A.S NARAYANA PILLAI V. UNION OF INDIA

WA/1908/2018

AI Insights

A.S. Narayana Pillai, a veteran freedom fighter, appealed against the dismissal of his writ petition which sought the disbursement of arrears of freedom fighters' pension from the date of his application rather than from the date of the court's earlier judgment. The High Court had previously recognized him as eligible for pensions under both state and central schemes. However, the pension was granted only from the date of the court's judgment in 2009, not from the date of his application in 2000. The appeal was based on the argument that his case should be treated differently due to specific circumstances and previous court decisions that supported his claim for earlier pension disbursement.

• Counselvise Citation: [2020] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 721485 (HC-KERALA)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 01-12-2020
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Mukund Lal Bhandari v. Union of India, Union of India v. Kaushalaya Devi, Union of India v. K.V. Swaminathan, Gurdial Singh v. Union of India, Union of India v. Radhamani, Union of India v. Kashiswar Jana
• Laws Referred To: Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: JAISHANKER NAIR
• Assessee Lawyers: N DHARMADAN; D P RENU
• Keywords: Pension Arrears; Primary evidence; Secondary evidence; Freedom fighters' pension; Liberal view in interpretation
• Section: 63

Judgement Text

"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY TUESDAY, THE 01ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2020 / 10TH AGRAHAYANA, 1942 WA.No.1908 OF 2018 [AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WP(C) NO.39384/2016(W) DATED 24.07.2018 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA] APPELLANT/PETITIONER: A.S NARAYANA PILLAI, AYIKUNNEL HOUSE, MAKKIYAD P.O, VELLAMUNDA, WAYANAD. BY ADVS. N. DHARMADAN (SR.) SMT.D.P.RENU RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, FREEDOM FIGHTERS DIVISION, LOK NAYAK, BHAVAN, GIRISH MANTRALAYA , NEW DELHI-110001. BY SRI. JAISHANKER V. NAIR, CGC REPRESENTING ASG THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 01.12.2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.A.1908/2018 2 “C.R” JUDGMENT Dated this the 1st day of December, 2020 S. Manikumar, CJ This intra court appeal is filed against the judgment passed in W.P. (C) No. 39384 of 2016 dated 24.07.2018, whereby a learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, by observing thus: “9. In the instant case, the respondent Union of India has granted pension not from the date of the order but from the date of Ext.P-1 judgment rendered by this Court (10.06.2009). In the light of the abovesaid rulings of the Apex Court in the decisions as in Kaushalaya Devi's case (supra), Kashiswar Jana's case (supra), Sawinder Kaur's case (supra), the applicant cannot contend that he is entitled for grant of pension from the date of receipt of his application (06.11.2000), in as much as it is indisputable that this case was considered only on the basis of secondary evidence and not on the basis of primary evidence. 10. The petitioner's counsel has placed reliance on decision of the Apex Court in Gurdial Singh v. Union of India and others reported in (2001) 8 SCC 8, para.9, which reads as follows: “9. We are satisfied that the order of the respondent authorities impugned before the High Court (Annexure P-14) dated 1-11-2000 is liable to be set aside and the appellant entitled to the grant of relief of pension. However, keeping in view the lapse of time and peculiar circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to grant him the pension with effect from 12-3-1973 as claimed and feel that the ends of justice would be met if the appellant is granted pension with effect from march 1996 when he was forced to file Writ Petition No.12350 of 1996.” W.A.1908/2018 3 From a reading of the abovesaid judgment in Gurdial Singh's case (supra), it can be seen that the direction in paragraph.9 has been granted in the special facts and circumstances of the case and the aforestated issue in that regard has not been pointedly raised and considered. Whereas, the issue at hand as to whether the claimant like the petitioner is entitled for grant of pension from the date of receipt of application or from the date of sanctioning order etc. has been raised and considered in the aforestated judgments of the Apex Court mentioned herein above, in claims which are established only by secondary evidence and not on the basis of primary evidence. In the light of these aspects, the petitioner's contentions cannot be accepted. In that view of the matter, it is ordered that the above Writ Petition (Civil) will stand dismissed.” 2. Facts leading to the filing of this appeal are that the appellant/ writ petitioner is a veteran freedom fighter, aged 94. He filed W.P.(C) No.39384 of 2016 for a direction to the respondent to disburse the arrears of freedom fighters' pension due to him with 12% interest, with effect from the date of receipt of Exhibit-P4 application submitted by him on 06.11.2000. As per the judgment dated 10.06.2009 in W.P.(C) No.39646 of 2003, appellant was found to be a freedom fighter, eligible for both, pension under the State Scheme and under Swatantrata Sainik Samman (SSS) Pension Scheme, 1980. His participation in Quit India movement and other suffering, evidenced by necessary certificates, were elaborately considered and discussed by the writ court in Exhibit-P1 judgment dated 10.06.2009 and earlier judgment referred to above, which was rendered, W.A.1908/2018 4 when he challenged the order passed by this court in O.P. No.34941/2002, specifically directing to consider his case, taking a liberal view, in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mukund Lal Bhandari v. Union of India (AIR 1993 SC 2127). Hence, he has a vested right. Since no appeal has been filed by the respondents against the said judgment, his right to get the benefits of Mukund Lal Bhandari case (cited supra) was kept alive, notwithstanding the subsequent judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court. 3. Appellant has further stated that the Central Government have considered his claim and issued pension payment order (Exhibit-P3) on 23.11.2011, granting central pension under the scheme. Appellant is now getting freedom fighters' pension under both of the above schemes. However, he is denied arrears from the date of receipt of Exhibit-P4 application dated 06.11.2009. He has contended that denial of SSS Pension from the date of receipt of his application, when the original pension payment order was passed, is illegal and arbitrary. 4. Before the writ court, the respondent in their counter has contended that the appellant has failed to produce primary evidence in support of his claim of freedom fighters' pension. In support of the contentions, the respondent has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. Kaushalaya Devi reported in (2007) 9 SCC 525. W.A.1908/2018 5 5. Apart from the above, in the case of the appellant, central pension can be granted only from the date of the order and not from the date of receipt of the application. They have also produced Exhibit-R1(b) guidelines for disbursement of central pension under the relevant scheme. 6. The appellant has filed a reply affidavit controverting the statements therein and submitted that in the light of the directions in the judgment dated 10.06.2009 in W.P.(C) No.39646 of 2003, he is entitled to freedom fighters' pension notwithstanding the provisions of the scheme and the distinction between primary and secondary evidence in proving his sufferings. He further stated that he is the senior most freedom fighter, who deserves respect from every quarters and that the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mukund Lal Bhandari case (cited supra), rendered in the year 1993, has directed the authorities to take a liberal view in the matter of interpretation of the provisions for grant of freedom fighters' pension. 7. Relying on the decision in Union of India v. Radhamani [2005 (4) KLT 27], appellant has stated that this Court had granted arrears of freedom fighters' pension under the Central scheme with effect from the date of application. Appellant has also relied on the decision in Puthusseri Valiya Veettil Thambayi Amma v. Union of India and Another [ILR 2011 (3) Ker. 50] and submitted that a genuine fighter is entitled to get pension w.e.f the date of receipt of the application. Hence, he is entitled to the arrears with interest from 06.11.2000. W.A.1908/2018 6 8. Appellant has further contended that the learned Single Judge, without adverting to any of the grounds raised, and the conclusion in Exhibit-P1 judgment dated 10.06.2009 in W.P.(C) No.39646 of 2003, dismissed the present writ petition placing reliance on Kaushalaya Devi's case (cited supra). Being aggrieved, the appellant has filed the instant appeal on the following grounds: A. Writ court failed to consider the observation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mukund Lal Bhandari and Ors. v. Union Of India and Ors. reported in AIR 1993 SC 2127, in spite of the specific direction that the freedom fighters are a separate category and they should be respected and honoured by the authorities by taking a liberal view. B. Writ court did not consider the findings and conclusion in Exhibit-P1 judgment and earlier judgment regarding the right and eligibility of the appellant to get the freedom fighters' pension w.e.f the date or receipt of the application and not from the date of order as held in Kaushalaya Devi's case (cited supra), which is distinguishable on facts. C. The distinction and its effects between primary evidence and secondary evidence in proving eligibility of freedom fighters' pension and the scheme [Exhibits-R1(a) and R1(b)] is not applicable on the facts and circumstances of this case. In fact, the interpretation of the scheme and guidelines should be made most favourable to the freedom fighters for honouring and respecting them. D. The secondary evidence defined in Section 63 of the Evidence Act is equally important and acceptable as primary evidence, in the absence of the latter, and that issue does W.A.1908/2018 7 not arise in this case on the facts and findings in Exhibit-P1 judgment dated 10.06.2009. 9. Placing reliance on Exhibit-P1 judgment dated 10.06.2009 in W.P. (C) No.39646/2003, Mrs. Renu D.P., learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the appellant is entitled to freedom fighters' pension from the date of application. In this context, she also relied on an unreported judgment of the Madras High Court in W.P.(MD) No.5521/2014 dated 21.06.2018, in which, a learned Single Judge, relying on the decision in Mukund Lal Bhandari case (cited supra) and another judgment passed by another Single Judge in W.P.(MD) No.4609 of 2014 dated 28.04.2017, allowed pension from the date of application. Learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court also held that the decision in Union of India and Others v. Kashiswasr Jana reported in (2008) 11 SCC 309, pertains to that individual case alone and the same cannot be applied as a straight jacket formula in all the cases. 10. Posed with a question as to whether the appellant was granted pension on the basis of primary or secondary evidence, Mrs. D.P.Renu, learned counsel for the appellant, candidly admitted that the appellant is being paid pension purely based on secondary evidence. 11. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 12. Exhibit-P1 judgment dated 10.06.2009 in W.P.(C) No.39646 of 2003 is reproduced hereunder: W.A.1908/2018 8 “13. On an anxious consideration of the issue in the above context, taking note of the purpose and objectives of the scheme, and taking note of the guidelines and principles settled through various precedents of the Hon'ble Apex Court, I feel that the approach and interpretations in this regard should always be liberal. The object sought to be achieved in insisting that, certificate should be obtained from any veteran freedom fighter who had undergone imprisonment for a period of two years or more, is clear that such certifier should be a person who had really participated in the freedom struggle in an active manner and had suffered sentence of imprisonment for a considerable extent of time. Normally remission on the period in sentence of jailors are granted for various reasons. Such remissions or premature release will not in any way dilute the rigour or seriousness of the offence alleged or sentence imposed. Taken on that view of the issue, I hold that the requirement under clause 9(b)(ii) of the SSS Pension Scheme can be construed as it takes in freedom fighters who were sentenced for a period of two years or more on conviction in any case connected with freedom struggle, even though they had undergone imprisonment only for a lesser period due to remission of sentence allowed while undergoing such imprisonment. 14. Under the above circumstances, Exts.P14 and P15 are hereby quashed. The 1st respondent is directed to conduct a verification from the records available with the authorities concerned, with respect to the details of conviction, sentence and history of imprisonment undergone by the certifier in Ext.P1, Sri.K.C. Mathew. Keeping in view of the findings above, and also the observations in the decisions cited above, a final decision may be taken on the eligibility of the petitioner under the State Scheme and for recommending his name for W.A.1908/2018 9 SSS Pension Scheme. It is made clear that the petitioner should be held eligible if there is proof that the certifier was sentenced for a period of 2 years or more in connection with any case registered on freedom struggle, despite he had undergone only a lesser period of actual imprisonment due to any sort of remission. Considering the age of the petitioner, a decision in this regard may be taken at the earliest after affording a personal hearing to him, at any rate within 2 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Judgment. The petitioner will produce a copy of this Judgment before the 1st respondent, along with copies of all relevant records, forthwith. The writ petition is disposed of as above.” 13. Though placing strong reliance on Exhibit-P1 judgment dated 10.06.2009 in W.P.(C) No.39646 of 2003, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the writ court in the above judgment has categorically declared the eligibility of the appellant for freedom fighters' pension, we cannot accept the said contention, for the reason that while quashing Exhibits-P14 and P15, challenged therein, writ court has only directed the 1st respondent therein – State of Kerala, represented by the Secretary to the Government, Home Department, to cause verification of the records available with the authorities concerned with respect to the details of conviction, sentence and history of imprisonment undergone by the certifier in Exhibit-P1, Sri.K.C.Mathew. Keeping in view of the findings recorded in W.P.(C) No.39646 of 2003 dated 10.06.2009, and also the observations in the decisions cited in the said judgment, a final decision W.A.1908/2018 10 may be taken on the eligibility of the petitioner under the State Scheme. Writ court has also directed the 1st respondent therein to take a decision within a time frame. 14. Exhibit-P2 pension payment order passed by the District Collector, Wayanad, dated 27.01.2020 is extracted hereunder: “M5-22179/07 Date: 27-1-2010. PROCEEDINGS OF THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR, WAYANAD (Present: Sri. T. Bhaskaran IAS) Sub: Sanctioning Freedom Fighter's Pension Kerala — orders issued. Ref: 1. Application of Sri.A.S.Narayana Pillai, Ayikkunnel, Makkiyad dated Nil. 2. Letter of the Government No.92127/FFPB2/00/GAD dated 22-5-02. 3. Application of Sri. S. Narayana Pillai dated 25-7-00. 4. Letter of the Government No.38984/FFPA3/02/GAD dated 4-7-02. 5. Order of the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in 0.P.34941/02 dated. 9-7-03. 6. Application of Sri.A.S.Narayana Pillai dated 16-10-03. 7. Government Order No.G.O.(Rt) 8025/03/GAD dated 11-11-03. 8. Order of the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in W.P.(C) 39646/03 dated. 10-6-09. 9. Letter of the Government No.10881/FFP-B2/04/GAD dated 14-9-09. 10. Letter of the Government No.10881/FFP-B2/04/GAD dated 24-12-09. Application of Sri. A. S.Narayana Pillai, Ayikkunnel House, Makkiyad, Wayanad submitted vide reference 1 for sanctioning the Freedom Fighters' Pension Kerala has been rejected for not producing the clear acceptable documents in proof as per the Rules to prove that Sri.Narayana Pillai was absconded for the period from 19-8-42 to 28-8-43 in connection with the Indian Freedom Struggle and it was informed to the applicant vide reference 2. For the same reason the application W.A.1908/2018 11 submitted by Sri. Narayana Pillai as per reference 3 for “Swatantrata Sainik Samman\" pension was also rejected vide reference 4. Against this, Sri. Narayana Pillai filed writ petition in the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala and in the order of the Court referred to as 5 above it wag-directed that his application should be reconsidered if Sri. Narayana Pillai produces proper and acceptable proof Thereupon Sri. Narayana Pillai submitted a fresh application as per reference 6. In the circumstance where Sri. Narayana Pillai could not produce any new evidence in the above said application, order was issued vide reference 7 rejecting his application again. Against this, Sri. Narayana Pillai again approached the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala and in the order referred to as 8 above it was directed that considering the age of the applicant and if there is any proof that the person who had issued certificate to the applicant had been sentenced for imprisonment for 2 years or more in connection with the freedom struggle (if he has not undergone the imprisonment for such period) it was made it clear that Sri. Narayana Pillai will be eligible for Freedom Fighter's Pension and directed the Government to give an opportunity of personal hearing to the applicant in that regard. Thereupon, on the basis of reference 9 letter applicant was personally heard and found that the applicant is eligible to get Freedom Fighter's Pension Kerala and as per reference 10 Freedom Fighters Pension Kerala was sanctioned to Sri. Narayana Pillai. Sri.A.S.Narayana has requested to issue order sanctioning the pension as granted by the Government as per reference 10 on the basis of the order of the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala W.A.1908/2018 12 dated 10-6-09 in W.P.(C) No. 39646/03. It was also made clear in the application that he may be permitted to receive pension from Dwaraka Sub Treasury in Wayanad District. Along with the application necessary identification marks and finger prints for sanctioning the pension was also produced. In this circumstance, on the basis of the order of the Hon'ble High Court and also the directions of the Government, order is hereby issued sanctioning the Freedom Fighter's Pension Kerala to Sri.A.S.Narayana Pillai, Ayikkunnel House, Makkiyad, Wayanad subject to Rule 18 of the Kerala Freedom Fighters Pension Rules. Identification marks of Sri.A.S.Narayana Pillai are given hereunder. In case if it is convinced that the pension was sanctioned by way of misleading or based on forged documents, this pension will be cancelled without any further notice and the entire pension amount distributed till then will be recouped to the Government. Identification Marks: 1. A black mole on the palm near to the wrist right hand. 2. A black mole just above the left side of the chest. Sri. A. S. Narayana Pillai, Ayikkunnel House, Makkiyad, Wayanad. (Sd) District Collector Wayanad.” 15. Exhibit-P3 pension payment order (Central) dated 23.11.2011 issued by the respondent reads thus: “PENSION PAYMENT ORDER (Pensioner's Portion) UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, and on the expiration of every month be pleaded to pay Shri A.S.NARAYANA PILLAI the pension as set out in Part-II of this order/Family Pension as W.A.1908/2018 13 set out in Part III of this order plus the amount of dearness relief as admissible from time to time thereon after due identification of the pensioner/family pensioner. The Payment should commence from 10.06.2009. The income tax, which was deductible, should be deducted at source.” 16. Payment of pension has been ordered from 10.09.2009, the date on which W.P.(C) No.39646 of 2003 was disposed of. The issue that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the appellant is entitled to the arrears of freedom fighters' pension from the date of application, i.e., 06.11.2020, or the date of judgment made in W.P.(C) No.39646 of 2003 dated 10.06.2009. 17. In Mukund Lal Bhandari and Others v. Union of India and Others [1993 Supp. (3) SCC 2], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “.........It should not further be forgotten that now its benefit is made available irrespective of the income limit. Secondly, and this is equally important to note, since we are by this decision making the benefit of the scheme available irrespective of the date on which the application is made, it would not be advisable to extend the benefit retrospectively. Lastly, the pension under the present Scheme is not the only benefit made available to the freedom fighters or their dependents. The preference in employment, allotment of accommodation and in admission to schools and colleges to their kith and kin etc. are also the other benefits which have been made available to them for quite sometime now. 10. Hence we are of the view that the pension under the Scheme should be made payable only from the date on which the application is made whether the application is accompanied by W.A.1908/2018 14 the necessary proof of eligibility or not. The pension should, of course, be sanctioned only after the required proof is produced. 11. We decline to go into the facts of the individual petitioners in this petition and direct the respondents as follows: [a] The respondents should accept the applications of the petitioners irrespective of the date on which they are made. The applications received hereafter should also be entertained without raising the plea that they are beyond the prescribed date. [b] The respondents should scrutinise every application and the evidence produced in support of the claim and dispose it of as expeditiously as possible and in any case within three months of the receipt of the application, keeping in view the laudable and sacrosanct object of the Scheme. [c] The pension should be paid to the applicant from the date on which the original application is received whether the application is filed with or without the requisite evidence. The sanction of the pension would, however, be subject to the requisite proof in support of the claim. 11. The respondents are directed to dispose of the cases of the individual petitioners in the present petition in the light of the above directions at the latest within two months from today.” 18. In Government of India Represented by the Secretary v. K.V. Swaminathan, [(1997) 10 SCC 190], a Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court considered an appeal arising from a judgment of the Madras High Court, which directed grant of freedom fighters' pension from the date of the application. Considering the distinction as to why freedom fighters' pension in the case of secondary evidence has to be granted from the date of order, as noticed in Union of India v. M.R. Chelliah Thevar (CA No.7762 of 1996) and decided on 30.04.1996, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.V. Swaminathan's case (cited supra) held thus:- W.A.1908/2018 15 “.................The controversy is no longer res integra. This Court had considered the entire controversy in Union of India v. M.R. Chelliah Thevar C.A. No. 7762/96 decided on April 30,1996 and held thus: “Heard counsel for both sides. On behalf of the Union of India, strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court dated 24th April, 1995. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent placed reliance on an earlier judgment of this Court in Mukund Lal Bhandari and Others v. Union of India and Ors., 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 2, as well as the decision in Amarnath Malhotra and Ors. v. Union of India dated 19-10-1996. The distinction, however, is that in the case relied on by the Union of India, the respondents were granted the benefit under the policy not because it was a clear case of the respondents being freedom fighters but because benefit of doubt was given and hence the pension was restricted from the date of the order and not the date of application. In the two cases relied on by the respondents, there was no question of the benefit having been founded on a finding of fact which did not clearly establish that the petitioners were freedom fighters but on the liberal ground of giving them the benefit of doubt and restricting it from the date of order. We are therefore of the opinion that there is a distinction between the decision relied on by the learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the Union of India and two decisions relied on by the respondent. In the instant case, since the benefit of doubt was given and the status of freedom fighter was recognised on that basis, the case would be covered by the first mentioned decision dated 24-4-1995 (Union of India v. Ganesh Chandra Dolai and Ors.) 3. In view of the above settled legal position, though the respondent was not entitled to the pension as a freedom-fighter, he was given the relief on the basis of benefit of doubt. Therefore, he is entitled to the pension only from the date of the order and not from the date of the application. We are informed that pursuant to the order W.A.1908/2018 16 of the High Court, the amount has been released. Under this circumstance, the appellant is directed to deduct the paid amount proportionately from the amount payable in every month, instead of asking him to refund the amount. 4. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.” 19. In Gurdial Singh v. Union of India [(2001) 8 SCC 8], the Hon'ble Apex Court on the facts and circumstances of the case, at paragraphs 7 to 9, ordered thus: “7. The standard of proof required in such cases is not such standard which is required in a criminal case or in a case adjudicated upon rival contentions or evidence of the parties. As the object of the scheme is to honour and to mitigate the sufferings of those who had given their all for the country, a liberal and not a technical approach is required to be followed while determining the merits of the case of a person seeking pension under the Scheme. It should not be forgotten that the persons intended to be covered by the scheme have suffered for the country about half a century back and had not expected to be rewarded for the imprisonment suffered by them. Once the country has decided to honour such freedom fighters, the bureaucrats entrusted with the job of examining the cases of such freedom fighters are expected to keep in mind the purpose and object of the Scheme. The case of the claimants under this scheme is required to be determined on the basis of the probabilities and not on the touch-stone of the test of 'beyond reasonable doubt'. Once on the basis of the evidence it is probabilised that the claimant had suffered imprisonment for the cause of the country and during the freedom struggle, a presumption is required to be drawn in his favour unless the same is rebutted by cogent, reasonable and reliable evidence. W.A.1908/2018 17 8. We have noticed with disgust that the respondent Authorities have adopted a hyper-technical approach while dealing with the case of a freedom fighter and ignored the basic principles/objectives of the scheme intended to give the benefit to the sufferers in the freedom movement. The contradictions and discrepancies, as noticed hereinabove, cannot be held to be material which could be made the basis of depriving the appellant of his right to get the pension. The case of the appellant has been disposed of by ignoring the mandate of law and the Scheme. The impugned order also appears to have been passed with a biased and close mind completely ignoring the verdict of this Court in Mukund Lal Bhandari's case. We further feel that after granting the pension of the appellant, the respondents were not justified to reject his claim on the basis of material which already existed, justifying the grant of pension in his favour. The appellant has, unnecessarily, been dragged to litigation for no fault of his. This High Court has completely ignored its earlier judgments in CWP No. 3790 of 1994 entitled Mohan Singh v. Union of India decided on 1.6.1995 and CWP 14442 of 1995 decided on 11.12.1995. 9. We are satisfied that the order of the respondent Authorities impugned before the High Court (Annexure P-14) dated 1.11.2000 is liable to be set aside and the appellant entitled to the grant of relief of pension. However, keeping in view the lapse of time and peculiar circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to grant him the pension with effect from 12.3.1973 as claimed and feel that the ends of justice would be met if the appellant is granted pension with effect from March, 1996 when he was forced to file Writ Petition No. 12350 of 1996.” W.A.1908/2018 18 20. That apart, in Gurdial Singh's case (cited supra) the earlier decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.V. Swaminathan's case (cited supra) has not been considered. In Union of India v. Radhamani [2005 (4) KLT 27], decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in K.V. Swaminathan's case (cited supra) has not been considered, and Mukand Lal Bhandari's case (cited supra) has been referred. 21. Thereafter, in Union of India and Another v. Kaushalaya Devi [(2007) 9 SCC 525], the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus: “3..........The short question in this case is whether the Freedom Fighters' Pension should be granted to the respondent from the date of the application or the date of the order granting the pension. 4. It has been held by this Court in Government of India v. K.V. Swaminathan (1997) 10 SCC 190 that where the claim is allowed on the basis of benefit of doubt, the pension should be granted not from the date of the application but from the date of the order. 5. In the present case, we have perused the record and found that it is stated therein that the claim was allowed on the basis of secondary nature of evidence. In other words, the claim was not allowed on the basis of jail certificate produced by the claimant but on the basis of oral statement of some other detenue. Hence, we are of the opinion that the pension should be granted from the date of the order and not from the date of the application. 6. Learned counsel for respondent has relied on the judgment of this Court in Mukand Lal Bhandari v. Union of India and Ors. (AIR 1993 SC 2127). W.A.1908/2018 19 7. In our opinion that decision is distinguishable as it has been stated therein that the pension cannot be granted from any date prior to the application. In our opinion this does not mean that it cannot be granted from a date subsequent to the application. For the reasons given above this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and it is directed that the pension will be granted only from the date of the order for granting pension and not from the date of the application.” 22. In Pauly v. State of Kerala reported in [(2008) 1 KLT 933], a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, considered a similar issue. After the issuance of pension order under the State Scheme, giving effect to the date of order, appellant therein challenged the said order. A learned Single Judge, relying on the judgment made by this Court in the case of State of Kerala v. G. Madhavikutty Amma, in W.A. No.1818 of 2006, and the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Devkinandan Maheshwari [(2003) 3 SCC 183], rejected the Writ Petition. Aggrieved by the same, an appeal was filed. The Hon'ble Division Bench, considered the claim of the appellant therein, with reference to the pension rules as hereunder:- “6. In W.A.No.1818 of 2006, the appellant was the widow of one late Achuthan Pillai who was a freedom fighter. He had filed an application before the State Government for grant of freedom fighters pension and the said application was allowed by the State Government on 25th March, 2003 and even before the order could be passed, the freedom fighter, namely Achuthan Pillai had expired. Thereafter his wife after approaching the State Government had approached this Court W.A.1908/2018 20 by filing a writ petition, inter alia, contending that she is entitled for freedom fighters pension from the date of the application and not from the date of the order sanctioning the pension. The learned Single Judge had rejected the writ petition and that is how the petitioner in the writ petition had approached this Court in W.A. No.1818 of 2006. This Court relying upon the observations made in Devkinandan Maheshwari's case, has rejected the writ appeal. 7. In Devkinandan Maheshwari's case, the Supreme Court was dealing with a situation which arose under the provisions of the M.P.Swatantra Sangram Sainik Samman Nidhi Niyam, 1972. In the said Nidhi Niyam, a rule had been incorporated, wherein it was said that the pension claims under the provisions of the Swatantra Sangram Sainik Samman Nidhi Niyam can be granted only from the date of the sanction of the pension and not from the date of the application. Before the apex Court, the decision of the apex Court in Mukund Lal Bhandari v. Union of India, (1993) Supp.(3) SCC 2, was cited and a further contention was raised that in the said decision the apex Court had observed that the pension requires to be sanctioned not from the date of the order sanctioning the pension but from the date of the application. While distinguishing the aforesaid decision, the apex Court in Devkinandan Maheshwari's case was pleased to observe that since the rule specifically provides that the pension requires to be sanctioned only from the date of the order and not from the date of the application, a freedom fighter is entitled for pensionary benefits under the Pension Rules only from the date of the sanction order and not from the date of the application. 9. In the instant case, Rule 18 of the Pension Rules clearly stipulates that the pension sanctioned under the Pension Rules W.A.1908/2018 21 will be payable only from the date of issue of the sanction order. …..” xx xxx xxxx 11. In Devkinandan Maheshwari's case the Apex Court was dealing with a more or less similar provision which provided for the grant of pension not from the date of the application, but from the date of the sanction order. While considering the said Rules the Supreme Court has specifically stated that in view of the rule so provided under the M.P.Swatantra Sangram Sainik Samman Nidhi Niyam, 1972, a freedom fighter is entitled for grant of pension not from the date of the application, but from the date of the sanction order.” 23. Though reliance has been made to Puthusseri Valiya Veettil Thambayi Amma v. Union of India and Another reported in ILR 2011 (3) Ker. 50, the same cannot be made applicable to the case on hand, for two reasons. Instant case is decided on the basis of the Central Scheme for grant of freedom-fighter's pension, in contradistinction to the State Scheme. The second reason is that the earlier decision in Pauly's case (cited supra) decided by a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court has not been considered. The judgment in Mukund Lal Bhandari's case (cited supra) alone has been relied on. 24. In yet another decision, in Union of India and Others v. Kashiswar Jana reported in (2008) 11 SCC 309, the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus:- W.A.1908/2018 22 “........The question that arose was the date from which the respondent was entitled to pension. Appellants released the pension with effect from 4th August, 1993 when the writ petition filed by the respondent was allowed by the learned Single Judge. Respondent claimed pension from the date of filing of the application. According to him he is entitled to pension from 28.7.1981 when the application was filed by him. Reference was made to the decision of this Court in Mukund Lal Bhandari v. Union of India (AIR 1993 SC 2127). 4. Stand of the present appellants was that since the claim of the respondent could not be decided till 1993 because of the non cooperative attitude of the State Government regarding supply of requisite information. In any event, the benefit of doubt was granted to the respondent and in line with the order passed by the High Court earlier pension was granted from the date of order i.e. 4-8-1993. The High Court did not accept the stand. 5. In support of the appeal learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the view of the High Court is clearly untenable because the question whether respondent was entitled to pension and whether he fulfilled the guidelines was under examination. Definite material was not placed by the State Government and only he was given benefit of doubt and because of the order of the High Court pension was granted to him. 25. Following the decision in Union of India v. Kaushalaya Devi [(2007) 9 SCC 525], the Hon'ble Apex Court, at paragraph 8 of the decision in Kashiswar Jana's case (cited supra), held thus: “8. Keeping in view what has been stated by this Court in Kaushalaya Devi's case (supra) we direct the pension to be W.A.1908/2018 23 granted from the date of the High Court's order i.e. 4.8.1993.” 26. In Union of India, Rep. By the Under Secretary to Government Ministry of Home Affairs, Freedom Fighters Division, v. Anandavally Amma, W/o. Late V. Chellappan Pillai, [2012 SCC Online Ker 18634], a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court held thus: 2. The issue revolved round the date from which the arrears of pension as per Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980 (for short 'SSS Pension Scheme'), is to be paid to the respondent who is a widow of a freedom fighter. As per Ext.P5 the petitioner was sanctioned pension with effect from 07.05.2008. The appellant authorities had given arrears with effect from 14.12.2007 and not with effect from 26.04.1998 the date of application for pension. 3. Admittedly the claim is based on secondary evidence and it is well settled in Union of India and another v. Kaushalaya Devi [(2007) 9 SCC 525] that in the case of a primary evidence alone the arrears would be payable from the date of application and in so far as secondary evidence, arrears has to be paid from the date of order. If it is payable from the date of order, it would go without saying that, the date when the positive direction of sanctioning pension is passed. Apparently, the decision relied upon by the learned Single Judge refers to a Supreme Court decision prior to the decision in Kaushalaya Devi's case (supra). In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion, the judgment of the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside. 4. Coming to the submission of learned counsel for the respondent that by virtue of an intimation dated 30.09.2011, all the arrears right from 01.05.1998 up to 14.12.2007 are W.A.1908/2018 24 paid. We note that the appeal came to be filed in the month of January, 2011 and the payments in the communication are dated 30.09.2011 which is later than the initiation of appeal proceedings. In other words, during the pendency of the appeal, as the arrears came to be paid, the appeal does not become infructuous. In view of Section 144 of Civil Procedure Code, we are of the opinion, if ultimately on merits the appeal is decided, if any benefits accrues to the appellant, then the parties have to be placed in the position which they would have occupied prior to filing of the appeal. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion, the respondent/writ petitioner is entitled for arrears of pension only from the date of sanctioning of pension and not from the date of application. So far as the amounts already paid, whether to recover or not to recover or get the amounts adjusted for future pension, it is left open to the appellant authority to take proper decision. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the appeal is disposed of as stated above.” 27. In Secretary to Government of India v. Sawinder Kaur and Another [(2013) 14 SCC 789], while making it clear as to why freedom fighters' pension is given on different dates, at paragraph 14, the Hon'ble Apex Court held thus:- “15. In the case at hand, as is evincible, the claim was not allowed on the basis of the jail certificate produced by the claimant but on the basis of the oral statement of some other detenu. The competent authority was not satisfied as regards the fulfillment of the conditions. There was no primary evidence available in the official records as required under the scheme to establish the W.A.1908/2018 25 claim of the Respondent-husband that he was an ex- INA member and suffered in New Guinea/New Britain Islands to prove his eligibility for pension under the scheme. However, regard being had to the totality of the circumstances, he was extended the benefit under the scheme as it was a case of benefit of doubt. As is evident from the orders passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench, there is no discussion in that regard but pension has been granted from the date of the application in an extremely mechanical manner. In our considered opinion, the approach is erroneous and it has resultantly led to an unsustainable order.” 28. In Union of India, Rep by the Secretary to Government, Ministry of Home Affairs, Freedom Fighters Division, New Delhi v. Sujatha, W/o. Late C.K.Padmanabhan, Sunimandiram, Pattanakkad P.O., Cherthala, Alappuzha, reported in 2015 SCC Online Ker 39218, similar view has been taken by a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court. 29. That apart, in a recent judgment of this Court in W.A. No.1176 of 2019 dated 21.08.2019, [The Union of India and Another v. Rajamma and Another], a Hon'ble Division Bench, after considering various decisions on the issue, at paragraphs 17 & 18, ordered thus: “17. In the instant case, the Dependent Pension under SSS Pension Scheme, which has already been granted to the writ petitioner by Ext.P8 order, is not on the basis of any primary evidence, but based on secondary evidence. W.A.1908/2018 26 The said fact is not disputed by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner/1st respondent. 18. If that be so, the writ petitioner is not entitled for Dependent Pension from the date of application and she is entitled for the same only with effect from the date of Ext.P8 order.” 30. Thus, from the legal pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is manifestly clear as to why, freedom fighters' pension is granted from the date of application (primary evidence), and from the date of the order (secondary evidence), as the case may be. 31. Though Mrs. D.P. Renu, learned counsel for the appellant, has placed reliance on an unreported decision of a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in W.P.(MD) No.5521/2014 dated 21.06.2018, we cannot accept the same, for the reason that it cannot be treated as a precedent, and binding on a Division Bench of this Court. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court that the decision in Kashiswar Jana, applies only to that individual case, cannot be accepted. The ratio decidendi in Kashiswar Jana's case has not been properly considered. On the said aspect of precedents, reference can be made to a few decisions: (i) In M. Subbarayudu v. State reported in AIR 1955 Andhra 87, a Hon'ble Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the binding nature of the precedents of one Court on another depends upon the fact whether such Courts are Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction or not and co-ordinate Jurisdiction does not connote the W.A.1908/2018 27 same idea as concurrent jurisdiction or simultaneous jurisdiction. The connotation of the word 'co-ordination' is not the same as that of the words 'concurrence or simultaneity'. Simultaneity or coexistence is not a necessary ingredient of coordination. Co-ordination is more comprehensive and takes in successive acts of the same status or level. (ii) In Anand Municipality v. Union of India [AIR 1960 Guj. 40], a Hon'ble Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court applied the principles of binding effect, declared in M. Subbarayudu's case (cited supra). (iii) A Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat v. Gordhandas Keshavji Gandhi reported in AIR 1962 Guj. 128, has considered the question as to binding nature of judicial precedents. K. T. Desai, CJ., in his judgment, observed: “Judicial precedents are divisible into two classes, those which are authoritative and those which are persuasive. An authoritative precedent is one which judges must follow whether they approve of it or not. It is binding upon them. A persuasive precedent is one which the Judges are under no obligation to follow, but which they will take into consideration and to which they will attach such weight as they consider proper. A persuasive precedent depends for its influence upon its own merits.... A decision of a High Court Judge of a State is regarded as binding on all the subordinate courts in that State. A decision of a Division Bench of a High Court is regarded as binding on Judges of the same High Court sitting singly in the High Court. A decision of a Full Bench, i. e. a Bench of at least 3 Judges of a High Court is considered binding on all Division Benches of the same High Court.... A decision of a High Court Judge sitting singly is not legally binding on another Judge of the same High Court W.A.1908/2018 28 sitting singly. So also a decision of a Division Bench of a High Court is not legally binding on another Division Bench of the same High Court. A decision of a Full Bench is not legally binding on another Full Bench of the same Court. One Judge of a High Court has however, no right to overrule the decision of another Judge of the same High Court nor has one Division Bench of a High Court the legal right to overrule another decision of a Division Bench of the same High Court...............The rule that a court should follow the decision of another Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction is subject however to several exceptions which have been dealt with in Salmond's jurisprudence, 11th Edn. at page 199 to 217. (1) A decision ceases to be binding if a statute or statutory rule inconsistent with it is subsequently enacted, or if it is reversed or overruled by a higher court. (2) A precedent is not binding if it was rendered in ignorance of a statute or a rule having the force of statute. (3) A precedent loses its binding force if the court that decided it overlooked an inconsistent decision of higher court. (4) xx xx xx xx xx (5) Precedents sub silentio are not regarded as authoritative. A decision passed sub silentio when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the Court or present to its mind.” (iv) In State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekar Misra, reported in AIR 1968 SC 647, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained as to when a decision can be taken as a precedent, and held as follows:- \"A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence of a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically W.A.1908/2018 29 follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic, this is what Earl of Halsbury LC said in Quinn v. Leathem, reported in 901 AC 495. \"Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood, reported in 1898 AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it.....\" (v) In Eknath Shankarrao Mukhawar v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1977 SC 1177, it was held that judicial discipline as well as decorum suggested only one course when a Bench wanted to differ from the decision of a co-ordinate court and that was to refer to a larger Bench. (vi) In Ayyaswami Gounder v. Munuswamy Gounder reported in (1984) 4 SCC 376, it was held that a single Judge of a High Court not agreeing with earlier decision of single Judge of the same Court, should refer the matter to a Larger Bench and propriety and decorum do not warrant his taking a contrary view. (vii) In Sonal Sihimappa v. State of Karnataka and Ors., reported in AIR 1987 SC 2359, it was observed, In a precedent-bound judicial system, binding authorities have got to be respected and the procedure for developing the law has to be one of evolution. W.A.1908/2018 30 (viii) The Hon'ble Chief Justice Pathak, speaking for the Constitution Bench, in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh reported in AIR 1989 SC 1933, said: “The doctrine of binding precedent has the merit of promoting a certainty and consistency in judicial decisions, and enables an organic development of the law, besides providing assurance to the individual as to the consequence of transactions forming part of his daily affairs. And, therefore, the need for a clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the decisions of a court.” (ix) In Sundaradas Kanyalal Bhathija v. The Collector, Thane reported in AIR 1991 SC 1893, the law is stated thus: “17. It would be difficult for us to appreciate the judgment of the High Court. One must remember the pursuit of the law, however glamorous it is, has its own limitation on the Bench. In a multi-Judge Court, the Judges are bound by precedents and procedure. They could use their discretion only when there is no declared principle to be found, no rule and no authority. The judicial decorum and legal propriety demand that where a learned single Judge or a Division Bench does not agree with the decision of a Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the matter shall be referred to a larger Bench. It is subversion of judicial process not to follow this procedure.” (x) In Philip Jeyasingh v. The Jt. Regr. of Co-op. Societies reported in 1992 (2) MLJ 309, a Hon'ble Full Bench of the Madras High Court, held as follows: “49. The ratio decidendi of a decision may be narrowed or widened by the judges before whom it is cited as a precedent. W.A.1908/2018 31 In the process the ratio decidendi which the judges who decided the case would themselves have chosen may be even different from the one which has been approved by subsequent judges. This is because Judges, while deciding a case will give their own reasons but may not distinguish their remarks in a right way between what they thought to be the ratio decidendi and what were their obiter dicta, things said in passing having no binding force, though of some persuasive power. It is said that \"a judicial decision is the abstraction of the principle from the facts and arguments of the case\". A subsequent judge may extend it to a broader principle of wider application or narrow it down for a narrower application.” (xi) A Hon'ble Division Bench of Bombay High Court in CIT v. Thana Electricity Supply Ltd., reported in (1994) 206 ITR 727 (Bombay), held as follows: “(a) The law declared by the Supreme Court being binding on all courts in India, the decisions of the Supreme Court are binding on all courts, except, however, the Supreme Court itself which is free to review the same and depart from its earlier opinion if the situation so warrants. What is binding is, of course, the ratio of the decision and not every expression found therein. (b) The decisions of the High Court are binding on the subordinate courts and authorities or Tribunals under its superintendence throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It does not extend beyond its territorial jurisdiction. (c) The position in regard to the binding nature of the decisions of a High Court on different Benches of the same court may be summed up as follows: W.A.1908/2018 32 (i) A single judge of a High Court is bound by the decision of another single judge or a Division Bench of the same High Court. It would be judicial impropriety to ignore that decision. Judicial comity demands that a binding decision to which his attention had been drawn should neither be ignored nor overlooked. If he does not find himself in agreement with the same, the proper procedure is to refer the binding decision and direct the papers to be placed before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question (see Food Corporation of India v. Yadav Engineer and Contractor AIR 1982 SC 1302). (ii) A Division Bench of a High Court should follow the decision of another Division Bench of equal strength or a Full Bench of the same High Court. If one Division Bench differs from another Division Bench of the same High Court, it should refer the case to a larger Bench. (iii) Where there are conflicting decisions of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the later decision is to be preferred if reached after full consideration of the earlier decisions. (d) The decision of one High Court is neither binding precedent for another High Court nor for courts or Tribunals outside its own territorial jurisdiction. It is well settled that the decision of a High Court will have the force of binding precedent only in the State or territories on which the court has jurisdiction. In other States or outside the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court it may, at best, have only persuasive effect.” (xii) In Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 44, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained, what constitutes a precedent, and held as follows:- \"Before adverting to and considering whether solatium and interest would be payable under the Act, at the outset, we will dispose of the objection raised by Shri Vaidyanathan that Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla reported in (1993) Suppl. W.A.1908/2018 33 2 SCC 149, is not a binding precedent nor does it operate as ratio decidendi to be followed as a precedent and is per se per incuriam. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates--(i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. A inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi. ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in W.A.1908/2018 34 relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi. Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. Law cannot afford to be static and therefore, Judges are to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents.” (xiii) In Government of W.B v. Tarun Roy and others, reported in (2004) 1 SCC 347, as regards binding precedent of a judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 26, observed as follows:- “26... If rule of law is to be followed, judicial discipline demands that the court follows its earlier binding precedent. The Calcutta High Court itself has rejected such a plea. The matter is pending in appeal. An order passed to the contrary by another learned Single Judge in ignorance of the earlier binding precedent by itself would not constitute a binding precedent and may be held to have been rendered per incuriam. W.A.1908/2018 35 (xiv) In Raman Gopi v. Kunju Raman Uthaman [2011 (4) KLT 458], a Hon'ble Full Bench of the Kerala High Court held that when a Bench of higher number of judges of the concerned court decided a question on the subject, then that is binding on the Bench of co- equal judges or lesser number of judges of that court. Further, it is settled law that, if a decision has been rendered by the same High Court , then any decision rendered by any other High Court is not binding on the other High Court but it has got only persuasive value. 32. In the light of the above discussion and decisions, we find no error in the impugned judgment warranting interference in appeal. Writ appeal is dismissed. Sd/- S. MANIKUMAR CHIEF JUSTICE Sd/- SHAJI P. CHALY JUDGE Krj W.A.1908/2018 36 APPENDIX APPELLANT'S ANNEXURES:- NIL RESPONDENT'S ANNEXURES:- ANNEX.- R1(A):- COPY OF THE SWATANTRATA SAINIK SAMMAN PENSION SCHEME, 1980. //TRUE COPY// P.A. TO C.J. "