"DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR BENCH, JAIPUR :JUDGMENT: (1) D.B.Civil Special Appeal (W) No. 1886/2011. Rishi Jain & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. ::: (2) D.B.Civil Special Appeal (W) No. 1882/2011. Rishi Jain & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. ::: (3) D.B.Civil Special Appeal (W) No.2133/2011. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Uma Shankar Agarwal & Ors. ::: (4) D.B.Civil Special Appeal (W) No.2179/2011. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Rishi Jain & Ors. DATE OF JUDGMENT : - 10-4-2014 HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE NARENDRA KUMAR JAIN Mr. J.P. Goyal, Senior Advocate with Mr. Sudesh Bansal ] Ms. Manisha Surana ] Mr. Pankaj Choudhary ] for the appellants in SAW Mr. Abhi Goyal ] Nos.1886/2011 & 1882/2011 Mr. Anant Kasliwal, for the appellants in SAW Nos.2133/2011 & 2179/2011 Mr. R.K. Agarwal, Senior Advocate with Mr. Yogesh Pujari ] Ms.Sunita Pareek ] Mr. Ved Prakash Saini ] Mr. Vimal Kumar Jain ] for the respondents. Mr. Mohammeddin Ansari, for the UOI <<>> BY THE COURT: (Per Dinesh Maheshwari,J.) These four intra-court appeals arising out of two orders dated 14.10.2011, as passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 2 two writ petitions (CWP Nos.8102/2007 and 7225/2011), involving intrinsically inter-connected facts and inter-related issues, have been considered together; and are taken up for disposal by this common judgment. The dispute herein essentially relates to a License for sale of petroleum products, as issued by the appellant of SAW Nos.2133/2011 and 2179/2011, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (‘BPCL’) for its outlet location at Bandikui in the name of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain. The contesting respondents of these appeals, Shri Uma Shankar Agarwal and Shri Vinod Kumar Agarwal, both sons of late Shri Matadeen Agarwal, preferred a writ petition (CWP No.8102/2007) seeking directions against BPCL that their names be substituted in place of their late father in the Selling License in question; and supply of the products be continued to M/s Kapoor Chand Jain, Petrol Pump, Bandikui while asserting that their father alone was carrying on business under the said License and while stating the grievance that after his demise, they sought substitution of their names and issuance of amended Selling License but BPCL was avoiding to do so. On the other hand, the appellants of SAW Nos.1886/2011 and 1882/2011, Shri Rishi Jain and others, legal representatives of late Shri Santosh Kumar Jain and Smt.Kailaso Devi, while contesting the claim made by the above-referred respondents, preferred a separate writ petition (CWP No.7225/2011) seeking declaration that the dealership agreement in question stood terminated and for further direction against BPCL to advertise the outlet afresh. These appellants also sought directions against BPCL to release the property over which the retail outlet was set up by the firm M/s DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 3 Kapoor Chand Jain. The learned Single Judge of this Court has considered and disposed of both the writ petitions by different impugned orders of even date i.e., 14.10.2011. While allowing the writ petition (CWP No.8102/2007) filed by the contesting respondents, the learned Single Judge has issued directions to BPCL as follows:- “Consequently, this writ petition is allowed and it is directed that the respondent BPCL consider the case of the petitioners for substitution of their names in the selling licence granted to firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain in accordance with the decisions of the Civil Courts, holding that Matadeen Agarwal was Proprietor of the Firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain. The case of the petitioners for substitution of their deceased father who was the de facto proprietor of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain recognized by BPCL be declared within four weeks of receipt of a certified copy of this order. During the period of consideration of the case of the petitioners as per the extant instructions and guidelines for substitution of legal heirs on the demise of the existing licensee, the respondent BPCL is directed to continue making supplies of motor spirit and other assorted products in its line of business to the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain as it has done in the past.” The appellants, Shri Rishi Jain and others have preferred intra-court appeal, being SAW No.1886/2011, against the aforesaid order dated 14.10.2011 as passed in CWP No.8102/2007. Against this very order, the petroleum company, BPCL, has also preferred another appeal, being SAW No.2133/2011. So far the writ petition (CWP No.7225/2011) filed by Shri Rishi Jain and others is concerned, the learned Single Judge has found it to be entirely baseless and these writ-petitioners guilty of suppression of material facts. The learned Single Judge has dismissed this writ petition with costs by another order dated 14.10.2011, while also making certain observations against the conduct and action of the officers of the BPCL. The learned Single Judge has concluded on this writ petition (CWP No. 7225/2011) in the following:- DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 4 “It is not for this court to comment as to the conduct of respondent BPCL in two timing the dealership to M/S Kapoor Chand Jain, inasmuch as while the selling license dated 4/7/80 officially recorded the entity as partnership firm, yet BPCL continued to deal with M/S Kapoor Chand Jain, in practice as a de facto proprietorship firm. The conduct and action of the Officers of BPCL needs to be inquired into by the competent authority and if evidence of wrong doing is found, such officers need to be disciplined in accordance with law. In the face of the case, I am, therefore, of the view that the writ petition as laid before this court is a gross misuse of the salutary jurisdiction of this court and the petitioners have not approached this court with clean hands. The petitioners have suppressed extremely materials facts and have supported the writ petition on the basis of false affidavits, wherein it has been stated that “nothing material has been concealed and no part of it is false”. The writ petition, therefore, deserves dismissal with exemplary costs. Resultantly the writ petition is dismissed with cost of Rs. 25,000/- to be paid by the petitioners to the respondents herein.” Aggrieved against the aforesaid order dated 14.10.2011 as passed in CWP No.7225/2011 Shri Rishi Jain and others have preferred another intra-court appeal, being SAW No.1882/2011. Against this very order, the petroleum company, BPCL, has also preferred another appeal, being SAW No.2179/2011. The relevant facts and the background aspects could be taken note of, in their feasible chronology, as follows: On 01.11.1957, the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain came to be constituted with two partners, namely, Shri Kapoor Chand Jain and his wife Smt.Kailaso Devi. This firm was granted a retail dealership of petroleum products at Bandikui by the then existing Burma Shell Company. After Shri Kapoor Chand Jain expired on 07.04.1967, his son Shri Santosh Kumar Jain became a partner in the said firm; and another partner Shri Kashi Prasad Gupta was also inducted. In the year 1974, the business of Burma Shell Oil Company was taken over by BPCL; and dealership of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain continued with BPCL. In the year 1980, the aforesaid partner Shri Kashi Prasad DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 5 Gupta retired and instead, Shri Matadeen Agarwal was substituted as a partner in the firm. The firm sought permission of the petroleum company BPCL to substitute the partner and to change its constitution on 23.05.1980. A partnership deed was also executed between Shri Santosh Kumar Jain and Shri Matadeen Agarwal for this business of the outlet in question. On 30.05.1980, BPCL accorded permission to substitute Shri Matadeen Agarwal as partner in the firm. On 04.06.1980, however, an agreement came to be executed between Shri Santosh Kumar Jain and Shri Matadeen Agarwal. Since this agreement (filed as Annexure-1 in CWP No.8102/2007 and as Annexure-7 in CWP No.7225/2011), with its purport and effect, has a bearing on the issues involved, it appears appropriate to reproduce its contents as under: “THIS AGREEMENT on the 4th day of June, 1980 between Shri Santosh Kumar Jain s/o Shri Kapoor Chand Jain, resident of Bandikui (hereinafter called the “First Party”) of the one part AND Shri Mata Din Agarwal s/o Shri Chiranji Lal Agarwal Resident of Begu Sarai (Bihar) (hereinafter called Second Party) of the other part. THAT the First Party owns Petrol Pump at Bandikui of Bharat Petrolium Corporation Ltd. and a residential quarter which is situated in the side of the said petrol pump, the boundaries and other details of the same have been shown in the site plan annexed with this deed, And the same will be treated as a part of this deed. Whereas, the First Party had been running this petrol pump under the name and style M/s Kapoor Chand Jain and both the parties had entertained in to partnership to run the said petrol pump under partnership deed dated 23rd May, 1980, but having found that the said partnership was not workable and beneficial both the parties, now the parties in supersession to the above referred partnership, have agreed to execute this agreement deed on the following terms and conditions:- 1. THAT the partnership referred above has come to end between the parties and the said partnership shall stand desolved from to-day. 2. THAT the First Party hereby demises to the Second Party ALL THAT site of petrol pump along with construction, fixtures made on it and the residential quarter properly shown by red coloured lines in the annexed site plan, TO HOLD the said premises and other accessories to the Second Party from to-day. 3. THAT the agreement will be for a period of three years initially and after the expiry of this period of three years, the parties will be at liberty to extend the agreement period for DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 6 another three years by mutual concent. 4. THAT the rent of the premises and other accessories will be Rs. 1,500/- (Rupees one thousand five hundred only) per month and in case the parties agrees to extend the period of the agreement after the expiry of three years period, the rent will exceed by 10%, in other words, the rent will be Rs. 1,650/- (Rupees one thousand six hundred fifty only) per month for the extend period after the expiry of three years. 5. THAT after the expiry of three years of agreement period, the First party will have a right to opt to be a partner with Second party for running the aforesaid petrol pump, in that case, the partnership will be between the parties. On the terms that both the parties will have a share of fifty percent in profit and loss of the business and the First Party will invest fifty percent capital in running the business and will also devide equal time for running the business. All other details of partnership agreement will be decided between the parties later on at the time, when the First party opts to enter in a partnership. 6. THAT the Second Party will be entitled to continue and carry on the business under the same name and style M/s. Kapoor Chand Jain. 7. That the First Party will be responsible and liable for all his acts and deeds up to now and from to-day, the Second Party will be incharge of the petrol pump and he will be responsible, liable for future acts and deed from to-day, either under licensing order or any other order, act, rules or regulations. 8. THAT neither any amount of goodwill will be paid to the First Party nor Second Party will be entitled to get any amount of goodwill at the time the agreement is terminated. 9. THAT if any recoveries are made by the Second Party from the debtors of the First Party, it will be credited by the Second Party in his accounts books in the name of the First Party and this amount will be payable to the First Party after fifteen day’s on demand from the Second Party. 10. That a sum of Rs. 5,000/- is hereby given to the First Party for which no interest shall be charged. After the expiry of the agreement period this amount of Rs. 5,000/- shall be refunded by the First Party to the Second Party. 11. THAT the Varandah shown in the site plan shall remain in exclusing possession of the First Party. The First Party can raise any construction on this Varandah. 12. THAT the First Party can with the permission of the Second Party can raise any other construction on the demised premises without disturbing the petrol business. 13. THAT the Second Party shall pay Rs. 1,500/- as rent amount to the First Party on the 1st of every month. In case of any default in payment of the rent amount, the First Party can determine the rent at his will and shall take the possession of the premises alongwith the Petrol Pump with other accessories and the First Party shallbe entitled to recover the arrears of rent amount, if any. 14. THAT the First Party shall not be liable for any loss of the partnership between the parties and if any amount is recovered from the First Party, the Second Party shall make good of any such loss to the First Party. The First Party has nothing to do with the business, profit and Loss of the partnership firm. The First Party has only to receive from the Second Party a sum of Rs. 1,500/- from the Second Party according to the terms & conditions of this Agreement Deed. 15. That any liability or liabilities arising out of the business from 23rd May, 1980 it shall be the liability of the Second Part and the First Part shall not in any way be responsible for any such liability/liabilities whether civil or criminal.” DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 7 Thus, it is borne out from the aforesaid agreement that the parties purportedly dissolved the partnership; the premises comprising of petrol pump with construction and fixtures were let to Shri Matadeen Agarwal on the agreed rent; Shri Matadeen Agarwal was given the right to continue and carry on business under the name and style M/s Kapoor Chand Jain with his exclusive responsibility for the acts and deeds under the License in question; and the initial term of the agreement was for three years with Shri Santosh Kumar Jain retaining a right to opt for being a partner in the said business thereafter. It is not in dispute that on 04.07.1980, the Selling License in question was granted by BPCL in favour of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain for the sale of petroleum products. The agreement for this License though was executed on 04.07.1980 but, as per the stipulations therein, was deemed to have commenced from 01.06.1980. It appears that the arrangement under the aforesaid agreement continued for about three years but then, differences cropped up between the parties which led to the said Shri Santosh Kumar Jain filing a civil suit (CO No.656/1983) in the Court of Additional Munsiff No.2, Jaipur City seeking perpetual injunction against conducting of further business by Shri Matadeen Agarwal under the License in question. In the said suit, apart from the defendant No. 1 Shri Matadeen Agarwal, Smt.Kailaso Devi was joined as defendant No.2 and the Divisional Manager, BPCL was joined as defendant No.3. An application seeking temporary injunction, as filed in the said suit, was considered and dismissed by the learned Trial Court on 16.07.1983. An appeal taken by Shri DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 8 Santosh Kumar Jain against the aforesaid order dated 16.07.1983 was also dismissed by the Additional District Judge No.5, Jaipur City on 18.03.1986. The proceedings in this suit ultimately came to an end when the suit was dismissed on 01.09.1994 with the counsel for plaintiff pleading no instructions. Yet another civil suit (CO No.1/1986) was filed by Shri Santosh Kumar Jain in the Court of Munsiff, Bandikui seeking recovery of rent for the said premises, as let to Shri Matadeen Agarwal. It is given out that the proceedings in the said suit were terminated on 22.08.1986 by way of compromise, as the admitted rent due was paid by Shri Matadeen Agarwal. Another civil suit (CO No.8/1986) was filed by Shri Santosh Kumar Jain against Shri Matadeen Agarwal seeking eviction on the ground of default, sub-letting, bonafide requirement etc. This suit was decided on 30.09.1999 by the Court of Additional District Judge, Bandikui. The other grounds of eviction were negatived and the defendant was extended the benefit of first default. It has been given out during the course of submissions that this suit was withdrawn in appeal and that fresh suit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has been filed, which remains pending. Yet another litigation having a direct bearing on the questions involved herein deserves to be taken note of, which had been a civil suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts, as filed by Smt.Kailaso Devi, mother of Shri Santosh Kumar Jain, being CO No.21A/1998. This suit was filed by Smt.Kailaso Devi through her power of attorney Shri Rishi Jain, who is the appellant before us. In this suit, Shri Matadeen Agarwal, Shri Santosh Kumar Jain and BPCL were arrayed as defendant Nos.1,2 and 3 respectively. After DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 9 taking evidence, this suit was considered and dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Bandikui on 04.08.2003. In this suit, assertions were made by the plaintiff about existence of partnership of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain and it was alleged that other partners were not giving her true accounts. The learned Trial Court found, inter alia, that the plaintiff had not been able to establish the constitution of alleged partnership. The learned Trial Court also observed that even if the partnership existed, it had already been dissolved. Findings on other issues were also recorded against the plaintiff. It appears that during all this time of the litigations aforesaid, wherein BPCL had also been joined as a party, Shri Matadeen Agarwal continued to operate the outlet in question. It has been the case of the contesting respondents that there had been several dealings wherein Shri Matadeen Agarwal projected himself, and was accepted, as the proprietor of the business though it was carried in the firm name M/s Kapoor Chand Jain. The certificate of registration as wholesale and retail dealer; particulars of accounts with the respective Banks; income-tax assessment orders and income tax clearance certificates, amongst others, have been referred by the contesting respondents in this regard. In the chronology of the facts and events, it could be noticed that the said Shri Matadeen Agarwal, father of the contesting respondents, Uma Shanker and Vinod Kumar, expired on 04.06.2007. Then, the said Shri Santosh Kumar Jain expired on 02.01.2010; and the said Smt.Kailaso Devi also expired on 19.05.2010. The appellants Rishi Jain and others, are the heirs and legal representatives of the said Shri Santosh Kumar Jain and DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 10 Smt.Kailaso Devi. In the backdrop of the above-referred facts, the contesting respondents of these appeals, Shri Uma Shankar and Shri Vinod Kumar, preferred the writ petition (CWP No.8102/2007) arraying Union of India and BPCL as respondents therein. It was submitted in the said writ petition that ever since the aforesaid agreement dated 04.06.1980, the writ-petitioners’ father Shri Matadeen Agarwal had been acting as de facto proprietor of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain; and such a fact was indeed accepted by the petroleum company BPCL. It was also submitted that since the year 1983, legal status of the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain had been determined by the Civil Courts as being the proprietorship concern of Shri Matadeen Agarwal; and BPCL continued to supply the petroleum products to him, treating M/s Kapoor Chand Jain as his proprietorship concern. The contesting respondents asserted in their aforesaid writ petition that they were entitled to succeed to the business after the demise of their father; and were entitled to continue the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain jointly as per the testamentary deposition of their father. They stated the grievance that when no action was taken by BPCL on their request for issuing Selling License in their names, they served a notice for demand of justice which too failed to evoke the necessary response. It was submitted that the inaction on the part of BPCL was wholly unjustified and the writ petitioners were being unnecessarily deprived of their rights to carry on the business. It was submitted in the said writ petition that BPCL, having continuously made the supplies to Shri Matadeen Agarwal between 1983 to 2007, recognising him as de facto proprietor of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain, was estopped from taking any other view of the matter. DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 11 It was also submitted that BPCL was bound by the judgments and orders of the Court as it had been the defendant in the suit where Shri Matadeen Agarwal was found to be the proprietor of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain. The stand of the appellant BPCL in the said writ petition had been that the Selling License was executed between BPCL on one hand and Smt. Kailaso Devi, Shri Santosh Kumar Jain and Shri Matadeen Agarwal as partners of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain on the other; and in the record of BPCL, the same status existed at all times and the record still indicated M/s Kapoor Chand Jain to be a partnership firm constituted of the said three partners. It was submitted that in given circumstances, the claim of the writ- petitioners to treat Matadeen Agarwal as the sole proprietor of the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain was contrary to the record and was liable to be rejected. It was also submitted that factum of dissolution of the firm under the agreement dated 04.06.1980 was never indicated to BPCL. However, the fact of having made supplies to M/s Kapoor Chand Jain was, of course, not denied. It was suggested before the Court that until the issue between the writ-petitioners (contesting respondents herein) and other partners of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain was resolved, BPCL would be unwilling to resume supply to the outlet in question. The stand of the BPCL had been that when the particulars standing in their record were never amended, the company was not in a position to recognise late Shri Matadeen Agarwal as proprietor of firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain or the writ- petitioners as his legal heirs entitled to continue the business unless the other partners/persons named in the Selling License or their DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 12 successors applied for the purpose. The learned Single Judge found the stand of BPCL entirely unjustified. After taking note of all the factual aspects and while holding BPCL bound by its own actions and further by the orders of the Courts, the learned Single Judge found no reason that BPCL would attempt to take a stand merely on the basis of its record as to deny de facto situation that Shri Matadeen Agarwal always acted as proprietor of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain. The learned Single Judge, inter alia, observed and held as under:- “The facts in this case and the callousness of BPCL is absolutely shocking to say the least. It is an admitted position that in the proceedings before the Civil Court, the BPCL has been a party defendant. The Civil Courts have consistently held that in view of the agreement dated 4.7.1980 the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain was a proprietorship firm and that Santosh Kumar Jain was a lessor of the Petrol Pump to Matadeen Agarwal, entitled to the agreed lease money/rental. In fact Santosh Kumar Jain also laid suit for recovery of rent amount over due and the matter was compromised between the parties in the first instance. A subsequent suit by Santosh Kumar Jain seeking eviction of Matadeen Agarwal on the ground of reasonable and bona fide need, non user and default was considered by the trial Court and vide order dated 30.4.1999 the learned Trial Court while rejecting the grounds based on reasonable bona fide need and non user, found Matadeen Agarwal to be a defaulter in payment of rent, but as per obtaining statutory provisions, gave him benefit of first default. In view of the aforesaid facts it is evident that BPCL has been aware at least since 16th July, 1983 of the status of firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain being a proprietorship firm of Matadeen Agarwal, late father of the petitioners and de facto treated it as such. BPCL was also aware of the fact that the suit laid both by Santosh Kumar Jain and Smt. Kailaso Devi claiming their rights as partners in the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain were unsuccessful and there was finality to the determination by the Civil Courts on the aforesaid issues. In its reply to the writ petition, the BPCL has admitted that late Matadeen Agarwal was running retail outlet as proprietary concern for over 25 years and being supplied motor spirit for retail. In view of the aforesaid factual status obtaining, it does not now lie in the mouth of the respondent BPCL to claim that the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain is a partnership firm merely on the basis of the record obtaining in its office and the selling license dated 4.7.1980. BPCL was a party to the proceedings before the Civil Courts and is bound by the determination of the Civil Courts treating late Matadeen Agarwal as proprietor of firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain and Santosh Kumar Jain as lessor entitled only to rent @ Rs.1500/- per month and as it may be enhanced in terms of the agreement dated 4.7.1980 between them. In the facts of the case, there is substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondent BPCL is estopped from treating the firm M/s Kapoor DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 13 Chand Jain as partnership firm and is under a legal duty to treat, in terms of the orders of the Civil Courts and its own past conduct, late Matadeen Agarwal as the then proprietor of the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain. It is also on record that respondent BPCL has for over 25 years engaged in business with M/s Kapoor Chand Jain as proprietorship firm of Matadeen Agarwal. On this count also, apart from decrees of the Civil Courts with which the BPCL is bound, the respondent BPCL cannot be allowed to deny the right of Matadeen Agarwal as proprietor of the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain during his lifetime. Consequently, on the death of Matadeen Agarwal, the petitioners would be entilted to be considered for being substituted as legal heirs of late Matadeen Agarwal after due compliance as warranted under the BPCL’s guidelines and instructions to deal with claim of substitution by the legal heirs of deceased licensee. From the facts of the case it transpires that the respondent BPCL needs to put its own house in order. For over 25 years it dealt with late Matadeen Agarwal as de facto Proprietor of the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain and did not take any action against the licensee M/s Kapoor Chand Jain for having altered its constitution from partnership to proprietorship by agreement dated 4.7.1980. On the contrary, BPCL accepted the orders of the Courts below by not filing any appeal against the said orders of the Courts from time to time, but it did not chose to make any alterations necessitated by the orders of the Courts obtaining finality. Consequently, in the record of BPCL the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain continued as a partnership firm contrary to the de facto situation of it being a Proprietorship of Matadeen Agarwal. Now for reasons best known to the respondent BPCL, in the reply to the writ petiton, it has proceeded to treat the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain as partnership firm and requires the successors in interest of the erstwhile partners Santosh Kumar Jain and Kailaso Devi to give their consent for the substitution of the petitioners as licensees following the death of Matadeen Agarwal. This Court vide order dated 10.3.2011 after having admitted the petition directed that during pendency of the writ petition, the respondent Oil Company to supply petrol/diesel to the petitioner firm. On having considered the matter I am inclined to allow the writ petition for reasons stated above.” In view of the above, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and issued directions, as noticed at the outset in this judgment. It appears that until the aforesaid writ petition, filed in the year 2007, continued without any interim order and the supplies were not being made, the appellants Shri Rishi Jain and others did not take up the litigation in this Court. However, the said writ petition (CWP No.8102/2007) was admitted for consideration on 10.03.2011; and the learned Single Judge directed by way of interim order that DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 14 BPCL shall supply the petroleum products to the writ-petitioners subject to the final outcome of the writ petition. After the order aforesaid, the appellants Shri Rishi Jain and others filed the other writ petition (CWP No.7225/2011) and then, also filed an application in the writ petition of Shri Uma Shanker and Shri Vinod Kumar for impleadment on 16.08.2011. In their writ petition (CWP No.7225/2011), the appellants Shri Rishi Jain and others made the submissions that BPCL was inclined to revive the dealership agreement in question in the names of the contesting respondents, which would be contrary to the condition of the dealership agreement. It was prayed in the said writ petition that BPCL be directed not to revive the dealership agreement dated 04.07.1980 which, according to the appellants, stood terminated automatically in view of Clause 12(b) of the agreement with dissolution of the partnership firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain due to the death of its three partners. It was also prayed that BPCL be directed to re-advertise the retail outlet in question and to release the land and property of the outlet to the writ-petitioners, who were its rightful owners. The learned Single Judge found the stand of BPCL being rather odd and observed, inter alia, as under:- “Oddly, as appears from the record, the respondent BPCL does not appear to have come with clean hands in its reply to the writ petition with regard to the history of the litigation between the partners of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain to which it was a party and submits vaguely that “the position has been more compounded by various orders passed by different courts at different times”. No details have been set out with regard to the “various orders passed by different court at different times”. Correct facts have been suppressed. The substratum of the reply by the BPCL to the writ petition however is that the dealership would be formally renewed “the moment the legal heirs of all deceased partners join together to continue business of dealership.” Further in reply to ground (i) of the writ petition, BPCL submits that “the answering respondent stands by its commitment to continue the dealership in the name of all the descendants of the erstwhile partners coming together.” DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 15 The learned Single Judge noticed that this writ petition was premised on the purported partnership of writ-petitioners Rishi Jain and others as heirs of Shri Santosh Kumar Jain and Smt.Kailaso Devi in M/s Kapoor Chand Jain. The learned Single Judge also took note of the stand of the contesting respondents and the other relevant facts, as already noticed in CWP No.8102/2007. The learned Single Judge found that the appellants had rather avoided to state all the facts relating to the litigation between the parties. After taking note of all the material aspects, the learned Single Judge was satisfied that the petition was liable to be dismissed for suppression of material facts. The learned Single Judge, again, found BPCL bound by the orders passed in the civil proceedings as also its own conduct. The learned Single Judge rejected the stand of both sets of the appellants i.e., Shri Rishi Jain and others as also BPCL in the following:- “It would be in order to observe that the substance of the petitioners’ case in the writ petition is that the partnership was continuing till death of all the 3 partners namely Santosh Kumar Jain on 2.1.2010, Matadin Agarwal on 4.6.1007 (sic) and Smt. Kailaso Devi on 19.5.2010. This issue has however been already answered in the civil suits referred to above and the findings of the civil courts in the aforesaid suits have attained finality and cannot be re-agitated in this Writ Petition. The predecessors in interest of the petitioners have agitated the issue of partnership in M/s Kapoor Chand Jain unsuccessfully and the very same issues are sought to be agitated in this writ petition. Now subsequent to the findings of the civil courts having attained finality the petitioners cannot be allowed to pursue the same questions by way of present writ petition in view of the principles of res judicata. This Court is of the view that the petitioners cannot achieve in the Writ Petition what their predecessors in interest have failed to achieve in the Civil suits and accompanying applications......” ...... ...... ...... “It would now be in order to consider the reply of the respondent BPCL to the writ petition. On consideration of the matter and in the facts as recorded above, more particularly, the fact that BPCL was party in civil proceedings taken by Santosh Kumar Jain and Kailaso Devi, it is evident that the findings of the civil court with regard to M/s Kapoor Chand Jain being a partnership firm were in the knowledge of BPCL and apply as much to the respondent BPCL as they do to Santosh Kumar Jain, DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 16 Kailaso Devi and their legal heirs. The respondent BPCL has since 16/7/1983 treated Matadin Agarwal as de facto proprietor of the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain. Metadin Agarwal appears to have entered into correspondence with respondent BPCL as proprietor of M/S Kapoor Chand Jain. He had opened as account with the bank for payments to be made to BPCL for motor spirit supplied and the said account was bieng run in the name of M/S Kapoor Chand Jain under the proprietorship of Matadin Agarwal. Even according to BPCL’s own case, it had entered into arrangement with M/S Kapoor Chand Jain, with Matadin Agarwal acting as proprietor for supply of motor spirits. In these circumstances, for BPCL to overlook the history of litigation in the case as also the judgements of the civil courts in setting up a case before this Court that it will renew the dealership only in the event of the legal heirs of all partners indicated in the selling license of 4/7/80 agreeing to such renewal is preposterous and inexplicable at the least. The respondent BPCL cannot in any eventuality consider itself as not bound by the orders of Civil Courts holding Matadeen Agarwal as the proprietor of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain which orders it did not seek to put to challenge in spite being a party in the said proceedings which since have attained finality. In spite of the selling license dated 4/7/80 effective 1/6/80 being in the name of a partnership firm, BPCL has continued to entertain and make supplies to Matadin Agarwal as de-facto proprietor of M/S Kapoor Chand Jain at least since 1983 till his death in 2007.” In view of the above, the learned Single Judge proceeded to dismiss the said writ petition with costs, as noticed at the outset. As noticed, the appellants Shri Rishi Jain and others have filed two appeals against the orders passed in both the writ petitions (CWP Nos.8102/2007 and 7225/2011). The oil company, BPCL, has also filed two appeals against the orders passed in both the writ petitions. The appellants Shri Rishi Jain and others were not the parties to CWP No.8102/2007 but had moved an application on 16.08.2011 in the said writ petition seeking impleadment. These appellants have filed herein an application seeking leave to appeal and it has been submitted, inter alia, that the learned Single Judge has erred in not considering the application filed by them for impleadment; and has further erred in passing the impugned order without impleading them as parties to the writ petition though they were directly necessary parties, being the heirs of Shri Santosh DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 17 Kumar Jain, the partner of the firm Shri Santosh Kumar Jain. It has also been submitted that though in the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has proceeded to hold Shri Matadeen Agarwal as proprietor of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain with reference to the judgments/orders of the Civil Court but then, the referred judgments/orders do not fortify any such contention of the respondents. Condition No.9(q) of the License has also been referred to submit that no change in the constitution of the firm could have been effected without permission of BPCL; and no permission having been taken, the suggestions about change of constitution of the firm remain baseless. It is contended that in none of the orders, any Court has declared Shri Matadeen Agarwal as the sole proprietor of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain nor BPCL accepted any such position. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, the orders passed by the learned Single Judge proceed fundamentally contrary to the facts and cannot be sustained. In SAW No.1886/2011, the appellants have also filed an application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, inter alia, seeking to place on record certain documents wherein late Shri Matadeen Agarwal signed as partner of the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain. The learned counsel for the appellants has also referred to condition No.12(b) of the License to submit that upon the demise of the partner or even the proprietor, the agreement stands terminated and no right could be claimed by the respondents. The learned counsel has also referred to the decisions in Kalabharati Advertising Vs. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania & Ors.:AIR 2010 SC 3745, Kandapazha Nadar & Ors. Vs. Chitraganiammal & Ors.:AIR 2007 SC 1575 and Fakir Mohammed DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 18 Vs. Ajaj Ali & Ors.: 2002(4) WLC(Raj.) 506. The stand of the appellant BPCL is that the learned Single Judge has erred in having saddled the appellant with the responsibility of substituting the names of the respondents in place of the deceased partners of the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain. It is submitted that the requirement on the part of BPCL that the respondents should obtain a consent from the legal heirs of other deceased co-licensees is directly in consonance with the rules of equity, fair play and good conscience; and such requirements cannot be held to be baseless or unwarranted. It has also been submitted that the views taken by the learned Single Judge as if Shri Matadeen Agarwal acquired proprietary status and the petitioners inherited such rights of Selling License are contrary to Clauses 8(v) and 12(b) of the License Agreement. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge has erred in failing to consider that in the civil litigation between co-licensees, BPCL was virtually a proforma party against whom no effective relief was sought and as such, it was not at all necessary for BPCL to have challenged the findings of the Court. In any case, according to the learned counsel, the license issued by BPCL does not carry heritable right and such right could only be obtained after complying with the requirements for the purpose of issuance of a license. Refuting the submissions made on behalf of the appellants, the learned counsel for the respondents has strongly relied upon the contents of the agreement dated 04.06.1980 and submitted that by virtue thereof, coupled with the conduct of the parties, the position had been that “M/s Kapoor Chand Jain” remained only a trade name and else, the partnership effectively came to an end and the DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 19 business continued in the proprietorship of Shri Matadeen Agarwal. The learned counsel would contend that in the face of this indisputable agreement dated 04.06.1980 coupled with the position that until the life time of Shri Matadeen Agarwal, BPCL continued to deal with him alone, it is too late in the day that any of the appellants could contend against the fact that Shri Matadeen Agarwal was the proprietor of this business, which fact has crystalized into all the legal rights in Shri Matadeen Agarwal qua the dealership in question. The learned counsel has also submitted, with reference to the plaint pertaining to the suit for perpetual injunction filed by Shri Santosh Kumar Jain wherein the application for temporary injunction was rejected on 16.07.1983, that a suggestion was made about there being some hidden partnership but the cause of action was that BPCL was supplying the goods to Shri Matadeen Agarwal. According to the learned counsel, in the said suit, not only the prayer for interim relief was declined but ultimately, the suit itself was dismissed on 01.09.1994 and was never got restored. Thus, according to the learned counsel, per Order IX Rule 9 CPC, there has arisen an effective bar against the said plaintiff, and consequently against his successors too, of maintaining any suit or petition on the same cause of action. The learned counsel has further referred to the other litigations where Shri Santosh Kumar Jain sought recovery of arrears of rent and eviction; and where the prayer for eviction was declined. This apart, the learned counsel has strongly relied upon the suit filed by Smt.Kailaso Devi on 24.05.1996, which was decided on 04.08.2003; and has particularly referred to the findings in the judgment dated 04.08.2003. The learned counsel submitted that the said suit was DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 20 filed by Smt.Kailaso Devi only through the present appellant Shri Rishi Jain but this fact was not stated in the writ petition filed by Shri Rishi Jain. The learned counsel contended that the findings as recorded in Smt.Kailaso Devi’s suit squarely bind the present appellants and hence, the suggestions about existence of partnership have rightly been rejected by the learned Single Judge. The learned counsel has also referred to the reply filed by BPCL and submitted that the suggestion by BPCL as if dealership has come to an end, is not justified when BPCL itself has stated in categoric terms that it could be continued in the individual’s name or under the firm’s name. Thus, according to the learned counsel, these appeals deserve to be dismissed. Having given thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions and having examined the record, we are clearly of the view that these appeals remain bereft of substance and deserve to be dismissed. An aspect regarding want of decision on the application dated 16.08.2011 as moved in CWP No.8102/2007 by the appellants Shri Rishi Jain and others, deserves to be dealt with at the first. Ordinarily, such an omission might have had some bearing on the matter but is not so in the present case for the simple reason that even before filing of this application for impleadment, the appellants, Shri Rishi Jain and others, had filed the other writ petition (CWP No.7225/2011) stating effectively their case in opposition to the case set up by the present contesting respondents Uma Shankar and another. It appears from the record that both the writ petitions were considered together by the learned Single Judge on 20.09.2011 and were decided by the impugned orders of even date, i.e., 14.10.2011. DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 21 In a cumulative and conjoint reading of both the orders dated 14.10.2011, evident it is that the case sought to be set up by the appellants has effectively gone into consideration. In the given position of record, where the appellants have had complete opportunity of hearing, the arguments concerning their application for impleadment in writ petition (CWP No.8102/2007) remains only a matter of form rather than of substance. The contentions in this regard are required to be, and are, rejected. Coming to the merits of the case, we find the observations of the learned Single Judge perfectly in accord with the records as also the relevant surrounding factors and circumstances. In a comprehension of the case set out by the rival parties, it is evident that the respondents Shri Uma Shankar Agarwal and another seek enforcement of their rights as successors-in-interest of their late father Shri Matadeen Agarwal, who, according to them, acquired the status of the proprietor of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain and always acted as such; and was always accepted as such. On the other hand, the suggestion on the part of the appellants Shri Rishi Jain and others is that M/s Kapoor Chand Jain was a partnership concern and in any case, the respondents cannot claim any right on the outlet in question as successors of Shri Matadeen Agarwal. The submissions of the appellants fall short of substance. The fact that Shri Matadeen Agarwal not only acted but was also accepted as singularly carrying on business in the name of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain in exclusion of the alleged erstwhile partners of the firm is apparent and stands fortified by the weight of the evidence available on record. The agreement dated 04.06.1980 itself makes it clear that Shri DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 22 Matadeen Agarwal was given the rights to carry on business in exclusion of others. In fact, in the said agreement, it was also suggested that the partnership shall stand dissolved. The agreement clearly stipulated that only Shri Matadeen Agarwal would remain incharge of the Petrol Pump and he would be liable for all the future acts and deeds. Shri Santosh Kumar retained in him the right to receive the rent @ Rs. 1,500/- per month; and, of course, another right to opt for the partnership after three years of this agreement, Shri Santosh Kumar Jain did not exercise any such option after three years and rather, the litigation ensued. However, the aspect of immense significance for the present appeals is that the result of every such litigation effectively and conclusively operates against the suggestions sought to be made by the appellants. In the first litigation, Shri Santosh Kumar Jain attempted to seek perpetual injunction while stating the grievance that BPCL was making supplies to Shri Matadeen Agarwal. Not only the prayer for interim relief was declined but ultimately, this suit was dismissed for want of appearance when the counsel pleaded no instructions. At this juncture, we may take note of the decisions referred by the learned counsel for the appellants. The decision of this Court in Fakir Mohammed (supra) to the effect that in case of different causes of action, in the matters of eviction on different grounds, dismissal of earlier suit in default, does not attract Order IX Rule 9 CPC has absolutely no relevance to the facts of the present case. As noticed, in the suit for perpetual injunction, Shri Santosh Kumar Jain stated the cause of action to the effect that BPCL was continuing to make supplies to Shri Matadeen Agarwal. Dismissal of the said suit in DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 23 default cannot be ignored as of irrelevance. The decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kandapazha Nadar (supra) dealing with the aspect relating to Order XXIII Rule 1(4) CPC on withdrawal of the suit has got no application to the questions at hand. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kalabharati Advertising (supra) on the principle that with withdrawal of the petition, interim order looses efficacy also appears having no direct bearing on the questions involved in these appeals. It is not only the order declining interim relief in the suit filed by Shri Santosh Kumar Jain that has been referred. As noticed, the suit was ultimately dismissed for want of prosecution. The commonness of the cause of action in the said suit and the writ petition as filed by Shri Rishi Jain and others cannot be ignored. Then, there were two other suits filed by Shri Santosh Kumar Jain seeking to enforce his rights as the landlord in relation to the premises of the outlet in question. In our view, the results coming out of these litigations are that: (a) attempt on the part of Shri Santosh Kumar Jain to obstruct conducting of business by Shri Matadeen Agarwal alone with BPCL failed; and (b) Shri Santosh Kumar Jain on the other hand exercised his rights only as the landlord of the premises in question. These results heavily operate against the claim sought to be made by the appellants Shri Rishi Jain and others in these matters. Even if all the aforesaid litigations are left aside for a moment, in our view, the decision of the suit filed in the name of Smt.Kailaso Devi effectively puts curtains on the claim sought to be made by the appellants Shri Rishi Jain and others. The said suit was prosecuted by Shri Rishi Jain himself as the attorney of the plaintiff Smt.Kailaso Devi. All the relevant persons i.e., Shri DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 24 Matadeen Agarwal, Shri Santosh Kumar Jain as also BPCL were the defendants therein. The suit was heard and finally decided after framing of issues and taking evidence led by the parties. Issue No.1 in the said suit had been specifically on the question about existence of the partnership of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain and ultimately, the learned Trial Court ruled in that regard against the plaintiff as under:- “31. उपरोक्त पिरिस्थितयᲂ मᱶ पर्थमत: वािदया तथाकिथत भागीदारी फमर् का गठन सािबत नहᱭ कर पाई है। यिद तकर् के िलए गठन मान भी िलया जाय तो वािदया के ᳞वहार एवं उपरोक्त समस्त पिरिस्थितयᲂ के कारण उक्त तथाकिथत फमर् का िवघटन का िनष्कषर् िनकाला जाना युिक्तयुक्त पर्तीत होता है। 32. उपरोक्त िववेचन के अनुसार मेरे मत मᱶ वादी पक्ष तथाकिथत भागीदारी फमर् मैससर् कपूर चन्द जैन का गठन एवं उसकी िनरंतरता सािबत करने मᱶ असमथर् रहा है। अत: यह तनकीह वािदया के िवरू िनिणत की जाती है।\" We need not burden this judgment with other findings in the said judgment dated 04.08.2003 but upon a comprehensive reading of the same, it is but clear that the Court had not an iota of doubt that the so-called partnership had come to an end at least in the year 1983; and recorded categorical findings to that effect. In the given fact situation and status of the findings in the litigation in which all the concerned were the parties, the learned Single Judge has been perfectly justified in holding that Shri Matadeen Agarwal was accepted to be the sole proprietor of the business that was carried in the name of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain. In the face of the above-referred findings of the Civil Court that the partnership had effectively come to an end at least in the year 1983, the suggestion as sought to be made by the appellants Rishi Jain and others with reference to some of the documents filed with the application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, in our view, are of DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 25 little avail. The appellants are not entitled to seek re-opening of concluded findings of the Civil Court by way of some documents here or there, where Shri Matadeen Agarwal might have signed or had been referred as partner. A feeble suggestion was also attempted on behalf of the appellants that the findings of the Civil Court remain perverse and cannot be held binding. This submission has only been noted to be rejected. When the judgment was rendered after thorough contest and has become final, the party to that suit or its successors could least be permitted to suggest anything of so-called perversity in the concluded findings. It has, however, been strenuously argued on behalf of the appellants that in none of the cases, the Civil Court has given a finding that Shri Matadeen Agarwal was the proprietor of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain. This argument too remains baseless. The findings of the Courts have all through been of rejection of case of the appellants and their predecessors about existence of partnership of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain. Coupled with this had been the indisputable fact situation that the business of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain was continued, since the year 1980 and until his demise, by Shri Matadeen Agarwal alone. In the given fact situation, it follows as a necessary corollary to the findings of the Civil Court that the business of the firm M/s Kapoor Chand Jain was carried on by Shri Matadeen Agarwal as the exclusive owner and, thus, he was to be known as proprietor thereof. It remains trite that a person having legal right or exclusive title to anything is called the proprietor; and a business, when owned and controlled exclusively by one person, is designated as that of “proprietorship” or “sole proprietorship”. In the given fact situation of the present case, no other status could be assigned to Shri DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 26 Matadeen Agarwal qua the business in question except that of proprietor. Thus, the contentions as urged on behalf of the appellants Shri Rishi Jain and others are required to be rejected. So far the oil company, BPCL is concerned, we are at one with what has been observed by the learned Single Judge regarding its conduct. Ever since the year 1980, the business was being carried on by Shri Matadeen Agarwal alone. The company continued to deal with him and continued to make supplies. Even if the constitution of the firm was not changed, the fact that Shri Santosh Kumar Jain and Smt.Kailaso Devi were not involved in the business at all, was always known to the company. There cannot be any doubt in this regard because in all the related litigations commencing from the year 1983, the company was indeed a party defendant. The pretension as sought to be put forward on behalf of the BPCL that it were only a proforma defendant, has rightly been commented adversely by the learned Single Judge and we endorse such comments without any doubt. The decisions of the Civil Court and particularly the decision in the civil suit for dissolution of the firm and rendition of accounts filed by Smt.Kailaso Devi equally bind BPCL for being a defendant therein; and it cannot wriggle out of the same. At this juncture, we are impelled to reproduce herein the self-defeating stand taken by BPCL in its memo of appeals. In paragraph (e) of the memo in SAW No.2179/2011, the company would state as under:- “e) Because the learned Single Judge has seriously erred in having failed to appreciate that the retail outlet started functioning by and under a license issued in the year 1957 in the name of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain, a partnership firm of Sh.Kapoor Chand Jain and Smt.Kailasho Devi and had generated a huge goodwill by 1983, when the appellant corporation first came to know about the fact of execution of agreement dated 4.6.1980, by which time, DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 27 the same became the subject matter of litigation between the co- licensees which litigation culminated upon passing of order dated 04-8-2003;” It is but apparent that in any case, the appellant came to know about the fact of execution of the agreement dated 04.06.1980 by the year 1983. The BPCL seeks to suggest that it were a proforma party to the litigation between co-licensees. If it were not concerned with those litigation, the company has still no answer as to why it continued with the license irrespective of such litigation when it had come in its knowledge that the business, though purportedly of partnership, was being carried on by Shri Matadeen Agarwal alone as exclusive owner. Then, the litigation admittedly culminated into the judgment dated 04.08.2003. Shri Matadeen Agarwal expired about four years later i.e., on 04.06.2007. There is nothing on record to show as to what the company did after the judgment dated 04.08.2003. In a comprehension of all the facts and circumstances, it appears that suggestion about the clauses in agreement is only a pretext on the part of BPCL to somehow deprive the respondents of their rightful claim as successors of Shri Matadeen Agarwal, who had all through been accepted as de facto proprietor of M/s Kapoor Chand Jain. In the given fact situation, we find nothing of substance in the suggestions made on behalf of the appellants with reference to the conditions in the agreement. It is also noticeable that the company BPCL has otherwise shown its keenness to continue with the dealership, as specifically taken note of by the learned Single Judge. Of course, the company has suggested that the dealership could be continued in the name of the successors of the so-called DBSAW No. 1886/2011. Alongwith three connected matters 28 parters but when the theory about partnership gets excluded and it is found that it had been a business in the proprietorship of Shri Matadeen Agarwal, in our view, the suggestions of BPCL ought to apply to the successors of late Shri Matadeen Agarwal. In the given set of facts and circumstances, the writ as issued by the learned Single Judge in CWP No.8102/2007 remains justified and calls for no interference. The other writ petition (CWP No.7225/2011) had been fundamentally baseless and has rightly been dismissed with costs. In the ultimate analysis, we find no force in any of these appeals. Consequently, the appeals fail and are, therefore, dismissed. However, in the circumstances, we make no order as to costs concerning these appeals. (NARENDRA KUMAR JAIN),J. (DINESH MAHESHWARI),J. MK CERTIFIED THAT ALL CORRECTIONS MADE IN THE JUDGEMENT / ORDER HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED IN THE JUDGEMENT / ORDER BEING EMAILED. Manoj Kumar PS "