AI Insights
The case involves an appeal by Smt. Pooja Tiwari and others against the Union of India, challenging the judgment and award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kanpur Nagar. The Tribunal had awarded Rs. 9,48,023/- as compensation for the death of the deceased, who was an employee of the Indian Air Force, due to an accident involving an Army truck. The appellants contested the findings of negligence attributed to the deceased and sought an enhancement in the quantum of compensation, particularly for future loss of income and non-pecuniary damages. The respondents defended the Tribunal's decision, arguing that the compensation awarded was just and proper.
Appeal Details
Counselvise Citation
[2022] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 723519 (HC-ALLAHABAD)
Assessee PAN
Bench
Appeal Number
CRN Number
Appellant
Respondent
Appeal Type
Others
Pronouncement Date
18-05-2022
Assessment Year
misc
Judgement Text
"A.F.R. Court No. - 2 Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No.1663 of 2016 Appellant :- Smt. Pooja Tiwari And 2 Others Respondent :- Union Of India Thru Secry. Defence And Another Counsel for Appellant :- Vidya Kant Shukla Counsel for Respondent :- Raj Kumari Devi Hon'ble Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker,J. Hon'ble Ajit Singh,J. 1. Heard Sri Vidya Kant Shukla for the appellants and Ms. Raj Kumari Devi for the respondents. 2. This appeal, at the behest of the claimants, challenges the judgment and award dated 31.03.2016 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No.17, Kanpur Nagar (hereinafter referred to as 'Tribunal') in M.A.C.P. No. 624 of 2007 awarding a sum of Rs. 9,48,023/- with interest at the rate of 7% as compensation. 3. Brief facts are that on the fateful date i.e. 8.8.2006 at about 9:40 a.m. the deceased was going to join his duties by Scooter, bearing no.UP78Z-4094, and when he reached near Golghar traffic point, Bahad, district Abardin, Andaman (Port Blair), a Army Truck, bearing no.03-D- 152105-M came and dashed with the scooter of the deceased which caused grievous injuries causing death. He succumbed to injuries on the very same day in the hospital. 4. The accident is not in dispute. The claimants have challenged the award on two counts namely negligence and quantum of compensation. 5. Leaned Counsel for the appellant has relied on the decisions in Dinesh Kumar J. @ Dinesh J Vs. National Insurance Company Limited and others, 2018 (1) TAC 337 (SC) and decision of this Court in Smt. Pooja Tiwari and others Vs. Union of India and another, First Appeal From Order No.1663 of 2016, decided on 28.4.2022, so as to contend that the deceased was not negligent and the quantum requires upward modification. It is submitted that the driver of the truck was solely negligent. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Tribunal has not granted any amount towards future loss of income. It is further submitted that 50% should be added as future loss of income of the deceased in view of the decision in National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and Others, 2017 0 Supreme (SC) 105 as the deceased was below 40 years and was in permanent job. It is further submitted that the amount granted under non- pecuniary head is on the lower side and is required to be enhanced. It is lastly submitted that interest should be as per the repo rate prevailing. 7. As against this, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just and proper and does not call for any interference of the Court. 8. The twin issues posed for our consideration are holding deceased to be co-author of the accident to the extent of 35% and compensation awarded more particularly non-grant of future loss of income. 9. The concept of contributory negligence has been time and again evolved, decided and discussed by the courts. 10. The term negligence means failure to exercise care towards others which a reasonable and prudent person would in a circumstance or taking action which such a reasonable person would not. Negligence can be both 2 intentional or accidental which is normally accidental. More particularly, it connotes reckless driving and the injured must always prove that the either side is negligent. If the injury rather death is caused by something owned or controlled by the negligent party then he is directly liable otherwise the principle of “res ipsa loquitur” meaning thereby “the things speak for itself” would apply. 11. The term contributory negligence has been discussed time and again a person who either contributes or is author of the accident would be liable for his contribution to the accident having taken place. The Apex Court in Pawan Kumar & Anr vs M/S Harkishan Dass Mohan Lal & Ors decided on 29 January, 2014 has held as follows: “7. Where the plaintiff/claimant himself is found to be a party to the negligence the question of joint and several liability cannot arise and the plaintiff’s claim to the extent of his own negligence, as may be quantified, will have to be severed. In such a situation the plaintiff can only be held entitled to such part of damages/compensation that is not attributable to his own negligence. The above principle has been explained in T.O. Anthony (supra) followed in K. Hemlatha & Ors. (supra). Paras 6 and 7 of T.O. Anthony (supra) which are relevant may be extracted hereinbelow: “6. “Composite negligence” refers to the negligence on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or more wrongdoers, it is said that the person was injured on account of the composite negligence of those wrongdoers. In such a case, each wrongdoer is jointly and severally liable to the injured for payment of the entire damages and the injured person has the choice of proceeding against all or any of them. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrongdoer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrongdoer separately. On the other hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the negligence on the part of another person or persons, and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the negligence on the part of the injured which contributed to the accident is referred to as his contributory negligence. Where the injured is guilty of some negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated merely by reason of the negligence on his part but the damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries stand reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. 3 7. Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other driver denies negligence or claims that the injured claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly responsible for the accident and the extent of his responsibility, that is, his contributory negligence. Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the principle of “composite negligence” will not apply nor can there be an automatic inference that the negligence was 50:50 as has been assumed in this case. The Tribunal ought to have examined the extent of contributory negligence of the appellant and thereby avoided confusion between composite negligence and contributory negligence. The High Court has failed to correct the said error.” 12. The Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal From Order No. 1818 of 2012 (Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Renu Singh And Others) decided on 19.7.2016 which has held as under: “16. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed. 17. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently. 4 18. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection. 19. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands V/s. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. 'Hit and run' cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. 20. These provisions (sec.110A and sec.110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was 'new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies. 21. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well settled and, therefore, court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew V/s. State of Punjab, 2005 0 ACJ(SC) 1840). 22. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor 5 accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part the other side.” 13. The respondent has failed to prove that accident occurred due to carrying of more persons as pillion rider. In absence of such a finding, the respondents having not proved factum of negligent on the part of the scooterist, cannot be benefitted. The negligent act must contribute to the accident having taken place. The Apex Court recently has considered the principles of negligence in case of Archit Saini and another Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, AIR 2018 SC 1143. 14. The Apex Court in Khenyei Vs. New India Assurance Company Limited & Others, 2015 LawSuit (SC) 469 has held as under: 4. It is a case of composite negligence where injuries have been caused to the claimants by combined wrongful act of joint tort feasors. In a case of accident caused by negligence of joint tort feasors, all the persons who aid or counsel or direct or join in committal of a wrongful act, are liable. In such case, the liability is always joint and several. The extent of negligence of joint tort feasors in such a case is immaterial for satisfaction of the claim of the plaintiff/claimant and need not be determined by the by the court. However, in case all the joint tort feasors are before the court, it may determine the extent of their liability for the purpose of adjusting inter-se equities between them at appropriate stage. The liability of each and every joint tort feasor vis a vis to plaintiff/claimant cannot be bifurcated as it is joint and several liability. In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between tort feasors for making payment to the plaintiff is not permissible as the plaintiff/claimant has the right to recover the entire amount from the easiest targets/solvent defendant. 14. There is a difference between contributory and composite negligence. In the case of contributory negligence, a person who has himself contributed to the extent cannot claim compensation for the injuries sustained by him in the accident to the extent of his own negligence;whereas in the case of composite negligence, a person who has suffered has not contributed to the accident but the outcome of combination of negligence 6 of two or more other persons. This Court in T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan & Ors. [2008 (3) SCC 748] has held that in case of contributory negligence, injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrong doer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrong doer separately. It is only in the case of contributory negligence that the injured himself has contributed by his negligence in the accident. Extent of his negligence is required to be determined as damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries have to be reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder : “6. 'Composite negligence' refers to the negligence on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or more wrong doers, it is said that the person was injured on account of the composite negligence of those wrong-doers. In such a case, each wrong doer, is jointly and severally liable to the injured for payment of the entire damages and the injured person has the choice of proceeding against all or any of them. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrong-doer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrong-doer separately. On the other hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the negligence on the part of another person or persons, and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the negligence of the part of the injured which contributed to the accident is referred to as his contributory negligence. Where the injured is guilty of some negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated merely by reason of the negligence on his part but the damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries stands reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. 7. Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other driver denies negligence or claims that the injured claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly responsible for the accident and the extent of his responsibility, that is his contributory negligence. Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the principle of 'composite negligence' will not apply nor can 7 there be an automatic inference that the negligence was 50:50 as has been assumed in this case. The Tribunal ought to have examined the extent of contributory negligence of the appellant and thereby avoided confusion between composite negligence and contributory negligence. The High Court has failed to correct the said error.” 18.This Court in Challa Bharathamma &Nanjappan (supra) has dealt with the breach of policy conditions by the owner when the insurer was asked to pay the compensation fixed by the tribunal and the right to recover the same was given to the insurer in the executing court concerned if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject-matter of determination for the tribunal and the issue has been decided in favour of the insured. The same analogy can be applied to the instant cases as the liability of the joint tort feasor is joint and several. In the instant case, there is determination of inter se liability of composite negligence to the extent of negligence of 2/3rd and 1/3rd of respective drivers. Thus, the vehicle – trailor- truck which was not insured with the insurer, was negligent to the extent of 2/3rd. It would be open to the insurer being insurer of the bus after making payment to claimant to recover from the owner of the trailor-truck the amount to the aforesaid extent in the execution proceedings. Had there been no determination of the inter se liability for want of evidence or other joint tort feasor had not been impleaded, it was not open to settle such a dispute and to recover the amount in execution proceedings but the remedy would be to file another suit or appropriate proceedings in accordance with law. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is as follows : (i) In the case of composite negligence, plaintiff/claimant is entitled to sue both or any one of the joint tort feasors and to recover the entire compensation as liability of joint tort feasors is joint and several. (ii) In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between two tort feasors vis a vis the plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. He can recover at his option whole damages from any of them. (iii) In case all the joint tort feasors have been impleaded and evidence is sufficient, it is open to the court/tribunal to determine inter se extent of composite negligence of the drivers. However, determination of the extent of negligence between the joint tort feasors is only for the purpose of their inter se liability so that one may recover the sum from the other after making whole of payment to the plaintiff/claimant to the extent it has satisfied the liability of the other. In case both of them have been impleaded and the apportionment/ extent of their negligence has been determined by the court/tribunal, in 8 main case one joint tort feasor can recover the amount from the other in the execution proceedings. (iv) It would not be appropriate for the court/tribunal to determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tort feasors. In such a case, impleaded joint tort feasor should be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tort feasor in independent proceedings after passing of the decree or award.” 15. The deceased sustained injuri0es on his head as helmet was not used by him. He came from behind and tried to overtake the truck. PW1 and PW2’s version is contradicted by driver of the truck, who was also an Army man. The evidence goes to show that it was a case of contributory negligence but, truck being bigger vehicle, the driver of the truck has to be more cautious and, therefore, we hold the deceased negligent to the tune of 25%. 16. It is not in dispute that the deceased was an employee in the Indian Air Force and was earning Rs.10,748/- per month. This fact has been held by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has considered the judgment in Vimal Kanwar and others v. Kishore Dan and others, 2013 (3) T.A.C. 6 (SC) holding that certain amounts cannot be deducted. We also confirm the same. However, non applicability of the judgment in Sarla Verma and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, 2009 LawSuit (SC) for addition of 50% towards future loss of income is an error apparent on the face of record. Non application of Rules 220 of Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicle Rules, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules’) by the Tribunal is also bad. The finding of the Tribunal that Rules came into force after 2010 and the accident occurred on 8.8.2006 is a misreading of the said Rules by the Tribunal. This finding of the Tribunal will have to be upturned and, therefore, we grant addition of 50% towards future loss of income as 9 both Rules as well as the decision in Sarla Verma (Supra) will apply. The deduction of 1/3rd as granted by the Tribunal is not disturbed. However, we are in agreement with the learned Counsel for the respondents that the multiplier of 16 should be applied instead of 17 as the deceased was in the age bracket of 31 – 35. The Tribunal has granted only Rs.6,000/- under non pecuniary heads which is also bad and against the settled legal principle. Therefore, as far as amount under non-pecuniary head are concerned, the claimants would be entitled to Rs. 70,000 + 10% rise in every three years in view of the decision in Pranay Sethi (supra). We also award Rs.50,000/- each to the minor children, who have lost their father at very prime age. Hence, the compensation payable to the appellants in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi (Supra) is computed herein below: i. Income Rs.10,748/- per month ii. Percentage towards future prospects : 50% namely Rs.5,374/- iii. Total income : Rs. 10,748 + 5,374 = Rs. 16,122/- iv. Income after deduction of 1/3rd : Rs. 10,748/- v. Annual income : Rs.10,748 x 12 = Rs.1,28,976/- vi. Multiplier applicable : 16 vii. Loss of dependency: Rs.1,28,976 x 16 = Rs. 20,63,616/- viii. Amount under non pecuniary heads : Rs.1,00,000/- (rounded up) + Rs.50,000/- + Rs.50,000/- (total Rs.2,00,000/-) ix. Compensation : Rs. 22,63,616/- x. Amount payable to claimants after deduction of 25% negligence is Rs. 16,97,712/-. 17. As far as issue of rate of interest is concerned, the interest should be 7.5% in view of the latest decision of the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Mannat 10 Johal and Others, 2019 (2) T.A.C. 705 (S.C.), wherein the Apex Court has held as under : \"13. The aforesaid features equally apply to the contentions urged on behalf of the claimants as regards the rate of interest. The Tribunal had awarded interest at the rate of 12% p.a. but the same had been too high a rate in comparison to what is ordinarily envisaged in these matters. The High Court, after making a substantial enhancement in the award amount, modified the interest component at a reasonable rate of 7.5% p.a. and we find no reason to allow the interest in this matter at any rate higher than that allowed by High Court.\" 18. No other grounds are urged orally when the matter was heard. 19. On depositing the amount in the Registry of Tribunal, Registry is directed to first deduct the amount of deficit court fees, if any. Considering the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of A.V. Padma V/s. Venugopal, Reported in 2012 (1) GLH (SC), 442, the order of investment is not passed because applicants /claimants are neither illiterate or rustic villagers. 20. In view of the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Gujarat High Court, in the case of Smt. Hansaguri P. Ladhani v/s The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., reported in 2007(2) GLH 291, total amount of interest, accrued on the principal amount of compensation is to be apportioned on financial year to financial year basis and if the interest payable to claimant for any financial year exceeds Rs.50,000/-, insurance company/owner is/are entitled to deduct appropriate amount under the head of 'Tax Deducted at Source' as provided u/s 194A (3) (ix) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and if the amount of interest does not exceeds Rs.50,000/- in any financial year, registry of this Tribunal is directed to allow the claimant to withdraw the amount without producing the certificate from the concerned Income- Tax Authority. The aforesaid view has been 11 reiterated by this High Court in Review Application No.1 of 2020 in First Appeal From Order No.23 of 2001 (Smt. Sudesna and others Vs. Hari Singh and another) while disbursing the amount. The said decision has also been reiterated by High Court of Gujarat in R/Special Civil Application No.4800 of 2021 (The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS) decided on 5.4.2022. 21. In view of the above, the appeal is partly allowed. Judgment and decree passed by the Tribunal shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent. The respondent shall deposit the amount with interest at the rate of 7.5% from the date of filing of the claim petition till the amount is deposited within a period of 12 weeks from today. The amount already deposited be deducted from the amount to be deposited. 22. Fresh Award be drawn accordingly in the above petition by the tribunal as per the modification made herein. 23. This Court is thankful to both the counsels to see that this very old matter is disposed of. Order Date :- 18.5.2022 Irshad 12 Digitally signed by IRSHAD AHMAD SIDDIQUI Date: 2022.05.19 15:21:18 IST Reason: Location: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad "
Other Referred Cases
Dinesh Kumar J. @ Dinesh J Vs. National Insurance Company Limited and others, Smt. Pooja Tiwari and others Vs. Union of India and another, Pawan Kumar & Anr vs M/S Harkishan Dass Mohan Lal & Ors, Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Renu Singh And Others, National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and Others, Jacob Mathew V/s. State of Punjab, Archit Saini and another Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, Khenyei Vs. New India Assurance Company Limited & Others, T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan & Ors., Vimal Kanwar and others v. Kishore Dan and others, Sarla Verma and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, Mannat 10 Johal and Others, A.V. Padma V/s. Venugopal, Smt. Hansaguri P. Ladhani v/s The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.
Laws Referred To
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, Fatal Accidents Act, 1855
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