M/s. Pacific International Private Limited, which challenged the Appellate Order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) under the Goods and Service Tax, Central Excise & Customs. The petitioner had previously won a decision where the Assistant Commissioner dropped proceedings under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994, recognizing their services as 'export services' exempt from service tax. However, the Commissioner (Appeals) reversed this decision, leading to the writ petition. The High Court found that the Appellate Authority had not provided adequate opportunity for a fair hearing and had failed to give reasons for its decision, thus violating the principles of natural justice.

• Counselvise Citation: [2025] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 745891 (HC-CUTTACK)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 05-05-2025
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Tribal Development Co-operative Corporation of Orissa Ltd. Vrs. Sales Tax Officer, East Coast Railway Vrs. Mahadev Appa Rao, Steel Authority of India Limited Vrs. Sales Tax Officer, State of Punjab Vrs. Bhag Singh, State of Uttarkhand and another Vrs. Mayan Pal Singh Verma
• Laws Referred To: Finance Act, 1994, Service Tax Rules, 1994, Central Excise Act, 1944
• Result in Favour of: Others
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: CHOUDHURY MISRA
• Assessee Lawyers: CHITTA RAN JAN DAS
• Keywords: Adjournment; Export service; Natural Justice; Reasoned order; Service tax
• Section: 73; 226; 227; 85(5); 84(3)

Judgement Text

" W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 1 of 47 ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 In the matter of an Application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India *** M/s. Pacific International Private Limited 2nd Floor, Shreeji Krupa Complex Madhu Sudan Marg Rourkela, Sundergarh Odisha – 769 001 Represented through Power of Attorney Holder Shri Arunava Sen Aged about 61 years Son of Late Provakar Sen. … Petitioner -VERSUS- 1. Commissioner (Appeal) Goods and Service Tax, Central Excise & Customs Central Revenue Building, Rajaswa Vihar Bhubaneswar – 751 007. 2. Commissioner, GST & Central Excise Rourkela Commissionerate, KK-42 Civil Township, Rourkela-769004. 3. Deputy Commissioner Goods and Service Tax & Central Excise Rourkela-I Division, KK-42, Civil Township Rourkela – 769 004. W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 2 of 47 4. Assistant Commissioner of Central Tax Goods and Service Tax & Central Excise Commissionerate Rourkela-I Division, Naya Bazar Rourkela – 769 010. … Opposite Parties Counsel appeared for the parties: For the Petitioner : M/s. Chittaranjan Das, Chitrasen Parida, Manas Ranjan Dhar and Raj Kumar Jena Amit Kumar Nayak, Advocates For the Opposite parties : Mr. Choudhury Satyajit Misra, Senior Standing Counsel for Goods and Services Tax, Central Excise and Customs Department P R E S E N T: HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. HARISH TANDON AND HONOURABLE JUSTICE MR. MURAHARI SRI RAMAN Date of Hearing : 05.05.2025 :: Date of Judgment : 05.05.2025 JUDGMENT MURAHARI SRI RAMAN, J.— Questioning the propriety of Order dated 24.02.2025 passed by the Commissioner (Appeal) Goods and Service W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 3 of 47 Tax, Central Excise & Customs, Bhubaneswar-opposite party No.1 allowing the appeal preferred by the Revenue against the Order-in-Original dated 26.05.2023 (Annexure-2) of the Assistant Commissioner of Central Tax, GST & Central Excise Commissionerate, Rourkela-I Division-opposite party No.4 dropping the proceeding under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994, this writ petition has been filed craving to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and227 of the Constitution of India with the following prayer(s): “Therefore, in the facts and circumstances stated above, it is most humbly prayed that this Hon‟ble Court may be pleased to; (i) issue appropriate writ, order or direction to set aside/quashed the order dated 24.02.2025 passed by opposite party No.1 at Annexure-5 and restore the appeal to its Original Number; (ii) issue appropriate declaration to the effect that the impugned Order-in-Appeal dated 24.02.2025 is not sustainable as arises out of an invalidated Order-in- Original being the Order-in-Original barred by limitation under Section 73(4B) of the Finance Act, 1994; (iii) issue appropriate declaration to the effect that the services provided by the petitioner qualifies to be „export service‟ under Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and exempt from levy of Service Tax; W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 4 of 47 (iv) pass any order(s) as this Hon‟ble Court may deem fit in the given facts and circumstances of the present case. And for this act of kindness, the Petitioner as in duty bound shall ever pray.” Facts: 2. The petitioner, registered under the Finance Act, 1994 as manufacturer providing technical support and consultancy service to foreign customers, supplied direct services falling under the category „export services‟ as enumerated in Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 (for short, “the ST Rules”) during financial years 2015-16 and 2016-17. Claiming such services as exempt from the purview of levy of service tax, the petitioner having received consideration during the aforesaid periods filed returns and also filed annual income tax returns. 2.1. Having considered the submission of the petitioner and examining the documents produced, the Assistant Commissioner of Central Tax, Goods and Services Tax & Central Excise Commissionerate, Rourkela-I, Rourkela (“Assessing Authority”) by Order-in-Original 26.05.2023 dropped proceeding initiated under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 taking cognizance of the fact that the consideration received on account of rendering technical support and consultancy service to the overseas customers does fall within the connotation of “export of W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 5 of 47 service” as envisaged under Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. 2.2. Upon review being undertaken, vide Order dated 04.09.2023, the Commissioner, Goods and Service Tax & Central Excise, Rourkela Commissionerate, Rourkela (“Reviewing Authority”) on reading of Rule 9 of the Provision of Service Rules, 2012 read with Section 66C of the Finance Act, 1994, opined that the service provided by the petitioner would be comprehended within the meaning of “intermediary service” as per Rule 2(f) of said Rules, and suggested for filing of appeal under Section 84(3) of the Finance Act, 1994. Accordingly an appeal was filed enumerating grounds therein for setting aside the Order-in-Original dated 26.05.2023. 2.3. Notice dated 20.09.2024 was issued fixing date of personal hearing on 27.09.2024 which was served on the petitioner on 23.09.2024. A petition for adjournment was moved citing short notice. Again notice dated 07.10.2024 fixing date of personal hearing on 15.10.2024 was received on 10.10.2024. As notices did not accompany memorandum of appeal, a petition seeking copy thereof was filed. On 15.10.2024 copy of appeal petition was served on the petitioner. W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 6 of 47 2.4. Another notice dated 29.10.2024 fixing date of personal hearing on 12.11.2024. After service of copy of appeal petition on the petitioner this being the first date of deferred hearing, a petition for adjournment was moved, considering which the prayer was allowed. 2.5. Further notice dated 26.11.2024 fixing date of hearing via video conferencing mode on 02.12.2024 was served on 30.11.2024. On account of short notice, the advocate for the petitioner sought for accommodation on 02.12.2024. 2.6. The appeal stood disposed of by the Commissioner (Appeals), Bhubaneswar vide Order dated 24.02.2025, though no date of hearing in consideration of petition dated 30.11.2024 was given. 2.7. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has filed this instant writ petition. Hearing: 3. This matter came up before this Court under the heading “Fresh Admission”. 3.1. Since issues of non-assignment reason and violation of principles of natural justice are involved, in absence of factual dispute, counsel for both the sides consented for disposal of the matter at this stage. W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 7 of 47 3.2. Accordingly, heard Sri Chittaranjan Das, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner and Sri Choudhury Satyajit Misra, learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the opposite parties. Rival contentions and submissions: 4. Sri Chittaranjan Das, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that since notices dated 20.09.2024 and 07.10.2024 did not contain appeal petition, in effect opportunity for personal hearing in appeal for the first time has been given vide Notice dated 29.10.2024 and Notice dated 26.11.2024 would be the second. Since on both the occasions the notices were served at short notice, the counsel could not attend the hearing due to difficulty mentioned in the petitions. As on the date so fixed the counsel could not appear before the Appellate Authority, the petitioner was deprived of personal hearing despite the fact that a petition dated 30.11.2024 seeking adjournment was filed before the Appellate Authority. The said Authority instead of disposing of the petition for adjournment, deferred the matter. Without any further intimation, the Appellate Authority passed the final Order on 24.02.2025 disposing of the appeal. Such a course is not only arbitrary, but also renders the action impeachable being in flagrant violation of principles of natural justice. W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 8 of 47 4.1. It is submitted that in absence of appearance of the petitioner or its representative, it was incumbent on the Appellate Authority to scrutiny the assessment record and evidence available. Without discussing the merit of the grounds of appeal as taken by the Revenue, the Appellate Authority could not have acted mechanically and passed laconic, bald and cryptic order. Therefore, he insisted for setting aside the Appellate Order for de novo hearing on merits. 5. Sri Choudhury Satyajit Misra, learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the Central Goods and Services Tax, Central Excise and Customs Department-opposite parties strongly opposed the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that the petitioner should not be granted any opportunity since he made attempts to thwart hearing of the appeal on one pretext or the other. The documents enclosed to writ petition shows that notices were served on the petitioner, yet on each occasion adjournment was sought for. The Appellate Authority having considered prayer for adjournments on 27.09.2024, 15.10.2024 and 12.11.2024 fixed the hearing via video conferencing mode on 02.12.2024. Since the counsel for the petitioner did not choose to appear before him, he had no other option but to proceed with the matter and dispose of the appeal in absence of petitioner/counsel representing it. W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 9 of 47 5.1. Since no response/explanation has been proffered by the petitioner with reference to grounds contained in the appeal petition, the Appellate Authority has allowed the appeal based on the material on record with reference to Review Order. Since the petitioner had the occasion to have the said document, it could not be contended that proper opportunity was not afforded to him for presenting the matter. Therefore, he fervently prayed for dismissal of the writ petition in view of availability of alternative remedy. Discussions and analysis: 6. Since principles of natural justice and assignment of reason are the issues raised by the petitioner, this Court notwithstanding availability of alternative remedy entertained this writ petition. In this respect a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Tribal Development Co- operative Corporation of Orissa Ltd. Vrs. Sales Tax Officer, (2003) 133 STC 620 (Ori) observed as follows: “Normally where alternative remedy is provided by any statute, writ application is not to be entertained. This rule of exhausting statutory remedy is a rule of self-imposed restriction. One of caution and is not a rule of law. It is a rule of policy, convenience and discussion and not of jurisdiction. In an appropriate case writ application can be maintained notwithstanding existence of an alternative remedy, as there is no absolute bar. This exception is normally extended (a) W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 10 of 47 when the proceedings are taken before a forum under a provision of law, which is ultra vires, and (b) where the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. An order which is non est on account of violation of basic principles of natural justice need not be appealed from. Whether the alternative remedy is equally efficacious or adequate is a question of fact to be decided in each case. When the factual position is indisputable and what arises for consideration is in substance a question of interpretation, i.e., a question of law, and adjudication of that dispute would avoid multiplicity of proceedings, a writ application can be entertained notwithstanding existence of alternative remedy. Where factual disputes are involved, normal rule is to direct the party to avail statutory remedy, unless it is shown that the same is not efficacious.” 6.1. There being no factual dispute involved in the instant case to decide the points at issue, this Court is called upon to examine whether the Appellate Order suffers from violation of principles of natural justice on the following aspects: i. audi alteram partem; ii. reasons. 7. Statutory provisions with respect to appeal are found in Sections 84 and 85 of the Finance Act, 1994, which stand as follows: “84. Appeals to Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals).— W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 11 of 47 (1) The Principal Commissioner of Central Excise or Commissioner of Central Excise may, of his own motion, call for and examine the record of any proceedings in which an adjudicating authority subordinate to him has passed any decision or order under this Chapter for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any such decision or order and may, by order, direct such authority or any Central Excise Officer subordinate to him to apply to the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) for the determination of such points arising out of the decision or order as may be specified by the Commissioner of Central Excise in his order. (2) Every order under sub-section(1) shall be made within a period of three months from the date of communication of the decision or order of the adjudicating authority. (3) Where in pursuance of an order under sub- section (1), the adjudicating authority or any other officer authorised in this behalf makes an application to the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) within a period of one month from the date of communication of the order under sub-section (1) to the adjudicating authority, such application shall be heard by the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals), as if such application were an appeal made against the decision or order of the adjudicating authority and the provisions of this Chapter regarding appeals shall apply to such application. W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 12 of 47 Explanation.— For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that any order passed by an adjudicating officer subordinate to the Commissioner of Central Excise immediately before the commencement of clause (c) of Section 113 of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2009, shall continue to be dealt with by the Commissioner of Central Excise as if this section had not been substituted. 85. Appeals to the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals).— (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed by an Adjudicating Authority subordinate to the Commissioner of Central Excise may appeal to the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals). (2) Every appeal shall be in the prescribed form and shall be verified in the prescribed manner. (3) An appeal shall be presented within three months from the date of receipt of the decision or order of such adjudicating authority, relating to service tax, interest or penalty under this Chapter: Provided that the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of three months, allow it to be presented within a further period of three months. (3A) An appeal shall be presented within two months from the date of receipt of the decision or order of such adjudicating authority, made on and after the Finance Bill, 2012 receives the assent of the W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 13 of 47 President, relating to service tax, interest or penalty under this Chapter: Provided that the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of two months, allow it to be presented within a further period of one month. (4) The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) shall hear and determine the appeal and, subject to the provisions of this Chapter, pass such orders as he thinks fit and such orders may include an order enhancing the service tax, interest or penalty: Provided that an order enhancing the service tax, interest or penalty shall not be made unless the person affected thereby has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement. (5) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, in hearing the appeals and making order under this section, the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) shall exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as he exercises and follows in hearing the appeals and making orders under the Central Excise Act, 1944.” 7.1. Regard being had to statutory provisions as culled out above, it is the Appellate Authority who is invested with “discretion” to consider merit of each petition for adjournment. A public body endowed with a statutory W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 14 of 47 discretion may legitimately adopt general rules or principles or policy to guide itself as to the manner of exercising its own discretion in individual cases, provided that such rules or principles are legally relevant to the exercise of its powers, consistent with the purpose of the enabling legislation and not arbitrary or capricious. Nevertheless, it must not disable itself from exercising a genuine discretion in a particular case directly involving individual interests; hence it must be prepared to consider making an exception to the general rule if the circumstances of the case warrant special treatment. The amplitude of a discretionary power may be so wide that the competent authority may be impliedly entitled to adopt a fixed rule never to exercise its discretion in favour of a particular class of person; and such a power may be expressly conferred by statute. [See, Halsbury, Vol. I, 4th Edition, para 33, page 35]. 7.2. Discretion when applied to a Court of justice means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular. „Discretion‟ means when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities, that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion, according to law, and not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 15 of 47 but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself. [Refer, Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vrs. Girja Shankar Pant, (2001) 1 SCC 182. 7.3. With such perspective when present case is gleaned, it is discernible that till 15.10.2024, the petitioner was not given copy of appeal petition. However, the matter stood adjourned to 12.11.2024. Since counsel for the petitioner was not available, the prayer was made for deferment of the hearing. On 30.11.2024, the petitioner received notice specifying date of personal hearing on 02.12.2024 to be attended through video conferencing mode. As it appears, the date of personal hearing has been scheduled with short notice. Inadequate time for preparation of appeal being granted, the Appellate Authority should have allowed further time granting opportunity to the counsel for the petitioner to avail the opportunity of personal hearing. 7.4. Be that as it may, this Court examining the Order-in- Appeal dated 24.02.2025 vide Annexure-5 finds that common order has been passed with respect to eleven different appellants with the observation that the respondents did not submit any counter nor did they appear for personal hearing. Having noted the appearance status the Authority jumped to conclude W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 16 of 47 that sufficient opportunities had already been granted and in absence of responses from the respondents proceeded to dispose of the matter. Scrutiny of the Appellate Order depicts that the same was not passed on the date of alleged default of the petitioner, i.e., 02.12.2024, but much later, i.e., 24.02.2025. 7.5. It is not number of adjournments granted but reasonableness of time granted which is determinative factor for consideration of grant of opportunity in adherence of principles of natural justice. Between 02.12.2024 and 24.02.2025 an opportunity could have been granted exercising the power under Section 84 and Section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994 read with Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Scrutiny of documents enclosed to the present writ petition reveals that on receipt of notice bearing scheduled date of personal hearing on 02.12.2024, the petitioner had filed a petition dated 30.11.2024 seeking consideration of deferment of date of hearing as the counsel for the petitioner was otherwise preoccupied and with short notice it was difficult on his part to collect all the documents and present the matter on behalf of the petitioner. 7.6. It appears that petition dated 30.11.2024, was received in the Office of the Commissioner (Appeals), GST, Central Excise & Customs, Bhubaneswar, but nothing is emanating on perusal of the Appellate Order that the W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 17 of 47 Appellate Authority has considered the same and rejected such prayer for deferment of date of hearing in order to proceed further to close the appeal for delivery of order. 7.7. Conjoint reading of sub-section (3) of Section 84 and sub-section (5) of Section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994 read with Section 35(1A) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, it is manifest that the Appellate Authority is empowered to consider the petition for adjournment of hearing on being satisfied with respect to sufficient cause at any stage of hearing of appeal. However, as proviso to sub- section (1A) of Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the Authority can grant not more than three adjournments to a party during the hearing of the appeal. In the present case after service of copy appeal petition, on two occasions with short notice the petitioner was directed to appear for hearing. 7.8. It is trite that without disposing of petition for adjournment, the Appellate Authority could not have proceeded to pass order finally disposing of the appeal. There was no refutal by the Senior Standing Counsel with respect to genuineness of submission of the lawyer against the factual details contained in the petition for adjournment. This Court, thus, finds the submission of Sri Chittaranjan Das, learned Advocate as genuine and plausible. W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 18 of 47 7.9. In Tribal Development Co-operative Corporation of Orissa Ltd. Vrs. Sales Tax Officer, (2003) 133 STC 620 it has been held that: “6. *** The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax has indicated three dates to substantiate his stand that prayer of adjournment was not to be accepted. The first date of appearance was January 5, 1996, second was January 15, 1996 and third was January 23, 1996. The last was declared as a public holiday. It is not number of adjournments granted, but reasonableness of time granted which is a determinative factor. Supposing in a case involving complex questions of fact or law, authority grants adjournment for a couple of days and goes on repeating it, it cannot be said to be grant of reasonable opportunity to a party who is likely to be affected by adjudication. In our considered opinion, the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax was not justified in holding that the petitioner did not deserve adjournment. However, that aspect can be considered by the Appellate Authority.” 7.10. Had the Appellate Authority rejected the petition dated 30.11.2024 on the date of hearing, i.e., 02.12.2024, and proceeded to pass final order on the very date, the matter would have stood differently. Nonetheless, having not considered such adjournment petition on the date of hearing 02.11.2024, the Order dated 24.02.2025 is indefensible. W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 19 of 47 7.11. The Appellate Authority having not disposed of the petition for adjournment of hearing in consonance with the manner projected in Section 84(3) and Section 85(5) of the Finance Act, 1994 read with Section 35(1A) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, particularly when the statute permits the Appellate Authority to exercise his discretion to grant reasonable opportunity, this Court cannot countenance the Appellate Order, but to set it aside for disposal of appeal de novo after affording appropriate reasonable opportunity to the parties. 8. This Court is also called upon to consider another aspect other than audi alteram partem. Another facet of principles of natural justice is sought to be pressed into service is “right to reason”. 8.1. The Appellate Order is bereft of reason. Non-speaking and terse order deserves to be interfered with by the writ Court. In absence of discussion on merit on consideration of each ground pressed in the appeal, the order in appeal is liable to be set aside. 8.2. After making mere statement that sufficient number of opportunities for appearing before the Appellate Authority being given, the petitioner did not submit its counter and in absence of response he proceeded to dispose of the appeal in the following manner: “*** W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 20 of 47 4. In such a scenario, I do not find any merit in keeping the appeals pending and I am of the view that the duty demanded, along with interest and penalties, in the Review Order is to be recovered from the Respondents. The quantum of the amounts to be demanded are brought out hereunder in Table-C: *** 5. Accordingly, the afore-mentioned 11 (Eleven) appeals filed by the Department are allowed and disposed with confirmation of demands of duty, interest and penalties, as tabulated at Table-C above.” 8.3. The Appellate Authority has not made any discussion as to category under which the consideration with respect to services rendered during the periods in question would be exigible to service tax. As is manifest from above paragraphs that the Appellate Authority has exercised his quasi judicial power by abdicating independent application of his conscientious mind. He has simply endorsed what was spelt out in the Review Order. The Appellate Authority hearing an appeal has to be cautious that his decision is not influenced by factors reflected in any other‟s opinion. The merit of each case under appeal vis-à-vis assessment depends on the nature of transactions entered into between parties. 8.4. It cannot be disputed or denied that the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority is coterminous with that of the W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 21 of 47 Assessing Authority. The Appellate Authority has the power, necessary and essential to re-do the assessment, in accordance with law enacted by the Legislature. An appeal is a continuation of the process of assessment. The Appellate Authority can do what the Assessing Authority could do and also direct to do what the former failed to do. 8.5. It is by now a well-settled proposition in law that the Appellate Authority while deciding the appeal is duty bound to consider the grounds of challenge. The Appellate Authority is also required to pass a reasoned and speaking order considering and dealing with those grounds. The impugned Order in the instant case, which is the order passed by the Appellate Authority, seems to be more of an administrative order than that of an Appellate Order passed by a quasi judicial Authority sitting in appeal in seisin of grounds taken by the Revenue. In the opinion of this Court, the Appeal has not been justifiably decided and therefore the same deserves to be remitted to the Appellate Authority for passing a reasoned and speaking order dealing with the grounds raised in the Appeal challenging the order passed by the Assessing Authority. 8.6. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) is supposed to hear and determine the appeal and pass such orders as he thinks fit. In hearing the appeal and W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 22 of 47 making order, the Appellate Authority is empowered to exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as he exercises and follows in hearing the appeals and making orders under the Central Excise Act, 1944. Thus, the Appellate Authority is required to address each of the issue/ground set out in the appeal petition on merit of the matter, even in the absence of either of the parties. 8.7. In East Coast Railway Vrs. Mahadev Appa Rao, (2010) 7 SCR 908, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in very categorical terms has held that arbitrariness in making of an order by an authority can manifest itself in different forms. Every order passed by a public authority must disclose due and proper application of mind by the persons making the order. Application of mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of mind by the authority making the order and disclosure is best done by recording the reasons that led the authority to pass the order in question. Absence of reasons either in the order passed by the authority or in the record contemporaneously maintained is clearly suggestive of the order being arbitrary, hence, legally unsustainable. In the absence of reasons in support of the order it is difficult to assume that the authority had properly applied its mind before passing the order. This is more explicit from the language contained in Section 84 and W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 23 of 47 Section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994 read with Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 in exercise of power under which the Appellate Authority is supposed to dispose of the appeal on merit, even if it be ex parte. 8.8. It is, therefore, apposite in the present context to have reference to the following observation of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Limited Vrs. Sales Tax Officer, (2008) 16 VST 181 (SC) made in the context of failure of the Appellate Authority to ascribe reasons: “12. A bare reading of the order shows complete non- application of mind. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, this is not the way a statutory appeal is to be disposed of. Various important questions of law were raised. Unfortunately, even they were not dealt by the first appellate authority. 13. Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same it becomes lifeless. [See Raj Kishore Jha Vrs. State of Bihar, (2003) 11 SCC 519]. 14. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen Vrs. Amalgamated Engg. Union, (1971) 1 All ER 1148, observed: “The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration.” In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. Vrs. Crabtree 1974 ICR 120 (NIRC) it was observed: W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 24 of 47 “Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice.” “Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at.” Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinx”, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system; reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made; in other words, a speaking-out. The “inscrutable face of the sphinx” is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.” 8.9. In Broom‟s Legal Maxims (1939 Edition, Page 97) there can be found a useful principle, Cessante Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex, that is to say, „Reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself‟. 8.10. In Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. Vrs. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496 the legal position has been summarised as follows1: 1 See also, Nareshbhai Bhagubhai Vrs. Union of India, (2019) 15 SCC 1. W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 25 of 47 “12. The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in support of its decision came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. Initially this Court recognised a sort of demarcation between administrative orders and quasi-judicial orders but with the passage of time the distinction between the two got blurred and thinned out and virtually reached a vanishing point in the judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak Vrs. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262. *** 47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial Authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 26 of 47 observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants‟ faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial Authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or „rubber- stamp reasons‟ is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 27 of 47 Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor, (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37). (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision- making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija Vrs. Spain, (1994) 19 EHRR 553 EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya Vrs. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA), wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, „adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions‟. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of „due process‟.” 8.11. In Abhiram Caretaking & Expert Services Vrs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, 2017 (II) ILR-CUT 1029 the importance of assigning reason in detail has been emphasized with the following observations2: “10. Franz Schubert said: „Reason is nothing but analysis of belief.‟ 2 Giving reasons facilitates the detection of errors of law by the Court. : Santosh Kumar Paikray Vrs. State of Odisha, 2016 (II) OLR 1131 (Ori). W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 28 of 47 In Black‟s Law Dictionary, reason has been defined as a— „faculty of the mind by which it distinguishes truth from falsehood, good from evil, and which enables the possessor to deduce inferences from facts or from propositions.‟ It means the faculty of rational thought rather than some abstract relationship between propositions and by this faculty, it is meant the capacity to make correct inferences from propositions, to size up facts for what they are and what they imply, and to identify the best means to some end, and, in general, to distinguish what we should believe from what we merely do believe. 10.1 In Union of India Vrs. Mohan Lal Capoor, AIR 1974 SC 87 it has been held that reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi- judicial and reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and conclusions reached. The reasons assure an inbuilt support to the conclusion and decision reached. Recording of reasons is also an assurance that the authority concerned applied its mind to the facts on record. It is vital for the purpose of showing a person that he is receiving justice. Similar view has also been taken in Uma Charan Vrs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 1915, Patitapaban Pala Vrs. Orissa Forest Development Corporation Ltd., 2017 (I) OLR 5; and Banambar W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 29 of 47 Parida Vrs. Orissa Forest Development Corporation Limited, 2017 (I) OLR 625. 11. In S.N. Mukherjee Vrs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 the Apex Court held that keeping in view the expanding horizon of principles of natural justice, the requirement to record reasons can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which governs exercise of power by administrative authorities. Except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority is required to record reasons for its decision. 12. In Menaka Gandhi Vrs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 the Apex Court observed that the reasons, if disclosed, being open to judicial scrutiny for ascertaining their nexus with the order, the refusal to disclose the reasons would equally be open to the scrutiny of the court; or else, the wholesome power of a dispassionate judicial examination of executive orders could, with impunity, be set at naught by an obdurate determination to suppress the reasons.” 8.12. It is stated by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vrs. Ajay Kumar Sood, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1067 that individual judges can indeed have different ways of writing judgments and continue to have variations in their styles of expression. The expression of a judge/ authority is an unfolding of the recesses of the mind. However, while recesses of the mind may be inscrutable, the reasoning in judgment cannot be. While judges/ authorities may have their own style of judgment W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 30 of 47 writing, they must ensure lucidity in writing across these styles. 8.13. Decision sans reason renders the decision making process arbitrary3. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Punjab Vrs. Bhag Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 547, observed as follows: “6. Even in respect of administrative orders, Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen Vrs. Amalgamated Engg. Union, (1971) 1 All ER 1148 = (1971) 2 QB 175 = (1971) 2 WLR 742 (CA) observed: „The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration.‟ In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. Vrs. Crabtree, 1974 ICR 120 (NIRC) it was observed: „Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at.‟ Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the „inscrutable face of the sphinx‟, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reasons is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the 3 See Steel Authority of India Limited Vrs. Sales Tax Officer, (2008) 10 SCR 655 = 2008 INSC 799. W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 31 of 47 matter before court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking-out. The ‘inscrutable face of a sphinx’ is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.” 8.14. The observations made in Vishal Ashwin Patel Vrs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Circle 25(3) and others, (2022) 14 SCC 817, has been reiterated in the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttarkhand and another Vrs. Mayan Pal Singh Verma, (2022) 13 SCC 189, which reads as under: “8. In the recent decision in Vishal Ashwin Patel Vrs. CIT, (2022) 14 SCC 817, it was observed by this Court that when the Constitution confers on the High Courts the power to give relief, it becomes the duty of the High Courts to give such relief in appropriate cases and the High Courts would be failing to perform its duty if relief is refused without adequate reasons. It is further observed that in this case, the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was required to have independently considered the legality and validity of the order passed by the Tribunal which was under challenge before it. Neither any submission on merits is recorded nor is there any discussion on the merits of the matter on the order passed by the Tribunal. There is no application of mind at all by the High Court on W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 32 of 47 merits of the order passed by the Tribunal. It can be seen that the High Court has failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it while exercising the powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 9. While emphasising the necessity to pass a reasoned order, in Central Board of Trustees Vrs. Indore Composite (P) Ltd., (2018) 8 SCC 443, it was observed and held by this Court that the courts need to pass a reasoned order in every case which must contain the narration of the bare facts of the case of the parties to the lis, the issues arising in the case, the submissions urged by the parties, the legal principles applicable to the issues involved and the reasons in support of the findings on all the issues arising in the case and urged by the learned counsel for the parties in support of its conclusion. It was further observed in the said decision that an order bereft of reasoning causes prejudice to the parties because it deprives them to know the reasons as to why one party has won and other has lost. 10. In a recent decision in UPSC Vrs. Bibhu Prasad Sarangi, (2021) 4 SCC 516, while emphasising that reasons ought to be given by the High Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it was observed and held by this Court that the reasons constitute the soul of judicial decision and how Judges communicate in their judgment is a defining characteristic of judicial process since quality of justice brings legitimacy to the judiciary. It is further observed that though statistics of disposal of cases is important, of a higher value, is the intrinsic content and of a quality judgment. It W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 33 of 47 is further observed that in exercise of powers under Article 226 the Courts require to independently consider the issues involved.” 8.15. Significant it is to have reference to Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract and Leasing, Kota Vrs. Shukla & Bros., (2010) 4 SCC 785, wherein it has been stated as follows: “14. The principle of natural justice has twin ingredients; firstly, the person who is likely to be adversely affected by the action of the authorities should be given notice to show cause thereof and granted an opportunity of hearing and secondly, the orders so passed by the authorities should give reason for arriving at any conclusion showing proper application of mind. Violation of either of them could in the given facts and circumstances of the case, vitiate the order itself. Such rule being applicable to the administrative authorities certainly requires that the judgment of the court should meet with this requirement with higher degree of satisfaction. The order of an administrative authority may not provide reasons like a judgment but the order must be supported by the reasons of rationality. The distinction between passing of an order by an administrative or quasi-judicial authority has practically extinguished and both are required to pass reasoned orders. 15. In Siemens Engg. and Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. Vrs. Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 981 = AIR 1976 SC W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 34 of 47 1785 the Supreme Court held as under: (SCC pp. 986-87, para 6) „6. … If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of administrative law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law.‟ 16. In McDermott International Inc. Vrs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181 the Supreme Court clarified the rationality behind providing of reasons and stated the principle as follows: „56. … „… “Reason” is a ground or motive for a belief or a course of action, a statement in justification or explanation of belief or action. It is in this sense that the award must state reasons for the amount awarded. W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 35 of 47 The rationale of the requirement of reasons is that reasons assure that the arbitrator has not acted capriciously. Reasons reveal the grounds on which the arbitrator reached the conclusion which adversely affects the interests of a party. The contractual stipulation of reasons means, as held in Poyser and Mills‟ Arbitration, In re, (1964) 2 QB 467 = (1963) 2 WLR 1309 = (1963) 1 All ER 612, „proper adequate reasons‟. Such reasons shall not only be intelligible but shall be a reason connected with the case which the court can see is proper. Contradictory reasons are equal to lack of reasons.‟ ‟ [Ed.: As stated in Bachawat‟s Law of Arbitration and Conciliation, 4th Edn., at pp. 855-56.] 17. In Gurdial Singh Fijji Vrs. State of Punjab, (1979) 2 SCC 368 while dealing with the matter of selection of candidates who could be under review, if not found suitable otherwise, the Court explained the reasons being a link between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions and held, that where providing reasons for proposed supersession were essential, then it could not be held to be a valid reason that the concerned officer's record was not such as to justify his selection was not contemplated and thus was not legal. In this context, the Court held (SCC p. 377, para 18) „18. … „Reasons‟ … „are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions‟. The Court accordingly held that the mandatory provisions W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 36 of 47 of Regulation 5(5) were not complied with by the Selection Committee. That an officer was „not found suitable‟ is the conclusion and not a reason in support of the decision to supersede him. True, that it is not expected that the Selection Committee should give anything approaching the judgment of a Court, but it must at least state, as briefly as it may, why it came to the conclusion that the officer concerned was found to be not suitable for inclusion in the Select List.‟ This principle has been extended to administrative actions on the premise that it applies with greater rigour to the judgments of the courts. 18. In State of Maharashtra Vrs. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan, (1981) 4 SCC 129 while remanding the matter to the High Court for examination of certain issues raised, this Court observed: (SCC p. 130, para 2) „2. … It would be for the benefit of this Court that a speaking judgment is given.‟ *** 21. The principles stated by this Court, as noticed supra, have been reiterated with approval by a Bench of this Court in a very recent judgment, in State of Uttaranchal Vrs. Sunil Kumar Singh Negi, (2008) 11 SCC 205, where the Court noticed the order of the High Court which is reproduced hereunder: „8. … „I have perused the order dated 27-5-2005 passed by Respondent 2 and I do not find any illegality in the order so as to interfere under W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 37 of 47 Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.‟ ‟ and the Court concluded as under: (Sunil Kumar Singh Negi case, (2008) 11 SCC 205: „9. In view of the specific stand taken by the Department in the affidavit which we have referred to above, the cryptic order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained. The absence of reasons has rendered the High Court order not sustainable. Similar view was expressed in State of U.P. Vrs. Battan, (2001) 10 SCC 607. About two decades back in State of Maharashtra Vrs. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan, (1981) 4 SCC 129 the desirability of a speaking order was highlighted. The requirement of indicating reasons has been judicially recognised as imperative. The view was reiterated in Jawahar Lal Singh Vrs. Naresh Singh, (1987) 2 SCC 222. 10. In Raj Kishore Jha Vrs. State of Bihar, (2003) 11 SCC 519 this Court has held that reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion and without the same, it becomes lifeless. 11. „8. … Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system; reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the matter before court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made;…‟ W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 38 of 47 [Ed.: As observed in State of Orissa Vrs. Dhaniram Luhar, (2004) 5 SCC 568, para 8.] 12. In the light of the factual details particularly with reference to the stand taken by the Horticulture Department at length in the writ petition and in the light of the principles enunciated by this Court, namely, right to reason is an indispensable part of sound judicial system and reflect the application of mind on the part of the court, we are satisfied that the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained.‟ 22. Besides referring to the above well-established principles, it will also be useful to refer to some text on the subject. H.W.R. Wade in the book Administrative Law, 7th Edn., stated that the flavour of the said reasons is violative of a statutory duty to waive reasons which are normally mandatory. Supporting a view that reasons for decision are essential, it was stated: „… A right to reasons is therefore an indispensable part of a sound system of judicial review. Natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man‟s sense of justice. … *** … Reasoned decisions are not only vital for the purpose of showing the citizen that he is receiving justice: they are also a valuable discipline for the tribunal itself.‟ *** W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 39 of 47 24. Reason is the very life of law. When the reason of a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases (Wharton's Law Lexicon). Such is the significance of reasoning in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers the cause of justice as well as avoids uncertainty. As a matter of fact it helps in the observance of law of precedent. Absence of reasons on the contrary essentially introduces an element of uncertainty, dissatisfaction and give entirely different dimensions to the questions of law raised before the higher/appellate courts. In our view, the court should provide its own grounds and reasons for rejecting claim/prayer of a party whether at the very threshold i.e. at admission stage or after regular hearing, howsoever concise they may be. 25. We would reiterate the principle that when reasons are announced and can be weighed, the public can have assurance that process of correction is in place and working. It is the requirement of law that correction process of judgments should not only appear to be implemented but also seem to have been properly implemented. Reasons for an order would ensure and enhance public confidence and would provide due satisfaction to the consumer of justice under our justice dispensation system. It may not be very correct in law to say, that there is a qualified duty imposed upon the courts to record reasons. *** 27. By practice adopted in all courts and by virtue of judge-made law, the concept of reasoned judgment has become an indispensable part of basic rule of W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 40 of 47 law and, in fact, is a mandatory requirement of the procedural law. Clarity of thoughts leads to clarity of vision and proper reasoning is the foundation of a just and fair decision. In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd., 1974 ICR 120 (NIRC) there are apt observations in this regard to say “failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice”. Reasons are the real live links to the administration of justice. With respect we will contribute to this view. There is a rationale, logic and purpose behind a reasoned judgment. A reasoned judgment is primarily written to clarify own thoughts; communicate the reasons for the decision to the concerned and to provide and ensure that such reasons can be appropriately considered by the appellate/higher court. Absence of reasons thus would lead to frustrate the very object stated hereinabove.” 8.16. In identical fact-situation as that is obtained on record, following the ratio laid down in the case of Shukla and Brothers (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in Assistant Commercial Tax Officer Vrs. Rijhumal Jeevandas, (2010) 4 SCR 715 has been pleased to hold as follows: “9. This revision petition came to be dismissed by the High Court vide its Order dated 7th July, 2008. The said Order reads as under: „After having carefully gone through material on record, since after due consideration proper discretion has already been used by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) as also the Rajasthan Tax Board, in the facts and circumstances, no further W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 41 of 47 interference is called for by this Court. The revision petition is dismissed accordingly as having no merits.‟ 10. The present appeals had been preferred by the Department against the order dated 7th July, 2008 passed by the High Court. The primary challenge, to the legality and correctness of the order, is that there is no discussion either on the facts or on the questions of law raised in the revision petition before the High Court and in the argument addressed during the time of hearing of the revision petition. 11. With some regret, we are constrained to notice that the cryptic orders like the above, have not only been passed in the present appeals, but identical orders had even been passed by the High Court in large number of cases from which the appeals have been preferred before this Court. Identical orders, though in different revision petitions dealing with different facts, parties and questions of law, running into 4 lines, like the present one, have been passed, even without variation of a coma or a full stop. It also needs to be noticed that the grounds raised by the Department before us cannot be said to be frivolous or untenable which required discussion by the High Court. The orders, besides being cryptic, suffer from basic infirmity of non-application of mind and non- speaking orders in law. This ground need not detain us any further as even in other cases where identical orders were passed, this Court had the occasion to consider the same grounds at some length. Reference, in this regard, can be made to the judgment of the date, the Bench, in the case of Assistant Commissioner Vrs. M/s. Shukla & W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 42 of 47 Brothers (SLP (C) No. 16466 of 2009) decided on the same day, where after discussing the law at some length, the order passed by the High Court was set aside and the case was remanded to the High Court for hearing the case de novo and passing of an order in accordance with law afresh. 12. In view of the ratio of the case of Mis. Shukla & Brothers (supra), which is squarely applicable on the fact and law to the present case, we are constrained to set aside the order passed by the High Court and remand the matter to the High Court for hearing the case de novo. We are compelled to make this direction as it was expected of the High Court to consider the question of law raised before it and express its own opinion/reasons.” 8.17. In Sri Nandlal Tejmal Kothari Vrs. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, (1997) 3 SCR 575 following has been stated: “The controversy raised in this appeal is covered by the judgment of this Court in C.B. Gautam Vrs. Union of India, (1993) 1 SCC 78 wherein it was held that: „31. The recording of reasons which lead to the passing of the order is basically intended to serve a two-fold purpose: (1) that the „party aggrieved‟ in the proceeding before (sic. the appropriate authority) acquires knowledge of the reasons and in a proceeding before the High Court or the Supreme Court (Since there is no right of appeal or revision), it has an opportunity to demonstrate that the W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 43 of 47 reasons which persuaded the authority to pass an order adverse to his interest were erroneous, irrational or irrelevant, and (2) that the obligation to record reasons and convey the same to the party concerned operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the quasi-judicial or the executive authority invested with judicial powers.‟ ***” 8.18. In the case at hand, this Court examining paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 of the impugned Appellate Order finds that the same is not decided on merit, but the order is cryptic, bald and terse. It deserves to be quoted in the present context the following observation made in the case of The Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee, Bangalore Vrs. The State of Karnataka, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 307: “Therefore, the courts should adjudicate on all the issues and give its findings on all the issues and not to pronounce the judgment only on one of the issues. As such it is the duty cast upon the courts to adjudicate on all the issues and pronounce the judgment on all the issues rather than adopting a shortcut approach and pronouncing the judgment on only one issue. By such a practice, it would increase the burden on the appellate court and in many cases if the decision on the issue decided is found to be erroneous and on other issues there is no adjudication and no findings recorded by the court, the appellate court will have no option but to remand the matter for its fresh W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 44 of 47 decision. Therefore, to avoid such an eventuality, the courts have to adjudicate on all the issues raised in a case and render findings and the judgment on all the issues involved.” 8.19. Glance at paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 of the Appellate Order in question, as extracted herein above, does not transpire that the Appellate Authority has applied his mind to the grounds of appeal of the Revenue vis-à-vis contents of Review Order qua the Order-in-Original dropping the proceeding initiated under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994. Conclusion: 9. With the enunciation of principles of audi alteram partem with reference to prayers made for adjournments, and legal position surfaced through different judicial pronouncements with respect to significance of passing of reasoned order, it is perceived that the Appellate Authority has failed to discuss the fact and the law with respect to each ground taken in the appeal petition of the Revenue. Since the appeal order does not emanate reason for the conclusion, this Court is constrained to observe that absence of reason in the Appellate Order do tantamount to negating the purpose of hearing in appeal and right to know the reason as to why the view expressed in Order-in-Original has been reversed and viewed as flawed. Furthermore, short notice fixing date W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 45 of 47 of personal hearing and/or hearing through video conferencing mode added to consider sustainability of Appellate Order. 10. Though this Court is conscious about existence of alternative remedy to assail the Appellate Order, having regard to the material on record and taking note of undisputed factual position as emanated from the submissions advanced by the counsel for both the parties, finding that there is violation of basic tenets of natural justice and assignment of reason, much less plausible, this Court entertained this writ petition. 11. Having thus entertained the writ petition, it is to impress upon that reasons as soul of the decision, the exercise of discretion by the Appellate Authority demonstrated non- application of mind inasmuch as the Appellate Order revealed mere affirmation of view expressed in the Review Order against the Order-in-Original. Thus, proper and sufficient opportunity being not afforded to the petitioner and/or its representative and the impugned Order dated 24.02.2025 sans reason, the same becomes vulnerable and liable to be impeached. Therefore, the Appellate Order is liable to be set aside. 12. Ergo, the Order-in-Appeal Nos.313-323/ST/RKL- GST/2024 (File No.GAPPL/COM/STD/419/2023- DC/AC/1023), dated 24.02.2025 passed by the W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 46 of 47 Commissioner (Appeals), Goods and Service Tax, Central Excise & Customs, Bhubaneswar-opposite party No.1 is hereby set aside and the matter is remitted to the said Authority for consideration of appeal on its merits afresh. 12.1. For availing opportunity of hearing, the petitioner is directed to appear before the Appellate Authority not later than 16.05.2025 with the copy of this Order. The petitioner is at liberty to furnish any response to the Appeal of the Revenue by the said date and take such plea(s) as is available under the law. 12.2. In the event of appearance of the petitioner on the said date before the Commissioner (Appeals), Goods and Service Tax, Central Excise & Customs, Bhubaneswar- opposite party No.1, the Authority is free to proceed with the appeal for hearing on the said date or fix any other suitable date(s) for hearing. 12.3. It is needless to say that, the petitioner shall not be granted unnecessary adjournments. 12.4. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any view or opinion on the merit of the appeal. The facts narrated and the observations made herein are for the purpose of considering the aspect of adherence to the principles of natural justice. W.P.(C) No.9943 of 2025 Page 47 of 47 13. As a consequence of above observations made and directions issued, the writ petition stands disposed of, but in the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs. 14. As a result of the disposal of the writ petition, all pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. (HARISH TANDON) CHIEF JUSTICE (MURAHARI SRI RAMAN) JUDGE High Court of Orissa, Cuttack The 5th May, 2025//Aswini/Laxmikant/Suchitra Digitally Signed Signed by: LAXMIKANT MOHAPATRA Designation: Senior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 08-May-2025 12:33:42 Signature Not Verified "