"[2024:RJ-JP:33187-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7205/2023 Ramawatar Verma S/o Shri Nath Mal Verma, Aged About 65 Years, C/o Lucky Farm House, Harmada Chungi Naka, Sikar Road, Jaipur. Retired From The Post Of Additional Commissioner, Income Tax (Sr. Ar), Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Indore. ----Petitioner Versus 1. Union Of India, Through Office Of Finance Minister, Government Of India, Ministry Of Finance, Department Of Revenue, Central Board Of Direct Taxes, North Block, New Delhi. 2. Secretary, Department Of Revenue, Ministry Of Finance, Government Of India, North Block, New Delhi. 3. Chairman, Central Board Of Direct Taxes, Department Of Revenue, Ministry Of Finance, Government Of India, North Block, New Delhi. 4. Chief Commissioner Of Income Tax, C.R. Building, Statue Circle, B.D. Road, Jaipur, Rajasthan. 5. Inquiry Officer/ Commissioner Of Income Tax (Code No. 76034), Office Of Chief Commissioner, C.R. Building, Statue Circle, B.D. Road, Jaipur, Rajasthan. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sandeep Singh Shekhawat For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sandeep Pathak Mr. Palash Gupta Mr. Shashwat Sharma HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AVNEESH JHINGAN HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR Order 05/08/2024 AVNEESH JHINGAN, J (ORAL): 1. This petition is filed seeking quashing of the order dated 13.04.2023 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jaipur [2024:RJ-JP:33187-DB] (2 of 9) [CW-7205/2023] Bench, Jaipur (for short ‘Tribunal’), dismissing the Original Application (O.A.) filed by the petitioner. 2. The brief facts are that the petitioner in the year 2002 was posted as Assistant Commissioner in the Income Tax Department. On registration of a case under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short ‘the Act’), the petitioner was suspended on 26.06.2002 and charge-sheet was issued on 06.11.2006. The petitioner represented that the charges and list of witnesses in the departmental proceedings and the case under the Act were identical, consequently, disciplinary proceedings be stayed till the finalization of the criminal case. The O.A. filed by the petitioner for staying the departmental proceedings was dismissed by the Tribunal on 24.07.2012 and order was upheld by this Court. On 18.09.2013, the petitioner filed a representation relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. vs. B.V. Gopinath & Ors. reported in (2014) 1 SCC 351, stating that the departmental proceedings are vitiated as no prior approval of the competent authority was sought. On 23.01.2014, ex-post facto approval was granted. Petitioner filed O.A. before the Tribunal. The respondent raised an objection that second O.A. is not maintainable and the petitioner had earlier approached the Tribunal. The objection was rejected that there is change in law and the claim of petitioner falls within the exceptions to the principle of res-judicata. The challenge of the petitioner to the proceedings being without jurisdiction for want of prior approval was rejected. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Tribunal erred in holding that the decision of the Supreme Court in B.V. [2024:RJ-JP:33187-DB] (3 of 9) [CW-7205/2023] Gopinath (supra) is prospective. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Sunny Abraham Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2021) 20 SCC 2012. Submission is that post-facto approval shall not validate the disciplinary proceedings initiated without approval of the Finance Minister. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents defends the impugned order. Submission is that it is second round of litigation and earlier O.A. filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Tribunal. The contention is that the proceedings are being challenged on the basis of the judgment of B.V. Gopinath (supra), which was not available at the time of initiation of the proceedings and moreover, ex-post facto approval was granted in the year 2014. 5. Heard the counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings. 6. The contention of learned counsel for the respondents viz-a- viz the maintainability of the second O.A. was rejected by the Tribunal for the reason that there was change in law. The decision of the Tribunal has not been challenged by the respondents. There is another aspect to be considered that in the first O.A., the prayer of the petitioner for staying the departmental proceedings during pendency of the criminal case was rejected and no other issue was decided on merits. 7. In B.V. Gopinath (supra), the Supreme Court while dealing with Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 held that charge-sheet cannot be issued without approval of the disciplinary authority. 8. The issue that as to whether the defect of initiating the disciplinary proceedings without approval of the Competent [2024:RJ-JP:33187-DB] (4 of 9) [CW-7205/2023] Authority can be ratified by post-facto approval, was subject matter in Sunny Abraham (supra). It was held that initiation of proceedings with an instrument deemed to be not in existence for fundamental defects in issuance shall not be revived by ratifying act done later. The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted below:- “11. We do not think that the absence of the expression “prior approval” in the aforesaid Rule would have any impact so far as the present case is concerned as the same Rule has been construed by this Court in the case of B.V. Gopinath (supra) and it has been held that chargesheet/charge memorandum not having approval of the Disciplinary Authority would be non est in the eye of the law. Same interpretation has been given to a similar Rule, All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 by another Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Pramod Kumar, IPS and Another [(2018) 17 SCC 677] (authored by one of us, L. Nageswara Rao, J). Now the question arises as to whether concluded proceeding (as in the case of B.V. Gopinath) and pending proceeding against the appellant is capable of giving different interpretations to the said Rule. The High Court’s reasoning, referring to the notes on which approval for initiation of proceeding was granted, is that the Disciplinary Authority had taken into consideration the specific charges. The ratio of the judgments in the cases of Ashok Kumar Das (supra) and Bajaj Hindustan Limited (supra), in our opinion, do not apply in the facts of the present case. We hold so [2024:RJ-JP:33187-DB] (5 of 9) [CW-7205/2023] because these authorities primarily deal with the question as to whether the legal requirement of granting approval could extend to ex-post facto approval, particularly in a case where the statutory instrument does not specify taking of prior or previous approval. It is a fact that in the Rules with which we are concerned, there is no stipulation of taking “prior” approval. But since this very Rule has been construed by a Coordinate Bench to the effect that the approval of the Disciplinary Authority should be there before issuing the charge memorandum, the principles of law enunciated in the aforesaid two cases, that is Ashok Kumar Das (supra) and Bajaj Hindustan Limited (supra) would not aid the respondents. The distinction between the prior approval and approval simplicitor does not have much impact so far as the status of the subject charge memorandum is concerned. 12. In the event a legal instrument is deemed to be not in existence, because of certain fundamental defect in its issuance, subsequent approval cannot revive its existence and ratify acts done in pursuance of such instrument, treating the same to be valid.The fact that initiation of proceeding received approval of the Disciplinary Authority could not lighten the obligation on the part of the employer (in this case the Union of India) in complying with the requirement of sub-clause (3) of Rule 14 of CCS (CCA), 1965. We have quoted the two relevant sub-clauses earlier in this judgment. Sub-clauses (2) and (3) of Rule 14 contemplates independent approval of the Disciplinary Authority at both stages - for initiation of enquiry and also for [2024:RJ-JP:33187-DB] (6 of 9) [CW-7205/2023] drawing up or to cause to be drawn up the charge memorandum. In the event the requirement of sub-clause (2) is complied with, not having the approval at the time of issue of charge memorandum fundamentally defective, not capable of being validated retrospectively. What is non-existent in the eye of the law cannot be revived retrospectively. Life cannot be breather into the stillborn charge memorandum. In our opinion, the approval for initiating disciplinary proceeding and approval to a charge memorandum are two divisible acts, each one requiring independent application of mind on the part of the Disciplinary Authority. If there is any default in the process of application of mind independent at the time of issue of charge memorandum by the Disciplinary Authority, the same would not get cured by the fact that such approval was there at the initial stage.” 9. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in B.V. Gopinath (supra) and Sunny Abraham (supra), the proceedings initiated against the petitioner without prior approval of the Competent Authority cannot be sustained. 10. Another angle is that the Tribunal erred in holding that the decision of the Supreme Court in B.V. Gopinath (supra) shall operate prospectively. Under Article 141 of the Constitution of India the law laid down by the Apex Court is law of the land and shall operate as if that was the law. The prospectivity of the ruling of the Apex Court is an exception to the general rule. In absence of specific directions in the decision, the judgment shall operate with retrospective effect. Reference in this regard is made in the [2024:RJ-JP:33187-DB] (7 of 9) [CW-7205/2023] decision of the Supreme Court in Golak Nath vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1967 SC 1643. Revelant portion of the judgment is quoted below:- “76. As this Court for the first time has been called upon to apply the doctrine evolved in a different country under different circumstances, we would like to move warily in the beginning. We would lay down the following propositions : (1) The doctrine of prospective over-ruling can be invoked only in matters arising under our Constitution; (2) it can be applied only by the highest court of the country, i.e., the Supreme Court as it has the constitutional jurisdiction to declare law binding on all the courts in India; (3) the scope of the retroactive operation of the law declared by the Supreme Court superseding its earlier decisions is left to its discretion to be moulded in accordance with the justice of the cause or matter before it.” The Supreme Court in the case of P.V. George & Ors. Vs. State of Kerala & Ors. reported in (2007) 3 SCC 557 has held as under:- “11. The Full Bench of the High Court indisputably did not say that the promotions which had already been granted would not be disturbed. The judgment of the Full Bench attained finality as special leave petition filed there against was dismissed. Rules as amended by the State of Kerala on 01.07.1980 and 30.08.1984 were upheld. If the said Rules ultimately were held to be constitutional, it was required to be given effect to. The law declared by a court is ordinarily affects the rights of the parties. A court of law having regard to the nature of adversarial system of our justice delivery system exercises adjudicatory role. Legal consequences are determined in respect of the matters which had taken place in the past. It may be true that when [2024:RJ-JP:33187-DB] (8 of 9) [CW-7205/2023] the doctrine of stare decisis is not adhered to, a change in the law may adversely affect the interest of the citizens. The doctrine of prospective overruling although is applied to overcome such a situation, but then it must be stated expressly. The power must be exercised in the clearest possible term. The decisions of this Court are clear pointer thereto.” The Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot Vs. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. reported in (2008) 14 SCC 171 held:- “ 42. In our judgment, it is also well- settled that a judicial decision acts retrospectively. According to Blackstonian theory, it is not the function of the Court to pronounce a `new rule' but to maintain and expound the `old one'. In other words, Judges do not make law, they only discover or find the correct law. The law has always been the same. If a subsequent decision alters the earlier one, it (the later decision) does not make new law. It only discovers the correct principle of law which has to be applied retrospectively. To put it differently, even where an earlier decision of the Court operated for quite some time, the decision rendered later on would have retrospective effect clarifying the legal position which was earlier not correctly understood. 43. Salmond in his well-known work states; The theory of case law is that a judge does not make law; he merely declares it; and the overruling of a previous decision is a declaration that the supposed rule never was law. Hence any intermediate transactions made on the strength of the supposed rule are governed by the law established in the overruling decision. The overruling is retrospective, except as regards [2024:RJ-JP:33187-DB] (9 of 9) [CW-7205/2023] matters that are res judicatae or accounts that have been settled in the meantime\". (emphasis supplied) 44. It is no doubt true that after a historic decision in Golak Nath v. Union of India, (1967) 2 SCR 762, this Court has accepted the doctrine of `prospective overruling'. It is based on the philosophy: The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. It may, however, be stated that this is an exception to the general rule of the doctrine of precedent.” 11. In view of the above, the order of the Tribunal and inquiry proceedings initiated without approval of the Competent Authority are quashed. The respondent shall be at liberty to proceed, if so advised, against the petitioner in accordance with law. 12. During pendency of this petition passing of final order in pursuance to proceeding was stayed. The petitioner has superannuated during the pendency of the litigation. The decision by the respondents as to whether to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner or not, shall be taken within six months of the receipt of certified copy of this order. 13. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. (ASHUTOSH KUMAR),J (AVNEESH JHINGAN),J Simple Kumawat /Aarzoo/32 Whether Reportable: Yes "