" WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 1 of 22 THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA AGARTALA WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 [ [[ [ Bharat Kumar Ghosh, S/O Late Krishnavallabh Ghosh, R/O Thakur Dwara Brahmpuri, Jodhpur(Rajasthan), PIN-342002, Now residing at Salbagan B.S.F. Headquarters, Agartala, Tripura West. ………… Petitioner - - - - Vs Vs Vs Vs – – – – 1. The Union of India, Through the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, South Block, New Delhi. 2. The Commandant, 129th Bn. BSF, Rampura, Fazilka-152123, Punjab. 3. The Inspector General, Border Security Force, FTR Headquarter BSF, Jalandhar Cantt. Jalandhar-144005, Punjab. 4. The Deputy Inspector General, Border Security Force, Sector HQ BSF, Azamgarh, Abohar-152116, District-Fazilka, Punjab. 5. The Director General, FHQ BSF, CGO Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-110001. 6. No.940768024 HC/LM Harendra Prasad, Border Security Force, FTR HQ Punjab attached with 51 Bn. BSF, Jalandhar, Punjab. ………… Respondents WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 2 of 22 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.C. DAS For the petitioner : Mr. S. Deb, Sr. Advocate Mr. S. Dutta, Advocate For the respondents : Mr. H. Deb, ASG Date of hearing & delivery of judgment & order : 15.06.2016 Whether Fit for Reporting : Yes No √ JUDGMENT JUDGMENT JUDGMENT JUDGMENT & ORDER & ORDER & ORDER & ORDER(ORAL) (ORAL) (ORAL) (ORAL) The question which fell for consideration at the motion stage itself is whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of cause of action. 2. Heard learned senior counsel, Mr. S. Deb, assisted by learned counsel, Mr. S. Dutta for the petitioner and learned ASG, Mr. H. Deb for the respondent-Union of India. 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the case of the petitioner is that he was serving under the Border Security Force(for short, BSF) and an FIR No.207 dated 13.11.2012 was lodged from the office of the Commandant, 51 Bn. BSF, Rampura, Fazilka(Punjab) alleging that there was a theft committed in the store-yard of the Unit and properties valued `4,00,000/- were stolen. Subsequently, a Security Force Court was constituted and an inquiry was WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 3 of 22 conducted against the petitioner in due process and he was held guilty in the inquiry and consequently the Commandant of 129 Bn. BSF, Rampura, Fazilka, Punjab passed the following order:- “OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT 129 BN BSF RAMPURA FAZILKA, PUNJAB No.Prov/129 Bn/BSF/Theft/Recovery/15/3155-59 dated 09/10 Mar, 2015 <<<<<>>>>>>>> As per the direction of SHQ BSF Abohar and as approved by the Competent Authority, the recoveries of Rs.1,59,854/-(Rupees One lac fifty nine thousand eight hundred fifty four) only each are to be made from No.94768042 HC/LM Harender Prasad and No.930219370 HC/GM Bharat Kumar Ghosh of FTR HQ BSF Punjab attached with this unit may be effected through their pay in 24 equal installments. Sd/- eligible FOR COMMANDANT 129 BN BSF” 4. The petitioner made several representations to the authority including that of the Director General of BSF, HQs at CGO Complex, New Delhi but his grievance was not redressed. 5. By filing this writ petition the petitioner sought for the following relief(s):- i. Issue a Rule calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why a Writ of Certiorari and/or in the nature thereof shall not be issued quashing/setting aside the impugned Order dated 09/10 March, 2015(Annexure P4 supra); WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 4 of 22 ii. Call for records; iii. Issue a Rule calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why a Writ of Mandamus and/or in the nature thereof shall not be issued mandating/directing not to act upon the impugned order dated 09/10 March, 2015(Annexure P4 supra) and also to show cause as to why the respondents and each one of them shall not be mandated/directed to forbear from acting upon the said order dated 09/10 March, 2015(Annexure P4 supra) and also to show cause as to why the salaries deducted illegally from the petitioner herein shall not be paid to the petitioner; iv. Issue a Rule calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why a Writ of Prohibition and/or in the nature thereof shall not be prohibited to act upon the impugned order dated 09/10 March, 2015(Annexure P4 supra) and also to show cause as to why the respondents and each one of them shall not be prohibited to forbear from acting upon the said order dated 09/10 March, 2015(Annexure P4 supra) and also to show cause as to why the deductions illegally made from the petitioner herein shall not be repaid to him; v. In the interim an Order in terms of i., iii and iv above; and vi. After hearing the parties be please to make the Rule absolute in terms of i., iii. & iv above;” 6. Article 226(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India prescribes:- “226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.— (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 5 of 22 Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including[writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.] (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.]” 7. The above provision of the Constitution makes it clear that the High Court can issue a writ if cause of action wholly or in part arises within its territorial jurisdiction even if the person or authority against whom writ is required to be issued is located outside its territorial jurisdiction. In order to maintain a writ petition the petitioner has to establish that his legal right has been infringed by the respondents and the cause of action for such infringement of legal right wholly or partly arises within the territorial limit of this High Court’s jurisdiction. 8. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb, at the outset has referred Fifteenth Amendment and Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution and submitted that the present position of Article WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 6 of 22 226(2) came into existence after Forty-second Amendment and now a writ can be issued against any person or authority within or outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, if the cause of action wholly or partially arises within its territorial jurisdiction. Referring to the cases of Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2000) 7 SCC 640 and Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India reported in (2014) 9 SCC 329 it is emphatically submitted by learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb that the horizon of territorial jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court has been widened after Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution and if a fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the writ petition can be entertained. According to Mr. Deb, the petitioner is now posted at Salbagan, BSF HQs, Agartala, and the impugned order dated 9/10th March, 2015(order reproduced hereinbefore) is chasing behind the petitioner and under that order the authority is recovering the amount from the salary of the petitioner and so the petitioner has cause of action to maintain the writ petition here in the High Court of Tripura and the BSF also has its unit in Tripura and therefore there is no hurdle for the respondents also to contest the case. 9. On the other hand, learned ASG, Mr. Deb has submitted that the cause of action for the Security Force Court proceeding occurred at Rampura, Fazilka, Punjab in the store-yard of 51 Bn. BSF and the proceeding was conducted there at Rampura in the State of Punjab. Punishment order was also passed by the WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 7 of 22 Commandant of 129 Bn. BSF at Rampura, Fazilka, Punjab. The petitioner made representation against the order there at Rampura and not even a fraction of the cause of action arose in Tripura. Simply because pursuant to the punishment order dated 9/10th March, 2015 the recovery is made while the petitioner is here at Agartala in Tripura, this Court cannot entertain the writ petition because the cause of action has not arisen here within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 10. As already stated hereinbefore, the alleged theft in the store-yard of 51 Bn. BSF was committed on 13.11.2012 at the Battalion HQs. at Rampura, Fazilka within the State of Punjab. The Security Force Court was constituted at Punjab and the entire proceeding against the petitioner was conducted there at Punjab and the impugned order dated 9/10th March, 2015 was passed by the Commandant of 129 Bn. BSF, Rampura, Fazilka, Punjab. All the representations the petitioner annexed here with the writ petition were addressed to the authority from his place of posting at Punjab. In his pleadings the petitioner stated nothing as to which part of the cause of action for filing the writ petition before this High Court has arisen. To invoke the jurisdiction of this Court the petitioner practically stated nothing in the writ petition that any part or fraction of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. In para 19 of the writ petition the petitioner simply stated: WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 8 of 22 “That the subject matter of the dispute is within the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court and the respondents are also within the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.”. The above statement does not disclose how the subject matter of the dispute is within the jurisdiction of this Court. 11. A bare reading of Article 226(2) of the Constitution makes it clear that the High Court can issue a writ if the cause of action wholly or partially arises within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Cause of action for the purpose of Article 226 of the Constitution, for all intent and purpose, must be assigned the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The expression cause of action has not been defined either in the Code of Civil Procedure or the Constitution. But now it has been settled that the cause of action is bundle of facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit before he can succeed. 12. Section 20 prescribes— “Subject to the limitations aforesaid every suit shall be instituted in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction………………………………………………………… (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. In the Code of Civil Procedure by Sarkar, it has been stated that the expression, ‘cause of action’ has acquired a WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 9 of 22 judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Every fact which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in ‘cause of action’. It has to be left to be determined in each individual case as to where the cause of action arises. It is observed by the Apex Court that each and every fact pleaded by the petitioner in their application would not give rise to a cause of action within the court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts, which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. 13. By filing this writ petition the petitioner challenged the impugned order dated 9/10th March, 2015 under which a recovery of an amount of `1,59,854/- has been ordered by twenty four installments from his salary. WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 10 of 22 The petitioner virtually challenged the Security Force Court’s proceeding initiated against him by the BSF authority at Rampura, Punjab in respect of the incident occurred at 51 Bn. BSF, Rampura. Not even a fraction of that incident or inquiry in connection with that incident occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. If I accept the argument of learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb that the petitioner is now posted here in the BSF Unit at Tripura and pursuant to that order the recovery is made from his salary, that fact in no way constitutes a part or fraction of the cause of action. 14. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb has heavily relied on the decisions of Navinchandra N. Majithia(supra) and Nawal Kishore Sharma(supra). In the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia(supra) the writ petition was filed in Bombay High Court by the petitioner seeking relief inter alia challenging an FIR lodged at Shillong in the State of Meghalaya. The dispute was between the petitioner’s company and another company, namely J.B. Holdings Ltd. in respect of the transaction between the two and the J.B. Holdings Ltd. set up their business in the State of Meghalaya. Relating to the transaction between the two the writ petition was filed at Bombay. So the fact of that case is squarely different to that of the fact of the present case. In that case though Bombay High Court observed that the writ petition was not maintainable at Bombay challenging a WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 11 of 22 criminal proceeding at Meghalaya but the Apex Court considering the whole facts held that the writ petition was maintainable in the Bombay High Court. I would like to quote here paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the judgment which read thus: “15. On the pleadings of the parties noticed in the foregoing paragraphs the moot question that arises for consideration is whether the Bombay High Court was right in passing the order rejecting the writ petition on the ground that the Court could not entertain the writ petition as the petitioner had prayed for quashing the complaint filed against him by J.B. Holding Ltd. at Shillong. 16. Article 226 of the Constitution of India which provides the power to High Courts to issue certain writs reads as follows : \"226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.— (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 12 of 22 High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3) - (4) * * * 17. From the provision in clause (2) of Article 226 it is clear that the maintainability or otherwise of the writ petition in the High Court depends on whether the cause of action for filing the same arose, wholly or in part, within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. 18. In legal parlance the expression “cause of action” is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person. (Black's Law Dictionary) 19. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary a “cause of action” is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. 20. In “Words and Phrases” (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the phrase “cause of action” in common legal parlance is existence of those facts which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf. 21. A Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Uptal Kumar Basu (1994) 4 SCC 711, considered at length the WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 13 of 22 question of territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India. Some of the relevant observations made in the judgment are extracted hereunder: SCC pp. 716-17, paras 5-6) “5. Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause - notwithstanding anything in Article 32 - and provides that every High Court shall have power \"throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction\", to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government. \"within those territories’ directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 14 of 22 territorial jurisdiction of that Court. This is at best its case in the writ petition. 6. It is well settled that the expression ‘cause of action’ means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the court. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh, ILR(1889) 16 Cal 98, Lord Watson said : \"........... the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour.\" Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must depend upon whether the WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 15 of 22 averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. (Emphasis supplied)” 15. In the case of Nawal Kishore Sharma(supra), the Supreme Court has taken note of its various earlier decisions on the issue. The fact of that case in short is that the petitioner was working under the Shipping Corporation of India and he was suffering from severe heart muscle disease and breathing problem for which he was declared permanently unfit and therefore he moved to his native place in Bihar and he claimed disability compensation. The respondents though initially offered that the petitioner will be entitled to severance compensation of `2,75,000/- but that was not accepted by the petitioner and he claimed disability compensation which was not allowed for which he approached Patna High Court and the interim petition was contested by the respondents. But ultimately the question of maintainability was raised on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. After the petitioner was declared permanently unfit he took shelter in his residence in Bihar and he made representation claiming disability compensation from the respondents at Bihar and the respondents also made communication with him at his residence at Bihar in respect of his claim and so the Apex Court considering the particular facts and circumstances of that case held that the Patna High Court has jurisdiction to decide the case. WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 16 of 22 The ratio of that decision is therefore not applicable in the facts of the present case of the petitioner since the petitioner has totally failed to make out any case whether any part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court. I would like to refer here paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the judgment of Nawal Kishore Sharma(supra) which reads thus— “8. While interpreting the aforesaid provision, the Constitution Bench of this Court in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210, held that the writ court would not run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction and that the person or the authority affected by the writ must be amenable to court’s jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories. The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issued under Article 226 of the Constitution which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insist on the presence of the person or authority within the territories in relation to which High Court exercises jurisdiction. In another Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207, this Court took the similar view and held that the writ court cannot exercise its power under Article 226 beyond its territorial jurisdiction. The Court was of the view that the exercise of power conferred by Article 226 was subject to a twofold limitation viz., firstly, the power is to be exercised in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and secondly, the person or authority on whom the High Court is empowered to issue writ WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 17 of 22 must be within those territories. These two Constitution Bench judgments came for consideration before a larger Bench of seven Judges of this Court in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 532. The Bench approved the aforementioned two Constitution Bench judgments and opined that unless there are clear and compelling reasons, which cannot be denied, writ court cannot exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution beyond its territorial jurisdiction. 9. The interpretation given by this Court in the aforesaid decisions resulted in undue hardship and inconvenience to the citizens to invoke writ jurisdiction. As a result, Clause (1-A) was inserted in Article 226 by the Constitution (Fifteenth) Amendment Act, 1963 and subsequently renumbered as clause (2) by the Constitution (Forty-second) Amendment Act, 1976. The amended clause (2) now reads as under:- “226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs— (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 18 of 22 authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3)—(4) * * * On a plain reading of the amended provisions in clause (2), it is clear that now High Court can issue a writ when the person or the authority against whom the writ is issued is located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action wholly or partially arises within the court’s territorial jurisdiction. Cause of action for the purpose of Article 226(2) of the Constitution, for all intent and purpose must be assigned the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The expression cause of action has not been defined either in the Code of Civil Procedure or the Constitution. Cause of action is bundle of facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit before he can succeed. The term “cause of action” as appearing in clause (2) came for consideration time and again before this Court. 10. In State of Rajasthan v. M/s Swaika Properties, (1985) 3 SCC 217, the fact was that the respondent-Company having its registered office in Calcutta owned certain land on the outskirts of Jaipur City, was served with notice for acquisition of land under the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959. Notice was duly served on the Company at its registered office in WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 19 of 22 Calcutta. The Company, first appeared before the Special Court and finally the Calcutta High Court by filing a writ petition challenging the notification of acquisition. The matter ultimately came before this Court to answer a question as to whether the service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act at the registered office of the respondent in Calcutta was an integral part of cause of action and was it sufficient to invest the Calcutta High Court with a jurisdiction to entertain the petition challenging the impugned notification. Answering the question this Court held: (Swaika Properties case, SCC pp. 222-23, paras 7-8) “7. Upon these facts, we are satisfied that the cause of action neither wholly nor in part arose within the territorial limits of the Calcutta High Court and therefore the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to issue a rule nisi on the petition filed by the respondents under Article 226 of the Constitution or to make the ad interim ex parte prohibitory order restraining the appellants from taking any steps to take possession of the land acquired. Under sub- section (5) of Section 52 of the Act the appellants were entitled to require the respondents to surrender or deliver possession of the lands acquired forthwith and upon their failure to do so, take immediate steps to secure such possession under sub-section (6) thereof. 8. The expression ‘cause of action’ is tersely defined in Mulla’s Code of Civil Procedure: “The ‘cause of action’ means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 20 of 22 the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court.” In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. The mere service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The Notification dated 8-2-1984 issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the Official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice on them by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 21 of 22 issued by the State Government under Section 52(1) of the Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under Section 52(1) of the Act by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of the respondents for the grant of such relief had to be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action wholly or in part arose.” 16. To invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner is to make out a prima facie case showing the cause of action that the same has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court or at least a part or fraction of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. It is not material at all as to whether the person or authority against whom the relief is sought is residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court or not. The petitioner has to make out that the cause of action or any part thereof has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. Simply because the petitioner is now attached with Salbagan BSF Unit in the State of Tripura this Court cannot usurp jurisdiction in respect of a proceeding initiated against the petitioner for a bundle of facts arisen in the State of Punjab. Further, a writ petition is decided on the basis of the pleadings and materials placed in support of the pleadings. In my WP(C) NO.429 OF 2016 Page 22 of 22 considered opinion, there shall be a clear pleading in the writ petition itself as to how the jurisdiction of the Court is attracted to adjudicate upon the issues raised in the writ petition. Unfortunately, the petitioner simply stated about the fact in respect of the Security Force Court’s proceeding initiated against him, the punishment imposed pursuant to the said proceeding and in respect of his subsequent representation, etc. and nothing else. There is no specific and clear pleading in the writ petition about cause of action to attract the jurisdiction of this Court in deciding the writ petition. In the absence of any such pleading showing the cause of action to attract jurisdiction of the Court, I think this Court should not entertain the writ petition on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. 17. In view of the discussions made above, I am of considered opinion that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and hence it stands dismissed. However, the dismissal of this writ petition will not debar the petitioner to approach the appropriate court of jurisdiction seeking the relief. JUDGE "