Akshara Enterprises Private Limited V. The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Hyderabad - 1 and The Income Tax Officer, Ward 4(1), Hyderabad and The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Central - 2, Mumbai and The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 4(4), Mumbai and The Director General of Income Tax (Investigation), Mumbai and The Additional Director General of Income Tax (Investigation), Mumbai

WP/35029/2023

AI Insights

The case involves M/s Akshara Enterprises Private Limited, which challenged the transfer of its income tax case from Hyderabad to Mumbai under Section 127 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The transfer was initiated by the Income Tax Department to facilitate a coordinated investigation following search and seizure operations related to transactions between the petitioner and M/s.IRIS Group. The petitioner argued that the transfer was arbitrary, lacked jurisdiction, and violated principles of natural justice. However, the court upheld the transfer, emphasizing the administrative nature of the decision and the need for a coordinated investigation.

• Counselvise Citation: [2024] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 817089 (HC-TELANGANA)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 08-01-2024
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Noorul Islam Educational Trust Vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Vijayasanthi Investments Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Chief Commissioner of Income-Tax, Hindusthan M-I Swaco Ltd. Vs. Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, Vadodara, Virbhadra Singh Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Shree Ram Vessel Scrap P. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Kamal Nath Vs. The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Kolkata and Others
• Laws Referred To: Income Tax Act, 1961
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: B SAPNA REDDY
• Assessee Lawyers: A V KRISHNA KAUNDINYA
• Keywords: Income Tax; Jurisdiction; Natural Justice; Transfer of Case; Writ petition
• Section: 127; 142; 15(1)

Judgement Text

"r [ 3379 ] HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) MONDAY, THE EIGHTH DAY OF JANUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P. SAM KOSHY AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI WRIT PETITION NO: 35029 OF 2023 lA NO: 1 OF 2023 Petition under Section 15'1 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated Between: M/s Akshara Enterprises Private Limited , 3-6-18211 and 2, Street N9\" 17' ttimaviihnaoar. Hvderabad - 500 029, Telangana. Represented by its Nlana'ging Direitor, Mr. Sreedhar Munnamgi, S/o Mr. M.Bhadt''ul..r=r,r,o*r* AND 1. The Princioal Commissioner of lncome Tax, Hyderabad - 1, 7th Floor, A Block, lT iowers, AC Guards, Masab Tank, Hyderabad - 500 q0-4' Telangana' Z. fne tncome Tax Officer, Ward 4(1), Hyderabad, lT Towers, AC Guards, Masab Tank, Hyderabad - 500 004, Telangana' 3. ihe Principa'l C6missioner of lncome Tax, Central - 2, Mumbai, Air lndia Building, Nariman Point, Mumbai - 400-021' Maharashtra. +. ihebeiutv Commissioner of lncome Tax, Central Circle 4(4) ' tvlumbai, Air lndia Auilding, Nariman Point, Mumbai - 40o O21 , Maharashtra' . S. tne Oirector\"General of lncome Tax (lnvestigation ), Mumbai, Scindia House, N.Morarii Road. Ballard Estate' Mumbai - 400 001' Maharashtra' o. ini O\"rjuivTAilaitionat Director General of lncome Tax (lnvestigatigl')'919) - vu-mlii StinOli ftouse, N.Morarji Road' Ballard Estate, Mumbai - 400 001' lvaharashtra' ...RESP.N'ENTS Petition under Article 226 of lhe constitution of lndia praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High court may be pleased to issue a writ, order or Direction, one, more particularly in the nature of Mandamus, declaring the order uls 127 of the lncome Tax Act, 196f in F.No..Pr.ClT-1 ,Hyd/127lNon- Local/AkshraEnterprises/2023-24, passed by the 1st Respondent on 20.11.2023, vide DIN and order No. ITBA/COMlFl1712023' 2411058059987(1 ), as arbitrary, illegal, bad in law, without jurisdiction, violative of principles of natural justice, and consequently set aside the same in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to rf grant stay of all further proceedings, including any recovery, pursuant to the order u/s 127 of lhe lncome Tax Act, 1961, in F.No.. Pr.ClT-1 ,Hyd/1 27lNon- Local/AkshraEnterprises/2023-24, passed by the 1st Respondent on 20.11.2023, vide DIN and Order No.. ITBA/COMlFl17l2j23-24l1058059987(1), pending disposal of the above Writ Petition. Counsel for the Petitioner: SRI A. V. KRISHA KAUDINYA, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRl A. V. A. SIVA KARTIKEYA Counsel for Respondents: SMT. B. SAPNA REDDY, SC FOR INCOME TAX The Court made the following: ORDER THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY AND THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI WRIT PETITION No.35O29 OF 2o23 ORDER:lper Hon'bte Srt Justice P.SAM KOSHY) Heard Sri A.V. Krishna Kaundinya, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri A.V.A. Siva Kartikaya, learned counsel for the petitioner and Smt.B.Sapna Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents 2. Aggrieved by the order dated 20.11.2023 passed by respondent No.1 under Section 127 of tlne Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short, the Act) and the consequential notice dated 30.11.2023 issued by respondent No.3 under Sub-section (1) of Section 142 of the Act, the present Writ Petition has been frled. 3. Vide the inpugned order dated 20.11.2023, respondent No. 1 in a proceeding under Section 127 of the Act, transferred the case of the petitioner from the jurisdiction of The Income Tax Officer, Ward a(1), Hyderabad (respondent No.2 herein) to the jurisdiction of The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 4(4), Mumbai (respondent No.4 heiein). Upon the matter being transferred, as a consequence, respondent No.4 issued the notice date4 O23 under Sub-section (1) of Section 142 of ? 30.1 1 PSK,J & NTR,I Wp_35029_2023 the Act to the petitioner, which led to frling of the instant Writ Petition 4. The brief facts in nutshell are that the petitioner_assessee is a private limited company engaged in the business of Information Technologr and Information Technolog, Enabled Services. That search and seizure proceedings under the provisions of the Act were drawn against a company named M/s.Sumaya Group, based at Mumbai. In the course of search and seizure, certain incriminating materials were found relating to the transactions carried out by M/ s. Sumaya Group with another firrn irz., M/s.IRIS G1obal Services private Limited and M/s.IRIS Computers Limited, both based at New Delhi. 5. Similar search and seizure proceedings were drawn against said M/s.IRIS Group at New Delhi. In the course of search and seizure of M/s.IRIS Group at New Delhi, certain transactions with the petitioner,s establishment were found from the documents seized. Accordingly, survey of the petitioner,s establishment was also conducted, wherein certain cash transactions were appe€rred to have been undertaken between the petitioner's establishment and M/s.IRIS Global Services Private Limited and M/s.IRIS Computers Limited. In those circumsta,-qces, r_egpondent No.3 sought germission from 2 3 PSK,J & NIR,J Wp_35029_2023 respondent No. 1 under Section 127 of the Act seeking transfer of the case of the petitioner from the jurisdiction of respondent No.2 to the jurisdiction of respondent No.4 enabling them to have a coordinated investigation and frna,lization of assessment It is this action which has been challenged by the petitioner herein in the instant Writ Petition. 6. The contention of the petitioner is that the action of the respondents is per se bad in law for more than one reason Firstly, the action is without jurisdiction. Secondly, the action being one which has been passed in mechalical and arbitrary manner without providilg justifrable reasons. Thirdly, the action is violative of the principles of natural justice. 7. In support of its contentions, learned Senior Counsel argued on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order dated 20.11.2023 passed by respondent No.1 under Section 127 of the Act lacks reasons and without application of mind inasmuch as they have not gone into the merits of the case requiring transfer in the teeth of the provisions under Section t27 of Ihe Act. 8. It was the further contention of the learned Senior Counsel that the impugned order lacks jurisdiction for the reason that it does not seem to be an agreement between 4 PSK,J & NTR,J wp_3s029_2C23 respondent Nos. 1 and 3 or at least, the said agreement is not reflected in the impugned order, and therefore, the impugned order is not sustainable. It was also his contention that the impugned order has been passed on mere asking for transfer by respondent No.3 which again is not proper, legal and justihed as it was incumbent upon respondent No.l to have thoroughly scrutinized the request for transfer by taking the entire pros and cons into consideration before passing the impugned order under Section 727 of the Act. It was also his contention that there were no valid and justifrable grounds available with respondent No.1 to transfer the case from the jurisdiction of respondent No.2 to the jurisdiction of respondent No.4, particularly for the reason that no search and seizure proceedings were conducted at the premises of the petitioner's establishment. That at the same time, the impugned order seems to have been passed with an impression that search and seizure proceedings were conducted at the premises of the petitioner's establishment. Therefore, the impugned order and the consequential notice both need to be interfered with. 9. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the only reason for the transfer of the petitioner's case from the jurisdiction of respondent No.2 to the jurisdiction of respondent 5 PSK,I & NTR,J Wp,35029_2023 No.4 was the so called commercial transactions that the petitioner had with M/s.lRIS Group. However, there is no allegation or a complaint to the effect that the so called commercial transactions between the petitioner and M/ s.IRIS Group are in any malner illegal or contrary to the provisions of the Act. In the absence of the same, the order of transfer so far as the petitioner's case is concerned was uncalled for and ought to have been rejected. 10. On the contrary, learned counsel for the Department, while opposing the petition, has drawn the attention of the Bench to the observations made in the impugned order, whereby it has been specifically stated that it has been passed so as to centraJtze and facilitate coordinated investigation and to frnalization of assessment of the different companies which had inter se link between each other. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the Department that in the course of survey of the petitioner's establishment, it was revealed that there were certain cash transactions between ttre petitioner and M/s.IRIS Group. 1 1 . Learned counsel for the Department referred to Section 127 of the Act and stressed on the fact that there are no pre- conditions as such envisaged in the said section which need to 6 PSK,J & NTR,J Wp_35029_2023 be met or fulfilled before an order under Section 127 is passed by the concerned authority. Hence, it was contended that the action of the respondents is purely an administrative decision for the convenience of the Department in order to have a proper investigation ensuring that there is no violation of the provisions of the Act by atry person. On the above contentions, learned counsel for the Department prayed for dismissal of the Writ Petition. 12. Having heard the contentions put forth by either side, and perusal of the record., in the opinion of this Court, it would be more appropriate if the provision of Section 127 of the Act is perused, and for the sake of convenience, it is being reproduced hereunder. \"127. Power to transfer cases:- (1) The Commissioner may, after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunily of being heard in tJle matter, wherever it is possible to do so, and after recording his reasons for doing so, transfer any case from any Income-tax Ofhcer or Income-tax Ofhcers subordinate to him to any other Income-tax Officer or Income-tax Offrcers a,lso subordinate to him and the Board may similarly transfer any case from any Income-tax Ofhcer or Income-tax Officers to any other Income-tax Ofhcer or Income tax Officers : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to require any such opportunity to be given where the transfer is from any Income-tax Ofhcer or Income-tax Officers to any other Income-tax Officer or Income-tax Officers and the Offices of all such Income-tax Offrcers are situated in the same city, Iocality or place : Provided further that where any case has been transferred from any Income-tax Officer or Income-tax Ofhcers to two or ./ -/ t2 \"' 7 PSK,I & NTR,I Wp_35029_2023 more Income-tax Officers, the Income-tax Ofhcers to whom the case is so transferred shall have concurrent jurisdiction over the case and shal1 perform such functions in relation to the said case as the Board or the Commissioner (or any Inspecting Assistant Commissioner authorised by the Commissioner in this behalf) may, by general or special order in writing, speciff, for the distribution and ailocation of the work to be performed. (2) The transfer of a case under sub-section (1) may be made at any stage of the proceedings, and shall not render necessary the re-issue of any notice already issued by the Income-tax Officer or Income-tax Officers from whom the case is transferred. Explanation.-In this section and in sections l2l, 123, 124 and 125 the word \"case\", in relation to any person whose name is specihed in any order or direction lssued thereunder, means all proceedings under this Act in respect of any year which may be pending on the date of such order or direction or which may have been completed on or before such date, and includes also all proceedings under this Act which may be commenced after the date of such order or direction in respect of aIry year. 13. A plain readirg of the aforesaid provision of law by itself would clearly indicate that the power to tralsfer a case under the statute is more of an administrative nature. The powers conferred upon the authorities are vast ald wide. There is no condition or pre-condition which needs to be adhered to before an order under Section L27 of the Act is passed. The only rider reflected in the provision is gralting the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard, that too wherever it is possible. to do so. The second rider is that while passing an order, the authority concerned has to record his reasons for doing so. But for the aforesaid two riders, there does not seem to be any 8 PSK,J & NTR,J wp_35029_2023 further requirement of law for the authorities to pass an order under Section 127 of the Act. 14. If we look into the pleadings, which have been supported with the Writ Petition, themselves would clearly grve an indication that before passing of the impugned order, the respondent authorities did issue notice to the petitioner making their intentions clear so far as the requirement of transferring the case of the petitioner from the jurisdiction of respondent No.2 to the jurisdiction of respondent No.4. The petitioner also have responded to the notices ald have submitted their objections, and thereafter only, the impugned order has been passed. This by itself gives a clear picture of the petitioner being given reasonable opportunity of hearing. 15. As regards the second rider of reasons being provided in the impugrred order, the authorities concerned while passing the impugrred order, have considered the objections raised by the petitioner, as would be evident from the contents of paragraphs 3, 3.1 and 4. The reason which necessitated the authorities to pass the impugned order is to have a coordinated investigation. 16. The instant Writ Petition is the one which has been filed on 22.12.2023, whereas the impugned order under Section 127 9 PSK,J & NTR,J Wp_35029_2023 of the Act was passed about one moth back i.e., on 20.11.2023. The consequential proceedings subsequent to the matter being transferred to respondent No.4 also had begun, as would be evidence from the notice dated 3O.1I.2O23 issued under Sub- section (1) of Section 142 ofthe Act. 17. Another crucia-i aspect which needs to be appreciated is that in the consequentia-l notice under Sub-section (1) of Section 142 of the Act, there is a clear elaboration of cash transactions between the petitioner's establishment with M/s.IRIS Group. To make the things bad, there is a statement of Accountant namely Sri Chennu Venkata Raghavendra, who in the course of survey, has not been able to give proper ald satisfactory explanation and also did not provide cogent material in respect of so called commercial transactions done between the petitioner's establishment with M/s.IRIS Group. There was also no suffrcient supporting documentar5r evidence with the petitioner's establishment or with their officials at the tirne of survey to establish tllat the said tralsactions were genuine and they were done strictly in accordance with the provisions of law. 18. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner relied upon Noorul Islam Educational Trust Vs. Commissioner of 10 PSK,.' & NTR,I Wp_35029_2023 Income-Tax and Othersr, Vijayasanthi Investments Rrt. Ltd. Vs. Chief Commissioner of Income-Tax and Others2, Hindusthan M-I Swaco Ltd. Vs. Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, Vadodaraa and Virbhadra Singh Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax4. 19 . If we look into the facts and the factual backdrop under which the aforesaid judgments were rendered, it would clearly reflect that those judgments have been passed under entirely different contextual backdrop. In catena of judgments, various High Courts have held that an order under Section 127 of tl:,e Act has to bejudged on case to case basis. 20. As has been discussed in the preceding paragraph, a plain reading of the impugned order itself would clearly indicate that the petitioner was in fact given an opportunity of hearing which the petitioner did avail and hnally, while passing the impugned order, the authority concerned has mentioned the reasons which necessitated them to transfer the case from the jurisdiction of respondent No.2 to the jurisdiction of respondent No.4. r I20161 s88 rTR 489 (SC) 2 It99L1 ta7 rTR 4Os (AP) 3 12016172 taxmann.com 14 (Gujarat) 4 [2015] 60 taxmann.com 269 (Himachal Pradesh) 2l 11 PsK,J&NTR,] Wp-35029-2023 In Vijayasanthi Investments Put. Ltd.'s case (supra), a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court held as under: \"From the a-foresaid decisions, it is clear that, in the matter of the transfer of a case under section I27 of rl:,e Act, it is necessary that the authority which proposes to tralsfer the case must, whenever it is possible to do so, give the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard with a view to enable him to effectively show cause against the proposed transfer. The notice must also propose to give a personal hearing. It is also necessary to mention in the notice the reasons for the proposed transfer so that the assessee could ma-ke an effective representation with reference to the reasons set out. It is not sufhcient merely to say in the notice that the transfer is proposed 'to facilitate detailed and coordinated investigation'. The reasons cannot be vague and too general in nature but must be specific and based on materia-l facts. It is again not merely sufficient to record the reasons in the frle but it is also necessar5r to communicate the sarne to the affected party .\" 22. So a-lso, in the case of Hindusthan M-I Swaco. Ltd. (supra), a Division Bench of High Court of Gujrat held as under: 15. In the said decision thus, while recognizing wide discretionary powers of the competent Revenue Authorities to tralsfer assessment cases under section 127 of the Act in public interest, the Court also recognized a degree of prejudice or inconvenience that may be caused to the assessee whose assessment may be lifted from his principal place of business and may be put at the disposal of an assessing authority who may be situated at anottrer place far away from the assessee's place ofbusiness. The power of transfer of cases therefore, would have to be exercised in proper cases when sufficient material on record jusLify such action. This is, however, not to suggest that transfer of cases for effective investigation and coordination can be resorted to only in cases assesses who are subjected to search operations. This requirement may arise in other circumstalces a-lso. However, the sufhciency of reasons would have to bejudged from case to case basis.\" L2 PSK,J & NTR,J Wp_35029_2023 23. Similarly, in the case of Shree Ram Vessel Scrap P. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income-Taxs, a Division Bench of the Guj arat High Court, while dealing with the provision of Section 127 of til.e Act, held as under: \"2O. Section 127 of the Act, as already noticed, pertains to power to transfer cases. Sub-section( 1) empowers the Director General, Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard wherever it is possible to do so ald aJter recording his reasons, transfer arty case from one more or more Assessing Officers subordinate to him to any other Assessing Oflicer or Assessing Officers also subordinate to him. Like-wise, under sub-section(2) of Section 127 alter following similar procedural requirements, it is open for the Director General, Chief Commissioner or Commissioner to transfer a case from one Assessing Officer to another who is not subordinate to him in agreement with the authority to whom he may be subordinate. Sub-section(3) of Section 127 provides that nothing contained in sub-seclion(1) or sub- section(2) shall be deemed to require giving of arry such opportunity where the transfer is from any Assessing Offrcer to another and offices of al1 such officers are situated in the same cit5i, locality or place. Sub-section(4) of Section 127 provides that the transfer of a case under sub-seclion(1) or sub-section(2) may be made at arry stage of the proceedings a-rrd sha-ll not render necessary the re-issuance of any notice already issued by the Assessing Ofhcer from whom the case is tralsferred. 21. Exercise of power under sub-section(1) and sub- section(2) of the Act comes with certain procedural requirements namely, of granting a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter wherever it is possible to do so, of recording of reasons for passing such order and as provided by the Supreme Court in Ajalta Industries(supra) communicating such reasons also to the assessee. Subject to fulhllment of such procedural requirements, the authority under section 127 enjoys considerable discretion while exercising the power contained in sub-section(l) or sub-section(2) thereof. Such discretion of-course has to be exercised for achieving the public purpose ald not for any arbitrary or irrelevant consideraLion. On the other hand, it s I201sl s55 ITR 255 (Guj) 13 PSK,J & NTR,J WP-35029-2023 can also be seen that tralsfer of a pending case from one Assessing Officer to another outside of a city, locality or place is likely to cause considerable inconvenience to al assessee. Therefore, even though an assessee may not have a vested right to insist that his assessment be completed only at one place or by a pa,rticular Assessing Offrcer, nevertheless, the reasons for transfer must be weighty enough to off-set against such personal inconvenience of al assessee. In exercise of power under section 127 tJlus we are concerned with larger public interest on one hald and personal inconvenience on the other. However, as long as such powers are exercised bona frde, for public purpose and in the interest of Revenue, the role of the Court to dissect such reasons and to come to a different conclusion would be extremely limited. It is by now well settled that judicial review against the administrative order in exercise of writ jurisdiction, tJle Court is concerned with the decision making process and not the f-rnal decision itself. Unless the reasons which prompted the competent authority to transfer the case can be stated to be wholly irrelevant or arbitrary, the Court would not interfere with such reasons. Of-course an order of such nature ca-n and need to be quashed if it is demonstrated that same is passed either without jurisdiction or is actuated by mala fide either in fact or in law. 24. Coming to the facts of the present case, if we look at the impugned order, dated 20.11.2023, it is reflected that the reasons have been spelt out in the said order. Though the impugrred order may not have elaborately dealt with the reasons, nonetheless, the reasons specifically stand spelt out i.e., in the course of search and seizure proceedings against M/s.Sumaya Group, certain documents pertaining to M/s.IRIS Group were found and that in the consequent search arrd seizure proceedings against M/s.IRIS Group, certain hnancial transactions between the said M/s.IRIS Group and the petitioner were found, all of which reqlrire inveJiti€ation' 14 PSK,J & NTR,I Wp_35029_2023 Therefore, considering the fact that all the companies a_re located at different places like Bombay, Delhi and Hyderabad, for administrative convenience and also for betterment of the proper investigation, Section 127 of the Act was invoked. Later, opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner and reasons for the transfer of the case from Hyderabad to Bombay have a_lso been mentioned. Thus, this Court is of the view that the requirement under statute i.e., Section 127 of tlne Act has been complied with while passing the impugned order. 25. From the judiciat pronouncements referred in the preceding paragraphs, it can be safely culled out that under the scope of judicial review in exercise of its extraordinar5r powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court is only required to see (i) the decision making power, (ii) whether the assessee has been granted opportunity of hearing before the order of transfer was passed and (iii) whether reasons have been given while passing the order under Section l2Z of tlrre Act. 26. So far as the decision making process is concerned, the Court has to see (i) whether the order, which is impugned, has been passed by arr authority who does not otherwise has authority to pass an order under Section l2Z of the Act and 15 PSK,J & NTR,J Wp_35029_2023 (ii) whether there is any malafide or arbitrariness attributed against aly of the offrcials of the Department 27. The case of the petitioner does not fall under any of the aforesaid categories. Therefore, now what requires to be ascertained is whether the petitioner was given an opportunity of hearing. From the documents enclosed with the present Writ Petition itself would show that the petitioner was indeed heard before passing the impug:ned order. Finally, what needs to be looked into is whether the reasons have also been given in the order of tralsfer or not. 2a. Paragraph No.4 of the impugned order read with paragraph Nos.3 and 3.1 would clearly speak of the reason which necessitated the authorities to pass the impugned order is centralized and coordinated investigation. 29. Very recently in the case of Kamal Nath Vs. The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Kolkata and Others6, dealing with the similar issue, the High Court at Calcutta held as under. \"22. The purpose of a transfer order under Section 127 is not to subject an assessee to tax liability. Its effect is only to subject an assessee to assessment under another jurisdictional ofhcer. Therefore, such an order involves balalcing of the inconvenience to the petitioner and revenue interests [public interest), which should tilt towards the 6 W.P.A.No.3868 0f 2022, dated 06.01.2023 16 PSK,I & NTR,J WP,35029-2023 latter if there is some nexus derivable from facts and not mere pleas based on conjecture. 23. The principles that emerge from a reading of the judgments above are as follows: A. There is no absolute right to be assessed in a particular territory. B. In a tralsfer order, the inconvenience of assessees is balanced against the right of the revenue to carry out effective tax collection (which is public interest). C. The assessee does not possess tJle right to choose his/ her assessing authority. D. The scope of judicial revieu'is limited to determining: i) whether t1.e decision making process was proper, which is to ascertain: (a) if the principles of natural justice were followed, and (b) the requirements of Section 727 were firlhlled, ii) whether 'che reasons are not wholly in'eleva::rt/ a-:rbitrary, iii) whether the order is passed without j urisdiction or actuated by mala fide, arrd iv) whether there is arry ne-rrrs of the assessee, whose assessment is being transferred, with the incriminatrng material a,rd/or persons on whom incrirninaLiog mater iai has been found. 24. In view of the above, it is clear ttrat the present transfer is based on cogent material that requires further investigation by the tax authorities. The argument of the petitioner that they are willing to cooperate in the rnvestigation, thereby negating the requirement of the transfer, is of no relevance as the officer conducting the coordinated search in my opinion, is best suited to investigate and carry out the assessment of the petitioner. It is to be noted that at the stage of passing an order under Section 127, a.fter considering objections of the petitioner, the authorities are not required to give out the entire case of the tax authorities. Even if t.lle additional information shared vide the alfrdavit-in-cipposition ald compilations are not considered, this Court frnds the Impugned Order to satisfy the threshold of an administrative/quasi- administrative order. 25. Thus, it would be incontestable and sufficient to conclude that as long as cogent materials are present, the L7 PSK,J & NTR,I Wp_3s029_2023 transfer that has been sought for cannot be held to be mala fide or based on extrareous circumstances. The judgements cited above clarify this point to the hilt. In my view, the administrative/quasi-administrative order passed under Section 127 of the Act does not need to give a detailed explarration ald a concrete financial nexus, but is required to bring out certain facts that could indicate that the case wa-rrants further investigation to be carried out by the tax authorities.\" 30. For all the aJoresaid reasons, this Court does not find that a strong case is made out by the petitioner for interference to the impugned order passed under Section 127 of the Act by respondent No.l. Hence, the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed. 31. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed. sD/- P f'Jtls+f(f HH3'$Rt //rRUE coPY// 5i SECTION OFFICER 'o', -n\" Principar commissioner \"r. 11\": T?1:)' I'}nd3i3335 : lo[lJllf !6.n'\"' ;ffi=n+il#*toT\".ft ry?l,.\"rili+q:r#ifi,,,f ff ;:::::;; 'ffi u\"[i'f #,:til\"$6'ii:?irrrvrn?ial:i5ini-*,*0,'* 'i1\",,*1\"3iffi xili\"::ly+*ru;i:U,',ffi 3ff ;Xl,'3;,o*no,.\", :w#ji,l$,\"\"l:s*'f; }ri.,i'sj:,#f [:\"fr itifu:\"[\"i;rlruHl{'t''usr;srl Hrl :H H':li x HJri [txl;: 3 3H: i#s I?\"\"?l o \" \" r 7 8 9. Two CD CoPies IVIBC et Y2. HIGH COURT DATED: 0810112024 oF rE( f % .? o I i.i- cl- ^.$ ( t!\" 'z + 9J .) o'i 9Q 'ctFt + ORDER WP.No.35029 of 2023 DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS t ,d* Y{--.- (, r "