MEASAGE POOJA FLOOR MILLS , AMRITSAR V. INCOME TAX OFFICER (TDS), AMRITSAR

ITA 371/ASR/2019

• Counselvise Citation: [2020] 110 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 8275 (ITAT-AMRITSAR)
• Duration Of Justice: 1 year(s) 1 month(s) 10 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 30-06-2020
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Allowed
• Bench Allotted: DB
• Assessment Year: 2015-2016
• Appeal Filed On: 20-05-2019
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Keywords: TDS; Set aside
• Section: 139; 201(1); 201; 13; 20

Judgement Text

P A G E | 1 ITA NO. 369-371/ASR./2019 A.YS. 2013-14 TO-2015-16 M/S PUJA FLOUR MILLS VS. ITO IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AMRITSAR BENCH, AMRITSAR BEFORE SHRI L. P. SAHU, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND SHRI RAVISH SOOD, JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA NO. 369-371/ASR./2019 (ASSESSMENT YEARS: 2013-14 TO 2015-16) M/S . P U JA FLOUR MILLS C/O SH. P.N. ARORA, ADVOCATE, 3 RD FLOOR SRK MALL, 14-KENNEDY AVENUE, MALL ROAD, AMRITSAR-143001 VS. INCOME TAX OFFICER WARD TDS, AAYAKAR BHAWAN, MAQBOOL ROAD, AMRITSAR TAN AMRPI2319G (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) APPELLANT BY : SHRI P.N. ARORA, ADVOCATE (A.R) RESPONDENT BY: SHRI CHARAN DASS,(D.R.) DATE OF HEARING: 06.02.2020 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT: 30.06.2020 O R D E R PER RAVISH SOOD, JM THE PRESENT SET OF APPEALS FOR A.YS. 2013-14, 2014- 15 & 2015-16 FILED BY THE ASSESSEE ARE DIRECTED AGAINST THE RESPECTIVE ORDERS PASSED BY THE CIT(A)-1, AMRITSAR, DATED 26.02.2019, WHICH IN TURN ARISES FROM THE COMMON OR DER PASSED BY THE A.O UNDER S/SEC.201(1)/201(1A) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 (F OR SHORT ACT), DATED 24.03.2016. AS A COMMON ISSUE IS INVOLVED IN THE CAPTIONED APPEALS, THEREFORE, THE SAME ARE BEING TAKEN UP AND DISPOSED OFF BY WAY OF A COMMON ORDER. WE SHALL TAK E UP THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE FOR A.Y 2013-14 AS THE LEAD YEAR, AND THE ORDER THEREIN PAS SED SHALL FOLLOW FOR THE OTHER TWO YEARS I.E A.Y 2014-15 AND A.Y 2015-16. THE ASSESSEE HAS ASSAI LED THE IMPUGNED ORDER ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS OF APPEAL BEFORE US :-. 1. THAT THE ORDER OF THE ITO-TDS, AMRITSAR AS WELL AS THE ORDER OF THE LEARNED CIT(A) ARE BOTH AGAINS T THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND ARE UNTENABLE IN LAW. P A G E | 2 ITA NO. 369-371/ASR./2019 A.YS. 2013-14 TO-2015-16 M/S PUJA FLOUR MILLS VS. ITO 2. THAT THE WORTHY CIT(A) HAS NOT APPRECIATED THE F ACTS OF THE CASE AND MERELY RELIED ON ORDER OF THE ITO(TDS) AND WITHOUT ANY RHYME AND REASON, THE LD C IT(A) IS BAD IN THE EYES OF LAW AND IS LIABLE TO BE CANCELLED. 3. THAT THE AUTHORITIES BELOW DID NOT APPRECIATED T HAT THERE WAS NO LIABILITY ON THE ASSESSEE TO DEPOS IT TDS U/S 201(1)/201(1A). 4. THAT THE ORDER OF THE ITO, WARD-TDS, AMRITSAR, P ASSED U/S 201(1)/2011(1A) DATED 24.03.2016 THEREBY CREATING DEMAND OF RS. 1,11,580/- IS ILLEGAL, INVAL ID AND VOID ABINITIO AND THE SAME IS LIABLE TO BE CANCELLED. SIMILARLY THE WORTHY CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE SAME. 5. THAT THE AUTHORITIES BELOW DID NOT APPRECIATE TH AT THERE WAS NO LIABILITY U/S 201(1)/201(1A) TO DED UCT THE TAX AT SOURCE. AS SUCH THE WORTHY CIT(A) SHOULD HAV E CANCELLED THE DEMAND OF RS. 1,11,580/-. 6. THAT THE AUTHORITIES BELOW DID NOT APPRECIATE TH AT THIS CASE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE MISCHIEF OF S ECTION 201(1)/201(1A) OF THE IT ACT, 1961. AS SUCH THE DEM AND CREATED IS BAD IN THE EYES OF LAW AND THE SAME IS LIABLE TO BE DELETED. ALTERNATIVELY THE DEMAND C REATED IS VERY HIGH & EXCESSIVE. 7. THAT ANY OTHER GROUND OF APPEAL WHICH MAY BE URG ED AT THE TIME OF HEARING OF THE APPEAL. 2. BRIEFLY STATED, THE ASSESSEE FIRM IS ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF RUNNING A FLOUR MILL. SURVEY UNDER SEC. 133A(1) OF THE ACT WAS CONDUCTED ON THE ASSESSEE ON 30.12.2014. AS PER THE DETAILS GATHERED IN THE COURSE OF THE SURVEY PR OCEEDINGS, IT EMERGED, THAT THE ASSESSEE IN THE COURSE OF ITS BUSINESS HAD PAID COMMISSION WHIL E MAKING PURCHASES OF WHEAT. OBSERVING, THAT THE ASSESSEE WHILE MAKING PAYMENT/CREDIT OF DH AMI/COMMISSION ON THE PURCHASE OF WHEAT WAS OBLIGATED TO DEDUCT TAX AT SOURCE UNDER SEC. 19 4H OF THE ACT, THE ITO(TDS) CALLED UPON IT TO EXPLAIN AS TO WHY IT HAD FAILED TO COMPLY WITH T HE SAID STATUTORY OBLIGATION. IN REPLY, THE ASSESSEE DECLINED OF HAVING PAID/CREDITED ANY COMMI SSION/DHAMI AND CLAIMED TO HAD MADE OUTRIGHT PURCHASE OF WHEAT FROM THE PARTIES. AS SUC H, IT WAS THE CLAIM OF THE ASSESSEE THAT IT HAD PURCHASED WHEAT ON A PRINCIPAL TO PRINCIPAL BAS IS AND NO COMMISSION WAS PAID TO A THIRD PARTY. INSOFAR THE MENTION OF DHAMI ON THE FACE OF THE PURCHASE INVOICE WAS CONCERNED, IT WAS SUBMITTED BY THE ASSESSEE THAT THE SAME WAS INTER S E BETWEEN ITS SUPPLIER AND THE FARMER, AND THE SAME HAD NO BEARING ON ITS PURCHASE TRANSACTION S. HOWEVER, THE ITO(TDS) WAS NOT INCLINED TO ACCEPT THE AFORESAID CLAIM OF THE ASSESSEE. IT W AS OBSERVED BY THE ITO(TDS) THAT SH. MOHAN SETHI, PARTNER OF THE ASSESSEE FIRM HAD IN HIS STAT EMENT RECORDED AT THE TIME OF THE SURVEY PROCEEDINGS CATEGORICALLY ADMITTED THE FACT THAT TH E PURCHASE INVOICE REFERRED TO THE AMOUNT OF DHAMI/COMMISSION. IT WAS OBSERVED BY THE ITO(TDS) T HAT THE ASSESSEE IN THE COURSE OF THE P A G E | 3 ITA NO. 369-371/ASR./2019 A.YS. 2013-14 TO-2015-16 M/S PUJA FLOUR MILLS VS. ITO SURVEY PROCEEDINGS ON BEING CALLED UPON TO EXPLAIN AS TO WHY TAX WAS NOT DEDUCTED AT SOURCE UNDER SEC. 194H OF THE ACT, HAD NOT DECLINED ITS LI ABILITY BUT HAD DEFERRED THE FURNISHING OF THE REPLY TO THE NEXT DATE. ON THE BASIS OF THE AFORESA ID FACTS THE ITO(TDS) TREATED THE ASSESSEE AS BEING IN DEFAULT U/SS. 201(1)/201(1A) OF THE ACT FO R A.Y. 2015-16. AS THE PURCHASE BILLS PERTAINING TO A.Y. 2013-14 AND A.Y. 2014-15 DESPITE SPECIFIC DIRECTIONS WERE NOT PRODUCED BY THE ASSESSEE, THEREFORE, THE ITO(TDS) ON A PRESUMPT IVE BASIS ADOPTED THE DHAMI/COMMISSION FOR A.Y. 2013-14 AND A.Y. 2014-15 AS SAME AS THAT F OR A.Y. 2015-16 I.E. RS. 7,53,933/- ON THE BASIS OF HIS AFORESAID OBSERVATIONS THE ITO(TDS) WO RKED OUT THE LIABILITY OF THE ASSESSEE U/SS. 201(1)/201(1A) FOR THE AFORESAID YEARS I.E. A.Y. 20 13-14, A.Y. 2014-15 AND A.Y. 2015-16, AS UNDER :- S. NO. F.Y. TOTAL DHAMI/ COMMISSION PAID ON PURCHASE OF WHEAT AS PER ANNEXURE-A TDS @ 10% U/S 194-H INTEREST U/S 201(1A) TOTAL AMOUNT 1. 2012 - 13 7 , 53,933/ - 75,393/ - 36,187/ - 1,11,580/ - 2. 2013 - 14 7,53,933/ - 75,393/ - 27,137/ - 1,02,530/ - 3. 2014 - 15 7,53,933/ - 75,393/ - 18,097/ - 93,490/ - 3. AGGRIEVED, THE ASSESSEE ASSAILED THE ORDER PASSE D BY THE ITO(TDS) BEFORE THE CIT(A). HOWEVER, THE CIT(A) DID NOT FIND FAVOUR WITH THE CO NTENTIONS ADVANCED BY THE ASSESSEE AND UPHELD THE ORDER PASSED BY THE ITO(TDS) U/SS. 201(1 )/201(1A) OF THE ACT. 4. THE ASSESSEE BEING AGGRIEVED WITH THE ORDER OF T HE CIT(A) HAS CARRIED THE MATTER IN APPEAL BEFORE US. THE LEARNED AUTHORIZED REPRESENTA TIVE (FOR SHORT A.R) FOR THE ASSESSEE AT THE VERY OUTSET OF THE HEARING OF THE APPEAL SUBMIT TED, THAT AS THE RESPECTIVE DEALERS TO WHOM THE IMPUGNED DHAMI/COMMISSION WAS PAID/CREDITED BY THE ASSESSEE HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT SUCH SUM WHILE COMPUTING THEIR INCOME IN THE RESPEC TIVE RETURNS OF INCOME FOR THE AFOREMENTIONED YEARS, AND ALSO HAVE PAID THE TAX DU E ON THE INCOME DECLARED BY THEM IN SUCH RETURNS OF INCOME, THEREFORE, THE ASSESSEE COULD NO T BE TREATED AS BEING IN DEFAULT U/S. 201(1) OF THE ACT. IT WAS THE CLAIM OF THE LD. A.R THAT TH E ASSESSEE HAD OBTAINED THE CERTIFICATE FROM THE ACCOUNTANT IN THE PRESCRIBED FORM I.E. FORM 26 A AS CONTEMPLATED IN THE FIRST PROVISO TO SUB-SECTION (1) OF SEC. 201 OF THE ACT. IN THE BACK DROP OF HIS AFORESAID CONTENTIONS, IT WAS AVERRED BY THE LD. A.R THAT TAKING COGNIZANCE OF TH E FACT THAT THE RESPECTIVE PAYEES HAD P A G E | 4 ITA NO. 369-371/ASR./2019 A.YS. 2013-14 TO-2015-16 M/S PUJA FLOUR MILLS VS. ITO ALREADY PAID THE TAX ON THE IMPUGNED AMOUNT OF DHAM I/COMMISSION, THEREFORE, THE ASSESSEE COULD NOT BE SADDLED WITH THE LIABILITY U/SS. 201(1 )/201(1A) OF THE ACT. 5. PER CONTRA, THE LEARNED DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTA TIVE (FOR SHORT D.R) RELIED ON THE ORDERS OF THE LOWER AUTHORITIES. 6. WE HAVE HEARD THE AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES FOR BOTH THE PARTIES, PERUSED THE ORDERS OF THE LOWER AUTHORITIES AND THE MATERIAL AVAILABLE ON RECORD. AS IS DISCERNIBLE FROM THE ORDERS OF THE LOWER AUTHORITIES, WE FIND, THAT IT IS THE CLAI M OF THE REVENUE THAT THE ASSESSEE HAD FAILED TO DEDUCT TAX AT SOURCE UNDER SEC. 194H ON THE DHAMI/C OMMISSION OF RS. 7,53,933/- FOR A.Y. 2014-15. ALSO, AS THE PURCHASE BILLS FOR A.Y. 2013- 14 AND A.Y. 2015-16 WERE NOT FORTHCOMING DESPITE SPECIFIC DIRECTIONS BY THE ITO(TDS), THEREF ORE, THE LATTER HAD PRESUMED THE ASSESSEE TO BE IN DEFAULT AS REGARDS DEDUCTION OF TAX AT SOURCE ON DHAMI/COMMISSION IN BOTH OF THE SAID YEARS ON THE SAME AMOUNT AS IN A.Y 2014-15 I.E. RS. 7,53,933/-. IN SUM AND SUBSTANCE, AS THE REQUISITE PURCHASE BILLS FOR A.Y. 2013-14 AND A.Y. 2015-16 WERE NOT PRODUCED BY THE ASSESSEE, THEREFORE, THE ITO(TDS) HAD PRESUMED THAT THE ASSES SEE IN THE SAID YEARS ALSO MUST HAVE PAID DHAMI/COMMISSION OF THE SAME AMOUNT AS IN A.Y. 2014 -15, DE HORS DEDUCTION OF TAX AT SOURCE. WE WOULD MINCE NO WORDS IN SAYING THAT WE ARE UNABL E TO PERSUADE OURSELVES TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE BASIS AS PER WHICH THE ASSESSEE HAD BEEN HELD T O BE IN DEFAULT U/SS. 201(1)/201(1A) OF THE ACT, IN RESPECT OF A PRESUMPTIVE PAYMENT OF DHAMI/C OMMISSION BY THE ASSESSEE IN A.Y. 2013- 14 AND A.Y. 2015-16. BE THAT AS IT MAY, IT IS THE C LAIM OF THE LD. A.R THAT AS THE RESPECTIVE PAYEES I.E. THE DEALERS IN WHEAT TO WHOM THE AFORES AID SUM HAD BEEN PAID/CREDITED HAD TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPUGNED SUM OF DHAMI/COMMISSION W HILE COMPUTING THEIR INCOME IN THEIR RETURNS OF INCOME FILED UNDER SEC. 139 OF THE ACT F OR THE CAPTIONED YEARS UNDER CONSIDERATION, AND HAVE ALSO PAID THE TAXES ON THE INCOME DECLARED IN SUCH RESPECTIVE RETURNS OF INCOME, THEREFORE, THE ASSESSEE CANNOT BE TREATED AS BEING IN DEFAULT AS PER THE FIRST PROVISO TO SEC. 201(1) OF THE ACT. ALSO, IT HAS BEEN STATED BY THE LD. A.R, THAT CERTIFICATES FROM THE ACCOUNTANT IN THE PRESCRIBED FORM I.E. FORM NO. 26A VERIFYIN G THE AFORESAID FACTS HAD BEEN OBTAINED BY THE ASSESSEE. ON THE BASIS OF THE AFORESAID FACTS, WE A RE OF THE CONSIDERED VIEW THAT THE MATTER IN ALL FAIRNESS REQUIRES TO BE RESTORED TO THE FILE OF THE ITO(TDS) FOR VERIFYING THE VERACITY OF THE AFORESAID CLAIM OF THE ASSESSEE. IN THE COURSE OF T HE SET ASIDE PROCEEDINGS, THE ITO(TDS) P A G E | 5 ITA NO. 369-371/ASR./2019 A.YS. 2013-14 TO-2015-16 M/S PUJA FLOUR MILLS VS. ITO SHALL VERIFY THE MAINTAINABILITY OF THE CLAIM OF TH E ASSESSEE THAT NOW WHEN THE REQUISITE CONDITIONS ENVISAGED IN THE FIRST PROVISO TO SEC. 201(1) OF THE ACT HAD BEEN COMPLIED ON ITS PART, IT CANNOT BE TREATED AS BEING IN DEFAULT AND CONSEQUENTIALLY BE SADDLED WITH THE LIABILITY U/SS. 201(1)/201(1A) OF THE ACT. BEFORE PARTING, WE MAY HEREIN CLARIFY THAT THE ASSESSEE SHALL IN THE COURSE OF THE SET ASIDE PROCEEDINGS FURNISH T HE REQUISITE DETAILS AS WOULD BE CALLED FOR BY THE ITO(TDS) FOR THE PURPOSE OF GIVING EFFECT TO OU R AFORESAID DIRECTIONS. 7. BEFORE PARTING, WE MAY HEREIN DEAL WITH A PROCED URAL ISSUE THAT THOUGH THE HEARING OF THE CAPTIONED APPEAL WAS CONCLUDED ON 06/02/2020, H OWEVER, THIS ORDER IS BEING PRONOUNCED MUCH AFTER THE EXPIRY OF 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF C ONCLUSION OF HEARING. WE FIND THAT RULE 34(5) OF THE INCOME-TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1962, W HICH ENVISAGES THE PROCEDURE FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS: (5) T HE PRONOUNCEMENT MAY BE IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING MANNERS: (A) THE BENCH MAY PRONOUNCE THE ORDER IMMEDIATELY UPON THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING. (B) IN CASE WHERE THE ORDER IS NOT PRONOUNCED IMMEDIATELY ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE BENCH SHALL GIVE A DATE FOR PRONOU NCEMENT. IN A CASE WHERE NO DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT IS GIVEN BY THE BENCH, EVERY ENDEAVOU R SHALL BE MADE BY THE BENCH TO PRONOUNCE THE ORDER WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE HEARING OF THE CASE WAS CONCLUDED BUT, WHERE IT IS NOT PRACTICABLE SO TO DO ON THE GROUND OF EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THE BENCH SHALL FIX A FUTURE DAY FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER, AND SUCH DATE SHALL NOT ORDINARILY BE A DAY BEYOND A FURTHER PERIOD OF 30 DAYS AND DUE NOTICE OF THE DAY SO FIXED SHALL BE GIVEN ON TH E NOTICE BOARD. AS SUCH, ORDINARILY THE ORDER ON AN APPEAL SHOULD BE PRONOUNCED BY THE BENCH WITH IN NO MORE THAN 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF CONCLUDING THE HEARING. IT IS, HOWEVER, IMPORTANT T O NOTE THAT THE EXPRESSION ORDINARILY HAS BEEN USED IN THE SAID RULE ITSELF. THIS RULE WAS IN SERTED AS A RESULT OF DIRECTIONS OF HONBLE HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF SHIVSAGAR VEG RESTAURANT VS AC IT [(2009) 317 ITR 433 (BOM)] WHEREIN IT WAS INTER ALIA, OBSERVED AS UNDER: WE, THEREFORE, DIRECT THE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLA TE TRIBUNAL TO FRAME AND LAY DOWN THE GUIDELINES IN THE SIMILAR LINES AS ARE LAID DOWN BY THE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF ANIL RAI (SUPRA) AND TO ISSUE APPROPRI ATE ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIONS TO ALL THE BENCHES OF THE TRIBUNAL IN THAT BEHALF. WE HOPE AND TRUST THAT SU ITABLE GUIDELINES SHALL BE FRAMED AND ISSUED BY THE PRESID ENT OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL WITHIN SHORTEST REASONABLE TIME AND FOLLOWED STRICTLY BY ALL THE BE NCHES OF THE TRIBUNAL. IN THE MEANWHILE (EMPHASIS, BY UNDERLINING, SUPPLIED BY US NOW), ALL THE REVISIONA L AND APPELLATE AUTHORITIES UNDER THE INCOME-TAX AC T ARE DIRECTED TO DECIDE MATTERS HEARD BY THEM WITHIN A PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS FROM THE DATE CASE IS CLOSED FOR JUDGMENT. P A G E | 6 ITA NO. 369-371/ASR./2019 A.YS. 2013-14 TO-2015-16 M/S PUJA FLOUR MILLS VS. ITO IN THE RULE SO FRAMED, AS A RESULT OF THESE DIRECTI ONS, THE EXPRESSION ORDINARILY HAS BEEN INSERTED IN THE REQUIREMENT TO PRONOUNCE THE ORDER WITHIN A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS. THE QUESTION THEN ARISES WHETHER OR NOT THE PASSING OF THIS ORDE R, BEYOND A PERIOD OF NINETY DAYS IN THE CASE BEFORE US WAS NECESSITATED BY ANY EXTRAORDINARY C IRCUMSTANCES. 8. WE FIND THAT THE AFORESAID ISSUE AFTER EXHAUSTI VE DELIBERATIONS HAD BEEN ANSWERED BY A COORDINATE BENCH OF THE TRIBUNAL VIZ. ITAT, MUMBAI F BENCH IN DCIT, CENTRAL CIRCLE-3(2), MUMBAI VS. JSW LIMITED & ORS. [ITA NO. 6264/MUM/18 ; DATED 14/05/2020, WHEREIN IT WAS OBSERVED AS UNDER : LET US IN THIS LIGHT REVERT TO THE PREVAILING SI TUATION IN THE COUNTRY. ON 24TH MARCH, 2020, HONBL E PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA TOOK THE BOLD STEP OF IMPOSING A NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, FOR 21 DAYS, TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF COVID 19 EPIDEMIC, AND THIS LOCKDOWN WAS EXTENDED FROM TIME TO TIME. THE EPIDEMIC SITUATION BEING GRAVE, THERE WAS NOT MUCH OF A RELA XATION IN SUBSEQUENT LOCKDOWNS ALSO. IN ANY CASE, THERE WAS UNPRECEDENTED DISRUPTION OF JUDICIAL WOK ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT HAS B EEN SUCH AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION, CAUSING DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF JUDICIAL MACHINERY, THAT HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, IN AN UNPRECEDENTED ORDER IN THE HISTORY OF INDIA AND VIDE ORDER DATED 6.5.2020 READ WITH ORDER DATED 23.3.2020, EXTENDED THE LIMITATION TO EXCLUDE NOT ONLY THIS LOCKDOWN PERIOD BUT ALSO A FEW MORE DAYS PRIOR TO, AND AFTER , THE LOCKDOWN BY OBSERVING THAT IN CASE THE LIMITATION EXPIRED AFTER 15.03.2020 THEN THE PERIOD FROM 15.03.2020 TILL THE DATE ON WHICH THE LOCKDOW N IS LIFTED IN THE JURISDICTIONAL AREA WHERE THE DISP UTE LIES OR WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES SHALL BE EXTENDED FOR A PERIOD OF 15 DAYS AFTER THE LIFTING OF LOCKDOWN. HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT, IN AN ORDE R DATED 15TH APRIL 2020, HAS, BESIDES EXTENDING THE V ALIDITY OF ALL INTERIM ORDERS, HAS ALSO OBSERVED TH AT, IT IS ALSO CLARIFIED THAT WHILE CALCULATING TIME F OR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME-BOUND BY THIS COUR T, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CO NTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY, AND ALSO OBSERVED THAT ARRANGEMENT CONTINUED BY AN ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 TILL 30TH APRIL 2020 SHALL CONTINUE FURT HER TILL 15TH JUNE 2020. IT HAS BEEN AN UNPRECEDEN TED SITUATION NOT ONLY IN INDIA BUT ALL OVER THE WORLD. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAS, VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 1 9TH FEBRUARY 2020, TAKEN THE STAND THAT, THE CORONAVIRU S SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A CASE OF NATURAL CALAMITY AND FMC (I.E. FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE) MAYBE INVOKED, WHEREVER CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, FOLLOWING THE DUE PROCEDURE. THE TERM FORCE MAJEURE HAS BEEN DEFINED IN BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, AS AN EVENT OR EFFECT THAT CAN BE NEITHER ANTICIPATED NOR CONTROLL ED WHEN SUCH IS THE POSITION, AND IT IS OFFICIALLY SO NOTIFIED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE COVID-1 9 EPIDEMIC HAS BEEN NOTIFIED AS A DISASTER UNDER THE NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT, 2005, AND ALS O IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS ABOVE, THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE CAN BE ANYTHING BUT AN ORDINARY PERIOD. 10. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSIONS, WE ARE OF THE CONSIDERED VIEW THAT RATHER THAN TAKING A PEDANTIC VIEW OF THE RULE REQUIRING PRONOUNCEMENT O F ORDERS WITHIN 90 DAYS, DISREGARDING THE IMPORTANT FACT THAT THE ENTIRE COUNTRY WAS IN LOCKDOWN, WE SH OULD COMPUTE THE PERIOD OF 90 DAYS BY EXCLUDING AT LEAST THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE LOCKDOWN WAS IN F ORCE. WE MUST FACTOR GROUND REALITIES IN MIND WHILE INTERPRETING THE TIME LIMIT FOR THE PRONOUNCEMENT O F THE ORDER. LAW IS NOT BROODING OMNIPOTENCE IN THE SKY. IT IS A PRAGMATIC TOOL OF THE SOCIAL ORDER. TH E TENETS OF LAW BEING ENACTED ON THE BASIS OF PRAGMATISM, AND THAT IS HOW THE LAW IS REQUIRED TO INTERPRETED. THE INTERPRETATION SO ASSIGNED BY US I S NOT ONLY IN CONSONANCE WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT O F RULE 34(5) BUT IS ALSO A PRAGMATIC APPROACH AT A TIME WHEN A DISASTER, NOTIFIED UNDER THE DISASTER MANAGE MENT ACT 2005, IS CAUSING UNPRECEDENTED DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF OUR JUSTICE DELIVE RY SYSTEM. UNDOUBTEDLY, IN THE CASE OF OTTERS CLUB VS DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (BOM)], HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT DID NOT APPROVE AN ORDER BEING PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL BEYOND A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS, BUT THEN I N THE PRESENT SITUATION HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT P A G E | 7 ITA NO. 369-371/ASR./2019 A.YS. 2013-14 TO-2015-16 M/S PUJA FLOUR MILLS VS. ITO ITSELF HAS, VIDE JUDGMENT DATED 15TH APRIL 2020, HE LD THAT DIRECTED WHILE CALCULATING THE TIME FOR DI SPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIO D FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY. THE EXTRAORDINARY STEPS TAKEN SUO MOTU BY THE HONBLE HIGH COURT AND HONBLE SUPREME COURT ALSO INDICATE THAT THIS PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN CANNOT BE TREATED AS AN ORDINARY PERIOD DURING WHICH THE NORMAL TIME LIMITS ARE TO REMAIN IN FORCE. IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, EVEN WITHO UT THE WORDS ORDINARILY, IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOV E ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL POSITION, THE PERIOD DURING W HICH LOCKOUT WAS IN FORCE IS TO EXCLUDED FOR THE PU RPOSE OF TIME LIMITS SET OUT IN RULE 34(5) OF THE APPELLA TE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963. VIEWED THUS, THE EXCEPTION , TO 90-DAY TIME-LIMIT FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, INHE RENT IN RULE 34(5)(C), WITH RESPECT TO THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN NINETY DAYS, CLEARLY COMES INTO PLAY IN THE PRESENT CASE. WE HAVE GIVEN A THOUGHTFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE AFO RESAID OBSERVATIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL AND FINDING OURSELVES TO BE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE SAME RESPECTFULLY FOLLOW THE SAME. AS SUCH, WE ARE OF THE CONSIDERED VIEW THAT THE PERIOD DURING W HICH THE LOCKOUT WAS IN FORCE SHALL STAND EXCLUDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF WORKING OUT THE TIME LI MIT FOR PRONOUNCEMENT ORDERS, AS ENVISAGED IN RULE 34(5) OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963 . 9. RESULTANTLY, THE APPEALS FILED BY THE ASSESSEE F OR A.Y 2013-14, A.Y 2014-15 AND A.Y 2015-16 ARE ALLOWED FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSES IN TER MS OF OUR AFORESAID OBSERVATIONS. ORDER PRONOUNCED UNDER RULE 34(4) OF THE INCOME TA X (APPELLATE TRIBUNAL) RULES, 1962, BY PLACING THE DETAILS ON THE NOTICE BOARD. SD/- SD/- (L. P. SAHU) (RAVISH SOOD) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER DATE 30.06.2020 / COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO : 1. / THE APPELLANT 2. / THE RESPONDENT. 3. ( ) / THE CIT(A)- 4. / CIT 5. DR, ITAT, AMRITSAR BENCH, AMRITSR 6. / GUARD FILE. //TRUE COPY// / BY ORDER, / (DY./ASSTT. REGISTRAR) P A G E | 8 ITA NO. 369-371/ASR./2019 A.YS. 2013-14 TO-2015-16 M/S PUJA FLOUR MILLS VS. ITO / ITAT, AMRITSAR. BENCH, AMRITSAR.