M/S GOODWILL TIMBER SUPPLY, KOTA V. INCOME TAX OFFICER, KOTA

ITA 372/JPR/2018

• Counselvise Citation: [2019] 117 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 3681 (ITAT-JAIPUR)
• Duration Of Justice: 1 year(s) 1 month(s) 10 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax (International Taxation) Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 29-04-2019
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Allowed
• Bench Allotted: A
• Assessment Year: 2006-2007
• Appeal Filed On: 19-03-2018
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: SEEMA MEENA JCIT DHK
• Assessee Lawyers: PRAKUL KHURANA
• Keywords: Sale consideration of property below Jantri Value; Period of limitation; Question of law; Time period of passing order; Reassessment proceedings; Set aside
• Section: 143(3); 50C; 150(1); 147; 148; 15

Judgement Text

VK;DJ VIHYH; VF/KDJ.K] T;IQJ U;K;IHB] T;IQJ IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, JAIPUR BENCHE S, JAIPUR JH FOT; IKY JKWO] U;KF;D LNL; ,O A JH HKKXPUN ] YS[KK LNL; DS LE{K BEFORE: SHRI VIJAY PAL RAO, JM & SHRI BHAGCHAND, A M VK;DJ VIHY LA- @ ITA NO. 372/JP/2018 FU/KZKJ.K O'K Z @ ASSESSMENT YEARS : 2006-07. M/S. GOODWILL TIMBER SUPPLY, 663-B, PRATAP NAGAR, CHAMBAL GARDEN, DADABARI, KOTA. CUKE VS. INCOME TAX OFFICER, WARD 1(1), KOTA. LFKK;H YS[KK LA-@THVKBZVKJ LA-@ PAN/GIR NO. AQGPS 4582 H VIHYKFKHZ@ APPELLANT IZR;FKHZ@ RESPONDENT FU/KZKFJRH DH VKSJ LS@ ASSESSEE BY : SHRI PRAKUL KHURANA (ADVOCATE) JKTLO DH VKSJ LS@ REVENUE BY : SMT. SEEMA MEENA (JCIT) LQUOKBZ DH RKJH[K@ DATE OF HEARING : 22.05.2018. ?KKS'K .KK DH RKJH[K @ DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 23/05/2018. VKNS'K@ ORDER PER VIJAY PAL RAO, J.M. THIS APPEAL BY THE ASSESSEE IS DIRECTED AGAINST TH E ORDER DATED 26 TH FEBRUARY, 2018 OF LD. CIT (A), KOTA FOR THE ASSESSM ENT YEAR 2006-07. THE ASSESSEE HAS RAISED THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS OF APPEAL :- 1. UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND IN LAW, THE LD. CIT (APPEALS) HAS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THE ASSE SSMENT ORDER DATED 30.03.2016 AS BAD IN LAW, WITHOUT JURISDICTIO N AND ILLEGAL. 2. UNDER THE FACTS & CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND IN LAW, THE LD. CIT (APPEALS) HAS ERRED IN :- 2 ITA NO. 372/JP/2018. M/S. GOODWILL TIMBER SUPPLY, KOTA. A. UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF REASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS INITIATED BY THE LD. AO IN THE CASE OF THE APPELLANT U/S 147/ 148 OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 (ACT); B. CONFIRMING THE ACTION OF THE LD. AO OF INVOKING SEC TION 150(1) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 IN THE CASE OF T HE APPELLANT WITHOUT APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT FINDIN G OR DIRECTION CONTAINED IN AN ORDER PASSED BY ANY AUTHO RITY MUST RELATE TO THE ASSESSEE ONLY AND NOT TO A THIRD PART Y; C. UPHOLDING THE ACTION OF THE LD. AO OF NOT CONSIDERI NG THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 150 OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 19 61 IN TOTALITY. 3. UNDER THE FACTS & CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND IN LAW, THE LD. CIT (APPEALS) HAS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE ACTU AL STAMP DUTY VALUE OF LAND OF RS. 1,35,22,275/- AND ADOPTING THE STAMP DUTY VALUE OF RS. 1,50,35,218/- ON THE BASIS OF ORDER PA SSED BY THE PREDECESSOR LD. CIT (A) IN THE CASE OF BRIJENDRA SE THI. 4. UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AN D IN LAW, THE LD. CIT (APPEALS) HAS ERRED IN MAINTAINING THE INTE REST LIABILITY U/S 234B, 234C & 234D OF THE INCOME T4AX ACT, 1961. 5. THE APPELLANT CRAVES TO ALTER, AMEND AND MODIFY AND GROUND OF APPEAL. GROUND NOS. 1 & 2 ARE REGARDING VALIDITY OF REOPENI NG ON THE GROUND THAT THE NOTICE ISSUED BY THE AO UNDER SECTION 148 IS BARRED BY LIMITATION. 2. THE LD. A/R OF THE ASSESSEE HAS SUBMITTED THAT T HE ASSESSEE IS A PARTNERSHIP FIRM AND ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF TIMBER ON WHOLE SALE BASIS. THE ASSESSEE FIRM PURCHASED LAND AT PLOT NO. 1, AERODROME CIRCLE, KOT A ON 28 TH MAY, 1973 IN OPEN AUCTION. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE TWO PARTNERS OF THE ASS ESSEE FIRM RELEASED THEIR RIGHT IN FAVOUR OF THE THIRD PARTNER NAMELY SHRI HARBANS LAL SETHI ON 28 TH MARCH, 2006. THE AO INITIATED THE PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 148 AGAI NST ONE PARTNER OF THE FIRM MS. BRIJENDRA SETHI ON 26 TH MARCH, 2013 AND PROPOSED TO ASSESS THE INCOME WHIC H 3 ITA NO. 372/JP/2018. M/S. GOODWILL TIMBER SUPPLY, KOTA. ESCAPED ASSESSMENT ON ACCOUNT OF THE TRANSACTION OF RELEASING THE RIGHTS IN THE SAID LAND. THEREAFTER, THE AO ASSESSED THE TOTAL INCOME OF MS. BRIJENDRA SETHI, WHILE PASSING THE ASSESSMENT ORDER UNDER SECTION 143(3) R EAD WITH SECTION 147 OF THE IT ACT ON 27 TH FEBRUARY, 2014 BY MAKING AN ADDITION OF RS. 74,16, 703/- UNDER SECTION 50C OF THE ACT. MS. BRIJENDRA SETHI CHALLENGED THE ACTION OF THE AO BY FILING APPEAL BEFORE LD. CIT (A). A SIMILAR APPEAL WAS ALSO FILE D BY SHRI BHUVNESH SETHI AGAINST THE ORDER PASSED BY THE AO IN HIS CASE. THE LD. CIT (A) KOTA VIDE ORDER DATED 20 TH OCTOBER, 2014 IN CASE OF MS. BRIJENDRA SETHI HELD T HAT THE SAID RELEASE DEED IN SUBSTANCE WAS A SALE DEED WHEREIN THE PARTNERSHIP F IRM HAS TRANSFERRED THE LAND AND, THEREFORE, MS. BRIJENDRA SETHI DOES NOT HAVE A NY SEPARATE RIGHT IN THE LAND EXCEPT THE RIGHTS POSSESSED ON BEING A PARTNER OF T HE PARTNERSHIP FIRM. THE LD. A/R HAS POINTED OUT THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE SAID ORDER PASSED BY THE LD. CIT (A) DATED 20 TH OCTOBER, 2014 IN CASE OF MS. BRIJENDRA SETHI, THE AO ISSUED A NOTICE UNDER SECTION 148 ON 3 RD MARCH, 2015 TO REOPEN THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ASSESS EE PARTNERSHIP FIRM. THUS THE LD. A/R HAS SUBMITTED T HAT THE NOTICE ISSUED BY THE AO UNDER SECTION 148 ON 3 RD MARCH, 2015 IS BARRED BY LIMITATION PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 149 AND FURTHER UNDER SECTION 150 OF THE IT ACT. I N SUPPORT OF HIS CONTENTION, HE HAS RELIED UPON THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS :- RAMESH CHAND SONI HUF VS. ITO 89 TAXMANN.COM 71 (JAIPUR TRIB.) PRAVEEN KUMARI VS. CIT 237 ITR 339 (P&H) LOTUS INVESTMENTS LTD. VS. G.Y. WAGH, ACIT 162 TAXMAN 241 (BOM.) 4 ITA NO. 372/JP/2018. M/S. GOODWILL TIMBER SUPPLY, KOTA. ITO VS. M/S. NEETEE CLOTHING (P) LTD. (ITA NO. 267/DEL/2013) GAURI SHANKAR CHOUDHARY VS. ADDL. CIT 234 ITR 865 (PAT.) VIJAY KUMAR SARDA VS. DCIT 40 TAXMANN.COM 113 (MUMBAI TRIB.) CITING THE FINDINGS OF THE ABOVE DECISIONS, THE LD. A/R HAS CONTENDED THAT WHEN THE LIMITATION FOR REOPENING THE ASSESSMENT IN THE CASE OF THE ASSESSEE HAD ALREADY EXPIRED ON 27 TH FEBRUARY, 2014 WHEN THE AO PASSED THE ASSESSMENT I N CASE OF MS. BRIJENDRA SETHI, THEN THE NOTICE ISSUED BY THE AO U NDER SECTION 148 ON 3 RD MARCH, 2015 IS BARRED BY LIMITATION. 2.1 ON THE OTHER HAND, THE LD. D/R HAS SUBMITTED TH AT THE LIMITATION HAS TO BE CONSIDERED ON THE DATE OF NOTICE ISSUED BY THE AO U NDER SECTION 148 IN THE CASE OF MS. BRIJENDRA SETHI AND NOT ON THE DATE WHEN THE AS SESSMENT ORDER WAS PASSED. THUS THE LD. D/R HAS SUBMITTED THAT THE AO HAS TAKE N A WRONG DECISION OF ASSESSING THE SAID INCOME IN THE HANDS OF THE PARTNER BY ISSU ING THE NOTICE UNDER SECTION 148 WHICH IS THE RELEVANT DATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPU TING THE LIMITATION. SHE HAS ALSO REFERRED TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 150(1) OF THE ACT AND SUBMITTED THAT THE AO HAS POWER TO ASSESS OR REASSESS THE INCOME OF A PERSON BASED ON THE ORDERS PASSED BY THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY AND, THEREFORE, THE REOPENI NG OF THE ASSESSMENT IS WELL WITHIN THE POWERS AND JURISDICTION OF THE AO. SHE HAS RELIED UPON THE ORDERS OF THE AUTHORITIES BELOW. 3. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE RIVAL SUBMISSIONS AS WELL AS THE RELEVANT MATERIAL ON RECORD. THE AO HAS REOPENED THE ASSESSMENT BY ISSUI NG NOTICE UNDER SECTION 148 ON 5 ITA NO. 372/JP/2018. M/S. GOODWILL TIMBER SUPPLY, KOTA. 3 RD MARCH, 2015 BY RECORDING THE REASONS THAT THE LD. CIT (A) IN CASE OF MS. BRIJENDRA SETHI, PARTNER OF THE ASSESSEE FIRM, HAS HELD THAT THE CAPITAL GAINS, IF ANY, WOULD ARISE IN THE HANDS OF THE FIRM M/S. GOODWILL TIMBER SUPPLY AND NOT IN THE HANDS OF THE PARTNER. THEREFORE, THE NOTICE ISSUED UNDER SECTION 148 ON 3 RD MARCH, 2015 IS BEYOND THE LIMITATION PERIOD OF 6 MONTHS PR OVIDED UNDER SECTION 149 OF THE ACT. HOWEVER, SINCE THE REOPENING IS BASED ON THE ORDER OF THE LD. CIT (A), THEREFORE, THE LIMITATION IS RELAXED UNDER SECTION 150(1) OF THE IT ACT SUBJECT TO THE RESTRICTIONS PROVIDED UNDER SUB SECTION (2) OF SECT ION 150 OF THE ACT. THIS ISSUE OF LIMITATION HAS BEEN CONSIDERED BY THIS TRIBUNAL AS WELL AS THE VARIOUS HIGH COURTS AS RELIED ON BY THE LD. A/R OF THE ASSESSEE. IN THE LA TEST DECISION IN THE CASE OF SHRI RAMESH CHAND SONI HUF VS. ITO (SUPRA), THE COORDINA TE BENCH OF THE TRIBUNAL WHILE DEALING WITH AN IDENTICAL ISSUE HAS HELD IN PARA 5 TO 7 AS UNDER :- 5. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE RIVAL SUBMISSIONS AS WELL A S RELEVANT MATERIAL ON RECORD. THE AO PROPOSED TO REOPEN THE ASSESSMENT OF THESE T WO ASSESSMENT YEARS I.E. 2001-02 & 2002-03 VIDE NOTICE U/S. 148 DATED 30.07.2010. TH US, IT IS APPARENT THAT THE NOTICE ISSUED U/S. 148 FOR INITIATION OF REASSESSMENT PROC EEDINGS IS BEYOND THE LIMITATION PROVIDED U/S. 149 AS EXIST AT THE RELEVANT POINT OF TIME. FOR READING REFERENCE WE QUOTE THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 149 AS UNDER: '149. TIME LIMIT FOR NOTICE. (1) NO NOTICE UNDER SECTION 148 SHALL BE ISSUE FOR THE RELEVANT ASSESSMENT YEAR, (A ) IF FOUR YEARS HAVE ELAPSED FROM THE END OF THE RE LEVANT ASSESSMENT YEAR, UNLESS THE CASE FALLS UNDER CLAUSE(B); (B ) IF FOUR YEARS, BUT NOT MORE THAN SIX YEARS, HAVE ELAPSED FROM THE END OF THE RELEVANT ASSESSMENT YEAR UNLESS THE INCOME CHARGEAB LE TO TAX WHICH HAS ESCAPED ASSESSMENT AMOUNTS TO OR IS LIKELY TO AMOUNT TO ONE LAKH RUPEES OR MORE FOR THAT YEAR. EXPLANATION. IN DETERMINING INCOME CHARGEABLE TO TAX WHICH HAS E SCAPED ASSESSMENT FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS SUB- SECTION, THE PROVISIONS OF EXPLANATION 2 OF SECTION 147 SHALL APPLY AS THEY APPLY FOR THE PURPO SES OF THAT SECTION. 6 ITA NO. 372/JP/2018. M/S. GOODWILL TIMBER SUPPLY, KOTA. (2) THE PROVISIONS OF SUB- SECTION (1) AS TO THE ISSUE OF NOTICE SHALL BE SUBJ ECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 151. (3) IF THE PERSON ON WHOM A NOTICE UNDER SECTION 148 IS TO BE SERVED IS A PERSON TREATED AS THE AGENT OF A NON-RESIDENT UNDER SECTION 163 AN D THE ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPUTATION TO BE MADE IN PURSUANCE OF THE NOTICE IS TO BE MADE ON HIM AS THE AGENT OF SUCH NON- RESIDENT, THE NOTICE SHALL NOT BE ISSUED AFTER THE EXPIRY OF A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS FROM THE END OF THE RELEVANT ASSESSMEN T YEAR.' IT IS CLEAR THAT NO NOTICE U/S. 148 SHALL BE ISSUED IN ANY CASE AFTER THE EXPIRY OF 6 YEARS, HOWEVER, THE LIMITATION PROVIDED U/S. 149 IS APPLIC ABLE IN A SITUATION WHERE THE AO ON ITS OWN ON THE BASIS OF FRESH MATERIAL OR INFORMATI ON FORMS AN OPINION THAT THE INCOME ASSESSABLE TO TAX AS ESCAPED ASSESSMENT. SECTION 15 0 OF THE I.T ACT PROVIDES THE ASSESSMENT OR REASSESSMENT IN PURSUANT TO AN ORDER OF APPEAL, REVISION OR REFERENCE AND THEREFORE, THE LIMITATION PROVIDED U/S. 149 FOR REO PENING OF THE ASSESSMENT IS NOT PER SE APPLICABLE WHEN THE REOPENING IS BASED ON THE DIREC TIONS OF THE APPELLATE OR REVISIONAL AUTHORITY OR AS PER THE DIRECTIONS OF THE COURT. SE CTION 150 OF THE IT ACT IS REPRODUCED AS UNDER:- '150. PROVISION FOR CASES WHERE ASSESSMENT IS IN PU RSUANCE OF AN ORDER ON APPEAL, ETC. (1) NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING CONTAINED IN SECTION 149, THE NOTICE UNDER SECTION 148 MAY BE ISSUED AT ANY TIME FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING AN ASSESSMENT OR REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPUTATION IN CONSEQUENCE OF OR TO GIVE EFF ECT TO ANY FINDING OR DIRECTION CONTAINED IN AN ORDER PASSED BY ANY 1. THE WORDS' MORE THAN' OMITTED BY THE DIRECT TAX LAWS (SECOND AMENDMENT) ACT, 1989, W. E. F. 1-4-1989. AUTHORITY IN ANY PROCEEDING UNDER THIS ACT BY WAY O F APPEAL, REFERENCE OR REVISION OR BY A COURT IN ANY PROCEEDING UNDER ANY OTHER LAW. (2) THE PROVISIONS OF SUB- SECTION (1) SHALL NOT APPLY IN ANY CASE WHERE ANY S UCH ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPUTATION AS IS REF ERRED TO IN THAT SUB- SECTION RELATES TO AN ASSESSMENT YEAR IN RESPECT OF WHICH AN ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPUTATION COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE AT THE TIME THE ORDER WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT- MATTER OF THE APPEAL, REFERENCE OR REVISION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WAS MADE BY REASON OF ANY OTHER PROVISION LIMITING THE TI ME WITHIN WHICH ANY ACTION FOR ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPUTATION MAY BE TAKEN.' THUS, AS PER SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION 150 THE LIM ITATION PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 149 IS NOT APPLICABLE IF NOTICE U/S. 148 IS ISSUED IN CONSEQUE NCE OR TO GIVE EFFECT TO ANY FINDINGS OR DIRECTIONS CONTAINED IN AN ORDER PASSED BY ANY AUTH ORITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS UNDER THIS ACT BY WAY OF APPEAL, REFERENCE OR REVISION OR BY A COURT IN ANY PROCEEDING IN OTHER LAW. THIS ENLARGEMENT OF TIME PERIOD FOR ISSUING THE NOTICE U /S. 148 AS CONTEMPLATED U/S. 150(1) IS ALSO NOT ABSOLUTE AND UNLIMITED BUT SUBJECT TO THE CONDI TIONS AND RESTRICTIONS AS PROVIDED UNDER SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTION 150 OF THE ACT. THEREFOR E, EVEN AS PER DIRECTIONS OF THE APPELLATE OR REVISIONAL AUTHORITY OR COURT THE TIME LIMIT AVAILA BLE IS NOT UNLIMITED FOR MAKING ASSESSMENT, 7 ITA NO. 372/JP/2018. M/S. GOODWILL TIMBER SUPPLY, KOTA. REASSESSMENT OR RE-COMPUTATION OF INCOME OF THE ASS ESSEE BUT THE SAME IS SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS AS PRESCRIBED SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTION 150 OF THE ACT. SUB-SECTION (2) PUTS A CONDITION THAT UNLIMITED TIME PERIOD PROVIDED UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) SHALL NOT APPLY IN A CASE WHERE SUCH ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RE-COMPUTATI ON RELATES TO AN ASSESSMENT YEAR IN RESPECT OF WHICH ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RE-COM PUTATION COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE AT THE TIME OF THE ORDER WHICH WAS SUBJECT MATTER OF A PPEAL, REFERENCE OR REVISION AS THE CASE MAY BE DUE TO THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF PRESCRIBING T HE LIMITATION WITHIN WHICH SUCH ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RE-COMPUTATION MAY BE M ADE. IN OTHER WORDS AS PER SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTION 150 THE ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RE-COMPUTATION IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE DIRECTIONS OF THE APPELLATE, REVISIONAL AUTHORITY O R THE DIRECTIONS OF THE COURT CAN BE MADE IF SUCH ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RE-COMPUTATION COU LD HAVE BEEN MADE AT THE TIME THE ORDER WHICH WAS SUBJECT MATTER OF APPEAL REVISION OR REFE RENCE AND NOT HIT BY THE LIMITATION PROVIDED U/S. 149 OF THE ACT AT THAT POINT OF TIME. NOW, THE QUESTION ARISES WHETHER IN CASE OF DIRECTIONS OF SECOND APPELLATE AUTHORITY THE ORDER WHICH WAS SUBJECT MATTER OF APPEAL WOULD BE 'ASSESSMENT ORDER' OR THE ORDER OF THE LD. CIT ( A) FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE LIMITATION PERIOD FOR REASSESSMENT HAS TO BE COUNTED. SUB-SECTION (2) RELAXES THE LIMITATION PERIOD AS PROVIDED U/S. 149 TO BE CO UNTED FROM THE END OF THE ASSESSMENT YEAR TILL THE DATE OF THE ORDER WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT MA TTER OF APPEAL INSTEAD OF THE DATE OF THE NOTICE ISSUED UNDER SECTION 148 OF THE ACT. HENCE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF LIMITATION FOR REASSESSMENT AS PRESCRIBED SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTI ON 150 THE LIMITATION PROVIDED U/S. 149 HAS TO BE COUNTED FROM THE END OF THE ASSESSMENT YE AR TILL THE DATE OF THE ORDER WHICH IS SUBJECT MATTER OF APPEAL WHEREIN THE DIRECTIONS WER E PASSED INSTEAD OF THE DATE OF THE NOTICE ISSUED U/S. 148. THE LD. AR OF THE ASSESSEE HAS SUB MITTED THAT THE DATE OF THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL PASSING THE DIRECTIONS IS THE RELEVANT DAT E FOR COMPUTING THE LIMITATION WHEREAS THE LD. DR HAS SUBMITTED THAT SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTIO N 150 IS APPLICABLE AND THERE IS NO RESTRICTIONS AS FAR AS LIMITATION FOR REASSESSMENT OF THE INCOME OF THE ASSESSEE IN PURSUANT TO THE DIRECTIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL. HE HAS FURTHER CONT ENDED THAT EVEN IF THE LIMITATION IS CONSIDERED ON THE DATE OF THE ORDER WHICH IS SUBJEC T MATTER OF APPEAL THEN THE ASSESSMENT ORDER DATED 29.12.2005 IN CASE OF M/S. TIRUPATI AUT OMOBILES PVT. LTD. IS THE RELEVANT ORDER FOR COUNTING THE LIMITATION AND AS SUCH NOTICE ISSU ED U/S. 148 ON 30.07.2010 IS WITHIN THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION AS PROVIDED U/S. 149 (1)(B) R. W.S. 150(2) OF THE ACT. AS FAR AS THE CONTENTION OF THE LD. AR THAT THE LIMITATION AS PER SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTION 150 HAS TO BE COUNTED AS ON THE DATE OF THE TRIBUNAL ORDER. WE FI ND THAT THIS IS NOT TRUE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE AS PER SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTION 150 A S IT IS MEANT FOR PROVIDING A CHECH ON THE ASSESSING AUTHORITY AGAINST THE MISUSE OF POWER FOR ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RE- COMPUTATION AS PROVIDED U/S. 150(1) OF THE ACT. FOR EXAMPLE IF THE ASSESSING OFFICER INSTEAD OF ASSESSING THE INCOME IN THE HANDS OF THE CORRECT ASSESSEE ASSESSED THE SAME IN THE HANDS OF THE WRONG ASSESSEE THEN, THE ASSESSING OFFICER IS N OT PERMIT FOR MISUSE THE PROVISIONS OF LAW FOR ASSESSMENT OR REASSESSMENT OF THE SAID INCOME F OR UNLIMITED PERIOD. THEREFORE, TO PUT A CHECH ON THIS UNLIMITED POWER OF AO SUB-SECTION (2) IS INSERTED IN THE STATUTE WHICH STIPULATES THE TIME LIMIT FOR SUCH ASSESSMENT OR REASSESSMENT BY CONSIDERING THE HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION THAT IF AT THE TIME OF FRAMING THE ASSESSMENT AT TH E WRONG HAND AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE APPELLATE OR REVISIONAL AUTHORITY PASSED THE DIRECTION TO ASS ESS IN THE RIGHT HAND THEN THE LIMITATION FOR SUCH REASSESSMENT HAS TO BE CONSIDERED ON THE DATE WHEN SUCH ORDER OF ASSESSMENT IN THE WRONG HAND IS PASSED INSTEAD OF THE ASSESSMENT IN T HE RIGHT HAND. IF THE AO WAS HAVING THE POWER AND JURISDICTION TO ASSESS THE SAID INCOME IN THE RIGHT HAND INSTEAD OF WRONG HAND AS PER THE LIMITATION PROVIDED U/S. 149 THEN THE TIME TAKEN IN THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE APPELLATE OR REVISIONAL AUTHORITY WHICH PASSED THE DIRECTIONS WILL NOT TAKE AWAY THE 8 ITA NO. 372/JP/2018. M/S. GOODWILL TIMBER SUPPLY, KOTA. JURISDICTION AND POWER OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER WHI CH WAS VERY MUCH AVAILABLE WITH THE AO ON THE DATE WHEN THE ASSESSMENT WAS MADE IN THE WRO NG HAND. IN OTHER WORDS IF THE ASSESSING OFFICER COULD HAVE ASSESSED THE SAME INCOME IN THE HANDS OF THE ASSESSEE INSTEAD OF ASSESSING THE SAME IN WRONG HAND THEN THE LIMITATION FOR REAS SESSMENT OF THE SAID INCOME IS STILL AVAILABLE WITH THE AO IRRESPECTIVE OF THE TIME CONS UMED IN THE APPEAL PROCEEDINGS AND DATE OF THE DIRECTIONS PASSED BY THE APPELLATE OR REVISI ONAL AUTHORITY. IN NUT SHELL SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTION 150 EXCLUDES THE TIME CONSUMED IN THE PR OCEEDING BEFORE APPELLATE OR REVISIONAL AUTHORITY WHEREIN SUCH DIRECTIONS ARE PASSED FROM T HE LIMITATION PRESCRIBED U/S. 149 OF THE ACT. 6-7. AS REGARDS THE DATE OF ORDER ON WHICH THE LIMITATI ON HAS TO BE CONSIDERED WHETHER IT IS ASSESSMENT ORDER OR THE ORDER OF FIRST APPELLATE AU THORITY IN CASE THE DIRECTIONS ARE PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL WE ARE OF THE CONSIDERED OPINION THAT IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE WHETHER THE DIRECTIONS ARE PASSED BY THE FIRST APPELLATE AUTHOR ITY OR IN THE SECOND APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS BY THIS TRIBUNAL AS THE TIME CONSUMED IN THE PROCEE DINGS IN THE APPEAL CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO ANY PARTY EITHER THE AO OR THE ASSESSEE FOR THE PURPOSE OF LIMITATION AS PER SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTION 150 OF THE INCOME TAX ACT. HOWEVER, WE F IND THAT THE HON'BLE KERALA HIGH COURT IN CASE OF VAIKUNDAM RUBBER CO. LTD. (SUPRA) WHILE DEALING WITH THIS ISSUE HAS HELD IN PARAS 4 TO 6 AS UNDER: '4. THE TWO QUESTIONS TO BE DECIDED IN THIS CASE ARE WHETHER THE REASSESSMENT WAS UNDER S. 147(A) OR S. 147(B) ? THE COUNSEL FOR THE DEPART MENT TRIED TO ARGUE THAT IT COMES UNDER S. 147(A). ACCORDING TO THEM, THE ASSESSEE HA S NOT DISCLOSED ABOUT THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL IN THE MADRAS HIGH COURT FOR ENHANCED COMPENSATION. THIS IS A CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH COULD BE MADE USE OF FOR REOPE NING THE ASSESSMENT. ACCORDING TO US, THIS SUBMISSION CANNOT BE ACCEPTED. IT IS AN ADMITTED CASE THAT THE EARLIER VIEW WAS THAT AS PER THE JUDGMENT IN JAYARAM V. CIT (SUP RA ), INTEREST ON THE COMPENSATION AMOUNT IS LIABLE TO BE ASSESSED IN THE YEAR IN WHIC H IT IS RECEIVED. IT WAS ONLY BY A LATER DECISION IN PETER JOHN'S CASE (SUPRA ) A FULL BENCH OF THIS COURT HELD THAT INTEREST IS LIABLE TO BE SPREAD OVER. HENCE, WE AGREE WITH THE TRIBUNAL THAT IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE ASSESSEE FAILED TO DISCLOSE ALL MA TERIALS BEFORE THE AO. IF THAT BE SO, THE ASSESSMENT CANNOT BE UNDER S. 147(A). THEN IT C AN BE ONLY UNDER S. 147(B). HERE, IT WAS BY VIRTUE OF THE DECISION OF THE TRI BUNAL ON 19TH FEB., 1988, THAT INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED BY THE AO THAT INTEREST CAN BE SPREAD OVER. THERE WAS A CONTENTION AS TO ACTUALLY WHETHER THERE IS ANY SUCH DIRECTION OR FIN DING IN THE TRIBUNAL'S ORDER. ACCORDING TO US, WHEN THE TRIBUNAL HOLD THAT O NLY INTEREST THAT ACCRUED FOR THE YEAR 1980- 81 CAN BE ASSESSED FOR THAT YEAR, IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT REST OF THE INTEREST IS SPREAD OVER TO VARIOUS YEARS AND THIS GIVES A RIGHT TO THE AO UNDER S. 147(B) TO START PROCEEDINGS FOR ESCAPED ASSESSMENT READ WITH S. 150(1) OF THE ACT. SEC. 150(1) SAYS THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING CONTAINED IN S. 149, THE NOTICE UNDER S. 148 MAY BE ISSUED AT ANY TIME FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING AN ASS ESSMENT OR REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPUTATION IN CONSEQUENCE OF OR TO GIVE EFFECT T O ANY FINDING OR DIRECTION CONTAINED IN AN ORDER PASSED BY ANY AUTHORITY IN AN Y PROCEEDINGS UNDER THIS ACT BY WAY OF APPEAL, REFERENCE OR REVISION. THUS, THE LIM ITATION UNDER S. 149 DOES NOT APPLY TO S. 150(1). BUT SUB-S. (2) OF S. 150 SAYS THAT TH E PROVISIONS OF SUB- S. (1) SHALL NOT APPLY IN ANY CASE WHERE ANY SUCH ASSESSMENT, REASSE SSMENT OR RECOMPUTATION AS IS REFERRED TO IN THAT SUB- SECTION RELATES TO AN ASSESSMENT YEAR IN RESPECT OF WHICH AN ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPUTATION COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE AT THE TIME THE 9 ITA NO. 372/JP/2018. M/S. GOODWILL TIMBER SUPPLY, KOTA. ORDER WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT- MATTER OF APPEAL, REFERENCE OR REVISION AS THE CASE MAY BE, WAS MADE BY REASON OF ANY OTHER PROVISION LIMIT ING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH ANY ACTION FOR ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPUTATIO N MAY BE TAKEN. THE QUE STION IS WHAT IS THE MEANING OF SUBJECT- MATTER OF APPEAL. WHILE THE DEPARTMENT CONTENDS THA T SUBJECT-MATTER OF APPEAL REFERS TO ORDER OR ASSESSM ENT PASSED FOR THE YEAR 1980- 81, I.E., 27TH JAN., 1983; THE ASSESSEE WOULD CONTEND T HAT ASSESSMENT ORDER PASSED ON 27TH JAN., 1983, WAS SUBJECTED TO APPEAL BEFORE THE CIT (A) AND THAT APPEAL WAS DISMISSED AND AGAINST THAT ORDER, AN APPEAL BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL WAS FILED. IT IS THE TRIBUNAL WHICH PASSED THE ORDER ON 19TH FEB., 1988. SO, ACCORDING TO THE ASSESSEE, IT IS THE ORDER OF THE CIT (A) WHICH WAS SUBJECT- MATTER OF APPEAL, BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL WHICH IS RELEVANT. THAT DATE IS 1ST MARCH, 1984. 5. HERE, SO FAR AS THE ASST. YRS. 1975-76, 1976-77 AND 1977- 78 IS CONCERNED, IT HAS BEEN FOUND BY THE TRIBUNAL THAT EVEN IF THE DATE IS RECKONED FROM 27TH JAN., 1983, AS POINTED OUT BY THE REVENUE, REASSESSMENT CANNOT BE HAD FOR THESE THREE YEARS VIZ., 1975-76 TO 1977- 78. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE DEPARTMENT CAN RESCUE ONLY IF THE CONTENTION UNDER S. 147(A) IS ACCEPTED. SINCE THAT IS REJECTED, WE AGREE WITH THE TRIBUNAL AND HOLD THAT REASSESSMENT FOR THE YEARS 1 975-76, 1976-77 AND 1977- 78 IS BARRED. SO, THE NEXT TWO YEARS ARE 1978-79 AND 1979 - 80. THE DEPARTMENT HAS FOUND THAT SO FAR AS THESE TWO YEARS ARE CONCERNED, THERE IS N O BAR OF LIMITATION IF THE DATE IS TAKEN FROM 27TH JAN., 1983. BUT, THE ASSESSEE CONTE NDS THAT IF 1ST MARCH, 1984, IS TAKEN, THE REASSESSMENT, FOR 1978-79 AND 1979- 80 WOULD HAVE BEEN BARRED. SO, THE QUESTION TO BE CONSIDERED IS THE MEANING OF THE WOR DS, 'A T THE TIME THE ORDER WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT- MATTER OF APPEAL, REFERENCE OR REVISION'. LEARNED C OUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE WOULD RELY ON THE DECISION OF THE ANDHRA P RADESH HIGH COURT IN CIT V. G. VISWANATHAM (1988) 73 CTR (AP) 123: (1988) 172 ITR 401(AP) : TC 51R.2015. EVEN THOUGH IN THAT CASE, THE COURT OBSERVED AS FOL LOWS : 'THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL IN SECOND APPEAL IS D T. 9TH SEPT., 1974. ACCORDING TO SUB-S. (2) OF S . 150, THE INITIATION OF REASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS W OULD BE BAD, EVEN WHEN THEY ARE INITIATED IN CONSEQUENCE OF OR TO GIV E EFFECT TO ANY FINDING OR DIRECTION CONTAINED IN THE APPELLATE ORDER, IF SUCH INITIATIO N OF REASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS IS BARRED BY ANY O THER PROVISION OF THE ACT ON THE DATE OF THE ORDER WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT- MATTER OF APPEAL. IN THIS CASE, THE SECOND APPEAL I N WHICH THE FINDING WAS RECORDED AROSE FROM THE ORDER OF THE AAC DT. 6TH OC T., 1972. THE QUESTION IS, WHETHER ON THAT DATE THE INITI ATION OF REASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS IS BARRED BY ANY PROVISION OF LAW ? ACCORDING TO S. 149(1)(B) REASSESSMENT PROCEE DINGS CANNOT BE INITIATED AFTER THE EXPIRY OF FOUR YEARS FROM THE END OF THE RELEVA NT ASSESSMENT YEAR. FOUR YEARS THEREFROM WOULD EXPIRE ON 3 1ST MARCH,1971. THUS, THE IMPUGNED INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER S. 147 BY A NOTICE ISSUED ON A DA TE SUBSEQUENT TO 9TH SEPT., 1974, WOULD BE CLEARLY BARRED.' BUT IN THAT CASE, THE COURT FOUND THAT EVEN IF THE DATE IS CONSTRUED AS REFERRING TO THE ORI GINAL ORDER OF ASSESSMENT, THE PROCEEDINGS WILL BE BARRED. ANOTHER DECISION RELIED ON BY THE DEPARTMENT IS ITO V. EASTERN COAL CO. LTD . (1975) 101 ITR 477 (CAL.) : TC 51R .947. IN THAT CASE, THERE IS NO DISCUSSION REGARDIN G THIS ASPECT. BUT, IT IS ASSUMED THERE THAT, DATE MENTIONED IS THE DATE OF THE ORIGI NAL ORDER. ACCORDING TO US, THE WORDS 'AT THE TIME THE ORDER WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT- MATTER OF APPEAL, REFERENCE OR 10 ITA NO. 372/JP/2018. M/S. GOODWILL TIMBER SUPPLY, KOTA. REVISI ON, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WAS MADE . . . . . ' IN S. 150(2) ARE SIGNIFICANT. IT IS BECAUSE OF THE WORD 'APPEAL' THAT, IT IS CONTENDED THAT THE SUBJECT- MATTER SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS THE ORIGINAL ORDER. THERE ARE TWO TIER S OF APPEALS FROM THE ASSESSMENT ORDER; ONE TO THE CIT (A) AND ANOTHER TO THE TRIBUNAL. BUT , THE NEXT WORD IS REFERENCE. REFERENCE IS MADE UNDER S. 256(1) OF THE ACT. WHAT IS REFERRED IS THE SUBJECT- MATTER OF THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL. CAN WE SAY THA T WHEN THE TRIBUNAL REFERS THE MATTER TO THE HIGH COURT, THE ORDER THAT WAS CONSIDERED BY THE TR IBUNAL IS THE ORDER OF THE AO?. NO. IT IS THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUN AL THAT IS BEING REFERRED. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THIS CASE, WHERE THERE IS A REFERENCE T O THE HIGH COURT AGAINST THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL, IT WIL L BE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL THAT WILL BE MATERIAL. F URTHER ACCORDING TO US, WHEN AN ORDER IS PASSED BY THE ORI GINAL AUTHORITY AND AN APPEAL IS FILED, THE ORDER PASSED BY THE ORIGINAL AUTHORITY M ERGES WITH THAT OF THE ORDER OF THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY. WHEN A SECOND APPEAL IS FILED, THE SUBJECT- MATTER IS THE ORDER OF THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY. SO ALSO, WHEN THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL IS CHALLENGED, WHAT IS THE SUBJECT- MATTER, IS THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL. IF THAT BE SO , THERE IS NO DIFFICULTY IN CONSTRUING S. 150(2). THEN, IN THIS CASE, THE ORDER WHICH WAS SUBJECT- MATTER OF APPEAL IS TO BE CONSTRUED AS THE ORDER PASSED BY THE CIT ( A), ON 1ST MARCH, 1984. IF SO, THE REASSESSMENT FOR 1978-79 WILL ALSO BE BARRED. 6. IN THE RESULT, THE QUESTION OF LAW RAISED AT THE INSTANCE OF THE REVENUE FOR THE YEARS 1975-76 TO 1977- 78 ARE ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, IN FAVOUR OF TH E ASSESSEE AND AGAINST THE REVENUE. WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF LAW RAISED AT THE INSTANCE OF THE ASSESSEE, WE ANSWER THE QUESTION IN THE NEGATIVE, IN FAVOUR OF THE ASSESSEE AND AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT.' THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT HAS CLEARLY HELD THAT WHEN T HE DIRECTIONS WERE PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL THEN THE ORDER OF LD. CIT (A) WAS THE SUBJ ECT MATTER OF APPEAL BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL AND THEREFORE, THE ORDER OF LD. CIT (A) IS RELEVANT FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 150(2) OF THE ACT AND NOT THE ASSESSMENT ORDER. SINCE, NO CONTRARY DE CISION HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO OUR NOTICE ON THIS POINT, THEREFORE, WE ARE BOUND TO FOLLOW THE D ECISION OF HON'BLE KERALA HIGH COURT IN CASE OF VAIKUNDAM RUBBER CO. LTD.(SUPRA) AND ACCORD INGLY HOLD THAT THE LIMITATION FOR REASSESSMENT HAS TO BE CONSIDERED ON THE DATE WHEN THE LD. CIT (A) PASSED THE ORDER IN CASE OF M/S. TIRUPATI AUTOMOBILES PVT. LTD. WHICH WAS SU BJECT MATTER OF APPEAL BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL IN WHICH THE TRIBUNAL PASSED THE DIRECTION S ON 26.03.2010. THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT THE LD. CIT (A) IN CASE OF M/S. TIRUPATI AUTOMOBILE S PVT. LTD. PASSED THE ORDER ON 15.07.2009 AND ON THAT DATE THE LIMITATION FOR REASSESSMENT FO R THE ASSESSMENT YEARS 2001-02 & 2002-03 ALREADY EXPIRED AS 6 YEARS FROM THE END OF THE RELE VANT ASSESSMENT YEARS EXPIRED ON 31.03.2008 AND 31.03.2009 RESPECTIVELY. THEREFORE, THE LIMITATION AS ON THE DATE OF THE ORDER PASSED BY THE LD. CIT (A) DATED 15.07.2009 WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR REASSESSMENT OF THIS INCOME FOR THESE TWO ASSESSMENT YEARS. ACCORDINGLY, THE RE OPENING OF THE ASSESSMENT IS BARRED BY LIMITATION AS PROVIDED U/S. 149 R.W.S. 150(2) OF TH E ACT. SINCE THE REOPENING IS BARRED BY LIMITATION, THEREFORE, THE CONSEQUENT REASSESSED IS NOT SUSTAINABLE AND THE SAME ARE QUASHED. WHEN THE REASSESSMENTS ITSELF ARE QUASH BEING VOID AND BARRED BY LIMITATION THEN THE GROUND NO. 2 RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE ON THE MERITS OF THE A DDITION BECOMES INFRUCTUOUS. THEREFORE, WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO GO INTO THE SAID GROUND OF THE AS SESSEE'S APPEAL. 11 ITA NO. 372/JP/2018. M/S. GOODWILL TIMBER SUPPLY, KOTA. THEREFORE, IT IS NOW SETTLED PROPOSITION OF LAW ON THE POINT THAT SECTION 150(1) IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE LIMITATION PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 149 FOR THE PURPOSE OF ISSUING A NOTICE UNDER SECTION 148. HOWEVER, THE LIMITATION RELAXED UNDER SECTION 150(1) IS ALSO NOT UNLIMITED BUT SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS AN D RESTRICTIONS AS PROVIDED UNDER SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTION 150 OF THE ACT. THE LIM ITATION, ACCORDINGLY, HAS TO BE COUNTED ON THE DATE OF ASSESSMENT ORDER PASSED BY T HE AO ASSESSING THE INCOME IN THE WRONG HANDS AND, THEREFORE, IF THE AO COULD HAV E ASSESSED THE SAME INCOME IN THE HANDS OF THE RIGHT PERSON INSTEAD OF A WRONG HA ND THEN THE LIMITATION FOR REASSESSMENT OF THE SAID INCOME IS AVAILABLE TO THE AO IRRESPECTIVE OF THE TIME CONSUMED IN THE APPEAL PROCEEDINGS. IN THE CASE IN HAND THE ASSESSMENT ORDER WAS PASSED BY THE AO IN CASE OF THE PARTNER ON 27 TH FEBRUARY, 2014 AND, THEREFORE, THE LIMITATION HAS TO BE CONSIDERED ON THE SAID DATE OF PASSING THE ASSESSMENT ORDER IN THE WRONG HANDS I.E. 27 TH FEBRUARY, 2014. THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT AS ON 27 TH FEBRUARY, 2014 THE AO COULD NOT REOPEN THE ASSESSME NT OF THE ASSESSEE BEING BARRED BY LIMITATION AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 149 AND, THEREFORE, THE RELAXATION PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 150(1) AND (2) OF THE ACT IS ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT IF THE AO COULD HAVE ASSESSED THE SAME INCOME IN THE HANDS OF THE RIGHT PERSON AS ON THE DATE OF THE ORDER BY WHICH THE INCOME WAS WRONGLY A SSESSED IN THE HANDS OF OTHER PERSON. SINCE THE LIMITATION FOR REOPENING THE ASS ESSMENT WAS NOT AVAILABLE WHEN THE ASSESSMENT ORDER WAS PASSED ON 27 TH FEBRUARY, 2014, THEREFORE THE NOTICE ISSUED BY THE AO UNDER SECTION 148 IS WITHOUT THE J URISDICTION OF THE AO TO INITIATE THE PROCEEDINGS FOR REOPENING OF THE ASSESSMENT. F OLLOWING THE EARLIER ORDER OF THIS 12 ITA NO. 372/JP/2018. M/S. GOODWILL TIMBER SUPPLY, KOTA. TRIBUNAL, WE HOLD THAT THE REOPENING IS NOT PERMISS IBLE IN THE CASE OF THE ASSESSEE WHEN THE LIMITATION WAS NOT AVAILABLE EVEN ON THE D ATE WHEN THE ASSESSMENT ORDER WAS PASSED IN THE CASE OF MS. BRIJENDRA SETHI. THE LIMITATION IS SAVED IF THE SAME WAS AVAILABLE ON THE DATE WHEN THE ASSESSMENT ORDER WAS PASSED IN THE WRONG HANDS AND, THEREFORE, THE SUBSEQUENT TIME PERIOD CO NSUMED IN THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE FIRST APPELLATE AUTHORITY AND THEREAFTER WILL NOT AFFECT THE POWER OF THE AO FOR REOPENING OF THE ASSESSMENT. IN VIEW OF THE AB OVE DISCUSSION, WE SET ASIDE THE REOPENING OF THE ASSESSMENT BEING VOID ABINITIO AND CONSEQUENTLY THE REASSESSMENT IS QUASHED. SINCE WE HAVE QUASHED THE REOPENING AN D REASSESSMENT, THEREFORE, WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO GO INTO THE MERITS OF THE OTHER G ROUNDS RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE. 4. IN THE RESULT, APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS ALLOWED . ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 23/05/20 18. SD/- SD/- HKKXPUN FOT; IKY JKWO (BHAGCHAND) ( VIJAY PAL RAO ) YS[KK LNL;@ ACCOUNTANT MEMBER U;KF;D LNL;@ JUDICIAL MEMBER TK;IQJ@ JAIPUR FNUKAD@ DATED:- 23 /05/2018. DAS/ VKNS'K DH IZFRFYFI VXZSFKR@ COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO: 1. VIHYKFKHZ@ THE APPELLANT-M/S. GOODWILL TIMBER SUPPLY, KOTA. 2. IZR;FKHZ@ THE RESPONDENT- THE ITO WARD 1(1), KOTA. 3. VK;DJ VK;QDR@ CIT 4. VK;DJ VK;QDR@ CIT(A) 5. FOHKKXH; IZFRFUF/K] VK;DJ VIHYH; VF/KDJ.K] T;IQJ@ DR, ITAT, JAIPUR 6. XKMZ QKBZY@ GUARD FILE {ITA NO. 372/JP/2018} VKNS'KKUQLKJ@ BY ORDER, LGK;D IATHDKJ@ ASST. REGISTRAR 13 ITA NO. 372/JP/2018. M/S. GOODWILL TIMBER SUPPLY, KOTA.