"CUSTOMS, EXCISE & SERVICE TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL New Delhi PRINCIPAL BENCH – COURT NO. III Service Tax Appeal No.51004 Of 2021 [Arising out of Order-in-Original No. 69/TPS/PC/CGST/DSC/2020-21DATED 15.02.2021 passed by the Principal Commissioner of Central Goods and Service Tax, New Delhi] M/s Jangid Interior Decor Private Limited : Appellant A-357, Near Sangam Lodge, Mangal Bazar Road Hamdard, New Delhi 110062 Vs Principal Commissioner, CGST, New Delhi : Respondent 2nd and 3rd Floor, EIL Annexe Building, Plot No. 2-B, Bhikaji Cama Place, Delhi South New Delhi 110066 APPEARANCE: Shri A.K. Batra Shri Ashok Batra and Ms. Sakshi Khanna, Chartered Accountants for the Appellant Shri Manoj Kumar, Authorized Representative for the Respondent CORAM : HON’BLE MS. BINU TAMTA, MEMBER (JUDICIAL) HON’BLE MS. HEMAMBIKA R. PRIYA, MEMBER (TECHNICAL) FINAL ORDER No. 50948/2025 Date of Hearing:28.04.2025 Date of Decision: 02.07.2025 HEMAMBIKA R. PRIYA The present appeal has been filed by M/s Jangid Interior Decor Private Limited1 to assail the Order-in-Original No. 69/TPS/PC/CGST/DSC/2020-21 dated 15.02.2021 wherein the Commissioner confirmed the demand of service tax of Rs. 3,17,97,060/- along with interest and imposed appropriate penalties. 1 The appellant Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 2 2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant is a private limited company, having its registered office at A-357 E, Near Sangam Lodge, Mangal Bazar Road, Hamdard, New Delhi-110062. The appellant was registered with erstwhile Service Tax Commissionerate vide STC. AAACJ5516FST001 under various categories of taxable service. The appellant's primary business involves providing works contract services both as a principal contractor and as a sub- contractor. During the period in dispute, 01.10.2013 to 30.06.2017, the appellant acted as a sub-contractor, executing work orders received from its primary contractors, namely M/s. SMCC Construction India Ltd. and M/s. Takenaka India Pvt. Ltd.The Appellant's scope of work, as a sub-contractor, encompasses a comprehensive range of construction services for newly built structures. These services include earthwork, construction activities (such as laying foundation stones, erecting brick walls, and constructing columns, slabs, and floors), as well as specialized tasks like water proofing, tiling and stonework, carpentry and glasswork (including doors, windows, and reception counters), plumbing and sanitary installations, ceiling and plasterwork, partitioning (using glass, wood, or gypsum), drainage and PVC piping, stainless steel railings, aluminum fixtures, and painting. The appellant had duly discharged the applicable service tax on the service portion of works contracts, after availing 60% abatement as per Rule 2A(ii)(A) of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006. In addition to the above, the appellant also executed a work order awarded by Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad, Uttar Pradesh (RKUMP) for constructing Apna Bazar' at Saifai, Farrukhabad, U.P. The appellant Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 3 availed exemption from service tax as per entry no. 12/12A of Mega Exemption Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 as the activity was for the benefit of agriculturists.An audit was conducted by the Department whereby it was noticed that the appellant was availing abatement @60% under Rule 2A of Valuation Rules and claiming exemption from service tax vide entry 12/12A of the Notification No. 25/2012- ST dated 20.06.2012 in respect of above referred contracts. The Department alleged that the services rendered by the appellant, as sub-contractor are not covered in 'original works' but are in nature of completion and finishing services. Therefore, the department proposed the differential demand by allowing the benefit of abatement of 30% instead of 60%. The Department also alleged that the works contract services rendered by the appellant to RKUMP are not exempt from service tax. The Department was of the view that RKUMP is not a Governmental Authority, and the activities carried out by the appellant are commercial in nature, thereby the appellant was not entitled to seek exemption vide entry 12/12A of N. No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012. In addition, the Department also noted that the activities carried out by the appellant do not fall under Article 243W of the Constitution. Hence, the appellant was liable to pay service tax on 40% of the gross amount charged from RKUMP. A show cause notice dated 23.04.2019 was issued for the period 01.10.2013 to 30.06.2017 whereby the demand of Rs. 3,17,97,060/- was proposed along with interest under Section 75 and the penalty under Section 76, 77 & 78 of the Act. The same was adjudicated by the Commissioner who confirmed the demand of Rs. 3,17,97,060/- along with interest and Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 4 appropriate penalties. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant filed the present appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the present SCN had been issued without giving any pre-SCN consultation opportunity to the appellant.Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the activity carried out by the Appellant for its contractors fell within the ambit of 'Original Works'.He stated that the term 'original works' defined under Rule 2A included (i) all new constructions;(ii) all types of additions and alterations to abandoned or damaged structures on land that are required to make them workable;(iii) Erection, commissioning or installation of plant, machinery or equipment or structure whether pre-fabricated or otherwise. In the present case, learned counsel contended that the appellant had carried out various types of activities viz. earth work, construction work, water proofing work, tiles & stone work, wooden & glass work, plumbing & sanitary work, ceiling & partition work, plaster work, drainage work, PVC piping work, ss railing work, aluminium work and paint work etc. He stated that the building cannot be considered as fully constructed without completion of all these works which are inbuilt and was in relation to construction of new building only and therefore, the same was covered under the ambit of 'original works‟.Learned counsel stated that the appellant had rightly availed the benefit of Rule 2A of the Valuation Rules 2006. Learned Counselfurther submitted that the Appellant's main contractors had received the work orders from their clients/customers for the construction of new buildings/civil structures. Subsequently, these Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 5 main contractors had subcontracted the same work or a portion thereof to the appellant. Consequently, the works undertaken by both the main contractors and the appellant unequivocally fell within the definition of 'Original Works'. Consequently, when the main contractors subcontract the same work or a part thereof to the Appellant, the nature of the work remained unchanged, retaining its characterization as „original works‟ in the hands of the appellant. In light of this, the appellant had correctly discharged its service tax liability, availing the 60% abatement under Rule 2A(ii)A of the Valuation Rules, and thus, there is no shortfall in tax payment. 3.1 With respect to issue relating to the demand of Rs. 1,35,62,702/- confirmed, learned counsel submitted that the Department has erred in interpreting the terms used in the Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012. He submitted that RKUMP had been established by the State Legislature under the 'Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 for the welfare of the agriculturist by way of facilitating them in selling their agricultural produce at reasonable rate in the markets situated in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Learned counsel contended that it was an admitted fact that RKUMP was established by the State Legislature and was a Governmental Authority as defined under explanation 2(s) of mega exemption notification. In this context, learned counsel stated that the Department's interpretation of the definition had been challenged, specifically regarding the condition for 90% or more participation and carrying out functions entrusted to Municipalities under Article 243W of the Constitution. The Hon'ble High Court of Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 6 Patna has upheld the proposition that these conditions are linked to clause (ii) of the definition in the case of Shapoorji aloonji& Company Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner, Custom & Central Excise & Service Tax2. Therefore, considering the said decision and the definition of Governmental Authority, it was clear that RKUMP is a Governmental Authority. 3.2 Learned counsel further submitted that invoking extended period under the proviso to section 73 (1) of the Finance Act, 1994 was not warranted, thus the impugned show cause notice is time barred for the period October 2013 to June 2017 and hence, the demand amounting to Rs. 2,00,44,332/- for the period 01.10.2013 to 31.03.2016 was liable to be dropped. He submitted that the transactions were duly recorded in the books of account of the appellant, therefore there was suppression at all. He submitted that the appellant was registered with the service tax department and had regularly been discharging its service tax liability and filing service tax returns. Hence, the appellant had no malafide intent to evade the payment of service tax, and was under bonafide view that works contract service rendered to SMCC and Takenaka were in the nature of 'Original Work'. Therefore, appellant had correctly discharged its service tax liability on value of service computed @ 40% of total amount charged for works contract service.Further, the appellant had also rendered works contract service to RKUMP for constructing 'Apna Bazar' Mandi which has been used for non-commercial purpose. 2 2016 (3) TMI 832-Patna High Court Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 7 Therefore, theappellant has claimed ST exemption in accordance with Entry No. 12/12A of Mega Exemption Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012. In this regard, learned counsel relied on the following decisions:-  M/s. Thyssenkrupp Industries India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax Pune-13  M/s. Raj Mohan vs. Commissioner of CGST, Panchkula4 Therefore, the demand of Rs. 2,00,44,332/- is not tenable as the same is barred by limitation. He prayed that cum-tax benefit should be extended to the appellant and no interest and penalty should be imposed. 4. Learned Authorized Representative for the Department submitted that the Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad (Uttar Pradesh) was neither a government, local authority nor governmental authority. Therefore, the exemption under Notification No. 25/2012, Sl. No. 12/12A was not available to the appellant.Further the services provided by the appellant being in the nature of construction of shops, office, cafeteria, hall including electrification of Mandi Samiti at Apna Bazar, Saifai, Jaswant Nagar, which were used for Commercial purposes and Mandi Samiti earns income by way of collecting Mandi Fees, cesses and other charges from the seller, purchaser and other users. Thus, the services provided to these Mandi Samitieswere for commercial consideration.Therefore, the learned Authorized Representative contended that the benefit of said notification was not 3 2018-TIOL-3828-CESTAT-MUM 4 2022 (8) TMI 832-CESTAT CHANDIGARH Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 8 available to them. Further the shops, offices, halls, cafeteria etc cannot be said to be for storage of post harvest storage purpose, therefore exemption under Sl. No. 14(d) of said Notification was also not available to them. Learned Authorized Representative submitted that the appellant has provided the details of total amount of work done and on the basis thereof, the short payment of service tax had been calculated at Rs.1,35,62,702/- which was liable to be recovered in terms of proviso to Section 73(1) of Finance Act, 1994 alongwith interest in terms of Section 75 and penalty under Section 78 of the Act ibid. 5. Learned Authorized Representative contended that the 'original work' was defined under the Valuation Rules and it was clear from the facts of the case that definition (ii) and (iii) are not at git relevant in the present matter, as none of the work order of the assessee is with respect to 'abandoned or damaged structures' or 'erection, commissioning or installation. Learned Authorized Representative further stated that being the actual holder of 'original work' and assisting the actual holder in the execution of 'original work were two different things. The work orders executed by the appellant received from M/s SMCC Constructions India Limited and M/s Takenaka India Pvt. Ltd, were in the nature of 'completion and finishing services' as defined under Rule 2A (ii)(C) upto 30.09.2014 and under Rule 24 (ii) B of Valuation Rules thereafter. Accordingly, all the work orders as detailed in the SCN, upto 30.09.2014, the taxable value was to be calculated as 60% of the work order value, and from 01.10.2014, as 70% of the work order value. Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 9 5.1 Learned Authorized Representative stated that with respect to the exemption at St.No.14 (d), the same was eligible only with respect to construction, erection, commissioning, or installation of original works pertaining to post-harvest storage infrastructure for agricultural produce, including a cold storages for such purposes. However, on going through the copy of contract awarded by the Mandi Parishad to the appellant, it was apparent that it was awarded with respect to construction of a project named 'Apna Bazgar wherein construction of shops, office spaces, kitchens, cafeterias, etc. were to be done. He submitted that the services provided were by way of construction of Apna Bazaar which was a new construction and qualified as original work. Further, for the usage of such constructed civil work/ market by the Mandi Parishad, the appellant had not submitted any evidence to specify the purpose of these markets used by the Mandi Parishad. The only submission of the appellant was on the ground that the Mandi Parishad were formed for the purpose of welfare and are not involved in commercial activity. Learned Authorized Representative submitted that the conditions 12(a) or 12A (a) were not met in the activities carried out by the appellant.Therefore, they were not eligible to avail the exemption under Sl. No. 12 (a) or 12A(a) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012. He prayed that the appeal may be dismissed. 6. We have heard the Ld Counsel for the appellant and the Ld AR for the Department. We have also perused the case records. The two issues before us are as follows: i. Whether the work orders executed by the appellant for M/s SMCC Constructions India Ltd and M/s Takenaka India Pvt Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 10 Ltd were in the nature of original works or was it completion and finishing services? ii. Whether the work contract services provided to Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad was eligible for exemption under Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 206.2012? 7. We shall consider each issue individually. 7.1 It is an admitted fact that the that the appellant was a sub- contractor who had been awarded work orders for interior finishing work, tiling work, main interior work, sanitary work, external sewage piping work etc. A perusal of the work orders reveals that the appellant was carrying out works related to plumbing fixtures, tiling, doors, flooring, railing work, water proofing etc to the incomplete structures given by the main contractor. The issue before us is whether this work can be considered as „original works‟. It is evident that the appellant was given the shell of a building and he was to carry out all the necessary activities to complete the building, including the final finishing works. It cannot be said that the appellant carried out finishing work only, as contended by the department. In this context, we draw support from Tribunal‟s decision in the case of Kalpakaaru Projects Pvt Ltd vs Pr. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi South vide Final Order 50769/2025 dated 26.05.2025, wherein the Tribunal had the opportunity to examine similar issue as to whether such works carried out by the appellant can be considered as original works. The Tribunal held as follows: “8. We have considered the submission on both sides on this count. Rule 2A of the Service Tax Valuation Rules, reads as follows: Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 11 “2A. Determination of value of taxable services involved in the execution of a works contract.- Subject to the provisions of section 67, the value of taxable service involved in the execution of a works contract (hereinafter referred to as works contract service), referred to in clause (8) of section 66E of the Act, shall be determined by the service provider in the following manner, namely:- (i) Value of works contract service shall be equivalent to the gross amount charged for the works contract less the value of transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of the said works contract. Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause,- (a) gross amount charged for the works contract shall not include value added tax or sales tax, as the case may be, paid, if any, on transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of the said works contract; (b) value of works contract service shall include, - (i) labour charges for execution of the works; (ii) amount paid to a sub-contractor for labour and services; (iii) charges for planning, designing and architect’s fees; (iv) charges for obtaining on hire or otherwise, machinery and tools used for the execution of the works contract; (v) cost of consumables such as water, electricity, fuel used in the execution of the works contract; (vi) cost of establishment of the contractor relatable to supply of labour and services; (vii) other similar expenses relatable to supply of labour and services; and 9 ST/50302/2022 (viii) profit earned by the service provider relatable to supply of labour and services; (c) where value added tax or sales tax has been paid or payable on the actual value of property in goods transferred in the execution of the works contract, then, such value adopted for the purposes of payment of value Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 12 added tax or sales tax, shall be taken as the value of property in goods transferred in the execution of the said works contract for determination of the value of service portion in the execution of works contract under this clause. (ii) Where the value has not been determined under clause (i), the person liable to pay tax on the service portion involved in the execution of the works contract shall determine the service tax payable in the following manner, namely:- A. in case of works contracts entered into for execution of original works, service tax shall be payable on forty per cent. of the total amount charged for the works contract: PROVIDED that where the amount charged for works contract includes the value of goods as well as land or undivided share of land, the service tax shall be payable on twenty-five per cent. of the total amount charged for the works contract: PROVIDED that where the amount charged for works contract includes the value of goods as well as land or undivided share of land, the service tax shall be payable on thirty per cent. of the total amount charged for the works contract: PROVIDED FURTHER that in case of works contract for construction of residential units having carpet area up to 2000 square feet or where the amount charged per residential unit from service recipient is less than rupees one crore and the amount charged for the works contract includes the value of goods as well as land or undivided share of land, the service tax shall be payable on twenty- five per cent. of the total amount charged for the works contract: PROVIDED that where the amount charged for works contract includes the value of goods as well as land or undivided share of land, the service tax shall be payable Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 13 on thirty per cent. of the total amount charged for the works contract: PROVIDED FURTHER that in case of works contract for construction of residential units having carpet area up to 2000 square feet and where the amount charged per residential unit from service recipient is less than rupees one crore and the amount charged for the works contract includes the value of goods as well as land or undivided share of land, the service tax shall be payable on twenty- five per cent. of the total amount charged for the works contract. PROVIDED that where the amount charged for works contract includes the value of goods as well as land or undivided share of land, the service tax shall be payable on thirty per cent. of the total amount charged for the works contract.” 9. Evidently, in case of “works contract” the assessee has two options-either to deduct the value of materials used from the works contract under rule 2A(i) and pay service tax on the remaining part of the works contract or claim abatement under rule 2A(ii) on notional basis. The appellant‟s claim is that the total value of the goods in its works contracts worked out to 61.23% and these figures were provided to the Commissioner. Under such circumstances, service tax had to be paid only 38.73. However, the appellant opted for rule 2A(ii). This covers two types of contracts- those which are original works and those which are completion and finishing services. 10. We have seen the photographs of the buildings in the form in which they are received and how they are completed. We also gone through the extensive work carried out by the appellant. Essentially, the appellant converts a bare skeletal structure of a building into a complete show room including the electricity, HVAC, plumbing, flooring, ceiling, air-conditioning, partitioning Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 14 etc. In our considered view, this has to be considered as original work and it cannot be called merely finishing or completion work. If they are considered as original works they will be covered by 2A(ii)(A) of the Valuation Rules and will be entitled to 60% abatement. Service Tax has to be paid only on 40% of the value which the appellant did. We also note it is value taken by previous audit teams who audited the appellant‟s work. Therefore, demand on this count cannot be sustained either on merits or on limitation.” 7.2 In view of the above decision, we hold that the demand in respect of the first issue cannot be sustained, and the same is set aside. 8. As regards the second issue, the Ld Counsel has submitted that RKUMP had been established by the State Legislature under the 'Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 for the welfare of the agriculturist by way of facilitating them in selling their agricultural produce at reasonable rate in the markets situated in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Learned counsel contended that it was an admitted fact that RKUMP was established by the State Legislature and was a Governmental Authority as defined under explanation 2(s) of mega exemption notification. In this context, we would need to examine the provisions contained n the Notification no. 25/2012-St for the relevant period. The period of the dispute is from 1.10.2013 to 30.6.2017. The definition of Governmental authority was as follows:- For the period 1.10.2013 to 29.01.2014: “(s) „governmental authority‟ means a board, or an authority or any other body established with 90% or more participation by way of equity or control by Government Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 15 and set up by an Act of the Parliament or a State Legislature to carry out any function entrusted under article 243W of the Constitution” For the period 30.01.2014 onwards “(s) \"governmental authority\" means an authority or a board or any other body; (i) set up by an Act of Parliament or a State Legislature; or (ii) established by Government, with 90% or more participation by way of equity or control, to carry out any function entrusted to a municipality under article 243W of the Constitution.” The facts in the instant case are that the Rashtriya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad has been set up by an Act passed by the UP-State Legislature. In this context, we note that Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the Civil Appeal no. 3991/2023 filed by the Department against the decision of the High Court of Patna in Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. Pvt Ltd vs Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise & Service Tax & Others5 examined the definition of „governmental authority‟ and vide its order dated 13.10.2023 held as follows:- “15. Having read the two definitions, first and foremost, it is necessary to ascertain the objective behind the Clarification Notification which amended the Exemption Notification and re- defined “governmental authority”. A bare perusal of the Exemption Notification reveals that the exemption therein was only extended to those entities, viz. board or authority or body, which fulfilled the three requisite conditions, i.e. : a) having been established with 90% or more participation by way of equity or control by Government, b) set up by an Act of the Parliament or a State Legislature, and c) carrying out any function entrusted to a municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution. It is evident 5 2023 (79) GSTL 145 (S.C.) Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 16 that the scope of the exemption was severely restricted to only a few entities. Although the reason for re-defining “governmental authority” has not been made available by the appellants, we presume that unworkability of the scheme for grant of exemption because of the restricted definition of “governmental authority” was the trigger therefor and hence, the scope of the exemption was expanded to cover a larger section of entities answering the definition of “governmental authority”. An amendment by way of the Clarification Notification was, therefore, introduced which expanded the definition of “governmental authority” and widened the exemption base for service tax to be provided even to an authority or a board or any other body, set up by an Act of Parliament or a State Legislature without the condition of having been established with 90% or more participation by way of equity or control by Government to carry out any function entrusted to a municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution. 16. While the aforesaid interpretation of amended clause 2(s) has been upheld by the Patna High Court, the appellants have countered the same by submitting that the amended definition of “governmental authority” as in clause 2(s) should be interpreted in a manner so as to make the long line under clause 2(s) applicable to both sub-clause (i) and sub-clause (ii). In other words, as per the appellants, to qualify as a “governmental authority” under clause 2(s)(i), such authority, board or body must not only be a statutory authority set up by an Act of Parliament or a State Legislature but must also have 90% or more participation of the Government by way of equity or control to carry out any like function that a municipality under Article 243W of the Constitution is entrusted to discharge. 17. We have no hesitation to disagree with the latter interpretation sought to be placed by the appellants, for the reasons that follow. Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 17 18. In Superintendent & Legal Remembrancer, State of West Bengal vs. Corporation of Calcutta11, a nine-judge Bench of this Court, relying upon Craies‟ On Statute Law (6th edn), stated that where the language of astatute is clear, the words are in themselves precise and unambiguous, and a literal reading does not lead to absurd construction, the necessity for employing rules of interpretation disappears and reaches its vanishing point. 19. This Court in Union of India & Ors. vs. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd.12, held that harmonious construction is required to be given to a provision only when it is shrouded in ambiguity and lacks clarity, rather than when it is unequivocally clear and unambiguous. 20. What is plain and ambiguous from a bare reading of a provision under consideration must be interpreted in the same way as it has been stipulated and not in a way that it presumes deficiency and radically changes the meaning and context of the provision. This is the view expressed in the decision of a five- judge Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. vs. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd.13. The relevant passage therefrom reads as under: “10. […] In interpreting a taxing statute, equitable considerations are entirely out of place. Nor can taxing statutes be interpreted on any presumptions or assumptions. The court must look squarely at the words of the statute and interpret them. It must interpret a taxing statute in the light of what is clearly expressed : it cannot imply anything which is not expressed; it cannot import provisions in the statutes so as to supply any assumed deficiency.” 21. It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that any authority, entrusted with the function of legislating, legislates for a purpose;it can, thus, safely be assumed that it will not indulge in unnecessary or pointless legislation. This Court, in Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 18 Utkal Contractors & Joinery (P) Ltd. vs State of Orissa14, lucidly explained thus: “9. […] It is again important to remember that Parliament does not waste its breath unnecessarily. Just as Parliament is not expected to use unnecessary expressions, Parliament is also not expected to express itself unnecessarily. Even as Parliament does not use any word without meaning something, Parliament does not legislate where no legislation is called for. Parliament cannot be assumed to legislate for the sake of legislation; nor can it be assumed to make pointless legislation. Parliament does not indulge in legislation merely to state what it is unnecessary to state or to do what is already validly done. Parliament may not be assumed to legislate unnecessarily.” 22. Having noticed some of the precedents in the field of interpretation of statutes, we now move on to a little bit of English grammar. The word “or” as well as the word “and” is a conjunction; and it is well known that a conjunction is used to join words, phrases, or clauses. On how the conjunctions “or” and “and” are to be read, guidance could be drawn from authoritative texts and judicial decisions. As per Justice GP Singh‟s Principles of Statutory Interpretation, the word “or” is normally disjunctive while the word “and” is normally conjunctive. In English law, the position is clear as crystal, as explained by Lord Scrutton in Green vs. Premier Glynrhonwy Slate Co.15, that one does not read “or” as “and” in a statute unless one is obliged, because “or” does not generally mean “and” and “and” does not generally mean “or”. 23. When the meaning of the provision in question is clear and unambiguous by the usage of “or” in clause 2(s), there remains no force in the submission of Ms. Bagchi that “or” should be interpreted as “and”. In our opinion, the word “or” employed in clause 2(s) manifests the legislative intent of prescribing an alternative. Going by the golden rule of interpretation that words Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 19 should be read in their ordinary, natural, and grammatical meaning, the word “or” in clause 2(s) clearly appears to us to have been used to reflect the ordinary and normal sense, that is to denote an alternative, giving a choice; and, we cannot assign it a different meaning unless it leads to vagueness or makes clause 2(s) absolutely unworkable. We are fortified in our view by the decision of this Court in Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust vs. A.G. Syed Mohideen16, where it was held thus: “11. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended by the legislature or the lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation toolkit containing the settled rules of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be.” 24. In the present case, the word “or” between sub-clauses (i) and (ii) indicates the independent and disjunctive nature of sub- clause (i), meaning thereby that “or” used after sub-clause (i) cannot be interpreted as “and” so as to tie it with the condition Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 20 enumerated in the long line of clause 2(s) which is applicable only to sub-clause (ii). 25. Applying a different lens, let us test the worth of Ms. Bagchi‟s submission in the light of the punctuations in clause 2(s). It has been held by a bench of nine Hon‟ble Judges of this Court in KantaruRajeevaru vs. Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors.17 that when a provision is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, weight should undoubtedly be given to the punctuation; however, though a punctuation may have its uses in some cases, but it cannot certainly be regarded as a controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning. While so observing, this Court considered several decisions as well as the punctuation comma in the relevant provision of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. 26. What follows is that punctuation, though a minor element, may be resorted to for the purpose of construction. 27. In the present case, the use of a semicolon is not a trivial matter but a deliberate inclusion with a clear intention to differentiate it from sub-clause (ii). Further, it can be observed upon a plain and literal reading of clause 2(s) that while there is a semicolon after sub-clause (i), sub-clause (ii)closes with a comma. This essentially supports the only possible construction that the use of a comma after sub-clause (ii) relates it with the long line provided after that and, by no stretch of imagination, the application of the long line can be extended to sub-clause (i), the scope of which ends with the semicolon. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the long line of clause 2(s) governs only sub-clause (ii) and not sub-clause (i) because of the simple reason that the introduction of semicolon after subclause (i), followed by the word “or”, has established it as an independent category, thereby making it distinct from sub-clause (ii). If the author wanted both these parts to be read together, there is no plausible reason as to why it did not use the word “and” and without the punctuation Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 21 semicolon. While the Clarification Notification introduced an amended version of clause 2(s), the whole canvas was open for the author to define “governmental authority” whichever way it wished; however, “governmental authority” was re-defined with a purpose to make the clause workable in contra-distinction to the earlier definition. Therefore, we cannot overstep and interpret “or” as “and” so as to allow the alternative outlined in clause 2(s) to vanish. 28. Let us consider the problem from a different angle. The revised definition of “governmental authority” and the few punctuations in the definition (two semicolons and two commas) and the conjunction „or‟ have been noticed above. Literally read, the conjunction „or‟ between sub-clauses (i) and (ii) clearly divides the two clauses in two parts with the first part completely independent of the second part. The first part is by itself complete andcapable of operating independently. A construction leading to an anomalous result has to be avoided and to so avoid, it has to be held that the long line of clause 2(s) starting with “with 90%” and ending with “Constitution” qualifies sub-clause (ii); and, if the conjunction „or‟ is to be read as „and‟, meaning thereby that the portion “with 90% … Constitution” has to be read as qualifying both sub-clauses (i) and (ii), then the intention of re-defining “governmental authority” would certainly be defeated. As discussed earlier, the purpose for which “governmental authority” was re-defined must have been to make it workable. We cannot, therefore, resort to a construction that would allow subsistence of the unworkability factor. Assuming what Ms. Bagchi contended is right, it was incumbent for the appellants to bring to our notice, if not by way of pleading, but at least with reference to the relevant statutes, which of the particular authorities/boards/bodies are created by legislation - Central or State – “with 90% or more participation by way of equity or control by Government”. Each word in the definition clause has to be given some meaning and merely because promoting educational aspects is one of the Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 22 functions of a municipality in terms of Article 243W of the Constitution read with Schedule XII appended thereto is no valid argument unless equity or control by the Government, to the extent of 90%, is shown to exist qua the relevant authority/board/body. Incidentally, neither is there any indication in the petition nor has Ms. Bagchi been able to disclose the identity of any such authority/board/other body which is covered by her argument. No such identified authority/board/body covered by the aforesaid construction of the definition of “governmental authority” in clause 2(s) of the Clarification Notification, which theappellants appeal to us to accept, having been brought to our notice, we are unable to find any fault in the decisions of the Patna High Court and the Orissa High Court extending the benefit of the Exemption Notification to the educational institutions, and a fortiori, to SPCL. 29. We need not draw guidance from any of the decisions cited by Ms. Bagchi, except one, on the question of construction of the relevant clause because none of those decisions had the occasion to deal with the issue emanating from the Exemption Notification and the Clarification Notification that we are tasked to consider. 30. Ms. Bagchi heavily relied on the decision of a five-judge Bench of this Court in Dilip Kumar (supra) to urge that in case of any ambiguity in interpreting an exemption notification, the interpretation that favours the revenue must be adopted; also, the burden of proving applicability of the exemption notification would be on the assessee to show that his case comes within the parameters of the exemption clause or exemption notification. At the outset, we record that there is absolutely no quarrel with the proposition laid down therein. We, however, reject the contention of Ms. Bagchi based on Dilip Kumar (supra) because the ratio is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. This, for the simple reason, that there exists no ambiguity insofar as the interpretation of clause 2(s) is concerned. We are endorsed in Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 23 our opinion by the Latin maxim quoties in verbisnulla est ambiguitas, ibinullaexpositio contra verba expressafienda est, which means that when there is no ambiguity in the words, then no exposition contrary to the words is to be made. It is, therefore, clear as a sunny daythat there arises only one plausible construction of clause 2(s) which is the one the Patna High Court adopted, and which we are inclined to uphold. 31. Ms. Bagchi had submitted that the impugned judgment broadens the scope of the exemption to include vast number of statutory bodies; therefore, unfairly burdening the exchequer. We observe that the authority having the competence to issue a notification completed its job by re-defining “governmental authority” and now it is a task entrusted to the courts to interpret the law. It is, at this juncture, important to notice the law laid down by this Court, speaking through Hon‟ble O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Girdhari Lal & Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur18. The position of law was affirmed in the following terms: “6. Where different interpretations are likely to be put on words and a question arises what an individual meant when he used certain words, he may be asked to explain himself and he may do so and say that he meant one thing and not the other. But if it is the legislature that has expressed itself by making the laws and difficulties arise in interpreting what the legislature has said, a legislature cannot be asked to sit to resolve those difficulties. The legislatures, unlike individuals, cannot come forward to explain themselves as often as difficulties of interpretation arise. So the task of interpreting the laws by finding out what the legislature meant is allotted to the courts. Of course, where words are clear and unambiguous no question of construction may arise. Such words ordinarily speak for themselves. Since the words must have spoken as clearly to legislators as to judges, it may be safely presumed that the legislature intended what the words plainly say. This is the real basis of Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 24 the so-called golden rule of construction that where the words of statutes are plain and unambiguous effect must be given to them. A court should give effect to plain words, not because there is any charm or magic in the plainness of such words but because plain words may be expected to convey plainly the intention of the legislature to others as well as judges.” 32. Keeping the above-said ratio in mind, an interpretation of the relevant provision resulting in the expanded scope of its operation cannot in itself be sufficient to attribute ambiguity to the provision. 33. To make a statute workable by employing interpretative tools and to venture into a kind of judicial legislation are two different things. Merely because the statute does not yield intended or desired results, that cannot be reason for us to overstep and cross the Lakshman Rekha by employing tools of interpretation to interpret a provision keeping in mind its outcome. Interpretative tools should be employed to make a statute workable and not to reach to a particular outcome. CONCLUSION 34. For the reasons aforesaid, we find no merit in these appeals. The impugned judgments and orders are upheld and the appeals are dismissed, without any order for costs.” 9. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the RKUMP is a governmental authority and the benefit of the exemption contained in Notification 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012 is available to the appellant. Hence, respectfully following the decision of the Apex Court, we hold that the demand is not sustainable. Service Tax Appeal No. 51004 Of 2021 25 10. Once the demand under both the issues are set aside, no penalties are liable to be imposed. 11. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed. (Order pronounced in the open Court on 02.07.2025) (BINU TAMTA) MEMBER (JUDICIAL) (HEMAMBIKA R. PRIYA) MEMBER (TECHNICAL) G.Y. "