IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL HYDERABAD BENCH A, HYDERABAD BEFORE SHRI P.M. JAGTAP, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND SHRI SAKTIJIT DEY, JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA NO. 1850/HYD/2011 ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2003-04 ASST. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME- TAX, CIRCLE 1(1), TIRUPATHI VS. M/S SAGAR SUGARS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS PVT. LTD., NELVOY (V), S.R. PURAM (M), CHITTOR DIST. PAN AAECS 1680D (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) REVENUE BY : SHRI S.K. GUPTA ASSESSEE BY : SHRI VIKRAM VIJAYARAGHAVAN DATE OF HEARING : 31-08-2015 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 04-09-2015 O R D E R PER P.M. JAGTAP, A.M.: THIS APPEAL IS PREFERRED BY REVENUE DIRECTED AGAIN ST THE ORDER OF LD. CIT(A), GUNTUR, DATED 29/06/2011 FOR THE AY 2003-04, WHEREBY HE DELETED THE ADDITION MADE BY THE AO RESTRICTING THE CLAIM OF ASSESSEE FOR DEPRECIATION AT 80% ON ENERGY SAVING D EVICES TO 8.24%. 2. ASSESSEE, IN THE PRESENT CASE, IS A COMPANY ENGA GED IN THE BUSINESS OF GENERATION OF POWER. THE RETURN OF INCO ME FOR THE YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION WAS ORIGINALLY FILED BY IT ON 2 7/11/2003 DECLARING LOSS OF RS. 17,67,12,569 AND BOOK PROFIT OF RS. 1,9 0,89,412 U/S 115JB OF THE ACT. THE INCOME/LOSS, AS RETURNED BY ASSESS EE, WAS ACCEPTED BY THE AO. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE SAID ASSESSMENT WAS RE OPENED BY THE AO ON THE GROUND THAT THE CLAIM OF ASSESSEE FOR DEP RECIATION AT HIGHER RATE OF 80% ON ENERGY SAVING DEVICES WAS WRO NGLY ALLOWED. 2 ITA NO. 1850 /HYD/2011 SAGAR SUGARS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS PVT. LTD. ACCORDINGLY, HE ISSUED A NOTICE U/S 148 OF THE ACT ON 25/03/2010, IN RESPONSE TO WHICH, A LETTER WAS FILED BY ASSESSEE S TATING THEREIN THAT THE RETURN ORIGINALLY FILED MAY BE TREATED AS RETUR N FILED IN RESPONSE TO THE NOTICE U/S 148. IN THE ASSESSMENT COMPLETED U/S 143(3) READ WITH SECTION 147 VIDE ORDER DATED 31/12/2010, THE AO CON CLUDED THAT ASSESSEE COULD NOT CLAIM DEPRECIATION AT 80% ON THE ENERGY SAVING DEVICES AS PER THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 5(1) AS IT HA D NOT EXERCISED OPTION UNDER THE SECOND PROVISO TO RULE 5(1A). ACCO RDINGLY, HE RESTRICTED THE CLAIM OF ASSESSEE FOR DEPRECIATION O N ENERGY SAVING DEVICES AT 8.24% (RS. 2,20,60,521) AS AGAINST 80% ( 20,53,82,364) CLAIMED BY ASSESSEE. 3. ON APPEAL, LD. CIT(A) REVERSED THE ORDER OF THE AO ON THIS ISSUE AND ALLOWED THE CLAIM OF ASSESSEE FOR DEPRECIATION @ 80% ON ENERGY SAVING DEVICES FOLLOWING, INTER-ALIA, THE DECISION OF CHENNAI BENCH OF ITAT IN CASE OF KKSK LEATHER PROCESSORS (P) LTD. VS . ITO, 130 TTJ 184. AGGRIEVED BY THE ORDER OF LD. CIT(A), THE REVE NUE HAS PREFERRED THE APPEAL BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL. 4. WE HAVE HEARD THE ARGUMENTS OF BOTH THE SIDES AN D ALSO PERUSED THE RELEVANT MATERIAL ON RECORD. AS AGREED BY BOTH THE REPRESENTATIVES, THE ISSUE INVOLVED IN THE APPEAL O F REVENUE IS SQUARELY COVERED IN FAVOUR OF ASSESSEE BY THE DECIS ION OF THE COORDINATE BENCH OF THIS TRIBUNAL IN ASSESSEES OWN CASE FOR AY 2004-05 AND 2009-10 VIDE ORDER DATED 12/11/2014 IN ITA NOS. 1087 & 1088/HYD/2012. A COPY OF THE SAID ORDER IS PLACED O N RECORD BEFORE US AND PERUSAL OF THE SAME SHOWS THAT SIMILAR ISSU E, AS INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT CASE, HAS BEEN DECIDED BY THE TRIBUNAL IN FAVOUR OF ASSESSEE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS GIVEN IN PARAGRA PH 8 TO 11 OF ITS ORDER: 8. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIE S AND PERUSED THE ORDERS OF REVENUE AUTHORITIES AS WELL AS OTHE R MATERIALS ON RECORD. WE HAVE ALSO APPLIED OUR MIND TO THE DECISIONS RE LIED UPON BY THE PARTIES. SO FAR AS THE FACTUAL ASPECT IS CONCERN ED, THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT IN THE RETURN OF INCOME FILED FOR THE IMPUGNE D ASSESSMENT YEAR, 3 ITA NO. 1850 /HYD/2011 SAGAR SUGARS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS PVT. LTD. ASSESSEE HAS CLAIMED DEPRECIATION AS PER RULE 5(1) AND APPENDIX 1, WHICH IS NOT ONLY REFLECTED IN THE ACCOUNTS BUT AL SO IN THE RETURN FILED BY ASSESSEE U/S 139(1) OF THE ACT. THEREFORE, THE ONL Y ISSUE WHICH ARISES FOR CONSIDERATION IS WHETHER THE DEPRECIATION CLAIMED UNDER RULE 5 AND APPENDIX 1 IN THE RETURN OF INCOME FILED CAN BE SAID TO BE IN COMPLIANCE TO THE SECOND PROVISO TO RULE 5(1A). WH ILE, AO HAS DISALLOWED ASSESSEES CLAIM BY OBSERVING THAT ASSE SSEE HAS NOT EXERCISED ANY OPTION, ASSESSEE ON THE OTHER HAND H AS STRONGLY REFUTED SUCH ALLEGATION OF AO BY STATING THAT THE CLAIM M ADE IN THE ACCOUNTS AS WELL AS IN THE RETURN OF INCOME FILED BY ASSESS EE WILL ITSELF AMOUNT TO EXERCISING OPTION IN TERMS OF SECOND PROVISO TO R ULE 5(1A) AS THERE IS NO PRESCRIBED MODE OR METHOD AVAILABLE UNDER TH E STATUTE FOR EXERCISING SUCH OPTION. 9. BEFORE DECIDING THIS CORE ISSUE, IT IS NECESSAR Y TO LOOK INTO THE RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION. SECTION 32(1)(I) OF THE ACT PROVIDES FOR ALLOWANCE OF DEPRECIATION ON ASSETS OF AN UNDERT AKING ENGAGED IN GENERATION OR GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF POWE R. RULE 5(1A) PROVIDES FOR ALLOWANCE OF DEPRECIATION ON ASSETS A S SPECIFIED U/S 32(1)(I) AT THE PERCENTAGE SPECIFIED IN APPENDIX 1A. HOWEVER, SECOND PROVISO TO RULE 5(1A) CARVES OUT AN EXCEPT ION BY ALLOWING THE ASSESSEE TO CLAIM DEPRECIATION AS PER APPENDIX 1 AT ITS OWN OPTION, PROVIDED SUCH OPTION IS EXERCISED BEFORE THE DUE D ATE OF FURNISHING THE RETURN OF INCOME U/S 139(1). FURTHER, IT IS PERTIN ENT TO NOTE, THOUGH THE SECOND PROVISO TO RULE 5(1A) SPEAKS OF EXERCISE OF OPTION BY THE ASSESSEE BUT IT DOES NOT PRESCRIBE ANY MODE AND M ANNER FOR EXERCISING SUCH OPTION. NEITHER LEARNED DR COULD POINT OUT NOR WE ARE ABLE TO LOCATE ANY OTHER PROVISION EITHER IN THE A CT OR IN RULES LAYING DOWN THE MODE AND MANNER OF EXERCISING OPTION IN T ERMS OF SECOND PROVISO TO RULE 5(1A). THEREFORE, IN THE ABSENCE O F ANY MODE OR MANNER FOR EXERCISING OPTION, THE ONLY WAY AVAILABLE TO ASSESSEE TO EXERCISE OPTION IS TO COMPUTE DEPRECIATION IN ACC ORDANCE WITH APPENDIX 1 IN THE ACCOUNTS AND CLAIM IT IN THE R ETURN OF INCOME FILED U/S 139(1). . IT IS NOT IN DISPUTE THAT ASSE SSEE, IN FACT, HAS EXERCISED OPTION IN CLAIMING DEPRECIATION AS PER APPENDIX 1 NOT ONLY IN AY 2003- 04, BUT, ALSO IN SUBSEQUENT ASSESSMENT YEARS INCL UDING THE IMPUGNED ASSESSMENT YEAR. THIRD PROVISO TO RULE 5 (1A) ALSO MAKES IT CLEAR THAT ONCE ASSESSEE EXERCISES ITS OPTION I N TERMS OF SECOND PROVISO TO RULE 5(1A) THE SAME WILL APPLY EVEN TO THE SUBSEQUENT AYS. THE ITAT, CHENNAI BENCH IN CASE OF KKSK LEATHER P ROCESSORS (P) LTD. VS. ITO (SUPRA), WHILE CONSIDERING IDENTICAL NATURE OF DISPUTE RELATING TO EXERCISE OF OPTION UNDER SECOND PROVI SO TO RULE 5(1A), HELD AS UNDER: FROM THE PROVISIONS OF SUB-S. (1) OF S. 32 ALONG W ITH THE EXPLN. 5, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AO IS DUTY-BOUND AND UNDER OBLIGA TION TO ALLOW THE DEDUCTION OF DEPRECIATION AS PER THE PROVISIONS OF SUB-S. (1) OF S. 32. SINCE TWO RATES OF DEPRECIATION ARE PRESCRIBED A S PER APPENDIX 1 AS WELL AS APPENDIX 1A TO R. 5 OF IT RULES IN RESP ECT OF ASSETS OF THE 4 ITA NO. 1850 /HYD/2011 SAGAR SUGARS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS PVT. LTD. UNDERTAKING ENGAGED FOR GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTIO N OF POWER, THUS TO MAKE IT CLEAR AND TO FACILITATE THE AO HAS TO SEE WHICH OF THE RATES PROVIDED UNDER TWO DIFFERENT APPENDICES OF DEPREC IATION SHALL BE ALLOWED, SECOND PROVISO TO R. 5(1A) REQUIRES THE ASSESSEE TO EXERCISE ITS OPTION THAT DEPRECIATION BE ALLOWED A S PER APPENDIX 1. THOUGH THE PROVISO STIPULATES THAT IF SUCH OPTION IS EXERCISED BEFORE THE DUE DATE OF FURNISHING THE RETURN OF INCOME UNDER SUB-S. (1) OF S. 139 OF THE IT ACT, IN OUR VIEW THE SECOND PROVISO TO R. 5(1A) IS ONLY TO FACILITATE THE AO IN DISCHARGING OF ITS OBLIGATION AS PER EX PLN. 5 TO SUB-S. (1) OF S. 32 OF IT ACT SO THAT THE DEPRECIATION SHALL BE ALLOWED AS PER THE OPTION OF THE ASSESSEE AND NOT ON THE DISCRETION O F THE AO. THE AO IS OTHERWISE UNDER OBLIGATION TO ALLOW THE DEPRECIATI ON BUT BECAUSE THE DEPRECIATION SPECIFIED UNDER TWO DIFFERENT APPEND ICES 1 AND 1A AND THE CHOICE IS GIVEN TO THE ASSESSEE IN RESPECT OF THE ASSETS SPECIFIED UNDER CL. (I) OF SUB-S. (1) OF S. 139 [SIC-S. 32] OF THE ACT, THEREFORE THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE RULES CANNOT OVERRIDE THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE STATUTE AND THE REQUIREMENT OF OP TION UNDER PROVISO TO R. 5(1A) CANNOT BE HELD IN THE NATURE THAT ON FAILUR E OF THE SAME WOULD BE SO FATAL THAT THE VERY OBJECT OF THE PRO VISION FOR PROVIDING HIGHER RATE OF DEPRECIATION IS DEFEATED. WHEN THER E IS NO SPECIFIC FORM OR METHOD PRESCRIBED FOR EXERCISING THE SAID OPTION THEN THE CLAIM MADE IN THE RETURN OF INCOME AS WELL AS REFLECTED FROM THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNT AND AUDIT REPORT FILED ALONG WITH RETURN OF INCOME IS MORE THAN THE EXERCISE OF THE OPTION AS REQUIRED UNDER SECO ND PROVISO TO R. 5(1A). IN OUR VIEW, THE REQUIREMENT OF SECOND PROVISO TO R. 5(1A) IS SATISFIED IF THE OPTION IS EXERCISED BEFORE THE EXPIRY OF DUE DATE OF FILING OF RETURN OF INCOME UNDER S. 139(1) OF THE IT ACT. THE MEANING OF THE TERM BEFORE DUE DATE SHALL BE UNDERSTOOD AS IT IS UNDERSTOOD BY A MAN OF ORDINARY PRUDENCE. BEFORE DUE DATE SIMPLY REFERS A ND MEANS THAT NOT AFTER THE EXPIRY OF DUE DATE. IF THE REQUISITE ACT IS DONE BEFORE THE LAST DAY EXPIRES THEN IT WILL SIMPLY BE SAID THAT BEFO RE DUE DATE. WHEN THE TIME OF FILING THE RETURN IS AVAILABLE TO THE ASS ESSEE TILL THE LAST MOMENT OF THE DUE DATE THEN THE WHOLE OF THAT DAY IS AVAILABLE TO THE ASSESSEE AND DUE DATE EXPIRES ONLY WHEN THE LAST D AY IS EXPIRED. AS SUCH THE OPTION EXERCISED ON THE DUE DATE IS NOTHI NG BUT BEFORE THE DUE DATE AS THE SAME IS NOT AFTER THE DUE DATE. IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. VIJAYA HIRASA KALAMKAR (HUF) (SUPRA), THE HON'BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT HAS HELD AT PP. 774 AND 775 AS UNDER : 'HAVING REGARD TO THE OBJECT OF THE ORDINANCE AND THE WORDS USED IN S. 3(1), IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE DECLARATION RECEIVE D ON 1ST JAN., 1976, WAS WELL WITHIN TIME. IN THE WHOLE CONTEXT, THE W ORD 'BEFORE' WILL HAVE TO BE CONSTRUED AS 'UPTO' OR AS 'NOT AFTER'. THERE ARE VARIOUS PROVISIONS IN THE IT ACT, WHEREIN THE EXPRESSION ' BEFORE' HAS BEEN USED [SS. 139(1)(A)(I), S. 139(1)(B); S. 184, S. 212]. THE EXPRESSION HAS ALWAYS BEEN TAKEN TO MEAN 'UPTO'. SEC. 3 SPECIFIE D THE PERIOD BEFORE WHICH A DECLARATION IN RESPECT OF INCOME HA S TO BE MADE FOR THE 5 ITA NO. 1850 /HYD/2011 SAGAR SUGARS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS PVT. LTD. PURPOSES OF GETTING A BENEFIT UNDER THE ORDINANCE. IT PROVIDES A PERIOD OF LIMITATION WITHIN WHICH CERTAIN BENEFITS ARE AVAILABLE. IN CASE OF AMBIGUITY THE CONSTRUCTION WHICH PRESERVES THE RI GHT TO THE ONE WHICH DEFEATS IT, HAS TO BE PREFERRED. AFTER ALL, THIS IS A TAXING STATUTE WHICH IN CASE OF DOUBT SHOULD BE INTERPRETED IN F AVOUR OF A TAXPAYER. HAD THE LEGISLATIVE INTENTION BEEN TO MAKE 31ST DE C., 1975, THE LAST DAY FOR MAKING THE DECLARATION, IT COULD HAVE CLEA RLY SAID SO IN THE PROVISO. THE VERY FACT THAT THE DATE 1ST JAN., 19 76, IS IN TERMS MENTIONED INDICATES THAT THE TIME- LIMIT WAS UP TO THAT DATE . THAT IN A GIVEN CASE THE WORD 'BEFORE' IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TIME CAN BE CONSTRUED AS 'NOT AFTER' IS WELL-SETTLED. [R VS. ARKWRIGHT, (1848) 1 2 QB 960]. THIS COURT IN THE CASE OF PREMCHAND NATHMAL KOTHARI VS. KISAN LAL BACHHARAJ VYAS AIR 1976 BOM 82, HAD READ THE WORD 'BEFORE' IN S. 3 OF THE MAHARASHTRA (VIDARBHA REGION) AGRICULTURAL DEBTOR S' RELIEF ACT, 1969, AS 'UPTO'.' FROM THE ABOVE-MENTIONED DECISIONS, IT IS CLEAR TH AT THE WORD 'BEFORE' WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSTRUED AS UPTO OR NOT AFTER. THE HON'BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT HAS SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO PROVISION S OF S. 139 OF THE ACT WHILE EXPLAINING THE EXPRESSION OF THE WORD 'BEFOR E'. THEREFORE WE HOLD THAT THE OPTION EXERCISED BY THE ASSESSEES ON DUE DATE BY WAY OF MAKING CLAIMS OF DEPRECIATION IN THE RETURN OF INC OME ALONG WITH AUDIT REPORT AND BOOKS OF ACCOUNT WHEREIN THE ASSESSEES HAVE ADOPTED THE RATE AS CLAIMED IS WITHIN TIME-LIMIT PRESCRIBED U NDER SECOND PROVISO TO R. 5(1A) OF IT RULES. EVEN OTHERWISE AS HELD BY T HE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. SHIVANAND ELECTRONICS (SUPR A) THE PROVISION CAN BE UNDERSTOOD WITH REFERENCE TO THE INTENT OF LEGISLATURE AND NOT UPON THE LANGUAGE IN WHICH THE INTENT IS CLOTHED. IF THE OBJECT OF ENACTMENT WILL BE DEFEATED BY HOLDING IT AS DIREC TORY IT SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS MANDATORY. WHEREAS IF BY HOLDING IT MANDATORY, SERIOUS GENERAL INCONVENIENCE WILL BE CREATED TO I NNOCENT PERSONS WITHOUT VERY MUCH FURTHERING THE OBJECT OF THE EN ACTMENT, IT SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS DIRECTORY. THE LIMIT PROVIDED UND ER THE SECOND PROVISO TO R. 5(1A) IS ONLY TO FACILITATE THE AO IN DISCH ARGING ITS OBLIGATIONS AND DUTIES AS PER THE PROVISIONS OF SUB-S. (1) OF S. 3 2 OF THE IT ACT. THEREFORE THE SAID REQUIREMENT CANNOT BE CONSIDERE D AS MANDATORY. MOREOVER THE AO CANNOT ACT ON THE OPTION EXERCISE D BEFORE THE RETURN IS FILED AND THEREFORE NO FRUITFUL PURPOSE OR OBJ ECT CAN BE ACHIEVED BY MANDATING EXERCISE OF OPTION PRIOR TO FILING OF R ETURN ON DUE DATE. 10. WHILE AFFIRMING THE AFORESAID VIEW EXPRESSED B Y ITAT, THE HONBLE MADRAS HIGH COURT, IN JUDGMENT DATED 09/09/14 IN CASE OF CIT VS. M/S KIKANI EXPORTS PVT. LTD. AND OTHERS HELD AS UNDER: 20. A READING OF THE ABOVE SAID DECISION OF THE B OMBAY HIGH COURT MAKES IT CLEAR THAT IF THE ASSESSEE EXERCISED THE OPTION IN TERMS OF SECOND PROVISO TO RULE 5(1A) OF THE INCOME TAX RU LES AT THE TIME OF 6 ITA NO. 1850 /HYD/2011 SAGAR SUGARS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS PVT. LTD. FURNISHING OF RETURN OF INCOME, IT WILL SUFFICE AN D NO SEPARATE LETTER OR REQUEST OR INTIMATION WITH REGARD TO EXERCISE OF O PTION IS REQUIRED. SINCE THE RETURNS ARE FILED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEC TION 139(1) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT AND THE FORM PRESCRIBED THEREIN MA KE A PROVISION FOR EXERCISING AN OPTION IN RESPECT OF THE CLAIM OF DEPRECIATION, NO SEPARATE PROCEDURE IS REQUIRED, AS CONTENDED BY TH E DEPARTMENT. WE ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE REASONING OF THE TRIBUNA L . 11. THE RATIO LAID DOWN BY THE ITAT CHENNAI BENCH, WHICH WAS CONFIRMED BY THE HONBLE MADRAS HIGH COURT SQUARE LY APPLIES TO THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE. AS CAN BE SEEN, THERE IS NO DISPUTE TO THE FACT THAT ASSESSEE IN THE RETURN OF INCOME FILED F OR AY 2003-04 HAS ALREADY EXERCISED ITS OPTION OF AVAILING DEPRECIAT ION AS PER APPENDIX 1. ASSESSEE HAS ADOPTED THE SAME METHOD IN THE RETURN OF INCOME FILED FOR THE IMPUGNED ASSESSMENT YEAR AS WELL AS IN THE RE TURNS FOR THE SUBSEQUENT ASSESSMENT YEARS ALSO. THEREFORE, ASSE SSEE HAVING EXERCISED ITS OPTION IN TERMS OF SECOND PROVISO T O RULE 5(1A), AO IS DUTY BOUND TO ALLOW ASSESSEES CLAIM OF DEPRECIATION. ONE MORE ASPECT WHICH NEEDS TO BE MENTIONED IS AS PER THE FACTS BR OUGHT TO OUR NOTICE, WE FIND THAT ASSESSEES CLAIM OF DEPRECIATION BY ADOPTING WDV METHOD AND RATE PRESCRIBED UNDER APPENDIX 1 HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE DEPARTMENT IN SOME OF THE SUBSEQUE NT ASSESSMENT YEARS ALSO. FOR EXAMPLE, SUCH CLAIM WAS ACCEPTED IN THE ASSESSMENTS COMPLETED U/S 143(3) FOR AYS 2006-07 AND 2008-09. FROM THIS IT IS QUITE EVIDENT THAT DEPARTMENT IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH RE GARD TO ASSESSEES CLAIM OF DEPRECIATION. BE THAT AS IT MAY, AS DEPR ECIATION CLAIMED BY ASSESSEE IS IN TERMS WITH THE STATUTORY PROVISION S, AO WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN INTERFERING WITH THE SAME. THEREFORE, WE DO NOT FIND ANY INFIRMITY IN THE ORDER OF LEARNED CIT(A), WHICH IS ACCORDINGLY UPHE LD. GROUNDS RAISED BY THE DEPARTMENT ARE DISMISSED. AS THE ISSUE INVOLVED IN THE YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATI ON AS WELL AS THE RELEVANT MATERIAL FACTS SIMILAR TO THAT OF AYS 2004 -05 & 2009-10, WE RESPECTFULLY FOLLOW THE DECISION OF THE COORDINATE BENCH OF THIS TRIBUNAL IN THE SAID YEARS AND UPHOLD THE IMPUGNED ORDER OF LD. CIT(A) ALLOWING THE CLAIM OF ASSESSEE FOR HIGHER DEPRECIAT ION AT 80% ON ENERGY SAVING DEVICES. 7 ITA NO. 1850 /HYD/2011 SAGAR SUGARS AND ALLIED PRODUCTS PVT. LTD. 5. IN THE RESULT, DEPARTMENTS APPEAL IS DISMISSED . PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 4 TH SEPTEMBER, 2015. SD/- SD/- (SAKTIJIT DEY) (P .M. JAGTAP) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOU NTANT MEM BER HYDERABAD, DATED: 4 TH SEPTEMBER, 2015 KV COPY TO:- 1) ACIT, CIRCLE 1(1), TIRUPATHI 2) M/S SAGAR SUGARS & ALLIED PRODUCTS P. LTD. NEL AVOY VILLAGE, SRI RANGARAJAPURAM MANDAL, CHITTOR DISTRICT. 3) CIT(A), GUNTUR 4) CIT, TIRUPATHI 5)THE DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTATIVE, I.T.A.T., HYDER ABAD.