Surendra Kumar V. Union Of India Thru. Secy. Ministry Of Finance, New Delhi And Others

/5564/2023

AI Insights

The case involves Surendra Kumar, a former daily wage casual laborer under the Joint Commissioner, Income Tax, Faizabad, who challenged the oral termination of his services in 2005. Initially, his application to the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) was dismissed, and subsequent attempts to review this decision were also unsuccessful due to procedural delays. The core legal issue revolved around whether the CAT had the authority to condone delays in filing review applications under its procedural rules, despite the absence of explicit provisions for such condonation. The High Court of Allahabad, after examining various precedents and statutory provisions, concluded that the CAT does possess the power to condone delays in filing review applications, aligning with the principles of natural justice and the broader objectives of the Limitation Act.

• Counselvise Citation: [2023] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 800258 (HC-LUCKNOW)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 24-08-2023
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Akshaya Kumar Parida (dead) through L.Rs. Vs. Union of India and others, Haris K.M. and others Vs. Jahfar and others, Ajit Kumar Rath v. State of Orissa, Gopalbandhu Biswal Vs Krishna Chandra Mohanty, N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, Mangu Ram V/s Municipal Corporation Delhi, C. Nara Simha Rao Vs Regional Joint Director of School Education, Union of India & Ors. Vs. Chanchal Nag, Union of India & Anr V/s Central Administrative Tribunal
• Laws Referred To: Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, Limitation Act, 1963, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
• Result in Favour of: Others
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: KUSHAGRA DIKSHIT
• Assessee Lawyers: AJAY PANDEY
• Keywords: Administrative Tribunal; Certiorari; Certiorari; Condonation of delay; Limitation Period; Mandamus; Review Application
• Section: 22; 5; 114; 17; 47; 226; 36; 21; 35; 29(2)

Judgement Text

"Page 1 of 38 Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:56331-DB A.F.R. RESERVED Court No. - 1 Case :- WRIT - A No. - 5564 of 2023 Petitioner :- Surendra Kumar Respondent :- Union Of India Thru. Secy. Ministry Of Finance , New Delhi And Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Ajay Pandey Counsel for Respondent :- A.S.G.I.,Kushagra Dikshit Hon'ble Attau Rahman Masoodi,J. Hon'ble Om Prakash Shukla,J. (Per : Om Prakash Shukla, J.) A. INTRODUCTION (1) This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner, with the following reliefs :- i. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 13.03.2023 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow in review application No. 20/2016 in Original Application No. 561/2005, Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others. ii. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow to decide the review application No. 20/2016 in Original Application No. 561/2005, Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others on merits.” B. FACTUAL MATRIX (2) In the year 2001, the petitioner was engaged as daily wage casual labour under the Joint Commissioner, Income Tax, Faizabad and Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 2 of 38 continued to work as such till his services was terminated orally w.e.f. 02.09.2005. (3) The aforesaid oral order of termination w.e.f. 02.09.2005 was challenged by the petitioner by preferring Original Application No. 561 of 2005 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal”). The Tribunal, vide judgment and order dated 30.09.2011, dismissed the aforesaid original application. (4) Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Tribunal dated 30.09.2011, the petitioner preferred writ petition No. 1551 (S/B) of 2013 before this Court. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, while recording the submission of the petitioner that in an identical matter, a review application was filed before the Tribunal and the Tribunal has proceeded to allow the review application, disposed of the writ petition with liberty to the petitioner to file review application before the Tribunal, vide judgment and order dated 21.01.2016. (5) Apparently, pursuant to the aforesaid judgment and order dated 21.01.2016, the petitioner preferred Review Application No. 20 of 2016 before the Tribunal, seeking review of the judgment and order dated 30.09.2011 passed by the Tribunal in Original Application No. 561 of 2005. The learned Tribunal, noting the Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 3 of 38 provision of Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 and also the fact that though in writ petition No. 1551 (S/B) of 2013, this Court had passed the order regarding filing of review application to the Tribunal on 21.01.2016, however, the petitioner preferred review application only on 17.05.2016 and thus arrived at a conclusion that there being no provision for condonation of delay under Rule 17 of Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, the review application would not be maintainable and accordingly, vide judgment and order dated 13.03.2023, the learned Tribunal dismissed the review application. It is this order dated 13.03.2023, which has been challenged in the instant writ petition. C. SUBMISSIONS (6) Heard Shri Ajay Pandey, learned Counsel representing the petitioner and Shri Kushagra Dikshit, learned Counsel representing the respondents/Union of India. This court records valuable suggestion by Mr. Apoorva Tiwari, Advocate, who was requested by this Court to give his assistance, keeping in view the significant question of law involved in this petition. (7) Learned Counsel representing the petitioner, at the outset, has fairly submitted that in the instant writ petition, he has not challenged the order dated 30.09.2011 passed by the learned Tribunal in Original Application No. 561 of 2005, but this writ Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 4 of 38 petition is limited to the extent of challenging the order dated 13.03.2023, by which the learned Tribunal has dismissed the review application seeking review of the aforesaid order dated 30.09.2011 (supra) only on the ground that the learned Tribunal has no power to condone the delay in filing the review application. (8) It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order sought to be reviewed was passed by the learned Tribunal on 30.09.2011 and the same was initially challenged by the petitioner before this Court in Writ Petition No. 1551 of 2013 (S/B). During pendency of the said writ petition, the learned Tribunal itself entertained a bunch of review application involving identical issue, the leading being Review Application No. 332/00028/2014 and vide common judgment and order dated 24.12.2014, the learned Tribunal was pleased to allow the bunch of review applications by reviewing/modifying the order sought to be reviewed in the said bunch of review application and resultantly, the learned Tribunal directed the respondents to consider the case of the applicants for regularization in accordance with law within six months. According to him, on coming to know the aforesaid order dated 24.12.2014 (supra), the petitioner has drawn the attention of the same to a Co-ordinate Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 5 of 38 Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 1551 (S/B) of 2013, which had ceased of the said matter. (9) Apparently, the said Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, appreciating the submission of the petitioner in this regard, disposed of the said writ petition by granting liberty to the petitioner to file a review application before the Tribunal by means of an order dated 21.01.2016. Thereafter, the petitioner has sought legal opinion and prepared review application No. 20 of 2016 and filed the same before the learned Tribunal. The petitioner claimed that the delay in filing the review application was bona fide as the petitioner is a Class-IV employee and he has no legal knowledge in this regard. According to him, there is no deliberate or intentional delay on the part of the petitioner, however, without considering the bona fide reasons for filing the review application belatedly, the learned Tribunal has dismissed the review application by means of the impugned order only on the ground that the Tribunal has no power to condone the delay. (10) The learned Counsel for the petitioner, placing reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in Akshaya Kumar Parida (dead) through L.Rs. Vs. Union of India and others : AIR 2015 Orissa 49, has submitted that in Akshsha Kumar Parida (supra), a Full Bench of Orissa High Court has held that the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 is a Special Act Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 6 of 38 and Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 1987”) provides a period of limitation for filing a review different from the schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the Orissa High Court has held in that judgment that Rule 17 of the Rules, 1987 does not contain any express rider prohibiting filing of a review application after 30 days and neither does it specifically exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963, hence the learned Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain an application for condonation of delay in filing a review application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. According to him, the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of Haris K.M. and others Vs. Jahfar and others : 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 4009 has also held that delay in filing a review application before the Central Administrative Tribunal can be condoned by application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by operation of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. (11) Learned Counsel for the petitioner, thus, has submitted that the review application filed by the petitioner is maintainable and the learned Tribunal has ample power to condone the delay, if he satisfies the Tribunal that the delay in filing the review application has been satisfactorily explained. Thus, it has been submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal, dismissing the Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 7 of 38 review application on the ground that the Tribunal has no power to condone the delay, is liable to be set-aside and the matter be remitted to the learned Tribunal for its adjudication on merits. (12) Per contra, learned Counsel representing the Union of India has opposed the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner and has argued that Rule 17 (1) of the Rules, 1987 indicated of the intent to make it mandatory that no application for review can be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the order sought to be reviewed. (13) According to the learned Counsel for the respondents, no other explanation or advantages can be made to the aforesaid Rules, 1987 as Rule 17 (1) of Rules, 1987 prohibited entertainment of any application for review beyond thirty days. He submits that admittedly, the petitioner has filed the Review Application No. 20 of 2016 after thirty days as provided under Rule 17 (1) of the Rules, 1987, hence the learned Tribunal has rightly dismissed the review application as not maintainable by means of the impugned order. Thus, the instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed. D. ANALYSIS (14) Having regard to the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties and going through the record available before this Court in the instant writ petition, we find that a very Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 8 of 38 interesting question emerges for consideration, which can be framed as herein below:- “Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal has power to condone the delay in filing a review application against its judgment exercising power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in view of section 21 & 22 of the Administrative Tribunal Act 1985 and Rule 17 (1) of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 ?” (15) Before analyzing the aforesaid question, we deem it apt to go through the relevant statutory provision touching the issue involved in the instant writ petition. (16) Presumably, part-XIV-A was inserted in the constitution of India by the forty-second amendment in the year 1976. The said part consists of two articles. Article 323A of the Constitution of India provides for establishment of Administrative Tribunals by law made by Parliament for the adjudication of disputes and complaints related to recruitment and conditions of service of Government servants under the Central Government and the State Government. It includes the employees of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of a corporation owned or controlled by the Government. On the other hand, Article 323B of the Constitution of India empowers the legislatures of states to Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 9 of 38 provide for the adjudication of certain disputes as enumerated in clause 2 of the said Article, for adjudication by the said Tribunals. (17) In pursuance of the provisions in Article 323A of the Constitution of India, Parliament passed the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, providing for all the matters falling within Clause (1) of Article 323-A of the Constitution of India. According to the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, there must be a Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) at the Centre and a State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) at the State Level for every State. (18) Without burdening this Judgment with the various provisions of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, it is stated that Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1985”) provided that subject to the other provisions of the Act, a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. Section 21 of the Act, 1985 deals with limitation in filing the original application. It would be profitable to extract section 21 of the Act, which inter- alia states as under: “21. Limitation.—(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,— (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 10 of 38 the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made; (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1), where— (a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and (b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.” Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 11 of 38 (19) It is apparent from a reading of the aforesaid provisions, specifically section 21(3) that the Act itself bestows power on the Tribunal to condone delay in filing of the original application, of course the applicant has to satisfy the Tribunal relating to “sufficient cause” for not making the said application within the period of limitation as provided under the Act. (20) Since, the present issue is relating to condonation of delay in filing the review before the Tribunal, this Court finds that section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 relates to the power of a Central Administrative Tribunal to review its own decision. Therefore, as far as the power of the Administrative Tribunal to review its own decision is concerned, sufficient power has been vested as per the statute itself. Apparently, the extent of power to be exercised by the Tribunal can be well understood from the provision that the said power of review is to be found under the larger umbrella of section 22 (3) of the Act, 1985, which inter-alia states: “22 (3) A tribunal shall have, for the purpose of discharging its function under this Act, the same powers as are vested in a civil court, under the Code of Civil procedure, 1908, while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely;- (a) Xxx (b)Xxx (c) Xxxx Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 12 of 38 (d)Xxxx (e) Xxxx (f) Reviewing its decisions ; (g)Xxx (h)Xxxx (i) Any other matter which may be prescribed by the Central Government. ( Emphasis Supplied) (21) In view of the above provisions, the power of review vested with an Administrative Tribunal is equated to a Civil Court and, thus, while considering and disposing of any review application, the Administrative Tribunal is to follow the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, by necessary implications the provisions of review as found under the Civil procedure Code i.e Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code came to be incorporated along with the power of review of an Administrative Tribunal. Moreover, the power of the Tribunal to review its judgment has been well explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Rath v. State of Orissa : (1999) 9 SCC 596 and Gopalbandhu Biswal Vs Krishna Chandra Mohanty : (1998) 4 SCC 447, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held review power of a Tribunal to be similar as has been granted to a Civil Court under Section 114 or under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. In any case, the power of review is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order XLVII Rule Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 13 of 38 1 of the Civil Procedure Code and the same can be exercised on the application of a person on restricted grounds of discovery of new and important matter; or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. The power can also be exercised on account of some mistake of fact or error apparent on the face of record or for any other sufficient reason. It may be pointed out that the expression \"any other sufficient reason\" used in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code means a reason sufficiently analogous to those specified in the rule and is squarely applicable to the Tribunal. (22) Further, it is significant to note that section 22(1) of the Act, 1985 clearly and in somewhat mandatory manner mentions that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil procedure, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules made by the Central Government. The very said provisions also says that the Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure including the fixing of places and times of its inquiry and deciding whether to sit in public or in private. (23) This Court finds that the Tribunal in the first instance should be guided by the principles of natural justice, which shall be subject to rules and secondly the Tribunal has been given a certain Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 14 of 38 amount of power to regulate its own procedure and to fix the time of its inquiry. Rule 21(3) of the Act, 1985 is in consonance to the said regulation for fixing of time of its inquiry as it gives certain amount of discretion on the Administrative Tribunal to fix the time of inquiry and in that regard also condone the delay, provided sufficient cause is shown by the applicant. In any case, Section 21(3) of the Act, 1985 says that an application may be admitted even after the period of limitation, if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the period prescribed. Section 21(3) of the Act, 1985 is similarly worded as Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Thus, section 21 of the Act, 1985 has to be read along with section 29 of the Limitation Act, which says that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 15 of 38 (24) However, the procedure for filing and consideration of an application for condonation of delay of review application is conspicuously absent from the provisions of the Act, although Section 21 relating to the limitation for filing and consideration of an original application is specifically mentioned in the said Act itself and Section 21 (3) provides for condonation of delay, but similar provision for review is not mentioned in the Administrative Act. (25) Since, the issue engaging the attention of this Court relates to condonation of delay in filing of a review Application and the necessary process and since the limitation thereof are not specifically mentioned in the Administrative Act, 1985, one has to see and refer to section 35 of the Act, which provides for power of central Government to make rules in the following terms :- “35. Power of the Central Government to make rules.—(1) The Central Government may, subject to the provisions of section 36, by notification, make rules to carry out the provisions of this Act. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:— (a) the case or cases which shall be decided by a Bench composed of more than 3 [two members] under clause (d) of sub-section (4) of section 5; (b) the procedure under sub-section (3) of section 9 for the investigation of misbehaviour or incapacity of 4 [Chairman or other Member]; Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 16 of 38 (c) the salaries and allowances payable to, and the other terms and conditions of, the 5 [Chairman and other Members]; (d) the form in which an application may be made under section 19, the documents and other evidence by which such application shall be accompanied 6 [and the fees payable in respect of the filing of such application or for the service or execution of processes;] (e) the rules subject to which a Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure under sub-section (1) of section 22 and the additional matters in respect of which a Tribunal may exercise the powers of a civil court under clause (i) of sub-section (3) of that section; and (f) any other matter which may be prescribed or in respect of which rules are required to be made by the Central Government.” (26) Apparently, section 35 (2) (e) of the Act, 1985 provides for rule making power of the Central Government as far as it tends to regulate its own procedure by the Tribunal under sub-section (1) of section 22 and also in respect of all those powers for which the Tribunal may exercise the power of Civil Court under clause (i) of sub-section (3) of that section. Even this section does not specifically provides for making of rules as far as the provision of review is concerned and merely authorizes the Central Government to frame rules as to how the principles of natural justice has to be followed while regulating its own procedure by the Tribunal and as to how and in what manner the Tribunal is to exercise the powers vested with it as a Civil Court under the Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 17 of 38 provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. This Court finds that a residual power to frame rules has been given to the appropriate Government in terms of section 36(3) of the Act, for those matters, which are not mentioned in section 35 of the Act. Since, the issue relating to competency relating to framing of rules is not before this court in the present matter, this court does not wish to express its view on the same and restricts itself to the issue raised in the present petition. (27) Nevertheless, the Administrative Rules came to be framed in 1987 and Rule 17 contains the provisions for application of review in the following words: “17. Application for review- (1) No application for review shall be entertained unless it is filled within thirty days from the date of receipt of copy of the order sought to be reviewed. (2) A review application shall ordinarily be heard by the same Bench which has passed the order, unless the chairman may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct it to be heard by any other bench. (3) Unless otherwise ordered by the Bench concerned, a review application shall be disposed of by circulation and the Bench may either dismiss the application or direct notice to the opposite party. (4) Where an application for review of any judgment or order has been made and disposed of, no further application for review shall be entertained in the same manner. (5) No application for review shall be entertained unless it is supported by a duly Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 18 of 38 sworn affidavit indicating therein the source of knowledge, personal or otherwise, and also those which are sworn on the basis of the legal advice. The counter-affidavit in review application will also be a duly sworn affidavit wherever any averment if fact is disputed.” (28) Although, the aforesaid rule provides that any review filed before an Administrative Tribunal cannot be entertained unless it is filled within thirty days from the receipt of the copy of the order. However, having traced the review making power of the Tribunal, it can be safely deduced that neither section 22 of the Act, which gives the power of review to an Administrative Tribunal, nor rule 17, which provides for application of review, expressly excludes the applicability of the Limitation Act. Further, the word; “no application for review shall be entertained”, intended to mean that no review application would be entertained until and unless the same is filed within 30 days. It does not say and perhaps it cannot say to curtail the scope of statute that no application for condonation of delay in filing the same, could be made when an application for review was not filed within the time framed in Rule 17. Apparently, Rule 17 prescribes for making of the application for review to save the purpose of statute and cannot be extended to mean that an application for condodnation of delay is specifically barred. In fact, the Tribunal bound by the principle of natural justice and some provisions of Code of Civil Procedure were created to ensure an expeditious process unlike the time Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 19 of 38 taking process by the Civil Courts in the matter of civil disputes. The bar of remedy was never an intention of law. The meaning and import of the negative couching of the said rule 17 relating to maintainability of review within 30 days can be well explained as held by a full bench of the Kerala High Court in the case of Haris K.M Vs. Jahfar : 2020 SCC Online Kerala 4009 in the following words: “18………..………The reason according to us is apparent, since the power granted is the power to review under the Code of Civil Procedure. The provisions relating to Review in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are contained in Section 114 and Order XLVII. Article 124 of the Limitation Act prescribes the period of limitation for a petition for review under the Civil Procedure Code as 30 days. However, since the provisions of Limitation Act are applicable, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is also applicable and a Review Petition can be filed beyond the period of 30 days, if the petitioner is able to show sufficient cause for the delay. 19. In exercise of power conferred under Section 35(2)(d), (e) and (f) and Section 36(c), the Central Government has promulgated the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2010. Rule 21 of the Rules says that no application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of the order of which the review is sought. As already observed, the rule making power does not take in power to make rules for fixing a period of limitation for filing a review application. Such a prescription of 30 days, which is the same as the one prescribed under the Limitation Act, for filing a review Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 20 of 38 petition under the Code of Civil Procedure, was totally unnecessary and uncalled for. Even without Rule 21, the review application ought to be filed within 30 days. Since the period of limitation prescribed in Rule 21 is the same as that applicable for a review petition under the Code of Civil Procedure, we do not think it is necessary to strike down Rule 21. All the same, Rule 21 has to be necessarily subject to the provisions of Section 29 of the Limitation Act which specifically says that provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act will apply to a prescription of limitation under any special or local law. That is to say, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condoning the delay in preferring a Review Petition is maintainable”. (Emphasis Supplied) (29) Having said so, this Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that in case sufficient reasons are pleaded for maintainability of review, the Tribunal should not shut its doors on the ground of limitation. Observing that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123, held as under:- “11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 21 of 38 sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.” As pointed out earlier, an appeal under Section 96 CPC is a statutory right. Generally, delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned, in the interest of justice, where there is no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay.” (30) Essentially, the law of limitation is founded on the anvil of public policy. However, while examining rule 17, we are countered with the disability which is present in the peremptory form for preference of a review application, in case they are filed after 30 days. At this juncture, it would be apt to mention that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mangu Ram V/s Municipal Corporation Delhi, (1976) 1 SCC 392 has held that prescription by a special Act of a mere provisions of a period of limitation however peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act, in the following words: Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 22 of 38 “7. There is an important departure made by the Limitation Act, 1963 in so far as the provision contained in s. 29, sub-s. (2) is concerned, whereas under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 s. 29, sub-s. (2),cl. (b) provided that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, other than these contained in ss. 4, 9 to 18 and 22, shall not apply and, therefore, the applicability of s. 5 was in clear and specific terms excluded, s. 29 , sub-s. (2) of the Limitation Act , 1963 enacts in so many terms that for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions contained in ss. 4 to 24 , which would include s. 5 , shall apply in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Section 29, sub-s. (2), cl. (b) of the Indian Limitation Act. 1908 specifically excluded the applicability of s. 5, while s. 29 , sub-s. (2) of the Limitation Act , 1963 in clear and unambiguous terms provides for the applicability of s. 5 and the ratio of the decision in Kaushalya Rani's case(1) can, therefore, have no application in cases governed by the Limitation' Act, 1963, since that decision proceeded on the hypothesis that the applicability of s. 5 was excluded by reason of s. 29(2) (b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Since under the Limitation Act , 1963 s. 5 is specifically made applicable by s. 29 . sub-s. (2), it can be availed of for the purpose of extending the period of limitation prescribed by a special or local law if the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the application within the period of limitation. It is only if the special or local law expressly excludes the applicability of s. 5 , that it would Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 23 of 38 stand displaced. There, as pointed out by this Court in Kaushalya Rani's case(1) the time limit of sixty days laid down in sub-s. (4) of s. 417 is a special law of limitation and we do not find anything in this special law which expressly excludes the applicability of s. 5 . It is true that the language of sub- s. (4) of s. 417 is mandatory and compulsive, in that it provides in no uncertain terms that no application for grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal. But that would be the language of every provision prescribing a period of limitation. It is because a bar against entertainment of an application beyond the period of limitation is created by a special or local law that it becomes necessary to invoke the aid of s. 5 in order that the application may be entertained despite such bar. Mere provision of period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of s. 5. The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that in a case where an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is filed after the coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, s. 5 would be available to the applicant and if he can show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time limit of sixty days prescribed in sub-s. (4) of s. 417, the application would not be barred and despite the expiration of the time limit of sixty days, the High Court would have the power to entertain it. The High Court, in the present case, did not, therefore, act without jurisdiction in holding that the application preferred by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi was not barred by the time limit of sixty days laid down in sub-s. (4) of s. 417 since the Municipal Corporation of Delhi had sufficient cause for not preferring the Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 24 of 38 application within such time limit. The order granting special leave was in the circumstances not an order outside the power of the High Court.” (31) This brings us immediately to section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, which rises to the occasion and says in the following words: “29(2)Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” (32) Now, therefore the question arises as to when the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to court/Tribunals functioning under Special Act by virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1953. This court finds that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mukri Gopalan V/s C.P. Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5, in an elaborate manner while dealing with the provisions of Kerala Rent Act, 1965, under which rent tribunals have been founded, noted an earlier decision passed by the Apex court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Vs. Madan Lal Dan & Sons. Bareilly(1977 (1) SCR 683) by a bench of three learned Judges, to conclude that the Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 25 of 38 period of limitation prescribed therein under Section 18 of the Kerala Act governing appeals by aggrieved parties will be computed keeping in view the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 as such proceedings will attract Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and consequently Section 5 of the Limitation Act would also be applicable to such proceedings. (33) The Hon’ble Apex Court refuted one of the submissions of the party in the aforesaid Mukri Gopalan’s Case that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply to civil courts as duly constituted under the Civil Procedure Code, wherein it was argued by a contesting party that, if section 29(2) of the Limitation Act are to be made applicable to suit, appeal or application governed by periods of limitation prescribed by any special or local law, they necessarily require such suit, appeal or application to be filed under special or local law before full-fledged civil courts as otherwise Sections 4 to 24 of the Act by themselves would not apply to them. The Apex Court not only agree to the said proposition, but also observed in the following words :- “It has to be kept in view that Section 29(2) gets attracted for computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application to be filed before authorities under special or local law if the conditions laid down in the said provision are satisfied and once they get satisfied the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 shall apply to such proceedings meaning thereby the procedural scheme contemplated by these Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 26 of 38 Sections of the Limitation Act would get telescoped into such provisions of special or local law. It amounts to a legislative shorthand. Consequently, even this contention of Shri Nariman cannot be countenanced.” ( Emphasis supplied) (34) Apparently, the Apex Court in the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Vs. Madan Lal Dan & Sons. Bareilly(1977 (1) SCR 683) has held that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 12(2), inter alia, shall apply in so far as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law, and noted that there was nothing in the U.P. Sales Tax Act expressly excluding the application of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. (35) Thus, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to a review Application field before the Administrative Tribunal as the provisions of limitation are not specifically barred by the Administrative Tribunal Act or the Rules framed therein. However, the Tribunal should exercise great caution while applying the said provision of the limitation Act, so as to balance between a right of a party to review the order on limited legally permissible grounds available to him and public policy which provides for finality of a lis between the parties. Besides, the other provisions for condoning the delay, the Tribunal should be guided Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 27 of 38 by the following principle, which came to devised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy: (2012) 12 SCC 693, by referring various earlier decisions, while considering the application for condonation of delay. Ordinarily the Tribunal should be guided by the following conditions as devised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgment :- (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice ori- ented, non pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (ii) The terms \"sufficient cause\" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate cause of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking codonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigi- lant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the for- mer doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 28 of 38 latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relat- ing to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the funda- mental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such litigation. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, is representation or interpolation by taking re- course to the technicalities of law of limitation. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scruti- nized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual percep- tion. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. (36) Both the parties have fairly admitted that there is no direct judgment by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the aforesaid aspect. However, this Court finds and as also relied upon by the contesting parties that the aforesaid question had directly been considered by the Full Benches of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court, Hon'ble Orissa High Court, Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court and a Division bench of Kerala High Court and the Gauhati High Court. Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 29 of 38 (37) Learned Counsel for the respondent would place reliance on the relevant portion of Full Bench judgment in the case of C. Nara Simha Rao Vs Regional Joint Director of School Education, 2003 SCC Online AP 1068, wherein the Full Bench was considering Rule 19 of A.P. Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, framed under Administrative Tribunal Act. These Rules are pari materia to Rule 17 as is under consideration by this court. The Full Bench took note of decision in K. Ajit Babu and others V/s Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 473 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court was examining as to the right of review or as to who is “a person aggrieved” to file a review Application and returned its findings in the following manner: \"12. Even otherwise the provisions of the Limitation Act which unless expressly excluded would be attracted can be made applicable to the nature of the proceedings under the Act/Rules, but the same is not what Section 29(2) of the Act says because it provides that Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. If none of them are excluded all of them are applicable whether those sections are applicable or not is not determined by the terms of those sections, but by their applicability or inapplicability to the proceedings under the special or local law. Section 6 of Limitation Act, which provides for the extension of the period of limitation till after the disability in the case of a person who is either minor or insane or an idiot, is inapplicable to the proceedings under the Act/Rules. Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 30 of 38 Similarly Sections 7 to 24are in terms inapplicable to the proceedings under the Act, particularly in respect of filing of applications and the procedure to be followed under the Act/Rules. The applicability of those provisions has, therefore, to be judged not from the terms of limitation Act but by the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 and the Rules made thereunder relating to the filing of original applications and review applications and their disposal to ascertain whether it is a complete code in itself which does not admit of the application of any of the provisions of the Limitation Act mentioned in Section 29(2) of the Act. 13. Rule 19 is couched in negative form and disables the person from seeking review under Section 22(e)(f) of the Act, in case review is not filed within 30 days of the order. However, in the Act nowhere it is stated the method or manner or time limit to file such review except Rule 19. In view of the same, the power of Tribunal to condone the delay under Section 21 of the Act is applicable only to the applications filed under Section 19, but the same cannot be made applicable to the review sought under Section 22(3)(f). Sub-section (1) of Section 22 puts an embargo on exercise of such power by the Tribunal, namely that the power of the Tribunal shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and of any rules made by the Central Government. In the absence of any provisions prescribed for condoning the delay either in the Act or in the Rules, the Tribunal will not have jurisdiction to condone the delay in taking aid and assistance of Section 5 of the Limitation Act on the premise that Limitation Act is made applicable in view of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act.\" Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 31 of 38 (38) It is evident that the Full Bench of the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh relied upon the decision in K. Ajit Babu's case and thereafter answered the question in negative regarding the powers and jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal to condone the delay in case of Review beyond prescribed period of limitation. However, this court finds that in K. Ajit Babu’s case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was examining as to who is “a person aggrieved” to file a review Application and was not concerned with the power of condonation of delay in preferring a review Application by the Tribunal. (39) Similarly, a Division bench of the Gauhati High Court in “Union of India & Ors. Vs. Chanchal Nag” : (W.P(c) 3034/2021 decided on 27-03-2023), held that the Tribunal shall have no power to condone the delay unless it has been expressly conferred by the statute creating it. As Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 expressly provides a timeline of 30 days for entertaining a review application, unless the statutory provision is declared to be ultra vires such power cannot be read into the statute by a judicial pronouncement. The learned Division bench noted the judgment of K. Ajit Babu case (supra) as well as the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.S. Rathore V/s State of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 4 SCC 582, which held that the Civil Courts jurisdiction has been taken away by the Act of 1985 and as such held that, as far as government Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 32 of 38 servants are concerned, Article 58 may not be invocable in view of the special limitation. The Gauhati High Court after noting that K. Ajit Babu’s case and S.S. Rathore’s case were not recorded by the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Central Administrative Tribunal : (2002) SCC Online Cal 597 and as such held that the Calcutta High Court judgment did not lay the correct proposition of law. Thus, the Gauhati High Court concluded as follows: “8. As stated above, the limitation for filing a review application is 30 days, as provided in Rule 17 of the Rules of 1987. Thus, the Act of 1985 lays down specific provisions with regard to limitation as well as the power for condonation thereof. Hence, the proceedings under the Act of 1985 cannot be governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act, which is a general law governing issues of limitation arising in proceedings before Courts. This view is further fortified when we consider the ratio of the judgments relied upon by Dr. Sharma in the cases of International Asset (supra) and Sakuru (supra), wherein it has been stipulated that the proceedings before a statutory Tribunal cannot be placed at par with proceedings before a court. The Tribunal shall have no power to condone the delay unless expressly conferred the power by the statute creating it. As Rule 17 of the Rules of 1987 expressly provides timeline of 30 days for entertaining a review application, unless the statutory provision is declared to be ultra vires such power cannot be read into the statute by a judicial pronouncement.” (40) This Court finds that both K. Ajit Babu’s case (supra) and Constitutional Bench Judgement in S.S. Rathore’s case (supra) are not on the issue of limitation relating to the power of review of a Tribunal. As recorded herein above, in K. Ajit Babu’s case, their Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 33 of 38 Lordship of the Hon’ble Supreme Court was examining as to the right of review or as to who is “a person aggrieved” to file a review Application under the Administrative Tribunal Act and similarly, as far as the Judgment in S.S. Rathore’s case is concerned, the same was relating to limitation as provided under section 21 of the Act for preferring an original application. Noticeably, in S.S. Rathore’s case, the Apex Court observed that the Civil Court’s Jurisdiction has been taken away by the Administrative Tribunal Act and did not observe anything relating to the application/observance of principle of natural Justice as per section 22(1) of the Act or the applicability to the provisions of Civil procedure Code as per section 22(3) of the Act, which also contains the provisions relating to reviewing of its own judgment by the Tribunal. (41) On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the Full Bench judgments of Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta and Hon'ble High Court of Orissa in the case of Union of India & Anr V/s Central Administrative Tribunal, ( 2002) SCC Online Cal 597 and Akshaya Kumar Parida V/s Union of India, AIR 2015 Orissa 49, wherein direct question with regard to the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to condone the delay in the event an application for review is filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation has been answered. In the case of Akshaya Kumar Parida (Dead) (supra), the Full Bench of Hon'ble High Court of Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 34 of 38 Orissa distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in the case of K. Ajit Babu (supra), which has been relied upon by the Hon’ble Andhra High Court, in the following manner: 21. Before parting with the case, we would like to observe that in Smt. Kanchana Badaseth (supra), the Bench relied upon a decision of the apex Court in the case of K.Ajit Babu (supra). In K.Ajit Babu (supra), the short question arose for consideration was whether the application filed by the appellants under Section 19 of the Act was maintainable. The apex Court held that often in service matters the judgments rendered either by the Tribunal or by the Court also affect other persons, who are not parties to the cases. In that context, the apex Court held that ordinarily, right of review is available only to those who are party to a case. It was further held that right of review is available if such an application is filed within the period of limitation on the grounds mentioned in Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus K.Ajit Babu (supra) cannot be understood as laying a law that the Tribunal is dehors of its power in entertaining an application for review filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, if the same is accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.” (42) After distinguishing the judgment delivered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Ajit Babu's case, the Full Bench of Hon'ble High Court of Orissa in the case of Akshaya Kumar Parida (Dead) (supra) held that : 22. The logical sequitur on the analysis made in the preceding paragraphs is that neither Section 22 of the Act nor Rule 17 of the Rules expressly excluded the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the event an application for review is filed beyond the period of limitation Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 35 of 38 along with an application for condonation of delay and the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not preferring an application within the time, the Tribunal can condone the delay. (Emphasis Supplied) (43) Further, this Court finds and as has been rightly relied upon by the Counsel for the petitioner that the Full Bench of the Calcutta high Court had formulated the question, which in view of this Court is the correct formulation of question as the implication of Rule 17 cannot be decided in seclusion, merely by reading the said provision only, but the said provision has to be read in conjunction to Section 21 of the Act providing for general limitation under the Administrative Tribunal Act and section 22 providing for application of Civil Procedure Code for exercising the power of review by the Tribunal, so that a harmonious construction can be given to all the provisions of the Administrative Tribunal Act as well as the rules framed therein. Be that as it may, the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of “Union of India Vs. Central Administrative Tribunal & Others” (supra), formulated the question to be decided in the following manner :- “Whether having regard to the provisions of Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) rules, 1987 and section 21 and 22 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, the Tribunal has Jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing a review Application?” Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 36 of 38 (44) The Full Bench of the Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta after discussing the various judgments and law on the subject, concluded that the Tribunal is conferred with power under the Act and the Rules to condone delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act in filing a review application, despite Rue 17 of the said rules. (45) Recently, a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court had examined the same issue as is engaging the attention of this Court in the present matter, in the case of Haris K.M Vs Jahfar: 2020 SCC Online Kerala 4009. The said Full Bench was brought to the notice an unreported decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India & others vs. Chitra Lekha Chakraborty passed in Civil Appeal No.6213 of 2008, wherein the Apex Court held that since there is a specific provision in Rule 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Rules for filing of Review applications before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Section 5 of Limitation Act was not applicable to a petition under Rule 17. The Full Bench after extracting the relevant portion of the judgement of the Apex Court held as follows :- “22. In our humble opinion, with all the respect at our command, we are of the considered view that the said judgment cannot be treated as a binding precedent since it falls under both the exceptions viz. per incuriam and sub silentio. We have already indicated the statutory provisions which govern the filing of a review petition before the Tribunal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the aforesaid decision was Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 37 of 38 not apprised of the statutory provisions, which relate to the power of review available with the Tribunal. In fact the application for review is not one filed under Rule 17 but under Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Section 22 of the Act which says that the Tribunal shall have the same powers as that of a civil court for reviewing its decisions was not considered. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and that of the Limitation Act, which governs the power of review were also not considered. Even if Rule 21 is to be treated as the specific provision prescribing limitation, the fact that the said prescription is subject to Section 29 of the Limitation Act was also not considered.” (Emphasis Supplied) E. CONCLUSION (46) Accordingly, this Court observes that the judgments of Full Benches of Hon'ble High Court of Orissa, Hon’ble High Court of Kolkata and Hon'ble High Court of Kerala are relevant law on the issue. Hence, this Court holds that an application for condonation of delay in Review Application filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 is maintainable and accordingly, it is held that the Tribunal can condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, if it is satisfied that sufficient cause for not preferring an application within the time has been supplemented. (47) As a sequitur, we hereby allow the writ petition and quash the impugned order dated 13.03.2023 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow, in review Application No. 20/2016 in Re: Original Application No. 561/2005 and Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Page 38 of 38 accordingly restore the review application along with the condonation of delay application filed by the petitioner to its original file. (48) It is also directed that the Review Application and Condonation of Delay Application be decided by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Lucknow on its own merits. (49) This Court makes it clear that it has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and respective parties are permitted to agitate all their grounds and submission before the learned Tribunal, as may be permissible to them under law. (50) There shall be no order as to cost. (Om Prakash Shukla, J.) ( Attau Rahman Masoodi, J.) Order Date :- 24th August, 2023 Ajit/- Surendra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others Digitally signed by :- AJIT KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench "