Pravinbhai Kanubhai Desai, Ahmedabad V. ITO, Ward-6(1)(3), Ahmedabad

ITA 646/AHD/2018

• Counselvise Citation: [2020] 111 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 0946 (ITAT-AHMEDABAD)
• Duration Of Justice: 2 year(s) 2 month(s) 18 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 01-06-2020
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Allowed
• Bench Allotted: A
• Next Hearing Date: 11-02-2020
• Assessment Year: 2014-2015
• Appeal Filed On: 14-03-2018
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: DEELIPKUMAR
• Assessee Lawyers: S N DIVATIA
• Keywords: Deemed to accrue or arise in india; Capital Gains
• Section: 271(1)(c); 69C; 143(3); 142(1); 69B; 274; 143(2)

Judgement Text

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AHMEDABAD A BENCH (BEFORE SHRI RAJPAL YADAV, VICE PRESIDENT & SHRI WASEEM AHMED, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER) ITA. NO: 646/AHD/2018 (ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2014-15) PRAVINBHAI KANUBHAI DESAI 64, PRERNAPARK SOCIETY NR. GOR NA KUVA MANINAGAR, AHMEDABAD V/S ASSTT. COMMISSIONER OF WEALTHTAX, CIRCLE-10, AHMEDABAD (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) PAN: ABLPD2694K APPELLANT BY : SHRI S. N. DIVATIA, A.R. RESPONDENT BY : SHRI DEELIP KUMAR, SR. D.R. ( )/ ORDER DATE OF HEARING : 11 -02-202 0 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 01- 06-2020 PER WASEEM AHMED, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER 1. THIS APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE IS DIRECTED AGAIN ST THE ORDER OF THE LD. CIT(A)-6, AHMEDABAD DATED 12.02.2018 PERTAINING TO A.Y. 2014-15. ITA NO. 646/ AHD/2018 . A.Y. 2014-1 5 2 2. THE SOLITARY ISSUE RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE IS THAT T HE LEARNED CIT (A) ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE PENALTY LEVIED BY THE AO FOR RS. 5,4 5,725/- UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT. 3. THE FACTS IN BRIEF ARE THAT THE ASSESSEE IN THE PRE SENT CASE IS AN INDIVIDUAL AND THE PARTNER IN VARIOUS PARTNERSHIP FIRMS. THE ASSES SMENT FOR THE YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION WAS FRAMED UNDER SECTION 143(3) OF TH E ACT AFTER MAKING THE ADDITIONS AS DETAILED UNDER: I. CAPITAL GAIN UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 45( 3) OF THE ACT FOR RS. 15,94,965/-. II. DISALLOWANCE OF THE INTEREST EXPENSES AMOUNTING TO RS 1,69,948/-. 4. THE AO IN THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS INITIATED THE PENALTY UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT, ON ACCOUNT OF FURNISHING INAC CURATE PARTICULAR OF INCOME AND THEREBY CONCEALMENT OF INCOME BY ISSUING NOTICE UNDER SECTION 274 OF THE ACT, VIDE NOTICE DATED 21 ST JULY 2016. 5. THE ASSESSEE IN RESPONSE TO SUCH NOTICE SUBMITTED T HAT THE LIABILITY FOR THE CAPITAL GAIN AROSE ON ACCOUNT OF THE VALUATION OF T HE LAND TRANSFERRED TO THE FIRM WHICH WAS DULY RECORDED IN THE BOOKS OF ACCOUN TS. AS SUCH, THE ASSESSEE NEVER TRIED TO HIDE THE FACTS ABOUT THE INCOME UNDE R THE HEAD CAPITAL GAIN DELIBERATELY. 6. THE ASSESSEE ALSO CLAIMED THAT HE HAS PAID THE TAXE S OF RS.2,69,732/- DATED 31 ST DECEMBER 2015 BY FILING THE REVISED COMPUTATION OF INCOME. ITA NO. 646/ AHD/2018 . A.Y. 2014-1 5 3 7. HOWEVER, THE AO WAS DISSATISFIED WITH THE CONTENTIO N OF THE ASSESSEE AND HELD THAT INCOME UNDER THE HEAD CAPITAL GAIN WAS OFFERED TO TAX ONLY AFTER SELECTION OF THIS CASE UNDER SCRUTINY AND ISSUANCE OF NOTICE UNDER SECTION 142(1) OF THE ACT. 8. SIMILARLY, THE AO ALSO HELD THAT THERE WAS NO EXPLA NATION FURNISHED BY THE ASSESSEE ABOUT THE EXCESS INTEREST EXPENSES CLAIMED FOR RS. 1,69,948/-. 9. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE THE AO LEVIED THE PENALTY UNDE R SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT FOR RS. 5,45,725/- BEING HUNDRED PERCENT OF THE AMOUNT OF TAX SOUGHT TO BE EVADED. 10. AGGRIEVED ASSESSEE PREFERRED AN APPEAL TO THE LEARN ED CIT (A) WHO CONFIRMED THE ORDER OF THE AO BY OBSERVING AS UNDER: AFTER CONSIDERING ALL FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF TH E ACT, I AM NOT INCLINED TO AGREE WITH THE CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT. THE AO MADE TWO ADDITIONS. FIRST ADDITION OF RS.15,94,965/- WAS MADE U/S 45(3) OF TH E ACT ON ACCOUNT OF SHORT TERM CAPITAL GAINS FROM INTRODUCTION OF LAND AS CAP ITAL CONTRIBUTION IN FIRM . SECOND ADDITION WAS ON ACCOUNT OF INTEREST OF RS. 1 ,69,948/- NOT RECEIVED FROM JAY CORPORATION. THERE IS NO SUBSTANCE IN THE CONTE NTION OF THE APPELLANT THAT NO PENALTY U/S 271(L)(C) OF THE ACT IS LEVIABLE SINCE IT INCLUDED ABOVE AMOUNTS IN HIS INCOME IN REVISED COMPUTATION AND PAID TAXES ON THE SAME. THUS CONTENTION IS WRONG, AS THE ADDITIONS ARE MADE OF RS. 15,94,965/- AND RS. 1,69,948/- WHILE TAX PAID ON 31.12.2015 IS RS.2,69,732/-. HENCE IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE IS CONCEALMENT OF INCO ME OF RS 15,94,965/- AND RS.1,69,948/- AND THE AO WAS JUSTIFIED IN LEVYING P ENALTY OF RS. 5,45,725/- ACCORDINGLY, I UPHOLD LEVY OF PENALTY OF RS. 5,45,7 25/-. THUS GROUND OF APPEAL IS REJECTED. 11. BEING AGGRIEVED BY THE ORDER OF THE LEARNED CIT (A) , THE ASSESSEE IS IN APPEAL BEFORE US. ITA NO. 646/ AHD/2018 . A.Y. 2014-1 5 4 12. THE LEARNED AR BEFORE US SUBMITTED THAT ALL THE TRA NSACTION FOR TRANSFERRING THE LAND TO THE FIRM AS WELL AS CLAIM OF INTEREST WERE DULY DISCLOSED IN THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSESSEE. THEREFORE THERE CANNOT BE ANY QUESTION OF CONCEALING THE INCOME. 13. THE LEARNED AR ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS F ILED REVISED COMPUTATION OF INCOME BEFORE THE ISSUANCE OF NOTICE UNDER SECTION 142(1) OF THE ACT. AS SUCH THE NOTICE UNDER SECTION 142(1) OF THE ACT, WAS ISS UED DATED 5 TH JULY 2016 WHEREAS THE ASSESSEE HAS PAID THE TAXES MUCH BEFORE THE ISSUANCE OF NOTICE I.E. 31ST DECEMBER 2015. 14. THE LEARNED AR ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE INCOME UNDER T HE HEAD CAPITAL GAIN WAS COMPUTED ON DEEMED BASIS. THEREFORE SUCH ADDITION O F INCOME CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR LEVYING THE PENALTY UNDER SECTION 271(1)( C) OF THE ACT. 15. ON THE OTHER AND THE LEARNED DR SUBMITTED THAT THE ASSESSEE OFFERED THE INCOME BY WAY OF FILING THE REVISED COMPUTATION OF INCOME ONLY AFTER SELECTION OF THE CASE UNDER SCRUTINY AND ISSUANCE OF NOTICE U NDER SECTION 143(2) OF THE ACT. ACCORDINGLY THE LEARNED DR VEHEMENTLY SUPPORTE D THE ORDER OF THE AUTHORITIES BELOW. 16. WE HAVE HEARD THE RIVAL CONTENTIONS OF BOTH THE PAR TIES AND PERUSED THE MATERIALS AVAILABLE ON RECORD. ADMITTEDLY THE NOTIC E UNDER SECTION 143(2) WAS ISSUED DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 2015 AND NOTICE UNDER SEC TION 142(1) WAS ISSUED UPON THE ASSESSEE DATED 27TH OF MAY 2016. HOWEVER T HE ASSESSEE HAS FILED THE REVISED COMPUTATION OF INCOME AND PAID THE TAXES OF RS. 2,69,732/- VIDE ITA NO. 646/ AHD/2018 . A.Y. 2014-1 5 5 CHALLAN DATED 31 ST DECEMBER 2015. THUS WHAT IS TRANSPIRED IS THIS THA T THE ASSESSEE HAS DISCLOSED THE INCOME BEFORE THE DETECT ION OF THE SAME BY THE AO IN THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS. 17. NOW THE FIRST CONTROVERSY BEFORE US ARISES SO AS TO ADJUDICATE WHETHER THE ASSESSEE HAS FURNISHED INACCURATE PARTICULARS OF IN COME BY NOT DISCLOSING THE INCOME UNDER THE HEAD CAPITAL GAIN AND BY CLAIMING THE EXCESS INTEREST EXPENSES. THE TERM INACCURATE PARTICULAR OF INCOME HAS NOT BEEN DEFINED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 271(1)(C) OR ELSEWHERE IN THE ACT THE ACT. HOWEVER, THE MEANING OF THE TERM INACCURATE HAS BEEN DISCUSS ED BY THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF RELIANCE PETROPRODUCTS (P) LTD REPORTED IN 189 TAXMAN 322 WHEREIN IT WAS HELD THAT THE TERM INACCURATE SIGNIFIES DELIBERATE ACT OR OMISSION ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE. AS SUCH, THE DETAILS/INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE RETURN OF INCOME /FINANCIAL STATEM ENTS /AUDIT REPORT WHICH ARE NOT CORRECT ACCORDING TO TRUTH, AND WERE FURNISHED BY THE ASSESSEE WITH THE DISHONEST INTENT SHALL BE TREATED AS INACCURATE PAR TICULARS. IN HOLDING SO, WE FIND SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE FROM THE JUDGEMENT OF HON BLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF RELIANCE PETROPRODUCTS (P) LTD (SUPRA). WE ARE NOT CONCERNED IN THE PRESENT CASE WITH THE M ENSREA. HOWEVER, WE HAVE TO ONLY SEE AS TO WHETHER IN THIS CASE, AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE ASSESSEE HAS GIVEN INACCURATE PARTICULARS. IN WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, TH E WORD 'INACCURATE' HAS BEEN DEFINED AS : 'NOT ACCURATE, NOT EXACT OR CORRECT; NOT ACCORDING T O TRUTH; ERRONEOUS; AS AN INACCURATE STATEMENT, COPY OR TRANSCRIPT.' WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN THE MEANING OF THE WORD 'PARTI CULARS' IN THE EARLIER PART OF THIS JUDGMENT. READING THE WORDS IN CONJUNCTION, TH EY MUST MEAN THE DETAILS SUPPLIED IN THE RETURN, WHICH ARE NOT ACCURATE, NOT EXACT OR CORRECT, NOT ACCORDING TO TRUTH OR ERRONEOUS. WE MUST HASTEN TO ADD HERE THAT IN THIS CASE, THERE IS NO FINDING THAT ANY DETAILS SUPPLIED BY TH E ASSESSEE IN ITS RETURN WERE FOUND TO BE INCORRECT OR ERRONEOUS OR FALSE ITA NO. 646/ AHD/2018 . A.Y. 2014-1 5 6 18. NOW, IF WE ANALYSES THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE I N THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE STATED DISCUSSION, WE FIND THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS OFFERED I NCOME BY FILING THE REVISED COMPUTATION OF INCOME WHICH WAS ACCEPTED BY THE REV ENUE. THE ASSESSEE HAS FILED SUCH REVISED COMPUTATION OF INCOME BEFORE THE DETECTION BY THE REVENUE ABOUT SUCH ADDITIONS MADE DURING THE ASSESSMENT PRO CEEDINGS. THUS IT CAN BE INFERRED THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS NOT DISCLOSE THE INC OME WITH ANY DISHONEST INTENT. ACCORDINGLY, IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW THE ASSESSEE CA NNOT BE VISITED WITH THE PENALTY UNDER SECTION 271 (1)(C) OF THE ACT. 19. WE ARE ALSO CONSCIOUS TO THE FACT THAT THE ADDITION IN THE PRESENT CASE UNDER THE HEAD CAPITAL GAIN HAS BEEN MADE UNDER THE PROVISION S OF SECTION 45(3) OF THE ACT, REPRESENTING THE SUCH ADDITION DURING THE ASSE SSMENT PROCEEDINGS BEING DEEMED INCOME DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY ATTRACT THE PE NALTY PROVISIONS AS ENVISAGED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT. AS SUCH, THE ONUS, IN THE CASE OF DEEMED INCOME AS SPECIFIED UND ER SECTION 45(3) OF THE ACT, LIES ON THE REVENUE TO PROVE THAT SUCH DEEMED INCOM E IS THE REAL INCOME OF THE ASSESSEE IN ORDER TO ATTRACT THE PENALTY PROVIS IONS SPECIFIED UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT. IN HOLDING SO WE FIND SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE FROM THE JUDGMENT OF HONBLE GUJARAT HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. BARODA TIN WORKS BOX REPORTED IN 221 ITR 661 WHEREIN IT WAS HE LD AS UNDER: SECTIONS 68, 69, 69A, 69B AND 69C ARE ALL PART OF T HE SAME SCHEME WHERE CERTAIN AMOUNTS THOUGH NOT PROVED TO BE THE INCOME OF THE A SSESSEE OF THE PREVIOUS YEAR CONCERNED ARE FOR THE PURPOSE OF CHARGING TO TAX AR E DEEMED TO BE SO BY CREATING LEGAL FICTION ABSOLVING THE DEPARTMENT FROM ITS INI TIAL DUTY TO PROVE THAT ANY SUCH IS THE INCOME OF THE ASSESSEE. BUT FOR THESE PROVIS IONS, IT WAS FOR THE REVENUE TO PROVE THAT ANY SUM, NOT DISCLOSED BY THE ASSESSEE B UT WHICH IS SOUGHT TO BE TAXED AS INCOME OF THE ASSESSEE, IS THE INCOME OF THE ASS ESSEE FOR THE PREVIOUS YEAR RELEVANT TO THE ASSESSMENT YEAR. ITA NO. 646/ AHD/2018 . A.Y. 2014-1 5 7 20. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, WE HOLD THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS NOT DELIBERATELY UNDISCLOSED THE INCOME UNDER THE HEAD CAPITAL GAIN AND CLAIMED EXCESSIVE INTEREST EXPENSES. AS SUCH THE ASSESSEE HIMSELF SUO-MOTO REVISED THE C OMPUTATION AND PAID THE TAXES BEFORE ANY FINDING FROM THE AO. ACCORDINGLY, IN SUCH A SITUATION THE PENALTY PROVISIONS CANNOT BE ATTRACTED. HENCE, WE S ET ASIDE THE FINDING OF THE LEARNED CIT (A) AND DIRECT THE AO TO DELETE THE PEN ALTY IMPOSED BY HIM. THUS THE GROUND OF APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS ALLOWED. 21. BEFORE WE PART WITH THE ISSUE/APPEAL AS DISCUSSED A BOVE, IT IS PERTINENT TO NOTE THAT THE CLAUSE (C) OF RULE 34 OF THE APPELLATE TRI BUNAL RULES 1963 REQUIRES THE BENCH TO MAKE ENDEAVOUR TO PRONOUNCE THE ORDER WITH IN 60 DAYS FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING. HOWEVER THE PERIOD OF 60 DAYS CAN BE EXTENDED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES BUT THE SAME SHOULD NOT ORDINARILY BE FURTHER EXTENDED BEYOND ANOTHER 30 DAYS. IN SIMPLE WORDS TH E TOTAL TIME AVAILABLE TO THE BENCH IS OF 90 DAYS UPON THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING. HOWEVER, DURING THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE ENTIRE WORLD IS FACING THE UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE OF COVID 2019 OUTBREAK, RESULTING THE LOCKDOWN IN THE COUNTRY, THE ORDERS THOUGH SUBSTANTIALLY PREPAR ED BUT COULD NOT BE PRONOUNCED FOR THE UNAVOIDABLE REASONS WITHIN THE M AXIMUM PERIOD OF 90 DAYS. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WE FIND THAT THE HONBL E MUMBAI TRIBUNAL IN THE CASE OF JSW LIMITED VS DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX IN ITA NO. 6103/MUM/2018 VIDE ORDER DATED 14-5-2020 EXTENDED THE TIME FOR PRONOUNCING THE ORDER WITHIN 90 DAYS OF TIME BY OBS ERVING AS UNDER: 9. LET US IN THIS LIGHT REVERT TO THE PREVAILING SI TUATION IN THE COUNTRY. ON 24TH MARCH, 2020, HONBLE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA TOOK T HE BOLD STEP OF IMPOSING A NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, FOR 21 DAYS, TO PREVENT THE SP READ OF COVID 19 EPIDEMIC, AND THIS LOCKDOWN WAS EXTENDED FROM TIME TO TIME. A S A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN ITA NO. 646/ AHD/2018 . A.Y. 2014-1 5 8 BEFORE THIS FORMAL NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, THE FUNCTIO NING OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AT MUMBAI WAS SEVERELY RESTRICTE D ON ACCOUNT OF LOCKDOWN BY THE MAHARASHTRA GOVERNMENT, AND ON ACCOUNT OF STRIC T ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH ADVISORIES WITH A VIEW OF CHECKING SPREAD OF COVID 19. THE EPIDEMIC SITUATION IN MUMBAI BEING GRAVE, THERE WAS NOT MUCH OF A RELAXAT ION IN SUBSEQUENT LOCKDOWNS ALSO. IN ANY CASE, THERE WAS UNPRECEDENTE D DISRUPTION OF JUDICIAL WOK ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT HAS B EEN SUCH AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION, CAUSING DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF JUDICIAL MACHINERY, THAT HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, IN AN UNPRECEDENTED ORDER I N THE HISTORY OF INDIA AND VIDE ORDER DATED 6.5.2020 READ WITH ORDER DATED 23.3.202 0, EXTENDED THE LIMITATION TO EXCLUDE NOT ONLY THIS LOCKDOWN PERIOD BUT ALSO A FE W MORE DAYS PRIOR TO, AND AFTER, THE LOCKDOWN BY OBSERVING THAT IN CASE THE LIMITATION HAS EXPIRED AFTER 15.03.2020 THEN THE PERIOD FROM 15.03.2020 TILL THE DATE ON WHICH THE LOCKDOWN IS LIFTED IN THE JURISDICTIONAL AREA WHERE THE DISPUTE LIES OR WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES SHALL BE EXTENDED FOR A PERI OD OF 15 DAYS AFTER THE LIFTING OF LOCKDOWN . HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT, IN AN ORDER DATED 15T H APRIL 2020, HAS, BESIDES EXTENDING THE VALIDITY OF ALL INTERIM ORDERS, HAS ALSO OBSERVED THAT, IT IS ALSO CLARIFIED THAT WHILE CALCULATING TIME FO R DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME-BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME S HALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY , AND ALSO OBSERVED THAT ARRANGEMENT CONTINUED BY AN ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 TILL 30TH APRIL 2020 SHALL CO NTINUE FURTHER TILL 15TH JUNE 2020 . IT HAS BEEN AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION NOT ONLY IN INDIA BUT ALL OVER THE WORLD. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAS, VIDE NOTIFICATION D ATED 19TH FEBRUARY 2020, TAKEN THE STAND THAT, THE CORONAVIRUS SHOULD BE CO NSIDERED A CASE OF NATURAL CALAMITY AND FMC (I.E. FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE) MAYBE INVOKED, WHEREVER CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, FOLLOWING THE DUE PROCEDURE . THE TERM FORCE MAJEURE HAS BEEN DEFINED IN BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, AS AN EVENT OR EFFECT THAT CAN BE NEITHER ANTICIPATED NOR CONTROLLED WHEN SUCH IS THE POSITION, AND IT IS OFFICIALLY SO NOTIFIED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA A ND THE COVID-19 EPIDEMIC HAS BEEN NOTIFIED AS A DISASTER UNDER THE NATIONAL DISA STER MANAGEMENT ACT, 2005, AND ALSO IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS ABOVE, THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE CAN BE ANYTHING BUT AN ORDINARY PERI OD. 10. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSIONS, WE ARE O F THE CONSIDERED VIEW THAT RATHER THAN TAKING A PEDANTIC VIEW OF THE RULE REQU IRING PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN 90 DAYS, DISREGARDING THE IMPORTANT FACT THA T THE ENTIRE COUNTRY WAS IN LOCKDOWN, WE SHOULD COMPUTE THE PERIOD OF 90 DAYS B Y EXCLUDING AT LEAST THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE. WE M UST FACTOR GROUND REALITIES IN MIND WHILE INTERPRETING THE TIME LIMIT FOR THE P RONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER. LAW IS NOT BROODING OMNIPOTENCE IN THE SKY. IT IS A PRA GMATIC TOOL OF THE SOCIAL ORDER. THE TENETS OF LAW BEING ENACTED ON THE BASIS OF PRA GMATISM, AND THAT IS HOW THE LAW IS REQUIRED TO INTERPRETED. THE INTERPRETATION SO ASSIGNED BY US IS NOT ONLY IN CONSONANCE WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF RULE 34(5) BUT IS ALSO A PRAGMATIC APPROACH AT A TIME WHEN A DISASTER, NOTIFIED UNDER THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT ITA NO. 646/ AHD/2018 . A.Y. 2014-1 5 9 2005, IS CAUSING UNPRECEDENTED DISRUPTION IN THE FU NCTIONING OF OUR JUSTICE DELIVERY SYSTEM. UNDOUBTEDLY, IN THE CASE OF OTTERS CLUB VS DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (BOM)] , HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT DID NOT APPROVE AN ORDE R BEING PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL BEYOND A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS, BUT THE N IN THE PRESENT SITUATION HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT ITSELF HAS, VIDE JUDGMENT DATED 15TH APRIL 2020, HELD THAT DIRECTED WHILE CALCULATING THE TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME- BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY . THE EXTRAORDINARY STEPS TAKEN SUO MOTU BY HONBL E JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT AND HONBLE SUPREME COURT ALSO INDICATE THAT THIS PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN CANNOT BE TREATED AS AN ORDINARY PERIOD DURING WHIC H THE NORMAL TIME LIMITS ARE TO REMAIN IN FORCE. IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, EVEN WI THOUT THE WORDS ORDINARILY, IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL POSITI ON, THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LOCKOUT WAS IN FORCE IS TO EXCLUDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIME LIMITS SET OUT IN RULE 34(5) OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963. VIEWED THUS, THE EXCEPTION, TO 90-DAY TIME-LIMIT FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, INHERENT IN RULE 34(5)(C), WITH RESPECT TO THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN NINETY DAYS, CLE ARLY COMES INTO PLAY IN THE PRESENT CASE. OF COURSE, THERE IS NO, AND THERE CAN NOT BE ANY, BAR ON THE DISCRETION OF THE BENCHES TO REFIX THE MATTERS FOR CLARIFICATIONS BECAUSE OF CONSIDERABLE TIME LAG BETWEEN THE POINT OF TIME WHE N THE HEARING IS CONCLUDED AND THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE ORDER THEREON IS BEI NG FINALIZED, BUT THEN, IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, NO SUCH EXERCISE WAS REQUIRED TO B E CARRIED OUT ON THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 11. TO SUM UP, THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS ALLOWE D, AND APPEAL OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER IS DISMISSED. ORDER PRONOUNCED UNDER RULE 3 4(4) OF THE INCOME TAX (APPELLATE TRIBUNAL) RULES, 1962, BY PLACING THE DE TAILS ON THE NOTICE BOARD. CONSIDERING THE ABOVE, WE EXPRESS TO PRONOUNCE THE ORDER BEYOND THE PERIOD OF 90 DAYS. ACCORDINGLY, WE PROCEED TO PRONOUNCE TH E ORDER AS ON DATE. 22. IN THE RESULT THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE ALLOWED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN OPEN COURT ON 01 - 06 - 2020 SD/- SD/- (RAJPAL YADAV) (WASEEM AHMED) VICE PRESIDENT TRUE COPY ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AHMEDABAD: DATED 01 /06 /2020 RAJESH