INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND (ICID PF TRUST),NEW DELHI V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (APPEALS), DELHI

ITA 4203/DEL/2024

AI Insights

The case involves the ICID PF Trust, which appealed against the orders of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) that had dismissed their claims for exemption under section 10(25)(ii) of the Income Tax Act for the Assessment Years 2014-15 and 2015-16. The primary contention was that the Trust, recognized as a Provident Fund under Rule 3(i) of part \'A\' of the Fourth Schedule of the Act, had inadvertently filled a tax return form incorrectly, which led to the disallowance of their claimed exemptions. The Tribunal noted that similar exemptions had been allowed in previous and subsequent years and that the Trust had been recognized continuously since 1984. The Tribunal decided to remand the case back to the CIT(A) for a fresh examination in light of the legal precedents and the specific circumstances of the case.

• Counselvise Citation: [2025] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 653193 (ITAT-DELHI)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 20-06-2025
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Allowed
• Bench Allotted: C
• Assessment Year: 2015-2016
• Other Referred Cases: Delhi Policy Group (reg.) [2023] 157 taxmann.com 192 (Delhi-Trib), Rajasthan Fasteners (P.) Ltd. [2014] 43 taxmann.com 175 (Rajasthan), Sanchit Software & Solutions (P) Ltd. [2012] 25 taxmann.com 123 (Bom), Satish S. Prabhu [2020] 114 taxmann.com 88 (Mumbai-Trib), HL Malhotra & Company Pvt. Ltd. Vs DCIT, Circle12, New Delhi (ITA No. 211/2020 & CM Appeals 32045-32047/2020 dated 22nd December, 2020), Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs Mst. Katiji and others (1987) 2 SCC 107, N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy 1998 (7) SCC 123, Goetze (India) Ltd. (2006) 284 ITR 323, Indian Express (Madurai) (P.) Ltd. (1983) 140 ITR 705, Jai Parabolic Springs Ltd. (2008) 306 ITR 42, J. H. Gotla (1985) 156 ITR 323
• Laws Referred To: Income Tax Act, 1961
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: OM PRAKASH
• Assessee Lawyers: HEMANT KUMAR
• Keywords: Condonation of delay; Set aside; Opportunity of being heard; Reasonable cause; Period of limitation; Charitable institution; Validity of assessment; Benefit of exemption
• Section: 154; 11; 12A; 6; 10

Judgement Text

" 1 IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DELHI BENCH ‘C’: NEW DELHI BEFORE SHRI ANUBHAV SHARMA, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SHRI AVDHESH KUMAR MISHRA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ITA No.4204/Del/2024, A.Y. 2014-15 ITA No.4203/Del/2024, A.Y. 2015-16 International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage Employees Provident Fund (ICID PF Trust), 48, Nyaya Marg, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi PAN: AAATI0119A Vs. Assistant/Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Exemption Circle-2, Civic Centre, J L Nehru Road, New Delhi (Appellant) (Respondent) Appellant by Shri Hemant Kumar, CA Smt. Renu Suri, CA Respondent by Sh. Om Prakash, Sr. DR Date of Hearing 23/04/2025 Date of Pronouncement 20/06/2025 ORDER PER AVDHESH KUMAR MISHRA, AM Common grounds and facts arise in the above captioned appeals of the assessee; therefore, these appeals were heard together and are being disposed off by this common order. 2. These appeals for Assessment Years (AY) 2014-15 and 2015-16 filed by the assessee are directed against orders dated 07.05.2024 of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), NFAC, New Delhi [CIT(A)]. ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 2 3. In both appeals, vide various grounds, the assessee has challenged disallowance of exemption under section 10(25)(ii) of the Income Tax act, 1961 (Act). 4. The relevant facts giving rise to these appeals are that the assessee, formed by the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID) for welfare of its employees, filed its Income Tax Returns (ITRs) for both years declaring NIL income after claiming exemption/deduction under section 11 and also under section 10 of the Act. As per the appellant, it is a case of a provident fund trust duly approved under Rule 3(i) of part ‘A’ of the Fourth Schedule of the Act. As per ITRs, the assessee has claimed exemption under section 11 of the Act [in Column No. 1 of part A and GEN of the ITR] as well as under section 10(21), 10(22B), 10(23A), 10(23B), 10(23C)(iv), 10(23C)(v), 10(23C)(vi), 10(23C)(via)] of the Act [in Column 12 of part B of TI (Total Income)]. These ITRs were processed under section 143(1) of the Act wherein the AO (CPC) disallowed the claim of exemption under section 10 of the Act on the reasoning that the assessee was not eligible for said exemption under specified sub-sections of section 10 of the Act duly mentioned in ITRs. Later, the assessee filed applications under section 154 of the Act for rectification of the processing under section 143(1) of the Act for allowing exemption under section 10(25)(ii) of the Act. The said rectification applications were rejected on the reasoning that there was neither a prima facie mistake apparent from the record as there was no claim of exemption under section ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 3 10(25)(ii) of the Act in ITRs nor the assessee was a registered Trust or Institution under section 12A of the Act. 4.1 Aggrieved with orders under section 154 of the Act, the assessee filed appeals before the CIT(A), who vide orders dated 12.12.2019 dismissed these appeals. Both appellate orders of the Ld. CIT(A) were challenged before the ITAT, who vide order dated 26.08.2022 in ITA No. 703 and 704/Del/2020 remitted the matter back to the Ld. CIT(A) as under: “7.9 The CPC while processing the return u/s. 143(1) of the Act, has limited jurisdiction and empowered to process the return as per material available and/or claim made by the Assessee in return of Income which has been done in this case. The mistake apparent from record can be rectified u/s. 154 of the Act but mistake must be obvious and patent and not something which can be established by a long- drawn process of reasoning on points on which there may be two opinions. Mistake as such though apparently not visible from the order of process u/s 143(1) of the Act in this case, however, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case as claimed by the Assessee and not refuted by the Ld. DR that the Assessee has been duly recognized as Provident Fund Institution under Rule 3(1) of Part 'A' of the 4th schedule of the Act, by the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax- VIII, New Delhi vide its order no. 3 of 1985 dated 24.07.1985 and in consequence thereof in the previous and subsequent years treated as exempted u/s 10(25)(ii) of the Act and no such addition has ever been made by the Department and the Id. Commissioner has co-terminus powers with that of the Income Tax Officer and is fully empowered to permit the Assessee to entertain the fresh claim of deduction and to examine the validity of assessment and to modify the assessment order, and therefore, for the ends of substantial justice and just decision of the case, we deem it appropriate to set aside the impugned order and to remand the case to the file of Id. CIT(A) for examining the case of Assessee afresh, in accordance with law and the dictums laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and Hon'ble High Court in the judgements referred above, suffice to say by giving reasonable ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 4 opportunity of being heard to the Assessee. The Assessee shall also be at liberty to place the relevant documents and raise the appropriate issues/claims before the Ld. Commissioner in accordance with law.” [Emphasis is supplied by us.] 4.2 In pursuance of the above-mentioned order of the Tribunal, the Ld. CIT(A), vide orders dated 07.05.2024 in remanded proceedings, again dismissed appeals on reasoning that there was neither a prima facie mistake apparent from the record as there was no claim of exemption under section 10(25)(ii) of the Act in ITRs nor the assessee was a registered Trust or Institution under section 12A of the Act. 5. At the outset, the Ld. Authorized Representative (AR) prayed for condonation of delay of 68 days in filing both appeals. The applications for condonation of the delay annexed with the appeal memos stated the reason for delay as the appellant assessee was firstly advised to file rectification applications against impugned orders before the Ld. CIT(A). However, the advice for filing of appeals came later. Per contra, the Ld. Senior Departmental Representative (DR) submitted that the condonation application for delay of 68 days in filing the present appeals did not reflect cogent justification for the delay on the part of the appellant assessee. He accordingly opposed condoning the delay in filing the present appeals. 5.1 The Ld. AR contended that Columns 13 to 16 of Part B – TI Statement of Income for The Period Ended On 31st March 2014 of the ITR 7 provides ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 5 claim of exemption under section 10 of the Act. Column 13 of Part B – TI Statement of Income for The Period Ended On 31st March 2014 of the ITR 7 provides overall claim of exemption under section 10 of the Act and its break up in Columns 14 to 16 of Part B – TI Statement of Income for The Period Ended On 31st March 2014 of the ITR 7. It was categorically submitted that the scanned copy of the ITR in impugned orders clearly demonstrated that the assessee had claimed overall exemption under section 10 of the Act in both years in Column 13 of Part B – TI Statement of Income for The Period Ended On 31st March 2014 of the ITR 7. However, the break-up of the same in both ITRs was wrongly shown in Column 14 instead of Column 16 of Part B – TI Statement of Income for The Period Ended On 31st March 2014 of the ITR 7. Thus, it was contended that there was a claim of exemption under section 10 of the Act. Only the breakup of exemption under section 10 of the Act was not properly mentioned in the respective column of ITRs. Our attention was also drawn to the fact that the exemption under section 10(25)(ii) of the Act had been allowed in all preceding and subsequent years as the assessee was having a recognition as a PF Trust in accordance with the Rule 3 of part A of the Fourth Schedule of the Act since 30.08.1984. It was submitted that the case of the appellant assessee was squarely covered by the decision of the Tribunal following as under: a) Delhi Policy Group (reg.) [2023] 157 taxmann.com 192 (Delhi-Trib) b) Rajasthan Fasteners (P.) Ltd. [2014] 43 taxmann.com 175 (Rajasthan) c) Sanchit Software & Solutions (P) Ltd. [2012] 25 taxmann.com 123 (Bom) ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 6 d) Satish S. Prabhu [2020] 114 taxmann.com 88 (Mumbai-Trib.) 6. The Ld. DR defended impugned orders and prayed for dismissal of both appeals. 7. We have heard both parties and perused the material available on records. There is no dispute and is an admitted fact that there has been a delay in filing the present appeals by 68 days. There is also no dispute that under section 253(5) of the Act, the Tribunal may admit an appeal filed beyond the period of limitation where it is satisfied that there exists a sufficient cause on the part of the appellant for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed time. We are of the considered view that there was no malafide or deliberate delay in filing both appeals in hand and in the interest of substantial justice, the delay in filing these appeals deserve condonation to be decided on merit. We do not see any prejudice which will be caused to the Revenue in deciding these appeals on merit. In case of HL Malhotra & Company Pvt. Ltd. Vs DCIT, Circle12, New Delhi (ITA No. 211/2020 & CM Appeals 32045-32047/2020 dated 22nd December, 2020), the Hon’ble Delhi High Court had held that in absence of anything male fide or deliberate delay as a dilatory tactic, the Court should normally condone the delay as the intent is always to promote substantial justice following the Hon’ble Supreme Court decisions in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs Mst. Katiji and others (1987) 2 SCC 107 and N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy 1998 (7) SCC 123. ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 7 8. The explanation of the appellant assessee therefore becomes relevant to determine whether the same reflects sufficient and reasonable cause on its part in not presenting these appeals within the prescribed time. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition vs MST Katiji (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the expression ‘Sufficient Cause’ employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner to sub-serves the ends of justice that being the life- purpose of the existence of the institution of Courts. It was further held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that such liberal approach is adopted on one of the principles that refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. Another principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. It was also held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of male fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. In the instant cases, applying the same principles, we find that there is no culpable negligence or malafide on the part of the assessee in delayed filing of these ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 8 appeals as the assessee does not stand to benefit by resorting to such delay. Therefore, in the factual matrix of the present cases, we find that there exists sufficient and reasonable cause for condoning the delay in filing these appeals as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, where substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserved to be preferred. 9. In light of aforesaid discussions, in exercise of powers under section 253(5) of the Act, we hereby condone the delay in filing both appeals as we are satisfied that there is sufficient cause for not presenting these appeals within the prescribed time and therefore, these appeals are hereby admitted for adjudication on merits. 10. We have perused various columns of ITR-7 of the relevant year and have found that the assessee has made overall claim of exemption under section 10 of the Act in ITRs of both years in Column 13 of Part B – TI Statement of Income for The Period Ended On 31st March 2014 of the ITR 7. However, the break-up of the same in both ITRs was wrongly shown in Column 14 instead of Column 16 of Part B – TI Statement of Income for The Period Ended On 31st March 2014 of the ITR 7. It is also an undisputed fact that the Revenue has allowed similar claim of exemption under section 10 of the Act in all preceding and subsequent years as the assessee was recognized as a PF Trust in accordance with the Rule 3 of part A of the Fourth Schedule of the Act since 30.08.1984. A simple prima-facie mistake ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 9 in filing a particular column of ITR should not go against the intent of the Act. The assessee filed petitions, under section 119(2) of the Act, before the Ld. PCIT to allow the assessee to revise ITRs. However, the same vide orders dated 23.07.2024 [DIN: ITBA/COM/F/17/2024-25/1066910706(1) and ITBA/COM/F/17/2024-25/1066910326(1)] were rejected on the reasoning that the CBDT vide Circular No. 09/2015 prohibits condonation of delay in filing ITR in refunds cases after 6 years. Here, the records show that the subordinate authorities of the PCIT have recommended for condonation of delay for filing revised ITRs with rider that the assessee’s refund claim cannot be entertained after 6 years. In such a situation where the Revenue is not considering overall facts of the case and decide the matter on merit, the only recourse available to the assessee is to file appeal before the Tribunal. 11. We further see that the Ld. CIT(A), in remanded proceedings, has not considered the case laws specifically mentioned in the Tribunal order dated 26.08.2022 in ITA No. 703 and 704/Del/2020 as there is no mention of the case laws in operative part of impugned orders. The relevant part of the Tribunal order dated 26.08.2022 is as under: “….the Id. Commissioner has co-terminus powers with that of the Income Tax Officer and is fully empowered to permit the Assessee to entertain the fresh claim of deduction and to examine the validity of assessment and to modify the assessment order, and therefore, for the ends of substantial justice and just decision of the case, we deem it appropriate to set aside the impugned order and to remand the case to the file of Id. CIT(A) for examining the case of Assessee afresh, in accordance with law and the dictums laid down by the Hon'ble Apex ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 10 Court and Hon'ble High Court in the judgements referred above, suffice to say by giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the Assessee. The Assessee shall also be at liberty to place the relevant documents and raise the appropriate issues/claims before the Ld. Commissioner in accordance with law.” 11.1 The Tribunal vide its order dated 26.08.2022, directed the Ld. CIT(A) for examining the case of assessee afresh, in accordance with law and the dictums laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and Hon'ble High Court in the judgements referred above, suffice to say by giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the Assessee. The assessee shall also be at liberty to place the relevant documents and raise the appropriate issues/claims before the Ld. Commissioner in accordance with law, and in such an event it is a duty of the ld. CIT(A) to consider the issue afresh as the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Goetze (India) Ltd. (2006) 284 ITR 323 would not debar the CIT(A) to consider the fresh claim, if any, so as to arrive at the correct taxable income. 12. Circular no. 14 - XZ (35) dated 11/04/1955 issued by the CBDT laid down that the Officers and Department must not take advantage of ignorance of an assessee as to his rights. It is one of their duties to assist a taxpayer which in the long run benefit the Department that would inspire confidence in the minds of public. Here, the Revenue has raised demand only due to a wrong data entry in Column 14 instead of Column 16 of Part B – TI Statement of Income for The Period Ended On 31st March 2014 of the ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 11 ITR 7, which is contrary to the intent of the CBDT Circular no. 14 - XZ (35) dated 11/04/1955. 13. In the case of Goetze (India) Ltd. (2006) 284 ITR 323, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the power of the Tribunal under section 254 of the Act is to entertain for the first time a point of law provided the fact on the basis of which the issue of law can be raised before the Tribunal. The decision does not in any way relate to the power of the AO to entertain a claim for deduction otherwise than by filing a revised ITR. In the case of Indian Express (Madurai) (P.) Ltd. (1983) 140 ITR 705, the Hon’ble Madras High Court observed that unlike a suit in civil appeals, in tax litigation, it cannot be treated as a litigation between two rival parties but the job of the AO is to arrive at the correct taxable income. Therefore, merely on account of fact that the assessee has not claimed exemption, the same could not have been denied. The relevant part of the decision in the case of Indian Express (Madurai) (P.) Ltd. (supra) is as under: 27. Quite apart from precedents, it seems to us quite in the fitness of things to invest the Tribunal with the plenary jurisdiction in matters of assessment. As we earlier observed, the Tribunal was created in 1941 as an independent, non-departmental body, in whose hands the Legislature intended to entrust the task of reviewing assessments made under the Act. Under the scheme of the Act, which gives only the High Courts and the Supreme Court the power of interference on questions of law, the Tribunal is constituted the final authority on facts and the penultimate authority on law touching the assessment and other proceedings under the I.T. Act. The primary purpose of the stature is to levy and collect the income- ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 12 tax. This is based on the cardinal principle, which has been incorporated as a veritable constitutional provision, that no tax can be levied or collected save under authority of law. The task of an appellate authority under the taxing statute, especially a non- departmental authority like the Tribunal, is to address its mind to the factual and legal basis of an assessment for the purpose of properly adjusting the taxpayer's liability to make it accord with the legal provisions governing his assessment. Since the be-all and end-all of the statutory provisions, especially those relating to the administration and management of income-tax, is to ascertain the tax-payers' liability correctly, to the last pie, if it were possible, the various provisions relating to appeal, second appeal, reference and the like can hardly be equated to a lis or dispute as arises between the two parties in a civil litigation. Although the income-tax statute makes the Department or its officers figure as parties in appeal proceedings, they are not in the strict sense what are called by American writers as parties to adversary proceedings. This is so, because the very object of the appeal is not to decide a point raised as a dispute, but any point which goes into the adjustment of the taxpayer's liability. In that sense, a view prevails, even in England, that the authorities sitting in appeal in a tax case, cannot be regarded as deciding a lis, but they are only engaged in an administrative act of adjusting the taxpayer's liability. Under our fiscal jurisprudence, we may regard the appellate authorities as exercising quasi-judicial functions in the same sense as a taxing officer does. But, even so, the proceedings before them lack the basis elements of adversary proceeding. It, therefore, follows that the discussion and the scope of the appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal and other authorities under the tax code cannot be pursued by drawing a parallel to civil litigation with particular reference to appeals from decrees, and the like. The insistence on one party to the appeal being entitled to the fruits of finality, as it is called, and the appellate authority being confined to the subject-matter of the appeal are all ideas which might have relevance if the discussion centers on purely civil litigation and such like adversary proceedings as in an industrial dispute. But in a case where the Revenue is all the while a party, in a manner of speaking, and is also at the same time, an authority vested with the responsibilities of drawing up the assessment and laying down the correct liability, it would not be in ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 13 accord with the scheme of the Act to impose restrictions on the ambit and the power of the Tribunal by such like notions as finality, subject-matter of the appeal, and the like. The statutory provision in s. 33(4) of the 1922 Act and s. 254 of the 1961 Act which confers appellate jurisdiction on the Tribunal clearly lays down that the Tribunal, in disposing of an appeal, may pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit. Excepting that the expression \"subject-matter\" has taken the fancy of many learned and eminent judges, that is an expression which is not employed by the provision conferring the jurisdiction in the Tribunal. Indeed, in the Mahalakshmi Textile Mills' case in one of the passages to which we have made reference, the Supreme Court has understood the Tribunal's appellate jurisdiction as a jurisdiction to pass \"such orders on the appeal as it thinks fit\", without adding any gloss of their own to the expression. In the Nelliappan's case as well as the Mahalakshmi Textile Mills' case, the Supreme Court had even used phrases which are reminiscent of the language which English judge's have used while describing a tax appeal. The Supreme Court observed that the Tribunal is not precluded from \"adjusting\" the tax liabilities of the assessee in the light of its findings merely because the findings are inconsistent with the case pleaded by the assessee. English judges have regarded a tax appeal, not as a lis, but as a process of further adjustment of taxpayer liability - vide Lord Hewart in Rex. v. Special Commissioners of Income Tax [1935] 20 TC 381 (CA); Greer L. J. in IRC v.Sneath [1932] 17 TC 149 (CA); Romer L. J. in the same case, IRC v. Sneath, and Lord Wright M. R. in Rex v. Special Commissioners of Income Tax. 28. In Rex. v. Special Commissioners of Income Tax, Lord Hewart C. J. laid down the nature of an appeal in tax matters as under (p. 382): \"In my opinion, the argument of the learned Attorney-General is absolutely correct, and the argument upon the other side is manifestly based, as he said, upon a misapprehension that an appeal under the Income Tax Act, 1918, is the same in substance as an appeal where two private persons are engaged in litigation. It is, of courts, totally different.\" ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 14 29. In IRC v.Sneath [1932] 17 TC 149, Greer L. J. gave a similar description of the true position of a tax appeal in the following words (P. 164): \"I think, the estimating authorities, even when an appeal is made to them, are not acting as judges deciding litigation between the subject and the Crown. They are merely in the position of valuers whose proceedings are regulated by statute to enable them to make an estimate of the income of the taxpayer for the particulate year in question.\" 30. Romer L. J., in the same case, held as under (p. 168): \"The appeal is merely another step taken by the Commissioners, at the instance of the taxpayers, in the course of the discharge by them of their administrative duty of collecting the sur-tax.\" 31. Rex. v. Special Commissioners of Income Tax [1935] 20 TC 381, went to the Court of Appeal and there Lord Wright M.R. reiterated the position in the following passage in his judgment (p. 387): \"I may note here at once that in making the assessment and in dealing with the appeals the Commissioners are exercising their statutory authority and their statutory duty which they are bound to carry out, not as judges deciding an issue between two particular parties: their obligation is wider than that. It is to exercise their judgment on such material as comes before them, and, as we shall see later, to obtain any material which they think is necessary and which they think they ought to have, and on that to make. They are not deciding the case inter prates; they are assessing or estimating the amount which in the interests of the country at large the taxpayer ought to have to deal with as the basis on which he is to be taxed.\" 32. In a recent Full Bench decision of this court dated November 2, 1982, in T.C.(R) Nos. 78 of 1980 (State of Tamil Nadu v. Arulmurugan & Co. [1982] 51 STC 381), it was held that the appellate authorities perform precisely the same functions as the assessing authority. The Full Bench expressed the view that a tax appeal is a rehearing of the entire assessment and it cannot be equated to adversary proceedings in appeal in civil cases. The following passage (at page ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 15 392), from the judgment of the Full Bench would be relevant to the discussion in the present case. \"An appellate authority under the taxing enactments sits in appeal, only in a manner of speaking. What it does, functioning, is only to adjust the assessment of the appellant in accordance with the facts on the record and in accordance with the law laid down by the legislature. An appeal is a continuation of the process of assessment, and an assessment is but another name for adjustment of the tax liability to accord with the taxable event in the particular taxpayer-s case. There can be no analogy or parallel between a tax appeal and an appeal, say, in civil cases. A civil appeal, like a law suit in the court of first instance out of which it arises, is really and truly an adversary proceeding, that is to say, a controversy or tussle over mutual rights and obligations between contesting litigants ranged against each other as opponents. A tax appeal is quite different. Even as the assessing authority is not the taxpayer's \"opponent\", in the strictly procedural sense of the term, so too the appellate authority sitting in appeal over the assessing authority's order of assessment is not strictly an arbitral tribunal deciding a contested issue between two litigants ranged on opposite sides. In a tax appeal, the appellate authority is very much committed to the assessment, either by pursuing further investigation or causing further investigation to be done. It can do sos on its own initiative, without being prodded by any of the parties. It can enhance the assessment, taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the taxpayer's appeal, even though the appeal itself has been mooted only with a view to a reduction in the assessment. These are special and exceptional attributes of the jurisdiction of a tax appellate authority. These attributes underline the truth that the appellate authority is no different, functionally and substantially, from the assessing authority itself.\" 33. It seems to us, therefore, that both on principle and on precedent, there is no reason why the Appellate Tribunal must be precluded from handling a point which appertains to the assessee's assessment merely because nobody else had handled it before or because to had not occurred either to the assessee or to the ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 16 Department to raise and urge that point at earlier stages of the proceedings. 34. For all the above reasons, we hold that the Tribunal in this case was justified in entertaining the additional ground raised by the assessee relating to a claim which was not raised either before the ITO or before the AAC. Our answer to the question referred to us, is, therefore, in the affirmative and against the Department. The assessee is entitled to its const. Counsel's fee Rs. 500.” 14. In the case of Jai Parabolic Springs Ltd. (2008) 306 ITR 42, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has held that the Tribunal has power to allow deduction to assessee to which he was otherwise entitled even though no such claim was made in the ITR. In the case of J. H. Gotla (1985) 156 ITR 323, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if strict literal construction leads to an absurd result, which is not subserved by the object of the legislation and if another construction is possible apart from strict literal construction is to be preferred to the strict literal construction. 15. Respectfully, following the ratio decidendi laid down in the above- mentioned cases (para 13 and 14 of this order), we are of the considered view that the assessee’s claim, which is undisputedly admissible, cannot be denied only on the reasoning that one of the columns of the ITR was wrongly filled up. 16. We find that this case is squarely covered by the decision of the Co- ordinate Bench of Tribunal in the case of Delhi Policy Group (reg.) [2023] 157 taxmann.com 192 (Delhi-Trib). In the case of Delhi Policy Group (reg.), ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 17 the fact is that the said assessee, a charitable trust registered under section 12A since 30-12-1993, failed to claim exemption under section 11 of the Act by mentioning its registration under section 12A/12AA of the Act in its ITR. That Assessing Officer rejected claim of the assessee under section 12A/12AA of the Act on the reasoning that the assessee inadvertently omitted to mention its registration under section 12A/12AA of the Act in its ITR. Later, the assessee filed rectification application under section 154 of the Act which that Assessing Officer rejected stating that benefit of exemption under section 12A/12AA of the Act could not be allowed as there was no claim for same in ITR which could have been rectified by filing revised ITR, which was not done. The Ld. CIT(A) affirmed the order of that Assessing Officer. On appeal the Tribunal allowed the appeal holding that since the assessee did not seek registration or any fresh claim of benefit of exemption under section 12A/12AA of the Act in its rectification application under section 154 of the Act instead it made a mere request to rectify inadvertent mistake which had crept in ITR filed by it online, Assessing Officer was not right in denying benefit of registration under section 12A of the Act. 17 We respectfully following the ratio decidendi of above-mentioned case laws and the reasoning of decision of the Co-ordinate Bench of Tribunal in the case of Delhi Policy Group (reg.) [supra], allow the claim of exemption ITA No. 4204 & 4203/Del/2024 ICID Employees Provident Fund 18 under section 10(25)(ii) of the Act in both years. The respective grounds thus, stand allowed accordingly. The assessee gets consequential relief. 18. In the result, both appeals of the assessee are allowed as above. Order pronounced in open Court on 20th June, 2025. Sd/- Sd/- (ANUBHAV SHARMA) (AVDHESH KUMAR MISHRA) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Dated:20/06/2025 Binita, Sr. PS Copy forwarded to: 1. Appellant 2. Respondent 3. PCIT/CIT 4. CIT(Appeals) 5. Sr. DR: ITAT ASSISTANT REGISTRAR ITAT, NEW DELHI "