DEV WINE SALES CORPORATION,NEW DELHI V. DCIT, CENTRAL CIRCLE-2, FARIDABAD

ITA 2398/DEL/2022

AI Insights

The case involves Dev Wine Sales Corporation, which appealed against the order of the Learned Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals)-3, Gurgaon, concerning an assessment order under Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 2020-21. The primary contention was the addition of Rs. 55,00,000 to the income of the assessee, which was treated as unexplained cash during search proceedings. The Tribunal examined the procedural validity of the approval under Section 153D, noting that it was granted in a mechanical manner without proper application of mind, as required by judicial precedents and the statutory framework.

• Counselvise Citation: [2025] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 398275 (ITAT-DELHI)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 04-06-2025
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Allowed
• Bench Allotted: B
• Assessment Year: 2020-2021
• Other Referred Cases: Infolance Software Solution, Municipal Council Neemuch vs Mahadeo Real Estate, West Bengal Central School Service Vs. Abdul Halim, ACIT, Circle 1(2), Bhubaneshwar vs. M/s Serajuddin & Co., Navin Jain vs. Dy. C.I.T., PCIT vs. Subodh Aggarwal, Sahara India vs. CIT and Others
• Laws Referred To: Income-Tax Act, 1961
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: SURENDER PAL
• Assessee Lawyers: VIJAY KUMAR SINGLA
• Keywords: Question of law; Search and seizure; Assessment record
• Section: 143(3); 142(1); 132; 153A

Judgement Text

" INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DELHI BENCH “B”: NEW DELHI BEFORE SHRI M. BALAGANESH, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND SHRI VIMAL KUMAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA No. 2398/DEL/2022 Assessment Year: 2020-21 Dev Wine Sales Corporation, 10A/15 Shakti Nagar, New Delhi PIN 1100 19 PAN No. AALFD1161A Vs. DCIT, Circle-II, Faridabad (Appellant) (Respondent) O R D E R PER VIMAL KUMAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER: The appeal filed by the appellant/assessee is against order dated 29.08.2022 of the Learned Commissioner of Income-Tax(Appeals)-3, Gurgaon (hereinafter referred as ‘Ld. CIT(A)’) arising out of assessment order dated 30.09.2021 under Section 143(1) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred as “the Act”) of the DCIT, Central Circle-2, Faridabad (hereinafter referred as “Ld. AO”) for assessment year 2020-21. 2. Brief facts of the case are that that on 26.03.2021, the assessee filed belated return of income under Section 139(4) of the Act at Rs.1,02,18,720/- under the head ‘income from business and profession’. Noted under Section Assessee by: Shri Vijay Kumar Singla, CA Department by: Shri Surender Pal, Sr. DR Date of Hearing: 05.03.2025 Date of pronouncement: 04.06.2025 ITA No.2398/Del/2022 2 143(2) of the Act was issued on 30.06.2021. Further, notice under Section 142(1) of the Act was issued along with questionnaire on 10.08.2021 and on 05.09.2021. Appellant/assessee furnished reply online and the authorized representative Shri M.L. Aggarwal, CA attended the proceedings and the issues were discussed with him. During search proceedings in case of assessee amounting of Rs.59,03,110/-, a statement of Devendra Gupta, partner of the firm was recorded under Section 132(4) of the Act which confronted the issue. On conclusion of the assessment proceedings, an addition of Rs.55,00,000/- was made by the Ld. AO vide order dated 30.09.2021. 3. Against order dated 30.09.2021, appellant/assessee filed appeal before the Ld. CIT(A) which was dismissed vide order dated 30.09.2021 vide order dated 29.08.2022. 4. Being aggrieved, the appellant/assessee filed present appeal. 5. Learned Authorised Representative for the appellant/assessee submitted that Ld. CIT(A) erred in not deleting addition on account of addition of Rs.55,00,000/- which was seized during search proceedings treating as unexplained. The said unexplained cash was added to the income of the assessee charging tax under Section 115BBE of the Act and appellate proceedings were initiated under Section 271AAB(1A) of the Act. The Ld. CIT(A) has erred in not appreciating the fact that the assessment was completed under Section 143(3) of the Act and the addition was made inspite of the fact ITA No.2398/Del/2022 3 that sufficient explanation was provided. There was sufficient cash in hands in books of accounts and due/fair evidence was provided during appellate/assessment proceedings. Ld. CIT(A) further erred in law and on facts of the case that as addition was null and void because of no co-relation to corresponding incriminating material found during course of search operation under Section 132 of the Act. Any post search proceedings cannot be treated/partake the character of evidence material in eyes of law. Ld. CIT(A) erred in not appreciating that the assessment framed under Section 153A/143(3) of the Act for the period under consideration was void ab initio being passed on basis of invalid and incomplete and inchoate approval under Section 153D of the Act by Ld. AO. Ld. CIT(A) erred in law as entire assessment framed deserves to be quashed and assessment may be declared as nullity. 6. Learned Authorised Representative for the appellant/assessee submitted that as per reply dated 03.02.2025 under Section 7(1) of the RTI Act, 2005, draft assessment order in this case was communicated vide official email. The consolidated letter dated 27.09.2021 is for assessment years 2016-17 to 2020-21 was also issued to the Ld. ACIT, Central Circle-II, Faridabad. Reliance was placed on order dated 26.11.2024 in ITA No.4105/Del/2019 titled as Infolance Software Solution of Co-ordinate Benches of ITAT Delhi. 7. Learned Authorised Representative for the Revenue submitted that there is a gap of one day between submissions of four assessment years of approval ITA No.2398/Del/2022 4 under Section 153D of the Act dated 26.09.2021 and passing of approval under Section 153D dated 27.07.2021. Order under Section 127 of the Act dated 15.7.2021 is a administrative order. 8. Learned Authorised Representative for the Department further submitted that in addition to the oral arguments submitted by the undersigned, the following legal issues/legal submissions, relevant to section 153D approval and two vital Judgments of the Hon. Supreme Court, on the legality and legal requirements of the Administrative Orders of government or executive authorities, may kindly be considered:- 1. The word/phrase \"written approval\" is not mentioned in the section 153D of the Income tax Act, 1961. The only phrase used is \"the prior approval\". Therefore, the contents of the written order of the JCIT/AddI. CIT are legally not required to be examined or considered, for meeting the legal or factual requirements of the approval under section 153D. 2. The order by the Addl. CIT/JCIT under section 153D is an Administrative Order, by the higher authority i.e. JCIT/AddI. CIT to the lower authority, i.e. AO. Such an order is not a quasi-judicial or judicial order. Therefore, the legal requirements and benchmarks regarding the principles of \"the application of mind\" and \"the speaking order\" are not as strict or high, as they are in the case of quasi-judicial or judicial order. 3. In respect of the legal requirements and the benchmarks regarding the administrative orders, the Hon. Supreme Court has given many comprehensive judgements quoted as under:- “(i)Municipal Council Neemuch vs Mahadeo Real Estate, dated 17 September, 2019, AIR 2019 SC 4517, 2019 (10) SCC 738; and (ii)West Bengal Central School Service Vs. Abdul Halim dated 24 July 2019, AIR, 2019, AIR 2019 SC 4504, AIRONLINE 2019 SC 2188 AIR 2020 SC (CIV) 82.” ITA No.2398/Del/2022 5 9. From examination of record in the light of light of aforesaid rival contentions, it is crystal clear that submission of draft assessment order for approval under Section 153D dated 26.09.2021 is as under: ITA No.2398/Del/2022 6 10. Approval under Section 153D dated 27.09.2021 is as under: 11. A Co-ordinate Bench of ITAT, Delhi in ITA No.4105/Del/2019 titled as “Infolance Sofarware Solutions (P) Ltd. vs. ACIT & Ors.” in order dated 26.11.2019 has held as under: “11. We have gone through the approval granted by the ld. JCIT on the date mentioned in the table hereinabove u/s 153D of the Act. The said approval letter clearly states that a letter dated 29.12.2017 ITA No.2398/Del/2022 7 was filed by the Ld. AO before the ld. JCIT seeking approval of draft assessment order u/s 153D of the Act. The ld. JCIT has accorded approval for the said draft assessment orders on the very same day i.e., on 29.12.2017 for various assessment years in the case of various assessees. In any event, whether is it humanly possible for an approving authority like the ld. JCIT to grant judicious approval u/s 153D of the Act for 40 cases for various assessment years on a single day is the subject matter of dispute before us. Further, section 153D of the Act provides that approval has to be granted for each of the assessment year whereas, in the instant case, the ld. JCIT has granted a single approval for all assessment years put together. We find that the reliance placed by the Ld. AR on the decision of the Hon'ble Orissa High Court in the case of ACIT, Circle 1(2), Bhubaneshwar vs. M/s Serajuddin & Co. in ITA Nos. 39 to 45 of 2022 dated 15.03.2023 is well founded. The question before the Hon'ble Orissa High Court is as under:- \"Whether on the facts and circumstances the ITAT was correct in holding that the approving authority has not applied his mind for giving approval u/s 153D?\" 12. In the case before the Hon'ble Orissa High Court, the approval of draft assessment orders was placed by the AO before the Addl.CIT on 27/29.12.2010 for seven assessment years. The approval was granted by the Addl. Commissioner for seven assessment years u/s 153D of the Act on 30.12.2010 by merely saying that the draft orders submitted by the officer in the above case for the seven assessment years are hereby approved. The Hon'ble Orissa High Court took note of this fact and quashed the search assessment and decided the issue in favour of the assessee by holding as under:- \"22. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the Assessee there is not even a token mention of the draft orders having been perused by the Additional CIT. The letter simply grants an approval. In other words, even the bare minimum requirement of the approving authority having to i ndicate what the thought process involved was is missing in the aforementioned approval order. While elaborate reasons need not be given, there has to be some indication that the approving authority has examined the draft orders and finds ITA No.2398/Del/2022 8 that it meets the requirement of the l aw. As explained in the above cases, the mere repeating of the words of the statute, or mere \"rubber stamping\" of the letter seeking sanction by using similar words like 'seen' or 'approved' will not satisfy the requirement of the law. This is where the Technical Manual of Office Procedure becomes important. Although, it was in the context of Section 158BG of the Act, it would equally apply to Section 153D of the Act. There are three or four requirements that are mandated therein, (i) the AO should submit the draft assessment order \"well in time\". Here it was submitted just two days prior to the deadline thereby putting the approving authority under great pressure and not giving him sufficient time to apply his mind; (ii) the final approval must be in writing; (iii) The fact that approval has been obtained, should be mentioned in the body of the assessment order. 23. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the assessment orders are totally silent about the AO having written to the Additional CIT seeking his approval or of the Additional CIT having granted such approval. Interestingly, the assessment orders were passed on 30th December 2010 without mentioning the above fact. These two orders were therefore not in compliance with the requirement spelt out in para 9 of the Manual of Official Procedure. 24. The above manual is meant as a guideline to the AOs. Since it was issued by the CBDT, the powers for issuing such guidelines can be traced to Section 119 of the Act. It has been held in a series of judgments that the instructions under Section 119 of the Act are certainly binding on the Department. In Commissioner of Customs v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. 2004 (165) E.L.T. 257 (S.C.) the Supreme Court observed as under: \"Despite the categorical language of the clarification by the Constitution Bench, the issue was again sought to be raised before a Bench of three Judges in Central Board of Central Excise, Vadodara v. Dhiren Chemicals Industries: 2002 (143) ELT 19 where the view of the Constitution Bench regarding the binding nature of circulars issued under Section 37B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was reiterated after it was drawn to the attention of the Court by the Revenue ITA No.2398/Del/2022 9 that there were in fact circulars issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs which gave a different interpretation to the phrase as interpreted by the Constitution Bench. The same view has also been taken in Simplex Castings Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Vishakhapatnam 2003 (5) SCC 528. The principles laid down by all these decisions are: (1) Although a circular is not binding on a Court or an assessee, it is not open to the Revenue to raise the contention that is contrary to a binding circular by the Board. When a circular remains in operation, the Revenue is bound by it and cannot be allowed to plead that it is not valid nor that it i s contrary to the terms of the statute. (2) Despite the decision of this Court, the Department cannot be permitted to take a stand contrary to the instructions Issued by the Board. (3) A show cause notice and demand contrary to existing circulars of the Board are ab initio bad. (4) It is not open to the Revenue to advance an argument or file an appeal contrary to the circulars.\" 25. For all of the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds that the ITAT has correctly set out the legal position while holding that the requirement of prior approval of the superior officer before an order of assessment or reassessment is passed pursuant to a search operation is a mandatory requirement of Section 153D of the Act and that such approval is not meant to be given mechanically. The Court also concurs with the finding of the ITAT that in the present cases such approval was granted mechanically without application of mind by the Additional CIT resulting i n vitiating the assessment orders themselves. 26. The question of law framed is therefore answered in the affirmative i.e. in favour of the Assessee and against the Department. 27. The appeals are accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances, with no order as to costs.\" 13. Further, we find that similar view was taken by the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in the case PCIT vs. Subodh ITA No.2398/Del/2022 10 Aggarwal in Income-tax Appeal No.86/2022 dated 12.12.2022. In this case, the draft assessment order was placed for approval before the Addl. CIT on 31.12.2017. The approval u/s 153D was granted by the Addl. CIT on 31.12.2017. The final assessment order was passed by the AO on 31.12.2017. The time limit for completion of search assessment was 31.12.2017. 38 cases were approved by the Addl. CIT u/s 153D of the Act on 31.12.2017. In this background, the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court held as under:- \"The submission is that the substantial question of law which arises for consideration before this Court is about the justification of the act of the Tribunal in ignoring the findings recorded by the Assessing Officer and setting aside the assessment order on the sole ground of defect in the approval to the draft assessment order granted by the competent Approving Authority. Learned counsel for the Assessee, however, defended the order of the tribunal for the reasoning given therein. Considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the order of the Tribunal, in view of the undisputed facts before us about the manner in which the approval to the draft assessment order was granted under Section 153D for the assessment proceedings, by a letter dated 31.12.2017 in 38 cases placed before the approving authority in a single day, we are required to examine as to whether a substantial question of law arises for consideration before us so as to admit the present appeal. To answer the same, we are required to go through the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act. Section 132 provides the procedure for search and seizure operations in consequence of the information in possession of the Income Tax Authorities. Section 153A prescribes assessment in case of search or requisition. Section 153A provides that in the case of a person where a search is initiated under Section 132, the Assessing Officer shall i ssue notice to such person requiring him to furnish within such period, as ITA No.2398/Del/2022 11 may be specified in the notice, the return of income in respect of each assessment year falling within six assessment years (and for the relevant assessment year or years) referred to in clause (b), in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may apply accordingly as if such return were a return required to be furnished under Section 139. Section 153D of the Act relevant for our purposes is to be noted \"Prior approval necessary for assessment in cases of search or requisition.” 153D.-No order of assessment or reassessment shall be passed by an Assessing Officer below the rank of Joint Commissioner in respect of each assessment year referred to in clause (b) of [sub-section (1) of] section 153A or the assessment year referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 153B, except with the prior approval of the Joint Commissioner. Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply where the assessment or reassessment order, as the case may be, is required to be passed by the Assessing Officer with the prior approval of the [Principal Commissioner or] Commissioner under sub-section (12) of section 144BA.\" The Tribunal while quashing the assessment order had relied upon its earlier decision in Navin Jain and Others (Supra) wherein a detailed discussion has been made with regard to the requirement of prior approval of superior authority on the draft assessment order under Section 153D, before passing the assessment order by the Assessing Officer. It was noted that the word 'approval' though has not been defined in the Income Tax Act but the general meaning of the word 'approval' in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition was to be seen. The decision of the Apex Court in Vijayadev Naval Kishore Bharatia vs. Land Acquisition Officer (2003) 5 SCC 83 wherein the distinction between Approving Authority and ITA No.2398/Del/2022 12 Appellate Authority was drawn, had been noted. The decision of the High Court of Gauhati in Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. vs. Union of India (2019) 366 ELT 253 (Gau.) has been noted to record that grant of approval means due application of mind on the subject matter approved which satisfies all the l egal and procedural requirements. There is an exhaustive discussion on the requirement of prior approval under Section 153D of the Act and it was noted that the requirement of approval cannot be treated as mere formality and the mandate of the Act that the Approving Authority has to act in a judicious manner by due application of mind in a manner of a quasi judicial authority, has been considered. It was held therein that if an approval has been granted by the Approving Authority in a mechanical manner without application of mind then the very purpose of obtaining approval under Section 153D of the Act and mandate of the enactment by the legislature will be defeated. For granting approval under Section 153D of the Act, the Approving Authority shall have to apply independent mind to the material on record for \"each assessment year\" in respect of \"each assessee\" separately. The words ' each assessment year' used in Section 153D and 153A have been considered to hold that effective and proper meaning has to be given so that underlying legislative intent as per scheme of assessment of Section 153A to 153D is fulfilled. It was held that the \"approval\" as contemplated under 153D of the Act, requires the approving authority, i.e. Joint Commissioner to verify the issues raised by the Assessing Officer in the draft assessment order and apply his mind to ascertain as to whether the required procedure has been followed by the Assessing Officer or not in framing the assessment. The approval, thus, cannot be a mere formality and, in any case, cannot be a mechanical exercise of power. It was noted that the obligations of the approval of the Approving Authority serves two purposes: (i) On the one hand, he has to apply his mind to ensure the interest of the revenue against any commission or negligence by the Assessing Officer in taxing right ITA No.2398/Del/2022 13 income in the hands of right person and in right assessment year. (ii) On the other hand, superior authority is also responsible and duty-bound to do justice with the taxpayer by granting protection against arbitrary or creating baseless tax liability on the assessee. The Tribunal has further noted that the provisions contained in Sections 153A to Section 153D provide for separate notice to be given to assessee for assessment for each year as specified in Section 153A of the Act; the assessee has to file separate ITR for each year as specified in Section 153A of the Act; separate assessment orders are to be passed for each year as specified in Section 153A of the Act. It was observed that this is an important concept mentioned in Section 153A of the Act, which is peculiar to the scheme of the said Section. Keeping in view of this basic fundamental features of Section 153A, if Section 153D is scrutinized, then, it would become manifest that an i mportant phrase is employed in the text of Section 153D, which is \"each assessment year\". The reading of the provisions in Section 153A and 153D conjointly makes it clear that separate approval of draft assessment order for each year is to be obtained under Section 153D of the Income Tax Act. In its erudite judgement with the discussion on the legislative intent of Section 153A to 153D and the meaning of the \"approval\" as defined in Black's Law Dictionary as also the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Sahara India vs. CIT and Others (2008) 300 ITR 403 (SC) where the discussion on the requirement of prior approval of Chief Commissioner or Commissioner in terms of provision of Section 142(2A) of the Act had been made, it was noted that the Apex Court has held therein that the requirement of previous approval of the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner in terms of the said provision being an in-built protection against arbitrary or unjust exercise of power by the Assessing Officer casts a very heavy duty on the said high ranking authority to see that the approval envisaged in the section is not turned into an empty ritual. The Apex ITA No.2398/Del/2022 14 Court has held therein that the approval must be granted only on the basis of material available on record and the approval must reflect the application of mind to the facts of the case. The above discussion made in the judgement of Tribunal dated 3.08.2021 i n the case of Navin Jain Vs. Dy. C.I.T. (Supra) has been relied by the Tribunal, in the instant case, to arrive at the conclusion that the mechanical approval under Section 153D of the Act would vitiate the entire proceedings in the instant case. For the reasoning given in the case of Navin Jain (Supra), as extracted in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, as noted above, there cannot be any two opinion to the requirement of prior approval of the Joint Commissioner to the draft assessment order prepared by the Assessing Officer, as per the mandate of Section 153D of the Income Tax Act. The approval of draft assessment order being an in- built protection against any arbitrary or unjust exercise of power by the Assessing Officer, cannot be said to be a mechanical exercise, without application of independent mind by the Approving Authority on the material placed before it and the reasoning given in the assessment order. It is admitted by Sri Gaurav Mahajan, learned counsel for the appellant-revenue that the approval order is an administrative exercise of power on the part of the Approving Authority but it is sought to be submitted that mere fact that the approval was in existence on the date of the passing of the assessment order, it could not have been vitiated. This submission is found to be a fallacy, in as much as, the prior approval of superior authority means that it should appraise the material before it so as to appreciate on factual and legal aspects to ascertain that the entire material has been examined by the Assessing Authority before preparing the draft assessment order. It is trite i n law that the approval must be granted only on the basis of material available on record and the approval must reflect the application of mind to the facts of the case. The requirement of ITA No.2398/Del/2022 15 approval under Section 153D i s pre-requisite to pass an order of assessment or re-assessment. Section 153D requires that the Assessing Officer shall obtain prior approval of the Joint Commissioner in respect of \"each assessment year\" referred to in Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 153A which provides for assessment in case of search under Section 132. Section 153A(1)(a) requires that the assessee on a notice issued to him by the Assessing Officer would be required to furnish the return of income in respect of \"each assessment year\" falling within six assessment years (and for the relevant assessment or years), referred to in Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 153A. The proviso to Section 153A further provides for assessment of the total income in respect of each assessment year falling within such six assessment years (and for the relevant assessment year or years). The careful and conjoint reading of Section 153A(1) and Section 153D leave no room for doubt that approval with respect to \"each assessment year\" is to be obtained by the Assessing Officer on the draft assessment order before passing the assessment order under Section 153A. In the instant case, the draft assessment order in 38 cases, i.e. for 38 assessment years placed before the Approving Authority on 31.12.2017 was approved on same day i.e. 31.12.2017, which not only included the cases of respondent-assessee but the cases of other groups as well. It is humanly impossible to go through the records of 38 cases in one day to apply independent to appraise the material before the Approving Authority. The conclusion drawn by the Tribunal that it was a mechanical exercise of power, therefore, cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on record. As the facts are admitted before us, the questions of law framed on the factual issues related to the findings recorded by the Assessing Officer are not open to agitate within the scope of the present appeal being in ITA No.2398/Del/2022 16 the nature of second appeal. No substantial question of law arises for consideration before us. The Appeal is dismissed being devoid of merit.\" 14. Further, we find that similar issue has been addressed by the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of PCIT vs. Anju Bansal in ITA 368/2023 order dated 13.07.2023 wherein, under similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court categorically held that statutory approval given by a quasi judicial authority without due application of mind as contemplated in section 153D of the Act would be fatal to the entire search assessment proceedings. The relevant operative part of the said order is reproduced below:- \"12. This aspect was brought to the fore by the Tribunal in the impugned order. The Tribunal, thus, concluded there was a complete lack of application of mind, inasmuch as the ACIT, who granted approval, failed to notice the said error. 12.1 More particularly, the Tribunal notes that all that was looked at by the ACIT, was the draft assessment order. 13. In another words, it was emphasised that the approval was granted without examining the assessment record or the search material. The relevant observations made in this behalf by the Tribunal in the impugned order are extracted hereafter: \"17.1 However, in the present case, we have no hesitation in stating that there is complete non- application of mind by the Learned Addl. CIT before granting the approval. Had there been application of mind, he would not have approved the draft assessment order, where the returned income of Rs.87,20,580/-, Similarly, when the total assessed income as per the AO comes to Rs. 16,69,42,560/-, the Addl. CIT could not have approved the assessed income at Rs. 1,65,07,560/- had he applied his mind. The addition of Rs. 15,04,35,000/- made by the AO in the instant ITA No.2398/Del/2022 17 case is completely out of the scene in the final assessed income shows volumes. 17.2 Even the factual situation is much worse than the facts decided by the Tribunal in the case of Sanjay Duggal (supra). In that case, at least the assessment folders were sent whereas in the instant case, as appears from the letter of the Assessing Officer seeking approval, he has sent only the draft assessment order without any assessment records what to say about the search material. As mentioned earlier, there are infirmities in the figures of original return of income as well as total assessed and the Addl. CIT while giving his approval has not applied his mind to the figures mentioned by the AO. Therefore, approval given in the instant case by the Addl. CIT, in our opinion, is not valid in the eyes of law. We, therefore, hold that approval given u/s 153D has been granted in a mechanical manner and without application of mind and thus it is invalid and bad in law and consequently vitiated the assessment order for want of valid approval u/s 153D of the Act. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the order passed u/s 153A r.w.s. 43(3) has to be quashed, thus ordered accordingly. The ground raised by the Assessee is accordingly allowed\". [Emphasis is ours] 14. In this appeal, we are required to examine whether any substantial question of law arises for our consideration. 15. Having regard to the findings returned by the Tribunal, which are findings of fact, in our view, no substantial question of law arises for our consideration. The Tribunal was right that there was ITA No.2398/Del/2022 18 absence of application of mind by the ACIT in granting approval under Section 153D. It is not an exercise dealing with a immaterial matter which could be corrected by taking recourse to Section 292B of the Act. 16. We are not inclined to interdict the order of the Tribunal.\" 15. In view of the aforesaid observations and respectfully following the judicial precedents relied upon hereinabove, we have no hesitation in holding that the approval u/s 153D of the Act has been granted by the ld. JCIT in the instant case before us in a mechanical manner without due application of mind, thereby making the approval proceedings by a high ranking authority, an empty ritual. Such an approval has neither been mandated by the provisions of the Act nor endorsed by the decisions of the Hon'ble Orissa High Court; Hon'ble Allahabad High Court and Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court (Delhi High Court) referred to supra. Hence, we find lot of force in the arguments advanced by the Ld. AR in support of the additional grounds raised for all assessment years under consideration before us for all the assessees. Accordingly, the Additional Grounds raised by all the assessees for all the assessment years under consideration are hereby allowed. 16. Since, pursuant to the allowing of the additional grounds, the entire search assessment framed in the hands of all the assessees is to be declared illegal and bad in law, the other legal grounds and grounds on merits raised by the assessees for various assessment years need not be gone into as adjudication of the same would be merely academic in nature and, hence, they are left open. 17. In the result, all the appeals of the assessee are allowed and appeal of the revenue in ITA No. 8788/Del/2019 in the case of Brij Kishore for Asst Year 2010-11 is dismissed. 8. In view of above observations and respectfully following the judicial ITA No.2398/Del/2022 19 precedent, we have no hesitation in holding that the approval u/s 153D of the Act granted by Learned JCIT in the instant cases were in mechanical manner without due application of mind. Accordingly, the grounds by all the assessees for all the assessment years under consideration are allowed. 12. In view of above observations and respectfully following the judicial precedents, we have no hesitation in holding that the approval under Section 153D of the Act granted by Ld. Additional CIT in the instant case was in mechanical manner without due application of mind. Accordingly, the ground of appeal by the assessee is allowed. 13. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed. Order pronounced in the open court on 4th June, 2025. Sd/- Sd/- (M.BALAGANESH) (VIMAL KUMAR) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER Dated: 04 /06/2025 Mohan Lal Copy forwarded to - 1. Applicant 2. Respondent 3. CIT 4. CIT (A) 5. DR:ITAT ASSISTANT REGISTRAR ITAT, New Delhi "