Shri Suraj, Kanpur V. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, CC-I, Kanpur

ITA 331/LKW/2019

• Counselvise Citation: [2020] 111 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 0047 (ITAT-LUCKNOW)
• Duration Of Justice: 1 year(s) 1 month(s) 2 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 26-06-2020
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Allowed
• Bench Allotted: A
• Assessment Year: 2013-2014
• Appeal Filed On: 24-05-2019
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Keywords: Principle of natural justice; Question of law
• Section: 271(1)(c); 274; 64; 73

Judgement Text

I.T.A. NO.331/LKW/2019 ASSESSMENT YEAR:2013-14 1 IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL LUCKNOW BENCH A, LUCKNOW BEFORE SHRI A. D. JAIN, VICE PRESIDENT AND SHRI T. S. KAPOOR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ITA NO.331/LKW/2019 ASSESSMENT YEAR:2013-14 SHRI SURAJ, 2A/388, AZAD NAGAR, KANPUR. PAN:ANRPS 4271M VS. DY.C.I.T., CENTRAL CIRCLE-1, KANPUR. (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) O R D E R PER A. D. JAIN: V.P. THIS IS AN APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE AGAINST TH E ORDER OF LEARNED CIT(A)-IV, KANPUR DATED 29/03/2019 PERTAINING TO AS SESSMENT YEAR 2013- 2014. 2. IN THIS APPEAL, THE ONLY GRIEVANCE OF THE ASSESS EE IS AGAINST IMPOSITION OF PENALTY UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT WHICH HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE LEARNED CIT(A). 3. AT THE TIME OF HEARING BEFORE US, THE LEARNED A. R. OF THE ASSESSEE INVITED OUR ATTENTION TO THE PAPER BOOK FILED WHERE IN SHOW CAUSE NOTICE FOR PENALTY UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT WAS PLA CED. IT WAS SUBMITTED THAT FROM A PERUSAL OF THIS NOTICE, IT IS CRYSTAL C LEAR THAT THE CHARGE IS NOT SPECIFIC FOR WHICH PENALTY IS LEVIED UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT, APPELLANT BY SHRI P. K. KAPOOR, C. A. RESPONDENT BY SHRI AJAY KUMAR, D.R. DATE OF HEARING 19/02/2020 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT 26 /0 6 /2020 I.T.A. NO.331/LKW/2019 ASSESSMENT YEAR:2013-14 2 WHETHER FOR CONCEALMENT OF INCOME OR FOR FURNISHING OF INACCURATE PARTICULARS OF INCOME. THE LEARNED A.R. OF THE ASS ESSEE VEHEMENTLY ARGUED THAT IT IS SETTLED POSITION OF LAW THAT IF NOTICE U NDER SECTION 274 READ WITH 271(1)(C) IS NOT SPECIFIC ABOUT THE CHARGE OR LIMB UNDER WHICH PENALTY IS BEING LEVIED UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT, TH EN ANY PENALTY LEVIED ON THE BASIS OF SUCH NOTICE IS BAD IN LAW AND LIABLE T O BE DELETED. 4. THE LD. D.R., ON THE OTHER HAND, RELIED ON THE O RDERS OF THE AUTHORITIES BELOW. LEARNED D. R. ALSO RELIED ON THE JUDGMENT O F HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF SUNDRAM FINANCE LTD. VS. DCIT [2018] 99 TAXMANN.COM 152 (SC). 5. WE HAVE PERUSED THE CASE RECORDS AND HEARD THE R IVAL CONTENTIONS AND AS APPARENT FROM NOTICE UNDER SECTION 274 READ WITH 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT, WE FIND THAT THE CHARGE ON WHICH PENALTY IS LE VIED IS NOT SPECIFIC. THE COPY OF SHOW CAUSE NOTICE HAS BEEN MADE PART OF THI S ORDER, WHICH IS AS UNDER: I.T.A. NO.331/LKW/2019 ASSESSMENT YEAR:2013-14 3 FROM A PERUSAL OF THIS NOTICE, IT IS CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT THE CHARGE IS NOT SPECIFIC FOR WHICH PENALTY IS LEVIED UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT, WHETHER FOR CONCEALMENT OF INCOME OR FOR FURNISHING OF INACCURA TE PARTICULARS OF INCOME. THE NOTICE HAS SPECIFIED BOTH CHARGES, I.E., CONCEA LMENT OF INCOME AND FURNISHING OF INACCURATE PARTICULARS OF INCOME AND HAS NOT SPECIFIED THE CHARGE FOR WHICH ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN AGAINST ASSE SSEE. THE NON SPECIFIC NATURE OF THE NOTICE INDICATES NON APPLICATION OF M IND BY ASSESSING OFFICER. IT IS A SETTLED POSITION OF LAW THAT IF NOTICE UNDE R SECTION 274 READ WITH 271(1)(C) IS NOT SPECIFIC ABOUT THE CHARGE OR LIMB UNDER WHICH PENALTY IS BEING LEVIED UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT, TH EN ANY PENALTY LEVIED ON THE BASIS OF SUCH NOTICE IS BAD IN LAW AND LIABLE T O BE DELETED. 6. THE LAW MANDATES THAT THE AUTHORITY, WHO IS PRO POSING TO IMPOSE PENALTY, SHALL BE CERTAIN AS TO WHAT BASIS PENALTY IS BEING LEVIED AND NOTICE MUST REFLECT THAT SPECIFIC REASON SO THAT ASSESSEE, TO WHOM SUCH NOTICE IS GIVEN, CAN WELL PREPARE HIMSELF REGARDING DEFENCE, WHICH HE LIKES TO TAKE TO SUPPORT HIS CASE. THIS IS EVEN ENSHRINED IN THE PR INCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND AS HAS BEEN UPHELD BY HON'BLE APEX COURT AND OT HER HIGH COURTS. WE WOULD LIKE TO RELY ON THE FOLLOWING CASES:- (1) CIT VS. SSAS EMERALD MEADOWS [2016] 73 TAXMANN.COM 248 (SC). IN THIS CASE THE HON'BLE APEX COURT LOOKED I NTO THE FACTS BEFORE THEM THAT TRIBUNAL RELYING ON THE DECISION O F DIVISION BENCH OF HON'BLE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT IN THE CASE O F CIT AND ANOTHER VS. MANJUNATH COTTON & GINNING FACTORY (SUP RA) ALLOWED THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE HOLDING THAT NOT ICE ISSUED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER UNDER SECTION 274 READ WIT H SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT WAS BAD IN LAW AS IT DID NOT S PECIFY UNDER WHICH LIMB OF 271(1)(C) PENALTY PROCEEDINGS HAS BEE N INITIATED I.E. WHETHER FOR CONCEALMENT OF PARTICULARS OF INCO ME OR FURNISHING OF INACCURATE PARTICULARS OF INCOME. WH EN THE MATTER TRAVELLED UPTO THE HIGH COURT, IT SUPPORTED THE JUD GMENT OF HON'BLE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT AND ANOTHER VS. MANJUNATH COTTON & GINNING FACTORY (SUPRA) AND DECIDED THAT THERE WAS THEREFORE NO SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW TO BE I.T.A. NO.331/LKW/2019 ASSESSMENT YEAR:2013-14 4 DECIDED. THEREAFTER AN SLP WAS FILED BEFORE THE HO N'BLE APEX COURT AND THE APEX COURT DISMISSED THE SLP OF THE R EVENUE FINDING NO MERIT THEREIN AND CONFIRMING THE ISSUE I N FAVOUR OF THE ASSESSEE. (2) CIT AND ANOTHER VS. MANJUNATH COTTON & GINNING FACT ORY [2013] 359 ITR 565 (KARN.). IN THIS CASE, IT HAS B EEN CLEARLY MENTIONED AND HELD BY THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT THAT N OTICE UNDER SECTION 274 READ WITH SECTION 271(1)(C) OF TH E ACT SHOULD SPECIFICALLY STATE THE GROUNDS MENTIONED IN 271(1)( C) I.E. WHETHER IT IS FOR CONCEALMENT OF INCOME OR FOR FURN ISHING OF INACCURATE PARTICULARS OF INCOME. SENDING PRINTED FORM WHERE ALL THE GROUNDS MENTIONED WOULD NOT SATISFY THE REQ UIREMENT OF LAW. ASSESSEE SHOULD KNOW THE GROUNDS WHICH HE HAS TO MEET SPECIFICALLY. OTHERWISE, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE IS OFFENDED. ON THE BASIS OF SUCH PROCEEDINGS NO PEN ALTY COULD BE IMPOSED TO THE ASSESSEE. PENALTY PROCEEDINGS AR E DISTINCT FROM ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS THOUGH IT EMANATES FROM THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS STILL IT IS SEPARATE AND IND EPENDENT PROCEEDINGS ALL TOGETHER. (3) MEHERJEE CASSINATH HOLDINGS PVT. LTD VS. ACIT (ITAT MUMBAI) ITA NO. 2555/MUM/2012, ORDER DATED 28/04/2017 WHERE IN THE OBSERVATION OF THE BENCH WAS THAT PENALTY PROCEEDIN GS UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT ARE 'QUASI-CRIMINAL' P ROCEEDINGS AND OUGHT TO COMPLY WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE. THE NON-STRIKING OF THE IRRELEVANT PORTION IN THE SHOW- CAUSE NOTICE MEANS THAT THE ASSESSING OFFICER IS NOT FIRM ABOUT THE CHARGE AGAINST THE ASSESSEE AND THE ASSESSEE IS NOT MADE A WARE AS TO WHICH OF THE TWO LIMBS OF S. 271(1)(C) HE HAS TO RE SPOND. (4) CHANDRA PRAKASH BUBNA VS. INCOME TAX OFFICER, WARD 27(3), KOLKATA (ITAT KOLKATA BENCH) [2015] 64 TAXMANN.COM 155 WHEREIN IT WAS HELD THAT WHEN THE ASSESSING OFFICER LEVIED PENALTY WITHOUT BRINGING OUT ANY SPECIFIC CHARGE FO R WHICH PENALTY HAD BEEN IMPOSED, PENALTY WAS LIABLE TO BE DELETED. 7. THE SETTLED LEGAL POSITION ON THE ISSUE, AS ENSH RINED IN THE AFORESAID CASES, IS APPARENT AND WE ARRIVE AT THE CONSIDERED VIEW THAT NOTICE UNDER SECTION 274 READ WITH 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT, WHICH H AS NOT SPECIFIED THE CHARGE AND LIMB UNDER WHICH PENALTY SHOULD BE LEVIE D, IT IS VOID AB INITIO AND ANY CONSEQUENT PENALTY IMPOSED ON THE BASIS OF SUCH NOTICE IS, THEREFORE, I.T.A. NO.331/LKW/2019 ASSESSMENT YEAR:2013-14 5 ILLEGAL AND BAD IN LAW AND LIABLE TO BE DELETED. W E, THEREFORE, DIRECT DELETION OF THE PENALTY. 8. IT IS PERTINENT TO MENTION HERE THAT THIS ORDER IS BEING PRONOUNCED AFTER A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING. IN THIS REGARD, WE PLACE RELIANCE ON THE D ECISION OF CO-ORDINATE BENCH OF THIS TRIBUNAL IN THE CASE OF JSW LTD IN IT A NOS. 6264 & 6103/MUM/2018 DATED 14.5.2020, WHEREIN THIS ISSUE H AS BEEN ADDRESSED IN DETAIL ALLOWING TIME TO PRONOUNCE THE ORDER BEYO ND 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF CONCLUSION OF HEARING BY EXCLUDING THE DAYS FOR WHICH THE LOCKDOWN ANNOUNCED BY THE GOVERNMENT WAS IN FORCE. THE RELEVANT OBSERVATIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL IN THE SAID BINDING PR ECEDENT ARE AS UNDER:- 7. HOWEVER, BEFORE WE PART WITH THE MATTER, WE MU ST DEAL WITH ONE PROCEDURAL ISSUE AS WELL. WHILE HEARING OF THESE APPEALS WAS CONCLUDED ON 7TH JANUARY 2020, THIS ORD ER THEREON IS BEING PRONOUNCED TODAY ON 14 TH DAY OF MAY, 2020, MUCH AFTER THE EXPIRY OF 90 DAYS FROM THE DAT E OF CONCLUSION OF HEARING. WE ARE ALSO ALIVE TO THE FAC T THAT RULE 34(5) OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RUL ES 1963, WHICH DEALS WITH PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS: (5) THE PRONOUNCEMENT MAY BE IN ANY OF THE FOLLO WING MANNERS : (A) THE BENCH MAY PRONOUNCE THE ORDER IMMEDIATELY UPON THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING. (B) IN CASE WHERE THE ORDER IS NOT PRONOUNCED IMMEDIATE LY ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE BENCH SHALL GIVE A DATE FOR PRONOUNCEMENT. (C ) IN A CASE WHERE NO DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT IS GI VEN BY THE BENCH, EVERY ENDEAVOUR SHALL BE MADE BY THE BENCH T O PRONOUNCE THE ORDER WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE HEARING OF THE CASE WAS CONCLUDED BUT, WHERE IT IS NOT PRACTICABLE SO TO DO ON THE GROUND OF EXCEPTIONAL A ND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THE BENCH SHALL FIX A FUTURE DAY FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER, AND SUCH DATE SHALL NOT ORDINARILY (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED BY US NOW) BE A DAY I.T.A. NO.331/LKW/2019 ASSESSMENT YEAR:2013-14 6 BEYOND A FURTHER PERIOD OF 30 DAYS AND DUE NOTICE O F THE DAY SO FIXED SHALL BE GIVEN ON THE NOTICE BOARD. 8. QUITE CLEARLY, ORDINARILY THE ORDER ON AN APPE AL SHOULD BE PRONOUNCED BY THE BENCH WITHIN NO MORE THAN 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF CONCLUDING THE HEARING. IT IS , HOWEVER, IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE EXPRESSION ORDINARILY HAS BEEN USED IN THE SAID RULE ITSELF. THIS RULE WAS INSERTED AS A RESULT OF DIRECTIONS OF HON BLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF SHIVSAGAR VEG RESTAURANT VS ACIT [(2009) 317 ITR 433 (BOM)] WHEREIN THEIR LORDSHIPS HAD, INTER ALIA, DIRECTED T HAT WE, THEREFORE, DIRECT THE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLA TE TRIBUNAL TO FRAME AND LAY DOWN THE GUIDELINES IN TH E SIMILAR LINES AS ARE LAID DOWN BY THE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF ANIL RAI (SUPRA) AND TO ISSUE APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIONS TO ALL THE BENCHES OF THE TRIBUNAL IN THAT BEHALF. WE HOPE AND TRUST THAT SUI TABLE GUIDELINES SHALL BE FRAMED AND ISSUED BY THE PRESID ENT OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL WITHIN SHORTEST REASONABL E TIME AND FOLLOWED STRICTLY BY ALL THE BENCHES OF THE TRI BUNAL. IN THE MEANWHILE (EMPHASIS, BY UNDERLINING, SUPPLIED BY US NOW), ALL THE REVISIONAL AND APPELLATE AUTHORITI ES UNDER THE INCOME-TAX ACT ARE DIRECTED TO DECIDE MATT ERS HEARD BY THEM WITHIN A PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS FROM THE DATE CASE IS CLOSED FOR JUDGMENT. IN THE RULE SO F RAMED, AS A RESULT OF THESE DIRECTIONS, THE EXPRESSION ORDINARILY HAS BEEN INSERTED IN THE REQUIREMENT T O PRONOUNCE THE ORDER WITHIN A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS. THE QUESTION THEN ARISES WHETHER THE PASSING OF THIS OR DER, BEYOND NINETY DAYS, WAS NECESSITATED BY ANY EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES. 9. LET US IN THIS LIGHT REVERT TO THE PREVAIL ING SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY. ON 24TH MARCH, 2020, HONBLE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA TOOK THE BOLD STEP OF IMPOSING A NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, FOR 21 DAYS, TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF COVID 19 EPIDEMIC, AND THIS LOCKDOWN WAS EXTENDED FROM TIME TO TIME. AS A MATTER OF FACT, EV EN BEFORE THIS FORMAL NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, THE FUNCTIO NING OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AT MUMBAI WAS I.T.A. NO.331/LKW/2019 ASSESSMENT YEAR:2013-14 7 SEVERELY RESTRICTED ON ACCOUNT OF LOCKDOWN BY THE MAHARASHTRA GOVERNMENT, AND ON ACCOUNT OF STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH ADVISORIES WITH A VIEW OF CHECKING SPREAD OF COVID 19. THE EPIDEMIC SITUATION IN MUMBAI BEING GRAVE, THERE WAS NOT MUCH OF A RELAXATION IN SUBSEQUENT LOCKDOWNS ALSO. IN ANY CASE , THERE WAS UNPRECEDENTED DISRUPTION OF JUDICIAL WOK ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT HAS B EEN SUCH AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION, CAUSING DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF JUDICIAL MACHINERY, THAT HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, IN AN UNPRECEDENTED ORDER I N THE HISTORY OF INDIA AND VIDE ORDER DATED 6.5.2020 R EAD WITH ORDER DATED 23.3.2020, EXTENDED THE LIMITATION TO EXCLUDE NOT ONLY THIS LOCKDOWN PERIOD BUT ALSO A FE W MORE DAYS PRIOR TO, AND AFTER, THE LOCKDOWN BY OBSERVING THAT IN CASE THE LIMITATION HAS EXPIRED A FTER 15.03.2020 THEN THE PERIOD FROM 15.03.2020 TILL THE DATE ON WHICH THE LOCKDOWN IS LIFTED IN THE JURISDI CTIONAL AREA WHERE THE DISPUTE LIES OR WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES SHALL BE EXTENDED FOR A PERIOD OF 15 DAYS AFTER THE LIFTING OF LOCKDOWN. HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT, IN AN ORDER DATED 15TH APRIL 2020, HAS, BESI DES EXTENDING THE VALIDITY OF ALL INTERIM ORDERS, HAS A LSO OBSERVED THAT, IT IS ALSO CLARIFIED THAT WHILE CAL CULATING TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME-BOUND BY THI S COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MA RCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME S HALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY, AND ALSO OBSERVED THAT ARRANGEMENT CONTINUED BY AN ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 TILL 30TH APRIL 2020 SHALL CONTINUE FURTHER TI LL 15TH JUNE 2020. IT HAS BEEN AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION NOT ONLY IN INDIA BUT ALL OVER THE WORLD. GOVERNMEN T OF INDIA HAS, VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 19 TH FEBRUARY 2020, TAKEN THE STAND THAT, THE CORONAVIRUS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A CASE OF NATURAL CALAMITY AND FMC (I.E. FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE) MAYBE INVOKED, WHEREVER CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, FOLLOWING THE DUE PROCEDURE . THE TERM FORCE MAJEURE HAS BEEN DEFINED IN BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY, AS AN EVENT OR EFFECT THAT CAN BE NEITHER ANTICIPATED NOR CONTROLLED WHEN SUCH IS TH E POSITION, AND IT IS OFFICIALLY SO NOTIFIED BY THE I.T.A. NO.331/LKW/2019 ASSESSMENT YEAR:2013-14 8 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE COVID-19 EPIDEMIC HAS BEEN NOTIFIED AS A DISASTER UNDER THE NATIONAL DISA STER MANAGEMENT ACT, 2005, AND ALSO IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS ABOVE, THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE CAN BE ANYTHING BUT AN ORDINARY PERI OD. 10. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSIONS, WE A RE OF THE CONSIDERED VIEW THAT RATHER THAN TAKING A PEDANTIC VIEW OF THE RULE REQUIRING PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHI N 90 DAYS, DISREGARDING THE IMPORTANT FACT THAT THE ENTI RE COUNTRY WAS IN LOCKDOWN, WE SHOULD COMPUTE THE PERIOD OF 90 DAYS BY EXCLUDING AT LEAST THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE. WE MUST FACTOR GROUND REALITIES IN MIND WHILE INTERPRETING THE TIME LIMIT FOR THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER. LAW IS NOT BROODING OMNIPOTENCE IN THE SKY. IT IS A PRAGMA TIC TOOL OF THE SOCIAL ORDER. THE TENETS OF LAW BEING E NACTED ON THE BASIS OF PRAGMATISM, AND THAT IS HOW THE LAW IS REQUIRED TO INTERPRETED. THE INTERPRETATION SO ASSI GNED BY US IS NOT ONLY IN CONSONANCE WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF RULE 34(5) BUT IS ALSO A PRAGMATIC APPROACH AT A TIME WHEN A DISASTER, NOTIFIED UNDER THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT 2005, IS CAUSING UNPRECEDENTED DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF OUR JUSTICE DELIVE RY SYSTEM. UNDOUBTEDLY, IN THE CASE OF OTTERS CLUB VS DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (BOM)], HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT DID NOT APPROVE AN ORDER BEING PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL BEYOND A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS, BUT THEN IN TH E PRESENT SITUATION HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT ITSELF HAS, VIDE JUDGMENT DATED 15 TH APRIL 2020, HELD THAT DIRECTED WHILE CALCULATING THE TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME- BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SH ALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY . THE EXTRAORDINARY STEPS TAKEN SUO MOTU BY HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT AND HONBLE SUPREME COURT ALSO INDICATE THAT THIS PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN CANNOT B E TREATED AS AN ORDINARY PERIOD DURING WHICH THE NORM AL TIME LIMITS ARE TO REMAIN IN FORCE. IN OUR CONSIDER ED VIEW, EVEN WITHOUT THE WORDS ORDINARILY, IN THE L IGHT OF THE ABOVE ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL POSITION, THE PE RIOD I.T.A. NO.331/LKW/2019 ASSESSMENT YEAR:2013-14 9 DURING WHICH LOCKOUT WAS IN FORCE IS TO EXCLUDED FO R THE PURPOSE OF TIME LIMITS SET OUT IN RULE 34(5) OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963. VIEWED THUS, THE EXCEPTION, TO 90-DAY TIME-LIMIT FOR PRONOUNCEMENT O F ORDERS, INHERENT IN RULE 34(5)(C), WITH RESPECT TO THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN NINETY DAYS, CLEARLY COMES INTO PLAY IN THE PRESENT CASE. OF COURSE, THE RE IS NO, AND THERE CANNOT BE ANY, BAR ON THE DISCRETION OF THE BENCHES TO REFIX THE MATTERS FOR CLARIFICATIONS BECAUSE OF CONSIDERABLE TIME LAG BETWEEN THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE HEARING IS CONCLUDED AND THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE ORDER THEREON IS BEING FINALIZED, BUT THEN, IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, NO SUCH EXERCISE WAS REQUIRED TO BE CARRIED OUT ON THE FACTS OF THIS CAS E. 11. TO SUM UP, THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS ALLOW ED, AND APPEAL OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER IS DISMISSED. ORDER PRONOUNCED UNDER RULE 34(4) OF THE INCOME TAX (APPELLATE TRIBUNAL) RULES, 1962, BY PLACING THE DE TAILS ON THE NOTICE BOARD. 9. RESPECTFULLY FOLLOWING THE AFORESAID JUDICIAL PR ECEDENT, WE PROCEED TO PRONOUNCE THIS ORDER BEYOND A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS FRO M THE DATE OF CONCLUSION OF HEARING. 10. IN THE RESULT, APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS ALLOWE D. (ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 26/06/2020) SD/. SD/. ( T. S. KAPOOR ) ( A. D. JAI N ) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER VICE PRESIDEN T DATED:26/06/2020 *SINGH COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO : 1. THE APPELLANT 2. THE RESPONDENT. 3. CONCERNED CIT 4. THE CIT(A) 5. D.R., I.T.A.T., LUCKNOW