SANTOSH AGGARWAL V. ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER GARHWAL MANDAL PAURI

WPMS/1218/2021

AI Insights

The case revolves around a dispute concerning the mutation of land records under the Land Revenue Act, 1901, and the subsequent sale of the property by Santosh Aggarwal, the petitioner. The property in question was originally owned by Late Smt. Indrawati, who had her name recorded in the revenue records after a long delay. Following her death, Santosh Aggarwal sold the property despite an ongoing injunction under the UPZA&LR Act, which led to the filing of a revision by the private respondent. The Additional Commissioner issued an interim order to maintain the status quo, which Santosh Aggarwal challenged in the High Court, arguing that the revisional court exceeded its jurisdiction.

• Counselvise Citation: [2021] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 725794 (HC-UTTARAKHAND)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 02-07-2021
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Income Tax Officer, Cannanore Vs. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi, Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi Vs. Bansi Dhar & Sons, Hakam Devi and others Vs. Phuman Singh, Buta Singh, Shri Kihota Hollohon Vs. Mr. Zachilhu and others, Ramchandra Ganpatrao Hande @ Handege Vs. Vithalrao Hande and others, Rupali Mehta Vs. Smt. Tina Narinder Sain Mehta, Indra Narayan Kundu Vs. Girindra Nath Mitra, Chintamani Sharan Nath Sahadeo Vs. State of Bihar and others
• Laws Referred To: Land Revenue Act, 1901, Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: M S BISHT; I P KOHLI
• Assessee Lawyers: ARVIND VASHISTHA
• Keywords: Interim order; Jurisdiction; Status quo; Revisional court; Land mutation
• Section: 34; 210; 219; 35; 229; 229D

Judgement Text

" IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1218 of 2021 Santosh Aggarwal .......Petitioner Vs. Additional Commissioner, Garhwal Mandal, Pauri & another …..Respondents Mr. Arvind Vashistha, Senior Advocate, for the petitioner. Mr. M.S. Bisht, Brief Holder, for the State of Uttarakhan/respondent No.1. Mr. I.P. Kohli, Advocate, for the respondent No.2. Hon’ble Sharad Kumar Sharma, J (Oral) Apparently the issue, which has been raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, seems to be too trifle in nature, but owing to the circumstances of the proceedings, and the stage at which, it has been agitated before this Court, by virtue of the present writ petition, it deals with a very prime issue which had been sought to be addressed by the petitioner pertaining to the competence of the courts created under the Land Revenue Act, 1901, for the purposes of grant of an interim order, in a proceedings particularly which are being held at the stage of the revision under Section 219 of the Land Revenue Act, 1901. 2. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has harped upon a question, that when the entire proceedings which are contemplated under the Land Revenue Act, 1901, which emanates from the principle proceedings under Section 34/35 of the Land Revenue Act, 1901, for the purposes of making the alterations of the revenue entries of rights, in the revenue records, or pertaining to the devolvement of rights over the land, by virtue of succession or by virtue of transfer, and when the ultimate order which had been passed by the subordinate courts and later when, it reaches to the stage of the appeal under Section 210 of the Land Revenue Act, 1901, or a revision under Section 219 of the Land Revenue Act, 1901. The submissions of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that the 2 Revisional Court, while exercising its power under Section 219 of Land Revenue Act, 1901, will have a very limited jurisdiction, to pass any interim order pertaining to the status of the property, as it is existing on the date, when the revision itself is being considered by the Revisional Court, by way of directing the parties to maintain status quo, in relation to a property which is subject matter of proceedings for mutation, under Section 34/35 of the Act of 1901. 3. The brief facts, which are involved consideration in the present writ petition, are that the predecessors in interest of the disputed property, as alleged by the petitioner, was Late Smt. Indrawati. It is contended that Late Smt. Indrawati, had purchased the property lying in “Khata No.142, Khasara No.1584”, having an area of 2.26 acres, which was allegedly purchased by the predecessors in interest of the petitioner, by virtue of the registered Sale Deed dated 14.05.1987, was a land, which was lying in Village Raipur, Pargana Parwadoon, District Dehradun, and it is contended that the predecessors in interest of the petitioner in turn is said to have purchased the aforesaid property (which would be herein called the property in dispute), from its predecessors owner Shri Kunwar Chandra Bahadur. 4. It is the case of the petitioner before this Court, that Late Smt. Indrawati, after having purchased the aforesaid property by virtue of the Sale Deed dated 14.05.1987, is said to have filed an application under Sections 33/34 of the Land Revenue Act, 1901, before the competent revenue authority, praying that her name may be recorded in the revenue records. The said application, thus, filed by Late Smt. Indrawati, was numbered as Case No.283 of 1987-88, and it is not in dispute, that the said application which was preferred by Late Smt. Indrawati, which was allowed by the court of Additional Tehsildar, vide its judgment dated 17.06.1988 and its ever since passing of the said judgment dated 17.06.1988, no attempt was ever made either by Late Smt. Indrawati, or anyone claiming under her, to get her name recorded in the revenue records in accordance with the provisions contained under the Revenue Court Manual, particularly, 3 that as provided under paragraph No.39 of the Revenue Court Manual, which castes a duty on the competent revenue authority, to record any alterations in the change of title, or a conferment of a right by succession or transfer, in the revenue records. Paragraph Nos.39, are extracted hereunder:- “39. Orders involving change in [Lekhpal] papers.- (1) If in any case the effect or the order of decree passed involves a change in the Lekhpal’s records (other than one which involves a change in the Khewats for which provisions exists in Rules 389 and 393 of the Revenue Court Manual), the Court shall draw up a separate order in the prescribed Form (B.R. No.250) giving full details of the entries to be made and entries to be expunged and direct the Tahsildar to have the new entries recorded in the Lekhpal’s papers. This order shall be forwarded to the Tahsildars who shall detach and return, within fifteen days from the date of receipt the perforated coupon attached thereto to the Court concerned, duly signed and dated by the Registrar Kanungo in token of having incorporated the necessary changes in the Registrar of Alterations and the Mutation Register. The Registrar Kanungo shall then get the necessary changes incorporated in the Khatauni and Khewat of the Lekhpal, before sending the mutation order to be placed on the guard-file of the Supervisor Kanungo. (2) The provisions of sub-rule (1) will also be applicable to all appellate Courts who, when transmitting to the lower court a copy of the order passed in appeal, shall attach thereto the order in the prescribed form to which effect is intended to be given, provided that when the appellate court merely cancels without altering the order passed by the lower court, it shall be sufficient to give the number and date of the order of the lower Court which is cancelled. This order in the prescribed form shall be forwarded to the Tahsildar by the presiding officer of the original Court for necessary action as regards correction in the records. (3) An entry to the effect that the form duly filled in has been dispatched to the Tahsildar or lower court, as the case may be, shall be made by the Ahalmad or other officer of the court on the order sheet and the file shall not be consigned to the record room till the coupon of the form is returned by the Tahsildar with the note referred to in sub-rule (1).” 5. The records, which have been placed by the petitioner in the present writ petition, it rather shows that Late Smt. Indrawati, after 4 passing of the judgment on 17.06.1988, by the court of Additional Tehsildar, neither got her name ever recorded in the revenue records, nor any such application was ever moved by her, till she had met with the sad demise on 22.08.2020. The petitioner has contended (without placing on record the complete “Khatauni”) that in pursuance to the order, which was passed by the Additional Tehsildar, as back as on 17.06.1988, no entries, whatsoever was ever carried or made in the revenue records for the last over 32 years, and it was for the first time, that the entry was attempted to be recorded in the revenue records by the Additional Tehsildar, Sadar, Dehradun, vide its order dated 19.03.2020, and the certified copy of the same has been obtained by the petitioner for the first time on 25.08.2020, which has been placed on record as Annexure No.2 to this writ petition. It would not be out of place and rather essential to, to mention, at this juncture itself, that on the date when the entry was made and the order was passed, it nowhere refers that Late Smt. Indrawati, had ever devolved with any right, to any of his successor, by virtue of any deed of conveyance or a gift deed, meaning thereby she died intestate. The respondents, herein, i.e. private respondent no.2, being aggrieved against the orders dated 19.03.2020 and 21.03.2020, which was passed by the court of Additional Tehsildar, Sadar, Dehradun, seeking a belated enforcement of the judgment dated 17.06.1988, passed in Case No.283 of 1987-88, had preferred the Revenue Revision No.27 of 2020-21, “Amardev Khanduri Vs. Smt. Indrawati”, through her alleged son Santosh Aggarwal (i.e. the present petitioner). 6. At this stage, this Court is of the opinion that it would be necessary to extract the pleadings raised in Paragraph Nos.5 and 15 of the said memorandum of revision, which is extracted hereunder:- “5. ;g fd fuxjkuhdrkZ dk ,d okn lgk;d dYkSDVj] lnj] nsgjknwu ds U;k;ky; esa vUrxZr /kkjk 229 ch teh0fo0vf/kfu;e tks fd yecs le; ls yfEcr pyk vk jgk gSa vkSj ml ij ekuuh; U;k;ky; }kjk bl ckr dh fu’ks/kkKk tkjh dh x;h] fd fuxjkuhdrkZ dh lEifRr esa fdlh izdkj dk dCtk] n[kyvUnkth] gLr{ksi] [kqnZ&cqnZ] gLrkUrj.k ,oa lEifRr dh izd`fr dks ugha cnyk tk;sxk vkSj uk gh tcju dksbZ dCtk fd;k tk;sxkA ;g vkns”k [krkSuh esa vafdr o ntZ gS vkSj vkns”k dh frfFk ls vkt rd vafdr o ntZ pyk vk jgk gSaA 5 15. ;g fd fuxjkuhdrkZ dk ,d okn ekuhu; lgk;d dySDVj&lnj] nsgjknwu esa vUrxZr /kkjk 229 ch tkeh0fo0vf/k0 ds vf/ku yfEcr gS vkSj ftlesa fd ekuuh; U;k;ky; }kjk bl ckr dh fu’kS/kkKk tkkjh dh x;h] fd iz”uxr lEifRr ij ,oa fuxjkuhdrkZ dh lEifRr ij fdlh izdkj dk dCtk] n[kyvUnkth] [kqnZ&cqnZ] gLrkukUrj.k vkSj lEifRr dh izd`rh dks ugha cnyk tk;sxk vkSj uk gh fdlh izkdj dk gLr{ksi fd;k tk;sxk] tks fd jktLo vfHkys[kksa dh [krkSuh esa Hkh vkns”k vafdr o ntZ gSA” 7. The records and pleadings, reflect that prior to the preference of the revision before the court of Additional Commissioner on 15.03.2021 under Section 219 of Land Revenue Act 1901, there has had been the prior pending proceedings drawn under Section 229B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950 (in short “UPZA&LR Act”), for the declaration of rights in relation to the land in dispute, and as per the pleadings raised in the revision, which has been extracted above (i.e. Para Nos.5 and 15), it seems that the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Class, before whom, the principal proceeding under Section 229B of the UPZA&LR Act for declaration of rights, had been filed, it had exercised its powers under Section 229D of the UPZA&LR Act, and had passed the interim injunction, whereby the parties to the proceedings under Section 229B of the UPZA&LR Act, for the same disputed property, were directed to restrain themselves from any act of wrongful interference over the property in question, they were further directed to not to change the nature of the disputed property, and further a direction was also issued that the opposite party to the proceedings under Section 229B of the UPZA&LR Act, that it will not transfer the property in any manner whatsoever, by creating any third party interest. 8. The revisionist to the present revision had pleaded that after the grant of the interim order of injunction under Section 229D of the UPZA & LR Act, by the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Class, with proceedings under Section 229B of UPZA&LR Act for declaration, the entries of the same was made in the revenue records 6 and in fact the revisionist/respondents, while assailing the orders of 19.03.2020 and 21.03.2020, wanted to convey to the Revisional Court, that prior to the institution of the revisional proceedings under Section 219 of the Land Revenue Act, 1901, since there has had been an interim injunction order, which was granted under Section 229D of the UPZA&LR Act; in a regular proceedings, no sale as such could have been made by the petitioner, through its attorney or himself, in any manner whatsoever, because it was restrained by the interim injunction order, passed under Section 229D of UPZA&LR Act. 9. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has contended that after the death of Late Smt. Indrawati, the name of the petitioner was mutated in the revenue records, by virtue of an order, which was passed by the Sub Naib Tehsildar, on 08.10.2020. In fact, this order too is not a complete extract of the “Khatauni”, for the reason being that the entry which had been made in the revenue records on 08.10.2020, was on the basis of the Form 6 Part 2, S.No.1558, dated 24.09.2020, on the basis of which, the revenue entries were allegedly said to have been made in the name of the present petitioner. These revenue entries rather reiterated, that it would run contrary to the interim orders which were passed by the competent revenue court of Assistant Collector, 1st Class, in regular proceedings for declaration of rights, under Section 229B of UPZA&LR Act, who has already passed an order of injunction restraining the sale of the property in dispute. 10. It is an admitted case of the petitioner, that after his name was recorded in the revenue records by the orders of Sub Naib Tehsildars’, order dated 08.10.2020 after 32 years of the order dated 17.06.1988, he had executed the two sale deeds of part of the property i.e. on 04.12.2020 in favour of one Mr. Amjad Ali, after exchange of the sale consideration of Rs.46,11,000/- and another sale deed, which was executed by the petitioner in favour of one Mr. Naresh Kumar Gaira and Smt. Poonam Gaira W/o Mr. Naresh Kumar Gaira, during the subsistence of the injunction order which was passed under 7 Section 229D of UPZA&LR Act, in the suit for declaration of rights, filed under Section 229B of UPZA&LR Act. 11. The petitioner has come up with a case, that, after the aforesaid purchase was made, after the execution of the respective sale deeds, the purchasers as detailed above, had filed an application for mutation before the Sub Naib Tehsildar, being Case No.924 and 925 respectively, and the same was instituted on 05.03.2021, and it was allowed by the order of the Sub Naib Tehsildar on 08.03.2021, and the purchasers name, from the petitioner, had been recorded in the revenue records. 12. The very grievance of the petitioner in the present writ petition is to the effect and from the prospective that on the institution of the Revenue Revision on 15.03.2021, under Section 219 of Land Revenue Act, 1901, the learned court of Additional Commissioner i.e. respondent No.1, herein, had passed the impugned order on 17.03.2021, whereby apart from that the effect and operation of the impugned orders dated 19.03.2020 and 21.03.2020 (which was recorded after 32 years of passing of an order of 17.06.1988) was kept in abeyance by the Revisional Court of Additional Commissioner, and further the parties were directed to maintain status quo, qua the disputed property. 13. The principal grievance and the tenacity of the argument of the learned Senior Advocate, for the petitioner was that since the revisional court while exercising, its revisional powers under Section 219 of the Land Revenue Act, 1901; its powers are only limited and confined and are limited with regards to the recording of the name in the revenue records, it ought not to have exceeded its jurisdiction; while passing an additional interim order directing the parties to maintain “status quo” with regards to the property in question. It is this part of the order of directing the parties to maintain status quo which has been partially put to challenge by the petitioner in the 8 present writ petition while modulating his relief to the following effect:- “It is therefore most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased:-] (1) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned part of the order dated 17.03.2021 passed by respondent no.1 in Revision No.27/2020-21 Sri Amardev Khanduri Vs. Smt. Indrawati, whereby operation and effect of the order dated 19.03.2020 and 21.03.2020 have been stayed and maintenance of status quo on the property in dispute has been directed. (2) Issue any other suitable writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit, just and proper in the circumstances of the case as also in the interest of justice. (3) Allow the writ petition with costs.” 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted, that his argument, about the competence and jurisdiction of the Revisional Court under Section 219 of the Land Revenue Act, 1901; could not be extended to pass an order of directing parties to maintain a status quo, particularly, when the jurisdiction, which has been vested with the revenue courts under the provisions of the Land Revenue Act, 1901, pertains to the recording of the name by the transfer of rights or ownership, by virtue of succession or by transfers, only for the purposes of being a fiscal entries, for the purposes of the remittance of the land revenue payable towards the land, and those entries itself will not amount to determine the title or a right of the person in whose name the land has been recorded, the order of status quo couldn’t be granted by the revisional court of Additional Commissioner, with regards to the status of the property, as the proceedings are confined to the revenue entries only. 15. In that eventuality, he submits that when under the Act, it is exclusively the revenue entries, which have been directed to be made, the Revisional Court ought not to have passed an order of directing the parties to maintain status quo, which runs contrary to the very purpose and object of the Land Revenue Act, 1901. In relation thereto, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner had made a reference to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, reported in 9 SCC Online Case Finder 2020, the judgment was rendered in Income Tax Officer, Cannanore Vs. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi in the context of an income tax matter. Particularly, he had made a reference to the paragraph No.9, of the aforesaid judgment, which was rather dealing with an issue that whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, since it is not a court, but it exercises its judicial powers, the widest amplitude of the passing of the interim order cannot be exercised by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, so as to stay the recovery of the arrears of the income tax, during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, under Income Tax Act. The question, which was being dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court, there in that case, it was arising from the judgment, which was passed by the Kerala High Court and the issue was whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, had the power under the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to stay the ‘recovery of penalty’, imposed by the departmental authorities, on an assesses during the pendency of the appeal. The relevant paragraphs Nos.9, 10, 12 and 13 are extracted hereunder:- “9. It is well known that an Income tax Appellate Tribunal is not a court but it exercises judicial powers. The Tribunal's powers in dealing with appeals are of the widest amplitude and have in some cases been held similar to and identical with the powers of an appellate court under the Code of Civil Procedure. It appears to me on principle that the Court ought to possess that jurisdiction, because the principle which underlies all orders for the preservation of properly pending litigation is this, that the successful party, is to reap the fruits of that litigation, and not obtain merely a barren success. That principle, as it appears to me, applies as much to the Court of first instance before the first trial, and to the Court of Appeal before the second trial, as to the Court of last instance before the hearing of the final appeal. 10. There are certain decisions, however, in which difficulty was felt that the Appellate Tribunal did not possess the power to stay recovery during the pendency of an appeal. In Vatcha Sreemamurthy v. The Income tax Officer, Vizianagram and Anr. the Assessee had to file a writ petition because the realisation of the tax assessed had not been stayed during the pendency of an appeal before the Tribunal. The controversy centred in that case mainly on the scope of 10 the discretionary power conferred by Section 45 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, on the Income tax Officer. It was held that a writ petition to compel the Income tax Officer to exercise his discretion under Section 45 or to exercise it honestly and objectively was not barred. But on the merits the Court declined to issue a writ. Viswanath Sastri, J., in his separate judgment made the following observations at page. 271; Lastly it has to be observed that Section 45 of the Income tax Act is somewhat cryptic in its terms and merely gives the Income tax Officer power to declare a person to be not in default pending the appeal. There is no provision for stay similar to Order XLI, Rules 5 & 6, of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no conferment of an express power of granting a stay of realisation of the tax, though the effect of an order in favour of the Assessee under Section 45 of the Act is a stay. Nor is there a provision for allowing the tax to be paid in installment or for taking security for deferred payment. Neither the Appellate Assistant Commissioner nor the Appellate Tribunal is given the power to stay the collection of tax. Whether the law should not be made more liberal so as to enable an Assessee who has preferred an appeal, to obtain from the appellate forum, a stay of collection of the tax, either in whole or in part, on furnishing suitable security, is a matter for the legislature to consider. 12. The High Court, in the present case, referred to a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 20 p. 705 where it is stated that \"no tax is payable while the assessment is the subject matter of an appeal, except such part of the tax assessed as appears to the Commissioners seized of the appeal not to be in dispute.\" This statement is apparently based on the provisions of the English Statutes and it is not possible to derive any assistance from it. 13. Section 255(5) of the Act does empower the Appellate Tribunal to regulate its own procedure, but it is very doubtful if the power of stay can be spelt out from that provision. In our opinion the Appellate Tribunal must be held to have the power to grant stay as incidental or ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction. This is particularly so when Section 220(6) deals expressly with a situation when an appeal is pending before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, but the Act is silent in that behalf when an appeal is pending before the Appellate Tribunal. It could well be said that when Section 254 confers appellate jurisdiction, it impliedly 11 grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution and that the statutory power carries with it the duty in proper cases to make such orders for staying proceedings as will prevent the appeal if successful from being rendered nugatory.” 16. In fact the underlining principal preposition, which was being dealt by the aforesaid Hon’ble Apex Court judgment, was in the light of and in the context of the exercise of powers by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal which are created under the Act, under Section 255 (5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which contemplates that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, has got the power to regulate its own procedure and there in those cases where the Appellate Tribunal had held that the power to stay the recovery of the penalty of the income tax, was incidental in nature to the powers vested with it under Section 255 (5) of the Act, or an ancillary powers in its exercise of the appellate jurisdiction. The said principles of taxing law will not apply to state revenue laws, which are altogether on different subjects and jurisdictions of which are bifurcated in its application, as per Schedule VII of the Constitution of India. 17. The second authority, on which the reliance has been placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, is to the judgment as reported in 1986 (1) SCC page 523, in the matters of Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi Vs. Bansi Dhar & Sons, which was decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court, with another Civil Appeal No.77 and 78 of 1974. Learned counsel for the petitioner had made a reference to Paragraph Nos.39, 40 and 42 of the aforesaid judgment, which are extracted hereunder:- “39. In an appropriate case, if the assessee feels that a stay of recovery pending disposal of the reference is necessary or is in the interest of justice, then the assessee is entitled to apply before the appellate authority to grant a stay until disposal of reference by the High Court or until such time as the appellate authority thought fit. But in case the Appellate Authority acted without jurisdiction or in excess jurisdiction or in improper exercise of the jurisdiction, then the decision of such Appellate Authority can be 12 corrected by the High Courts by issuing appropriate writs under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 40. It has to be borne in mind that in answering questions or disposing of references either under Section 66 of 1922 Act or Section 256 of 1961 Act, the High Courts do not exercise any jurisdiction conferred upon them by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Charters or by the Acts establishing respective High Courts. In respect of certain matters jurisdictions exercised by the High Court, must be kept separate from the concept of inherent powers or incidental powers in exercising jurisdiction under Section 66 of 1922 Act or 256 of 1961 Act. Section 66 of Income-Tax Act of 1922 or Section 256 of Income-Tax Act of 1961 is a special jurisdiction of a limited nature conferred not by the Code of Civil Procedure or by the Charters or by the special Acts constituting such High Courts but by the special provisions of Income Tax Act, 1922 or 1961 for limited purpose of obtaining High Court's opinion on questions of law. In giving that opinion properly if any question of incidental or ancillary power arises such as giving an opportunity or restoring a reference dismissed without hearing or giving some additional time to file paper book, such powers inhered to the jurisdiction conferred upon it. But such incidental powers cannot be so construed as to confer the power of stay of recovery of taxes pending a reference which lie in the domain of an appellate authority. Therefore, the concept of granting stay in a reference ex debito justitiae does not arise. That concept might arise in case of the appellate authority exercising its power to grant stay where there is not express provision. Ex debito justitiae is to do justice between the parties. 42. Therefore, in our opinion it cannot be said that the High Court has inherent power or incidental power in the matter of a reference pending before it to grant stay of realisation or to grant injunction. That must remain within the jurisdiction of the appellate authority and pendency of a reference does not detract from that jurisdiction of the appellate authority. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was in error in exercising its jurisdiction by passing an order for stay of realisation under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in a pending reference. The High Court could have exercised its power if the appellate authority had not properly exercised its 13 jurisdiction, not in reference jurisdiction but by virtue of its jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 227 in appropriate cases. But that was not the case here.” 18. With due reverence at my command, I am in absolute disagreement with the gravity of argument, which had been extended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, in the light of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the matters, where the appellate court was exercising its inherent powers of granting an interim protection from the recovery of penalty due under the Income Tax Act, 1961, and its correlated invocation of writ jurisdiction, as referred in paragraph 39 of the said judgment. 19. In second judgment, which has been relied with, by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner i.e. 1986 (Supra), the question, which arose for determination, before the Hon’ble Apex Court, was as to whether the assesses under the proceedings of the Income Tax? a reference court could have exercised the powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “CPC”), for granting of an order of injunction for restraining the Commissioner of Income Tax (1), and Income Tax Officer, from enforcing the demand, which was raised and for realizing the arrears of tax, which was still then pending consideration in a reference proceedings under the Income Tax Act, 1961, and whether an interim order could have been granted by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, while exercising its powers under Section 151 of the CPC. 20. In order to answer, the principles which had been argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, under the pretext of recovery of penalty, or for recovery of an income tax arrears and its staying of recovery by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, was altogether a distinct question, which was being considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the aforesaid two judgments. It was distinct in the sense that as per the opinion of this Court, the recovery or the procedure contemplated under the Income Tax Act, 1961, which falls to be a part of a Central Legislation contained in Entry 82 of the List 14 1 of Schedule 7 of the Constitution of India. The said principles or the ratio laid down pertaining to the grant of an interim order by an Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, by virtue of an impact of being a Central Legislation, cannot be kept at a common pedestal for its interpretation, and in parlance with that of the revenue accruing, to the revenue land, falling within the ambit of the Land Revenue Act, 1901, and the justification for this reasoning is that the land revenue is contained in List 2 Entry 18 of Schedule 7 of the Constitution of India. Meaning thereby, it is a State subject, it cannot be treated as to be in parlance in its application to the taxing laws, which is and has been laid down as to be a compulsory extractions of money from the assesses, for the income accruing to him in a particular financial year, and which on its assessment and as a consequence of its recovery, would fall in the coffers of the Government of India; since being contained as a subject, under List 1 of the Constitution of India, and no equivalence could be treated in relation to it for the said subjects, particularly that of the agricultural land and the agricultural revenue accruing to the land contained in Entry 18 of Schedule 7 of the Constitution of India. Apart from it, the recovery which was sought to be kept in abeyance, in the said case, it was by invoking the provisions contained under Section 151 of the CPC, which was to be considered in the context of exercise of powers by the appellate jurisdiction of the Income Tax Tribunal, in the light of the procedure which has been contemplated under Section 255 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Whereas on the contrary, under the Land Revenue laws, the procedure of the same is governed by Chapter 9 of the Land Revenue Act, 1901, which is absolutely distinct in the procedure as contemplated under the Income Tax Act. 21. Hence, the aforesaid two judgments are of no benefit to the petitioner. If the provisions of Chapter 9 of the Land Revenue Act, are taken into consideration, which deals with the procedure to be resorted by the revenue courts and the revenue officers, the provisions of CPC, has been made, its limited applicability to the procedures which had been specifically, provided under the Land Revenue Act, 1901, and thus, the principles of grant of an interim protection, would 15 be governed by the procedure provided under Sections 208 and 209 of the Land Revenue Act, which reads as under:- “208 - Recovery of fines and costs.- All fees, fines, costs, other than costs, between party and party, and other moneys ordered to be paid under this Act, shall be recoverable as if they were an arrear of revenue. A Revenue Court shall have power, subject to any special provisions in this Act, to give and apportion costs due under this Act in any proceedings before it in such manner as it thinks fit: Provided that when land is sold under this section for moneys not payable to the Government, the provisions of Section 161 shall not apply to such sale. 209. Delivery of possession of immovable property.- When an order is made that a person be put in possession of any immovable property, the officer making the order may deliver over possession in the same manner, and with the same powers in regard to all contempts, resistance and the like, as may be lawfully exercised by the Civil Courts, in execution of their own decrees. 22. Though the principles under Section 209 of the Land Revenue Act of 1901, deals with an aspect that where a person is placed in possession of the immovable property, and where the issue of delivery of possession is involved in question, the revenue courts would exercise the powers of civil courts in execution of its orders. 23. In the present case, the petitioner had preferred the writ petition against the grant of interim order which was passed by the Revisional Court, directing the parties to maintain “status quo”, this Court is of the view that in the light of the judgment reported in AIR 1991 (Allahabad Full Bench), 114, “Ganga Saran Vs. Civil Judge, Hapur, Ghaziabad & others”, no writ petition in the exercise of its inherent or supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, would be maintainable, as against the grant of interim protections or interlocutory orders which are passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court because the interim order, which had directed to be maintained, its only an arrangement, which is made between the rival parties, during the pendency of the principle proceedings and it does not adjudicate or determine any right of a parties to the proceedings, and hence in the exercise of extraordinary 16 supervisory jurisdiction, it ought not be exercised by the High Court, in the writ proceedings, wherein the interim orders are put to challenge, the relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder:- “11. With respect to the second question to be answered by us, we are not inclined to deal it elaborately here. Suffice it to say that the view of the Supreme Court in Qamaruddin's case (Supra) that ordinarily an interlocutory order passed in civil suit is not amenable to extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, no doubt is based upon recognised principle taken into consideration by the Court in refusing the writ. In our opinion, this view of the Supreme Court in Qamaruddin's case is based on assumption that a revision u/S. 115, C.P.C. to High Court is maintainable and the party aggrieved can invoke revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. But in a situation where a revision is barred against the appellate or revisional order passed by the district courts and the said order suffers from patent error of law and further causes manifest injustice to the party aggrieved, can it be said that such an order is not amenable to extra-ordinary juris- diction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, in our opinion, although every interlocutory order passed in a Civil Suit is not subject to review under Art. 226 of the Constitution but if it is found from the order impugned that fundamental principle of law has been violated and further such an order causes substantial injustice to the party aggrieved, the view taken by the Supreme Court in Qamaruddin's case (supra) will not preclude such a writ being issued by the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. But only such writ petition under Arts. 226 or 227 of the Constitution would be maintainable where writ can be issued within the ambit of the well-established and recognised principles laid down by the Supreme Court as well as by the various High Courts in that regard. The opinion expressed by the Supreme Court in Qamaruddin's case (supra) to the extent that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to a private individual unless he is under statutory duty to perform a duty is in accord with well-established principles regarding writ of certiorari and mandamus and need no reiteration or elaboration at our hand. Indeed in one case counsel for the respondent did appear but the said counsel contented himself by saying that the matter may be sent back to the lower court after quashing the impugned order if a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to a private individual under Art. 226 of the Constitution. This contention is not correct. Where an aggrieved party approaches High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution against an order passed in civil suit refusing to issue injunction to a private individual who is not under statutory duty to perform public duty or vacating an order of injunction, the main relief is for issue of a writ of 17 mandamus to a private individual and such a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution would not be maintainable. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Qamaruddin's case (Supra) this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to a private party unless he is under a statutory duty to perform a public duty. It is not shown to us that the respondents in these petitions are under any statutory duty and, therefore, these petitions are not maintainable. 12. Our answer to the two questions framed by us are these: Answer to Question No. I : In the negative. Answer to Question No. II : In the affirmative only to this extent that where it is found from the order impugned that fundamental principle of law has been violated and further such an order causes substantial injustice to the party aggrieved, the principle that ordinarily interlocutory order passed in the civil suit is not amenable to extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court, will not preclude such a writ petition being issued by the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution within the ambit of well- established and recognised principles laid down by the Supreme Court.” 24. There had been a consistent opinion of this Court that where the statutory appeal or revision has been preferred, the courts should make an endeavour to ensure that once the proceedings are statutory in nature and are admitted, then interim protection, has had to be granted in order to protect the lis to be rendered infructuous due to pendency of litigation, and that is what has been contemplated in the judgment reported in 1983 AWC 121, “Mool Chand Yadav & another Vs. Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. Rampur and others” relevant paragraph No.4 are extracted hereunder:- “4. We heard Mr. S.N. Kacker, learned Counsel for the appellants, and the respondents appeared by Caveat through Mr. Manoj Swarup, Advocate. We are not inclined to examine any contention on merits at present, but we would like to notice of the emerging situation if the operation of the order under appeal is not suspended during the pendency of the appeal. If the F. A.F.O. is allowed, obviously Mool Chand Yadav would be entitled 18 to continue in possession. Now, if the order is not suspended in order to avoid any action in contempt pending the appeal, Mool Chand would have to vacate the room and handover the possession to the respondents in obedience to the Court's order. We are in full agreement with Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned advocate for respondents, that the Court's order cannot be flouted and even a covert disrespect to Court's order cannot be tolerated. But if orders are challenged and the appeals are pending, one cannot permit a swinging pendulum continuously taking place during the pendency of the appeal, Mr. Manoj Swarup may be wholly right in submitting that there is intentional flouting of the\" Court's order. We are not interdicting that finding. But judicial approach requires that during the pendency of the appeal the operation of an order having serious civil consequences must be suspended. More so when appeal is admitted. Previous history of litigation cannot be overlooked. And it is not seriously disputed that the whole of the building, Hari Bhawan, except one room in dispute is in possession of the Corporation. We accordingly suspend the operation of the order dated 6th August 1982 directing the appellants to handover the possession of the room to the respondents till the disposal of the first appeal against that order pending in the High Court of Allahabad. Mr. Manoj Swarup requests that both the earlier and later Appeals should be heard together as early as possible, We order accordingly and request the High Court if it considers proper in its own discretion to hear both the appeals as expeditiously as possible in order to avoid the continuance of the boiling situation. The appeal stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.” 25. It is also reported in the judgment reported in AIR 1993 Supreme Court, 412, “Shri Kihota Hollohon Vs. Mr. Zachilhu and others”, (5 Judges) which has provided that the status or the subject matter of the proceedings are to be maintained in order to further complicate or multiply the litigation between the parties. The relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder:- “51. Before parting with the case, we should advert to one other circumstance. During the interlocutory stage, the constitution bench was persuaded to make certain interlocutory orders which, addressed as they were to the Speaker of the House, (though, in a different capacity as an adjudicatory forum under the Tenth Schedule) engendered complaints of disobedience culminating in the filing of 19 petitions for initiation of proceedings of contempt against the Speaker. It was submitted that when the very question of jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the matter was raised and even before the constitutionality of Paragraph 7 had been pronounced upon, self restraint required that no interlocutory orders in a sensitive area of the relationship between the legislature and the Courts should been made. The purpose of interlocutory orders is to preserve in status-quo the rights of the parties, so that, the proceedings do not become infructuous by any unilateral overt acts by one side or the other during its pendency. One of the contentions urged was as to the invalidity of the amendment for non- compliance with the proviso to Article 368(2) of the Constitution. It has now been unanimously held that Paragraph 7 attracted the proviso to Article 368(2). The interlocutory orders in this case were necessarily justified so that, no land- slide changes were allowed to occur rendering proceedings ineffective and infructuous.” 26. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in support of his contentions has further made a reference to the two judgments as reported in 2011 (4) Maharashtra Law Journal, page 50, “Ramchandra Ganpatrao Hande @ Handege Vs. Vithalrao Hande and others” and the second judgment which was reported in 2006 (6) Maharashtra Law Journal, 786, “Rupali Mehta Vs. Smt. Tina Narinder Sain Mehta”. 27. Before answering to the references made by the learned Senior Counsel, for the petitioner to the aforesaid two judgments, this Court would too still take a liberty, to draw a distinction. For example to that of the judgment of Rupali Mehta (Supra), it was emanating from the proceedings under Section 217, 268 and 192 of the Indian Succession Act, and the reference may be had to paragraph nos.8, 11 and 13 of the said judgment, which are extracted hereunder:- “8. Sections 192 & 193 quoted above are found in Part- VII of the Act. Perusal of the provisions of Part-VII shows that the order for protection of the property under Part-VII is made by the Court in summary proceeding 20 and the court can make such an order when the Court finds that urgent orders are necessary and the court cannot wait for the party to secure that order by adopting an ordinary remedy of civil suit. The order under Sections 192 and 193 can be made only to prevent a person having no rights in relation to the property taking forcible possession. Sections 208 and 209, in my opinion, are also relevant. They reads as under: 208. Saving of right to bring suit.-Nothing contained in this Part shall be any impediment to the bringing of a suit either by the party whose application may have been rejected before or after the summoning of the party in possession, or by the party who may have been evicted from the possession under this Part. 209. Effect of decision of summary proceeding.- The decision of a District Judge in a summary proceeding under this Part shall have no other effect than that of settling the actual possession; but for this purpose it shall be final, and shall not be subject to any appeal or review.” 11. No doubt not only Section 141, but the entire Civil Procedure Code is applicable to a testamentary suit. Therefore, the power of the court under Order XXXIX would also be available to the court for making orders of temporary injunction. But for making an order of temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, the property in relation to which the order is sought has to be subject matter of the suit. Similar is the case with the provisions of Order XL, in relation to appointment of the receiver. An order of temporary injunction or an order appointing the receiver can be made by the court only in relation to the property which is subject matter of the suit. A civil court can also make interim order in relation to property which is not the subject matter of the suit, but interim order in relation to such property is necessary to be made to secure the execution of the decree that the court may pass in the suit. However, in a testamentary suit, property left behind by the deceased is not the subject matter of the testamentary suit. The nature of decree that the testamentary court passes is such that to secure its execution it is not necessary for the court to make any interim order in relation to any property. The Division Bench of the Patna High Court in its judgment in the case Kashi Nath Singh v. Dulhin Gulzari Kuer AIR 1941 Patna 475 has observed thus: In an application for probate of a will or for the grant of letters of administration with a copy of the will annexed the sole question that arises is whether or not the will is a true one. It is not open to the probate Court to decide whether or not the 21 property with which a testator has purported to deal, in fact, belonged to him. In 19 All 458 Sir John Edge said this: It has been contended that where an application for probate of a will is contested and it is alleged that the property dealt with by the will was not of the testator or was not property over which the testator had a power of testamentary disposal, it is the duty of the Court to try an issue raising this question. All we can say is that it would be exceedingly inconvenient if Courts in this country had to try such issue. A Court could never be quite sure that it had got the proper parties before it. It would be difficult always to be sure that there was no collusion in the case. It is much safer in the interest of the public that issues as to the title to property should be decided when the issues are raised in a regular suit, and not on an application for a grant of probate. It is true that the learned Additional District Judge realised perfectly well that it would have been improper for him to decide whether or not the house and the orchard and kasht land described in the will actually belonged to Mr. Barta Kuar and not to her son, Ram Chariter Singh. It is, however, a pity that he did not also recognize that for more or less the same reasons as made this improper Kashi Nath Singh was not a person interested in the estate of the testatrix and as such entitled to oppose the grant. The result of permitting persons in such a position as Kashi Nath Singh to appear and contest the grant of probate or letters of administration may be very inconvenient and troublesome to the proponents of a will who are thereby put to the expense of proving it in solemn form when it might otherwise be proved in common form. I would dismiss this appeal with costs. 13. It is thus clear that the Supreme Court has held that the proposition of law which is laid down by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in its judgment in Kashi Nath Singh case is undisputable. The Supreme Court has also observed that the testamentary court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of title of the deceased to the property mentioned in the Will. It is thus clear that in a testamentary suit, the property which is mentioned in the Will or property which may be or may not be left behind by the deceased is not the subject matter of the testamentary suit, and therefore, in my opinion, in exercise of its power under Civil Procedure Code, the court would not be entitled to make any interim order in relation to protection of the property, unless, an order is 22 required to be made by the court in the peculiar circumstances under Part-VII of the Act.” 28. The said judgment was under altogether on a different subject and under a different context, and would not be applicable in the instant case, because it was a case where the CPC, was made applicable to the testamentary suit proceedings, and there in those facts and circumstances it has been held that the powers of the court, while dealing with the testamentary suit will have the power which had been conferred to the Civil Courts under Order 39 of the CPC, also for the grant of temporary injunction. 29. In the other matter, on which the reference has been made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is to the judgment of Ramchandra Ganpatrao Hande @ Handege (supra), a reference may be had to the paragraph no.14 of the said judgment, which was yet again dealing with the proceedings, with regards to the implications of Sections 217, 266, 268 and 269 of the Indian Succession Act, which was in the nature of the proceedings which was declaratory in nature which entailed determination of personnel rights of the parties, for the purposes of the grant of probate, which was under consideration, and there in those circumstances in paragraph no.14 of the said judgment, the Court has dealt with the legislative intent and the mandate of Section 269 of the Indian Succession Act, for the purposes of issuance of letter of administration, wherein, it has been opined that in view of the expressed provisions provided under Section 269 (2) of the Indian Succession Act, there is no recourse which has been legislatively made available to the courts to exercise the inherent powers of a civil courts because the issue relates to the grant of probate and a letter of administration only, and it is not a immovable property, which is the subject matter of the proceedings, which is not the case at hand. Hence, it would not be applicable in the present case, which is arising out of the proceedings under the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. 23 30. This Court is of the view that looking to the aforesaid backdrop as discussed above, under which the proceedings have been taken up to the revisional stage under Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, this Court cannot be oblivions of the two facts:- (1) That the mutation made in the revenue records by one of the impugned order, which is under challenged in fact was in compliance of an order of 17.06.1988, which was incorporated in the revenue records after 32 years of its passing of the order, and that too after the death of Smt. Indrawati, in whose favour the mutation order was passed. (2) This Court cannot also be oblivions of the fact that prior to the institution of the revision, if the reference to paragraph nos.5 and 15 of the memorandum of revision, which has already been extracted above, is taken into consideration, it is stated that in a regular proceedings for the declaration of rights under Section 229B of the UPZA& LR Act, where the power to grant of an interim protection has been exercised under Section 229D of the UPZA&LR Act, still when the transfer of the property was restrained and despite of the said restraint order, the sale deeds were executed by the petitioner through his attorney Mr. Dhanjeet Kalita on 14.12.2020. This itself shows the implications and intention of the petitioner, to further complicate the judicial proceedings, by creating new rights by sale of property, which ought to have been safeguarded by the impugned order. 31. In that eventuality and the circumstances, the sale which was made itself was in violation of principal injunction order which was granted in the regular proceedings under Section 229B of the UPZA&LR Act. Hence, in these circumstances, this case cannot be placed on a common pedestal, and dealt with, with a common yardstick and hence if the principles which had been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court; in the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is concerned, are taken into consideration, particularly, in the light of the ratio laid down in the judgment reported in 1987 (2) ARC, page 513, “Mohd. Swalleh 24 & others Vs. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Meerut and another” even if an order is without jurisdiction, then too the proceedings, before the writ courts under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is not available as of right to a party to the proceedings, for the reason being that the powers of the High Court under this Article is purely discretionary in nature, and the exercise of powers to interfere in the proceedings of the inferior courts or Tribunal, cannot be claimed as a matter of a right, because it has been contemplated that the High Court while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the courts may or may not entertain the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in the exercise of its discretion, which would be absolutely dependent upon the circumstances of each case, and which has been quite explicitly dealt with in the aforesaid paragraphs, even if the order impugned is without jurisdiction, but when quashing of it may result into a revival of an illegal order or action, the writ courts can still decline to exercise its jurisdiction. Relevant paragraph is extracted as under:- “7. It was contended before the High Court that no appeal lay from the decision of the Prescribed Authority to the District Judge. The High Court accepted this contention. The High Court finally held that though the appeal laid before the District Judge, the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and was rightly set aside by the District Judge. On that ground the High Court declined to interfere with the order of the learned District Judge. It is true that there has been some technical breach because if there is no appeal maintainable before the learned District Judge, in the appeal before the learned District Judge, the same could not be set aside. But the High Court was exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court had come to the conclusion that the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and improper. The High Court itself could have set it aside. Therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case justice has been done though, as mentioned hereinbefore, technically the appellant had a point that the order of the District Judge was illegal and improper. If we reiterate the order of the High Court as it is setting aside the order of the Prescribed Authority in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution then no exception can be taken. As mentioned hereinbefore, justice has been done and as the improper order of the Prescribed 25 Authority has been set aside, no objection can be taken.” 32. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held in the judgment as reported in ARC 1987 (Supra), that even if the order which is the subject matter of a judicial scrutiny under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, even if it is without jurisdiction, if it is set aside, and it results into the revival of the wrongful order, the writ court will not exercise its jurisdiction and that is why it has been provided that in a writ petition against the interlocutory order passed during the subsistence of the proceedings before the learned Appellate or the Revisional Courts, the court will have to ensure that there has to be a manifest error resulting into a grave injustice, which has been committed by the court or the tribunal, which is not identical in the present case, which is quite apparent from the factual conduct of the petitioner, by proceeding to convey the property, despite injunction under Section 229D of UPZA&LR Act. 33. The Division Bench of a Calcutta High Court in a judgment reported in AIR 1952 Calcutta, Page 192, “Indra Narayan Kundu Vs. Girindra Nath Mitra”. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment reads as under:- “2. The landlord applied for the fixation of standard rent of premises No. 53 Harrison Road which were in the possession of the opposite party, as a tenant. The premises were let in 1934 at a rental of Rs. 185/- and that rent has been paid ever since. The proceedings were commenced before the Rent Control Act of 1950 came into force and the judgment of the Rent Controller was also given before the 1950 Act was in force. An appeal was pending when the 1950 Act came into force and by reason of Section 17(3) of the 1950 Act the appellate Court was bound to apply the provisions of the 1950 Act relating to the fixation of standard rent, and that has been done. 3. As I have already said the application is for revision of the order of the appellate Judge under the provisions of Section 32(4) of the 1950 Act. But this Court has held that that sub-section gives no right to revise an appellate order which 26 was made in proceedings which were instituted before the 1950 Act came into force. These proceedings are governed by the 1948 Act except for the provision which I have already referred to contained in Section 17(3) of the 1950 Act. There was no right of revision under the 1948 Act and this Court has already held in a case similar to the present that no revision at all lies to this Court. 4. Mr. Panchanan Chowdhury however has urged us to treat this application as an application under Article 227 of the Constitution. There is no application before us under that Article and in the circumstances of this case we are not inclined to interfere though we could under powers given by that Article. 5. Mr. Choudhury's argument is that the appellate Judge in this case had no jurisdiction to hear this appeal because it was an appeal governed by the 1948 Act and the appellate Judge was not a person who could hear the appeal. The appeals under the 1948 Act lay to the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes in the Presidency area who could transfer the appeals to persons who were notified by Government under sub-section (2) of Section 32 as persons who could hear appeals. Under the 1950 Act the Chief Judge could transfer the case to any of the Judges of the Small Cause Court and that is what he did in this case. He transferred the case to one of the ordinary Judges of the Court. It may be that the appellate Judge in this case had no jurisdiction to hear this case. But should we interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution? It has been held that interference should be rare under that section and that the Court should only act in cases where there would be a grave miscarriage of justice if the Court did not interfere.” 34. The law thus laid down is that even in the cases, where the orders under challenge of the inferior courts are without jurisdiction, the High Court, not still not to interfere in the exercise of its powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, where such an interference is not called for in the interest of justice. This preposition has been laid down that a High Court exercises its discretionary jurisdiction, the mere fact that a different view could have been taken on a particular controversial issue itself may not be a reason to interfere, in any interlocutory orders which has been put to challenge before it, as would be apparent that the aforesaid 27 principles would be equally applicable in the present case. Though without accepting the argument extended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the order of status quo granted by the court of Additional Commissioner; was beyond its competence, but still looking to the very conduct of the petitioner by taking an advantage of mutation carried after 32 years and had later also proceeded to sell the property within a couple of months of recording of his name, after 32 years, the order of the status quo granted by the Revisional Court by virtue of the impugned orders it rather goes in the spirit of an effective adjudication to protect the multiplicity of the proceedings, and also to protect the abuse of the process of the court, which has emanated herein and rather the order of status quo goes in league with, the interim orders passed in the regular proceedings under Section 229B of UPZA& LR Act while exercising the powers under Section 229D of the UPZA&LR Act, in a pending proceedings where a right of a declaration is still to be adjudicated on merits. We may make reference to the following judgments on the subject. In the case of Hakam Devi and others Vs. Phuman Singh, Buta Singh, which has been reported in AIR 1963 Punjab, 156 , held as under:- “2. In Phalgu Dutt's case MANU/PH/0230/1960 the learned Single Judge observed that the remedy provided under Article 227 is of an extraordinary nature and there is no difference in principle or analogy in the case of a writ under Article 227 which partakes of the essential characteristics of a writ of certiorari which is the subject matter of Article 226. It is desirable at this stage to reproduce Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Article 226, as its marginal heading expressly suggests, deals with the power of High Courts to issue certain writs, end, is in the following terms:-- Power of High Courts to issue certain writs 226. (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories In relation to which It exercises Jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority. Including In appropriate cases any Government, within those territories , directions, orders or wits including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and tor any other purpose. (2) The power conferred an 3 High Court by clause (1) shall not be In derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court 28 by clause (2) of Article 32 Article 227 on the contrary is a provision conferring power of superintendence over all Cons and Tribunals by the High Courts, and reads as follows: - \"Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court 227, (1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation 19 which it exercises Jurisdiction. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High court may- (a) call for returns from such courts; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and (c) prescribe forms In which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts. (3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practising therein: Provided that any rules made, forma prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not ba Inconsis-tent with the provision of any taw for the time being in force, and shall re-quire the previous approval of the Governor. 4.Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court at tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.\" It may here be mentioned that the power of the High court to Issue certain writs, directions and orders as conferred by Article 226 is exercisable notwithstanding anything contained in Article 32 Clause 2 of which confers on the Supreme Court power to issue \"directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate\", for the enforcement of any of the right conferred by Part III. A comparison of this clause with Article 226 would show that the High Court is in addition empowered to issue 29 directions, orders or writs for any purpose other than the enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. A bare reading of Articles 223 and 227, which have been reproduced above, shows in clear and unmistakable terms that the power conferred by Article 227 is that of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals whereas the power conferred by Article 226 expressly refers to directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of the five categories mentioned therein and they can be Issued to any person or authority including in appropriate cases any Government within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court concerned. Article 226 is a new provision introduced by the Constitution-makers in our Constitution whereas Article 227 is in substance a reproduction of Section 107 of the GOVT. of India Act 1915, with this further addition that under Article 227 this Court can exercise its power of superintendence even over Tribunals which are not Courts. Previously, the three Presidency High Courts undoubtedly used to exercise the power of issuing prerogative writs, but this jurisdiction was claimed by those High courts as successors of the old Supreme Court and, was, therefore, confined only to the limits of the Presidency towns. The other High Courts had never possessed any such jurisdiction prior to the introduction of the Constitution. The power of superintendence restored by Article 227 in slightly enlarged form was, however, possessed by all the High Courts under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, and, as I will presently show, also under the Indian High Courts Act of 1861, I may here reproduce Section 107 :- \"107. Each of the high courts has superintendence over all courts for the time being subject to its appellate jurisdiction, and may do any of the following things, that is to say,-- (a) call for returns; (b) direct the transfer of any suit or appeal from any such court to any other court of equal or superior jurisdiction; (c) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; (d) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts Shall be kept by the officers of any such courts, and (e) settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff, attorneys and all clerks and officers of courts: Provided that such rules, forms end tables shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of any Act for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval, in the case of the high Court at Calcutta, of the Governor-General In Council, and in other cases of the local Government. 30 This section used to be quite frequently utilised by suitors for invoking the power of superintendence of the High Courts in keeping the subordinate Courts within their bounds in cases where Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, was, for certain reasons, held to be inapplicable, but there was hardly a case in which the provisions of this section were considered to confer on the High Court power to issue writs in the popular sense as understood in law. As a matter of fact this very question came up before me in Hudi v. Sudi, Civil Misc. No. 630 of 1960: (AIR 1962 Punj 467) when a preliminary objection was raised on the ground of non-impleading of the Tribunal whose order was challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution. Phalgu Dutt's case MANU/PH/0230/1960 was of course not cited at the bar. But I repelled the objection holding that Article 227 does not confer on this Court writ jurisdiction which is created by Article 226 with the result that the presence of the Tribunal in the array of respondents is not mandatory. There I also pointed out the distinction between Articles 226 and 227 as postulated by the rules framed by this Court for petitions under Article 226. A couple of months later again this very question was raised before me in Faqir Chand Anant Ram v. Gopi Chand MANU/PH/0194/1962. On this occasion, Phalgu Dutt's case MANU/PH/0230/1960 was relied upon in support of the objection but I felt considerable doubt about the correctness of the view taken in that case. However, in spite of my doubt, I did not refer the matter to a larger Bench because, on the merits, I felt that the petition in any case deserved to be dismissed. 3. That the jurisdiction under Article 227 is not completely identical with the jurisdiction which this Court exercises under Article 226 would also appear to Una support from the view consistently taken by this Court that orders under Article 227 are not subject to appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, unlike orders under Article 226. This view has been taken in the following decisions, among others:-- Raj Kishan Jain v. Tulsi Dass MANU/PH/0088/1959 and Braham Dutt v. Peoples' Co- operative Transport Society Ltd. New Delhi 1960 PLR 916: (AIR 19S1 P&H 24). 5. It is no doubt true that the origin of the power to issue the necessary writ of cartiorari lay in the power of superintendence of the superior Court over inferior bodies doing judicial acts but then that specific and precise power has in express terms been conferred on High Courts by Article 226 of the Constitution and not by Article 227. An application under Article 227 would thus not entail dismissal as a matter of law merely on the ground that the Tribunal whose order is challenged has not been arrayed as party respondent in the petition. I am not called upon to, and I need not, advert to the question whether a prayer for a direction, order or writ etc. can be technically entertained in a 31 petition specifically filed under Article 227 for that is not the point referred.” 35. In the case of Chintamani Sharan Nath Sahadeo Vs. State of Bihar and others, which has been reported in AIR 1990 Patna Page 165. Relevant paragraph is extracted hereunder:- “27. Even if the order of respondent No. 2 was without jurisdiction, since it has corrected the order which was also improper and invalid and as justice has been done and improper order of respondent No. 3 has been set aside, I decline to exercise my discretion in favour of the petitioner, because if I set aside the order as contained in annexure 9 that will revive the invalid and improper order passed by respondent No. 3.” 36. Hence for the reasons aforesaid, this Court is of the view that the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, to refrain itself in interfering in the interlocutory orders in order to meet a wider interest of justice. For the facts and circumstances, which has already been dealt with above, this writ petition lacks merit and the same is accordingly dismissed. (Sharad Kumar Sharma, J.) 02.07.2021 NR/ "