Shri Harimohan B. Agrawal, Ahmedabad V. The Income tax Officer,Ward-7(1), Ahmedabad

ITA 2032/AHD/2009

• Counselvise Citation: [2011] 119 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 6421 (ITAT-AHMEDABAD)
• Duration Of Justice: 1 year(s) 11 month(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 25-05-2011
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Dismissed
• Bench Allotted: A
• Next Hearing Date: 25-05-2011
• Assessment Year: 2001-2002
• Appeal Filed On: 25-06-2009
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: JAI RAJ KUMAR
• Keywords: Period of limitation; Reasonable cause; Right to appeal; Time period of passing order; Condonation of delay

Judgement Text

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL: AHMEDABAD A BENCH (BEFORE S/SHRI T.K.SHARMA, JM & A.N.PAHUJA, AM ) ITA NO. 2032/AHD/2009 ASSTT. YEAR:- 2001-02 SHRI HARIMOHAN B AGARWAL NEAR SUNRRISE HOTEL, BAVLA ROAD, SARKHEJ, AHMEDABAD [PAN:ABGPA0603G] VS ITO WARD-7(1),AHMEDABAD (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) ASSESSEE BY : NONE REVENUE BY : SHRI JAI RAJ KUMAR, DR O R D E R A.N. PAHUJA: THIS IS AN APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE ON 25.6.200 9 AGAINST AN ORDER DATED 23.2.2009 OF THE LD. CIT(A)-XI, AHME DABAD, UPHOLDING ADDITION OF RS.7,61,000/- U/S 68 OF THE INCOME-TAX ACT,1961[HE REINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE ACT]. ADMITTEDLY, THE IMPUGNED ORDER WAS SERVED U PON THE ASSESSEE ON 12.3.2009. THEREFORE, APPEAL IS DELAYED BY 45 DAYS. THE ASSESSEE DID NOT FILE ANY APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL .EVEN WHEN THE ASSESSEE WAS SPECIFICALLY POINTED OUT VIDE NOTICE DATED 23.2.2009 SERVED UPON THE ASSESSEE ON 25.2.2009 THAT APPEAL WAS DELAYED B Y 45 DAYS, HE DID NOT RESPOND NOR SUBMITTED ANY REQUEST FOR CONDONATION O F DELAY. NONE APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEE WHEN THE APPEAL WAS CALLED F OR HEARING NOR ANY REQUEST FOR ADJOURNMENT HAS BEEN FILED . 2. SINCE THE APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE IS DELA YED BY 45 DAYS WHILE NO REQUEST HAS BEEN MADE BY THE ASSESSEE FOR CONDONAT ION OF DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL, APPARENTLY, APPEAL CAN NOT BE ADMITTED. TH E LD. DR ARGUED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY REASONS FOR DELAY IN FILING THE APPE AL, APPEAL HAS TO BE DISMISSED IN LIMINE. 3. WE HAVE HEARD THE LD. DR AND GONE THROUGH TH E FACTS OF THE CASE. AS IS EVIDENT FROM THE AFORESAID FACTS, APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE IS DELAYED BY 45 ITA NO.2032/AHD/2009 2 DAYS WHILE NO REQUEST HAS BEEN MADE BY THE ASSESSE E FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL. EVEN WHEN THE ASSESSEE WAS S PECIFICALLY POINTED OUT VIDE NOTICE DATED 23.2.2009 THAT APPEAL WAS DELAYED BY 4 5 DAYS , HE DID NOT RESPOND NOR SUBMITTED ANY REQUEST FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL. NONE APPEARED BEFORE US EVEN WHEN APPEAL WAS CALLED FOR HEARING. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE BEING NO SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL, THE APPEAL CAN NOT BE ADMITTED . REGARDING SUFFICIENT CAUSE,IN THE CASE OF GOPAL FILMS VS. CIT AND OTHERS,237 ITR 655(KAR) IT WAS HE LD BY THE HONBLE COURT THAT WHENEVER A PARTY WANTS DELAY TO BE CONDONED, HE SHOULD SHOW SUFFICIENT CAUSE. IF NO CAUSE IS SHOWN AT ALL, THE ONLY CONCLUSION THAT CAN BE REACHED IS THAT THE DELAY CANNOT BE CONDONED, PARTI CULARLY WHEN LACK OF BONA FIDES IS EVIDENT. 3.1 IT IS WELL ESTABLISHED THAT THE ONUS IS ALWA YS ON THE ASSESSEE TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT CAUSE AND THERE IS NO PRESU MPTION THAT THE DELAY OCCASIONED IN THE FILING OF THE APPEAL IS ALWAYS BO NA FIDE . THE LAW OF LIMITATION PRESCRIBED IN THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 253(5) OF T HE ACT ENVISAGES THAT THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN A SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR NOT PRESENT ING THE APPEAL WITHIN THE PERIOD AS PRESCRIBED. IN THE INSTANT CASE, THE ASSE SSEE HAS FAILED TO SHOW SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY AND INACT ION AS ALSO NEGLIGENCE GALORE. IT IS THE PARTY CONCERNED TO SUBSTANTIATE THE REASO NS FOR DELAY AND IT IS NOT THE FUNCTION OF THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY TO FIND THE CAU SE OF THE DELAY. THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY HAS TO EXAMINE, WHETHER SUFFICIENT CAUSE HAS BEEN SHOWN BY THE PARTY FOR CONDONING THE DELAY AND WHETHER SUCH CAUSE IS A CCEPTABLE OR NOT. INACTION AND WANT OF DILIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSE WO ULD NOT ENTITLE THE ASSESSEE TO THE BENEFIT OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 253(5) OF THE ACT. 3.2. IN THE CASE OF SITARAM RAM CHARAN [1959-60] 17 FJR 379 ; AIR 1960 SC 260, THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OBSERVED THA T THE WHOLE OF THE PERIOD OF DELAY WAS REQUIRED TO BE EXPLAINED, WHICH WOULD INDICATE EVEN THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY THE LAW OF LIMITATION. ITA NO.2032/AHD/2009 3 3.3. IN THE CASE OF COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX.VS RAM MOHAN KABRA,257 ITR 773(PB), IT WAS OBSERVED BY THE HONB LE COURT AS UNDER: THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO PRESCRIPTION OF LIMI TATION IN EVERY STATUTE MUST NOT BE CONSTRUED SO LIBERALLY THAT IT WOULD HAVE THE EFFEC T OF TAKING AWAY THE BENEFIT ACCRUING TO THE OTHER PARTY IN A MECHANICAL MANNER. WHERE THE LEGISLATURE SPELLS OUT A PERIOD OF LIMITATION AND PROVIDES FOR POWER T O CONDONE THE DELAY AS WELL, THERE SUCH DELAY CAN BE CONDONED ONLY FOR SUFFICIEN T AND GOOD REASONS SUPPORTED BY COGENT AND PROPER EVIDENCE. NOW IT IS A SETTLED PRINCIPLE OF LAW THAT THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO SPECIFIED PERIOD OF LIMI TATION MUST BE APPLIED WITH THEIR RIGOUR AND EFFECTIVE CONSEQUENCES. 3.31 IN THIS REGARD, REFERENCE CAN BE MADE TO THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF P.K. RAMACHANDRAN V. STATE OF KERALA, AIR 1998 SC 2 276. THE RELEVANT PORTION READS AS UNDER: LAW OF LIMITATION MAY HARSHLY AFFECT A PARTICULAR PARTY BUT IT HAS TO BE APPLIED WITH ALL ITS RIGOUR WHEN TH E STATUTE SO PRESCRIBES AND THE COURTS HAVE NO POWER TO EXTEND TH E PERIOD OF LIMITATION ON EQUITABLE GROUNDS. THE DISCRETION E XERCISED BY THE HIGH COURT, WAS, THUS, NEITHER PROPER NOR JUDIC IOUS. THE ORDER CONDONING THE DELAY CANNOT BE SUSTAINED. THIS A PPEAL, THEREFORE, SUCCEEDS AND THE IMPUGNED ORDER IS SET ASI DE. CONSEQUENTLY, THE APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DE LAY FILED IN THE HIGH COURT WOULD STAND REJECTED AND THE MISCELLANEO US FIRST APPEAL SHALL STAND DISMISSED AS BARRED BY TIME. NO COST S.' 3.4 THE ITAT, IN THE CASE OF SRI VENKATESA PAPER AND BOARDS LTD. VS. DCIT,98 ITD 200, HELD THAT IN GRANTING INDULGE NCE AND CONDONATION OF DELAY, APPELLATE AUTHORITY MUST BE SATISFIED THAT THERE H AD BEEN DILIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT. IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE IS NO MAT ERIAL BEFORE US, ESTABLISHING DILIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE, EVEN WHEN SP ECIFIC OPPORTUNITY WAS ALLOWED TO THE ASSESSEE. 3.5 IN THE CASE OF VINAY EXTRACTION (P) LTD. V. VIJAY KHANNA [2004] 271 ITR 450 (GUJ) , IT WAS HELD BY THE HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL H IGH COURT THAT IT IS TRUE THAT THE APEX COURT HAS HELD THAT THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT A LIBERAL APPROACH IN CONSIDERING THE APPLICATION FOR CONDONA TION OF DELAY AND THAT SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE DESERVES TO BE PREFERRED OVER T ECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS. ITA NO.2032/AHD/2009 4 HOWEVER, IT IS EQUALLY WELL SETTLED THAT A PERSON I NVOKING THE DISCRETION OF THE APPELLATE OR REVISIONAL AUTHORITY BEYOND THE PRESCR IBED PERIOD OF LIMITATION IS REQUIRED TO SHOW SUFFICIENT CAUSE WHICH WOULD INCLU DE SHOWING THAT THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT WAS EITHER BONA FIDE PURSUING HIS REMEDIES OR WAS PREVENTED BY SUFFICIENT CAUSE FROM PURSUING HIS REMEDIES. WHE THER SUFFICIENT CAUSE IS MADE OUT OR NOT IS ALWAYS A QUESTION OF FACT DEPENDING U PON THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH CASE AND HAS TO BE ESTABLISHE D ON RECORD. AN APPLICATION SEEKING CONDONATION OF DELAY HAS ALSO TO ESTABLISH THAT THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE OR INACTION OR WANT OF BONA FIDES AND THAT THE RIGH T GRANTED UNDER LAW TO CHALLENGE THE ORDER WAS NOT ABANDONED. IT CANNOT BE OVERLOOKE D THAT ON EXPIRY OF THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION PRESCRIBED FOR SEEKING LEGAL R EMEDY, A CORRESPONDING RIGHT ACCRUES IN FAVOUR OF THE OTHER PARTY AND THE SAME S HOULD NOT BE LIGHTLY INTERFERED WITH. 3.6. HON'BLE MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT IN TH E CASE OF NIHALKARAN V. CWT [1989] 175 ITR 14 HAS HELD AS UND ER: 'THE BURDEN IS ON THE PARTY CLAIMING CONDONATION OF DELAY TO PLACE BEFORE THE COURT, IN CLEAR AND EXPLICIT TERMS, ALL FACTS ON WH ICH THE PARTY RELIES, SO THAT THE COURT CAN COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT IS NOT A C ASE OF WANT OF DILIGENCE OR INACTION ON THE PART OF THE APPLICANT. IN THE INSTA NT CASE, THE APPLICANT HAS FAILED TO PLACE ON RECORD ALL THESE FACTS. INACTION OR WAN T OF DILIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE APPLICANT WOULD NOT ENTITLE THE APPLICANT TO THE BE NEFIT OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT. IN OUR OPINION, THEREFORE, THE APPLICANT HAS FAILED TO MAKE OUT A CASE THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR DELA Y IN FILING THE APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 27(3) OF THE ACT. THE APPLICATION FOR CONDO NATION OF DELAY IS, ACCORDINGLY, REJECTED. AS THE APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 27(3) OF THE ACT IS BARRED BY LIMITATION, IT DESERVES TO BE REJECTED ON THIS GROUND ALONE.' 3.7. IN MADHU DADHA VS THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONE R, HONBLE MADRAS HIGH COURT IN THEIR DECISION DATED 23.6.2009 IN TC(A). NO. 421 OF 2009 WHILE REFERRING TO THE AFORESAID DECISION OF THE HONBLE APEX COURT IN P.K. RAMACHANDRAN V. STATE OF KERALA , OBSERVED THAT 14. AT THIS JUNCTURE, WE HAVE TO BE GUIDE D BY THE JUDGMENT REPORTED IN [1990] 1 LLN 457 IN THE CASE OF T.N.M. BANK LTD. V. APP. AUTY., SHOPS ACT. IN THAT PARTICULAR CASE, THE DIVISION BENCH OF THIS COURT HAS HELD THAT, '.................. WE ARE OF THE VIEW THAT THE QUE STION OF LIMITATION IS NOT MERELY A TECHNICAL CONSIDERATION. RULES OF LIMITATION ARE BA SED ON PRINCIPLES OF SOUND POLICY AND PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY. IS A LITIGANT LIAB LE TO HAVE A DAMOCLES' SWORD HANGING OVER HIS HEAD INDEFINITELY FOR A PERIOD TO BE DETERMINED AT THE WHIMS AND FANCIES OF THE OPPONENT?' IN THAT DECISION, THIS COURT HAS HELD THAT THE D ELAY OF 285 DAYS IN PREFERRING THE APPEAL COULD NOT BE CONDONED. IT WAS HELD THAT THE CONDONATION OF DELAY WAS NOT JUSTIFIED ON FACTS AND EVIDENCE OF THE CASE. AS RIG HTLY POINTED OUT THAT THE RULES ITA NO.2032/AHD/2009 5 OF LIMITATION ARE BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF SOUND PUBL IC POLICY AND PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY. THOUGH THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT THE DEL AY IS OCCASIONED DELIBERATELY OR ON ACCOUNT OF CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE, IF THE ADMITT ED FACTS IN THAT CASE ARE TAKEN NOTE OF, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE DELAY ON THE PA RT OF THE APPELLANT IS DELIBERATE AND THE APPELLANT IS CLEARLY GUILTY OF CULPABLE NEG LIGENCE. SUCH NEGLIGENT ATTITUDE OF THE APPELLANT WAS NOT TAKEN CARE TO PRESERVE THE RIGHT OF APPEAL AND HAVING BEEN SLEPT OVER FOR MORE THAN 558 DAYS AND NOT EXPL AINED THE DELAY WITHOUT ANY REASONABLE DOUBT, THE APPELLANT CANNOT AVAIL SYMPAT HY OR DISCRETION OF THIS COURT. 3.8 IN VIEW OF THE AFORESAID OBSERVATIONS, HONBLE HIGH COURT CONCLUDED THAT THE DISCRETION HAVING BEEN RIGHTLY REFUSED BY THE T RIBUNAL, THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENT REASON OR CAUSE TO INTERFERE WITH THE ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL. IN THIS CASE, THE ASSESSEE FAILED TO EXPLAIN THE SUFFICIENT CAUSE OR REASON BY GIVING NECESSARY DETAILS AS TO HOW THE DELAY OF 558 DAYS FROM JANUAR Y 2007 TO THE DATE OF FILING THE APPEAL HAD OCCURRED. HONBLE HIGH COURT IN THIS C ASE QUOTED THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS OF THE ITAT . FROM THE FACTS IT SEEMS THAT THE ASSEESSEE WA S NEGLIGENT BY NOT TAKING THE NECESSARY STEP FOR FILING THE APPEAL WITHIN TH E TIME PRESCRIBED BY THE STATUTE AND THEREBY FROM THE CONDUCT OF THE ASSESSEE, IT SE EMS THAT THE ASSESSEE TAKES THE CONDONATION OF DELAY PROVISION AS GRANTED. IT I S WELL SETTLED LAW THAT THE COURT HELPS THE VIGILANT AND NOT INDOLENT. WE ARE THEREFO RE OF THE VIEW THAT THE ASSEESEE HAS NOT MADE OUT SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR COND ONING THE DELAY IN THE PRESENT APPEAL. THE CAUSE SHOWN BY THE ASSESSEE IS MUCH LESS THAN THE SUFFICIENT CAUSE AS TO WHY THE APPEAL WAS NOT FILED WITHIN THE LIMITATION PERIOD AND EVEN AFTER THE EXPIRY OF LIMITATION PERIOD. SIN CE THE ASSESSEE HAS NOT GIVEN ANY DETAILS AS TO WHAT STEP SHE TOOK FOR FILING THE APPEAL WITHIN THE LIMITATION PERIOD OR AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE THEREFORE, THE EXPLA NATION FOR DELAY OF 558 DAYS APPEARS TO BE TOO INSUFFICIENT, UNSATISFACTORY AND UNREASONABLE FOR CONDONING THE INORDINATE DELAY. FROM THE AFFIDAVIT IT REFLECTS TH AT AVERMENTS ARE QUITE VAGUE AS NO DATES HAVE BEEN SPECIFIED AS TO WHEN THE PAPERS WERE HANDED FOR DRAFTING AN APPEAL AND ON WHAT OCCASION THE ENQUIRIES WERE MADE FOR PREPARATION AND FILING OF APPEAL. MOREOVER, WHEN THE ASSESSEE NEVER WENT F OR SIGNING THE APPEAL, HOW IT COULD HAVE BEEN FILED AS PRESUMED BY THE ASSESSE E. EVEN THE CONDUCT OF THE ASSESSEE BEFORE THIS TRIBUNAL IS ALSO NOT APPRECIAB LE AS VARIOUS NOTICE WERE SENT TO THE ASSESSEE AND FIRST TIME THE ASSESSEE APPEARE D ON 3.3.2008 WHEN THE APPEAL WAS HEARD. WE THEREFORE DECLINE TO CONDONE T HE DELAY OF 558 DAYS IN FILING THE PRESENT APPEAL. ACCORDINGLY, THE PRAYER FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY IS REJECTED.' ITA NO.2032/AHD/2009 6 4. IN THE INSTANT CASE ALSO THE ASSEESSEE SEEMS TO BE QUITE NEGLIGENT BY NOT TAKING THE NECESSARY STEPS FOR FILING THE APPEAL W ITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY THE STATUTE .THE CONDUCT OF THE ASSESSEE REVEALS THAT THE ASSESSEE TAKES THE CONDONATION OF DELAY PROVISION AS GRANTED. THE ASS ESSEE DID NOT CARE TO SUBMIT ANY REQUEST FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY , EVEN WHEN IT WAS BROUGHT SPECIFICALLY TO HIS NOTICE. IN GRANTING THE INDULGENCE AND CONDONIN G THE DELAY, IT MUST BE PROVED BEYOND THE SHADOW OF DOUBT THAT THE ASSESSEE WAS DI LIGENT AND WAS NOT GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE WHATSOEVER. THE SUFFICIENT CAUSE WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE LIMITATION PROVISION MUST BE A CAUSE WHICH IS BEYON D THE CONTROL OF THE PARTY INVOKING THE AID OF THE PROVISIONS. IN THE CASE OF RAMLAL V. REWA COALFIELDS LTD. (AIR 1962 SC 361), THE HON BLE APEX COURT HELD TH AT THE CAUSE FOR THE DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL, WHICH BY DUE CARE AND ATTENTION, COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED, CANNOT BE A SUFFICIENT CAUSE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE LIMITATION PROVISION. THE RULE OF LIMITATION ALSO CONTAINS A RULE OF JUSTICE, ESPECIALLY WHERE A PERSON CHOOSES NOT TO TAKE UP REQUISITE LEGAL REMEDIES FOR AN INORDINATE LENGTH OF TIME AND WITHOUT REASONABLE CAUSE, THE TRIBUNAL SHOULD A PPLY THE RULE OF LIMITATION. SEEKERS OF JUSTICE MUST COME WITH CLEAN HANDS. IN T HE INSTANT CASE, WE DO NOT FIND ANY REASONABLE CAUSE FOR CONDONING THE DELAY. 5.. IN THE LIGHT OF AFORESAID DECISIONS , THE BURDEN IS ON THE PARTY CLAIMING CONDONATION OF DELAY TO PLACE BEFORE THE COURT, IN CLEAR AND EXPLICIT TERMS, ALL FACTS ON WHICH THE PARTY RELIES, SO THAT THE COURT CAN COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT IS NOT A CASE OF WANT OF DILIGENCE OR INACTION O N THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE. INACTION OR WANT OF DILIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE AS SESSEE WOULD NOT ENTITLE HIM TO THE BENEFIT OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 253(5) OF THE ACT. IN THE CASE UNDER CONSIDERATION, ADMITTEDLY, THE ASSESSEE HAS NOT SH OWN ANY ACTION OR VIGILANCE FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN 45 DAYS AFTER THE IMPUGN ED ORDER WAS SERVED UPON . IN THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE, THE ASSESSEE HAS NOT PROVED ANY INACTION OR NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF A THIRD PARTY, MUCH LESS HAVE THEY PLEADED ANY ACTION OR VIGILANCE ON THEIR OWN PART. ITA NO.2032/AHD/2009 7 6. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, ESPECIAL LY WHEN THE ASSESSEE HAS NOT COME WITH CLEAN HANDS BEFORE US AND HAS ALSO FAILED TO ESTABLISH WITH COGENT AND PROPER EVIDENCE THAT THERE EXISTED SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR NOT PRESENTING THE APPEAL WITHIN THE STIPULATED PERIOD, DELAY OF 45 DAYS IN FILING APPEAL, CAN NOT BE CONDONED.. AS THE APPEAL IS BARRED BY LIMITATION, I T DESERVES TO BE REJECTED ON THIS GROUND ALONE. THEREFORE , WE DECLINE TO ADMIT THE APPEAL. 7. IN THE RESULT, APPEAL IS DISMISSED IN LIMINE . . ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE COURT ON 25.5.2011 SD/- SD/- (T.K.SHARMA) JUDICIAL MEMBER (A.N. PAHUJA) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AHMEDABAD DATED 25. 5.2011 . COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO : THE ASSESSEE/ ITO WARD-7(1),AHMEDABAD / THE CIT CONCERNED/ THE CIT(A)-XI,AHMEDABAD/DR/ GUARD FILE BY ORDER DEPUTY REGISTRAR OF ITAT, AHMEDABAD BENCH