IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL A BENCH, AHMEDABAD BEFORE SHRI WASEEM AHMED, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER& MS. MADHUMITA ROY, JUDICIAL MEMBER I.T.A. NO. 2580/AHD/2017 (ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2014-15) INCOME TAX OFFICER WARD-1(3)(2), AHMEDABAD 1 ST FLOOR, PRATYAKSHYAKAR BHAVAN, PANJRAPOLE, AMBAWADI, AHMEDABAD- 380015 VS. SHRI HIJABDULGANI T MEMON PROP: KOHINOOR TRANSPORT, 600/99, NR. ROSY CINEMA, SARANGPUR, AHMEDABAD [PAN NO. AFT PM1 187 Q] ( APPELLANT ) .. ( RESPONDENT ) APPELLANT BY : SHRI DILEEP KUMAR, SR. DR RESPONDENT BY : NONE DATE OF HEARING 03.03.2020 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT 29 . 0 6 . 20 20 O R D E R PER MS. MADHUMITA ROY - JM: THE INSTANT APPEAL FILED BY THE REVENUE IS DIRECTED AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 12.09.2017 PASSED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF INCO ME TAX (APPEALS) 10, AHMEDABAD ARISING OUT OF THE ORDER DATED 23.12. 2016 PASSED BY THE ITO, WARD-1(3)(2), AHMEDABAD UNDER SECTION 143(3) O F THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 (HEREINAFTER REFERRED AS TO THE ACT) FO R ASSESSMENT YEAR 2014- 15 WITH THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:- (1) THAT THE LD.CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN LAW AND/OR ON FACTS IN DELETING THE DISALLOWANCE MADE BY THE AO ON ACCOUNT OF EXPENSES CLAIMED BY THE ASSESSEE OF RS. 1,96,59,188/-. ITA NO.2580/AHD/2017 ITO VS. SHRI HAJIABDULGANI T MEMON ASST.YEAR 2014-15 - 2 - (2) THAT THE LD.CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN LAW AND/OR ON F ACTS IN DELETING THE ADDITION MADE BY THE AO U/S. 68 OF THE ACT OF RS. 10,00,000/ -. GROUND NO. 1:- 2. IT RELATES TO DELETING THE DISALLOWANCE MADE BY THE LD. AO ON ACCOUNT OF EXPENSES CLAIMED BY THE ASSESSEE OF RS. 1,96,59, 188/-. NONE APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEE BEFORE US. HOWEVER, AT T HE TIME OF HEARING LD. DR APPEARING FOR THE REVENUE SUBMITTED THAT THE MATTER IS COVERED IN ASSESSEES OWN CASE FOR THE A.Y. 2012-13. 3. WE HAVE HEARD THE LD. DR AND PERUSED THE RELEVAN T MATERIALS AVAILABLE ON RECORD. DURING THE COURSE OF ASSESSMENT PROCEEDING IT WAS FOUND THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS CLAIMED AGGREGATE EXPENSES OF RS. 12,5 0,94,367/-. OUT OF WHICH UPON VERIFICATION OF THE LEDGER ACCOUNT IT WA S FOUND THAT EXPENSES OF AUTO PARTS AND DIESEL HAVE BEEN PAID BY CHEQUE. OT HER EXPENSES MAINLY LORRY RENT EXPENSES, HOWEVER, WAS PAID IN CASH. FU RTHER THAT THE GROSS RECEIPT OF THE PROPRIETARY SHIP CONCERN HAS BEEN SH OWN AT RS. 13,06,46,335/- AGAINST WHICH EXPENSES TO THE TUNE OF RS. 13,00,76, 516/- WAS CLAIMED AND, THEREFORE, NET PROFIT WAS OF ONLY RS. 5,69,819/-. THOUGH THE ASSESSEE FURNISHED THE LEDGER ACCOUNT OF THE EXPENSES BUT SU PPORTING EVIDENCES LIKE BILLS/VOUCHERS WERE NOT SUBMITTED BEFORE THE LD. AO AND, THEREFORE, IN THE ABSENCE OF CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCES THE 20% OF THE A GGREGATE EXPENSES EXCEPT EXPENSES INCURRED IN AUTO PART AND DIESEL WH ICH WAS WORKED OUT TO RS. 2,08,72,059/- IS ALLOWED OUT OF THE TOTAL CLAIM ED OF EXPENSES OF RS. 10,43,60,296/-. IN APPEAL THE SAME WAS DELETED BY THE LD. CIT(A). WHILE DEALING WITH THE APPEAL PREFERRED BY THE ASSESSEE T HE LD. CIT(A) TOOK INTO ITA NO.2580/AHD/2017 ITO VS. SHRI HAJIABDULGANI T MEMON ASST.YEAR 2014-15 - 3 - CONSIDERATION THE ADDITIONS MADE BY THE AUTHORITIES FOR A.YS. 2011-12 AND 2013-14 AGAINST WHICH NO APPEAL HAS BEEN PREFERRED BY THE ASSESSEE. THE SAID ORDER PASSED BY THE LD. CIT(A) HAS BEEN UPHELD BY THE ITAT IN ITA NO. 2630/AHD/2017 FOR THE A.Y. 2012-13 IN THE APPEA LS PREFERRED BY REVENUE COPY WHEREOF HAS BEEN SUBMITTED BEFORE US. WE HAVE ALSO CONSIDERED THE SAID JUDGMENT PASSED BY THE CO-ORDIN ATE BENCH. IN THE INSTANT CASE THE PAYMENT TOWARDS LORRY RENT EXPENSE S AND SOME OTHER EXPENSES RELATING TO TYRE TUBE EXPENSES/DIESEL EXPE NSES WAS MADE IN CASH. ULTIMATELY THE LD. CIT(A) TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE ENTIRE ASPECT OF THE MATTER DISALLOWED 1% OF THE LORRY RENT EXPENSES OF RS. 9,31,01,400/- I.E. THE ADDITION WAS MADE OF RS. 9,31,014/-. FOUR PER CENT OF AUTO PARTS, DIESEL EXPENSES, LOADING EXPENSES AND TYRE AND TUBE EXPENS ES OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF RS. 2,78,40,505/- WAS DISALLOWED BY THE LD. CIT( A). THE TOTAL ADDITION WAS OF RS. 20,44,634/- WHICH IS KIND OF SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE ADDITION MADE BY THE LD. CIT(A) FOR A.Y. 2012-13 ON THE SIMILAR S ET OF FACTS. THUS, ACCORDING TO US, THE ORDER IMPUGNED IS WITHOUT ANY AMBIGUITY SO AS TO WARRANT INTERFERENCE AND HENCE THE ORDER IS PASSED IN AFFIRMATIVE I.E. IN FAVOUR OF THE ASSESSEE AND AGAINST THE REVENUE. GROUND NO.2:- 4. THE SECOND GROUND RELATES TO ADDITION OF RS. 10, 00,000/- DEPOSITED BY IN CASH BY THE APPELLANT, WHICH WAS CONSIDERED TO B E UNEXPLAINED IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION GIVEN BY TH E ASSESSEE. TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE IDENTICAL ISSUE AS DECIDED BY THE LD. CIT(A) FOR A.Y. 2012-13 IN ASSESSEES OWN CASE, AS IT APPEARS FROM THE RECORDS, THE LD. CIT(A) DELETED SUCH AMOUNT, WHICH IS ACCORDING TO U S JUST AND PROPER AND ITA NO.2580/AHD/2017 ITO VS. SHRI HAJIABDULGANI T MEMON ASST.YEAR 2014-15 - 4 - WITHOUT ANY AMBIGUITY. HENCE, THE SAME IS HEREBY C ONFIRMED. THIS GROUND OF APPEAL BY THE REVENUE IS THUS, FOUND TO BE DEVOI D OF ANY MERIT AND HENCE DISMISSED. 5. IN THE RESULT, REVENUES APPEAL IS DISMISSED. 6. BEFORE PARTING WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CERTAIN OBS ERVATION RELATING TO THE ISSUE CROPPED UP UNDER PRESENT SCENARIO OF COVI D-19 PANDEMIC AS TO WHETHER WHEN THE HEARING OF THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDE D ON 03.03.2020 THE ORDER CAN BE PRONOUNCED TODAY I.E. ON 30.06.2020. THE ISSUE HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE CO-ORDINATE BENCH IN THE CASE OF DCIT VS. JSW LTD. (ITA NOS. 6264 & 6103/MUM/2018) PRONOUNCED ON 14.05 .2020 IN THE LIGHT OF WHICH IT IS WELL WITHIN THE TIME LIMIT PERMITTED UNDER RULE 34(5) OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963 IN VIEW OF THE FOLLO WING OBSERVATIONS MADE THEREIN: 7. HOWEVER, BEFORE WE PART WITH THE MATTER, WE MUS T DEAL WITH ONE PROCEDURAL ISSUE AS WELL. WHILE HEARING OF THESE A PPEALS WAS CONCLUDED ON 8TH JANUARY 2020, THIS ORDER THEREON IS BEING PRONO UNCED TODAY ON THE DAY OF 14TH MAY, 2020, MUCH AFTER THE EXPIRY OF 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF CONCLUSION OF HEARING. WE ARE ALSO ALIVE TO THE FAC T THAT RULE 34(5) OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES 1963, WHICH DEA LS WITH PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS: (5) THE PRONOUNCEMENT MAY BE IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWIN G MANNERS : (A) THE BENCH MAY PRONOUNCE THE ORDER IM MEDIATELY UPON THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING. ITA NO.2580/AHD/2017 ITO VS. SHRI HAJIABDULGANI T MEMON ASST.YEAR 2014-15 - 5 - (B) IN CASE WHERE THE ORDER IS NOT PRONO UNCED IMMEDIATELY ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE BENCH SHALL GIVE A DATE FOR PRO NOUNCEMENT. (C) IN A CASE WHERE NO DATE OF PRONOUNCE MENT IS GIVEN BY THE BENCH, EVERY ENDEAVOUR SHALL BE MADE BY THE BENCH TO PRONOUNCE T HE ORDER WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE HEARING OF THE CASE WAS CONCL UDED BUT, WHERE IT IS NOT PRACTICABLE SO TO DO ON THE GROUND OF EXCEPTIONAL A ND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THE BENCH SHALL FIX A FUTURE DAY FOR PRON OUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER, AND SUCH DATE SHALL NOT ORDINARILY (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED BY US NOW) BE A DAY BEYOND A FURTHER PERIOD OF 30 DAYS AND DUE NOTICE OF THE DAY SO FIXE D SHALL BE GIVEN ON THE NOTICE BOARD. 8. QUITE CLEARLY, ORDINARILY THE ORDER ON AN APPE AL SHOULD BE PRONOUNCED BY THE BENCH WITHIN NO MORE THAN 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF CONCLUDING THE HEARING. IT IS, HOWEVER, IMPORTANT T O NOTE THAT THE EXPRESSION ORDINARILY HAS BEEN USED IN THE SAID RULE ITSELF. THIS RULE WAS INSERTED AS A RESULT OF DIRECTIONS OF HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF SHIVSAGAR VEG RESTAURANT VS ACIT [(2009) 317 ITR 4 33 (BOM)] WHEREIN THEIR LORDSHIPS HAD, INTER ALIA, DIRECTED THAT WE, THEREFORE, DIRECT THE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL TO FRAME AND LA Y DOWN THE GUIDELINES IN THE SIMILAR LINES AS ARE LAID DOWN BY THE APEX COUR T IN THE CASE OF ANIL RAI (SUPRA) AND TO ISSUE APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATIVE DIR ECTIONS TO ALL THE BENCHES OF THE TRIBUNAL IN THAT BEHALF. WE HOPE AND TRUST THAT SUITABLE GUIDELINES SHALL BE FRAMED AND ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL WITHIN SHORTEST REASONABLE TIME AND FOLLOWED STRICTLY BY A LL THE BENCHES OF THE TRIBUNAL. IN THE MEANWHILE(EMPHASIS, BY UNDERLINING , SUPPLIED BY US NOW), ALL THE REVISIONAL AND APPELLATE AUTHORITIES UNDER THE INCOME-TAX ACT ARE DIRECTED TO DECIDE MATTERS HEARD BY THEM WITHIN A P ERIOD OF THREE MONTHS FROM THE DATE CASE IS CLOSED FOR JUDGMENT. IN TH E RULED SO FRAMED, AS A RESULT OF THESE DIRECTIONS, THE EXPRESSION ORDINAR ILY HAS BEEN INSERTED IN THE REQUIREMENT TO PRONOUNCE THE ORDER WITHIN A PER IOD OF 90 DAYS. THE ITA NO.2580/AHD/2017 ITO VS. SHRI HAJIABDULGANI T MEMON ASST.YEAR 2014-15 - 6 - QUESTION THEN ARISES WHETHER THE PASSING OF THIS OR DER, BEYOND NINETY DAYS, WAS NECESSITATED BY ANY EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANC ES. 9. LET US IN THIS LIGHT REVERT TO THE PREVAILING SI TUATION IN THE COUNTRY. ON 24TH MARCH, 2020, HONBLE PRIME MINISTER OF INDI A TOOK THE BOLD STEP OF IMPOSING A NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, FOR 21 DAYS, TO PRE VENT SPREAD OF COVID 19 EPIDEMIC, AND THIS LOCKDOWN WAS EXTENDED FROM TI ME TO TIME. AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN BEFORE THIS FORMAL NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AT MUMBAI WAS SEVERELY RESTRICTED ON ACCOUNT OF LOCKDOWN BY THE MAHARASHTR A GOVERNMENT, AND ON ACCOUNT OF STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH ADVISORIES WITH A VIEW OF CHECKING SPREAD OF COVID 19. THE EPIDEMIC SITUATION IN MUMBA I BEING GRAVE, THERE WAS NOT MUCH OF A RELAXATION IN SUBSEQUENT LOCKDOWN S ALSO. IN ANY CASE, THERE WAS UNPRECEDENTED DISRUPTION OF JUDICIAL WOK ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT HAS BEEN SUCH AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION, CAUSING DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF JUDICIAL MACHINERY , THAT HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, IN AN UNPRECEDENTED ORDER IN THE HI STORY OF INDIA AND VIDE ORDER DATED 6.5.2020 READ WITH ORDER DATED 23.3.202 0, EXTENDED THE LIMITATION TO EXCLUDE NOT ONLY THIS LOCKDOWN PERIOD BUT ALSO A FEW MORE DAYS PRIOR TO, AND AFTER, THE LOCKDOWN BY OBSERVING THAT IN CASE THE LIMITATION HAS EXPIRED AFTER 15.03.2020 THEN THE PE RIOD FROM 15.03.2020 TILL THE DATE ON WHICH THE LOCKDOWN IS LIFTED IN THE JUR ISDICTIONAL AREA WHERE THE DISPUTE LIES OR WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES SH ALL BE EXTENDED FOR A PERIOD OF 15DAYS AFTER THE LIFTING OF LOCKDOWN. HO NBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT, IN AN ORDER DATED 15TH APRIL 2020, HAS, BESI DES EXTENDING THE VALIDITY OF ALL INTERIM ORDERS, HAS ALSO OBSERVED THAT, IT IS ALSO CLARIFIED THAT WHILE ITA NO.2580/AHD/2017 ITO VS. SHRI HAJIABDULGANI T MEMON ASST.YEAR 2014-15 - 7 - CALCULATING TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME- BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CO NTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY , AND ALSO OBSERVED THAT ARRANGEMENT CONTINUED BY AN ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 TILL 30TH APRIL 2020 SHALL CONTINUE FURTHER TILL 15TH JUNE 2020. IT HAS BEEN AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION NOT ONLY IN INDIA BUT ALL O VER THE WORLD. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAS, VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 19 TH FEBRUARY 2020, TAKEN THE STAND THAT, THE CORONA VIRUS SHOULD BE CONSIDE RED A CASE OF NATURAL CALAMITY AND FMC (I.E. FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE) MAY BE INVOKED, WHEREVER CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, FOLLOWING THE DUE PROCEDURE . THE TERM FORCE MAJEURE HAS BEEN DEFINED IN BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY , AS AN EVENT OR EFFECT THAT CAN BE NEITHER ANTICIPATED NOR CONTROLLED WHE N SUCH IS THE POSITION, AND IT IS OFFICIALLY SO NOTIFIED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE COVID-19 EPIDEMIC HAS BEEN NOTIFIED AS A DISASTER UNDER THE NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT, 2005, AND ALSO IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS ABOVE, THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE CAN BE AN YTHING BUT AN ORDINARY PERIOD. 10. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSIONS, WE ARE OF THE CONSIDERED VIEW THAT RATHER THAN TAKING A PEDANTIC VIEW OF THE RULE REQUIRING PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN 90 DAYS, DISREGARDING THE IMPORTAN T FACT THAT THE ENTIRE COUNTRY WAS IN LOCKDOWN, WE SHOULD COMPUTE THE PERI OD OF 90 DAYS BY EXCLUDING AT LEAST THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE LOCK DOWN WAS IN FORCE. WE MUST FACTOR GROUND REALITIES IN MIND WHILE INTERPRE TING THE TIME LIMIT FOR THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER. LAW IS NOT BROODING OMN IPOTENCE IN THE SKY. IT IS A PRAGMATIC TOOL OF THE SOCIAL ORDER. THE TENETS OF LAW BEING ENACTED ON ITA NO.2580/AHD/2017 ITO VS. SHRI HAJIABDULGANI T MEMON ASST.YEAR 2014-15 - 8 - THE BASIS OF PRAGMATISM, AND THAT IS HOW THE LAW IS REQUIRED TO INTERPRETED. THE INTERPRETATION SO ASSIGNED BY US IS NOT ONLY IN CONSONANCE WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF RULE 34(5) BUT IS ALSO A PRAGMATIC AP PROACH AT A TIME WHEN A DISASTER, NOTIFIED UNDER THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT AC T 2005, IS CAUSING UNPRECEDENTED DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF OUR JUSTICE DELIVERY SYSTEM. UNDOUBTEDLY, IN THE CASE OF OTTERS CLUB VS DIT [(2 017) 392 ITR 244 (BOM)], HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT DID NOT APPROVE A N ORDER BEING PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL BEYOND A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS, BUT THE N IN THE PRESENT SITUATION HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT ITSELF HAS, VIDE JUDGMENT DATED 15TH APRIL 2020, HELD THAT DIRECTED WHILE CALCULATING THE T IME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME-BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY. THE EXTRAORDINARY STEPS TAKE N SUO MOTU BY HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT AND HONBLE SUPREME COURT ALSO INDICATE THAT THIS PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN CANNOT BE TREATED AS AN ORDINARY PERIOD DURING WHICH THE NORMAL TIME LIMITS ARE TO REMAIN IN FORCE. IN O UR CONSIDERED VIEW, EVEN WITHOUT THE WORDS ORDINARILY, IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL POSITION, THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LOCKOUT WAS IN FO RCE IS TO EXCLUDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIME LIMITS SET OUT IN RULE 34(5) OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963. VIEWED THUS, THE EXCEPTION, TO 90-DAY TIME-LI MIT FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, INHERENT IN RULE 34(5)(C), WITH RESPECT TO THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN NINETY DAYS, CLEARLY COMES INTO PLAY IN THE PRESENT CASE. OF COURSE, THERE IS NO, AND THERE CANNOT BE ANY, BAR O N THE DISCRETION OF THE BENCHES TO RE-FIX THE MATTERS FOR CLARIFICATIONS BE CAUSE OF CONSIDERABLE TIME LAG BETWEEN THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE HEARING IS C ONCLUDED AND THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE ORDER THEREON IS BEING FINALIZED, BUT THEN, IN OUR ITA NO.2580/AHD/2017 ITO VS. SHRI HAJIABDULGANI T MEMON ASST.YEAR 2014-15 - 9 - CONSIDERED VIEW, NO SUCH EXERCISE WAS REQUIRED TO B E CARRIED OUT ON THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 7. ON THE BASIS OF THE OBSERVATION MADE IN THE AFOR ESAID JUDGMENT WE EXCLUDE THE PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN WHILE COMPUTING THE LIMITATION PROVIDED UNDER RULE 34(5) OF THE INCOME TAX (APPELLATE TRIBU NAL) RULE 1963. ORDER IS, THUS, PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT. 8. IN THE RESULT, REVENUES APPEAL IS DISMISSED. THIS ORDER PRONOUNCED IN OPEN COURT ON 29/06/2020 SD/- SD/- (WASEEM AHMED) (MS. MADHUMITA ROY) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER AHMEDABAD; DATED 29/06/2020 TANMAY, SR. PS TRUE COPY / COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO : 1. / THE APPELLANT 2. / THE RESPONDENT. 3. / CONCERNED CIT 4. ( ) / THE CIT(A)- 5. , ! ' , #$%% / DR, ITAT, AHMEDABAD 6. &' () / GUARD FILE. / BY ORDER, / (DY./ASSTT. REGISTRAR) !, #$ / ITAT, AHMEDABAD 1. DATE OF DICTATION 04.03.2020 2. DATE ON WHICH THE TYPED DRAFT IS PLACED BEFORE THE DICTATING MEMBER 05.03.2020 3. OTHER MEMBER 4. DATE ON WHICH THE APPROVED DRAFT COMES TO THE SR.P. S./P.S 29.06.2020 5. DATE ON WHICH THE FAIR ORDER IS PLACED BEFORE THE D ICTATING MEMBER FOR PRONOUNCEMENT 6. DATE ON WHICH THE FAIR ORDER COMES BACK TO THE SR.P .S./P.S 7. DATE ON WHICH THE FILE GOES TO THE BENCH CLERK 29.06.2020 8. DATE ON WHICH THE FILE GOES TO THE HEAD CLERK ... 9. THE DATE ON WHICH THE FILE GOES TO THE ASSISTANT RE GISTRAR FOR SIGNATURE ON THE ORDER.. 10. DATE OF DESPATCH OF THE ORDER