M/s Rabiya Basari Brahamath-ullah allayha Charitable Trust, V. CIT,

ITA 423/BANG/2013

• Counselvise Citation: [2015] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 95328 (ITAT-BANGALORE)
• Duration Of Justice: 2 year(s) 7 month(s) 10 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 06-11-2015
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Bench Allotted: B
• Next Hearing Date: 04-11-2015
• Assessment Year: 2008-2009
• Appeal Filed On: 27-03-2013
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: KUM NEERA MALHOTRA
• Assessee Lawyers: S VENKATESAN
• Keywords: Gift; Rectification of order; Charitable institution; Retrospective amendment
• Section: 12AA; 92

Judgement Text

`IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL BANGALORE BENCH B BEFORE SMT. ASHA VIJAYARAGHAVAN, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SHRI JASON P. BOAZ, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ITA NOS.423 & 1631/(BANG)/2013 M/S. RABIYA BASARI RAHAMAT-ULLA-HI ALLAYHA CHARITAB LE TRUST, RABIYA EDUCATIONAL CENTRE, G.P.ROAD, SAGAR-577 401 APPEL LANT VS THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DAVANGERE. RESPON DENT APPELLANT BY : SHRI S. VENKATESAN, CA. RESPONDENT BY : KUM. NEERA MALHOTRA, CIT DATE OF HEARING : 04.11.2015 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 06-11-2015 O R D E R PER SHRI JASON P BOAZ, AM : THESE TWO APPEALS BY THE ASSESSEE ARE DIRE CTED AGAINST TWO SEPARATE ORDERS UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 19 61 (IN SHORT 'THE ACT') DT.31.1.2013 AND 27.9.2013 RESPECTIVELY REFUSING TH E ASSESSEE REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE ACT. SINCE THE ISSUES IN VOLVED ARE INTER-CONNECTED, THESE APPEALS WERE HEARD TOGETHER AND ARE BEING DIS POSED OFF BY WAY OF THIS COMMON ORDER. 2. THE FACTS OF THE CASE, BRIEFLY ARE AS UNDER :- 2 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 2.1 THE ASSESSEE TRUST WAS CONSTITUTED UN DER THE INSTRUMENT OF DECLARATION OF TRUST DATED 15-12-2001 FOR ATTAINMEN T OF CERTAIN AIMS AND OBJECTIVES MENTIONED IN CHAPTER-III OF THE TRUST DE ED. THE ASSESSEE TRUST MADE AN APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IN FORM NO.10A ON 24-03-2011. THE SAID APPLICATION WAS DISPOSED OFF BY THE CIT, DAVANGERE BY ORDER DT.28.9.2011, REFUSING IT REGISTRATION ON THE GROUND THAT THE ASS ESSEE HAD NOT FULFILLED THE CONDITIONS FOR GRANT OF REGISTRATION. IN THE SAID O RDER IT WAS MENTIONED THAT SOME OF THE INFORMATION CALLED FOR WAS NOT FURNISHE D AND SOME OF THE OBJECTS MENTIONED IN CHAPTER III OF THE TRUST DEED ARE FOR THE BENEFIT OF A PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY AND THEREFORE THE PROVISIONS O F SECTION 13(1)(B) OF THE ACT, WAS ALSO INVOKED BY THE LEARNED CIT WHILE REFUSING THE ASSESSEE REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE ACT. 2.2 AGGRIEVED BY THE ORDER DT.28.9.2011 OF THE LD. CIT, DAVANGERE, THE ASSESSEE FILED AN APPEAL BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL RAISIN G SEVERAL GROUNDS. THE CO- ORDINATE BENCH OF THIS TRIBUNAL AFTER HEARING OF TH E ASSESSEE'S APPEAL INCLUDING ITS RELIANCE ON THE DECISION OF THE HON'BLE APEX CO URT IN THE CASE OF AHMEDABAD RANA CASTE ASSOCIATION REPORTED IN 140 ITR 1 SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF THE LD. CIT AND REMANDED THE ISSUE OF GRANT OF R EGISTRATION FOR FRESH CONSIDERATION VIDE ITS ORDER IN ITA NO.1237/BANG/20 11 DT.12.9.2012 GRANTING THE ASSESSEE LIBERTY TO PUT FORTH ALL ITS CONTENTIO NS IN THIS REGARD. 3 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 2.3 SUBSEQUENT TO THE ORDER OF THE ITAT, BANG ALORE IN ITA NO.1237/BANG/2011 DT.12.9.2012, THE ASSESSEE APPEAR ED BEFORE THE CIT, DAVANGERE AND MADE ITS SUBMISSIONS. IT WAS CONTEND ED BY THE ASSESSEE THAT THE BENEFITS OF THE TRUST WERE OPEN TO ALL PERSONS AND IT WAS NOT RESTRICTED TO A PARTICULAR COMMUNITY. THE LD.CIT, HOWEVER, WAS NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORTH BY THE ASSESSEE AND REJECTED IT S APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE ACT, VIDE OR DER DATED 27-09-2013. IN THE SAID ORDER, THE LD. CIT ONCE AGAIN TOOK THE VIE W THAT THE OBJECT CLAUSES 2,3,7,8,14,16 & 17 OF THE TRUST DEED DATED 31-01-20 13 ARE FOR A SPECIFIC RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY AND HENCE THE TRUST GETS HIT BY THE MISCHIEF OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 13(1)(B) OF THE ACT. 2.4 AGGRIEVED BY THE AFORESAID ORDER OF THE CIT, DAVANGERE DT.31.1.2013, THE ASSESSEE PREFERRED AN APPEAL IN ITA NO.423/BANG /2013 RAISING THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS :- 1. THE ORDER OF THE LD.CIT (IN THE FORM OF CERTIF ICATE) U/S 12AA OF THE IT ACT, 19161 DATED 31-01-2011 ONCE AGA IN REFUSING TO REGISTER THE TRUST U/S 12AA OF THE IT A CT, 19161 IN SO FAR AS IT IS AGAINST THE ASSESSEE, IS OPPOSED TO LAW, EQUITY, WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE, PROBABILITIES FACTS AND CIRCUMS TANCES OF THE CASE. 2. THE LD.CIT IS NOT JUSTIFIED IN HOLDING THAT THE ASSESSEE TRUST HAS NOT FULFILLED THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN F OR GRANT OF REGISTRATION U/S 12AA OF THE IT ACT, 1961 UNDER THE FACTS AND IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ASSESSEES CASE. 4 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 3. THE LD.CIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE ALL THE OBJECTS MENTIONED IN THE TRUST DEED ARE CHARITABLE IN NATUR E AS CONTEMPLATED U/S 2(15) OF THE IT ACT, AND THE OBJEC TS OF DEVELOPING THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY, WHICH IS A BROAD C ROSS SECTION OF GENERAL PUBLIC ITSELF IN AN OBJECT OF AD VANCEMENT OF GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITY, WHICH IS CHARITABLE OBJECT ALONGWITH THE OTHER OBJECTS NO.5,6,7,8,12,14,15,16 AND 18 ARE NOT FOR THE BENEFIT OF MUSLIM COMMUNITY BUT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY, WHICH ARE MEMBERS OF THE CROSS SE CTION OF THE SOCIETY AND THE OTHER OBJECTS NO.1,3,10,11 AND 13 THEY ARE NOT FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE COMMUNITY AS SUCH AN D FURTHER THE OBJECTS SERIAL NO.2,4,7,8,14,16 AND 17, IF THEY ARE CONSIDERED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE COMMUNITY, THEY A RE FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN, WHICH IS ACCEPTED BY EXPLANATIO N(2) TO SEC.13(1)(B)C OF THE ACT. 4. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE ABOVE, EVEN ASSUMING THE TRUST IS FOR THE BENEFIT OF A PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY IN RESPECT OF CERTAIN OBJECTS IN VIEW OF EXPLANATION ( 2) TO SEC.13, THE PROVISIONS OF SEC.13(1) OF THE ACT WOULD NOT A PPLY AS THESE OBJECTS OF THE TRUST IS FOR THE BENEFIT OF WOMEN AN D CHILDREN AND THE TRUSTY IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF SEC.1 1 OF THE ACT AND THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 13(1) OF THE ACT WOUL D NOT APPLY AND THE LEARNED CIT OUGHT TO HAVE GRANTED THE REGIS TRATION U/S 12AA OF THE ACT. 5. THE LEARNED CIT IS NOT JUSTIFIED IN HOLDING THA T THE RATIO OF THE DECISION OF THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS AHMEDABAD RANA CASTE ASSOCIATION REPORTED IN 140 ITR 1, IS DISTINGUISHABLE AND WOULD NOT APPLY UNDER THE F ACTS AND IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ASSESSEES CASE. 5.1 THE LEARNED CIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT DEVELOPMENT OF A PARTICULAR COMMUNITY OR CASTE, WHI CH IS A 5 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 BROAD CROSS-SECTION OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITY, BY ITSELF IS A OBJECT GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITY AND THE RATIO OF THE DECISION OF THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS AHMEDAB AD RANA CASTE ASSOCIATION REPORTED IN 140 ITR 1, IS AP PLICABLE AND FURTHER THE OBJECTS IF THEY ARE CONSIDERED FOR THE BENEFIT OF A COMMUNITY, SUCH OBJECTS ARE FOR THE BENEFIT OF WO MEN AND CHILDREN OF SUCH COMMUNITY AND THEY ARE ACCEPTED FR OM THE HIGHER RIGOUR OF SEC.13(1)(B) OF THE IT ACT. 6. FOR THE ABOVE AND OTHER GROUNDS THAT MAY BE URG ED AT THE TIME OF HEARING OF THE APPEAL, YOUR ASSESSEE HU MBLY PRAYS THAT THE APPEAL MAY BE ALLOWED AND JUSTICE RENDERED 3.1 AFTER THE ORDER DT.31.1.2013 WAS PASSED BY THE CIT, DAVANGERE, THE AUTHOR OF THE TRUST EXECUTED A DEED OF AMENDMENT OF TRUST ON 18.3.2013. IN THE SAID DEED OF AMENDMENT, IT WAS EXPRESSED BY TH E AUTHOR THAT SINCE THE AIMS AND OBJECTS OF THE TRUST AS CONTAINED IN THE T RUST DEED DATED 05-12- 2001 WERE CONSIDERED TO BE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE M USLIM COMMUNITY, THEREFORE REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE AC T WAS DENIED TO THE TRUST. IT WAS ALSO STATED THAT THE ASSESSEE TRUST WAS FACT UALLY ENGAGED IN PROVIDING EDUCATION AND AWARENESS OF EDUCATION AMONGST WOMEN AND CHILDREN IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY CASTE, CREED OR RELIGIOUS AFFIL IATION AND THEREFORE THE AUTHOR OF THE TRUST DECIDED TO AMEND THE AIMS AND OBJECTIV ES IN THE ORIGINAL TRUST DEED DATED 05-12-2001. IT WAS STATED IN THE DEED O F AMENDMENT THAT THE AIMS AND OBJECTS OF THE TRUST SHALL BE AMENDED AND REPLACED WITH THE OBJECTS MENTIONED IN THE AMENDMENT DEED, WHICH WILL BE ADVE RTED TO W.R.E.F. 05-12- 2001 ITSELF. 6 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 3.2 BASED ON THE AMENDMENT TRUST DEED DT.18 .3.2013, THE ASSESSEE FILED A FRESH APPLICATION IN FORM NO.10A ON 28.3.20 13 SEEKING GRANT OF REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE ACT. THE SA ID APPLICATION WAS DISPOSED OFF BY THE CIT, DAVANGERE VIDE ORDER DT.27.9.2013. ONCE AGAIN THE LD. CIT REFUSED TO GRANT REGISTRATION OBSERVING THAT THE AS SESSEE HAD ALREADY FILED AN APPEAL AGAINST THE EARLIER ORDER OF THE CIT, DAVANG ERE DT.31.1.2013 REFUSING THE ASSESSEE REGISTRATION AND THAT MATTER WAS SUBJU DICE. IT WAS ALSO OBSERVED BY THE LD. CIT THAT THE AMENDED TRUST DEED EVIDENCE S THAT THE ASSESSEE HAD AGREED WITH THE FINDINGS IN THE EARLIER ORDER DT.31 .1.2013. IN THAT VIEW OF THE MATTER, THE FRESH APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION ALSO COME TO BE REJECTED BY THE ORDER OF THE LEARNED CIT DT.27.9.2013. 3.3 AGGRIEVED BY THE ORDER OF THE CIT, DAVANGERE DT.27.9.2013 REJECTING THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE ACT DT.28.3.2013, THE ASSESSEE HAS PREFERRED THIS APPEAL RAISING THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS :- 1. THE ORDER OF THE LEARNED CIT (IN THE FORM OF CERTIFICATE) UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE I.T. ACT, 1961 DATED 27.9 .2013 ONCE GAIN REFUSING TO REGISTER THE TRUST UNDER SECT ION 12AA OF THE IT ACT, 1961, IN SO FAR AS IT IS AGAINST THE AP PELLANT, IS OPPOSED TO LAW, EQUITY, WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE, PROBABI LITIES FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE. 2. THE LEARNED CIT IS NOT JUSTIFIED IN HOLDING TH AT THE APPELLANT TRUST IS NOT ENTITLED TO GRANT OF REGISTR ATION ON THE GROUND THAT THE APPELLANT IS IN APPEAL BEFORE THE H ON'BLE ITAT AGAINST REJECTION OF APPLICATION FOR REGISTRAT ION UNDER 7 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 SECTION 12AA OF THE ACT, DATED 31.1.2013, UNDER THE FACTS AND IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE APPELLANTS CASE. 3. THE LEARNED CIT (APPEALS) FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT AFTER REJECTION FOR GRANT OF REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 1 2AA OF THE ACT DT.31.1.2013, THE APPELLANT HAD AMENDED ITS TRU ST DEED TO THE CLARIFY AND REMOVE ANY DOUBTS THAT IT EXISTS TO CATER TO A PARTICULAR COMMUNITY AND THEREAFTER HAS APPLIED F RESH APPLICATION FOR GRANT OF REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12AA AND THEREFORE, THE CIT OUGHT TO HAVE GRANTED REGISTRATI ON UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE ACT. 4. FOR THE ABOVE AND OTHER GROUNDS THAT MAY BE URG ED AT THE TIME OF HEARING OF THE APPEAL, YOUR APPELLANT H UMBLY PRAYS THAT THE APPEAL MAY BE ALLOWED AND JUSTICE RE NDERED. 4. WE HAVE HEARD BOTH THE LEARNED AUTHORISE D REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE ASSESSEE AND THE LD. DR FOR REVENUE AT LENGTH, PERU SED AND CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE MATERIAL ON RECORD AND THE JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS CITED AND PROCEED TO DISPOSE THE TWO APPEALS HEREUNDER. ITA NO.423/BANG/2013. 5.1 THOUGH AS MANY AS 6 GROUNDS HAVE BEEN RAISED IN THIS APPEAL IN ITA NO.423/BANG/2013, THE ONLY QUESTION THAT ARISES FOR OUR CONSIDERATION IS WHETHER THE ASSESSEE IS ENTITLED FOR REGISTRATION U NDER SECTION 12AA OF THE ACT, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE AIMS AND OBJECTS CON TAINED IN CHAPTER III OF THE TRUST DEED DATED 15-12-2001. THE CASE OF THE LD. C IT IS THAT CERTAIN OBJECTS SHOWED THAT THE BENEFITS OF THE TRUST ARE RESTRICTE D TO MEMBERS OF THE MUSLIM 8 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 COMMUNITY AND THEREFORE, THE TRUST IS HIT BY THE PR OVISIONS OF SECTION 13(1)(B) OF THE ACT. 5.2 PER CONTRA, THE CONTENTION OF THE LEA RNED AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE ASSESSEE IS THAT THE BENEFITS OF THE ASSESS EE TRUST ARE OPEN TO ALL PERSONS WITHOUT DISTINCTION OF CASTE, COMMUNITY OR SEX. IT WAS SUBMITTED THAT THE BENEFIT OF THE TRUST SHALL ENSURE TO THE PUBLIC WITHOUT ANY DISTINCTION OF CASTE, COMMUNITY OR SEX. RELIANCE WAS PLACED BY T HE LEARNED AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE ON THE DECISION OF THE HON'BLE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT V DAWOOD BOHRA JAMAT REPORTED IN (2014) 102 DTR (SC) 361. IT WAS CONTENDED THAT THE UPLIFTMENT OF A COMMUNITY ITSELF WAS AN OB JECT OF GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITY AS HELD BY THE HON'BLE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF AHMEDABAD RANA CASTE ASSOCIATION REPORTED IN 140 ITR 1. IT WAS SUBMITTED THAT THE P ROVISIONS OF SECTION 13(1)(B) OF THE ACT, IS TO THE EFFECT THAT A TRUST CREATED OR ESTABLISHED FOR THE BENEFIT OF A PARTICULAR RELIGIONS OR CASTE WOUL D NOT BE ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 11 OF THE ACT. DISTINCTION WAS SOUG HT TO BE MADE BETWEEN UPLIFTMENT OF THE COMMUNITY AND CHANNELING THE BENE FITS OF THE TRUST TO A PARTICULAR COMMUNITY. 5.3 ON THE ISSUE OF THE REFUSAL OF REGISTRA TION BY THE LD. CITS ORDER DT.3.1.2013 IS CONCERNED, WE FIND IT RELEVANT THAT THE HON'BLE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF DAWOOD BOHARA JAMAT (SUPRA) HAS OBSERVED AS UNDER :- 9 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 28.THE OBJECTS OF THE RESPONDENT-TRUST ARE NOT IND ICATIVE OF A WHOLLY RELIGIOUS PURPOSE BUT ARE COLLECTIVELY INDIC ATIVE OF BOTH CHARITABLE AND RELIGIOUS PURPOSES. IT IS EXPEDIENT TO COMPREHEND THE OBJECTS OF THE RESPONDENT-TRUST WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE EXPRESSIONS CHARITABLE PURPOSE AND RELIGIOUS PURPOSE. 29.................................. 30.ACCORDING TO SECTION 2(15), THE EXPRESSION CHAR ITABLE PURPOSE HAS BEEN DEFINED BY WAY OF AN INCLUSIVE DEFINITION SO AS TO INCLUDE RELIEF TO THE POOR, EDUCATION, MEDICAL RELIEF AND A DVANCEMENT OF ANY OTHER OBJECT OF GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITY. A CATEN A OF DECISIONS OF THIS COURT WHICH HAVE INTERPRETED THE SAID PROVISIO N AND ESPECIALLY THE EXPRESSION ANY OTHER OBJECT OF GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITY HAVE OBSERVED THAT THE SAID EXPRESSION IS OF THE WIDEST CONNOTATION. THE WORD GENERAL IN THE SAID EXPRESSION MEANS PERTAIN ING TO A WHOLE CLASS. (CIT V. GUJARAT MARITIME BOARD, (2007) 14 SC C 704). THEREFORE, ADVANCEMENT OF ANY OBJECT OF BENEFIT TO THE PUBLIC OR A SECTION OF THE PUBLIC AS DISTINGUISHED FROM BENEFIT TO AN INDIVIDUAL OR A GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS WOULD BE A CHARITABLE PUR POSE. (CIT V. AHMEDABAD RANA CASTE ASSN.) THE SAID EXPRESSION WOU LD PRIMA FACIE INCLUDE ALL OBJECTS WHICH PROMOTE THE WELLBEI NG OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC. IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT A PURPOSE WOULD CEAS E TO BE CHARITABLE EVEN WHEN PUBLIC WELFARE IS INTENDED TO BE SERVED. 31.THE CONSTITUTION BENCH OF THIS COURT IN CIT V. S URAT ART SILK CLOTH MANUFACTURERS ASSN. HAS HELD THAT IF THE PRI MARY PURPOSE AND THE PREDOMINANT OBJECT OF A TRUST ARE TO PROMOT E THE WELFARE OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC THE PURPOSE WOULD BE CHARITABLE PURPOSE. IF THE PRIMARY OR PREDOMINANT OBJECT OF AN INSTITUTION IS CHARITABLE, ANY OTHER OBJECT WHICH MIGHT NOT BE CHARITABLE BUT WHIC H IS ANCILLARY OR INCIDENTAL TO THE DOMINANT PURPOSE, WOULD NOT PREVE NT THE 10 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 INSTITUTION FROM BEING A VALID CHARITABLE TRUST. (T HIAGARAJAR CHARITIES V. CIT, (1997) 4 SCC 724). 32.THIS COURT IN SEVERAL DECISIONS HAS REITERATED T HE AFORESAID TEST OF PREDOMINANT PURPOSE AND HELD THAT THE PURPOSES W HICH WOULD YIELD TO PROFIT OR NOT IN GENERAL PUBLIC INTEREST C OULD BE SEPARATED AND THE TRUST WOULD ONLY BE EXIGIBLE TO TAX TO THE EXTENT OF THE CHARITABLE PURPOSES UNDER ITS OBJECTS. IN CIT V. KA MLA TOWN TRUST, (1996) 7 SCC 349, THE OBJECT OF THE TRUST INCLUDED CONSTRUCTION OF HOUSES FOR WORKMEN IN GENERAL AND IN PARTICULAR FOR THE WORKMEN, STAFF AND OTHER EMPLOYEES OF THE SETTLER COMPANY. I T WAS HELD THAT WHILE THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO WORKMEN IN GENER AL DID CONSTITUTE A CHARITABLE OBJECT, THE WORDS IN PARTICULAR FOR W ORKMEN OF THE COMPANY NEGATIVE THE CHARITABLE PURPOSE AND THEREF ORE, THE ENTIRE TRUST COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN ESTABLIS HED WHOLLY FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSE. 33.IN ABDUL SATHAR HAJI MOOSA SAIT DHARMASTAPANAM V . COMMR. OF AGRI. INCOME TAX, (1974) 3 SCC 257, AT PAGE 259, THIS COURT CONSIDERED THE QUESTION WHETHER THE APPELLANT THERE IN WAS A PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTI ON 4(B) OF THE KERALA AGRICULTURAL INCOME TAX ACT, 1950. THE 3/4TH OF THE INCOME OF THE BEQUEST WAS PRIMARILY EARMARKED FOR THE BENE FIT OF NEAR RELATIONS OF THE TESTATOR ONLY, IT CANNOT BE CONSID ERED AS A PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST. WHILE THE REST ONE-FOURTH WAS CON CLUDED TO FORM THE VALID CHARITABLE TRUST. (TRUSTEES OF GORDHANDAS GOVINDRAM FAMILY TRUST V. CIT). IN CIT V. ANDHRA CHAMBER OF C OMMERCE; AHMEDABAD RANA CASTE ASSN. V. CIT; SOLE TRUSTEE, LO KA SHIKSHANA TRUST V. CIT AND YOGIRAJ CHARITY TRUST V. CIT AND CIT V. ANDHRA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,[1965] 55 ITR 722 (SC), IT WAS OBSERVED THAT OBJECTS FOR SERVICE AND BENEFIT TO TH E GENERAL MASSES WOULD INDICATE THAT THEY ARE MEANT FOR PUBLIC PURPO SE AND THUS, WOULD CREATE A PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST. 11 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 34.INDUBITABLY, THE WORD CHARITY CONNOTES ALTRUIS M IN THOUGHT AND ACTION AND INVOLVES AN IDEA OF BENEFITING OTHER S RATHER THAN ONESELF. (ANDHRA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (SUPRA)). IT A LSO CANNOT BE LOST SIGHT OF THAT THE SUPREME GOAL OF ALL RELIGION S IS PHILANTHROPY WHICH COULD BE MANIFESTED IN VARIOUS FORMS. IT IS H ELD THAT GIFTS FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES ARE PRIMA FACIE GIFTS FOR CHARIT ABLE PURPOSES. (SCHOALES V. SCHOALES [1930] 2 CH. 75 (CA); WHITE V . WHITE (1893) 2 CH. 41 (CA)) 35.UNLIKE THE PHRASE CHARITABLE PURPOSE, RELIGIO US PURPOSE IS NOT DEFINED UNDER THE ACT. ACCORDING TO LEXICOGRAPH ERS, THE TERM RELIGIOUS WOULD MEAN OF OR RELATING TO RELIGION. (MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, MACMILLAN ENGLISH DICTIONARY). THE SHOR TER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY DEFINES THE TERM AS FOLLOWS: DE VOTED TO RELIGION; EXHIBITING THE SPIRITUAL OR PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF RE LIGION, FOLLOWING THE REQUIREMENTS OF RELIGION; PIOUS, GODLY, DEVOUT. IN KANGA, PALKHIVALA AND VYAS, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAX , VOL. 1, ED. 9TH (AT P. 544) RELIGIOUS PURPOSES ARE INDICATED TO INCLUDE THE ADVANCEMENT, SUPPORT OR PROPAGATION OF A RELIGION A ND TENETS. THUS, A RELIGIOUS PURPOSE WOULD BE ONE RELATING TO A PARTICULAR RELIGION AND BROADLY WOULD ENCOMPASS OBJECTS RELATI NG TO OBSERVANCE OF RITUALS AND CEREMONIES, PROPAGATION O F TENETS OF THE RELIGION AND OTHER ALLIED ACTIVITIES OF THE RELIGIO US COMMUNITY. AN EXAMPLE OF SUCH WOULD ENTAIL ACTIVITIES SUCH AS THE DANCE PERFORMANCES (GARBA) OR DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD SPECIF ICALLY FOR PEOPLE ON FAST DURING THE HINDU FESTIVITIES OF NAVRATRI. 36.IN CERTAIN CASES, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE TRUST MA Y CONTAIN ELEMENTS OF BOTH: RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE AND THUS, BOTH TH E PURPOSES MAY BE OVER LAPPING. MORE SO WHEN THE RELIGIOUS ACTIVIT Y CARRIED ON BY A PARTICULAR SECTION OF PEOPLE WOULD BE A CHARITABLE ACTIVITY FOR OR TOWARDS OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY AND ALSO PUB LIC AT LARGE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRACTICE OF OPTIONAL CHARITY IN TH E FORM OF KHAIRAT 12 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 OR SADAQUAH UNDER MOHAMMADAN LAW WOULD BE COVERED U NDER BOTH CHARITABLE AS WELL AS RELIGIOUS PURPOSE. FURTH ER, WHILE PROVIDING FOOD AND FODDER TO ANIMALS ESPECIALLY COW IS RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY FOR HINDUS, IT WOULD BE CHARITABLE IN RESP ECT TO NON-HINDUS AS WELL. SIMILARLY, SERVICE OF WATER TO THE THIRSTY WOULD FIND MENTION AS RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY IN SACRED TEXTS AND A T THE SAME TIME WOULD QUALIFY AS A CHARITABLE ACTIVITY. 37................................. 38. UNQUESTIONABLY, OBJECTS (C) AND (F) WHICH PROV IDE FOR THE ACTIVITIES COMPLETELY RELIGIOUS IN NATURE AND RESTR ICTED TO THE SPECIFIC COMMUNITY OF THE RESPONDENT-TRUST ARE OBJE CTS WITH RELIGIOUS PURPOSE ONLY. HOWEVER, IN RESPECT TO THE OTHER OBJECTS, IN OUR VIEW THE FACT THAT THE SAID OBJECTS TRACE THEIR SOURCE TO THE HOLY QURAN AND RESOLVE TO ABIDE BY THE PATH OF GODLINESS SHOWN BY ALLAH WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO CONCLUDE THAT THE ENTIRE PURPOSE AND ACTIVITIES OF THE TRUST WOULD BE PURELY RELIGIO US IN COLOR. THE OBJECTS REFLECT THE INTENT OF THE TRUST AS OBSERVAN CE OF THE TENETS OF ISLAM, BUT DO NOT RESTRICT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE TR UST TO RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS ONLY AND FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY. THE PRIVY COUNCIL IN RE THE TRIBUNE, 7 I TR 415 HAS HELD THAT IN JUDGING WHETHER A CERTAIN PURPOSE IS O F PUBLIC BENEFIT OR NOT, THE COURTS MUST IN GENERAL APPLY THE STANDA RDS OF CUSTOMARY LAW AND COMMON OPINION AMONGST THE COMMUN ITY TO WHICH THE PARTIES INTERESTED BELONG TO. THEREFORE, IT IS PERTINENT TO ANALYSE WHETHER THE CUSTOMARY LAW WOULD RESTRICT TH E CHARITABLE DISPOSITION OF THE INTENDED ACTIVITIES IN THE OBJEC TS. 39.THE PROVISION OF FOOD TO THE PUBLIC ON RELIGIOUS DAYS O F THE COMMUNITY AS PER OBJECT (A) AND (B), THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MA DARSA AND ORGANIZATIONS FOR DISSEMINATION OF RELIGIOUS EDUCAT ION UNDER OBJECT (D) AND RENDERING ASSISTANCE TO THE NEEDY AND POOR FOR RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES UNDER OBJECT (E) WOULD REFLECT THE ESSEN CE OF CHARITY. THE 13 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 OBJECTS (A) AND (B) PROVIDE FOR ARRANGEMENT FOR NYA Z AND MAJLIS (LUNCH AND DINNER) ON THE RELIGIOUS OCCASION OF THE BIRTH ANNIVERSARY AND URS MUBARAK OF AWLIYA-E-QUIRAM (SA) AND THE SAINTS OF THE DAWOODJI BOHRA COMMUNITY AND FOR ARRA NGEMENT OF LUNCH AND DINNER ON RELIGIOUS OCCASIONS AND AUSPICI OUS DAYS OF THE DAWOODI BOHRA COMMUNITY, RESPECTIVELY. NYAZ REFERS TO THE FOOD A PERSON MAKES AND OFFERS TO OTHERS ON ANY PARTICULAR OCCASION ON THE OCCASION OF THE DEATH OF A SAINT AND MAJHLIS IM PLIES A PLACE OF GATHERING OR MEETING. THE ACTIVITY OF PROVIDING FOR FOOD ON CERTAIN SPECIFIC OCCASIONS AND OTHER RELIGIOUS AND AUSPICIO US EVENTS OF THE DAWOODI BOHRA COMMUNITY DO NOT RESTRICT THE BENEFIT TO THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY. NEITHER THE RELIGIOUS TEN ETS NOR THE OBJECTS AS EXPRESSED LIMIT THE SERVICE OF FOOD ON T HE SAID OCCASIONS ONLY TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SPECIFIC COMMUNITY. THUS , THE ACTIVITY OF NYAZ PERFORMED BY THE RESPONDENT-TRUST DOES NOT DEL INEATE A SEPARATE CLASS BUT EXTENDS THE BENEFIT OF FREE SERV ICE OF FOOD TO PUBLIC AT LARGE IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR RELIGION, CAS TE OR SECT AND THEREBY QUALIFIES AS A CHARITABLE PURPOSE WHICH WOU LD ENTAIL GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITY. 40.FURTHER, ESTABLISHMENT OF MADARSA OR INSTITUTION S TO IMPART RELIGIOUS EDUCATION TO THE MASSES WOULD QUALIFY AS A CHARITABLE PURPOSE QUALIFYING UNDER THE HEAD OF EDUCATION UNDE R THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 2(15) OF THE ACT. THE INSTITU TIONS ESTABLISHED TO SPREAD RELIGIOUS AWARENESS BY MEANS OF EDUCATION THOUGH ESTABLISHED TO PROMOTE AND FURTHER RELIGIOUS THOUGH T COULD NOT BE RESTRICTED TO RELIGIOUS PURPOSES. THE HOUSE OF LORD S IN BARRALET V. IR, 54 TC 446, HAS OBSERVED THAT THE STUDY AND DIS SEMINATION OF ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND THE CULTIVATION OF RATIONAL RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT WOULD FALL IN THE CATEGORY OF EDUCATIONA L PURPOSES. THE MADARSA AS A MOHOMMEDAN INSTITUTION OF TEACHING DOE S NOT CONFINE INSTRUCTION TO ONLY DISSIPATION OF RELIGIOU S TEACHINGS BUT 14 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 ALSO CONTRIBUTES TO THE HOLISTIC EDUCATION OF AN IN DIVIDUAL. THEREFORE, IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE OBJECT (D) WO ULD EMBODY A RESTRICTIVE PURPOSE OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES ONLY. S IMILARLY, ASSISTANCE BY THE RESPONDENT-TRUST TO THE NEEDY AND POOR FOR R ELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES WOULD NOT DIVEST THE TRUST OF ITS ALTRUI ST CHARACTER. 41..................................... 42. ................................... 43.THUS, THE SECOND ISSUE WHICH ARISES FOR OUR CONS IDERATION AND DECISION IS, WHETHER THE RESPONDENT-TRUST IS A CHAR ITABLE AND RELIGIOUS TRUST ONLY FOR THE PURPOSES OF A PARTICUL AR COMMUNITY AND THEREFORE, NOT ELIGIBLE FOR EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 11 OF THE ACT IN VIEW OF PROVISIONS OF SECTION 13(1)(B) OF THE ACT. 44........................ 45.FROM THE PHRASEOLOGY IN CLAUSE (B) OF SECTION 13 (1), IT COULD BE INFERRED THAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO INCLUDE O NLY THE TRUSTS ESTABLISHED FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES. THAT HOWEVER D OES NOT MEAN THAT IF A TRUST IS A COMPOSITE ONE, THAT IS ONE FOR BOTH RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE PURPOSES, THEN IT WOULD NOT BE COVERED B Y CLAUSE (B). WHAT IS INTENDED TO BE EXCLUDED FROM BEING ELIGIBLE FOR EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 11 IS A TRUST FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSE WHICH IS ESTABLISHED FOR THE BENEFIT OF ANY PARTICULAR RELIG IOUS COMMUNITY OR CASTE. 46.SUCH TRUSTS WITH COMPOSITE OBJECTS WOULD NOT BE EXPELLED OUT OF THE PURVIEW OF SECTION 13(1)(B) PER SE. THE SECTION REQUIRES IT TO BE ESTABLISHED THAT SUCH CHARITABLE PURPOSE IS NOT FOR THE BENEFIT OF A PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY OR CASTE. THAT IS TO SAY, IT NEEDS TO BE EXAMINED WHETHER SUCH RELIGIOUS-CHARITABLE ACTIV ITY CARRIED ON BY THE TRUST ONLY BENEFITS A CERTAIN PARTICULAR REL IGIOUS COMMUNITY OR CLASS OR SERVES ACROSS THE COMMUNITIES AND FOR S OCIETY AT LARGE. (SOLE TRUSTEE, LOKA SHIKSHANA TRUST V. CIT, (1975) 101 ITR 234 (SC)). THE SECTION OF COMMUNITY SOUGHT TO BE BENEFI TED MUST BE 15 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 EITHER SUFFICIENTLY DEFINED OR IDENTIFIABLE BY A CO MMON QUALITY OF A PUBLIC OR IMPERSONAL NATURE. (CIT V. ANDHRA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 55 ITR 722). 47.................. 48................. 49.IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE OBJECTS OF THE RESPONDE NT-TRUST ARE BASED ON RELIGIOUS TENETS UNDER QURAN ACCORDING TO RELIGIOUS FAITH OF ISLAM. WE HAVE ALREADY NOTICED THAT THE PERUSAL OF THE OBJECTS AND PURPOSES OF THE RESPONDENT-TRUST WOULD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE TRUST THOUGH BOTH CHARIT ABLE AND RELIGIOUS ARE NOT EXCLUSIVELY MEANT FOR A PARTICULAR RELIGIOU S COMMUNITY. THE OBJECTS, AS EXPLAINED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPHS, DO NOT CHANNEL THE BENEFITS TO ANY COMMUNITY IF NOT THE DAWOODI BO HRA COMMUNITY AND THUS, WOULD NOT FALL UNDER THE PROVIS IONS OF SECTION 13(1)(B) OF THE ACT. 5.4. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES THAT CAN BE C ULLED OUT FROM THE ABOVE DECISION, IN OUR VIEW, APPEARS TO BE THAT THE TEST OF PREDOMINANT PURPOSE OF THE OBJECTS OF THE TRUST HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED AND IF T HE PREDOMINANT PURPOSE DOES NOT SHOW ANY CHANNELING OF BENEFITS TO A PARTICULAR COMMUNITY, THE TRUST WOULD NOT BE HIT BY THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 13(1)(B) OF THE ACT. HOWEVER, IN SO FAR AS THE ASSESSEE IN THE CASE ON HAND IS CONCERNED, WE A RE NOT EXPRESSING ANY OPINION ON THE PREDOMINANT PURPOSE OF THE AIMS AND OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE DECLARATION OF TRUST DATED 15-12-2001 SIMPLY BECAUS E THE SAME STANDS AMENDED WITH RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT BY THE AMENDMENT DEED DT.18.3.2013. WE FIND THAT THE DISPOSAL OF THE APPEAL IN ITA NO.1631 /BANG/2013 AGAINST THE ORDER DT.27.9.2013 OF THE LEARNED CIT WILL AUTOMATI CALLY DISPOSE OFF THIS APPEAL 16 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 AND NO SEPARATE ADJUDICATION IS REQUIRED AS THESE O BJECTS ARE NO LONGER RELEVANT FOR THE PURPOSE OF GRANT OF REGISTRATION UNDER SECT ION 12AA OF THE ACT. ITA NO.1631/BANG/2013 6.1 ALTHOUGH SEVERAL GROUNDS HAVE BEEN RAI SED IN THIS APPEAL, THE SOLE ISSUE THAT ARISES FOR OUR CONSIDERATION IS WHETHER THE ASSESSEE IS ENTITLED TO REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE ACT IN THE L IGHT OF THE AMENDED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE AMENDMENT TRUST DEED DT.18.3.2013. 6.2 ON THE ASPECT OF THE AMENDMENT OF THE T RUST DEED, WE FIND THAT THE HON'BLE RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF LAXMINA RAIN LATH TRUST REPORTED IN 170 ITR 370 HAS OBSERVED AS UNDER :- 9. THE NEXT QUESTION WHICH NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED IS AS TO THE EFFECT OF THE SUPPLEMENTARY DEED DT. 21ST MA Y, 1958, WHEREBY CL. 2(VI) HAS BEEN AMENDED AND THE WORDS 'B ELONGING TO THE FAMILY OF LATHS' HAVE BEEN DELETED AND IN THEIR PLACE, THE WORDS 'IN DISTRESS' HAVE BEEN INSERTED. AS A RESULT OF THE AFORESAID AMENDMENT, CL. 2(VI) READS AS UNDER : 'TO RENDER AID TO ANY PERSONS IN DISTR ESS AND TO GRANT MONTHLY AND OTHER PERIODICAL AIDS TO THEM.' THE SUPPLEMENTARY DEED DATED 21ST MAY, 1958, WAS EXECUTED BY THE SETTLOR, SHRI LAKSHMINARAIN LATH, A ND WHO IS PARTY OF THE ONE PART AND THE TRUSTEES OF THE ASSES SEE WHO ARE PARTIES OF THE OTHER PART IN THE SAID DEED. THE TRU STEES WHO WERE PARTIES TO THE SUPPLEMENTARY DEED WERE SHRI LAKSHMI NARAIN LATH, THE SETTLOR OF THE TRUST, HIS SON, SHRI NARBADA PRA SAD LATH, SHRI MAHABIR PRASAD PODDAR AND SHRI MOTILAL LATH. THREE OUT OF THE 17 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 FOUR TRUSTEES, NAMELY, SHRI LAXMINARAIN LATH, SHRI NARBADA PRASAD LATH AND SHRI MOTILAL LATH, WERE ALSO PARTIE S, AS TRUSTEES, TO THE ORIGINAL SETTLEMENT DEED DT. 25TH AUG., 1948 . SHRI BISSESSURLAL LATH, WHO WAS A PARTY TO THE ORIGINAL SETTLEMENT DEED DT. 25TH AUG., 1948, AS A TRUSTEE, WAS NOT A P ARTY TO THE SUPPLEMENTARY DEED DT. 21ST MAY, 1958. THE REASON B EING THAT IN THE MEANWHILE, SHRI BISSESSURLAL LATH HAD DIED AND IN HIS PLACE, SHRI MAHABIR PRASAD PODDAR HAD BEEN APPOINTED AS A TRUSTEE AND HE WAS A PARTY TO THE SETTLEMENT DEED DT. 21ST MAY, 1958. 10. THE BOMBAY BENCH OF THE TRIBUNAL, IN ITS ORDER DT. 30TH SEPT., 1975, HAS HELD THAT AMENDMENTS INTRODUCED IN THE SETTLEMENT DEED BY THE SUPPLEMENTARY DEED WERE INVA LID FOR THE REASON THAT THE OBJECTS OF THE TRUST AS SET OUT IN THE ORIGINAL TRUST DEED COULD BE MODIFIED ONLY WITH THE CONSENT OF THE BENEFICIARIES AND IN A CASE WHERE THE BENEFICIARIES ARE FOUND TO BE INCOMPETENT TO CONTRACT, APPROVAL OF THE COURT WAS NECESSARY WH ICH HAD NOT BEEN OBTAINED IN THIS CASE. THE BOMBAY BENCH OF THE TRIBUNAL HAS, IN THIS CONNECTION, REFERRED TO SS. 9, 11, 58, 61 AND 78 OF THE INDIAN TRUSTS ACT, 1882. 11. WE HAVE LOOKED INTO THE SAID PROVISIONS OF THE IND IAN TRUSTS ACT, 1882. SEC. 9 MAKES PROVISION WITH REGAR D TO PERSONS WHO MAY BE BENEFICIARIES. SEC. 11 RELATES TO THE DU TIES OF THE TRUSTEES TO EXECUTE THE TRUST. SEC. 58 RELATES TO T HE RIGHT OF THE BENEFICIARY TO TRANSFER HIS BENEFICIAL INTEREST. SE C. 61 PROVIDES FOR THE RIGHT OF THE BENEFICIARY TO COMPEL THE TRUSTEE TO PERFORM ANY PARTICULAR ACT OR HIS DUTY. SEC. 78 PROVIDES FOR RE VOCATION OF THE TRUST. ON A CLOSER READING OF THE ORDER OF THE BOMB AY BENCH OF THE TRIBUNAL, WE FIND THAT THE TRIBUNAL HAS RELIED UPON S. 11 OF THE INDIAN TRUSTS ACT. SHRI SUROLIA, LEARNED COUNSEL FO R THE REVENUE, 18 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 HAS ALSO LAID STRESS ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE SAID SECTION WHICH PROVIDE AS UNDER : 'SEC. 11 : TRUSTEE TO EXECUTE TRUST.THE T RUSTEE IS BOUND TO FULFIL THE PURPOSE OF THE TRUST, AND TO OBEY THE DI RECTIONS OF THE AUTHOR OF THE TRUST GIVEN AT THE TIME OF ITS CREATI ON, EXCEPT AS MODIFIED BY THE CONSENT OF ALL THE BENEFICIARIES BE ING COMPETENT TO CONTRACT. WHERE THE BENEFICIARY IS INCOMPETENT TO C ONTRACT, HIS CONSENT MAY, FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION, BE G IVEN BY A PRINCIPAL CIVIL COURT OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. NOT HING IN THIS SECTION SHALL BE DEEMED TO REQUIRE A TRUSTEE TO OBEY ANY DI RECTION WHEN TO DO SO WOULD BE IMPRACTICABLE, ILLEGAL OR MANIFESTLY INJURIOUS TO THE BENEFICIARIES. EXPLANATION.UNLESS A CONTRARY INTEN TION BE EXPRESSED, THE PURPOSE OF A TRUST FOR THE PAYMENT O F DEBTS SHALL BE DEEMED TO BE : (A) TO PAY ONLY THE DEBTS OF THE AUT HOR OF THE TRUST EXISTING AND RECOVERABLE AT THE DATE OF THE INSTRUM ENT OF TRUST, OR, WHEN SUCH INSTRUMENT IS A WILL, AT THE DATE OF HIS DEATH, AND (B) IN THE CASE OF DEBTS NOT BEARING INTEREST, TO MAKE SUC H PAYMENT WITHOUT INTEREST.' 12. WITH REGARD TO THE AFORESAID PROVISIONS OF THE IND IAN TRUSTS ACT, IT MAY BE STATED THAT IN S. 1 OF THE IN DIAN TRUSTS ACT, IT HAS BEEN EXPRESSLY LAID DOWN THAT NOTHING CONTAINED IN THE SAID ACT WOULD APPLY TO PUBLIC OR PRIVATE RELIGIOUS OR C HARITABLE ENDOWMENTS. ALTHOUGH THE PROVISIONS OF THE INDIAN T RUSTS ACT AS SUCH ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO PUBLIC TRUSTS IN VIEW OF S. 1 OF THE SAID ACT, THE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THEM, BEING BASED ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES OR RULES OF ENGLISH LAW, ARE APPLIED BY THE COURTS TO PUBLIC TRUSTS ALSO (SEE PHULCHAND LAKHMICHAND JAIN VS. HUKAMCHAND GULABCHAND JAIN, AIR 1960 BOM 438 AND KI SHORE JOO VS. GUMAN BEHARI JOO DEO, AIR 1978 ALL 1. IN ST ATE OF UTTAR 19 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 PRADESH VS. BANSI DHAR, AIR 1974 SC 1084, THE SUPRE ME COURT HAS OBSERVED AS UNDER : 'THE NEXT QUESTION IS WHETHER THE INDIAN T RUSTS ACT, 1882, APPLIES TO THE PRESENT CASE. THE COURTS BELOW HAVE ARGUED THEMSELVES INTO AN APPLICATION OF S. 83 OF THE TRUS TS ACT. SHRI DIXIT RIGHTLY OBJECTS TO THIS COURSE BECAUSE THAT ACT REL ATES ONLY TO PRIVATE TRUSTS, PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUSTS HAVING BEE N EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED FROM ITS AMBIT. BUT WHILE THESE PROVISIONS PROPRIO VIGORE DO NOT APPLY, CERTAINLY THERE IS A COMMON AREA OF L EGAL PRINCIPLES WHICH COVERS ALL TRUSTS, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC AND MER ELY BECAUSE THEY FIND A PLACE IN THE TRUSTS ACT, THEY CANNOT BE COME UNTOUCHABLE' WHERE PUBLIC TRUSTS ARE INVOLVED. CAR E MUST CERTAINLY BE EXERCISED NOT TO IMPORT BY ANALOGY WHA T IS NOT GERMANE TO THE GENERAL LAW OF TRUSTS, BUT WE NEED H AVE NO INHIBITIONS IN ADMINISTERING THE LAW BY INVOKING TH E UNIVERSAL RULES OF EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE UPHELD BY THE E NGLISH JUDGES, THOUGH ALSO SANCTIFIED BY THE STATUTE RELATING TO P RIVATE TRUSTS. THE COURTS BELOW HAVE DRAWN INSPIRATION FROM S. 83 OF T HE TRUSTS ACT AND WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO FIND FAULT WITH THEM ON THAT SCORE BECAUSE THE PROVISION MERELY REFLECTS A RULE OF GOO D CONSCIENCE AND OF GENERAL APPLICATION.' 13. THE QUESTION WHICH NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED IS WHETHER THE RULE INCORPORATED IN S. 11 OF THE INDIA N TRUSTS ACT CAN BE REGARDED AS A RULE WHICH IS GERMANE TO THE GENER AL LAW OF TRUSTS TO BE APPLIED AS PART OF THE RULES OF EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE TO PUBLIC TRUSTS. IN THIS CONTEXT, IT MA Y BE STATED THAT IN A PRIVATE TRUST THE BENEFICIARIES ARE A DETERMINATE BODY AND, THEREFORE, ANY MODIFICATION IN THE MATTER OF TERMS OF THE AUTHOR OF THE TRUST IS REQUIRED TO BE MADE WITH THE CONSENT O F ALL THE 20 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 BENEFICIARIES WHO ARE COMPETENT TO CONTRACT AND IN CASES WHERE THE BENEFICIARY IS INCOMPETENT TO CONTRACT, HIS CON SENT MAY BE GIVEN BY THE CIVIL COURT. THE SITUATION IN THE CASE OF A PUBLIC TRUST IS, HOWEVER, DIFFERENT BECAUSE IN A PUBLIC TRUST, T HE BENEFICIARIES ARE GENERALLY INDETERMINATE AND THE PROVISIONS OF S . 11 REQUIRING THE CONSENT OF THE BENEFICIARIES CANNOT, THEREFORE, BE APPLIED TO A PUBLIC TRUST. 6.3 THE HON'BLE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF KAMALA TOWN TRUST REPORTED IN 217 ITR 699 HAD QUOTED WITH APPROVAL THE AFORESAID JUDGMENT OF THE HON'BLE RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF LAXMINARIAN LAT H TRUST (SUPRA) AND OBSERVED AS UNDER :- IN THE CASE OF LAXMINARAIN LATH TRUST VS. CIT (1987) 65 CTR (RAJ) 91 : (1988) 170 ITR 375 (RAJ) : TC 23R. 7 63 A DIVISION BENCH OF RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT SPEAKING THROUGH S.C. AGRAWAL, J., AS HE THEN WAS, HAD TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION WH ETHER ANY RECTIFICATION OF THE TRUST DEED WHICH CHANGED CHARA CTER OF THE PRIVATE TRUST INTO PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST COULD BE RELIED UPON BEFORE THE IT AUTHORITIES FOR CLAIMING EXEMPTION UN DER S. 11 OF THE IT ACT, 1961 BY THE ASSESSEE-TRUST. IN THAT CAS E THE ORIGINAL TRUST DEED EXECUTED IN AUGUST, 1948 DID NOT BRING O UT THE REAL INTENTION OF THE SETTLOR TO CREATE A PUBLIC CHARITA BLE TRUST ON ACCOUNT OF CERTAIN SUB-CLAUSES OF OBJECT CL. NO. 2. IT WAS, THEREFORE, FELT NECESSARY TO RECTIFY THE MISTAKE IN THE ORIGINAL SETTLEMENT DEED SO AS TO PUT ON RECORD THE TRUE INT ENTION OF THE SETTLOR AND OF THE TRUST CREATED BY HIM. IT WAS HEL D BY THE RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT THAT IT WAS PERMISSIBLE FOR TH E SETTLOR TO CLARIFY HIS INTENTION IN CREATING THE TRUST UNDER T HE ORIGINAL SETTLEMENT DEED BY EXECUTING THE SUPPLEMENTARY DEED . EVEN IN 21 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 THE ORIGINAL DEED, A DISCRETION HAD BEEN CONFERRED ON THE TRUSTEES TO APPLY THE INCOME OF THE TRUST IN RENDER ING AID TO PERSONS BELONGING TO THE L FAMILY AND IT WAS PERMIS SIBLE FOR THE TRUSTEES NOT TO APPLY THE INCOME OF THE TRUST FOR T HE SAID OBJECT AND IN FACT THE INCOME OF THE TRUST HAD NEVER BEEN APPLIED FOR THAT OBJECT. IT COULD NOT BE SAID THAT THE BENEFICI ARIES UNDER CL. 2(VI), NAMELY, PERSONS BELONGING TO THE FAMILY OF L , HAD AN ENFORCEABLE RIGHT TO THE APPLICATION OF THE INCOME OF THE ASSESSEE FOR THE OBJECT MENTIONED IN CL. 2(VI), AND IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THEIR CONSENT WAS NOT NECESSARY BEFOR E ALTERING THE TERMS OF THE TRUST DEED. IN ANY CASE ALTHOUGH T HE SUPPLEMENTARY DEED WAS EXECUTED IN MAY, 1958, NONE OF THE PERSONS BELONGING TO THE FAMILY OF L HAD CHALLENGED THE VALIDITY OF THE SAME IN A COURT OF LAW. AFTER THE EXECUTION OF THE SUPPLEMENTARY DEED, IT WAS NOT OPEN TO THE TRUSTEES TO APPLY THE FUNDS OF THE ASSESSEE FOR NON-CHARITABLE PURPOS ES. THE ASSESSEE-TRUST HAD ACQUIRED THE STATUS OF A TRUST W HOLLY FOR CHARITABLE AND RELIGIOUS PURPOSES AFTER THE AMENDME NT OF THE TRUST DEED IN MAY, 1958. IT WAS ENTITLED TO EXEMPTI ON UNDER S. 11 OF THE IT ACT, 1961. THE DOCTRINE OF CY PRES WAS ALSO INVOKED IN THE SAID CASE BY OBSERVING THAT IN RESPECT OF CH ARITIES THE COURTS APPLY THE DOCTRINE OF CY PRES WHICH ENVISAGE S THAT IF A CLEAR CHARITABLE INTENTION IS EXPRESSED, IT WILL NO T BE PERMITTED TO FAIL BECAUSE THE MODE, IF SPECIFIED, CANNOT BE EXEC UTED AND THE LAW WILL SUBSTITUTE ANOTHER MODE CY PRES, I.E., AS NEARLY AS POSSIBLE TO THE MODE SPECIFIED BY THE DONOR. THE SA ID DOCTRINE IS APPLIED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE COURT WOULD LEAN IN FAVOUR OF CHARITY AND WHERE A GENERAL CHARITABLE GOAL IS PROJ ECTED AND PARTICULAR OBJECTS AND MODES ARE INDICATED, THE COU RT, ACTING TO FULFIL THE BROADER BENEVOLENCE OF THE DONOR AND TO AVERT THE FRUSTRATION OF THE GOOD TO THE COMMUNITY, RECONSTRU CTS, AS NEARLY 22 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 AS MAY BE, THE CHARITABLE INTENT AND MAKES VIABLE W HAT OTHERWISE MAY DIE. THE AFORESAID DECISION OF THE RA JASTHAN HIGH COURT ALSO TAKES A VIEW WHICH IS ALMOST PARALL EL TO THE VIEW TAKEN BY THE DELHI HIGH COURT THOUGH THE BINDI NG NATURE OF THE RECTIFICATION ORDER OF THE CIVIL COURT ON THE I TO IS NOT HIGHLIGHTED AS NO SUCH OCCASION AROSE FOR RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT TO PRONOUNCE ON THE SAME ON THE FACTS OF THAT CASE. HOWEVER, THE FACT REMAINS THAT AFTER DUE RECTIFICATION OF TH E ORIGINAL TRUST DEED EITHER BY THE SETTLOR HIMSELF BY EXECUTING A S UPPLEMENTARY DEED OR BY GETTING IT RECTIFIED THROUGH COMPETENT C IVIL COURT UNDER THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE SPECIFIC RELIE F ACT, THE TRUSTEES WOULD BE BOUND TO CARRY OUT THE AMENDED AN D RECTIFIED OBJECTS OF THE TRUST AND IF THEY FAIL TO DO SO THEY WOULD BE GUILTY OF BREACH OF TRUST FOR WHICH EVEN PROPER PROCEEDING S CAN BE INITIATED AGAINST THEM UNDER S. 92 OF THE CPC. FOR ALL THESE REASONS, THEREFORE, IT MUST BE HELD THAT WHEN SUCH RECTIFIED TRUST DEED IS PRESSED IN SERVICE BEFORE THE IT AUTH ORITIES IN ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING THE RELEVANT ASSE SSMENT YEARS THE ITO WILL HAVE TO INTERPRET SUCH RECTIFIED INSTRUMENT FOR FINDING OUT ITS CORRECT LEGAL EFFECT. BUT IT WILL N OT BE OPEN TO THE ITO TO REFUSE TO LOOK AT SUCH RECTIFIED INSTRUMENT OF TRUST AND TO INSIST THAT THE TRUSTEES OF THE TRUST SHOULD IGNORE THE SAID RECTIFIED OBJECTS AND SHOULD STICK TO THE INSTRUMEN T AS IT EXISTED PRIOR TO ITS RECTIFICATION. THE ITO WILL HAVE TO TA KE THE INSTRUMENT AS IT EXISTS IN ITS ACTUAL AMENDED FORM WHEN IT IS PRESSED IN SERVICE FOR FRAMING THE ASSESSMENT CONCERNING THE R ELEVANT ASSESSMENT YEAR IN WHICH SUCH RECTIFIED INSTRUMENT HOLDS THE FIELD. THE SECOND CONTENTION, THEREFORE, FAILS AND IS REJECTED. 23 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 6.4 IN THE LIGHT OF THE AFORESAID JUDGMENT S RELIED ON BY THE ASSESSEE, THE LD. CIT OUGHT NOT TO HAVE REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE DEED OF AMENDMENT OF TRUST DT.18.3.2013. AS HELD BY THE HON'BLE APEX COURT, T HE DEED OF AMENDMENT OF THE TRUST BINDS THE AUTHOR AND TRUSTEES WHO HAVE TO ADMINISTER THE TRUST IN ACCORDANCE WITH TERMS CONTAINED IN THE RECTIFIED TR UST DEED THAT IS PRODUCED BEFORE THE AUTHORITIES BELOW. THEREFORE, WHAT IS B EFORE THE LD. CIT IN THE CASE ON HAND IS THE AMENDED OBJECTS AS CONTAINED IN THE DEED OF AMENDMENT DT.18.3.2013 WHICH HAS AMENDED THE OBJECTS W.R.E.F. 15-12-2001. 6.5 THE HON'BLE DELHI HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF JAGDAMBA CHARITY TRUST AND ANOTHER V. CIT REPORTED IN 125 ITR 377 HAS DEAL T WITH THE RETROSPECTIVE OPERATIONS OF THE DEED OF TRUST. THE HON'BLE DELHI HIGH COURT OBSERVED THAT :- HOWEVER, WE THINK, THAT FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE PRESENT CASE, WHAT CONCERNS US IS NOT WHETHER THE PROVISION S OF S. 26 OF THE SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT COULD HAVE BEEN PROPERLY INVOKED BUT THE EFFECT, VIS-A-VIS THE IT DEPARTMENT, OF THE ORD ER WHICH HAS BEEN PASSED BY THE SUB-COURT UNDER THAT SECTION. TH E AUTHOR OF THE TRUST HAS FILED A SUIT AND, AFTER GIVING NOTICE TO THE TRUSTEES WHO HAVE BEEN ADMINISTERING THE TRUST, HAS OBTAINED AN ORDER OF RECTIFICATION. RIGHT OR WRONG, AND, WHETHER WITH IN THE PURVIEW OF S. 26 OR NOT, THERE IS AN ORDER OF THE S UB-COURT WHICH IS BINDING ON BOTH THE PARTIES, NAMELY, THE A UTHOR AND THE TRUSTEES. IN THE FACE OF THIS ORDER WHICH IS BI NDING ON BOTH OF THEM NEITHER THE AUTHOR OF THE TRUST NOR THE TRU STEES COULD GO CONTRARY TO THE TERMS OF THE TRUST DEED AS AMENDED. AFTER THE DOCUMENT HAS BEEN AMENDED BY THE COURT IN THE TERMS MENTIONED ABOVE, IT WILL NOT BE OPEN TO THE TRUSTEE S TO IGNORE 24 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 THE AMENDED DOCUMENT AND TO PROCEED TO INVEST THE T RUST FUNDS IN COMMERCIAL CONCERNS OR TO CARRY OUT BUSINE SS TRANSACTIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, IT APPEARS TO US THA T THE FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE TO THE DEPARTMENT IN THE SUIT FOR RECTI FICATION, AS WAS DONE IN VAN DER LINDE'S CASE (SUPRA) IS ALSO NO T QUITE RELEVANT. IT IS NOT AS IF THE IT DEPARTMENT IS A PA RTY TO OR BOUND BY, THE TERMS OF THE TRUST DEED SO THAT SUCH FAILUR E WOULD VITIATE THE RECTIFICATION OR ENTITLE THE DEPARTMENT TO IGNORE THE COURT'S ORDER OF AMENDMENT. SO FAR AS THE IT DEPART MENT IS CONCERNED ITS PROVINCE UNDER S. 11 OF THE IT ACT IS TO FIND OUT AND GIVE EFFECT TO THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES ; IT IS ENTITLED TO ASK WHETHER THE TRUSTEES ARE HOLDING THE PROPERT IES IN QUESTION UNDER A LEGAL OBLIGATION WHOLLY FOR RELIGI OUS OR CHARITABLE PURPOSES. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT, HAVING REGARD TO THE ORDER OF THE COURT BY WHICH THE TRUSTEES ARE BO UND, THAT THEY CAN ADMINISTER THE TRUST ONLY IN TERMS OF THE AMENDMENT DIRECTED BY THE COURT. THE TRUSTEES ARE AND MUST BE DEEMED FROM THE BEGINNING, TO HAVE UNDER A LEGAL OBLIGATIO N TO HOLD THE PROPERTIES ONLY FOR THE OBJECTS AND WITH THE POWERS SET OUT IN THE TRUST DEED AS AMENDED. IT, THEREFORE, APPEARS T O US THAT, WHATEVER MAY BE THE CORRECTNESS OR OTHERWISE OF THE ORDER PASSED UNDER S. 26, IT IS NOT OPEN TO THE ITO TO SA Y THAT THE TRUSTEES COULD ADMINISTER THE TRUST IN ACCORDANCE W ITH THE ORIGINAL DEED AND THAT THE CLAIM FOR EXEMPTION WILL HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH ON THE BASIS OF THE OLD DEED. THOUGH WE ARE CONCERNED WITH THE ASST. YRS. 1966-67 AND 1967-68, SINCE THE AMENDMENT IS FULLY RETROSPECTIVE, IT IS ALSO NOT PO SSIBLE FOR THE ITO TO SAY THAT, IN THE RELEVANT ACCOUNT YEARS, THE TRUSTEES HELD THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THE OLD DEED A ND NOT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AMENDED DEED. 25 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 6.6 IN THE LIGHT OF THE AFORESAID POSITIO N OF LAW AS EMANATE FROM THE JUDGMENTS REFERRED TO AND EXTRACTED (SUPRA), WE HOL D THAT THE FOLLOWING OBJECTS IN THE AMENDED TRUST DEED DT.18.3.2013 WILL HAVE TO BE EXAMINED IN ORDER FOR GRANT OF REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE ACT :- 1. THE AIMS AND OBJECTS OF THE TRUST AS CONTAINED IN THE DEED OF TRUST DATED 15-`12-2001 IN CHAPTER THREE SH ALL STAND AMENDED AND REPLACED WITH THE FOLLOWING OBJEC TS WITH EFFECT FROM 15-12-2001 AND SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN AMENDED AND INSERTED FROM THAT DAY :- A.MEDICAL RELIEF. TO PROVIDE MEDICAL RELIEF TO THE POOR, NEEDY, DESTI TUTE ESPECIALLY WOMEN & CHILDREN IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY CAS TE, CREED OR RELIGION AND BELONGING TO ALL COMMUNITIES BY PRO VIDING THE FOLLOWING : B. EDUCATION: (1) ESTABLISHING AND RUNNING SCHOOLS, RESIDENTIAL INSTITUTIONS FOR ALL PERSONS ESPECIALLY FOR WOMEN A ND CHILDREN TO PURSUE EDUCATION; (2) ESTABLISHING AND MANAGING VOCATIONAL TECHNICAL SCHOOLS, AND TRAINING CENTRES ALL PERSONS ESPECIALL Y FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN; (3) ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING READING ROOMS, LIBRARIES, STUDY CLASSES, ETC. (4) PROVIDING FACILITIES FOR EDUCATION AND DEVELOPING AND FOSTERING THE INTEREST IN EDUCATION IN MEN, WOMEN A ND CHILDREN; (5) TEACHING CHILDREN EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES; (6) STARTING PART TIME SCHOOLS IN VILLAGES. C. RELIEF TO POOR :- 26 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 TO PROVIDE RELIEF TO THE POOR, NEEDY, DESTITUTE ESP ECIALLY WOMEN & CHILDREN IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY CASTE, CREED O R RELIGION AND BELONGING TO ALL COMMUNITIES BY PROVIDING THE F OLLOWING : (1) RUNNING AND MAINTENANCE OF ORPHANAGES, DESTITUTE HOMES, DISPENSARIES, HOSPITALS AND NURSING HOMES FO R THE POOR OF ALL THE COMMUNITIES. (2) TO RUN AND MAINTENANCE OF ORPHANAGES, SCHOOL S FOR PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED PEOPLE IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR CASTE, RELIGION, ETC. (2) TO START AND WORKOUT SUCH SCHEMES AS MAY BE NECESSARY, FOR THE AMELIORATION OF DISTRESS AND POV ERTY IN THE COUNTRY; (3) TO ESTABLISH AND PROVIDE WELLS, SUCH AS OPEN TYPE O R TUBE TYPE; (4) TO CONDUCT MARRIAGES OF POOR GIRLS OF ALL COMMUNITI ES; (5) RELIEF WORK DURING THE DISASTROUS TIMES; (6) TO PROVIDE LOANS AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PO OR PEOPLE TO UPLIFT THEMSELVES FORM POVERTY SO THAT TH EY COULD ENGAGE THEMSELVES IN GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT. D. GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITY :- (1) FOSTER THE SPIRIT OF BROTHERHOOD AMONG VARIOUS SECTIONS, SHADES OF OPINIONS AND SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT AMONG ALL PEOPLE AT LARGE; (2) TO PROMOTE INTER RELIGIOUS HARMONY AND GOOD UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF ALL COMMUNITIES . (3) THE BENEFIT OF THE TRUST SHALL ENSURE TO ALL S ECTIONS OF THE PUBLIC I.E. BENEFICIARIES IN INDIA, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR CASTE, CREED AND RELIGION AND REGION OF DOMESTIC IN INDIA. 27 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 6.7 FROM A PERUSAL OF THE AFORESAID OBJEC TS EXTRACTED BY US ABOVE, IT APPEARS TO US THAT THE OBJECTS OF THE ASSESSEE TRUS T ARE CHARITABLE IN NATURE, COMING UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 2(15) OF THE ACT. THE ONLY OBJECTION OF THE LD. CIT FOR GRANT OF REGISTRATION WAS THAT THE OBJECTS OF THE TRUST CONTAINED IN DEED DATED 15-12-2001 SHOWED THAT THE TRUST WAS SET UP FOR THE BENEFIT OF A PARTICULAR COMMUNITY. WHATEVER MAY BE THE CORRECTN ESS OR OTHERWISE OF THE SAID FINDINGS OF THE LEARNED CIT, IT IS ONLY THE AM ENDED OBJECTS THAT HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED FOR PURPOSE OF GRANT OF REGISTRATION. TH US, IN OUR VIEW, THE OBJECTIONS OF THE LEARNED CIT WITH REGARD TO THE PR OVISIONS OF SECTION 13(1)(B) OF THE ACT, ARE THEREFORE NO LONGER RELEVANT. IN THIS VIEW OF THE MATTER, THE CIT IS DIRECTED TO ACCORD THE ASSESSEE TRUST REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE ACT. IN ANY CASE, THE GRANT OF REGISTRATION IS ONL Y A STEP IN THE PROCESS FOR CLAIM OF EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 11 TO 13 OF THE ACT TO E NABLE THE ASSESSING OFFICER TO ENSURE THAT THE ASSESSEE COMPLIES WITH THE REQUI REMENTS CONTAINED THEREIN TO CLAIM EXEMPTION. 7. IN THE RESULT, THE ASSESSEE'S APPEALS AR E ALLOWED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON TH E 6 TH NOVEMBER, 2015. SD/- SD/- (ASHA VIJAYARAGHAVAN) (JASON P BOAZ) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER DATED: 06-11-2015 PLACE: BANGALORE AM* 28 ITA NOS.423 & 1631/BANG/2013 COPY TO : 1 APPELLANT 2 RESPONDENT 3 CIT(A) BANGALORE 4 CIT 5 DR, ITAT, BANGALORE. 6 GUARD FILE BY ORDER AR, ITAT, BANGALORE