Shyam Lal Sharma and Bajrang Lal and Shola Ram and Ram Prasad Sharma and Bhudh Ram V. Hindustan Copper Limited

CW/8623/2008

AI Insights

The case involves a group of petitioners who were employees of Hindustan Copper Limited (HCL) and had opted for voluntary retirement under various schemes. They sought the benefits of a pay revision settlement that was applicable to all regular workmen on the rolls of HCL as of 01.11.1997. The settlement was not extended to the petitioners by HCL, citing a Supreme Court ruling that treated voluntarily retired employees as a separate class not entitled to such benefits. The petitioners contested this decision, arguing that the settlement did not distinguish between different classes of employees and that they were entitled to the same benefits as other ex-employees who had not taken voluntary retirement.

• Counselvise Citation: [2018] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 802982 (HC-RAJASTHAN)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 26-11-2018
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Bank of India & Anr. Versus K. Mohandas And Others, Life Insurance Corporation of India And Others Versus Retired LIC Officers Association And Others, HEC Voluntary Retd. Employees Welfare Society And Another Versus Heavy Engineering Corpn. Ltd. And Others, A.K. Bindal And Another Versus Union of India And Others, Vijay Kumar And Others Versus Whirlpool of India Ltd. And Others, ITI Limited Versus ITI EX/VR Employees/Officers Welfare Association And Others, Radha Kishan Bal Kishan Muchhal & Co. Vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Shankara Co-op Housing Society Ltd. Vs. M. Prabhakar and Ors., Nand Kishore Gupta and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors., Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and Ors. Versus G. Jayarama Reddy and Ors., Empire Jute Co. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Mundra International Containerterminal Private Ltd. And Anr. Vs. The Gujrat Maritime Board and Ors.
• Laws Referred To: Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
• Result in Favour of: Others
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: ABHAY KUMAR BHANDARI; VAIBHAV BHARGAVA
• Assessee Lawyers: G S GILL; ASHWINI JAIMAN; SAUGATH ROY
• Keywords: Arrears; Discrimination; Pay Revision; Settlement; Voluntary Retirement Scheme
• Section: 18(3); 33-C(2)

Judgement Text

"HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2548/2010 1. Shyam Lal Sharma age about 63 years, Son of Late Shri Banwari Lal Sharma, retired as Engineering Assistant (civil) Code No. 28235 presently residing at Sector 1/95 malviya Nagar, Jaipur. 2. Bajrang Lal, son of Late Shri Mali Ram, retired as work Assistant ‘A’ Civil Code No. 11168, Resident of Village & Post Sultana District Jhunjhunu. 3. Shola Ram son of Late Shri Baksha Ram Code No.28238 Resident of Village Dudania Post Gagreta Tehsil Khetri District Jhunjhunu. 4. Ram Prasad Sharma son & nominee of Late Shri Nand Lal Sharma Code No. 23064, Resident of Khetri Naar, Jhunjhunu. 5. Bhudh Ram, son & nominee of Late Shri Surja Ram Service Code No. 28237, Resident of Village & Post Chirani, Tehsil Khetri, Jhunjhunu. ….Petitioners Versus The Hindustan Copper Limited through General Manager, Khetri Copper complex, Khetri Nagar, District Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan. ……..Respondent Connected With S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8623/2008 1. Hindustan Copper Sewa Nivrit Karmchari Sangh, Khetri Nagar, Jhunjhunu through its Secretary B.K. Upadhyay Son of Late Shri Chandrama Upadhyay aged about 60 years resident of Khetrinagar, Jhunjhunu. 2. Pitram Saini Son of Shii Dhola Ram Saini aged about 59 years resident of 116, Vishvanathdham Colony, Niwaru bypass Road, Jhotwara, Jaipur. 3. Harish Dixit Son of Late Shri Heera lal Dixit aged about 64 years resident of 69-A, Bal Bihar, Kalwar Road, Jhotwara, Jaipur. 4. B.K. Upadhyay Son of Late Shri Chandrama Upadhyay aged about 60 years resident of Khtrinagar, Jhunjhunu. …...Petitioners (2 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] Versus 1. The Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Mines, New Delhi. 2. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director, M/s. Hindustan Copper Limited, Tamra Bhawan 1-Ashutosh Chaudhary Avenue, Kolkata. 3. General Manager, Hindustan Copper Limited, Khetri Copper Complex, Khetri Nagar, Jhunjhunu. Respondents S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8640/2008 1. Hindustan Copper Sewa Nivrit Karmchari Sangh, Khetri Nagar, Jhunjhunu through its President G.R. Sharma, Son of Shri Uma Shankar Sharma aged about 66 years resident of Singhana, Jhunjhunu. 2. B.S. Srivastava Son of Shri B.P. Srivastava aged about 65 years resident of Taranagar, Jhotwara, Jaipur. 3. H.R. Sharma Son of Shri M.L. Sharma aged about 66 years resident of Mandawa District Jhunjhunu. 4. G.R. Sharma Son of Shri Uma Shankar Sharma aged about 66 years resident of Singhana, Jhunjhunu. …...Petitioners Versus 1. The Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Mines, New Delhi. 2. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director, M/s. Hindustan Copper Limited, Tamra Bhawan 1-Ashutosh Chaudhary Avenue, Kolkata. 3. General Manager, Hindustan Copper Limited, Khetri Copper Complex, Khetri Nagar, Jhunjhunu (Raj.) 4. The Assistant Secretary, D.O.P. Group. II, Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur. Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. G.S. Gill, Adv., Mr. Ashwini Jaiman, Adv. Dr. Saugath Roy, Adv. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Abhay Kumar Bhandari Senior (3 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] Advocate with Mr. Vaibhav Bhargava, Adv. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA Order reserved on 25 th October, 2018 Order pronounced on 26 th November, 2018 REPORTABLE:- 1. On 25.10.2018 while reserving the cases the Court passed the following order:- “(1) SB Civil Writ Petition No.2548/2010 (Shyam Lal Sharma & Ors. Vs. Hindustan Copper Limited) came to be listed before this on 22/10/2018 wherein after hearing arguments, order was dictated in open Court. (2) Before draft of the aforesaid order could be prepared and placed for signature, two similar cases i.e. SB Civil Writ Petition No.8623/2008 (Hindustan Copper Sewa Nivrit Karmchari Sangh and Others Vs. The Union of India and others) and SB Civil Writ Petition No.8640/2008 (Hindustan Copper Sewa Nivrit Karmchari Sangh and Others Vs. The Union of India and others) also came to be listed on 24/10/2018 wherein arguments were advanced again by counsel for the respondents and it was submitted that the entire law in relation to the case was not put forward earlier on 22/10/2018 and accordingly, SB Civil Writ Petition No.2548/2010 (Shyam Lal Sharma & Ors. Vs. Hindustan Copper Limited) was ordered to be listed again in ‘to be mentioned’ category for today and the aforesaid two similar writ petitions were also ordered to be listed today. (4 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] (3) Today, arguments have been again heard at length in all the aforesaid writ petitions and the order is reserved. (4) In view thereof, the order dictated in open Court in SB Civil Writ Petition No.2548/2010 (Shyam Lal Sharma & Ors. Vs. Hindustan Copper Limited), need not be signed and is ordered to be treated as recalled.” 2. All the cases have been heard. Learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that while petitioners in SBCWP No.2548/2010 have approached this Court in individual capacity the other two writ petitions have been filed on behalf of the Union as well as individuals. 3. The case of the petitioners in brief is that the respondents a government of India Enterprises has a unit at Khetrinagar, Jhunjhunu known as Khetri Copper Complex. It has introduced from time to time the voluntary retirement schemes laying down certain conditions and terms therein. Schemes were introduced in the year 1993, 1999, 2001 and 2002. Petitioners are those persons who have taken voluntary retirement under the aforesaid schemes. The schemes specifically mention conditions of opting laying down a particular time frame. In the circumstances, the employees under an atmosphere of uncertainty and of being retrenched opted for the scheme. At the time of the floating of the said schemes, the pay revision was pending, which was brought in force from 1997 after the petitioners had been voluntary retired. The revision of the pay scale was done on the basis of a settlement w.e.f. 01.11.1997. The said 5th All India Wage Settlement arrived at between (5 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] management of HCL mentions of the 4th All India Wage Settlement signed on 20th December, 1995 which was made operative from 01.11.1992 to 31.10.1997. The petitioners submit further that the circular was issued on 20.02.1995 to the effect that those employees who have retired or would be retiring under the Companies Voluntary Retirement Scheme would be entitled to wage, revision pay benefits as and when the same is finalized. The respondent-HCL after floating of the aforesaid schemes, on 19.04.2006 settlement was arrived at between workmen of HCL and union with regard to the revision of pay scales of all regular workmen borne on the rolls of HCL on 01.11.1997, the petitioners therefore demanded entitlement for revision of their pay scales as they were all regular workmen on the rolls of HCL as on 01.11.1997. However, as the petitioners were not given the arrears under the pay settlement effective from 01.11.1997, the petitioners demanded to release the same which was rejected by the respondent conveying a letter to the Hindustan Copper Limited, Khetri Jhujhunu i.e. the petitioner- Union informing vide letter dated 12.02.2008 that in pursuance of the Supreme Court order and other Court rulings, employees who had opted for VRS scheme were not entitled to any arrears arising out of subsequent pay revision. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioners have preferred the present writ petitions. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the period of settlement would be from 01.11.1997 upto 31.10.2007. The scope and coverage specifically mentions to (6 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] cover all regular workmen borne on roles of Hindustan Copper Limited as on 01.11.1997 subject to conditions as enumerated in paras 7.1 and 8.1 of the memorandum of the settlement. Thus, it is submitted that the petitioners who were on rolls of HCL as on 01.11.1997 cannot be discriminated and denied benefits of settlement merely because they have subsequently sought voluntary retirement under the various scheme floated after 01.11.1997. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners Mr. G.S. Gill has taken this Court to the various documents which have been placed on record to submit that while those employees who had died or resigned or discharged or dismissed or terminated from service have been granted benefit of the settlement for the period till the date of their superannuation from HCL, the petitioners who had voluntary retired were denied the said benefits even the employees who had superannuated were also given benefit. Learned counsel submits that no distinction can be drawn between the ex-employees of the HCL who had superannuated, removed, dismissed and discharged from service and the present set of employees who have voluntary retired as the settlement does not make any distinction between the employees. Learned counsel submits that the judgments of the Supreme Courts have to be applied in facts of each case which are on record and in cases where different classes have been laid down under the pay revision settlement, the facts have to be interpreted differently from the facts as are available on record in the present settlement. Learned counsel has also taken this Court to the (7 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] letter dated 12.01.2008 which provides that “arrears of payment including difference of terminal dues if any will also cover ex- employees separated on and from 01.08.2002 on account of superannuation, death, resignation, discharged, dismissal, termination provided there is no inhibiting class.” In view thereof, learned counsel submits that distinction drawn by the respondent on the basis of Supreme Court orders could not have been applied on the petitioners. 6. Learned counsel Mr. Ashwini Jaiman while supporting arguments of Mr. G.S. Gill, has further submitted that not only the respondents have drawn an artificial distinction, but a discrimination has been crept in. It is submitted that there is no rational to create a separate class moreover at the time when the petitioners had sought voluntary retirement. A promise was already made while issuing circular dated 20.02.1995 that all the concerned employees who would be retiring under the companies voluntary retirement scheme would be entitled to wage revision pay benefits as and when the same is finalized. It is vehemently put forward that circular has not been withdrawn nor the Supreme Court or any other Court has set-aside the circular dated 20.02.1995. In the circumstances, the benefit already granted to the petitioner by the aforesaid circular could not be deprived on the ground that in a different case relating to a separate set of pay revision scheme, the Supreme Court had taken a view treating voluntary retired persons as a separate class. Learned counsel has also taken this Court through Government of India Office memorandum dated 08.12.2000 (8 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] wherein parameters on the basis of which voluntary retirement scheme for employees of public enterprises were clarified and it was on a specific query “whether any arrears of ex gratia are to be paid in the event of pay revision being sanctioned subsequent to the voluntary superannuation ?” It was answered that ex gratia will be recalculated on the basis of revised pay scales and the difference be paid. Thus, it is argued that the action of the respondents is unjustified and illegal and amounts to withholding the dues to which is entitled wrongfully and unjustifiably. Learned counsel also submits that vide order dated 13.07.2001, 10% of the respective basic pay of the concerned workmen as on 01.06.2001 was also released as an interim relief to the workmen and one Damodar Dutta who was an Ex-Senior Accounts Officer was granted the benefit of arrears who was also similarly placed and had taken voluntary retirement under the earlier pay revision thus he submits that once the benefit under the earlier pay revision was granted to the persons who had voluntary retired after onward 1992, a different yardstick cannot be adopted for those who have retired after 01.11.1997. Learned counsel has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Bank of India & Anr. Versus K. Mohandas And Others, (2009) 5 SCC 313 and Life Insurance Corporation of India And Others Versus Retired LIC Officers Association And Others, (2008) 3 SCC 321. 7. Learned counsel Dr. Saugath Roy appearing in the other writ petition, has apart from adopting the arguments raised by their (9 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] colleagues, submits that settlement of wages had arrived at between the parties has to be read as per the terms therein. It is submitted that under Section 18 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1947’), settlement is enforceable and binding on all the parties to the Industrial Dispute and to the workmen to which the dispute relates. Since the settlement is for the period from 01.11.1997 to 31.10.2007 all the workmen and employees who were on rolls as on 01.11.1997 would form a same class unless there is a specific execution in terms of the settlement itself. It is submitted that this Court or the respondents would not add or subtract any word from the concerned settlement and it is submitted that the golden rule of interpretation has to be applied for interpreting the meaning and import of the terms of the settlement. Dr. Saugath Roy submits that in his case, the petitioners had preferred an application under Section 33 C (2) for claiming the arrears and releasing the same in their favour on the basis of an award passed by the Labour Court on 13.11.1979 in their favour for grant of promotion which was not complied with. During the pendency of the application under Section 33 C (2) and the settlement was arrived at between the parties on 05.03.1982. According to the same, petitioners were declared entitled for personal pay of Rs.595-955/- w.e.f. 02.04.1978. Accordingly, the case was decided accepting the said settlement by award passed on 12.06.1998. The said award was challenged before the High Court which was dismissed. In the meanwhile, the petitioners No.1 and 3 took VRS on (10 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] 17.05.2000 and petitioner No.2 took VRS on 31.02.1999. D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.799/2009 (Hindustan Copper Limited Versus Judge Labour Court & Others) was preferred against the dismissal of the writ petition dated 06.04.2009 which was also dismissed by the Division Bench on 02.09.2009. Accordingly, it is submitted that the petitioners became entitled to their pay fixation under the award w.e.f. 02.04.1978 in the pay scale of Rs.595-955/- and also on the basis of settlement dated 19.04.2006 but the same was released after filing of the writ petition, the respondents have released amount in terms of the award dated 13.11.1979 granting them benefit of pay scale from 02.04.1978 but the arrears under the settlement dated 19.04.2006 were not released on the ground that the petitioners had been voluntary retired under the voluntary retirement scheme. 8. Per contra learned senior counsel appearing for the HCL Shri Abhay Kumar Bhandari has opposed the claim of the petitioners and submits that the action of the HCL in denying the benefits of settlement dated 19.04.2006 to the persons who have retired under the voluntary retirement scheme was justified and proper. It is submitted that since the petitioners form a separate class, they could not be equated with those who have superannuated, dismissed, discharged or being left the organization on account of any other reason. Learned counsel emphasized his submission on the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in HEC Voluntary Retd. Employees Welfare Society And Another Versus Heavy Engineering Corpn. (11 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] Ltd. And Others, 2006 (3) SCC 708, wherein the voluntary retired persons were treated as a separate class of employees and were not granted the benefit of revised pay scale which had come into force retrospectively. Learned counsel also relies on the earlier judgment passed in A.K. Bindal And Another Versus Union of India And Others, (2003) 5 SCC 163 and Vijay Kumar And Others Versus Whirlpool of India Ltd. And Others, (2008) 1 SCC 119 and ITI Limited Versus ITI EX/VR Employees/Officers Welfare Association And Others, 2010 (12) SCC 347. 9. I have heard learned counsels and given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions raised as noted above. The voluntary retired persons who have been allowed under the voluntary retirement schemes are provided certain benefits as laid down therein. The benefits which are granted, are based on the basis of the salary which the said individual is drawing. The entire ex gratia payment and the gratuity, provident fund, transfer benefits and compensations payable to such an employee is calculated on the basis of the salary which he is drawing on the day when he voluntary retires. Till that date, when his voluntary retirement is allowed, he remains as an employee of the concern. All the benefits to which he is entitled are calculated as a lump sum for the future service which he would have rendered with the institution and has been shortened on the basis of the voluntary retirement. The benefits which have already been paid to the concerned person are not accounted for. Thus, for any rights which may accrue (12 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] subsequently to an employee, would not be available to a voluntary retired person. However, so far as the benefits which have been created in relation to service already rendered, would continue to accrue as a vested right to a voluntary retired person. 10. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, if the case of the petitioners is examined in light of the settlement agreement entered on 19.04.2006, it is noticed that the preamble of the settlement mentions of the previous pay fixation having been done as on 01.01.1992 in the year 1995. The fixation under the present settlement, is for the period from 01.11.1997 to 31.10.2007. The scope and coverage of the terms of settlement outlined that it shall cover all regular workmen borne on rolls of HCL as on 01.11.1997 subject to the conditions laid down in paras 7.1 and 8.1 of the memorandum of the settlement. Paras 7.1 and 8.1 read as under:- “7.1 The fixation of pay in the revised scales of pay will be effective from 1.11.1997. However, this fixation will be notional from 1.11.1997 and actual payment would commence from 1.8.2004 in the revised scales of pay. 8.1 The matter of payment of arrears for the earlier period from 1.11.1997 to 31.7.2004 and modalities of payment thereof will be discussed and decided separately keeping in view the paying capacity of the company in consultation with Administrative Ministry.\" From above, it is thus apparent that the fixation of the revised pay scales under the settlement shall be notional from 01.11.1997 upto 01.08.2004 and the modalities for the actual payment for the period from 01.11.1997 to 31.07.2004 would be (13 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] laid down separately keeping in view the paying capacity of the company. If both the aforesaid paras are read with para 1.1, the conclusion which one can draw is that all the workmen who were borne on roles of HCL as on 01.11.1997 would be entitled to the benefit of settlement, however their fixation would be done notionally and actual payment of the period from 01.11.1997 to 31.07.2004 would be released subject to separate orders being issued in that regard. From the documents which have been placed on record by the petitioners, the actual payment of arrears on account of pay wage fixation to the employees who were on roles as on 01.11.1997 has been also released to ex- employees, who died, resigned, discharged, dismissed or terminated or superannuated vide circulars dated 30.05.2006, 21.06.2006, 28.09.2007 and 12.01.2008 (Annexures 11-14) in SBCWP No.8623/2008. 11. The question before this Court is only with respect to entitlement of the benefits of the settlement to the employees who have taken retirement under the voluntary retirement scheme. 12. To decide the aforesaid question, the judgment cited and relied upon by the respondents need to be looked into. In A.K. Bindal Versus Union of India (supra), the department of public enterprises had issued an office memorandum on 12.04.1993 withdrawing the ban and allowing the public sector enterprises to negotiate wage structure. This was followed by office memorandum dated 19.07.1995 whereby revision of pay scales of executives was revised w.e.f. (14 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] 01.01.1992. However, para 13 of the memorandum mentioned for sick PSE’s registered with BIFR, pay revision and grant of benefits would be allowed if it is decided to revive the unit. The said clause was challenged alongwith certain other clauses by the union of the executives of the FCI and HFC and in the said circumstances relying upon the financial conditions of the FCI and HFC who were registered with the BIFR at that relevant time found that the employees who accepted VRS in the said companies which were incurring losses, it was held that such a condition laid down in the scheme could not be said to be unjustified. Taking into consideration that nearly 99% of the employees had also opted voluntary retirement scheme and left the company challenging the conditions of the office memorandum was not made out and the writ petitions were declared to have become infructuous. 13. In the case of HEC Voluntary Retd. Employees Welfare Society And Another Versus Heavy Engineering Corpn. Ltd. And Others (supra), the voluntary retirement scheme of 20.10.1990 was introduced in furtherance thereof the employees had sought voluntary retirement relating to government company which was already referred to BIFR under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, company issued a circular on 09.10.1997 effecting revision of pay with retrospective effect from 01.01.1992 to remain into force upto 31.12.1996. However, Clause 3.2 and para 3.3 of the revision of pay circular reads as under:- “3.2 The revised scales of pay shall also be applicable on a pro rata basis to only those executives, non-unionised supervisors (15 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] and employees in equivalent salary grads who were on the rolls of the Corporation as on 1-1-1992 but have subsequently ceased to be in service of the Corporation on account of superannuation or death. 3.3. Benefits of revision of scales of pay shall not be applicable to those executives, non-unionised supervisors and employees in equivalent salary grades of the Corporation who were on the rolls of the Corporation as on 1-1-1992 but have subsequently left the services of the Corporation for the following reasons: 3.3.1. dismissal; 3.3.2. discharge; 3.3.3. resignation without permission; 3.3.4. resignation in cases where disciplinary action for misconduct involving moral turpitude had been initiated or contemplated.” Those who had voluntary retired between 01.01.1992 and 31.12.1996 claimed benefit of revision of pay, the Supreme Court has held under:- “11. An offer for voluntary retirement in terms of a scheme, when accepted, leads to a concluded contract between the employer and the employee. In terms of such a scheme, an employee has an option either to accept or not to opt therefore. The scheme is purely voluntary, in terms whereof the tenure of service is curtailed which is permissible in law. Such a scheme is ordinarily floated with a purpose of downsizing the employees. It is beneficial both to the employees as well as to the employer. Such a scheme is issued for effective functioning of the industrial undertakings. Although the Company is a \"State\" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the terms and conditions of service would be governed by the contract of employment. Thus, unless the terms and conditions of such a contract are governed by a statute or statutory rules, the provisions of Contract Act would be applicable both at the formulation of the contract as also the determination thereof. By reason of such a scheme only an invitation of offer is floated. (16 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] When pursuant to or in furtherance of such a voluntary retirement scheme an employee opts therefore, he makes an offer which upon acceptance by the employer gives rise to a contract. Thus, as the matter relating to voluntary retirement is not governed by any statute, the provisions of Indian Contract Act, 1872, therefore, would be applicable too. 12. It is also common knowledge that a scheme of voluntary retirement is preceded by a financial planning. Finances for such purpose, either in full or in part, might have been provided for by the Central Government. Thus financial implications arising out of implementation of a scheme must have been borne in mind by the Company, particularly when it is a sick industrial undertaking. Offers of such number of employees for voluntary retirement, in that view of the matter, were to be accepted by the Company only to the extent of finances available therefore. 16. The question which arises for our consideration is whether in view of the fact that the employees who had opted for voluntary retirement having not been excluded from the purview of Clause 3.3 of the said Circular No.5/97, would be treated to be included or the benefits thereof would be available to only such employees who come within the purview of Clause 3.2 thereof ? 26. Considering the matter from that context, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that the Company intended to extend the said benefits to those who had opted for voluntary retirement. Clause 3.2 of the circular includes only those who were on the rolls of the Corporation as on 1.1.1992, as also those who ceased to be in service on that date on account of superannuating or death. The appellants do not come in the said category. In view of the fact that they have not been expressly included within the purview thereof, we are of the opinion that although they have not been excluded by Clause 3.3, they would be deemed to be automatically excluded.” 14. In the aforesaid case of ITI Limited Versus ITI EX/VR Employees/Officers Welfare Association And Others (17 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] (supra), the benefit of subsequent wage revision with retrospective fact was denied by the Apex Court. Taking into consideration the relief clause 23.1 of the voluntary retirement scheme which mentioned specifically as under:- “23.1…….Calculations related to compensation paid under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, incentive for not availing house building advance/interest subsidy for housing loan and/or vehicle advance shall not be reopened.” 15. In 2008 (1) SCC 119, Vljay Kumar & Ors. Versus Whirlpool of India Ltd. & Ors. (supra), the Apex Court has held that Section 33 C (2) cannot be invoked to seek benefits under the settlement, in that cases, the Apex Court denied the benefit to the employees who had taken voluntary retirement as the settlement only cover cases of existing employees alone. The case is thus distinguishable. Thus, in each of the above case, individual schemes had different condition for grant of revised pay scale and voluntary retirement. 16. The Court in the aforesaid judgments treated voluntary retired persons were as a separate class and held them not entitled to the benefit of the pay revision but in the present case as noticed above the settlement granting pay revision dated 19.04.2006 does not carve out any distinction between existing employees as on the date when the settlement was arrived at and the ex-employees. The distinction between employees ceased to be in service on account of superannuation or death or those who have been dismissed, discharged, resigned for any reason, is also not mentioned. On the other hand, the settlement (18 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] has kept all the employees who were on rolls as on 01.11.1997 at the same pedestal without making distinction amongst them on account of any change of status which may have arisen after 01.11.1997. 17. It is also noticed that the voluntary retired employees got all their benefits under the old pay scales and were not in any manner better placed than those who retired ordinarily and who have got the benefit under the new pay scales, distinction in this regard has also not been made by the authorities introducing the settlement scheme. Therefore, this Court would not venture to add or subtract anything from the scheme which has been floated by the authorities and approved under a settlement. 18. Applying principles of golden rule of interpretation which lays down that the interpretation of a sentence has to be made ordinarily according to the meaning of the words used in the sentence, a statement must be read as a whole. Natural and ordinary meaning of words should not be departed from unless it could be shown that a legal content in which the words are used requires a different meaning. It would be useful to quote the passage of the Principles of Statutory Interpretation (Justice G.P. Singh) (twelfth edition) which reads as under:- “The Rule of Literal Construction (a) Natural and grammatical meaning The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the is (19 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. “The true way”, according to LORD BROUGHAM is, “to take the words as the Legislature have given them, and to take the meaning which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of those words is, either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question, controlled or altered”, and in the words of VISCOUNT HALDANE, L.C., if the language used “has a natural meanint we cannot depart from that meaning unless, reading the statute as a whole, the context directs us to do so.” In an oft-quoted passage, LORD WENSLEYDALE stated the rule thus: “In construing wills and indeed statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the word is adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity, and inconsistency, but no further”, And stated LORD ATKINSON: “In the construction of statutes, their words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the context, or in the object of the statute in which they occur or in the circumstances in which they are used, to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense”, VISCOUNT SIMON, L.C., said: “The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning”. Natural and ordinary meaning of words should not be departed from “unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning”. Such a meaning cannot be departed from by the judges “in the light of their own views as to policy” although they can “adopt a purposive interpretation if they can find in the statute read as a whole or in material to which they are permitted by law to refer as aids to interpretation an expression of Parliament’s purpose or policy”. For a modern statement of the rule one may refer to the Speech of LORD SIMON OF GLAISDALE in a recent case where he said: “Parliament is prima facie to credited with meaning what is said in an Act of (20 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] parliament. The drafting of statutes, so important to a people who hope to live under the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless courts seek whenever possible to apply ‘the golden rule’ of construction, that is to read the statutory language, grammatically and terminologically, in the ordinary and primary sense which it bears in its context, without omission or addition. Of course, Parliament is to be credited with good sense; so that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no further”. The rules stated above have been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court.” 19. The Apex Court in the cases of Radha Kishan Bal Kishan Muchhal & Co. Vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (1977) ILR 1 Delhi 162; Shankara Co-op Housing Society Ltd. Vs. M. Prabhakar and Ors. AIR 2011 SC 2161; Nand Kishore Gupta and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 2010 SC 3654; Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and Ors. Versus G. Jayarama Reddy and Ors. (2011) 10 SCC 608; Empire Jute Co. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1980 SC 1946 and Mundra International Containerterminal Private Ltd. And Anr. Vs. The Gujrat Maritime Board and Ors., has held that each case has to be decided on its own facts. 20. In the present case, when the earlier pay fixation was made in the year 1995 revising the pay scale from 1992 the benefits were granted to the employees who had voluntary retired during the said period by revising their voluntary retirement benefits. A promise to the petitioners was also made by the company of granting them the benefit of revision of pay to the employees (21 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] who have retired under the company voluntary retirement scheme. The short recital of the preamble to the settlement dated 19.04.2006 mentions the HCL to have come out of the financial crunch and the case of the petitioner company cannot be equated with those which were before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases as the companies therein were those which had already been referred to BIFR under the SICA 1985. The Apex Court taking into consideration the funding incapabilities of the said companies, upheld the criteria of not granting the benefit to those who have ceased to have its employees, and held that persons who have sought voluntary retirement would not be entitled to the benefit of the revision of pay in terms of the concerned circular while the case before this Court is distinguishable. In the present case settlement, there is no such provision to deny the benefit of revision of pay scale to the ex- employees. Once the benefit of revision of pay scale has been granted to the employees who have already been dismissed from service or discharged or resigned for any reason, the employees who have been granted VRS cannot be treated at a lower pedestal to such ex-employees. 21. The action of the respondents in denying the petitioners benefits of the settlement which has an enforceable character in terms of Section 18 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is thus found to be unjustified and illegal. It amounts to changing the terms and conditions of the settlement arbitrarily and in violation of Section 18 (3) of the Act of 1947. The contentions of the respondent while issuing the impugned letter dated (22 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] 12.02.2008, that the Supreme Court having passed an order dis- entitling the employees is also not made out as no such order has been produced. 22. After having held so question arises as to what benefit can a voluntary retired employee receive under the settlement of 2006. So far as the employees who come in the category of voluntary retired under the voluntary retirement scheme, are concerned, all of them were on rolls as on 01.11.1997 till they were granted retirement their pay fixation is required to be notionally fixed and thus the benefits to voluntary retired under the voluntary retirement scheme would have to be notionally fixed under the settlement scheme and the arrears on the basis of the notionally fixed salary will have to be calculated under the prevailing voluntary retirement scheme for release of voluntary retirement benefits as I have already stated in the forgoing paras, the voluntary retiral benefits are based on the salary being drawn by the concerned individual on the day when he is voluntary retiring. Thus viewed, salary is as already been revised on that date or his benefit to have been released on that date, by deeming fiction, the voluntary retiral benefits will also be required to be revised on the basis of the deemed revised salary. However, as noted above that the company has also released actual arrears to the employees for the period from 01.11.1997 upto 31.07.2004. If the fact is found to be correct, similar benefit of actual payment would also become entitled to the voluntary retirement employees and no distinction can be drawn. (23 of 23) [CW-2548/2010] 23. Accordingly, in view of the above, the writ petitions are allowed. The letter dated 12.02.2008 is quashed and set-aside. The respondents shall now release the benefits to the employees individually. Since there were different schemes floated for voluntary retirement. For the said purpose, the petitioners shall place before the respondent-Management its claim, each claim shall be examined in terms of the settlement dated 19.04.2006 and after conducting exercise of pay fixation, the voluntary retirement benefits shall be revised strictly in terms of the benefits to which the concerned employee was entitled to the benefits of the claims under which the concerned employee was granted VRS. 24. Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed in terms as aforesaid. 25. A copy of this order be separately placed in each petition. (SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA),J 140-142. "