S A K Mynoddin V. The Chief Election Commissioner

EP/7/2009

AI Insights

The case revolves around an election petition filed against the election of the 8th respondent, who was accused of malpractices during the 2009 assembly elections. The petitioner alleged that the 8th respondent had subsisting government contracts which disqualified him from contesting the elections under Section 9A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The court examined whether the 8th respondent had any such contracts at the time of his nomination and whether the election commission had acted arbitrarily in allowing his nomination. The court also considered the procedural aspects of the election petition, including the non-impleadment of all contesting candidates and the legal implications of such an omission.

• Counselvise Citation: [2012] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 696906 (HC-ANDHRA_PRADESH)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 21-08-2012
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi, Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat and another v. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe and others, T.H. Musthaffa v. M.P. Varghese and others, Ananga Uday Singh Deo v. Ranga Nath Mishra and others, Kattinokkula Muralikrishna v. Veeramalla Koteswara Rao and others, Jeet Mohinder Singh v. Harminder Singh Jassi, Baldev Singh v. Shinder Pal Singh and another, Markio Tado v. Takam Sorang and others, National Institute of Technology and others v. Niraj Kumar Singh, Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, Shrikant v. Vasantrao and others, K.V. Venkateswara Rao and another v. Bekkam Narasimha Reddy and others, Vishwanatha Reddy v. Konappa Rudrappa Nadgouda and another, Hari Singh Nalwa v. Kartar Singh Bhadana, Union of India v. A.L. Rallia Ram, Seth Bikraj Jaipuria v. Union of India, State of W.B. v. M/s. B.K. Mondal and sons, Union of India and others v. N.K. Private Limited and another, The Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh and others, State of Bihar v. M/s. Karam Chand Thapar and Brothers Ltd.
• Laws Referred To: Representation of the People Act, 1951, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Constitution of India
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: B RAO; V R AVULA
• Assessee Lawyers: V MALLIK
• Keywords: Contractor; Disqualification; Election Petition; Government Works; Malpractices; Legislative Assembly
• Section: 9A; 86; 82; 83; 81

Judgement Text

"*HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD +Election Petition No.7 of 2009 %21/08/2012 # S.A.K. Mynoddin ..... PETITIONER Vs. $ The Chief Election Commissioner, Secretariat Buildings, Hyderabad and others .....RESPONDENTS ! COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER: Sri V. Mallik ^ COUNSEL FOR 1 TO 7 RESPONDENTS: -- (R.1 to R.7 deleted from the array of respondents) ^ COUNSEL FOR 8TH RESPONDENT: Sri B. Adinarayana Rao ^ COUNSEL FOR 9TH RESPONDENT: Sri V.R. Avula < Gist : Ø Head Note: ? CITATIONS: 1. AIR 2001 SC 3689 2. AIR 1995 SC 2284 3. AIR 2000 SC 153 4. AIR 2001 SC 2992 5. (2010) 1 Supreme Court Cases 466 6. AIR 2000 SC 256 7. (2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases 341 8. (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 236 9. AIR 1999 SC 1347 10.AIR 2000 SC 2306 11.AIR 2001 SC 1877 12.AIR 1996 SC 540 13.AIR 2005 SC 565 14.AIR 2006 SC 898 15.(2008) 9 SCC 24 16.AIR 1995 SC 705 17.(2007) 2 SCC 481 18.(2003) 8 SCC 673 19.(2006) 2 SCC 682 20.(2001) 4 SCC 661 21.AIR 1963 SC 1685 22.1962(2) SCR 880 23.AIR 1962 SC 779 24.AIR 1972 SC 915 25.AIR 1964 SC 152 26.AIR 1977 SC 2149 27.AIR 1962 SC 110 28.AIR 1963 SC 1811 29.AIR 1965 SC 40 30.1964 (7) SCR 17 31.AIR 1979 SC 1628 32.(1985) 3 SCC 267 33.(2001) 10 SCC 305 34.AIR 1962 SC 1810 35.(2000) 8 SCC 560 36.AIR 1993 SC 212 37.(2002) 7 Supreme 148 38.2011 STPL (Web) 376 SC 39.AIR 2009 AP 117 40.(2002) 5 SCC 568 41.(2006) 2 SCC 682 42.(2006) 10 SCC 96 43.AIR 1969 SC 872 44.AIR 1969 SC 604 45.AIR 2001 P&H 86 ORDER: An election petition under Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short “the Act”) to declare the inaction of respondents 1 to 7 to check the malpractices of the 8th respondent during 2009 assembly elections and disqualify the 8th respondent as Member of Legislative Assembly, as illegal, arbitrary and contrary to law and declare his election from Giddalur Assembly Constituency No.231 as illegal and void. 2. The 9th respondent was impleaded on his application in E.P.M.P. No.922 of 2009 on 22-01-2010. 3. On Application No.213 of 2010 being allowed on 16-07-2010, respondents 1 to 7 were deleted from the array of respondents. 4. E.P.M.P. No.1047 of 2009 under Sections 83 and 86 of the Act read with Order VI Rule 16 and Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was allowed on merits on contest on 03-09-2010, due to which the pleadings in paras 3(b), (c), (d) and (f) to (i) of the election petition were struck off. 5. The election petition and the affidavit of the election petitioner in support thereof stated in the remaining contents that the 8th respondent is a registered contractor of public works attending to Government works and kept such public works pending at Dupadu, Kandukuru, Alampur, Giddalur and K.S. Palli, in spite of which he was permitted to file his nomination. On that date, the 8th respondent was a partner of his firm taking up the public works on contract basis and the subsisting contracts on the date of filing nomination disqualified the 8th respondent under Section 9A of the Act and his election is liable to be set aside. The petitioner also claimed to have made a representation to respondents 3 and 6 to permit three autos with electric mikes for canvassing and the permission was withheld in spite of paying the fee, whereas ten vehicles were allowed for the 8th respondent, which was illegal, discriminatory, arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the election petition. 6. The written statement of the 8th respondent in so far as the above allegations are concerned, claimed that it is true that the respondent was a registered contractor, who entered into contracts in his individual capacity for executing certain works of the Government, but he has no subsisting contracts on the date of scrutiny of nominations on 06-04-2009. The 8th respondent was never a partner of any firm taking up public works and his registration as a special contractor was from 2005 to March, 2009. On 21-03-2009 he gave a declaration transferring all the pending works, including his experience as a special class contractor, in favour of A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private Limited, a private limited company registered on 22-07-2008 under the Indian Companies Act. The company also gave a declaration on the same day taking over all the assets, liabilities, pending works, obligations and experience of the 8th respondent as an individual. Both the individual and the company submitted an application on 21-03-2009 along with a draft, dated 19-03-2009 for Rs.10,000/- on ING Vysya Bank Limited, Markapur to the Engineer-in-Chief to transfer all the subsisting works, assets, liabilities and obligations, etc., from the individual to the company. The application was referred to the committee of engineers who passed a resolution on consideration as per the proceedings, dated 25-03-2009 agreeing to so transfer, which was intimated by the Engineer-in-Chief in his proceedings, dated 30-03-2009. The committee of Engineers-in-Chief and the Commissioner of Tenders passed a resolution in their 68th meeting held on 25-03-2009 and approved and recognized that all the existing works, experience, assets, liabilities and obligations of the individual stood transferred to the company and all the Directors of the company shall be responsible for discharging all the liabilities due to the department that arise in future from the works done by the 8th respondent. The resolution was communicated by the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009. Subsequently, the 8th respondent tendered his resignation to the office of the Managing Director of the private limited company on 31-03-2009, which was also intimated to the Registrar of Companies in Form No.32. Thus, the 8th respondent as individual contractor did not have any subsisting contracts with the Government and was not disqualified from contesting the election to the Legislative Assembly in April, 2009. The 8th respondent transferred all his shares in the private limited company in favour of A. Durga Kumari, which was accepted by the Board of Directors in its meeting on 31-03-2009. Hence, there is no disqualification under Section 9A of the Act. The 8th respondent also denied any knowledge about the representation of the petitioner to respondents 3 and 6 and their withholding permission for use of three autos with electric mikes by the petitioner. The 8th respondent claimed to have been permitted to use only three autos for canvassing. The 8th respondent also contended that the 9th respondent cannot be added as a respondent to the election petition, as the implead petition is not filed within a period of 14 days from the date fixed for trial of the election petition on 10-09-2009 as stipulated by Section 86(4) of the Act. The 9th respondent also cannot seek a declaration that he was validly elected, after the period of limitation and in the absence of all the contesting candidates, the election petition is liable to be dismissed under Section 82 read with Section 86(1) of the Act for not impleading all the contesting candidates and the petitioner, who secured only 618 votes as against 55,282 votes secured by the 8th respondent, filed the election petition with false and frivolous allegations and oblique motives. Hence, the 8th respondent desired the election petition to be dismissed with exemplary costs. 7. The 9th respondent reported that he has no written statement. 8. After E.P.M.P. No.1047 of 2009 was allowed on 03-09-2010, it was ordered that the trial of the election petition shall be proceeded with in respect of the remaining contents of the election petition (after paras 3(b),(c),(d) and (f) to (i) of the petition stood struck off) and only on such of those issues still relevant for such enquiry. 9. Therefore, the trial of the election petition has to be confined to only the following issues out of those settled on 25-06-2010. (1) Whether the election petition is not maintainable due to not impleading all the contesting candidates ? (4) Whether the 8th respondent has any subsisting interest in Government works as a contractor, as an individual or as a partner in a firm ? (6) Whether the election of the 8th respondent is liable to be set aside ? (7) Whether the 9th respondent is entitled to be declared as elected ? (8) To what relief ? 10. P.Ws.1 to 9 and R.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.P.1 to P.7, R.1 to R.27 and X.1 to X.7 were marked. 11. Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the election petitioner, Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel for the 8th respondent and Sri V.R. Avula, learned counsel for the 9th respondent are heard. 12. The allegation in para 3(j) of the election petition about the discriminatory treatment meted out to the petitioner, who was permitted to use only three autos with electric mikes as against permitting the 8th respondent to use ten such vehicles for canvassing, was denied by the 8th respondent in the written statement claiming that he was also permitted to use only three autos for such purpose, but there was absolutely no reference to the said aspect in the evidence adduced by the parties. In so far as the said allegation is concerned, therefore, the election petition should fail due to total lack of any reference to such aspect in the evidence. 13. Issue No.4: The election petition in para 3 (e) stated the 8th respondent to be a registered contractor of public works and again stated that on the date of filing nomination, the 8th respondent was a partner of his firm taking up public works on contract basis. The evidence, however, made no reference to any partnership, in which the 8th respondent was a partner at any time and the whole emphasis was on the legality, permissibility and truth of the transfer of pending public works undertaken by the 8th respondent as an individual contractor to M/s. A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private Limited, a private limited company. While the 8th respondent being a partner of a firm taking up public works on contract basis on the date of filing nomination was, thus, not even remotely repeated in the evidence, the admissibility of any evidence in relation to the works of the individual contractor being transferred to a private limited company and the irregularities or illegalities in the same making the works to be open to consideration as pending with the individual himself, was claimed by the learned counsel for the 8th respondent to be impermissible, as the material facts or particulars relating to the same were never pleaded in the election petition. Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel relied on Hari Shanker Jain v. Sonia Gandhi[1], wherein the Apex Court held that where the averments are bald allegations without any basis thereof, they do not amount to pleading material facts, which may warrant any enquiry into those allegations. It was held that when the manner and the enlarged dimension in which the plea has been projected before the Court does not find reflected in the election petition, no foundation has been laid in the pleadings by stating all relevant material facts enabling the Court to enter into examining such a plea of far reaching consequences and implications. The Apex Court concluded that the election petitions therein do not satisfy mandatory requirement of pleading material facts as required by Section 82(1)(a) of the Act, statutorily enacted and judicially explained in umpteen number of decisions. The petitions were considered to be hopelessly vague and completely bald in the allegations made, most of which could not possibly be within the personal knowledge of the petitioners, but verified as ‘true’ to their knowledge, without indicating the source and such pleadings were held to be not disclosing any cause of action and are required to be rejected/dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 14. Similarly in Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat and another v. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe and others[2], the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court ought not to have allowed evidence to be led by the election petitioners, which was beyond the pleadings of the parties for no amount of evidence can cure a defect in the pleadings, but it was all the more improper for the trial Court to have allowed the pleadings to be amended so as to be brought in conformity with the evidence already led in the case. Of course, since evidence was allowed to be led, though beyond the pleadings without any objections from the opposite side, the Court could have evaluated and analysed the same to determine the worth of that evidence, which, in the facts and circumstances of the case, came under a cloud. 15. In T.H. Musthaffa v. M.P. Varghese and others[3] also, with reference to the relief of recount, it was observed that the pleading did not refer to either the rules or the pamphlet issued by the Election Commission in this regard, nor any specific allegations are found in the case. How many votes were liable to be rejected for using wrong instrument was not stated and how many of such votes had been polled in favour of the 1st respondent therein so as to materially affect the result of the election, was also not stated. Therefore, the view that the pleadings were insufficient to order recount, was held to be perfectly in order. 16. Similarly in Ananga Uday Singh Deo v. Ranga Nath Mishra and others[4], there was no pleading at all, except some vague assertion in the grounds, with regard to the allegation of corrupt practice relating to alleged bribery indulged by the 1st respondent. No issue had been framed, but evidence was permitted to be led during the trial on the allegation. The Apex Court held that no such evidence could have been permitted to be led and the salutary principle that evidence can only be permitted to be led on a plea properly raised and issue framed, was ignored. Irrelevant, impermissible and inadmissible evidence could not be allowed to be brought on record. 17. To the same effect is Kattinokkula Muralikrishna v. Veeramalla Koteswara Rao and others[5], wherein it was held that it is a settled principle of law that evidence beyond the pleadings can neither be permitted to be adduced nor can such evidence be taken into consideration. A bald plea that some irregularities and illegalities had been committed in counting without any material on record, was held to be insufficient to order any recount. 18. I n Jeet Mohinder Singh v. Harminder Singh Jassi[6], it was stated that material facts and particulars as to commission of corrupt practice are required to be given in the election petition and such facts and particulars alleged for the first time in the replication and not forming part of averments made in the election petition, cannot be tried and cannot be made subject matter of issues framed by the Court. Such material facts and particulars as to corrupt practice are required to be supported by an affidavit in the prescribed proforma. 19. I n Baldev Singh v. Shinder Pal Singh and another[7], it was pointed out that verification of an election petition must be done strictly in terms of Order VI Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it was, thus, incumbent to specifically state as to which statements made in the election petition were true to his knowledge and which were true to his belief and a factual averment made in the election petition cannot be both true to the knowledge and belief of the deponent and it was also pointed out that in respect of a recount, there must be a prima facie case, material facts must be pleaded and there should not be a roving or fishing inquiry. 20. Likewise in Markio Tado v. Takam Sorang and others[8], the Supreme Court reiterated that in an election petition, one has to plead the material facts at the outset, and the failure to plead the same is fatal to the election petition and no evidence can be led on a plea which is not raised in the pleadings and no amount of evidence can cure the defect in the pleadings. 21. The pleadings in the election petition herein, if tested with reference to the above principles, do not appear to stand legal scrutiny. In verifying the contents of the election petition, the election petitioner stated that the contents of paras 1 to 4 are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, including the allegation about the 8th respondent being a registered contractor of public works or a partner of a firm taking up public works on contract basis with subsisting works on the date of filing nomination. However, in verifying the contents of his affidavit in support of the election petition, he stated that the facts stated in paras 5 to 11 of the affidavit are based on information and advice received and believed to be true and correct with the allegations about subsisting works of the 8th respondent as an individual contractor or as a partner of a firm being stated in paragraph No.5 of the affidavit. As held in Baldev Singh v. Shinder Pal Singh and another (7 supra), such factual averment cannot be both true to the knowledge and also belief based on any information and advice. That apart, there was absolutely no allegation and evidence of the 8th respondent being a partner of a firm carrying out public works on contract basis at any time or on the date of his filing nomination and whether the works stated in the election petition were undertaken by him as an individual contractor or as a partner of a firm, was not stated. Which works were pending on the date of filing of nomination or scrutiny of the same, was not specifically stated and what were his lapses in completing the public works was also not elaborated. There was absolutely no reference in the pleadings to what has been projected in the evidence about the subsisting contracts of the 8th respondent as an individual, which could not have been legally transferred to a private limited company before filing or scrutiny of nomination. If so, the vice of absence of any foundation in the pleading due to absence of relevant material facts appears to be attracted and it becomes highly doubtful whether the evidence in this regard beyond the pleadings could have been permitted to have been let in and can be analysed and evaluated for consideration and acceptance, more so in the absence of any specifics even regarding the works referred to in the pleadings. 22. Be that as it may, Section 9A of the Act disqualifies a person if, and for so long as, there subsists a contract entered into by him in the course of his trade or business with the appropriate government for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any works undertaken by, that Government. The explanation thereunder states that where a contract has been fully performed by the person by whom it has been entered into with the appropriate government, the contract shall be deemed not to subsist by reason only of the fact that the government has not performed its part of the contract either wholly or in part. Whether the evidence on record herein discloses a subsisting contract entered into by the 8th respondent within the mischief of Section 9A vitiating his nomination, is the question to be probed into. The election notification herein was on 24-03-2009. The filing of nomination of the 8th respondent was on 04-04-2009, while the scrutiny of nominations was on 06-04-2009. The election was held on 23-04-2009 and the results were declared on 16-05-2009. The 8th respondent was admittedly registered as a special class contractor on 03-05-2005 for a period of five years, which registration, therefore, would have been in force up to 02-05-2010. The proceedings of the Engineer-in-Chief (Admn. Wing), Irrigation & CAD Department, dated 03-05-2005 mentioned in the Annexure that the 8th respondent was registered as a special class contractor as an individual. A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private Limited was incorporated as a private limited company on 22-07-2008. Under Ex.R.12, the 8th respondent was elected as the Chairman of the Board of Directors in the meeting, dated 23-07-2008 and was stated to have resigned as Managing Director/Director on 31-03-2009, which was claimed to have been accepted by the Board of Directors in its meeting on the same day under Ex.R.13 and Form No.32 was accordingly submitted to the Registrar of Companies under Ex.R.14. The resignation of the 8th respondent as Director of the private limited company was communicated by the Director of the company to the Engineer-in- Chief, Public Health and the Commissioner, Commissionerate of Tenders on 02-04-2009 under Ex.R.15. 23. Even before, the 8th respondent as Managing Director of the private limited company appeared to have applied to the Commissioner of Tenders on 21-03-2009 to register the company as a special class contractor enclosing a demand draft for Rs.10,000/-, dated 19-03-2009, solvency certificate and other required documents as per Ex.X.5. Ex.X.5 was produced by P.W.3, Engineer-in-Chief, Public Health and Exs.X.5(a) to (h) were marked to indicate that the experience certificate, etc., related to the 8th respondent and not the private limited company requesting to be registered as a special class contractor, but the submission of the application on 21-03-2009 followed by communications from the same day for verification of the genuineness of various enclosures, need not be in doubt, more so, when P.W.3 was not questioned about the same. 24. P.W.3 deposed about forwarding the application after due verification for conversion of contractor Sri A.V. Ram Babu into M/s. A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private Limited to the competent authority/Commissioner of Tenders, which conversion was accepted in the 68th meeting held on 25-03-2009 by the committee of Engineers-in-Chief. The approval was stated by P.W.3 to have been communicated to his department for issuing proceedings, which is valid up to the period of validity of the original registration. P.W.3 claimed to have issued Ex.P.1 proceedings accordingly dated 30-03-2009. In Ex.P.1, the decision of the committee of Engineers-in-Chief and the Commissioner, Commissionerate of Tenders in its 68th meeting held on 25-03-2009 approving the request of the private limited company to be registered as a special class contractor for all the engineering departments of the State Government, was recorded and it was further stated that all the existing works, experiences, assets and liabilities of Sri A.V. Ram Babu, contractor/8th respondent stood transferred to the company and all the Directors, including the Managing Director of the company shall be responsible to personally discharge all the liabilities due to the departments that arise out of at any time in future from the works done by Sri A.V. Ram Babu, contractor/8th respondent. The existing special class registration of the 8th respondent under this category under proceedings, dated 03-05- 2005 stood cancelled in terms of G.O.Ms. No.94 I & CAD Department, dated 01-07-2003 and the 8th respondent was stated to have surrendered his original registration proceedings along with contract identity card with a letter, dated 30-03-2009, which were cancelled. The registration was stated to be valid up to 02-05-2010 i.e. five years from the date of issue of the original proceedings in the name of the 8th respondent. Copies of proceedings were marked to all the Engineers-in-Chief of all departments and all the Chief Engineers of all departments and the Commissioner, Commissionerate of Tenders. Thus, Ex.P.1 proceedings are as though the registration of the private limited company as a special class contractor, which came into effect on 30-03-2009, also resulted in transfer of all the existing works, experiences, assets and liabilities of the 8th respondent to the company under the very same proceedings. 25. P.W.3 admitted that a special class contractor is registered as per the procedure prescribed by G.O.Ms. No.94 Irrigation and Command Area Development (PW-COD) Department, dated 01-07-2003/Ex.P.3. While claiming that all the particulars with reference to the check list have been furnished in the application, P.W.3 admitted that the application is not as per the prescribed proforma and that the income tax return of 2008- 2009 in the name of the 8th respondent was not available in the file. Similarly, the income tax assessment order of the company was also not available and the sales tax clearance certificate, VAT clearance certificate and the particulars of the works executed in the last five years also related to the 8th respondent, but not the company. P.W.3 further admitted that the registration of the 8th respondent was converted into that of the company in the meeting of the Engineers-in-Chief on 25-03-2009, in which he participated. He claimed that the application of the 8th respondent, dated 21-03- 2009 was presented on the same day with inward No.5218 in his office, though he did not bring the inward register. While he had to admit that if the private limited company were to tender for the works transferred to it in the name of the company, it does not satisfy the qualification criteria prescribed by Ex.P.3 Government Orders. He claimed that the opinion of the Government Pleader was also obtained regarding transfer of pending works, by way of a clarification by the Commissioner of Tenders and the minutes of the meeting, dated 25-03-2009 were delivered in their office by local tapal with the Chief Engineer initialing them on 30-03-2009 in token of receiving the minutes. The terms and conditions of the earlier agreements entered into by the 8th respondent with the department not being verified at the time of conversion, was also admitted. But he stated that transfer of works from individual to partnership firms or from individuals to companies happened in other cases also. The role of the Engineer-in-Chief was stated to be just forwarding the application to the Commissionerate of Tenders and registration proceedings only are issued by the Engineer-in-Chief, which are binding on all the offices and the departments. The evidence of P.W.3, thus, discloses that the registration of the private limited company as a special class contractor was based mainly on the documentation relating to the 8th respondent and the committee of Engineers-in-Chief and the Commissioner of Tenders treated the issue as conversion of the registration of the 8th respondent into that of the company, as was done before in number of other cases. 26. That such a procedure was followed earlier in respect of various others, is sought to be probablised by the 8th respondent as R.W.2 by filing Exs.R.17 to R.27 copies of the meetings of the committee on the respective dates, which information was obtained by him under the Right to Information Act through Ex.R.16 letter. The information furnished shows that on 25-03-2009 during the 68th meeting of the committee itself, similar decisions were taken in respect of seven more firms/companies and the authority/the rule empowering the committee to transfer the registration from an individual to a firm or a company and transfer the existing works, experiences, assets and liabilities from the individual name to the firm or company, was stated in Ex.R.16 to be Clause (1)(g)(viii) of Annexure-II of G.O.Ms. No.94 Irrigation and Command Area Development (PW-COD) Department, dated 01-07-2003. 27. G.O.Ms. No.94, dated 01-07-2003 in Clause (1)(g) (viii) in Annexure-II stated that the contractor already registered in a particular class can form partnership firms in the same class and category only by a separate registration foregoing his individual registration at the time of biennial registration as mentioned in Clause (1)(g)(i). Clause (1)(g)(ix) refers to cases of partnership/ companies in requiring any changes in the partners to be reported to the registering authorities within one month of the date of such change. The rules in Clause (1)(g) of Annexure-II for registration for every five years referred in Clause (1)(g)(iii) about the scope for considering the firms or companies, though newly formed, provided the concerned firms or companies have recruited or already consist of highly skilled engineers and experts, in their organization and Clause (1)(g)(v) states that the contractor shall not apply for registration in his name and also in the name of the partnership/ company, which runs in his name in the same class or category at a time. All the Clauses read together, may suggest that a contractor may apply for registration of his name or in the name of partnership/company, which runs in his name in the same class or category, but not in both ways and foregoing of individual registration to have a partnership/company registered in the same class or category, is contemplated. G.O.Ms. No.130 Irrigation & CAD (PW: Reforms) Department, dated 22-05-2007 incorporated the modifications to the norms stipulated in G.O.Ms. No.94 with effect from 22-05-2007. 28. Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to various precedents in this regard to contend that illegal benefit conferred cannot be a precedent. I n Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Sampuran Singh[9], when the allotments made in favour of some of the respondents were based on wrong application of reservation made for a local displaced person and those allotments were contrary to law, the principle of promissory/equitable estoppel was held not invokable to protect such illegal allotments. It was specifically stated that if allotments were made wrongly in favour of similarly situated persons, the same may become liable for cancellation, if permissible in law, but that will not create an enforceable right on the respondents to claim similar wrongful allotments in their favour. 29. Similarly, in State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another[10], it was held that when a judgment in favour of a person was contrary to law, on the analogy of the said judgment, another is not entitled to any relief. 30. In Union of India and others v. Rakesh Kumar[11] also, it was made clear that if pensionary benefits are granted to someone by erroneous interpretation of the rules, it would not mean that the said mistake should be perpetuated by direction of the Court contrary to the statutory rules and in such cases, there is no question of application of Article 14 of the Constitution or any estoppel. 31. Likewise, in Smt. Sneh Prabha etc. v. State of U.P. and another[12], the Apex Court held that even if a benefit is wrongly given in favour of one or two, it does not clothe with a right to perpetrate the wrong and the Court cannot give countenance to such actions though they are blameworthy and condemnable. It was made clear that equality clause does not extend to perpetrate wrong nor can anyone equate a right to have the wrong repeated and benefit reaped thereunder. 32. In M/s. Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana and others[13], it was pointed out that two wrongs do not make one right and a party cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case, direction should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right, but would be perpetuating another wrong. In such matters, there is no discrimination involved and the concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be pressed into service. 33. Likewise, in K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. and others[14], the Supreme Court stated that it is well settled that the equality clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked for perpetrating an illegality. 34. In Maharaj Krishan Bhatt and another v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others[15], the Apex Court reiterated that if one illegal action is taken, a person, whose case is similar, cannot invoke Article 14 or 16 and demand similar relief illegally or against a statute. 35. So was the decision in Chandigarh Administration and another v. Jagjit Singh and another[16], wherein it was pointed out that each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles and because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must not be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. 36. Lastly, in National Institute of Technology and others v. Niraj Kumar Singh[17], it was stated that where an order is passed by an authority, which lacks inherent jurisdiction, the principles of res judicata would not apply, the same being a nullity. 37. The principles laid down in these precedents relied on by Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel are unexceptionable, but the question is whether the parameters of G.O.Ms. No.94 as amended from time to time prohibit any transfer of registration from an individual to a partnership or a company, as sought to be canvassed. The language of G.O.Ms. No.94, more particularly in Annexure-II, is suggestive of the possibility of a contractor registering in a class or category in his name or in the name of a firm or a company in his name, which registration is mutually exclusive and any such conversion of registration has to be preceded by foregoing the individual registration and while no specific provision or principle of any statute or case law prohibiting such conversion or registration has been brought to notice, if the administrative instructions in G.O.Ms. No.94, though not explicitly worded so, envisage a situation of such conversion or at any rate, did not prohibit such conversion, the administrative jurisdiction or competence of the Committee of Engineers-in-Chief and the Commissioner of Tenders to effect such conversion may not be open to be considered to be lacking or at least, to be prohibited. Even if such conversion does not strictly adhere to the letter of G.O.Ms. No.94, the same may be open to be construed as an irregularity, but not an illegality going to the root of such conversion being permitted and such transfer of works being made, from individual registration to the registration of a firm or a company. As such, the argument that Exs.R.17 to R.27 are of no avail and cannot be a basis for perpetrating an illegality, may not hold good and the accepted practice of the State Government in doing so, may indicate no undue preference or positive discrimination being shown to favour the 8th respondent. 38. When P.W.2 applied under the Right to Information Act in Ex.P.6 for the relevant information, the same was furnished in Ex.P.7, dated 28-07-2009 stating that Smt. A. Durga Kumari, wife of the 8th respondent informed the office of the Chief Engineer, Public Health on 02-04-2009 about the resignation of the 8th respondent as Director and furnished Form No.32 issued by the Registrar of Companies duly accepting cessation of the 8th respondent as a Director of the company with effect from 31-03- 2009 vide letter, dated 02-04-2009. The Commissioner of Tenders was stated to be the competent authority to approve the registration of special class contractor and the company was stated to have applied with new Directors as per the registration proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 with fresh solvency certificate, demand draft, etc., and after verification of the same, the application was submitted to the Commissioner of Tenders for further action on 28-07-2009. P.W.2, who attempted to claim Exs.P.6 and P.7 not to disclose substitution of any new contract, admittedly had no personal knowledge or information about the incorporation of the private limited company or the subject of his application and has no knowledge whether the 8th respondent was disqualified from contesting the election. Exs.P.6 and P.7 do not, in any manner, suggest that the transfer of all the subsisting contracts from the 8th respondent to the private limited company on 30-03-2009 under Ex.P.1 did not take effect in law or in fact. 39. The petitioner as P.W.1 claimed that the 8th respondent had subsisting contracts on the date of filing his nomination on 04-04-2009 till the date of declaration of the result. He contended that Ex.P.1 proceedings of the Engineer-in-Chief, Public Health and Medical, Engineering Department, Hyderabad, dated 30-03- 2009 did not result in substitution of any new contracts in the absence of following the prescribed procedure. He also relied on Ex.P.2 copy of the letter, dated 25-05-2010 from the Deputy Chief Engineer (Public Health) in response to his application under the Right to Information Act about the works undertaken by the 8th respondent along with an enclosed statement to show that the works were in progress. The petitioner further relied on Ex.P.5 letter from the Deputy Chief Engineer, Public Health, dated 24-07- 2010 in response to the application under the Right to Information Act about the 8th respondent being registered as a special class (civil) contractor. While he admitted that he did not raise any objection to the acceptance of nomination of the 8th respondent at the time of scrutiny of nominations, he attributed the same to his ignorance by then about the 8th respondent being a contractor carrying on contract works with the Government. He also admitted that he did not verify with the Registrar of Companies as to when M/s. A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private Limited was incorporated, which may be on 22-07-2008. While admitting the information covered by Exs.P.2 and P.5 to be different, he asserted that the private limited company was not given a status as a special class contractor, but admitted that he did not challenge Ex.P.1 proceedings in any other legal proceedings. He claimed the information furnished in Ex.P.1 by the Public Information Officer to be false and claimed that the procedure prescribed by Ex.P.3 was not followed in transferring the subsisting works. 40. The evidence of P.W.1 also like that of P.W.2 is not based on any personal knowledge, but on the contents of the documents obtained by P.Ws.1 and 2 and P.W.1 mainly relied on the prescribed procedure not being followed in substituting the old contract with a new contract from individual status to that of a corporate entity. Contending that personal qualifications could not have been transferred from the individual to the company, the petitioner claimed to be knowing the distinction between a partnership firm and a private limited company, but did not explain as to why in the election petition, he referred the 8th respondent as a partner in a firm. Though he claimed the information furnished by the Public Information Officer under Ex.P.5 to be false, he admittedly did not take any action regarding the same. 41. Ex.P.2 from the Deputy Chief Engineer, Public Health/Public Information Officer, dated 25-05-2010 mentions five works to be in progress, one work to be started and five works to have been completed. While all agreements between 2006 and 2008 were in the name of the 8th respondent, the agreement, dated 02-03-2009 and LOA issued on 22-04-2010 are in the name of M/s. A.V. Rambabu Infra Private Limited. However, Ex.P.5 information from the same officer, dated 24-07-2010 mentions 11 works specified therein to have been transferred to M/s. A.V. Rambabu Infra Private Limited. The information furnished in Ex.P.5 stated about the original registration of the 8th respondent on 03-05-2005, his subsequent application, dated 21-03-2009, the resolution at the meeting of the Engineers-in-Chief, dated 25-03-2009, the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 and the resignation of the 8th respondent as Director of the company on 31-03-2009, which changes were approved vide proceedings, dated 28-07-2009. The registration of the 8th respondent was stated to have been cancelled in the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 and the works were stated to have been transferred to the private limited company. Significantly, the contents of Exs.P.2 and P.5 are not identical, maybe in view of the specification of the information sought for in different ways, as admittedly, the works were originally sanctioned to the 8th respondent as contractor up to Ex.P.1 proceedings. There is nothing which is inconsistent with the claims of the 8th respondent in Exs.P.2 and P.5 and Ex.P.5 is in tune with his defence. 42. The Commissioner of Tenders as P.W.4 explained the process of registration of a special class contractor and stated that on 25-03-2009, 28 applications were considered including that of the 8th respondent, who applied for conversion as a contractor from individual to firm, which application was forwarded by the concerned department. While admitting that G.O.Ms. No.94 did not speak about any conversion or transfer, P.W.4 stated about the concerned Engineer-in-Chief issuing proceedings after clearance of the committee. P.W.4 also stated about the experience certificate and the sales tax clearance certificate being in the name of the 8th respondent. The minutes of the meeting, dated 25-03-2009 were stated by P.W.4 to have not been communicated to the Panchayat Raj and Rural Water Supply Department and the Engineer-in-Chief, Rural Water Supply did not participate in the meeting on 25-03-2009, though invited. The witness also claimed that as per the legal opinion obtained in 2007 in another case, the experience possessed by the 8th respondent stood transferred to the private limited company as per the Companies Act. While he stated that the tenders quoted by the Engineer-in-Chief, Rural Water Supply did not come to the Commissionerate of Tenders like those of the agreements relating to Public Health Department, he explained that the Commissionerate of Tenders has nothing to do with the agreements and it only evaluates the bids referred to it. He stated that if a registered contractor converts himself into a firm or a company and makes a request, then they will advise the concerned Engineer-in-Chief to register the new entity and cancel the old registration simultaneously and also direct obtaining of undertaking from the new entity to complete the remaining works with the erstwhile registered contractor. They were allowing individuals to form firms or companies and convert the registration and transfer the works earlier also and the application of the 8th respondent was stated by him to be for conversion to that of a company. 43. P.W.5 was speaking about Exs.R.4 to R.11 agreements and supplemental agreements entered into with the 8th respondent and he stated that the Commissionerate of Tenders had nothing to do with the works under Exs.R.4 to R.11. He admitted that Ex.R.5 specified either the Engineer-in-Chief or the Chief Engineer, Rural Water Supply as the employer and terminating authority. He also admitted about the various restrictions against joint ventures under different agreements and stated that while entering into the agreements, the 8th respondent entered into them with the responsibility to execute them by himself and not along with any other legal entity or through any other legal entity. Ex.R.4, dated 25-03-2009 was, in fact, subsequent to the request of the 8th respondent on 21-03-2009, but it is a supplemental agreement in pursuance of the original agreement, dated 07-06-2007. P.W.5, of course, stated that the Commissionerate of Tenders has power to transfer the works, assets and liabilities also by virtue of Clause (viii) of Annexure-II (g) of G.O.Ms. No.94, apart from Clause (v) thereof. Though his evidence suggests that the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 under Ex.P.1 were received by him only on 13-04- 2009, while there were seven on-going works of their department relating to the 8th respondent, he was ignorant of the deliberations of the meeting held on 25-03-2009 by the Committee of Engineers- in-Chief, which he did not attend. The private limited company of the 8th respondent was stated to have not executed any works of the department of P.W.5, but when he admitted that the Commissionerate of Tenders is the final authority concerning the procedures relating to the registration of all engineering departments, it is obvious that Ex.P.1, dated 30-03-2009 binds the department of P.W.5 also. P.W.5 stated that they will follow whatever proceedings are given by the Commissionerate of Tenders. The jurisdiction of the Commissionerate of Tenders concerning registration of the contractors and transfer of the works, assets and liabilities over the department of P.W.5 also, is thus, admitted. P.W.5, of course, had to check whether the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 were delivered through local tapal in their office on 30-03-2009 itself. He had any how stated that though the proceedings were communicated on 21-04-2009 to all the Superintending Engineers by him, they were given effect to from 01-04-2009 itself. P.W.5 claimed that the 8th respondent gave a copy of Ex.P.1 along with a covering letter on 13-04-2009 and in any view, the evidence of P.W.5 discloses that his department is bound by Ex.P.1 proceedings and had given effect to it from 01- 04-2009 itself and even assuming that various conditions in Exs.R.4 to R.11 agreements and supplemental agreements do not permit any joint ventures or do not contemplate any transfer of works, either Ex.P.1 proceedings or their being given effect to by P.W.5, were not shown to be non-est in the eye of law under any provision or principle of law and even if they were irregular, if the contracting parties abide by such change, accept it and implement it, how the factual and legal effect of the same can be ignored for any purpose, is not evident. 44. The evidence of P.W.6 about the communication spoken to by P.W.5 not being the subject of any further action due to the 8th respondent having no work with them, except the work being done by him in 2007, leaves nothing relevant for the present purpose, though no formal orders of termination of agreement are passed. P.W.6 stated that the work was stopped, as grant was not released and P.W.7 also spoke about the communication of Ex.P.1 proceedings to them with an endorsement, dated 21-04- 2009 and he stated that since 01-04-2009 either the supplemental agreements or payments were given only in the name of the private limited company and not in the name of the 8th respondent, as the 8th respondent submitted to them on 31-03-2009 itself that he transferred all his works, assets and liabilities to the private limited company and that his registration of special class contractor was cancelled. While P.W.5 spoke about seven on- going works of the 8th respondent as on 01-04-2009, P.W.7 spoke about 11 on-going works of the 8th respondent as on 30-03-2009. The evidence of P.W.7 may show that though P.W.5 communicated Ex.P.1 proceedings only on 21-04-2009, the 8th respondent submitted the information about Ex.P.1 on 31-03-2009 itself, which was acted upon. While P.W.7 had no knowledge about M/s. A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private Limited or its existence prior to the communication on 28-04-2009, he stated the letter of the 8th respondent dated 31-03-2009 to have been entered in their inward register with No.235, dated 15-04-2009, a copy of which is Ex.X.2. P.W.7 also admitted about the restrictions on joint ventures in Exs.R.5 to R.8 and P.W.7 was not sure whether any request by the 8th respondent for transfer of his tenders in favour of the private limited company can be considered at the stage of consideration of tenders. P.W.7 also has no idea whether the other Chief Engineers or Engineers-in-Chief or the Commissioner of Tenders have no power to transfer tenders, but he stated about the payment of bills only to the private limited company since 01-04- 2009. He produced Ex.X.1 copy of proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 along with Ex.X.2, the originals of which are produced by P.W.9 as Exs.X.6 and X.7, and he stated that in respect of the works in which the 8th respondent was the contractor, they were being executed by the private limited company since 01-04-2009, which was issuing the bills and receiving the cheques. He also stated that if any defect is found in execution of the works, a notice will be given to the company and not the 8th respondent and from 01- 04-2009, the 8th respondent had no contractual obligations under the agreement. 45. P.W.8 is the Pay and Accounts Officer, who was called to speak about Ex.X.3 demand draft and Ex.X.4 schedules and he could not say why the demand draft addressed to the Pay and Accounts Officer, Ranga Reddy District was received in the Hyderabad office, but he tried to explain that mistakes occur in issuing the demand drafts. P.W.8 received the demand draft as sent by the Engineer in Public Health and any discrepancy probably could not have been explained by him. 46. The 9th respondent as R.W.1 spoke about the information obtained by his employee A. Mohana Krishna concerning the pending works of the 8th respondent as on 06-04-2009 and he relied on the proximity of time of various agreements and supplemental agreements under Exs.R.4 to R.11 with the filing and scrutiny of nominations, the last supplemental agreement being only on 25-03-2009, which works must be pending. Exs.R.1 and R.2 show Mohana Krishna obtaining such information and also Ex.R.3 copy of certificate of incorporation of M/s. A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private Limited. R.W.1, while admitting that he did not file any separate written statement in the election petition, also admitted that he did not raise any objection against receiving or accepting the nomination of the 8th respondent before the Returning Officer. He does not know when the registration of the 8th respondent as a special class contractor was withdrawn and has no personal knowledge about the private limited company or when the company was registered as a special class contractor. He also admitted that the papers obtained by him show the transfer of the works entrusted to the 8th respondent to the company on 30-03-2009 and like the election petitioner, R.W.1 also did not take recourse to any legal proceedings questioning the transfer of the works. He also does not know whether the company raised the bills from 01-04-2009 and the Government also made payments to it. It was his impression that transfer of such works or experience is not permissible and he does not know whether the Government is, in fact, effecting a number of such transfers. He also stated that Ex.P.1 specified the existing special class registration of the 8th respondent to have been cancelled and the 8th respondent to have resigned as Director of the company with effect from 31-03-2009, which was accepted by the Board of Directors and communicated to the Registrar of Companies on 31- 03-2009 itself. The information obtained by R.W.1 admittedly referred to the 8th respondent transferring all his shares in the company to Smt. A. Durga Kumari on 31-03-2009 and he also does not know whether the supplemental agreements under Exs.R.4, R.6 and R.8 were executed much later to the completion of the works, including the original works only to enabling billing and payment for the additional works. 47. The 8th respondent examined himself as R.W.2 and reiterated the defence that the 8th respondent was a registered special class contractor from 2005 to March, 2009, having entered into Government contracts in his individual capacity, while his being a partner of any firm taking up public works was denied. A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private Limited was claimed to have been registered as a private limited company under the Companies Act on 22-07-2008, on which day the company gave a declaration taking over all the assets, liabilities, pending works and obligations, including the experience of the 8th respondent as an individual. The 8th respondent claimed to have submitted a declaration on 21-03-2009 to the same effect and both the individual and the private limited company were claimed to have submitted an application on 21-03-2009 to the Engineer-in-Chief along with a draft, dated 19-03-2009 for Rs.10,000/- for transferring all the subsisting works, assets, liabilities and obligations from the individual to the private limited company. The Committee of Engineers-in-Chief and the Commissioner of Tenders was claimed to have passed a resolution in its 68th meeting on 25-03-2009 approving the request and recognizing such transfer making the Directors of the private limited company responsible for discharging all the liabilities due to the department from the works. The same was claimed to have been communicated by proceedings, dated 30-03-2009. The 8th respondent was claimed to have resigned as Managing Director of the private limited company on 31-03-2009, which was accepted by a resolution of the company on the same date and intimated to the Registrar of Companies in Form No.32. The transfer of all the shares of the individual to Smt. A. Durga Kumari was also claimed to have been accepted by the Board of Directors on 31-03-2009. The disqualification under Section 9A of the Act was, hence, claimed to be not applicable. 48. R.W.2 claimed that supplemental agreements were executed to cover the works not provided for by the original agreements to regularize the additional work and the allegation that any works of the 8th respondent were pending on the date of the nominations or scrutiny, was denied. He claimed to have taken a decision to contest to the Legislative Assembly on 27th or 28th of March, 2009. While he had no idea about the difference between a partnership firm and a company, R.W.2 denied G.O.Ms. No.94 not contemplating transfer of entrusted works from one contractor to another. He was cross-examined at length about the private limited company being ineligible and not qualified for the class and category of registration of the contractor sought for and he admitted that he did not address any letters to any of the employers under Exs.R.4 to R.11 to terminate the contracts. He also does not know whether the minutes of the meeting were communicated to the Engineer-in-Chief, Rural Water Supply. He admitted further that they approached only the Registration Authority for transferring the works, but not individual Engineers- in-Chief or Chief Engineers and he denied continuing his contractual relationship in respect of the works worth Rs.250.00 crore and that no employer in any of the subsisting works was informed or communicated by 04-04-2009 or 06-04-2009 about the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009. 49. While the evidence of R.W.2, R.W.1 and P.W.1 is necessarily tainted with interestedness, which becomes acceptable only on satisfactory corroboration from the other material on record, R.W.2 reiterated his defence of having no subsisting Government contracts as on the date of filing his nomination or scrutiny of nominations either as an individual or as a Director or the Managing Director or the Chairman of the private limited company or a shareholder therein based on the cancellation of his registration as a special class contractor and transfer of all works, assets, liabilities and experience to the private limited company by the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 and his subsequent resignation as the Director of the Company and transfer of his shares to his wife. Though it is true that it is only his wife and son that remained in the private limited company after he quit the same, which may be, in effect and substance, retaining all the assets and works with the family, in so far as the legal status of the 8th respondent as on the date of filing his nomination and the scrutiny thereof is concerned, he cannot be considered to be having any subsisting interest in any Government contracts within the meaning of Section 9A of the Act, if the transfer of the existing works, assets and liabilities of the individual contractor to the private limited company under proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 is not illegal and non-est. While the petitioner or the 9th respondent or for that matter, anybody else was not stated to have challenged the legality and validity of Ex.P.1 proceedings in any other manner, any deviations from the procedure prescribed by G.O.Ms. No.94, as amended from time to time, or departure from the terms and conditions of the individual agreements are not shown to go to the root of the permission accorded by the 68th meeting of the Engineers-in-Chief and Commissioner of Tenders on 25-03-2009, in implementation of which, the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 were issued, nor is the disconnection of the 8th respondent with the private limited company by 31-03-2009 by his resignation as Director and transfer of his shares to his wife, open to any suspicion or rejection. 50. The approach to be adopted in matters of elections has been laid down in the two precedents relied on by Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the petitioner and in Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar[18], the Apex Court held that the Election Tribunal, while determining an issue of this nature has to bear in mind that Article 173 of the Constitution of India provides for the same and a person cannot be permitted to occupy an office for which he is disqualified under the constitution. The endeavour of the Court, therefore, should be to see that a disqualified person should not hold the office, but should not, at the same time, unseat a person qualified therefor. The Apex Court mandated that the Court is required to proceed cautiously in the matter and thus, while seeing that an election of the representative of the people is not set aside on flimsy grounds, but would also have a duty to see that the constitutional mandate is fulfilled. 51. Similarly, dealing with disqualification under Section 9A of the Act, the Supreme Court pointed out in Shrikant v. Vasantrao and others[19] that the object and intent of Section 9A of the Act is to maintain the purity of the legislature and to avoid conflicts between duty and interest of Members of the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council. The said object is sought to be achieved by ensuring that a person, who has entered into a contract with the State Government and therefore, liable to perform certain obligations towards the State Government, is not elected as a Member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council, lest he should use his influence as an elected member of the legislature to dilute the obligations or to seek and secure undue advantages and benefits in respect of the subsisting contracts. The Supreme Court referred to Kartar Singh Bhadana v. Hari Singh Nalwa[20] about the six requirements for application of disqualification under Section 9A, that (1) there should be a contract entered into by the candidate, (2) such contract should be entered into by him in the course of his trade or business, (3) the contract should be entered into with the appropriate Government, (4) the contract should subsist, (5) the contract should relate to the works undertaken by the appropriate Government, and (6) the contract should be for execution of such works. The note of caution in Kartar Singh Bhadana v. Hari Singh Nalwa (20 supra) is that a citizen may be disqualified only if the facts of his case squarely fall within the conditions prescribed by Section 9A. While the approach in the present adjudication should, thus, present a cautious balance as advised in Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar (18 supra), the other five requirements stated in Kartar Singh Bhadana v. Hari Singh Nalwa (20 supra) are, undoubtedly, answered by the nature of the works in question and it is only the sixth requirement that the contract should subsist that needs to be examined in depth on the evidence herein. 52. With that background, the efficacy of Ex.P.1 proceedings is questioned not only with reference to the alleged deviations from G.O.Ms. No.94, but also with reference to failure to comply with Article 298 and Article 299 of the Constitution. Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a series of precedents and in Union of India v. A.L. Rallia Ram[21], the Apex Court held that every contract to bind the Government must comply with the requirements of Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. So is the decision in Seth Bikraj Jaipuria v. Union of India[22], wherein it was laid down that Section 175(3) providing for the form of contract between the Government and the private individual, is mandatory and not merely directory and public interest implies a prohibition against a contract being effectively made otherwise than in the manner prescribed. In State of W.B. v. M/s. B.K. Mondal and sons[23], it was pointed out that failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 175(3) makes the contracts invalid and the word ‘shall’ used in making the provision, is intended to make the provision itself obligatory and not directory. In an exhaustive consideration, the Supreme Court recognized that sometimes officers may have to act in emergency and on many occasions in the pursuit of welfare policy of the State Government, officers may have to enter into contract orally or through correspondence without strictly complying with the provisions of Section 175(3), in which cases, if what is done in pursuance of the contracts is for the benefit of the Government and for their use and enjoyment and is otherwise legitimate and proper, Section 70 of the Contract Act would step in and support a claim for compensation made by the contracting parties notwithstanding the fact that the contracts had not been made as required by Section 175(3). Union of India and others v. N.K. Private Limited and another[24] is also about there being no valid or binding contract, because the letter of acceptance is not by a person authorized to execute the contracts for and on behalf of the President of India under Article 299 of the Constitution. Similarly, in New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) Private Limited v. The Union of India[25], it was stated that a contract in contravention of Section 175(3) is void and unenforceable, but, if in pursuance of void contract, the party has performed his part and the Government of India has received its benefit, Section 70 of the Contract Act would justify the claim against the Government. In The Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh and others[26] also, the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution were held mandatory and failure to comply with the conditions nullifies the contract and renders it void and unenforceable. Lastly, in State of Bihar v. M/s. Karam Chand Thapar and Brothers Ltd.[27], it was pointed out that Section 175(3) does not prescribe any particular mode, in which authority must be conferred. 53. Interpreting G.O.Ms. No.94 as alien to any concept of transfer of registration or works, Ex.P.1 proceedings were contended to be untenable with reference to Articles 298 and 299 of the Constitution of India. But the question herein is not about Ex.P.1 answering the mandate of Articles 298 and 299, but about the 8th respondent being relieved of being subjected to any subsisting contracts with the State Government after the Committee of Engineers-in-Chief and the Commissioner of Tenders cancelled his registration as a special class contractor, which, they are, undoubtedly, competent to do and transferred the works, assets and experience of the individual contractor to the private limited company, which is attempted to be claimed to be beyond their competence. While the agreements themselves are entered into by the respective Engineers-in-Chief or Chief Engineers, the competence of the Committee to consider registration of the contractors is not in doubt, while transferability or conversion of registration of an individual to a firm or a company that is attempted to be rendered doubtful. The prescriptions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India (Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935) about the manner in which such contracts should be expressed and executed, do not appear to directly fall for consideration and the exercise of power on behalf of the Governor will be by persons directed or authorized to do so in the prescribed manner and the constitution of the Committee for the purpose for which it was intended, reflects such direction or authorization to be executed in such prescribed manner for that purpose. 54. Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the principles governing the juristic personality of a company and its members. I n State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. The Commercial Tax Officer and others[28], relied on by the learned counsel, the Supreme Court clearly pointed out that a corporate company has separate existence and is a legal person, separate and distinct from its members. The members, who form the incorporated company, do not pool their status or their personality and the personality of the members has little to do with the persona of the incorporated company. It was stated that the persona that comes into being is not the aggregate of the personae either in law or in metaphor. The experience, the income, the taxes paid and the other eligibility or qualifying criteria of the 8th respondent being considered for registering the company as a special class contractor in lieu of the 8th respondent, is sought to be assailed with reference to the observation that the members, who form the incorporated company, do not pool their status or their personality in forming the personality of the company. It is true that the company and the members maintain their distinct legal personalities in law, but the individual members of the company providing their support with reference to their own experiences or resources or assets for giving effect to the memorandum of association and objects of the company, cannot be equated to aggregating the personae of the members in law or in metaphor to make up or constitute the persona of the company. Pooling of the status of the 8th respondent or his personality in the new legal person functioning as an entity, did not happen in the manner in which it was attempted to be projected. I n Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and others[29], the Supreme Court was dealing with doctrine of lifting the veil to examine the face of the Corporation in substance. In such cases, the shareholders are held to be the persons who actually work for the corporation and even if the doctrine were to be applied to the facts of the present case, firstly, the members of the private limited company were openly stated to be the 8th respondent, his wife and son originally, for whose benefit alone the company came into being. The 8th respondent resigning as Director of the company and transferring all his shares to his wife on 31-03-2009, even if it were for the purpose of enabling him to contest in the election, left nothing further to examine the face of the company in substance after lifting of the veil. If formation of a firm or a company by an individual contractor is an accepted and recognized form of change in the constitution of the person dealing with the Government even as indicated in G.O.Ms. No.94, nothing illegal can be considered to have been disclosed by lifting the veil. In Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. The Income-Tax Officer and another[30], a corporation, though statutory, was noted to have a personality of its own, distinct from that of the State or other shareholders and the doctrine that a corporation has a separate legal entity of its own, is firmly rooted from notions drafted from common law. The principle no way offends the attempt of the 8th respondent to have the transfer of experience, works and assets to the company from him. 55. Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the precedents governing the distribution of State largesse and in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others[31], the Apex Court held that the power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largesse, including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences, etc., must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departs from its standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down. Similarly, in Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana and others[32], the Supreme Court referred to public property being squandered for a song by persons in power who hold the position of trust and how judicial intervention can serve larger public interest. It was laid down that the Government cannot, for example, give a contract or sell or lease out its property for a consideration less than the highest that can be obtained for it. Application of minimum principles of natural justice was held to be obligatory to result in fair play in action. I n V. Purushotham Rao v. Union of India and others[33], it was pointed out that the disposal of a public property, undoubtedly, partakes the character of a trust and therefore, there should not be any suspicion of a lack of principle in the matter of such disposal. It is in that context when the Court was examining each and every individual case of discretionary allotment, the Court was trying to find out whether there existed some materials, on which the subjective satisfaction could have been arrived at for exercise of discretion in favour of the party. The principles are unexceptionable. But in the present case, the procedure adopted with reference to the 8th respondent and his private limited company is not peculiar to them alone. It is shown that in similar cases, similar procedure has been adopted. The procedure prescribed by G.O.Ms. No.94, as amended from time to time, was not claimed to have resulted in any violation of the principles governing distribution of State Largesse. Apart from the 8th respondent or his private limited company being not shown to have received any unique treatment, different from all others similarly situated, the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 by following the same procedure as adopted in all such cases, cannot be considered to be, ex facie, vitiated under the circumstances. 56. Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel also referred to Khardah Company Ltd. v. Raymon and Co. (India) Private Ltd.[34] about the obligations under a contract being not assignable except with the consent of the promisee, which consent is only a novation resulting in substitution of liabilities. The rights under a contract are otherwise assignable, unless the contract is personal in its nature or the rights are incapable of assignment either under the law or under an agreement between the parties. In the present case, no legal prohibition against any assignment has been made out, while the consent of the promisee and the agreement between the parties is evident from the very proceedings, dated 30-03-2009. The learned counsel also referred t o Bihar State Electricity Board and another v. Umi Special Steel Limited[35], wherein it was held that the obligations of the parties continue till the contract is determined according to its terms. The issue involved herein is not about the obligations of the parties under the contracts, but the substitution of one of the parties with another, which is not shown to be, in any manner, impermissible. The obligations of the contractor continue till the respective contracts are determined with the private limited company, which entered into the shoes of the 8th respondent after the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 under Ex.P.1. 57. Sri V. Mallik, learned counsel for the petitioner then referred to the precedents with reference to disqualification under Section 9A of the Act. Sewaram v. Sobaran Singh[36] is a case where the High Court found on evidence in the election petition that abandonment of works in respect of three contracts in question by Sewaram was not established. Sewaram Gupta continued to be associated with these contracts, even after writing his letters, dated 30-01-1990 withdrawing himself from the contracts/works. The Supreme Court also found that Patiram Gupta continuing the contracts is the real brother and member of joint Hindu family with Sewaram and the power of attorney holder of Sewaram during the relevant period. The Supreme Court also found that the correspondence even after 30-01-1990 was made in the name of Sewaram, though signed by Patiram. Sewaram did not go personally to the Executive Engineer to put an end to the contract mutually and did not end the contract unilaterally by breach taking the risk of damages. As Sewaram continued with the contract through the proxy of his real brother, he was held to have incurred the disqualification under Section 9A. Obviously, the conclusion was due to Sewaram Gupta alone participating in the execution of the contract much after the filing of nomination. The Apex Court made it clear that the question of subsistence of a contract with the appropriate Government making it a disqualification under Section 9A, is a question of fact depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. Noting that a contract would have come to an end by breach, the Apex Court considered that the contract can come to an end by performance or by express agreement or under the doctrine of frustration or by breach. The facts in the present case in contrast present an absolutely opposite setting not showing the transfer of contracts to be only faked. In Rajeshekar Basavaraj Patil v. Subash Kallur and others[37], the burden of proof was held to squarely lay on the respondent, which he could have discharged by rebuttal evidence and on facts, the Apex Court concluded that there is neither unilateral nor mutual termination of subsisting contract by the 1st respondent therein. The letter in question was found not to contain any intention to terminate the contract and the respondent also miserably failed to explain the deviation from normal office procedure in the submission and receipt of the letter and in proving that the letter was formally tendered or officially received in the office of the Executive Engineer. It was again a factual failure that led to the failure of the respondent. In P.H. Paul Manoj Pandian v. Mr. P. Veldurai[38], the opinion expressed by Government officials, who are expected to have sufficient knowledge and experience as to how a Government Order should be operated and/or implemented, was opined to be capable of being relied on and if so, the evidence of P.Ws.3 to 9 herein does not strengthen the claim of the election petitioner. On facts in that case, the contract was found to have not been terminated earlier than 01-06- 2006 and to be subsisting by that date, a date beyond the last date of filing of nomination papers and scrutiny thereof and consequently, the contracts were held to be subsisting disqualifying the elected candidate. I n Chalimeda Lakshmi Narasimha Rao v. Chennadi Sudhakar Rao[39], a learned Judge of this Court was referring to Sewaram v. Sobaran Singh (36 supra) and Rajeshekar Basavaraj Patil v. Subash Kallur and others (37 supra) and observed that the 1st respondent before His Lordship did not intimate his retirement from the partnership to the Government, leave alone take steps to put an end to the contract mutually or unilaterally. Again it was the factual matrix that led to the failure of the elected candidate and the application of the principles in the above cited precendents to the facts of the present case does not appear to favour any conclusion in favour of the election petitioner. 58. Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel for the 8th respondent referred to Prakash Khandre v. Dr. Vijay Kumar Khandre and others[40], wherein also the Supreme Court pointed out that the question whether contracts were subsisting or not, is always a question of fact to be determined upon the evidence on record. In that case, the first letter written by the appellant to the Chief Engineer was about the cancellation of his registration as a Class I contractor with the department putting an end to any sort of subsisting contractual relationship between him and the Government. It was also pointed out that the objects and reasons of Section 9A of the Act provide that an unduly strict view about the Government contract should not be taken, as it might lead to disqualification of a large number of citizens, many of whom may prove to be able or capable Members of Parliament or State Legislatures. Even subsequent payment by the Government for the work done, which was payable at the time of termination of contract, was held not to mean the contract to be subsisting. In the case before Their Lordships, not following certain departmental procedures prescribed for grant of contract to the other contractor was also a ground of challenge and it was positively held that not following the procedure prescribed under the rules would hardly be a ground for holding that the contract was subsisting. If it were so, any deviation from G.O.Ms. No.94 herein, which may, at the worst, amount to irregularity and not illegality, will not make the contracts to be subsisting, when the transfer of the contracts to the private limited company was effected by the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 and the evidence on record does not suggest applicability of Section 9A of the Act. 59. Sri Adinarayana Rao also relied on Shrikant v. Vasantrao and others[41], wherein the Supreme Court, while holding that a contract subsists till the rights and obligations thereunder are finally performed, recognized the effect of assignment coupled with novation creating a new contract between the assignee and the contractor, which can apply with equal force to the employer and the assignee of the contractor. 60. Sri V. Mallik also referred to A. Jithendernath v. Jubilee Hills Coop. House Building Society and another[42], wherein it was held that the statutory rules and bye-laws of a cooperative society must be strictly and scrupulously followed and where there was an order passed by the authority without jurisdiction, it need not even be set aside being a nullity in the eye of law. The Committee of Engineers-in-Chief and the Commissioner of Tenders cannot be considered herein to be acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and its proceedings cannot be considered a nullity nor is any deviation from G.O.Ms. No.94, is such as would vitiate their decision, more so in the light of the principle laid down about any deviation from the prescribed procedure and the rules being hardly a ground for holding a contract to be subsisting as held in Prakash Khandre v. Dr. Vijay Kumar Khandre and others (40 supra). 61. Any delayed communication of the proceedings, dated 30-03-2009 to any department cannot dilute its legal effect and when the contracting parties can contract out of the contract even when one of the contracting parties is the Government, the disqualification under Section 9A of the Act cannot be considered attracted to the 8th respondent and the issue has to be answered that it was not probablised that the 8th respondent had any subsisting interest in the Government works as a contractor, as an individual or as a partner in a firm by the time of filing his nomination or scrutiny of the nominations. 62. Issues 1 and 7: On this question, Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel for the 8th respondent referred to K. Venkateswara Rao and another v. Bekkam Narasimha Reddy and others[43], wherein apart from holding that the trial of an election petition is not the same thing as the trial of a suit, the Supreme Court pointed out that no addition of parties is possible, except under Section 86(4) and if an election petition does not comply with Sections 81 and 82, such election petition should be dismissed under Section 86(1). The Representation of the People Act, 1951 was held to be a complete and self-contained Code and Sri V.R. Avula, learned counsel for the 9th respondent referred to Vishwanatha Reddy v. Konappa Rudrappa Nadgouda and another[44], wherein it was held that when in an election there are only two candidates and the returned candidate is found to be under statutory disqualification existing at the date of filing of the nomination paper, the votes cast in favour of the disqualified candidate may be regarded as thrown away and the candidate securing the next highest number of votes will be declared elected. That contingency does not arise in this case, as there are more than two contesting candidates in this election. The learned counsel also referred to Hari Singh Nalwa v. Kartar Singh Bhadana[45], (claimed by Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel to have been overruled in AIR 2001 SC 1556), wherein the High Court refused to decide a case on preliminary issue when the questions involved are mixed questions of fact and law, on which evidence has to be recorded. In the present case, in E.P.M.P. No.922 of 2009, the 9th respondent stated in his affidavit that he is reserving his right to file a detailed counter and also to file a petition praying to declare him as elected as a Member of Legislative Assembly from the subject constituency. After being impleaded, he neither filed any written statement nor filed any petition for declaration of his being elected till now. Section 81 of the Act requires presentation of election petition within forty-five days from the date of election of the returned candidate. Section 82 requires all the contesting candidates to be necessary parties in the event of any declaration being claimed about any other candidate than the returned candidate having to be declared as duly elected. Though all the contesting candidates are not indispensable parties for the election petition as framed and filed by the election petitioner, if the 9th respondent desires to be considered to be declared elected, he is debarred from doing so both by his approaching the Court beyond 45 days prescribed by Section 81(1) and further due to absence of all the contesting candidates as prescribed by Section 82. Hence, while the election petition as framed cannot be considered to be not maintainable due to not impleading all the contesting candidates, the 9th respondent is not entitled to be declared as elected, even if the election of the 8th respondent is found to be liable to be set aside and these issues are answered accordingly. The position is so, is also evident from the observations of the Supreme Court in Prakash Khandre v. Dr. Vijay Kumar Khandre and others (40 supra), wherein it was stated that there is no specific provision under which the person, who has secured the next highest number of votes, could be declared as elected, when the elected candidate is declared to be disqualified and there are more than two contesting candidates. Observing that if disqualified candidate was not permitted to contest the election, then how the voters would have voted in favour of the candidate who has secured more votes than the other remaining candidates, would be a question in the realm of speculation and unpredictability, the Supreme Court held that such situation would not entitle the election petitioner or any other candidate to be declared elected. 63. Issues 6 and 8: In view of my findings on issue No.4, the election petition cannot succeed, because the High Court cannot form an opinion that the 8th respondent was disqualified to be chosen to fill the seat on the date of his election or that his nomination has been improperly accepted or that any non-compliance with the Constitution or the Representation of the People Act, 1951 or any Rules or Orders made under the Act has been committed within the meaning of Section 100(1) of the Act and consequently, an order has to be made dismissing the election petition under Section 98(a) of the Act, while leaving the costs to be borne by the parties respectively under Section 99(1)(b) of the Act. 64. Accordingly, the election petition is dismissed without costs. A copy of this order be communicated to the Election Commission of India and the Speaker of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly in terms of Section 103 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. _____________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J APPENDIX OF EVIDENCE WITNESSES EXAMINED FOR PETITIONER: FOR RESPONDENTS: P.W.1: S.A.K. Mynoddin R.W.1: B. Chandrasekhar P.W.2: K. Ravi R.W.2: A.V. Rambabu P.W.3: B. Chandrasekhar P.W.4: K. Ashok Kumar P.W.5: B. Rajeswararao P.W.6: K.K. Kishore Kumar P.W.7: V. Gopala Krishna P.W.8: V. Yesubu P.W.9: R.M.R. Dayal DOCUMENTS MARKED FOR PETITIONER: Ex.P.1/30-03-2009/Copy of the Proc.No.130/Regn/AVRB/T1/2009 issued by the Engineer-in-Chief, Public Health, Hyderabad to M/s. A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private Limited, Hyderabad. Ex.P.2/25-05-2010/Letter No.8/T9/RTI/2010 of the Deputy Chief Engineer (P.H.), Public Information Officer, P.H.&M.E. Department, Hyderabad to P.W.1. Ex.P.3/01-07-2003/G.O.Ms. No.94 Irrigation and CAD (PW-COD) Department. Ex.P.4/22-05-2007/G.O.Ms. No.130 Irrigation & CAD (PW: Reforms) Department. Ex.P.5/24-07-2010/Copy of the Letter No.8/T9/RTI/2010 from Deputy Chief Engineer (P.H.), Public Information Officer, Municipal Engineering Department, Hyderabad to P.W.1. Ex.P.6/25-07-2009/Copy of Application by P.W.2 for information under Section 6(1) of RTI Act submitted to the Public Information Officer, office of the Engineer- in-Chief, Public Health, Hyderabad. Ex.P.7/28-07-2009/Letter No.1756/T9/RIA/2005/COR from the Deputy Chief Engineer, Public Health, Hyderabad to P.W.2. FOR RESPONDENTS: Ex.R.1/10-05-2010/Letter from Public Information Officer & Deputy Executive Engineer, RWS & Sanitation Engineering Department, Ongole to A. Mohan Krishna, Ongole. Ex.R.2/24-04-2010/Letter from Superintending Engineer, RWS & Sanitation Engineering Department, Ongole to A. Mohan Krishna, Ongole. Ex.R.3/ -- /Copy of Form 1 Certificate of Incorporation of A.V. Rambabu Infra Private Limited Ex.R.4/25-03-2009/Copy of supplemental agreement No.4-2/2008- 09 of R.W.S.& Sanitation Circle, Ongole, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Panchayat Raj Department. Ex.R.5/24-12-2008/Copy of agreement No.77/2008-09 of Government of Andhra Pradesh Rural Water Supply & Sanitation Engineering Department, Prakasam District. Ex.R.6/11-11-2008/Copy of supplemental agreement No. /2008- 09 of R.W.S.& Sanitation Circle, Ongole, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Panchayat Raj Department. Ex.R.7/02-03-2009/Copy of agreement No.89/2008-09 of Government of Andhra Pradesh Rural Water Supply & Sanitation Engineering Department, Prakasam District. Ex.R.8/28-01-2009/Copy of supplemental agreement No. /2008- 09 of R.W.S.& Sanitation Circle, Ongole, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Panchayat Raj Department. Ex.R.9/04-12-2008/Copy of agreement No.67/2008-09 of Government of Andhra Pradesh Rural Water Supply & Sanitation Engineering Department, Prakasam District. Ex.R.10/24-12-2008/Copy of agreement No.76/2008-09 of Government of Andhra Pradesh Rural Water Supply & Sanitation Engineering Department, Prakasam District. Ex.R.11/18-6-2008/Copy of agreement No.29/2008-09 of Government of Andhra Pradesh Rural Water Supply & Sanitation Engineering Department, Prakasam District. Ex.R.12/ -- /Form 1 Certificate of Incorporation of A.V. Rambabu Infra Private Limited. Ex.R.13/31-3-2009/Minutes of the meeting of Board of Directors of M/s. A.V. Rambabu Infra Private Limited, Hyderabad. Ex.R.14/ -- /Form 32 copy-appointment of Managing Director, directors, manager and secretary etc., for A.V. Rambabu Infra Private Limited. Ex.R.15/02-04-2009/Letter from the Director, A.V. Rambabu Infra Private Limited, Hyderabad to the Engineer- in- Chief, Public Health, Hyderabad. Ex.R.16/12-11-2010/Letter from the Commissioner, Commissionerate of Tenders, Hyderabad to R.W.2. Ex.R.17/30-04-2008/True copy of minutes of the 57th Meeting of Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad. Ex.R.18/28-05-2008/True copy of minutes of the 58th Meeting of Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad. Ex.R.19/30-06-2008/True copy of minutes of the 59th Meeting of Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad. Ex.R.20/21-07-2008/True copy of minutes of the 61st Meeting of Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad. Ex.R.21/30-08-2008/True copy of minutes of the 62nd Meeting of Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad. Ex.R.22/14-11-2008/True copy of minutes of the 64th Meeting of Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad. Ex.R.23/11-12-2008/True copy of minutes of the 65th Meeting of Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad. Ex.R.24/30-01-2009/True copy of minutes of the 66th Meeting of Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad. Ex.R.25/24-02-2009/True copy of minutes of the 67th Meeting of Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad. Ex.R.26/25-03-2009/True copy of minutes of the 68th Meeting of Committee of Engineers-in-Chief, Hyderabad. Ex.R.27/18-10-2003/Copy of draft minutes of the Fourth meeting of the Committee of Engineers-in-Chief and Commissioner, COT, Hyderabad. BY WITNESSES: Ex.X.1/30-03-2009/Copy of the proceedings No.130/Regn/ AVRB/ T1/2009 from Engineer-in-Chief (PH) to M/s. A.V.Ram Babu Infra Private Limited, Hyderabad. Ex.X.2/31-03-2009/Xerox copy of letter from R.W.2 to the Superintending Engineer, RWS&S Circle, Ongole. Ex.X.3/19-03-2009/Copy of demand draft No.902104 on ING Vysya Bank Ltd. for Rs.10,000/-. Ex.X.4/ -- /Copy of Treasury Challan No. 1/8.10.09 for Rs.10,000/- Ex.X.5/21-03-2009/Application submitted by M/s. A.V. Rambabu Infra Private Limited to the Commissioner of Tenders, Hyderabad. Ex.X.5(a)/ -- /Copy of experience certificate of R.W.2 given by the Executive Engineer (PH), Spl. Divn. Nellore. Ex.X.5(b)/18-3-‘03/Copy of Commercial Tax Certificate of R.W.2. Ex.X.5(c)/ -- /Copy of income tax clearance certificate of R.W.2 in five sheets . Ex.X.5(d)/19-3-‘09/Copy of demand draft No.902104 for Rs.10,000/-. Ex.X.5(e)/ -- /Copy of bio-date of M/s. A.V. Rambabu Infra Private Limited, Hyderabad in 13 sheets. Ex.X.5(f)/ -- /Self declaration given by A.V.Rambabu, Managing Director, M/s. A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private Limited. Ex.X.5(g)/ -- /Declaration given by A.V. Rambabu, Special Contractor, Markapur. Ex.X.5(h)/ -- /Declaration given by Anna Krishna Chaitanya and Anna Durga Kumari. Ex.X.6/30-03-2009/Proceedings No.130/Regn/AVRB/T1/ 2009 from the Engineer-in-Chief (PH) to M/s. A.V. Ram Babu Infra Private Limited, Hyderabad. (Original of Ex.X.1) Ex.X.7/31-03-2009/Letter from R.W.2 to the Superintending Engineer, RWS&S Circle, Ongole. (Original of Ex.X.2) _____________________ G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J Date: 21-08-2012 Note: L.R. copies to be marked. 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