M/s.Srini Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd V. Union of India

WP/9057/2020

AI Insights

M/s. Srini Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. filed a writ petition against the Union of India and other respondents, challenging an order by the National Green Tribunal (NGT) which constituted a Committee to investigate potential environmental violations by the petitioner. The petitioner argued that the NGT's order was illegal, arbitrary, and without jurisdiction, particularly because it was issued without an opportunity for the petitioner to be heard and was allegedly time-barred. The High Court examined whether it should exercise its writ jurisdiction despite the existence of an alternative remedy under the NGT Act, which allows appeals to the Supreme Court. The Court concluded that the writ jurisdiction should not be invoked in this case as the petitioner did not meet the threshold of exceptional circumstances required to bypass the statutory remedy.

• Counselvise Citation: [2020] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 721832 (HC-TELANGANA)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 06-07-2020
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, State of Telangana, through its Chief Secretary, Kairatabad, Hyderabad, Telangana v Md. Hayath Uddin, Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes, Commissioner of Income Tax v Chhail Das Agarwala, Nivedita Sharma v Cellular Operators Association of India, CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd, United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon
• Laws Referred To: National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, Constitution of India
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: NAMAVARAPU RAO; B S PRASAD; P KUMAR
• Assessee Lawyers: S REDDY
• Keywords: Environmental Pollution; Ex parte order; Interim order; Jurisdiction; Writ of Mandamus
• Section: 22; 226; 19(4)(i)

Judgement Text

"HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) I 4ONDAY, THE SIXTH DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY PRESENT Between: lr//s.Srini Pharmaceuticals Pr4. Ltd, Rep. by its Managing Director Sri Tera Chinnappa Reddy, S/o.T.Ram Reddy Aged about 55 years, Occ. Business 0/s. Plot No.10, Type-C, Road No.8 Film Nagar, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad - 500 096. Telangana State ...PETrroNER AND 1. Union of lndia, rep. by its Secretary, lndira Paryavaran Bhavan Jorbagh, New Delhi - 110 003. 2. The State of Telangana, rep. by its Chief Secretary, Secretariat, Hyderabad - 500 022, Telangana state. 3. Telangana State Pollution Control Board, Rep. by its Member Secretary, A-3, Paryavaran Bhavan, Sanathnagar lndustrial Estate Sanath Nagar, Hyderabad - 500 018. 4. The Director, Drugs Control Administration The State of Telangana Vengalrao Nagar, Hyderabad -500 038. 5. Agriculture Commissioner, and Director Fathe Midan, Basheer Bagh Near Nizam College, Basheer Bagh, Hyderabad, Telangana - 500 001. 6. The District Collector, Yadadri Bhuvanagiri District Bhuvanagiri, Telangana State -508 116. 7. District Medical and Health Officer, Yadadri Bhuvanagiri District Bhuvanagiri. Telangana State - 508 116. 8. Ir//s.Divis Laboratories Pv.t. Ltd, Rep. by its Managing Director Lingojigudem Village, Choutuppal tr/andal Yadadri Bhuvanagiri District, Telangana State - 508 252. 9. Ir4/s. tr,4aruth i Cottex Ltd., rep. by its Managing Director, Choutuppal, Yadadri District Telangana State - 508 252. 10. Central Pollution Control Board, Rep. by its ft/ember Secretary, Parivesh Bhavan, East Arjun Nagar Delhi - 32. 11. Kalushsya Parirakshana Samithi, (Registered Society) Through its authorised representatives 12.Jala Venkatesham, S/o.J.lr/aisaiah R/o.3-529/4, Choutuppal (Post and lVandal) Yadadri Bhuvanagiri District, Telangana - 508 252. 'l3.Yerrasani Sathish Kumar, Sio.Y.Premkumar R/o.1-43, Choutuppal (Post and l /andal) Yadadri Bhuvanagiri District, Telangana - 508 252. '14.Sappidi Linga Reddy, S/o.Sri Sri Ram Reddy R/o.1-87, Choutuppal (Post and Mandal) Yadadri Bhuvanagiri District, Telang ana - 508 252. 15. Gunamgari Manohar Reddy, S/o.G.tt/alla Reddy R/o.Plot No.3, Tirumala Hills, Malakpet Hyderabad, Telangana - 500 036. ...RESpoNDENrs Petition under Article 226 ol lhe Constitution of lndia praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to issue a writ order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Ivlandamus, declaring the Orders in O.A.No.80 of 2020, dt.10.06.2020 passed by National Green Tribunal, South Zone, Chennai in appointing a Joint Committee comprising of various departments to inspect the petitioners premises and directed to submit a report within two months without affording an opportunity to the petitioner as illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction and contrary to Sec.19 of the National Green Tribunal Act and consequently set aside the same. Contd.... THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI RAGHVENDRA SINGH CHAUHAN AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B. VIJAYSEN REDDY WRIT PETITION No. 9057 OF 2020 I Petition under !jection 151 CPC praying that in the circl mslances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court ma) re pleased to grant interim suspension of the Orders passed in O.A.No.80 of 20,2), dt.10.06.2020 by National Green Trik unal, South Zone, Chennai, pending dlsposal of the Writ Petition. Counsel for the Petiti,:ner: SRI S. NIRANJAN REDDY, SENIOR IOIJNSEL FOR SRI THOOM SRINIVAS Counsel for Respondent Nos.1&10: SRI NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO ASSISTANT SOLICITOR G :NE:RAL Counsel for the Respondent No.2,4 to 7: SRI B.S. PRASAD, ADVOCATE GENERAL Counsel for the Respondent No.3 : SRI P. SHIV KUMAR, STANDING COUl,I;EL, FOR TSPCB. Counsel for the Respondent Nos. 8,9,11 to 15:------- The Court made the lollowing: ORDER Z lA NO: 1 OF 2020 THE HON'BLE THD CHIEF JUSTICE RAGHVENDRA SINGH CHAUHAN AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B. VIJAYSEN REDDY WRIT PETITION No. 9OS7 OF 2O2O ORDER (Per Llonble the Chief Justice Raghvendra Singh Chauhan) M / s. Srini Pharmaceuticals Private Limited, the petitioner has challenged the legality of the order dated 10.06.2020 passed by the National Green Tribunal, South Zone, Chennai ('the learned Tribunal', for short), u,hereby on an Original Application filed by the Kalushya Parikshana Samithi, the learned Tribunal has constituted a fact finding Committee comprising of a Senior Officer dealing with the pharmaceutical matters from Regional Office, Chennai, a Senior Scientist of Regional Office, Central Pollution Control Board, Chennai, Telangana State of Pollution Board, Director, or a Senior Officer Deputed by Director, Control Administration, State of Telangana and the Collector, Yadadri-Bhuvanagiri District, to inspect the question, and to submit a factual and action taken violation ol any environmental laws were discovered. Control Drugs District area 1n report, if Briefly, the facts of the case are that the petitioner is a Company established in 1998. Ever since its establishment, the Company is manufacturing bulk drugs and drugs intermediate; it is exporting the same to a few foreign countries. For the excellent w.ork carried out by the Company, in the year 2006, the National Safety Council awarded a Certificate of Appreciation to the Company. In the years 2004, 2OO7 and 2009, the District Collector, Nalgonda awarded the Best Green Belt Development Certificate to the Company. However, in 20 19, based on a complaint made by a third party, the Telangana State Pollution Controi Board ('the Board', for l short), the resl)ondent No.3, held an elaborate enqui.l against the Company. The Board discovered minor discrepancier;. rvhich were in no way connccted with the allegations with re 3ard to the pollution of rvater. or environment. The respondent I.l ). 3 directed the Company to comply with the minor deviations. '[ re Company not only complied with the minor deviations, but also submitted a report to the respondent No. 3. Further, in January, 2O2O, th,e respondent No ;. 11 to 15, including the }iaiushya Parikshana Samithi (the ap1;licant before the learned Tlibr.rnal), filed a complaint before tf ,r Tr:langana Human Rights C<,mmission ('the THRC', for short) u herein they claimed that t re petitioner-Company and other pha rmaceutical Companies u'ere causing environmental pollution in the Yadadri- Bhuvanagiri District. Thus, the pharmaceutical conr.;anies u'ere violating the hrrman rights of the people residing in he District. Considering the complaint, the THRC directed the Boar I to enquire into the allegat ions about groundwater, air, and lar d pollution allegedly being, caused by the industries in tf e District. Consequently, 'espondent No. 3 again conducted ir r elaborate enquiry, and srrbmitted its report, dated 05.02.202Ct, before the THRC. Furtherm,rre. while the case was pending before thc THRC, the respondent .rlos. 1 i to 1 5 also approached the learr: e d Tribunal, u,here similar a legations were made before the learne I Tribunal. Based on the c,rrnclaint, by order dated 10.06.2020, he learned Tribunal constitrted a Committee as aforementioned. -Ier-ce, this petition before this Court. t Considering the fact that Section 22 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 20 10 (for short the Act') provides an efficacious alternate remedy to any person aggrieved by any order of the Tribunal, this Court has asked Mr. S. Niranjan Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel, to address this Court on the issues of maintainability of the present writ petition. Mr. S. Niranjan Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel, has raised the following contentions belore this Court:- Firstll', the mere availabilitl. of efficacious alternate remedl,' does not bar a High Court from invoking its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Relying on the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbail, the learned Senior Counsel has pleaded that where a writ is filed for enforcement of any fundamental rights, or on the ground that there is a violation of the principles of natural justice, or that the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction, or where the very uires of an Act is under chailenge, under these four circumstances, a writ petition is certainly maintainable. Secondly, according to Section 1a (3) of the Act, no application for adjudication of a dispute shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless the application is made within a period of six months from the date on which the cause of action of such dispute first arose. Therefore, according to the learned Senior Counsel, it is the foremost duty of the learned Tribunal to see whether the application is hit by limitation or not? If the application were hit by limitation, the learned Tribunal should not proceed any further. Despite the fact that in the present case, the application was hit by limitation, as it was filed six months from the date of the cause of '(1998) 8 scc 1 ,l action had ,1ri:.ien, the learned Tribunal ought to l Lavt: refused to exercise its lrowers under the Act. Thirdlr, according to Section 19 (4) (i) of the A.ct, an interim order can br: passed only after providing the parti:; c(,ncerned an opportunity of being heard. However, in the pr:sent case the learned Trit,unal has passed an ex-parte interiro or,Cer therebl, constituting eL Committee to examine certain issues Tlrerefore, the rights ol the p€ titioner under the principles of natu 'al .rustice have been violaterl. Fourthly, only vague allegations have beer made in the complaint a,lzrinst the petitioner-Compan5,, namell. tha.t like other industries, -he industry being run by the petit.( ner is equally causing pollution in the area. According to the learned Senior Counsel. the learned Tribunal is unjustified in constituting a Committee -o enquire about the functioning of the petitioner- Company. F or, already twice the Board had encuirt-'d into the functioning of the petitioner-Company. A repeated e nqtriry into the functioning :[ the petitioner-Company would adv,:'sely affect the goodu'ill of thr: Company in the market. Therefore, t-re r:onstitution of the Comrr ir:tce by the learned Tribunal is legally u njustified. Lastly. ar:cording to the learned Senior Cou rse., the issue rvith regard to the maintainability of a r.r,rit petit on against an interim order 6rassed by the learned Tribunal '\"1'a s equally raised before this (lourt in the case of State of Telanga:na, through its Chief Secretary, Kairatabad, Hyderabad, Telangana v Md. Hayath Uddin2. In the said case, a learned Divisicr Bi:nch of this Court had h:ld that despite the existence of Sectior 22 of the Act, in spite the existence of an alternative remedy, a vrit petition is ' (zou) o eLr ss; (os) I maintainable. Hence, even the present writ petition is maintainable before this Court Heard the learned Senior Counsel, examined the impugned order, and considered the case law cited at the Bar. Section 22 of the Act is as follows:- 22 Appeal to Supreme Court. - Aru) person aqaieued bu anu autard, decision or order of the tibunal, mau, file an appeal to the Supreme Court, within ntnety days .from the date of communication of the autard, decision or order of Tibunal, to him, on anlt one or more of the qrounds specilled in section 1OO of the Code of Ciuil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908): Prouided that the Supreme Court mall, entertain ang appeaL after the expiru of ntnetu daus, if it [s sat[sfied that the appeLlant uLas preuented by sufficient cause from prefen-ing the appeal. A bare perusal of the said provision clearly reveals that a right to file an appeal before the Apex Court is granted to any person aggrieved by an order of the Tribunal. The word \"order\" cannot be confined to a final order. Per force, it would include an interim order as well. The provision bestows a right of appeal to any aggrieved person, provided the person files the appeal within a period of ninety days from the date of the communication of the order. Further, the said appeal can be hled on any of the grounds specified in Section 1O0 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the Apex Court is empowered to condone the delay in filing of the appeal if sufficient cause is shown for the delay in filing the appeal. Hence, Section 22 of the Act provides an efficacious alternate remedy to the aggrieved person. The interesting jurisprudential question is why the Act provides a direct appeal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, s.ithout first making an order, or au,ard, or decision of the learned Tribunal subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court? G-, 6 Th:re seems to be a legislative logic rv-rich bestows the power to hear an appeal only upon the Apex )ourt: firstly, the object of thc Act is to provide \"for the effecti,t, t and expeditious disposal of cases relatina to enuironmento, protection a nd conseruat on of forests and other natural re.;ources includitg enforcement of ang legal right relating to enuirc tme,rft and giuirtg relief and compensation for damages to persons 1nc!, propertg and for mattet s connected therewith or incidental trt reto \" (Emphasis added). tr hile enacting the Act, the Parliamen: took note of the United Nz tions Conference on the Human Envi-onment, held at StockholnL, in June, 1972, to which India was a participant, and also of tle United Nations Conference on F nr.ironment and Developmr:nt. held at Rio de Janeiro, in 1992, wht re l.ndia had also participat<'cl. At the latter Conference the States \"rrere called upon \"to prouide effectiue access to iudicial ottrl administratiue proceedtnc s, including redress and remedg and tc deuelop national lanus regan.ding liabilitg and compensation for eh u'ctirns of pollution and othe. enuironmentol damage.\" (Emphas s added). The Parliamen' also noticed that the right to a healthy environment $.as part oi the right to life enshrined in Art. 21 c,f the Constitution of lndia. Thus, the aim and object of the Act is t{' provide \"for the effectiue arrd expeditious disposal of cases\", \"to pr,>uicie for effectiue access to ,udtcial...proceedings\" , Thus, the aim is to shorten the time lor the completion of the judicial proceedinl i, rlther than to put the palies on a rollercoaster ride through the tinre consuming hierarchy c,f the judiciary. More over, since environmental issues may r )ver a vast areas of the cor.rntry, may involve different States, r ray affect large 1 population, it u'as felt necessary that any appeal, concerning the subject, has to be heard by the Highest Court of the land. For, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has a territorial jurisdiction over the entire country. Therefore, Section 22 of the Act purposefully directs the aggrieved party to approach the Apex Court by filing an appeal within ninety days from the date of communication of the impugned order, decision, or award passed by the learned Tribunal. Further, in order to ensure that complete justice is done to the aggrieved person, the Section further bestows the power of condonation of delay upon the Apex Court. Therefore, two moot issues arise for this Court: firstly, u,hether the existence of an efficacious alternate remedy prevents the High Court from exercising its rvrit jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or not? Secondly, whether in light of Section 22 of tlne Act, and in the light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the High Court should invoke its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or not? The first issue is no longer res integra; it is well settled by numerous judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the case of Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes3, a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court opined as under:- 7....The iurtsdiction of the Hioh Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is couched in utide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to an11 restictions except the teritoial restrictions uthich are expressh.t prouided in the Articte. But the exercise of the urisdiction is discretiona it is not exercised merel because it is lalDful to do so. The ueru amplitude of the .iuisdiction demands that it u-till ordinarilu be exercised sub ject to certoin self-imposed timitations. Resort to that .jurisdiction is not intended as an altematiue remedy for relief tuhich may be obtained in a suit or other mode AtR 1964 SC 1419 I 8 presc ibc'd bu statute. Ordinarilu the Cour u'ilt not entenain a petition for a uit under Art. 226, t-the:re the petiti( r,,er has an altemctiue remedLt u.thicl , utithout bein-q ur dulu or-erous, prouides an equallu e fficacious remec' 1r. Aqain the Hiqh Court does not qenet ctllu' enter upon a iTetermination of questions which aernand an elabota.k' examination of euidence to establisl thrz riqht to enjorce which the urit is claimed. The )-L'qh Court does ;'tot therefore act as a court of appeal tu,ainst the decisitn of a court or tribunal, to correct erro.s of fact, and tloes not bu assuminq jurtsdiction u.tde. ArL 226 trzn<'h upon an alternatiue remedy prouidecl bLt statute lor obtaininq relief. Where it is op'a n 16 11'r\" qgg!1e u_eJl. petitioner to moue onotfu l or _epen i/sel nother iuisdiction for obtaininq red;'< ss irt the ta manne! -prouided bu a statute, t H t norntallu u.till nclpermit, bu enteftaininq a petition undtl AL!-225 o the Constitution, the machineru created under the stattt<' t,t be bu-passed, and will lgaue L7e patlu applui Lg_..o it to seek resort to c sel up. (trmphas s alded) In Commissioner of Income Tax v Chhaiil Das Agarwala, th: Apex Court observed as under: It is s ettLed laut that non-entertainment oJ pet;.tions under wnt jur[sdiction bg the High Court uhen on eJ.ficacious alternatiue rzmedy is auailable is a rule of self imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policg, conuenie nce and discretion rather than a rule of laut. Undoubtedly, it s u'ithin the discretior . o; the High Court to grant relief unc't r Article 226 despite the existence of an altematiue remedy. Itotueuer, the High CoiLft must not interfere if ttLere is on c deauote efficacious al'.entatiue remedy auailable to the petiticner and he has approaclrcd the High Court uithout auailing t'Le seme unless he ha: ;_rt ade out an exceptional case warranl g_such interference or ihere exist sufftgie;:11.1 arounds to in toke the extraordirtart) iuisdiction under Afticle 226 (Emphasis a dde C). Relying on its earlier judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court further held as under: Althoug article 226 confers a uery u.tide potue\" in the ^o11s7 a,f issuing uLits on the High Court, the nz,nedy of u.trit is ttbsolutely discretionary in character. If t te lligh Court is satisfied that the aggieued partA can l,,aue an adequate or suitable relief elseu.there, it can rt fuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraodirgry circumst a.nces, may exercise the pouter if it comes to the conclusitn that here hos been a breach of pinc;.ples of natural justice or procedure required for deci:;tcn has not beer, acl.opted. ' 120 t,l.y t scc 603 I In the case of Nivedita Sharma v Cellular Operators Association of Indias, the Apex Court had opined that, \" Where hierarchg of appeals is prouided by the stature, partA must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to utrit jurisdiction for relief .\" Even in the case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Hiqh Court, hauinq reqard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertoin or not to entertain a uit petition. But the Hiqh Court hos imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of uthich is that if an effectiue and efficacious remedy is auailable, the Hiqh Court u.tould not normallu exercise its .juisdiction. But the alternatiue remedg has been consistentl!.,1 held bu this Court not to operdte as a bar in ot least three continqencies, namely, u.there the urit petition hos been .filed for the enforcement of anu of the Fundamental Riqhts or u-;here there has been a uiolation of the pinciple of natural .justice or tuhere the order or proceedinqs are tuhollg tuithout jurisdiction or the uires of an Act is challenqed. (Emphasis added) Therefore, even in the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not opined that merely because one or some of the four circumstances is/ are made out, the discretion of the High Court is denuded or deprived. Even if any of the four grounds u,ere made out, even then the High Court would continue to have the discretion whether to invoke, or not to invoke its writ jurisdiction. In the case of CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd.6, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has further opined that \" Article 226 of the Constihttion of India is not meant 'to short-circuit or circumuent statutory procedures'. It is onlg uhere stafittory remedies are entirelg ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the uery uires of the statute is in question or '(2011) 14 SCC 337 ^ (198s) 1 SCC 260 t0 Luhere prtuate or public u)rongs are so inexticably mL:ed up and the preuention o-' public injury and the uindication cf public justice require it than re:ourse may be had to Article 226 of tl e Constitution. But then tle C'.ourt must haue good and sufficient re'( sorL to bypass the altentatiue remedy prouided by statute\". Therefn\" . 7. S:nce the existence of an alternative rernedy is not an alrsolute bar to the invoking of a writ ju: isdiction, the sitid jurisdiction may be exercirx d in four circumstances: a) where the writ petit on has been fi ecl for enforcement of fundamental rig hts; b) where thi: r:rinciples of natural justice have bc,:n violated; c) n he:'e the order or proceedings are 'r'holly u,ithout jlLrisdiction; d) where the vires of an Act is under c-rallenge. But even when these grounds; are made out, e ./(-'n then the exercise ol the wr i j -rrisdiction c >nt inues to be discretionary. B. Eefore exercising the writ jurisdiction :n face of the e KLSLence of the alternative remedy, tho Court is duty bound to consider if the exercise of wrir por.t er would deleat the purpose, aim or object of tht: statute which provides the alternative remedy. For, t re exercise of t re extraordinary jurisdiction under Ar t. 1226 of the (.onstitution may defeat the very pL rpc,se of the statute. 9. 'l'he High Court should also conside'r ri':rether the e xercise of the writ jurisdiction is in th,: int,:rest of the lrrtblic or not? For, the jurisdiction sh < uld not be so amine certain aspects of t re possible environmental pollution c aused by the pharmaceutir:al companies, in the subject area, but {Llso to suggest the remedial measures which are required to be t rken, and the compensatiori u'hich may be required to be paid, if any violation of the environnrental laws were discovered. Most ilr portantly, the Committee has not been constituted specifically :t, e>:amine the functioning ol the petitioner-company. Thus, the < onstitution of the Committ,)c ls not targeted only at the petition,:; -Company. In fact, it has been constituted to examine the functio rin51 of a large number ol pealmaceutical companies l,,,hich continue to produce bulk drugs in the Choutuppal Mandal of Yada,-1-i-Bhuvanagiri District. HerLce. prima facie, the constitution of su<:l r Committee is in \"public interest\". For, unless and until the a11ege 1 extent of the environmentiLl pollution being caused by p harmaceutical companies ir r tire given area is discovered, the le a rned Tribunal would not be in a position to adjudicate the lis befolt it. Therefore, 17 the learned Senior Counsel is unjustified in claiming that if repeatedly the functioning and operation ol the petitioner-company are enquired into, its goodwill would adversely be affected in the market. The learned Senior Counsel has vehemently argued that the learned Tribunal has overstepped its jurisdiction by not initially examining the issue with regard to the limitation. However, the said argument is highly misplaced. Firstly, according to the learned Senior Counsel, the impugned order was passed ex-parte. Hence, the petitioner could not have raised the plea of limitation before the learned Tribunal prior to passing of the impugned order. Since the plea was not even raised, there was no occasion for the Iearned Tribunal to adjudicate on the said issue. Secondly, the issue of limitation is both a question of law and of fact. Therefore, the learned Tribunal could not have entered into the said issued at the initial stage of the proceedings. For, the learned Tribunal has clearly noticed that \"at present we are not going into the question as to uhether all the pragers that haue been praged for bg th-e applicant can be granted or not? Hou.teuer, on going through tLre allegations, we are satisfied that there aises a substantial question of enuironment requiring interference of this tibunal to resolue the issue\". But, before entering into the actual dispute, the learned Tribunal has merely constituted a fact finding Committee. The learned Senior Counsel has also pleaded that the learned Tribunal has passed an ex-parte order, whereas the porver to pass an ex-parte order is not available to the learned Tribunal. Suffice it to say, that the power to pass an ex-parte order does ------ir'- V ,j 18 exist. For, urder Section 19 (4) (h) of the Act, the lezrned Tribunal has the pov.'er \"to set-aside an ex-parte order tr assed by if' . Horvever, thir; Court refrains from commenting any urther, as the issue before tl-ris Court is whether the writ iurisdi,:.ion should be exercised wh:n an efficacious alternative remedy is e vai1able under Section 22 ol the Act, or not? Moreor er, the twin issues being raised by thr, .earned Senior Counsel u'itlr regard to the limitation, and u,ith regard to the passing of rLn ex-parte order, can very well be raised by the petitioner be iore the Hon'b1e Supreme Court in th r appeal under . Section 22 rl rhe Act. Therefore, the existence cf a statutory alternate rernedy cannot be claimed to be \"ill-suit'zd to meet the demands of ,zxtraordinary sihtations\" . Furthe r, keeping in mind the purpose of having Section 22 of the Act in th: statute, the existence of the alternate :'emedy of filing of appeal be bre the Apex Court of the country is, irdeed, the most elficacious r emedy available. For, such an altr:r nat.ive remedy $,ould shortcn :he period of judicial proceedings, th:retr1' providing \" an effec:tiue access to judicial proceedings.\" Furthr:rm.ore, if this Court were to intr:r ferr: rvith the impugnecl o'der, it would keep the environmental ssuers alive lor some time. lhis u'ould defeat the very purpose of he Act. Hence, the invoking of the power of writ would be against 1> rblic interest. Furth,rrmore, since the environmental issue s nlay cover a large popul rtion, may cover a large area of tht: country, it is, indeed, in t re interest of justice that such issues re debated and decided by -he highest court of the country. KeeJrirg in mind the legisiative k,gic behind the existence of Section 2'.2 of the Act, the t9 High Court should be weary of exercising its r,\"rit jurisdiction unless the rarest of the rare case is made out, and unless there are exceptional circumstances for invoking the writ jurisdiction. As discussed above, no such exceptional circumstances have been made out in the present case. For the reasons stated above, this Court is of the firm opinion that though this Court can exercise its writ jurisdiction despite the existence of the alternative remedy, but such power should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances. Since the petitioner has failed to make out a case of \"exceptional circumstances\", this court declines to invoke its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the writ petition is, hereby, dismissed. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous Applications, pending if any, shall stand closed. SD/-B.SATYAVATHI ASSISTANT REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY// . SECTIOITbFFICER one fair copy to the Hon'bre THE cHIEF JUSTTCE RAGHVENDRA srNGH CHAUHAN (for His Lordships Kind perusal) One fair copy to the Hon,ble Sri. Justice B. VIJAYSEN REDDY (for His Lordships Kind perusal) 10 LR. Copies To, The Under Secretary, Union of lndia, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi The Secretary, A.P. Advocates' Association Library, High Court Buildings, Nelapadu, Guntur District The Secretary, T.S. Advocates' Association Library, High Court Buildings, Hyderabad. One CC to Sri Thoom Srinivas Advocate tOpUCl one cc- to Sri Namavarapu Rajeshwar R'ao, Ass'istant solicitor Generar Iopucr Une C.C. to Sri P. Shiv Kumar, Standing-Counsel for TSpCB. (OPUC) Two CCs to the Advocate General, High-Court for the Stateof ietanglna at Hyderabad. [OUT] Two CCs to GP for Revenue, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad. [OUT] 1 0. Two ccs to GP for l /edical & Health, High court for the state of relangana at Hyderabad. [OUT] 1 'l . 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