"1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr.M.P. No. 1896 of 2019 Rohitash Krishnan aged about 43 years, son of Shri Shiv Shankar Sharma, resident of Road No. 7, Kujur Niwas, Hawai Nagar, P.O. and P.S. Jagarnathpur, District-Ranchi …… Petitioner Versus Union of India through the Directorate of Enforcement having its office at Kaushalya Chambers-II, Pee Pee Compound, P.O.-G.P.O, P.S. Lower Chutia, District-Ranchi …… Opp. Party --------- CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI --------- For the Petitioner : Mr. Pandey Neeraj Rai, Advocate For the Respondent-E.D : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate ……….. 10/Dated: 03/11/2022 Heard Mr. Pandey Neeraj Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the respondent-E.D. 2. This petition has been filed for quashing of the Supplementary Complaint under sections 44 and 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 dated 03.05.2019 in ECIR 02/PAT/2009/AD including cognizance order dated 03.05.2019 and the entire criminal proceeding with all consequences, pending in the Court of learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-XVI-cum-Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi. 3. Initially a complaint vide Complaint Case No. 01 of 2009 was filed before the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Ranchi by one Rajiv Sharma against four persons and the said learned court vide its order dated 1.7.2009 referred the said complaint under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to the Vigilance Police Station, Ranchi for institution of F.I.R. and investigation of the case and accordingly the officer-in-charge, Vigilance Police Station registered the F.I.R. on 02.07.2009 vide Vigilance P.S. Case No. 09/2009 alleging commission of offences punishable under sections 409, 420, 423, 424, 465, 120B, I.P.C. and sections 7, 10, 11 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, CBI came into picture by virtue of order of the Hon’ble High Court in a PIL referring the matter to CBI (order dated 04.08.2010 in W.P.(PIL) No. 4700/2008 (Durga Oroan Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors) C.B.I took over the investigation from Vigilance Bureau on 2 11.08.2010 by registering Vigilance P.S. Case No. 9/2009 as R.C 5(A)2010/AHD-R. Upon investigation , C.B.I. filed chargesheet no. 6/2010 dated 12.11.2010 and charge-sheet no. 1 dated 21.05.2013. 4. On the basis of the allegation of commission of aforesaid offences, which fall in the schedule of the Prevention of Money Lanundering Act, an inquiry into money laundering was undertaken by the Directorate of Enforcement and Enforcement Directorate separately registered a proceeding/case vide ECIR No. 02/PAT/2009/AD dated 08.10.2009. 5. A complaint dated 15.01.2011 under section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was filed against one Binod Kumar Sinha and others alleging commission of offences under section 3 of the Act. Consequently, cognizance was taken against them and after framing of charges against them on 25.09.2012 and the trial was proceeded. 6. Before filing of the impugned, a complaint as Supplementary Complaint under section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 dated 17.07.2018 in ECIR 02/PAT/2009/AD was filed against the company namely, Quantum Power Tech Private Limited, of which the petitioner is one of the Directors, for offence under section 4 of the PMLA. Pursuant thereto this petitioner has been implicated and complaint has been filed and cognizance has been taken against the company on 17.07.2018 and a separate complaint was filed against the petitioner and cognizance was taken against this petitioner on 03.05.2019. 7. Mr. Pandey Neeraj Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that so far as Quantum Power Tech Private Limited is concerned, this company has approached in Cr.M.P. No. 779 of 2019 through its director Brajesh Kumar Singh and that case was decided by this Court along with analogous cases by order dated 19.09.2022 whereby the those cases were dismissed. So far argument advanced on that case with regard to Quantum Power Tech Private Limited is concerned that is also to be taken care of by this Court. He further elaborates his argument by submitting that this petitioner has co-operated in the investigation and the E.D. filed the case against the petitioner who is one of the director of Quantum Power Tech Private 3 Limited. At the out set, he submits that the petitioner has submitted his income tax assessment before the appellate authority and the appellate authority has given the clearance to the petitioner with regard to assessment year 2007-08 and 2008-09. He submits that income tax clearance is having substance in the case of the PMLA. To buttress his argument, he relied on judgment in the case of “ J. Sekar Alias Sekar Reddy V. Directorate of Enforcement” (2022) 7 SCC 370 wherein para 22 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “22. As discussed above, looking to the facts of this case, it is clear by a detailed order of acceptance of the closure report of the Schedule Offence in RC MA1 2016 A0040 and the quashment of two FIRs by the High Court of the Schedule Offence and of the letter dated 16-5-2019 of the IT Department and also the observations made by the adjudicating authority in the order dated 25-2-2019, the evidence of continuation of offence in ECR CEZO 19/2016 is not sufficient. The Department itself is unable to collect any incriminating material and also not produced before this Court even after a lapse of 5½ years to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. From the material collected by the Agency, they themselves are prima facie not satisfied that the offence under PMLA can be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The argument advanced by the learned ASG regarding pendency of the appeal against the order of adjudicating authority is also of no help because against the order of the appellate authority also, remedies are available. Thus, looking to the facts as discussed hereinabove and the ratio of the judgments of this Court in Radheshyam Kejriwal [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] and Ashoo Surendranath Tewari [Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v. CBI, (2020) 9 SCC 636 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 209] , the chance to prove the allegations even for the purpose of provisions of PMLA in the Court are bleak. Therefore, we are of the firm opinion that the chances to prove those allegations in the Court are very bleak. It is trite to say, till the allegations are proved, the appellant would be innocent. The High Court by the impugned order [J. Sekar v. SRS Mining, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 13804] has recorded the finding without due consideration of the letter of the IT Department and other material in right perspective. Therefore, in our view, these findings of the High Court cannot be sustained.” 8. Relying on the aforesaid judgment, he submits that income tax clearance is there, there is no question of proceeding against the petitioner in the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He further submits that vicarious liability can not be fastened against the petitioner who is one of the director and allegation is against company about the money laundering. To buttress his argument, he relied on judgment in the case of “Municipal Corporation of Delhi V. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and others” (1983) 1 SCC 1 wherein para 15 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “15. So far as the Manager is concerned, we are satisfied that from 4 the very nature of his duties it can be safely inferred that he would undoubtedly be vicariously liable for the offence; vicarious liability being an incident of an offence under the Act. So far as the Directors are concerned, there is not even a whisper nor a shred of evidence nor anything to show, apart from the presumption drawn by the complainant, that there is any act committed by the Directors from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that they could also be vicariously liable. In these circumstances, therefore, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the argument of the High Court that no case against the Directors (accused 4 to 7) has been made out ex facie on the allegations made in the complaint and the proceedings against them were rightly quashed.” 9. He took the Court to running page 67 internal page 1, running page 88 internal page 22 and running page 93 internal page 27 of the complaint and submits that there is no allegation against the petitioner. He further submits that the cognizance order is bad and cryptic in nature. 10. On these grounds he submits that the entire criminal proceeding is bad and this court is competent to quash the entire proceeding. 11. On the other hand, Mr. A.K. Das, learned counsel for the Enforcement Directorate submits that so far as company namely, Quantum Power Tech Private Limited is concerned the case of that company has already been dismissed by this Court by order dated 19.09.2022. He further submits that Brajesh Kumar Singh and this petitioner are founder director of Quantum Power Tech Private Limited. He draws the attention of the Court at running page 93 internal page 27 para 6 of the complaint and submits that petitioner is director of the said company and responsible for day to day business affairs and conduct of the company and huge proceeds of crime have been knowingly concealed and transferred in this company by them. He further submits that this petitioner is still absconding and he has not appeared before the Court. He submits that process under section 82 Cr.P.C. has been issued against the petitioner which was challenged by the petitioner in Cr.M.P. No. 206 of 2012 which was dismissed by this Court holding that the inspite of interim protection provided to the petitioner, he has not appeared before the Court. On this ground, he submits that the petition is fit to be dismissed. 12. In view of above submission of the learned counsel for the parties the court has gone through the materials on record and finds that admittedly the petitioner is director of the Quantum Power Tech Private Limited. The case of 5 Quantum Power Tech Private Limited has been considered in another case which has been dismissed by order dated 19.09.2022. Arguments advanced by Mr. Rai with regard to the case of the company was considered in that case and the said argument was answered by the Court in following manner:- “In the light of the above submissions of the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record and finds that there are allegations against the petitioners, the company as well as the Directors who are the petitioners in the respective petitions. In paragraph no.17 of the complaint it has been disclosed that their transactions were limited to provide accommodation entries in lieu of cash only that on receipt of cash, cheques were issued to the companies either as share application or loan. One of the witness Shri Mridul Bhowmick at paragraph no.18 of the complaint has stated that he is not knowing that whether any share certificate is in possession and he was not aware whether any share certificate has been issued at all. Vivek Kumar Goenka has said so in paragraph no.19 of the complaint. Thus, prima-facie it appears that intentionally the proceed of the crime has been transferred in the name of share to the petitioners and the petitioners’ firm. So far as the 8 contention of Mr. Roy, the learned counsel for the petitioners with regard to mens rea is concerned that can only be decided at the time of trial.. It is well settled that when the prosecution relies upon the materials, strict standard of proof is not to be applied at the stage of issuance of summons nor to examine the probable defence which the accused may take and all that the court is required to do is to satisfy itself as to whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding before summoning the accused and the facts stated will have to be accepted as they appear on the very face of it. For issuance of process against the accused it has to be seen only whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and for that the Court is not required to weigh the evidentiary value on the basis of materials on record and the only thing the Court is required is to apply its judicial mind and in the case in hand the learned court has taken cognizance by a speaking order. There is no illegality in the order taking cognizance. In the case of Dayle De’souza v. Government of India, Through Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner(supra) relied by Mr. Roy, the learned counsel for the petitioners that case was arising out under the Minimum Wages Act and considering section 22 of Minimum Wages Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held at its paragraph nos.15, 16 and 17 which have been referred hereinabove. In the case in hand, some of the petitioners are Directors and the companies are also the petitioners and hence that judgment is not helping to the petitioners. In Cr.M.P.No.2193 of 2018 the facts and circumstances of that case was different in which section 276(B) of the Income Tax Act was the subject matter for consideration. Admittedly, section 23 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 speaks of presumption in interconnected transactions and the burden of proof is on the accused in light of section 9 24 of the said Act which can be proved in the trial. These two sections have been held to be legal in the case of Vijay Mondal Choudhary and Ors. V. Union of India by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Court is not required to examine such factual submissions which may be led by Mr. Rai, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, at this premature stage that the prosecution evidence is yet to be led in the trial. The complaint does base on the certain statement, evidence of certain persons it is not necessary to obey the factual prosecution which is said out of running proceeds of crime and the Court is not required to go into the details of that statement while will hamper or embarrass the learned trial court. Moreover, the quashing application of the co-accused have been dismissed by this 6 Court as discussed (supra). In view of the above facts and the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties as well as the reasons and the analysis, the Court is not willing to quash the entire proceeding including the order taking cognizance. Accordingly, Cr.M.P. No.2507 of 2019, Cr.M.P. No.779 of 2019, Cr.M.P. No.1861 of 2019 and Cr.M.P. No.2503 of 2019 stand dismissed. Interim orders granted earlier in the respective cases are hereby vacated.” 13. On perusal of complaint, it appears that there is direct allegation against the petitioner of enjoying proceeds of crime to the tune of Rs. 11.10 crores through company. For ready reference relevant part of the complaint is quoted here-in-below:- “That during investigation, it has been established that proceeds of crime to the tune of Rs. 11.10 crore has been concealed and invested through M/s Quantum Power Tech Pvt. Ltd. and accordingly, properties involved in money laundering worth Rs. 11.10 crores owned by the company have been attached by issuance of PAO No. 04/2010 which has been confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority. It was further revealed from the investigation that Shri Binod Sinha offered Rohitash Krishnan and Brajest Kumar Singh to work in Jharkhand and also assured that he would provide financial help. That the same facts was confirmed from the submission of Shri Brajesh Kumar Singh, Director of M/s Quantum Power Tech Pvt. Ltd at 4th Floor Rukmni, Towers, Ratu Road, Ranchi in his letter dated 24.11.2009 to the Directorate of Enforcement where in he has submitted a list of transaction details of the company with Binod Kumar Sinha, which shows that a sum of Rs. 8,70,00,000/- was deposited and a sum of Rs. 7,99,35,000/- was withdrawn at various dates in the account of the company at PNB, Hinoo, Ranchi, HDFC Bank Ltd, Lalpur, Ranchi and Bank of Baroda, Main Road Ranchi. Rohitash Krishnan and Brajesh Kumar Singh got M/s Quantum Powertch Pvt. Ltd. incorporated on 28.03.2008. That, Binod Sinha had given them a sum of approximately Rs. 8,70 crores. The said company was registered with the office of Registrar of Companies , New Delhi and its official address is at B-271, Greater Kailash, New Delhi. Subsequently the address of the company was shifted to the residential address of Shri Rohitas Krishnan at Hawai Nagar, Road No. 7, Ranchi. Both Shri B.K. Singh and Shri Rohitas Krishnan were holding 50% of the shares each in the company and only these two persons were responsible for day to day affair of the company and it is also evident from periodical returns submitted by the said company to the Registrar of Companies (RoC), the documents submitted by the company to the bank alongwith the Account Opening Form and the ITR filed by the company to IT Department that Brajesh Kumar Singh and Rohitash Krishnan were the Authorized Signatories of the company and were also its incharge and responsible for day to day business and conduct of the company. Proceeds of crime have been knowingly concealed and transferred in this company with the connivance of Brajesh Kumar Singh and Rohitash Krishnan. Modus operandi of investment of proceeds of crime in this company was collection of cash and arranging accommodation entries through various companies like Jalsagar Commdeal Pvt. Ltd., Sun Kissed Agencies Pvt. Ltd, Kejriwal Finvest Pvt. Ltd. and Acme Pvt. Ltd. These companies were engaged in business of investment, trading and non- banking financial transaction with certain companies and transactions were limited to providing of accommodation entries in lieu of cash. On receipt of cash, cheques were issued in the name of M/s Quantum Power Tech Ltd, M/s Vini Iron & Steel Ltd. and M/s Shvrama Sponge Iron Pvt. Ltd. (subsequently known as Emmar Alloys Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Lemos Cement Ltd. (subsequently known as Khalari 7 Cement). In this manner, the proceeds of crime were invested in these companies either by showing it as against the share application of loan. Though as a matter of fact, there is no record of transfer of such shares on receipt of such money or repayment of any loan. Summons was also issued to Rohitash Krishnan, being another director of the company. But he failed to appear before the investigation. In this regard, a Non-Bailable Warrant (NBW) against Rohitash Krishnan has also been issued. But Rohitash Krishnan has been deliberately avoiding the investigation in a desperate attempt to frustrate the proceedings under the PMLA; that summon was again issued to Rohitash Krishnan on 31.0-1.2019, which was duly acknowledged by him, but he deliberately avoid to before this Directorate.” 14. Thus, it is crystal clear that there is allegation against the petitioner who happens to be director of the company whose case has been considered and dismissed. Merely because he has been cleared by the Income Tax Department allegation made against the petitioner are not rendered infructuous. It is not known whether in that income tax return the proceeds of crime have been shown by the petitioner in that return or not. Moreover in the judgment relied by Mr. Rai in the case of J. Sekar Alias Sekar Reddy(supra), the facts of that case are different. The C.B.I. and E.D. has closed the case and the income tax department has also closed the case and in that scenario the Hon’ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that finding of the High court is not sustainable. Para 19 and 21 of the said judgment is quoted here-in-below:- “19. On the basis of the intimation given by the IT Department and registration of the FIR by CBI which was closed, the Directorate of ED registered ECIR/CEZO/19/2016 under Sections 3, 4 and 8(5) of PMLA. After the said FIR, Deputy Director (ED) passed an order under Section 5(1) of PMLA on 1-6-2017 attaching the property. For confirmation of attachment, OC No. 785 of 2017 was filed by the Department which is rejected by the adjudicating authority while exercising the power under Section 5(5) of PMLA. The adjudicating authority observed as thus: “It is pertinent to note that about two years have lapsed since passing of the said bail order dated 17-3-2017, and over two years have passed after filing of FIR, however till date no final report is filed by the investigating officer concerned investigating the scheduled offences. Most material is the fact that so far no bank or bank officers are identified, either by the officer investigating the Schedule Offences or even the Enforcement Directorate, Chennai. In view of the absence of any bank or bank officers having been identified, it was necessary for the Deputy Director to consider the absence and/or non-identification of any bank or bank officers. Nothing is adduced or available on record as to which banks and which bank officers are involved, who have unauthorisedly converted demonetised old currency into new currency. The reasonable belief as is formed by the Deputy Director reveals that the vital aspect concerning the fact that no such bank or bank officers are existing or found is not considered by the Deputy Director at all. The reasonable belief is thus impaired. The reasonable belief formed by the Deputy Director inter alia is that the accused persons have laundered their unaccounted money in conspiring with the bank officials of various 8 banks who helped them laundering the unaccounted money. There is nothing on record which reveals the name of even single bank, much less, the various banks as stated by the Deputy Director. Similarly not a single bank official is identified or named and there is nothing on record which reveals any such detail. Consequently the reasonable belief becomes baseless and is mere speculation of the Deputy Director. Such a belief can not be justified and sustained. The aspect concerning non-identification and/or non-availability of any bank and bank officials, goes to the root of the formation of the entire reasonable belief. The Additional Director/Joint Director/Deputy Director ought to have directed the Enforcement Directorate Officers to investigate or cause to be investigated the aspect concerning the bank or bank officers. The Deputy Director ought to have deliberated on the issue and proceeded, which is not done. In the absence of such basic material the reasonable belief entertained by the Deputy Director specifically forming the reasonable belief that the accused laundered their unaccounted money in conspiring with the bank officials of various banks who helped them in laundering the unaccounted money, cannot be legally tenable. The reasonable belief of the Deputy Director further upon its analysis indicates that the Deputy Director has entertained the reasonable belief as stated in paras 21, 26 and 27 of the provisional attachment order, only in respect of a part of the seized amount of Rs 33,47,92,000, without specifying as to what quantum and as to what part of the seized amount of Rs 33,47,92,000 in the form of movable properties is related to the Schedule Offences. The formation of the reasonable belief only for part of the seized amount and yet proceeding to attach the entire seized amount vitiates the entire reasonable belief and renders it as illegal. It is seen from the reasonable belief that such an exercise was not carried out by the Deputy Director. The reasonable belief formed by the Deputy Director that the new currency, which were seized by the Income Tax Authorities are nothing but the currency received in lieu of exchange of old currency notes (demonetised currency) inclusive of commission for such exchange received by S/Shri J. Sekar Reddy, M. Premkumar, S. Srinivaslu, S. Ramachandran and K. Rethinam, is neither based on any specified material nor is justified. It is therefore, concluded that the reasonable belief formed by the Deputy Director in this regard cannot be sustained, the same having been not based on any specifically material and the same is merely surmises, conjectures and speculation. Considering the material in OC, the written replies/additional written reply/submissions of the defendants and the arguments above referred, I find that the property provisionally attached by PAO No. 14 of 2017 dated 12-6-2017 i.e. 49,480 kg of gold valued at Rs 13,96,88,246 mentioned in para 22 of PAO (para 1 of this order) is not involved in money laundering.” 21. In view of the aforesaid legal position and on analysing the report of the IT Department and the reasoning given by CBI while submitting the final closure report in RC MA1 2016 A0040 and the order passed by the adjudicating authority, it is clear that for proceeds of crime, as defined under Section 2(1)(u) of PMLA, the property seized would be relevant and its possession with recovery and claim thereto must be innocent. In the present case, the Schedule Offence has not been made out because of lack of evidence. The adjudicating authority, at the time of refusing to continue the order of attachment under PMLA, was of the opinion that the record regarding banks and its officials who may be involved, is not on record. Therefore, for lack of identity of the source of collected money, it could not be reasonably believed by the Deputy Director (ED) that the unaccounted money is connected with the commission of offence under PMLA. Simultaneously, the letter of the IT Department dated 16-5-2019 and the details as mentioned, makes it clear that for the currency seized, the tax is already paid, therefore, 9 it is not the quantum earned and used for money laundering. In our opinion, even in cases of PMLA, the Court cannot proceed on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. On perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons specified in PMLA, it is the stringent law brought by Parliament to check money laundering. Thus, the allegation must be proved beyond reasonable doubt in the Court. Even otherwise, it is incumbent upon the Court to look into the allegation and the material collected in support thereto and to find out whether the prima facie offence is made out. Unless the allegations are substantiated by the authorities and proved against a person in the court of law, the person is innocent. In the said backdrop, the ratio of the judgment of Radheshyam Kejriwal [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] in paras 38(vi) and (vii) are aptly applicable in the facts of the present case.” 15. The judgment relied by Mr. Rai, in J. Sekar Alias Sekar Reddy(supra)is not helping the petitioner. So far as judgment relied by Mr. Rai in Ram Kishan Rohtagi (supra), the fact of that case is on different footing. That case was arising out of Food Adulteration Act and the director of the company has been made accused on presumption and in that scenario the Hon’ble Supreme Court has given finding that when there is no averment of the role of director and who is looking day to day affairs of the company, the prosecution is bad. Where as in the case in hand there is averment in the complaint that the petitioner is looking after day to day affairs of the company. The petitioner is facing charge in money laundering case. How the white collor criminals affect the fibre of country economic structure, has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the several judgments. This crime has been made in well planned manner and not in the hit of moment as occurred in section 302 of I.P.C. Further the petitioner has not taken care of the order of the High Court whereby he has been provided interim protection. He has violated the order pursuant to that process of 82 Cr.P.C has been issued against the petitioner which has been challenged by him in Cr.M.P. No. 206 of 2012 and by detailed order this Court has come to the conclusion that the petitioner is absconding. The relevant part of the finding of the Court is quoted here-in-below:- “ Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and on perusal of the record, it does appear that earlier when the warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner, it was challenged before this Court on the ground that in the investigation proceeding, the petitioner had been interrogated as witness but suddenly warrant of arrest was issued and as such, he could not place his explanation against the incriminating materials appearing against him before the Directorate authority. However, stand of the other side was that upon collecting prima facie materials of Investigating Officer got warrant of arrest issued, when the petitioner did not cooperate in the 10 investigating proceeding. In such situation, operation of warrant of arrest was stayed for eight weeks during which petitioner was directed to appear before the Enforcement Directorate as and when he is called upon for the purpose of investigation. Further direction was that the petitioner will appear before the court within eight weeks, if he is cited as an accused in the charge sheet filed in the case. At the same time, liberty was given to the petitioner to seek anticipatory bail before the appropriate forum. Pursuant to that direction, petitioner did appear before the Enforcement Directorate and gave undertaking to produce certain documents some of which according to the petitioner were produced but some document could not be produced as it was not available but according to the prosecution, it were not produced in spite of the undertaking being given by the petitioner. Meanwhile, after expiry of eight weeks, warrant of arrest issued earlier against the petitioner became operative after 22.11.2010 and as such, the investigating officer took step to locate the petitioner against whom according to prosecution materials are there showing commission of offence under Prevention of Money Laundering Act on the address given by the petitioner before the Enforcement Directorate but he was never found present on the address and thereby there was reason to believe that the petitioner was absconded. Under the circumstances, the special court never seems to have committed any illegality in passing the order under which process under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been issued against the petitioner. Thus, I do not find any illegality with the order. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed.” 16. A person having no regard of order of the High Court, challenged entire criminal proceeding that too in a serious crime. 17. So far as argument of Mr. Rai that cognizance order is cryptic, that is not sustainable in view of the fact that in a case instituted on police report the Magistrate is not required to record reasons for issuing the process. The Magistrate is only required to pass an order issuing summons to the accused. Such an order issuing summons to the accused is based upon subject to satisfaction of the Magistrate considering the police report and other documents and satisfying himself that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In a case based upon the police report, at the stage of issuing the summons to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record any reason. In case, if the chargesheet is rejected or not taken on file, then the Magistrate is required to record his reasons for rejection of the chargesheet and for not taking on file. Cognizance was taken considering the report filed by the E.D. Order of issuance of process is not illegal. Mens rea is subject matter of trial. Thus argument of Mr. Rai, with regard to cognizance order is not accepted by this Court. 18. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis no case of interference 11 is made out. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. Pending I.A., if any, stands disposed of. Interim order is vacated. (Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Satyarthi/ "