आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरणआयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण, अहमदाबाद 瀈यायपीठ अहमदाबाद 瀈यायपीठअहमदाबाद 瀈यायपीठ अहमदाबाद 瀈यायपीठ ‘C’ अहमदाबाद। अहमदाबाद।अहमदाबाद। अहमदाबाद। IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL “C” BENCH, AHMEDABAD BEFORE SHRI RAJPAL YADAV, VICE-PRESIDENT AND SMT.ANNAPURNA GUPTA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 & ITA No.2362/Ahd/2018 Asstt.Year 1998-1999 AND ITA No.1148/Ahd/2019 & ITA No.2361/Ahd/2018 Assessment Year :1994-1995 Jilichem Laboratories (India) Ltd. C/o.Ramanlal Shah 2, Pankaj Apartment Opp: Jain Temple Paldi Bhatta Ahmedabad 380007. Vs. ITO-Ward-2(1)(2) Ahmedabad. (Applicant) (Responent) Assessee by : Shri Rushin Patel, AR & Shri Kalpesh Shah, AR Revenue by : Shri Rakesh Jha, Sr.DR सुनवाई क琉 तारीख/D a t e o f H e a r i n g : 2 0 / 0 4 / 2 0 2 3 घोषणा क琉 तारीख /D a t e o f Pr o n o u n c e m e n t : 1 2 / 0 7 / 2 0 2 3 आदेश आदेशआदेश आदेश/O R D E R PER ANNAPURNA GUPTA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER The above two sets of appeals, comprising four appeals in all, filed by the same assessee, are against orders of the ld.Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Ahmedabad passed, under section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 2 referred to as “the Act” for short) in quantum and penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act and relate to Assessment Years (A.Y)1994-95 and 1998-99. The order passed by the Ld.CIT(A) in quantum proceedings for both the years in challenge before us is dated 12.3.2003 and that in penalty proceedings for both the years is dated 31.10.2018. 2. At the outset Ld.Counsel for the assessee requested that all the appeals be taken up together for hearing since in both the quantum appeals the assessee needed to first address the delay of more than 5000 days which he stated had occurred in the backdrop of same facts and circumstances. On merits, he pointed out that the Ld.CIT(A) had passed exparte order and his request would be restoration of the appeals back to the Ld.CIT(A) for adjudication afresh. The penalty appeals accordingly he stated would also need to be restored back alongwith the quantum appeals. Ld.DR did not object to this plea of the assessee. Accordingly all the appeals were taken up together for hearing. 3. As noted, the above two sets of appeals are in relation to orders passed by the first appellate authority i.e. ld.CIT(A) in quantum proceedings and in penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. 4. The Registry of the Tribunal has noted that appeals of the assessee in quantum proceedings in ITA No.1148/Ahd/2019 and ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 pertaining to Asst.Year 1994-95 and 1998-98 respectively are barred by limitation as being delayed by 5092 days and 5442 days respectively; the ld.CIT(A), having passed the orders for both the years on the same date i.e. 12.3.2003 and the assessee ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 3 having filed the appeal for Asst.Year 1994-95 before us on 8.7.2019 and that pertaining to Asst.Year 1998-98 on 4.4.2018. There was no delay noted in the appeal filed by the assessee in penalty proceedings. Therefore, the matter was first taken up for condonation of delay in the quantum appeals. 5. An application seeking condonation of delay was filed by the assessee alongwith voluminous documents and affidavits of the Director of the assessee-company stating the facts leading to the delay on oath before us. While making oral arguments before us, references were made to the aforesaid documents. 6. Briefly stated, the explanation of the assessee for the huge delay of 5000-plus in filing present appeals was that due to change in its fortune, the assessee, which earlier was a profit making entity became non-profitable and continued to suffer huge losses right from the year 1997 onwards, as a fallout of which its financial condition took a deep dive and plunged it into deep financial crisis, resulting in innumerable litigation being initiated against it and its directors from all possible fronts, i.e the statutory authorities and others associated with the assessee filing cases, both civil and criminal against the assessee in different courts and forums. The banks who had advanced loans to the assessee filed cases for recovery of their debts, creditors for cheque bouncing and other offences committed by the assessee, ESI-PF authorities, excise and sales tax, foreign trade, GIIC, Food& Drug Control, Commercial Tax authorities etc. for non-payment of the dues. That as a consequence, the assessee and its directors was deeply embroiled in civil and criminal litigations which was spread all over the country and took place continuously right through 1997 onwards; that it was battling ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 4 for its mere existence right from the year 1997 which continued for many years and even the directors of the assessee-company was put behind bars during this period. That even its factory was taken over by the banks. And while in the midst of this crisis, when the assessee was battling for survival, the ld.CIT(A) passed order in quantum proceedings for Asst.Year 1994-95 and 1998-99 and the Assessing Officer passed order levying penalty under section 271(1)(c) for both the years, all in the year 2003; the ld.CIT(A)’s order being passed for both the years on the same date i.e. 12.3.2003 and the penalty orders in both the years being passed on 23.10.2003.That considering the crisis that it was fighting against, its factories being taken over by banks and the directors fighting litigation all over the country, the assessee did not receive these ordersand only when recovery notice was served at the residential address of the director of the assessee-company in 2018 that the auditors of the assessee-company were contacted and all orders received .That immediately on receipt of orders the assessee swung into action and appeals were filed in the year 2018 against both orders of the ld.CIT(A) in the ITAT and against the penalty orders passed under section 271(1)(c) before the ld.CIT(A); that as a consequence, the appeal before the ld.CIT(A) in penalty proceedings was also delayed by the same period of 5000-plus days, which was not condoned by the ld.CIT(A) and the appeals dismissed as non- maintainable. 7. The contention of the ld.counsel for the assessee was that the orders passed by the AO in A.Y 1998-99 and the ld.CIT(A) in both the years was ex parte order since the assessee was unable to attend the proceedings, and had resulted in huge unjustified addition in Asst.Year 1994-95 of approx..Rs. 43lacs against returned income of ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 5 Rs.9.8 lacs on account of alleged preoperative expenses and interest on FDRs made out of Public issue of Funds which were capitalized by the assessee. In Asst.Year 1998-99, it was pointed out that additions to the tune of Rs. 1.33 Crs were made to returned loss of Rs.14.66 lacs on account of disallowance of 30% of raw-material consumption. In the absence of representation by the assessee before the AO/ld.CIT(A) the huge unjustified additions and disallowances made were upheld that as a result, huge demand had been created on the assessee amounting to Rs.1,44,50062/- in Asst.Year 1994-95 and Rs. 1,97,24,611/- in Asst.Year 1998-99; that the assessee even now is not in a position to pay these demands and if the appeals are not entertained and admitted, it would have serious financial and legal implications on the assesses-company which even today has barely managed to stand-up after fighting humongous litigations since 1997 onwards and would also have consequences on the directors of the assessee-company. It was pleaded before us that it was imperative for the assessee to contest all the additions and disallowance made in both the years, since they were highly unjustified and in the circumstances that the assessee’s pleadings found favour with the ITAT, the assessee would get a new spark of life and would able to stand up again after facing huge storm of difficulties in the past years; that failure to entertain the appeals would be the final nail in the coffin of the assessee, and there would be no chance left for any survival for the assessee. 8. The contents of the affidavit for condonation of delay identically worded for both the years, is as under: ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 6 1. I, RamanlalLilachand Shah, Aged about 65 years, Director M/s Jilichem Laboratories Ltd. having Income tax PAN AAACJ8235D, having resident at 2, Pankaj Apartment, Opp Pankaj Jain Temple, Bhathha, Paldi, Ahmedabad 380007, hereby declare, affirm and confirm the following; 2. That I m the director of the Company M/s Jilichem Laboratories Ltd., (Referred to as The Company) since inception. The Income tax Permanent Account Number of the Company is AAACJ8235D. 3. That the company has filed all its income tax returns since its inception. The assessment and re-assessment orders of Income were passed for AY 1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1998-99. The Assessment orders are passed with various adjustments to returned income. 4. That the company was having profitable business activities till year end 31st March 1996. Thereafter since Previous year 1996-97, there were huge losses and that continued till date. Sr Year Turnover Profit Loss Remarks 1 1993 40732501 16373714 0 Audited Financial Statement 2 1994 66415294 11233708 0 3 1995 124609536 11108604 0 4 1996 143039848 4042300 0 5 1997 146169464 0 5657028 6 1998 50407621 25853999 7 1999 Data not Available 8 2000 21730237 0 49205501 9 2001 21640128 0 28475993 10 2002 14738840 0 4935119 11 2003 12370719 0 3753778 12 2004 35110093 0 2635772 13 2005 142165468 2563078 5 That the company was having profitable business activities till year end 31st March 1996. Thereafter since Previous year 1996-97, there were huge losses and that continued till date. 6 That in view of losses and financial hardship, the company could not honor its repayment schedule to Scheduled and Co-operartive Banks and to State Financial Corporation. The default in payment instigated number of litigation with banks and supplier creditors. 7 That the company got in deep financial mess and could not survive from the losses. There were number of legal disputes arised. The main dispute was with the Bankers of the Company i.e. Bank of Baroda, ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 7 Kalupur Commercial Co-op Bank Ltd., Ahmedabad, Kankaria Maninagar Co Op Bank Ltd., Vis Nagar NagrikSahkari Bank Ltd., Sarangpur Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Janta Co- operative Bank - Nadiad. 8 That the legal disputes for non-payment of Secured Loans arised with Gujarat Industrial Investment Corporation (GIIC) and Gujarat State Financial Corporation (GSFC) and Gujarat State Financial Services (GSFS). 9 That the legal disputes for non-payment to suppliers of material and dishonoured cheques arised and number of Criminal cases are filed against the Company and Individual Directors of the Company, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881. These Criminal cases are filed in different courts situated all over India. 10 The Bank of Baroda took the possession of Vatva factory on 26th December 2006 after long letigation. Similarly GIIC, SGFC and The Kalupur Commercial Co OP Bank took over the possession of Adhana Factory. 12 The Company filed application with BIFR (Board of Financial Reconstruction) for revival of the Company in the year 2000-01. The said application was admitted and finally same was rejected in year 2010.The Directors were also facing litigation from other institutions i.e. Security Exchange Board of India,Food and Drug Department, Sales Tax, Excise and Customs Department, Director General of Foreign Trade, Labour Court, Provident Fund, ESIC, Factory Act, Gujarat Pollution Control Board and Allien Recovery. 13 That the directors were also attending number of Criminal Cases of dishonour of cheques in different court spread over India. 14 That there were almost Two Hundred and Fifty (250) legal matters were faced by the Company and individual directors during period of 1998 to 2015. That in this situation, it was difficult to attend the day to day routine matters of business. The financial crises also prevented directors to hire consultants and professionals to attend to legal matters. 15 That In the year, 2018 Income tax Recovery notice was served at the residential address of the director, by The Income tax officer Ward 2(1)(2) Ahmedabad. Where in demand of Rs 252.12 was demanded for outstanding demand of AY 1994-95 to 1998-99. These demand consists of Income Tax - Interest and Penalty. The details are set out in table hereunder: ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 8 Assessment Year Tax Interest Penalty Total Status of Demand 1993 94 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.11 Accepted 1994 95 26.37 38.14 0.00 64.51 ITAT ITA 1148 1994 95 0.00 0.00 24.67 24.67 ITAT ITA 2361 1995 96 27.57 0.00 0.00 27.57 CIT Appeal 1996 97 0.05 0.00 0.39 0.44 Accepted 1997 98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 No orders 1998 99 41.63 46.42 0.00 88.05 ITAT ITA 835 1998 99 0.00 0.00 46.77 46.77 ITAT ITA 2362 Total 95.73 84.56 71.83 252.12 17 That the directors immediately contacted Auditors of the Company M/s P R Shah & Associates, Chartered Accountants, Ahmedabad to understand the legal implications of the notice. 18 That the Chartered Accountants explained the demand is pertaining to old assessment years and they need to have copies of orders to further advice on the matter. 19 That the said Chartered Accountants firm was appointed to assist the company in obtaining information from the department. Therefore the firm wrote a letter to the Income tax officer on 7th February 2018, interalia explaining the facts and seeking Certified True Copies of the Orders on record. Challan for obtaining Certified True Copies was also paid. 20 That the letter was duly acknowledged by the Income tax officer Shri Sunil Purabiya, on the same date. Further the learned Income tax officer Ward 2(1)(2) provided certified True Copies of Orders of Assessment, Penalty orders and Commissioner of Income tax Appeals Orders on 16th February 2018, related to Assessment Year 1994-95, 1995-96 and 1998-99. 21 That on receipt of orders, the company has appraised all the orders and under advice of the chartered accountants, filed appeals before Commissioner of Income tax Appeals. The Appeal for AY 1994-95 was e-filed on 14th March 2018 and for AY 1998-99, e- appeal was filed on 10th March 2018. 22 That the director also confirmed and represented before the chartered accountants that there was no service of notice of hearing and or order of penalty for Assessment Year 1994-95. further it was also evident from the order of Penalty Order that the ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 9 Assessee was not served with the notices and order of penalty was passed ex-parte. 23 That the director also confirmed and represented before the chartered accountants that there was no service of notice under section 148 of re-opening of assessment or that of hearing and or order of assessment and or penalty for Assessment Year 1998-99. Further it was also evident from the order of Assessment and Order of Penalty that the Assessee was not served with the notices and order of Assessment as well as Order of Penalty was passed ex- parte. 24 That the directors also confirmed that the order of Assessment for AY 2015-16 was passed without service of notice of hearing and the order of Assessment was also not served on them. 25 That the directors preferred appeal before CIT Appeals in all Penalty cases related to Assessment year 1994-95 and 1998-99 within thirty days of receipt of Certified True Copies of the Penalty order from Income tax office. 26 That the directors also obtained information from department record that Hon'ble Gujarat High Court has dismissed Departments Tax Appeal Number 519/2008 for AY 1996-97 for want of proper service of notices to the Assessee. 27 That it was brought to my notice that the Assessing Officer, ACIT Circle 4 Ahmedabad has wrongly served hearing notice, dated 16.10.2003 in matter of Penalty under section 271(1)(c) for AY 1994-95, to Official Liquidator, Ashram road, Ahmedabad, instead of to the Assessee. Thereafter order of penalty was passed ex-parte on 23rd October 2003. 28 That the above instances indicate that the notices and orders were not effectively served on the Company or Directors of the Company. 29 That the Company and directors were attending lot many legal matters before various forums in past years. However there was no notice or orders were served on the Assessee Company and or Directors as stated hereinabove. 30 That the company has filed appeal before CIT Appeals and ITAT Ahmedabad well within the time limits provided in the Act. Thus the Appeal in matter of Penalty for AY 1994-95 and 1998-99 are filed within thrirty days from the date of service of notice or order i.e. 16.02.2018. ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 10 31 That the company has filed belated appeal before ITAT Ahmedabad, against the order of Assessment in case of Assessment Year 1994-95. The Appeal was filed on 08/07/2019 (ITA 1148/Ahd/2019). Thus appeal was filed late by 447 days. 32 That the company has filed belated appeal before CIT Appeal against the order of Assessment in case of Assessment Year 1995- 96. The Appeal was filed on 20/11/2018. Thus appeal was filed late by 240 days. The CIT Appeal has admitted the appeal and present status is that the matter is remanded back to ITO for verification of Service of Order to Assessee. 33 That the company has filed belated appeal before ITAT Ahmedabad, against the order of Assessment in case of Assessment Year 1998-99. The Appeal was filed on 04/04/2018 (ITA 835/Ahd/2018). Thus appeal was filed in time limit of Sixty Days. 34 That the company has acted promptly and diligently on receipt of notice of demand and recovery from the department and obtained True Copies from the Department and also filed appeals and communication under section 154 of the Act immediately on receipt of True Copies of the orders from department records. 35 That the Company has no benefit in delay filing of appeal and or malafide intention in delay filing of appeals etc before the CIT Appeal and or ITAT Ahmedabad. 36 That the Company and directors are after long years of financial hardship is now again coming back to path of normal business. Therefore hope that the appeals would be admitted and heard and decided on merit of the case. 37 That the fair hearing and decision making would be in interest of the justice and would not be against the interest of any party to dispute or otherwise. 38 That whatever stated and declared above, are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Ahmedabad, 26th August 2021 Sd/- RamanlalLilachand Shah” ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 11 9. A list of all the suits filed against the assessee-company and its directors, numbering in all to 213, along with copies of all the suits were filed before us in a paper-book. 10. The ld.DR however vehemently opposed the condonation of delay and relied on the order of the ld.CIT(A) passed in the penalty proceedings, wherein the delay of identical number of days in filing appeal before the ld.CIT(A) was not condoned and the appeals dismissed as non-maintainable. He further sought time of 15 days for making written submissions on the issue of condonation of delay. After hearing both the parties on the aspect of condoning the huge delay in filing the appeals in quantum proceedings by the assessee, the Bench reserved in its order on this point giving the ld.DR 15 days’ time to file submissions in writing, and thereafter arguments on merits were invited, pointing out that, if, while considering contentions of both the parties, the delay is not condoned, then the appeals would be dismissed at the threshold without dealing with the merits. But in case the delay is condoned, the issue would be adjudicated on merits also. 11. On merits, the ld.counsel for the assessee made his arguments while the ld.DR contended that since the proceedings before the ld.CIT(A) were ex parte, it would be difficult for him to comment on the contentions made by the ld.counsel for the assessee on the facts of the case. He accordingly sought time to file his reply in writing on this aspect also. Accordingly, 20 days’ time was granted. The detailed order-sheet in this regard, dated 20.4.2023 is reproduced hereunder: 20.04.2023 Present four appeals are directed at the instance of the assessee impugning orders of the ld.CIT(A) dated 12.3.2003 passed on the ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 12 quantum appeals for Asst.Year 1994-95 and 1998-99. Similarly, orders of the ld.CIT(A) dated 31.10.2018 passed on the penalty appeals under section 271(1)(c) of the Act in both these years respectively. 2. Registry has pointed out that quantum appeals are time- barred by 5092 days. In order to explain the delay in filing quantum appeals, the assessee has filed application for condonation of delay supported with affidavit in both the years. 3. With the assistance of the ld.counsel for the assessee, we have gone through the affidavits of the assessee as well as other circumstances demonstrated before us for condonation of delay. The ld.Sr.DR, on other hand submitted that penalty appeals before the ld.CIT(A) were identically time barred and the ld.CIT(A) has exhaustively dealt with the issue while dismissing the appeals of the assessee on account of filing appeals beyond the time of limitation. He, therefore, relied upon the finding of the ld.CIT(A) incorporated in para 3.1 to 3.5 of the order dated 31.10.2018 passed in both the years. The ld.Sr.DR thereafter sought further time of 15 days for giving written submissions on the issue of condonation of delay. 4. Though, we have not adjudicated the issue whether the delay is to be condoned or not, we reserve this part and will be adjudicated after the submissions of the ld.DR on this point. However, without getting prejudiced from this aspect, we invited arguments on merits of the issue, in case we condone the delay. If we do not find any reasonable cause in filing appeals for such delayed period, then at the threshold, the appeal will be dismissed being time barred, but in any case the delay is condoned, the issues are adjudicated on merits. 5. The ld.counsel for the assessee on merits submitted that in Asst.Year 1994-95 the assessment was reopened by issuance of notice under section 148 of the Act. He submitted that the time limit to issue notice under section 143(2) for scrutinizing of the return was still due, and before that a notice under section 148 has been issued. To support his case, he relied upon the judgment Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of Aditya Medisales Ltd. Vs. DCIT, 73 taxamnn.com 197 (Guj). 6. As far as assessment year 1998-98 is concerned, he submitted that though the assessment has been reopened by issuance of notice under section 148, but the additions have not been made on the items for which reopening was made. In other words, no addition has been made on the points, which have been assigned in the reasons, but additions have been made on the items, which have discovered during the re-assessment proceedings. He put reliance on judgment of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Mohemd Juned Dadani, 30 taxmann.com 1 (Guj), CIT Vs. Jet Airwasy (I) Ltd., 331 ITR 236 and Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. Vs. CIT, 336 ITR 136, he emphasised that the ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 13 expressions “or” and “also any other income” have been employed in section 147, it has been explained by the Hon’ble High Court that any discovery of new item of income construed by the AO, as escaped income can only be added if the addition has been made on any of the items for which the assessment has been reopened. In case no addition is made on the item for which reopening has been made, then no other addition can be made for the escapement of income came to the notice of the AO thereafter in the re-assesmsent proceedings. 7. On the other hand, the ld.DR submitted that since proceeding before the Revenue authorities were ex parte, and even in the grounds of appeal these aspects have not been taken by the assessee, it is difficult for him to comment in the absence of complete facts. Therefore, he seeks time to file reply on this issue also. The ld.DR may call for comments of the AO on this aspect and give submissions on merits along with submission on the point of delay. He may do so within 20 days from today. 8. Hearing is concluded; orders are reserved.” 12. Thereafter, written submissions dated 9.5.2023 and 16.5.2023 were filed by the ld.DR, and the contents of which are reproduced hereunder: Letter dated 09-05-2023 2. In this case, your good office has directed to submit detailed report incorporating factual and legal positions on the issues discussed in the Hon'ble ITAT, "C" Bench Ahmadabad's order sheet Dated:20.04.2023 in this case and also mentioned in above referred letter dated:21.04.2023. 3. In this connection, the facts and report related-to the case of the assessee for the AY 1994-95 & 1998-99 are as under: Facts related to the AY 1994-95 In this case, assessment proceedings u/s 147 of the Act for the AY 1994-95 was initiated by way of issuing notice u/s 148 of the Act dated: 24.02.1997. The above said notice was served on the authorized signatory of the assessee company on 25th February, 1997. Thereafter, the assessee was served notices u/s 142(1) & 143(2) of the Act and in response to the same the assessee duly cooperated in the assessment proceedings and through its authorized representative Shri BakulIswarlal Shah submitted its reply on 08.12.1998, 18.12.1998 and 29.12.1998. Thereafter, considering the submission made by the assessee, the then AO passed an assessment order u/s 143(3) rws 147 of the of the Income Tax; Act, 1961 on 05, January, 1999 and made an addition of Rs.42,93,586/- to the income determined u/s 143(l)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Simultaneously, the assessing officer also initiated penalty proceedings u/s 271(l)(c) of the Act against the assessee for the AY 1994-95. The above said assessment order ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 14 u/s 143(3) rws 147 and show cause notice u/s 274 rws 271 of the Act were duly served upon the authorized representative of the assessee on 01.02.1999. In response to ' the above said show cause notice the assessee didn't submit any reply with the department. Thereafter, the assessee was again served with one more show cause notice u/s 271(l)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 09.07.1999 to explain as to why a penalty under the provisions of the above said section shall not be levied upon the assessee. However, the assessee again remained non-compliant to the above said show cause notice. Thereafter, it is gathered from records that the assessee preferred an appeal before the Ld. CIT(A)-5, Ahmedabad against the above said assessment order u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore, the penalty proceedings were kept in abeyance till the disposal of the first appeal filed by the assessee. Thereafter, the Ld. CIT(A)-X, Ahmedabad, passed an order and dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee on 12.03.2003. In consequence of dismissal of the first appeal filed by the assessee, the AO again served a show cause notice u/s 271(l)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 which was served by affixture to the assessee company at; its address on 16.10.2003 and also served upon the official liquidator of the assessee company on 16.10.2003, and requested to submit its explanation as to why a penalty u/s 271(l)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 should not be imposed upon the assessee for the AY 1994-95. However, no reply was submitted in response to the above said show cause notice on or before the specified date for compliance. Therefore, the assessing officer proceeded with completion of the above said penalty proceedings and passed an penalty order u/s: 271(l)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on 23.10.2003. The above said penalty order was duly served upon the assessee through affixture on 23.10.2003 at the address of assessee company and a panchnama to that effect was prepared in' presence of two witnesses by the Inspector of the Circle-4, Ahmedabad (copy enclosed). Further, with regard to issuance of notice u/s. 148 vis-a-vis 143(2) for AY 1994-95, it is submitted that the provisions of Income Tax Act applicable during the relevant period regarding 148 are as under: "149(l)No notice under section 148 shall be issued for the relevant assessment year,- (b) if four years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, unless the case falls under sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iii) Hence the notice u/s. 148 has been issued within the time limit, even though the time for 143(2) may be available. Facts related to the AY 1998-99 In this case, assessment proceedings u/s 147 of the Act for the AY 1998-99 was initiated by way of issuing notice u/s 148 of the Act dated: 28- 07.2000. The above said notice was served to the assessee via speed post on 01.08.2000. Thereafter, the assessee was served with notices u/s 142(1) ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 15 of the Act to submit its return of income for the AY 1998-99. The assessee vide its reply dated: 22.03.2002 submitted that its return of income filed on 30.11.2000 for the AY 1998-99 may be considered as return of income filed against notice u/s 148 of the Act. The assessee was also served with a notice u/s 143(2) of the Act on 25.02.2002 and the same was served upon the assessee via RPAD on the same date. Thereafter, considering the data available on record, the assessing office passed an order u/s 144 rws 147 of the Act on 28.03.2002 for the AY 1998-99. Along with the above said assessment order, penalty proceedings u/s 271(l)(c) of the Income Tax Act was also initiated against the assessee and a show cause notice to that effect was also served upon the assessee. Condonation As regards to the condonation of 5092 days is concerned in filing appeal before the Hon'ble ITAT, it is submitted that as per records the Ld. CIT(A)-X, Ahmedabad dismissed the appeals filed by the assessee for AY 1994-95 & 1998-99 on 12.03.2003. It is clearly mentioned in the appeal orders that the C1T(A) had provided a number of opportunities to the assessee to represent the case, but the assessee never bothered to comply. It is clear that the assessee was not serious about pursuing its appeals. But suddenly the assessee stated that it received a recovery letter from AO in 2018/The assessee claimed that it didn't receive the letters and order .of CIT(A) but received the recovery letter of AO. The assessee also claimed that the penalty orders were also served in 2018. These claims of the assessee do not find any merit. First of all the penalty show cause notices and penalty orders were served on the assessee through affixture in; the year 2003, and a panchnama to that effect was prepared in presence of two witnesses by the Inspector of the Circle-4, Ahmedabad (copy enclosed) and the same is available on records. Further, the penalty orders were served after the passing of CIT(A) order, and it was clearly mentioned in the penalty orders that the appeal of the assessee has been dismissed by the CIT(A). Hence the assessee was very well aware of the status of appeal before the CIT(A) but the assessee never bothered to file appeal before the Hon'ble Tribunal within the prescribed time limit. However, the assessee requested the AO in 2018 to provide the certified copies of the orders, and upon receipt of the same, the assessee itself treated the date of receipt in 2018 as date of service of the orders, which were already served in 2003. Hence the condonation of the assessee may not be accepted.” Letter dated 16-05-2023 “In continuation to the above referred written submission in this case, please find enclosed the report from the Assessing Officer, endorsed by his supervisory authority, as directed by the HonTDle Bench. In addition to submission on merits, this report opposes the condonation of delay, which supplements the already detailed written submission on this ground vide the above referred letter. Additionally, it is also brought on record that the original grounds of appeal filed by the assessee does not include these grounds and seem to have been orally taken up during the course of last hearing on 20.04.2023. ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 16 Further, there is no written submission by the assessee on these grounds made available to the department for arguments. This being assessee's appeal the onus lies on it to produce / argue with necessary documentary evidences, so that the same can be rebutted on factual and legal grounds.” Submitted. Sd/- (RAKESH JHA) Senior Departmental Representatives 13. Having heard both the parties at length, having gone through their submissions in writing before us as also all documents and case laws referred to before us, we now proceed to give our verdict on the plea of the assessee to condone the delay in filing the quantum appeals in ITA No.835/Ahd/18 and 1148/Ahd/19,before us. 14. Coming to the merits of the condonation of delay, as noted above, the delay in filing appeals in the quantum proceedings before us in ITA No.1148/Ahd/2019 and 835/Ahd/2018 is substantial exceeding 5000-plus days and the facts relating to the same have already been noted in the earlier part of our order. 15. Before proceeding to give our verdict on the application of the assessee for condonation of delay in the present case, we shall first bring out judicially settled principles laid down for condonation of delay. Beginning with decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, 1998 (7) SCC 123,the Hon’ble Court in the said case first dealt with the meaning and purpose of laying down limitation rule in law. Hon’ble Court held that object and purpose of providing a legal remedy is to repair damage caused by reason of legal injury. The Law of Limitation, it held, fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redressal of the legal injury so suffered. Hon’ble Court noted that time being precious and that wasted time would never revisit, and by passing of ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 17 time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts, therefore, there had to be a life span fixed for each remedy; that unending period of launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Hon’ble Court held that the law of limitation was thus founded on public policy, for the general welfare of all that a period be put to litigation. It held that Rule of Limitation is not meant to destroy the right of the parties, rather they are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The relevant portion of the above judgment laying down the above principles is as under: “Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly the object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finislitium (it is for the general welfare that a period be putt to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.” 16. Having so dealt with the purpose of law of limitation, the Hon’ble Court in the said decision also held that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court, whichis to be exercised on the basis of acceptability of the explanation for the delay, with the length of delay being of no consequence; that what would be a prime point for consideration of the delay, was whether there was a satisfactory explanation for the impugned delay. The Court held that primary function of courts is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice and the time limit fixed for approaching the ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 18 Court is not for the reason that on expiry such time limit, a bad cause would become a good cause. The relevant portion of the judgment is as under: “It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in reversional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on whole untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first cut refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior cut would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations in not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause.” 17. Having so explained, the logic and purpose behind the Law of Limitation and the manner in which discretion is to be exercised for condonation of the delay, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. Mst.Katiji& Others, 167 ITR 471 (SC) exhaustively dealt with power conferred by the Legislature to condone the delay by enacting section 5 in the Limitation Act, holding that purpose for the same was to enable Courts to advance substantial justice to the party by disposing of the matters on merit. The Hon’ble Court in the said case held that expression “sufficient cause” for section 5 of Limitation Act was to be applied in a manner to sub-serve the ends of justice and therefore a justifiable liberal approach had to be adopted on principle. The Hon’ble Court has given reasons for adopting a liberal approach stating that: ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 19 • ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late, • and by refusing to condone delay, a meritorious matter will be thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice defeated, • as opposed to that if delay is condoned ,the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties; • that when substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, because either side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non- deliberate delay • that there was no presumption that delay was occasioned deliberately, and in fact a litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay; • that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. The Hon’ble Court elucidated these aspects for adopting a liberal and justice oriented approach on the issue of condonation of delay as under: “1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 20 every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinary (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non- grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on mertis in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore. set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court.” 18. In the case of Maniben Devraj Shab Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157, Hon’ble Apex Court emphasised that liberal and justice oriented approach is required to ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 21 be adopted while condoning the delays, but at the same time, the Hon’ble Court took note of rights acquired by the successful litigant on the expiry of period of limitation and taking note of the same held that the expression “sufficient cause” would derive colour from the factual matrix of each case and would largely depend upon the bona fide nature of the expression; that if the Courts find that there is no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fide, then the Court can condone the delay, but on the other hand, if the explanation is found to be concocted or the litigant found to be negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be legitimate for the Court not to exercise its discretion to condone the delay. Para-23 and 24 of the judgment holding so are as under: "23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice- oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. 24. What colour the expression 'sufficient cause' would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay." 19. Similarly, Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Cenzer Industries Ltd. Vs. ITO in Notice of Motion Nos.492 & 493 of 2015 dated 15.1.2016 while condoning the delay of 865 days reiterated the principles laid down in Maniben Devraj Shah(supra), taking note of right accrued to the successful litigants on the expiry of litigation to treat the dispute as settled and arrange its affairs on that basis, ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 22 held that this right of successful defendant could be disturbed for condoning the delay of filing appeal by the litigants only when the litigants explained the delay, and there is bonafide reasons for not having moved within the prescribed time i.e. by not being diligent. The reason for explaining the delay, it was held had to be plausible and reasonable so as to enable the court to exercise its discretion. The relevant finding of the Hon’ble Court in this regard at para-11 of its order is as under: '5. It is a settled position that an application for condonation of delay has to be liberally construed, as held by the Apex Court in various cases (see Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji [1987] 167 ITR 471 (SC). However, this liberal construction of the sufficient cause while condoning delay has to be counter balanced by ensuring that the law of limitation which provides for definite consequence on the rights of the parties does not become ineffective. The rule of limitation is provided for general welfare of the society so as to put a period beyond which a party cannot agitate an issue in litigation. The rationale for the same is that once a litigation is decided, the dispute must repose. This is particularly so, if the party aggrieved by the order does not agitate the issue before the appellate forum within the time provided. The opposite party can then proceed on the basis that the dispute is settled and arrange its affairs on that basis. Thus, if the aggrieved party has not moved the appellate forum within the prescribed time, resulting in other securing an accrued rights, then the party moving an application for condonation of delay, must endeavour to explain the delay and show his bonafide in not having moved within the time prescribed (i.e. not being diligent). The law assist the vigilant and not the indolent as stated in the LatinMaxim "Vigilantsbusennondormientibus jura suveniunt.". The reasons for explaining the delay has to be plausible and reasonable so that the Court can exercise its discretion. Moreover, although a party is not be required to explain the reasons for not filing an appeal within the prescribed time the party must explain the delay post period of limitation i.e. from the expiry of the period of limitation.' 20. In the decision of ITAT, Chennai Bench in Tractor & Farm Equipments Ltd. (2007) 104 ITD 149 (Chennai) (TM) the same principle was laid down stating that the party seeking condonation of delay has to prove beyond the shadow of doubt that he was diligent and not guilty of negligence whatsoever; that sufficient cause must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the said of the provisions; that the cause for delay in filing the ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 23 appeal which could have been avoided, cannot be a cause within the meaning of the limitation provisions; that the cause for delay in filing appeal, which could have been avoided by due care and attention cannot be a sufficient cause within the meaning of limitation provisions. The relevant observations of the Tribunal in the said cases are as under: “The delay cannot be condoned simply because the appellant's case is hard and calls for sympathy or merely out of benevolence to the party seeking relief. In granting the indulgence and condoning the delay, it must be proved beyond the shadow of doubt that the appellant was diligent and was not guilty of negligence, whatsoever. The sufficient cause within the contemplation of the limitation provision must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the provisions. The cause for the delay in filing the appeal, which by due care and attention, could have been avoided, cannot be a sufficient cause within the meaning of the limitation provision. Where no negligence, or inaction, or want of bona fides can be imputed to the appellant, a liberal construction of the provisions has to be made in order to advance substantial justice. Seekers of justice must come with clean hands. In the instant case, the assessee justified the delay only with reference to the affidavit of its director. In the said affidavit it was stated that the Commissioner (Appeal) 's order was misplaced and forgotten. It was found while sorting out the unwanted papers and thereafter steps were taken for the preparation of the appeal and consequently the delay was caused. That clearly showed that the delay was due to the negligence and inaction on the part of the assessee. The assessee could have very well avoided the delay by the exercise of due care and attention. There existed no sufficient and good reason for the delay of 310 days. Therefore, reasonings adduced by the Accountant Member were to be concurred with. [Para 8]” 21. What can be culled out from the above is that the in matters of condonation of delay the principles to be applied rest on the basic premise that : ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 24 • Rule of limitation is to provide certainty to litigations and thus avoid consequential anarchy due to unending period for launching litigations and is thus for benefit of general public. • It is not for denying rights of parties to legal remedy but only to ensure prompt redressal by litigants to the remedy available and to prevent any dilatory tactics being adopted . • That expiry of period of limitation does not render a bad cause good. 22. That therefore based on the above premise, section 5 of the Limitation Act and section 253(5) of the Act provides power to condone delay on demonstrating sufficient cause to the satisfaction of the courts. This satisfaction accordingly has been held by Courts to be interpreted liberally, for advancement of substantial justice. That at the same time, considering the rights which accrue to the other party to the litigation on the expiry of limitation, to treat the dispute as settled and arrange its affairs accordingly, this right can be disturbed only in the circumstances that it is demonstrated that the delay was a bona fide delay and not on account of any laxity and negligence in pursuing litigations Thus, the crux of the principle laid down by Hon’ble Courts for exercising the power for condoning delays is that there has to be sufficient and reasonable cause adduced by the assessee for the delay and the assessee should not appear to have acted negligently and in a mala fide manner. 23. In the light of the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court for condonation of the delay as above, we are convinced that in the facts of the case before us, there were convincing reasons for ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 25 delay of 5000-plus days in filing the two appeals in quantum proceedings before us. 24. The Ld.CIT(A) passed orders for both the years i.e A.Y 1994-95 and 1998-99 in2003 while the assessee filed appeal against the said orders in 2018. The assessee has contended that the delay occurred on account of the fact that it was embroiled in fighting innumerable litigations instituted against it all over the country, its factory premises were closed and some taken over by banks and it was only when demand notice for these years were served on the directors of the assessee company in 2018 that necessary action was taken and orders passed by the Ld.CIT(A) procured and appeals filed against the same. 25. The assessee has substantiated its contention by filing copies of all the litigations /suits instituted against it, in all 213 in number, both civil and criminal, instituted all over the country by different statutory authorities, nationalized banks and sundry creditors for recovery of their due amounts and going on right from the year 1997 onwards and even during the year 2003, when the Ld.CIT(A) passed orders in quantum proceedings, and thereafter also right upto the year 2017 when the assessee has demonstrated criminal proceedings going on against it in the Metropolitan Magistrates court in Ahmedabad, civil proceedings before the Prant Officer, Kalol, before the Collector of Gandhinagar, the Commissioner, P.F Ahmedabad, Arbritral Tribunal, Ahmedabad, Industrial Tribunal and such other matters. 26. The above facts have remained uncontroverted by the Revenue before us. Nothing has been brought to our notice by the Revenue to, in any way, dilute the magnitude of the dire situation in which ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 26 the assessee stated and demonstrated itself to be embroiled in when the appellate proceedings were going on before the Ld.CIT(A) and orders passed by him and even subsequently. 27. The assessee has contended that it did not receive the appellate orders. This contention of the assessee was supported by demonstrating that even before the ld.CIT(A) none appeared, demonstrating that the assessee was unaware of any appellate proceedings in the income-tax matters, being undertaken against it.That even the assessment order for A.Y 1998-99 passed in March of 2002 is an exparte order. The director of the assessee company has stated on oath that the departments appeal for A.Y 1996-97 was dismissed by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court for want of proper service of notices to the assessee. He has also stated on oath before us that the AO was serving notices in penalty proceedings for A,Y 1994-95 to the Official Liquidator and not the assessee. 28. All these facts have also remained uncontroverted before us. Therefore it cannot be completely ruled out that considering the dire circumstances which the assessee was facing it did not receive the orders passed by the Ld.CIT(A) in quantum proceedings. 29. The assessee has contended that in 2018, the directors of the assessee company were served with recovery notice for the demand pertaining to these years. This fact has also not been disputed by the Revenue before us. And therefore, after 15 years, 2003 to 2018, when the Department attempted to recover the outstanding due on the assessee, that the assessee became aware of some appellate orders having been passed against it in income tax proceedings. 30. Considering the above facts and circumstances as demonstrated by the assessee before us and which has remained ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 27 uncontroverted by the Revenue, we unhesitatingly hold that there was just and sufficient cause with the assessee for delaying the filing of appeals before us by almost 15 years. The uncontroverted fact being that the assessee was mired in litigation during the relevant period when the appellate proceedings before the Ld.CIT(A) took place and his appellate order was passed and served on the assessee, and notices of hearing were not being received by it on account of the unprecedented difficult situation it was facing, and the assessee immediately on being aware of such orders passed by the Ld.CIT(A) ,taking proactive steps by filing appeal before us, albeit after 15years delay, we are of the view that there cannot be a better and befitting situation for condoning the delay in filing appeal for advancement of substantial justice. The Revenue has been unable to demonstrate in any way that the assessee did not act diligently and was guilty of negligence in filing the appeals delayed. 31. It also needs to be noted that the assessment orders and the CIT(A)’s orders were largely ex parte orders passed without hearing the assessee, resulting in adhoc huge additions being made to the income of the assessee. Surely, the assessment framed against the assessee was without the assessee being heard and the assessee remained unheard for reasons, which were beyond its control; this has resulted in huge demands being created on the assessee. Considering the entire facts and circumstances that for reasons beyond its control the assessee could not participate adequately in the assessment proceedings or even in the penalty proceedings, and as a consequence, it has been burdened with huge demand of taxes and interest, interest of justice demands that the assessee now be heard before us. ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 28 32. The sole purpose of the judiciary is to impart justice to assessees and ensure that no gross-injustice is caused to any person. And considering the admission of the assessee that after years of being embroiled in litigation, the assessee has been able to come out of its difficult times, it is all the more the bounden duty of the Courts to lend a helping hand to the assessee to stand up on its two feet rather than pushing to its death for mere technical consideration of delay in filing appeals that too for reasons beyond the control of the assessee. 33. In view of the above, we condone the delay in filing the appeals i.e. ITA No.1148/Ahd/2019 and 835/Ahd/2018 and proceed to adjudicate the appeals on merits. 34. Since the assessee has remained unrepresented before the Ld.CIT(A) as noted in the foregoing paragraphs, we consider it fit to restore the issues back to the file of the ld.CIT(A) to adjudicate the appeals afresh, after giving due opportunity of hearing to the assessee in accordance with law. 35. Needless to mention, the assessee shall cooperate in the set aside proceedings and finalization thereof before the first appellate authority. 36. Thus, both the quantum appeals in ITA No.1148/Ahd/2019 and ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 are allowed for statistical purpose. 37. Coming to the penalty proceedings, we have noted that these appeals were dismissed by the ld.CIT(A) due to non-condonation of identical quantum of delays in filing appeal. The period of the delay ITA No.835/Ahd/2018 and 1148/Ahd/2019 & 2 Others 29 and the reasons admittedly were identical as that for the delay in filing appeals against the CIT(A) order before us. 38. Since we have found the assessee to have adduced sufficient cause for the delay in filing appeals before us, we direct the ld.CIT(A) to condone the delays in the penalty appeals and adjudicate the same on merits alongwith the quantum appeals restored back to the Ld.CIT(A) for adjudication afresh, as directed by us above. Accordingly, the penalty appeals in ITA No.2361/Ahd/2018 also are restored back to the file of the ld.CIT(A) to be decided alongwith the quantum appeals. 39. In the result, all the appeals of the assessee are allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in the Court on 12 th July, 2023 at Ahmedabad. Sd/- Sd/- (RAJPAL YADAV) VICE-PRESIDENT (ANNAPURNA GUPTA) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Ahmedabad, dated 12/07/2023 vk* आदेश आदेशआदेश आदेश क琉 क琉क琉 क琉 灹ितिलिप 灹ितिलिप灹ितिलिप 灹ितिलिप अ灡ेिषत अ灡ेिषतअ灡ेिषत अ灡ेिषत/Copy of the Order forwarded to : 1. अपीलाथ牸 / The Appellant 2. 灹瀄यथ牸 / The Respondent. 3. संबंिधत आयकर आयु猴 / Concerned CIT 4. आयकर आयु猴(अपील) / The CIT(A) 5. िवभागीय 灹ितिनिध, आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण / DR, ITAT, 6. गाड榁 फाईल / Guard file. आदेशानुसार आदेशानुसारआदेशानुसार आदेशानुसार/BY ORDER, True Copy उप उपउप उप/सहायक सहायकसहायक सहायक पंजीकार पंजीकारपंजीकार पंजीकार (Dy./Asstt.Registrar) आयकर आयकरआयकर आयकर अपीलीय अपीलीयअपीलीय अपीलीय अिधकरण अिधकरणअिधकरण अिधकरण, अहमदाबाद अहमदाबादअहमदाबाद अहमदाबाद / ITAT, Ahmedabad