Ind Swift Laboratories Ltd., Chandigarh V. Addl. CIT, Chandigarh

ITA 771/CHANDI/2008

• Counselvise Citation: [2013] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 68566 (ITAT-CHANDIGARH)
• Duration Of Justice: 5 year(s) 2 month(s) 13 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 07-11-2013
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Partly Allowed
• Bench Allotted: A
• Next Hearing Date: 07-08-2013
• Assessment Year: 2005-2006
• Appeal Filed On: 25-08-2008
• Result in Favour of: Partly Allowed
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: JYOTI KUMARI
• Keywords: Depreciation; Capital expenditure
• Section: 27; 56

Judgement Text

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL CHANDIGARH BENCHES A CHANDIGARH BEFORE SHRI T.R. SOOD, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND MS. SUSHMA CHOWLA, JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA NO. 771/CHD/2008 ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2005-06 M/S. IND SWIFT LABORATORIES LTD. VS. THE ADDL. CI T SCO 493-494 CIRCLE 4(1) SECTOR 35-C CHANDIGARH CHANDIGARH PAN NO. AAJFM7090F (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) APPELLANT BY : SHRI T.N. SINGLA RESPONDENT BY : SMT. JYOTI KUMARI DATE OF HEARING : 03/10/2013 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 7/11/2013 ORDER PER T.R.SOOD, A.M. THIS IS AN APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 03/07/2008 OF CIT (APPEALS), CHANDIGARH. 2. FOLLOWING GROUNDS HAVE BEEN RAISED IN THIS APPEA L:- 1. THAT THE ORDER OF LEARNED C.I.T. (APPEALS) IS BA D AGAINST THE FACTS & LAW. 2. THAT THE LEARNED COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (APP EALS) HAS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF S. 40(A)( IA) OF THE ACT ARE APPLICABLE ON AMOUNT OF RS. 13500000/- ACTUALLY PAI D BY THE APPELLANT TO M/S IND-SWIFT LIMITED FOR TECHNICAL CO NSULTANCY WITHOUT APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT THE PROVISIONS O F S.40(A)(IA) OF THE ACT ARE ONLY APPLICABLE IN CASE OF EXPENSE PAYA BLE AT THE END OF YEAR AND DOES NOT APPLY WHERE AMOUNT HAS ACTUALL Y BEEN PAID BY THE ASSESSEE. 3. THAT THE LEARNED COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (APP EALS) HAS WRONGLY GAVE DIRECTIONS TO THE LEARNED ASSESSING OF FICER TO DISALLOW THE INTEREST EXPENSE AS PER RULE 8D OF THE INCOME TAX RULES 1962. 4. THAT THE LEARNED COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (APP EALS) HAS WRONGLY GAVE DIRECTIONS TO THE LEARNED ASSESSING OF FICER TO DISALLOW ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES, OTHER EXPENSES AN D DEPRECIATION AS PER RULE 8D OF THE INCOME TAX RULES 1962. 5. THAT THE LEARNED COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (APP EALS) HAS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DISALLOWANCE MADE BY THE LEA RNED ASSESSING OFFICER OF EXPENDITURE INCURRED AMOUNTING TO RS. 500000/- BY THE APPELLANT ON ADVERTISEMENT AND PUBL ICITY ON THE EVENT OF INDO PAK GAMES. THE LEARNED COMMISSIONER O F INCOME TAX (APPEALS) HAS FAILED TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF PROV ISIONS OF S. 40(A)(IA) OF THE ACT AS THE SAID AMOUNT WAS ACTUALL Y PAID BY THE 2 APPELLANT AND WAS NOT PAYABLE AND PROVISIONS OF S.4 0(A)(IA) OF THE ACT ARE APPLICABLE ONLY IN CASE OF AMOUNT PAYABLE. 6. THAT THE LEARNED COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (APP EALS) HAS WRONGLY DISALLOWED THE WEIGHED DEDUCTION UNDER S. 3 5(2AB) OF THE ACT TO THE EXTENT OF RS. 140164514. 3 GROUND NO. 1 IS OF GENERAL NATURE AND DOES NOT N EED SEPARATE ADJUDICATION. 4 GROUND NO. 2 - AFTER HEARING BOTH THE PARTIES WE FIND THAT DURING ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS AO NOTICED THAT ASSESSEE HAS MADE PAYMENT TO M/S IND SWIFT LABORATORIES LTD. ON ACCOUNT OF TECHNICAL CONSULTANCY AGAINST WHICH TDS WAS NOT DEDUCTED AND THEREFORE THE AMOUNT WAS A DDED TO THE INCOME OF ASSESSEE UNDER SECTION 40(A)(IA). 5 BEFORE LD. CIT(A) IT WAS MAINLY SUBMITTED THAT T HE WORD PAYABLE USED IN THE SECTION CLEARLY DENOTES THAT TDS PROVISIONS ARE APPLICABLE IF THE AMOUNT REMAIN PAYABLE IN CASE THE AMOUNT HAVE BEEN PAID AS IN THE PRESENT CASE THEN TDS PROVISIONS ARE NOT APPLICABLE. HOWEVER LD. CIT( A) DID NOT FIND FORCE IN THIS SUBMISSION AND CONFIRMED THE ADDITION. 6 BEFORE US LD. COUNSEL OF THE ASSESSEE RELIED ON T HE DECISION OF SPECIAL BENCH IN CASE OF MERILYN SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT V. ACIT REPORTED IN 146 TTJ 1, ON THE OTHER HAND LD. DR STRONGLY RELIED ON THE DEC ISION OF HONBLE GUJARAT HIGH COURT IN CASE OF CIT VS. SIKANDARKHAN & ORS. (87 DT R 137). 7 AFTER HEARING BOTH THE PARTIES WE FIND THAT DECIS ION OF SPECIAL BENCH HAS BEEN REVERSED BY THE HON,BLE GUJARAT HIGH COURT IN CASE OF CIT VS. SIKANDARKHAN & ORS. (87 DTR 137). THE SAME VIEW HAS BEEN TAKEN EVEN BY HONBLE KOLKATA HIGH COURT IN CASE OF CIT VS. CRES CENT EXPORT SYNDICATE (216 TAXMAN 258). THE DECISION OF HONBLE GUJARAT HIGH C OURT HAS BEEN FOLLOWED BY CHANDIGARH BENCH OF THE TRIBUNAL IN FOLLOWING PARAS : 24 WHAT THIS SUB-SECTION, THEREFORE, REQUIRES IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN `AMOUNT PAYABLE IN THE NATURE DESCRIBED ABOVE, WHIC H IS SUCH ON WHICH TAX IS DEDUCTIBLE AT SOURCE UNDER CHAPTER XVII-B BUT SUCH TAX HAS NOT BEEN DEDUCTED OR IF DEDUCTED NOT PAID BEFORE THE DUE DATE. THIS P ROVISION NO-WHERE REQUIRES THAT THE AMOUNT WHICH IS PAYABLE MUST REMAIN SO PAYABLE THROUGHOUT DURING THE YEAR. TO REITERATE THE PROVISION HAS CERTAIN STRICT AND S TRINGENT REQUIREMENTS BEFORE THE UNPLEASANT CONSEQUENCES ENVISAGED THEREIN CAN BE AP PLIED. WE ARE PREPARED TO AND WE ARE DUTY BOUND TO INTERPRET SUCH REQUIREMENT S STRICTLY. SUCH REQUIREMENTS, HOWEVER, CANNOT BE ENLARGED BY ANY AD DITION OR SUBTRACTION OF WORDS NOT USED BY THE LEGISLATURE. THE TERM USED IS INTEREST, COMMISSION, BROKERAGE ETC. IS PAYABLE TO A RESIDENT OR AMOUNTS PAYABLE TO A CONTRACTOR O R SUB-CONTRACTOR FOR CARRYING OUT ANY WORK. THE LANGU AGE USED IS NOT THAT SUCH AMOUNT MUST CONTINUE TO REMAIN PAYABLE TILL THE END OF THE ACCOUNTING YEAR. ANY SUCH INTERPRETATION WOULD REQUIRE READING WORDS WHI CH THE LEGISLATURE HAS NOT USED. NO SUCH INTERPRETATION WOULD EVEN OTHERWISE B E JUSTIFIED BECAUSE IN OUR OPINION, THE LEGISLATURE COULD NOT HAVE INTENDED TO BRING ABOUT ANY SUCH DISTINCTION NOR THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE SECTION BR INGS ABOUT ANY SUCH MEANING. IF THE INTERPRETATION AS ADVANCED BY THE ASSESSEES IS ACCEPTED, IT WOULD LEAD TO A SITUATION WHERE THE ASSESSEE WHO THOUGH WAS REQUIRE D TO DEDUCT THE TAX AT 3 SOURCE BUT NO SUCH DEDUCTION WAS MADE OR MORE FLAGR ANTLY DEDUCTION THOUGH MADE IS NOT PAID TO THE GOVERNMENT, WOULD ESCAPE TH E CONSEQUENCE ONLY BECAUSE THE AMOUNT WAS ALREADY PAID OVER BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR IN CONTRAST TO ANOTHER ASSESSEE WHO WOULD OTHERWISE BE IN SIMIL AR SITUATION BUT IN WHOSE CASE THE AMOUNT REMAINED PAYABLE TILL THE END OF TH E YEAR. WE SIMPLY DO NOT SEE ANY LOGIC WHY THE LEGISLATURE WOULD HAVE DESIRED TO BRING ABOUT SUCH IRRECONCILABLE AND DIVERSE CONSEQUENCES. WE HASTEN TO ADD THAT THIS IS NOT THE PRIME BASIS ON WHICH WE HAVE ADOPTED THE INTERPRETA TION WHICH WE HAVE GIVEN. IF THE LANGUAGE USED BY THE PARLIAMENT CONVEYED SUCH A MEANING, WE WOULD NOT HAVE HESITATED IN ADOPTING SUCH AN INTERPRETATION. WE ONLY HIGHLIGHT THAT WE WOULD NOT READILY ACCEPT THAT THE LEGISLATURE DESIR ED TO BRING ABOUT AN INCONGRUOUS AND SEEMINGLY IRRECONCILABLE CONSEQUENC ES. THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, GUJARAT VS. ASHOKBHAI CHIMANBHAI (SUPRA), WOULD NOT ALTER THIS SITUATION. THE SAID DECISION, OF COURSE, RECOGNIZES THE CONCEPT OF ASCE RTAINING THE PROFIT AND LOSS FROM THE BUSINESS OR PROFESSION WITH REFERENCE TO A CERTAIN PERIOD I.E. THE ACCOUNTING YEAR. IN THIS CONTEXT, LAST DATE OF SUCH ACCOUNTING PERIOD WOULD ASSUME CONSIDERABLE SIGNIFICANCE. HOWEVER, THIS DEC ISION NOWHERE INDICATES THAT THE EVENTS WHICH TAKE PLACE DURING THE ACCOUNTING P ERIOD SHOULD BE IGNORED AND THE ASCERTAINMENT OF FULFILLING A CERTAIN CONDITION PROVIDED UNDER THE STATUTE MUST BE JUDGED WITH REFERENCE TO LAST DATE OF THE ACCOUN TING PERIOD. PARTICULARLY, IN THE CONTEXT OF REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 40(A)(IA) OF THE ACT, WE SEE NO WARRANT IN THE SAID DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT TO APPLY THE TES T OF PAYABILITY ONLY AS ON 31 ST MARCH OF THE YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION. MERELY BECAU SE, ACCOUNTS ARE CLOSED ON THAT DATE AND THE COMPUTATION OF PROFIT AND LOSS IS TO BE JUDGED WITH REFERENCE TO SUCH DATE, DOES NOT MEAN THAT WHETHER AN AMOUNT IS PAYABLE OR NOT MUST BE ASCERTAINED ON THE STRENGTH OF THE POSITION EMERGIN G ON 31 ST MARCH. 25. THIS BRINGS US TO THE SECOND ASPECT OF THIS DIS CUSSION, NAMELY, WHETHER THIS IS A CASE OF CONSCIOUS OMISSION AND THEREFORE, THE LEGISLATURE MUST BE SEEN TO HAVE DELIBERATELY BROUGHT ABOUT A CERTAIN SITUATION WHICH DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY FURTHER INTERPRETATION. THIS IS THE FUNDAMENTAL ARG UMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL IN THE CASE OF M/S. MERILYN SHIPPING & TRANSPORTS VS. ACIT(SUPRA) TO ADOPT A PARTICULAR VIEW. 26. WHILE INTERPRETING A STATUTORY PROVISION THE CO URTS HAVE OFTEN APPLIED HYDEN S RULE OR THE MISCHIEF RULE AND ASCERTAINED WHAT WA S THE POSITION BEFORE THE AMENDMENT, WHAT THE AMENDMENT SOUGHT TO REMEDY AND WHAT WAS THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGES. 27. IN THE CASE OF BENGAL IMMUNITY CO. LTD. VS. STATE OF BIHAR AND OTH ERS REPORTED IN AIR 1955 SC 661 , THE APEX COURT REFERRED TO THE FAMOUS ENGLISH DECISION IN HYDEN S CASE WHEREIN WHILE ADOPTING RESTRICTIVE OR ENLARG ING INTERPRETATION, IT WAS OBSERVED THAT FOUR THINGS AR E TO BE CONSIDERED, (1) WHAT WAS THE COMMON LAW BEFORE MAKING OF THE ACT (2) WHAT WA S THE MISCHIEF AND DEFECT IN WHICH THE COMMON LAW DID NOT PROVIDE. (3) WHAT REME DY THE PARLIAMENT HAD RESOLVED AND ADOPTED TO CURE THE DISEASE AND (4) TR UE REASON OF THE REMEDY. 28. IN SUCH CONTEXT, THE POSITION PREVAILING PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT INTRODUCED IN SECTION 40(A) WOULD CERTAINLY BE A RELEVANT FACTOR. HOWEVER, THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE PARLIAMENT, ITS DEBATES AND EVEN THE SPEECHES M ADE BY THE PROPOSER OF A BILL ARE ORDINARILY NOT CONSIDERED AS RELEVANT OR SAFE T OOLS FOR INTERPRETATION OF A STATUTE. IN THE CASE OF ASWINI KUMAR GHOSE AND ANOTHER VS. ARABINDA BOSE AND ANOTHER REPORTED IN A.I.R. 1952 SC 369 IN A CONSTITUTION BENCH DECISION OF (CORAM: PATANJALI SASTRI, C.J.) , OBSERVED THAT:- 33. &..IT WAS URGED THAT ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION OF AMENDMENTS TO A BILL IN THE COURSE OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEEDINGS FORMS PART OF THE PRE-ENACTMENT HISTORY OF A STATUTE AND AS SUCH MIGHT THROW VALUABLE LIGHT ON T HE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE WHEN THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE ST ATUE ADMITTED OF MORE THAN ONE CONSTRUCTION. WE ARE UNAB LE TO ASSENT TO THIS PREPOSITION. THE REASON WHY A PARTICULAR AMENDMENT WAS PROPOSED OR ACCEPTED OR REJECTED IS OFTEN A MATTER OF CONTROVER SY, AS IT HAPPENED TO BE IN THIS CASE, AND WITHOUT THE SPEECH ES 4 BEARING UPON THE MOTION, IT CANNOT BE ASCERTAINED W ITH ANY REASONABLE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY. AND WHERE THE LEGISLATURE HAPPENS TO BE BICAMERAL, THE SECOND CHA MBER MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE KNOWN OF SUCH REASON WHEN IT DE ALT WITH THE MEASURE. WE HOLD ACCORDINGLY THAT ALL THE THREE FORMS OF EXTRINSIC AID SOUGHT TO BE RESORTED TO BY THE PARTIES IN THE CASE MUS BE EXCLUDED FROM CONSIDERAT ION IN ASCERTAINING THE TRUE OBJECT AND INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE. 29. IN YET ANOTHER CONSTITUTION BENCH JUDGMENT IN T HE CASE OF A.K.GOPALAN VS. STATE OF MADRAS REPORTED IN AIR 1950 SC 27 , IT WAS OBSERVED AS UNDER:- 17.....THE RESULT APPEARS TO BE THAT WHILE IT IS N OT PROPER TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT OR CONVENTION TO CONSTRUE THE MEANING OF THE PARTICULAR CLAUSE, W HEN A QUESTION IS RAISED WHETHER A CERTAIN PHRASE OR EXPRESSION WAS UP FOR C ONSIDERATION AT ALL OR NOT, A REFERENCE TO THE DEBATES MAY BE PERMITTED. 30. IN THE CASE OF EXPRESS NEWSPAPER (PRIVATE) LTD. AND ANOTHER VS. THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS REPORTED IN AIR 1958 SC 578 , N.H.BHAGWATI, J., OBSERVED AS UNDER:- 173. WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO ENTER INTO ANY ELABORATE DISCUSSION ON THE QUESTION WHETHER IT WOULD BE COMPETENT TO US IN ARR IVING AT A PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF THE EXPRESSION FIXING RATES OF WAGES TO LOOK INTO THE STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS ATTACHED TO THE BI LL NO.13 OF 1955 AS INTRODUCED IN THE RAJYA SABHA OR THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE WORD MINIMUM CAME TO BE DELETED FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE BILL RELATING TO RATES OF WAGES AND THE WAGE BOARD AND THE FACT OF S UCH DELETION WHEN THE ACT CAME TO BE PASSED IN ITS PRESENT FORM. THERE IS A CONSENSUS OF OPINION THAT THESE ARE NOT AIDS TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TERMS OF THE STATUTE WHICH HAVE OF COURSE TO BE GIVEN THEIR PLAIN AND GRAMMATI CAL MEANING ( SEE: ASHVINI KUMAR GHOSH V. ARABINDA BOSE, 1953 SC R 1:( AIR 1952 SC 369) (Z24) AND PROVAT KUMAR KAR V. WILLIAM TREVELYAN CUR TIEZ PARKER, AIR 1950 CAL 116 (Z25). IT IS ONLY WHEN THE TERMS OF THE STA TUTE ARE AMBIGUOUS OR VAGUE THAT RESORT MAY BE HAD TO THEM FOR THE PURPOS E OF ARRIVING AT THE TRUE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE. 31. IT CAN THUS BE SEEN THAT THE DEBATES IN THE PARLIAMENT ARE ORDINARILY NOT CONSIDERED AS THE AIDS FOR INTERPRETATION OF THE UL TIMATE PROVISION WHICH MAY BE BROUGHT INTO THE STATUTE. THE DEBATES AT BEST INDIC ATE THE OPINION OF THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS AND ARE ORDINARILY NOT RELIED UPON FOR INTE RPRETING THE PROVISIONS, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE PROVISIONS ARE PLAIN. WE ARE CONSCIOUS THAT DEPARTURE IS MADE IN TWO EXCEPTIONAL CASES, NAMELY, THE DEBATES IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND IN CASE OF FINANCE MINISTER S SPEECH EXPLAINING THE REASON FOR INTRODUCTION OF A CERTAIN PROVISION. THE REASON WHY A CERTAIN LA NGUAGE WAS USED IN A DRAFT BILL AND WHY THE PROVISION ULTIMATELY ENACTED CARRIED A DIFFERENT EXPRESSION CANNOT BE GATHERED FROM MERE COMPARISON OF THE TWO SETS OF PR OVISIONS. THERE MAY BE VARIETY OF REASONS WHY THE ULTIMATE PROVISION MAY V ARY FROM THE ORIGINAL DRAFT. IN THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, TWO HOUSES SEPARATELY DEB ATE THE LEGISLATIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION. IT WOULD ALL THE MORE BE UNSAFE TO R EFER TO OR RELY UPON THE DRAFTS, AMENDMENTS, DEBATES ETC FOR INTERPRETATION OF A STA TUTORY PROVISION WHEN THE LANGUAGE USED IS NOT CAPABLE OF SEVERAL MEANINGS. I N THE PRESENT CASE THE TRIBUNAL IN CASE OF M/S. MERILYN SHIPPING & TRANSPORTS VS. ACIT (SUPRA) FELL IN A SERIOUS ERROR IN MERELY COMPARING THE LANGUAGE US ED IN THE DRAFT BILL AND FINAL ENACTMENT TO ASSIGN A PARTICULAR MEANING TO THE STA TUTORY PROVISION. 32. IT IS, OF COURSE, TRUE THAT THE COURTS IN INDIA HAVE BEEN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF DELIBERATE OR CONSCIOUS OMISSION. SUCH PRINCIPLE IS APPLIED MAINLY WHEN AN EXISTING PROVISION IS AMENDED AND A CHANGE IS BROUG HT ABOUT. WHILE INTERPRETING 5 SUCH AN AMENDED PROVISION, THE COURTS WOULD IMMEDIA TELY INQUIRE WHAT WAS THE STATUTORY PROVISION BEFORE AND WHAT CHANGES THE LEG ISLATURE BROUGHT ABOUT AND COMPARE THE EFFECT OF THE TWO. THE OTHER OCCASION F OR APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE, WE NOTICE FROM VARIOUS DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, HAS BEEN WHEN THE LANGUAGE OF THE LEGISLATURE IS COMPARED WITH SOME O THER ANALOGOUS STATUTE OR OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE SAME STATUTE OR WITH EXPRES SION WHICH COULD APPARENTLY OR OBVIOUSLY BEEN USED IF THE LEGISLATURE HAD DIFFEREN T INTENTION IN MIND, WHILE FRAMING THE PROVISION. WE MAY REFER TO SOME OF SUCH DECISIONS PRESENTLY. IN THE CASE OF BHUWALKA STEEL INDUSTRIES LTD. VS. BOMBAY IRON AND STEEL LABOUR BOARD REPORTED IN AIR 2010 (SUPPL.) 122 , THE APEX COURT OBSERVED AS UNDER:- THE OMISSION OF THE WORDS AS PROPOSED EARLIER FROM THE FINAL DEFINITION IS A DELIBERATE AND CONSCIOUS ACT ON THE PART OF THE LEGISLATURE, ONLY WITH THE OBJECTIVE TO PROVIDE PRO TECTION TO ALL THE LABOURERS OR WORKERS, WHO WERE THE MANUAL WORKERS A ND WERE ENGAGED OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY SCHEDULED EMPLOYMEN T. THEREFORE, THERE WAS A SPECIFIC ACT ON THE PART OF THE LEGISLA TURE TO ENLARGE THE SCOPE OF THE DEFINITION AND ONCE WE ACCEPT THIS, AL L THE ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE OBJECTS AND REASONS, THE COMMITTEE RE PORTS, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BEING CONTRARY TO THE EXPRESS L ANGUAGE, ARE RELEGATED TO THE BACKGROUND AND ARE LIABLE TO BE IG NORED. 33. IN THE CASE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE, NARELA, DELH I VS. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND ANR. REPORTED IN AIR 2008 SC(SUPPLEMENT) 566 , THE SUPREME COURT NOTICED THAT PRIOR TO FINANCE A CT, 2002, THE INCOME TAX ACT DID NOT CONTAIN THE DEFINITION OF WORDS LOCAL AUTHORITY . THE WORD CAME TO BE DEFINED FOR THE FIRST TIME BY THE FINANCE ACT OF 2002 BY EXPLANATION/ DEFINITION CLAUSE TO SECTION 10(20) OF THE ACT. IT WAS FURTHER NOTICED THAT THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN THE DEFINITION OF TERM LOCAL AUTHORITY CONTAINED UNDER SECTION 3(31) OF THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1987 AS C OMPARED TO THE DEFINITION CLAUSE INSERTED IN SECTION 10(20) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 VIDE FINANCE ACT, OF 2002. IN THIS CONTEXT IT WAS OBSERVED THAT:- 27. CERTAIN GLARING FEATURES CAN BE DECIPHERED FROM THE ABOVE COMPARATIVE CHART. UNDER SECTION 3(31) OF THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897, LOCAL AUTHORITY WAS DEFINED TO MEAN A MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, DISTRICT BOARD, BODY OF PORT COMMISSIONERS OR OTHER AUTHORITY LEGALLY ENTITLED T O THE CONTROL OR MANAGEMENT OF A MUNICIPAL OR LOCAL FUND. THE WOR DS OTHER AUTHORITY IN SECTION 3(31) OF THE 1897 ACT HAS BEEN OMITTED BY PARLIAMENT IN THE EXPLANATION/ DEFINITIO N CLAUSE INSERTED IN SECTION 10(20) OF THE 1961 ACT VIDE FIN ANCE ACT, 2002. THEREFORE, IN OUR VIEW, IT WOULD NOT BE CORRE CT TO SAY THAT THE ENTIRE DEFINITION OF THE WORD LOCAL AUTHORITY IS BODILY LIFTED FROM SECTION 3(31) OF THE 1897 ACT AND INCOR PORATED, BY PARLIAMENT, IN THE SAID EXPLANATION TO SECTION 10(2 0) OF THE 1961 ACT. THIS DELIBERATE OMISSION IS IMPORTANT. 34. THE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF GREATER BOMBAY CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD. VS. M/S. UNITED YARN TEX.PVT.LTD & ORS. REPORTED IN AIR 2007 SC 1584 , IN THE CONTEXT OF QUESTION WHETHER THE COOPERATIVE BANKS T RANSACTING BUSINESS OF BANKING FALL WITHIN THE MEANING OF BANKING COMPANY DEFINED IN THE BANKING REGULATION ACT, 1949, OBSERVED AS UNDER:- 59. THE RDB ACT WAS PASSED IN 1993 WHEN PARLIAMENT HAD BEFORE IT THE PROVISIONS OF THE BR ACT AS AMENDED BY ACT NO.2 3 OF 1965 BY ADDITION OF SOME MORE CLAUSES IN SECTION 56 OF THE ACT. THE PARLIAMENT WAS FULLY AWARE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF T HE BR ACT APPLY TO CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES AS THEY APPLY TO BANKING COM PANIES. THE PARLIAMENT WAS ALSO AWARE THAT THE DEFINITION OF BANKING COMPANY IN SECTION 5(C) HAD NOT BEEN ALTERED BY ACT NO.23 O F 1965 AND IT WAS KEPT INTACT, AND IN FACT ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS WER E ADDED BY SECTION 56(C). CO-OPERATIVE BANK WAS SEPARATELY DEFINED BY THE NEWLY INSERTED CLAUSE (CCI) AND PRIMARY CO-OPERATIVE BANK WAS SIMILARLY SEPARATELY DEFINED BY CLAUSE (CCV). THE PARLIAMENT WAS SIMPLY ASSIGNING A MEANING TO WORDS; IT WAS NOT INCORPORAT ING OR EVEN REFERRING TO THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE BR A CT. THE MEANING OF 6 BANKING COMPANY MUST, THEREFORE, NECESSARILY BE STRICTLY CONFINED TO THE WORDS USED IN SECTION 5(C) OF THE B R ACT. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE EASIEST THING FOR PARLIAMENT TO SAY T HAT BANKING COMPANY SHALL MEAN BANKING COMPANY AS DEFINED IN SECTION 5(C) AND SHALL INCLUDE CO-OPERATIVE BANK AS DEFINED IN SECTION 5(CCI) AND PRIMARY CO-OPERATIVE BANK AS DEFINED IN SECTION 5(CCV). HOWEVER, THE PARLIAMENT DID NOT DO SO. THER E WAS THUS A CONSCIOUS EXCLUSION AND DELIBERATE COMMISSION OF CO -OPERATIVE BANKS FROM THE PURVIEW OF THE RDB ACT. THE REASON FOR EXCLUDING CO-OPERATIVE BANKS SEEMS TO BE THAT CO-OPERATIVE BA NKS HAVE COMPREHENSIVE, SELF-CONTAINED AND LESS EXPENSIVE RE MEDIES AVAILABLE TO THEM UNDER THE STATE CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACTS OF THE STATES CONCERNED, WHILE OTHER BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUT IONS DID NOT HAVE SUCH SPEEDY REMEDIES AND THEY HAD TO FILE SUITS IN CIVIL COURTS. 35. IN THE CASE OF NATIONAL MINERAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. VS. S TATE OF M.P AND ANOTHER REPORTED IN AIR 2004 SC 2456 , THE APEX COURT OBSERVED AS UNDER:- 29. THE PARLIAMENT KNOWING IT FULL WELL THAT THE I RON ORE SHALL HAVE TO UNDERGO A PROCESS LEADING TO EMERGENCE OF LUMPS, FI NES, CONCENTRATES AND SLIMES CHOSE TO MAKE PROVISION FOR QUANTIFICATION OF ROYALTY ONLY BY REFERENCE TO THE QUANTITY OF LUMPS, FINES AND CONCENTRATES. IT LEFT SLIMES OUT OF CONSIDERATION. NOTHING PREVENTED THE PARLIAMENT FROM EITHER PROVIDING FOR THE QUANTITY O F IRON ORE AS SUCH AS THE BASIS FOR QUANTIFICATION OF ROYALTY. IT CHOSE T O MAKE PROVISION FOR THE QUANTIFICATION BEING AWAITED UNTIL THE EMERGENC E OF LUMPS, FINES AND CONCENTRATES. HAVING DONE SO THE PARLIAMENT HAS NOT SAID FINES INCLUDING SLIMES . THOUGH SLIMES ARE NOT FINES THE PARLIAMENT COULD HAVE ASSIGNED AN ARTIFICIAL OR EXT ENDED MEANING TO FINES FOR THE PURPOSE OF LEVY OF ROYALTY WHICH IT HAS CHOSEN NOT TO DO. IT IS CLEARLY SUGGESTIVE OF I TS INTENTION NOT TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION SLIMES FOR QUANTIFYING THE AMOUNT OF ROYALTY. THIS DELIBERATE OMISSION OF PARLIAMENT CANNOT BE MADE GOOD BY INTERPRETATIVE PROCESS SO AS TO CHARGE ROYALTY ON SLIMES BY READING SECTION 9 OF THE ACT DIVORCED FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE SECOND SCHEDULE. EVEN IF SLIMES WERE TO BE HELD LIABLE TO CHARGE OF ROYALTY, THE QUESTION WOULD STI LL HAVE REMAINED AT WHAT RATE AND ON WHAT QUANTITY WHICH QUESTIONS CANN OT BE ANSWERED BY SECTION 9. 36. IN THE CASE OF GOPAL SARDAR, VS. KARUNA SARDAR REPORTED IN AIR 2004 SC 3068 , THE APEX COURT IN THE THE CONTEXT OF LIMITATION W ITHIN WHICH RIGHT OF PREEMPTION MUST BE EXERCISED AND WHETHER IN THE CON TEXT OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN WEST BENGAL LAND REFORMS AN D LIMITATION ACT, 1963 APPLIED OR NOT, OBSERVED AS UNDER:- 8....PRIOR TO 15-2-1971, AN APPLICATION UNDER SECTI ON 8 WAS REQUIRED TO BE MADE TO THE REVENUE OFFICER SPECIFICALLY EMPOWERED BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT IN THIS BEHALF. THIS PHRASE WAS SUBSTITUTED BY THE PHRASE MUNSIF HAVING TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION BY THE AFOREMENTIONED AMENDMENT. EVEN AFTER THIS AMENDMENT WHEN AN APPLIC ATION IS REQUIRED TO BE MADE TO SECTION 8 OF THE ACT EITHER TO APPLY SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT OR ITS PRINCIPLES SO AS TO EN ABLE A PARTY TO MAKE AN APPLICATION AFTER THE EXPIRY OF THE PERIOD OF LI MITATION PRESCRIBED ON SHOWING SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR NOT MAKING AN APPLICAT ION WITHIN TIME. THE ACT IS OF 1955 AND FOR ALL THESE YEARS, NO PROV ISION IS MADE UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE ACT PROVIDING FOR CONDONATIO N OF DELAY. THUS, WHEN SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT IS NOT M ADE APPLICABLE TO THE PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 8 OF TH E ACT UNLIKE TO THE OTHER PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE ACT, AS ALREADY STATED ABOVE, IT IS APPROPRIATE TO CONSTRUE THAT THE PERIOD OF LI MITATION PRESCRIBED UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE ACT SPECIFICALLY AND EXPRESSLY GOVERNS AN APPLICATION TO BE MADE UNDER THE SAID SE CTION AND 7 NOT THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLE 137 OF THE LIMITATION ACT . 37. IN OUR OPINION, THE TRIBUNAL COMMITTED AN ERROR IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSCIOUS OMISSION IN THE PRESENT CASE. FIRSTLY, AS ALREADY OBSERVED, WE HAVE SERIOUS DOUBT WHETHER SUCH PRINCIPLE CAN BE AP PLIED BY COMPARING THE DRAFT PRESENTED IN PARLIAMENT AND ULTIMATE LEGISLAT ION WHICH MAY BE PASSED. SECONDLY, THE STATUTORY PROVISION IS AMPLY CLEAR. 38. IN THE RESULT, WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT SECTI ON 40(A)(IA) WOULD COVER NOT ONLY TO THE AMOUNTS WHICH ARE PAYABLE AS ON 31 TH MARCH OF A PARTICULAR YEAR BUT ALSO WHICH ARE PAYABLE AT ANY TIME DURING THE Y EAR. OF COURSE, AS LONG AS THE OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF THE SAID PROVISION EXIST. IN THAT CONTEXT, IN OUR OPINION THE DECISION OF THE SPECIAL BENCH OF THE TR IBUNAL IN THE CASE OF M/S. MERILYN SHIPPING & TRANSPORTS VS. ACIT (SURPA), DOES NOT LAY DOWN CORRECT LAW. 39. WE ANSWER THE QUESTIONS AS UNDER:- QUESTION (1) IN THE NEGATIVE I.E. IN FAVOUR OF THE REVENUE AND AGAINST THE ASSESSEES. QUESTION (2) ALSO IN THE NEGATIVE I.E. IN FAVOUR OF THE REVENUE AND AGAINST THE ASSESSEES. THUS IT IS CLEAR THAT HON'BLE GUJARAT HIGH COURT HA S CONSIDERED ALL ASPECTS OF THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE DECISION OF SPECIAL BENCH IN CASE OF MERILYN SHIPPING TRANSPORTERS V. A CIT (SUPRA). WE FURTHER FIND THAT THAT EVEN HON'BLE CA LCUTTA HIGH COURT HAS OVERRULED THIS DECISION IN CASE OF CIT VS . CRESENT EXPORT SYNDICATE. MOREOVER CHANDIGARH BENCH OF THE TRIBUNAL CONSISTENTLY HAS BEEN FOLLOWING THE DECISION OF HON 'BLE GUJARAT HIGH COURT IN CASE OF CIT V. SIKANDARKHAN N TUNWAR AND OTHERS (SUPRA) AS WELL AS THE DECISION OF HON'BLE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT IN CASE OF CIT VS. CRESENT EXPORT SYNDICATE ( SUPRA). THEREFORE, FOLLOWING THE ABOVE DECISION WE DECIDE THIS ISSUE AGAINST THE ASSESSEE. 8 GROUND NO. 3 AND 4 - THESE TWO GROUNDS RELATES TO THE ISSUE OF DISALLOWANCE UNDER SECTION 14A. 9 AFTER HEARING BOTH THE PARTIES WE FIND THAT DURIN G THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDING IT WAS NOTICED THAT ASSESSEE HAS MADE INVESTMENT IN IND SWIFT LAB USA AMOUNTING TO RS. 18 1.22 LACS AO INVOKED THE PROVISION OF SECTION 14 A READ WITH RULE 8D AND DISALLOWED A SUM OF RS. 14,16,574/-. ON APPEAL THE DISALLOWANCE WAS CONFIRMED BY LD. CIT(A). 8 10 BEFORE US IT WAS MAINLY SUBMITTED THAT HONBLE B OMBAY HIGH COURT HAS CLEARLY HELD IN CASE OF GODREJ & BOY CE MANUFACTURING VS. DCIT, 328 ITR 81 (BOM) THAT RULE 8D CANNOT BE APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY. THEREFORE IT IS CLEAR T HAT RULE 8D IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT ASSESSMENT YEAR I.E. AY 2005-06. 11 ON THE OTHER HAND LD. DR SUBMITTED THAT IN THE S AME JUDGMENT OF HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT HAS ALSO HEL D THAT REASONABLE DISALLOWANCE CAN BE MADE EVEN IN THE EAR LIER YEARS. 12 WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE RIVAL SUBMISSION CAREFULL Y AND FIND THAT HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN CASE OF GODR EJ AND BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. V. DEPUTY CIT AND ANOTHER (SUPR A) HAS CLEARLY HELD RULE 8D IS APPLICABLE FROM AY 2008-09. THEREFORE THIS RULE CANNOT BE APPLIED IN THE PRESENT CASE WHI CH IS FOR ASSESSMENT YEAR 2005-06. AT THE SAME TIME REASONABL E DISALLOWANCES HAS TO BE MADE. CONSIDERING OVER ALL FACT OF THE CASE WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT DISALLOWANCE OF RS. 1 LAC WOULD MEET THE ENDS OF JUSTICE. ACCORDINGLY WE SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF LD. CIT (A) AND DIRECT AO TO MAKE DISALLOW ANCE OF RS. 1 LAC UNDER SECTION 14 A. 13 GROUND NO. 5 - AFTER HEARING BOTH THE PARTIES WE FIND THAT DURING ASSESSMENT PROCEEDING AO NOTICED THAT ASSESS EE HAS INCURRED SUM OF RS. 5.00 LACS TOWARDS ADVERTISEMENT . IT WAS CLAIMED THAT SAID AMOUNT WAS GIVEN FOR INDO PAK GAM ES, NO EVIDENCE WAS FILED. THEREFORE AO WAS OF THE OPINION THAT THIS EXPENDITURE HAS NOT BEEN SUBSTANTIATED. IN ANY CASE ALTERNATIVELY IT WAS OBSERVED THAT SINCE TDS HAS NO T BEEN DEDUCTED, DISALLOWANCE HAS TO BE MADE EVEN UNDER SE CTION 40(A)(IA). ON APPEAL THE ADDITION WAS CONFIRMED BY LD. CIT(A). 14 BEFORE US SIMILAR ARGUMENTS WERE MADE BY BOTH TH E PARTIES AS IN RESPECT OF GROUND NO. 1. AFTER CONSID ERING THE 9 RIVAL SUBMISSION WE FIND THAT NO TDS HAS BEEN DEDUC TED ON ADVERTISEMENT EXPENSES. THEREFORE CLEARLY PROVISION S OF SECTION 40(A)(IA) WOULD BE ATTRACTED. FURTHER IN AN Y CASE NO EVIDENCE HAS BEEN FILED BEFORE AO OR LD. CIT(A) OR EVEN BEFORE US TO SUBSTANTIATE THE CLAIM OF THIS EXPENDITURE AN D THEREFORE WE FIND NOTHING WRONG WITH THE ORDER OF LD. CIT(A) AND CONFIRM THE SAME. 15 GROUND NO. 6 - AFTER HEARING BOTH THE PARTIES WE FIND THAT DURING ASSESSMENT PROCEEDING IT WAS NOTICED THAT AS SESSEE HAS CLAIMED WEIGHED DEDUCTION @150% IN RESPECT OF REVEN UE AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURE INCURRED ON RESEARCH AND DEVELO PMENT ACTIVITIES. THE ASSESSEE WAS ASKED TO JUSTIFY THE E XPENDITURE. INITIALLY IT WAS SUBMITTED THAT ASSESSEE WAS ENGAGE D IN THE BUSINESS OF MANUFACTURING OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND TH E EXPENDITURE WAS INCURRED FOR IN HOUSE RESEARCH FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND COMPANY HAS ALSO FURNISHED AN APPLICATION IN FORM 3CK FOR APPROVAL OF THE IN HOUS E RESEARCH FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, THEREFORE CONDITIONS ARE SATISFIED. AO WAS NOT IMPRESSED WITH THIS INITIAL R EPLY AND ONCE AGAIN ASKED ASSESSEE TO GIVE DETAILED JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CLAIM. NO FURTHER DETAILS WERE FILED. IT WAS OBSERV ED THAT SINCE ASSESSEE HAS NOT FILED ANY EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE THE CLAIM THAT IT SATISFY THE CONDITION LAID IN THE SECTION 3 5(2AB). IT WAS ALSO OBSERVED THAT MAKING OF APPLICATION IN FORM 3C K IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR ALLOWING OF CLAIM. ACCORDINGLY WEIGH TED DEDUCTION AMOUNTING TO RS. 14,01,64,514/- WAS DISALLOWED. 16 ON APPEAL THE LD. CIT(A) CONFIRMED THE DISALLOWA NCE. 17 BEFORE US THE LD. COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE REITE RATED THE SUBMISSION MADE BEFORE AO. ON THE OTHER HAND LD. DR STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE ORDER OF THE CIT(A). 18` AFTER CONSIDERING RIVAL SUBMISSION WE FIND THAT LD. CIT(A) HAS DECIDED THIS ISSUE VIDE PARA 46 TO 48 WHICH AR E AS UNDER: 46 I HAVE CONSIDERED THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE ASSES SEE. I FIND THAT THERE IS NO LAW POINT INVOLVED. TO DECIDE THIS ISSUE, THE RE HAS TO BE ENQUIRY INTO THE FACTS. THE ASSESSEE CAN AGITATE TH E MATTER UNDER ADDITIONAL GROUND OF APPEAL IF A LAW POINT IS INVOL VED. MOREOVER, THE ORDER OF APPROVAL HAS BEEN GIVEN W.E.F. 1/04/2006 T ILL 31/03/2010 WHICH DOES NOT FALL IN THE A.YT. 2005-06. 10 47 THE ASSESSEE HAS RELIED UPON THE DECISION OF HON BLE ITAT AHMEDABAD BENCH IN 112 ITD 307 WHEREIN HONBLE ITAT HELD THAT ENTIRE EXPENDITURE SHOULD BE ALLOWED EVEN THOUGH IN THAT CASE THE APPROVAL WAS GRANTED ONLY W.E.F. 27/02/2001. THE HO NBLE ITAT HELD THAT HERE IS NO PROVISIONS UNDER THE ACT TO GR ANT APPROVAL W.E.F A CERTIFIED DATE WHEN THE ASSESSEE HAS FILED THE AP PLICATION IN TIME. IN THAT CASE, THE ASSESSEE HAD MADE AN APPLICATION VIDE LETTER DATED 07/08/2000 AND THE APPROVAL WAS GRANTED W.E.F . 27/02/2001. 48 IN MY OPINION, THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE ARE DIFFERENT AND DISTINGUISHABLE. IN THE CASE OF CLARIS LIFE SCIENCE LTD., 112 ITD 307(AHD), THE ASSESSEE HAD MADE AN APPLICATION PRIO R TO THE DATE OF APPROVAL WHEREAS FOR THE PRESENT CASE, THE ASSES SEE MADE APPLICATION ON 08/01/2007 AND THE APPROVAL WAS GRAN TED RETROSPECTIVELY W.E.F 01/04/2006. MOREOVER, THE PRE SCRIBED AUTHORITY HAS TO SATISFY HIMSELF ON THE BASIS OF THE DATA SUP PLIED BY THE ASSESSEE. THE ASSESSEE HAS ATTACHED THE DETAILS WHI CH ARE TO BE SUBMITTED FOR GETTING THE APPROVAL. CERTAIN DATA IS SUPPLIED TO THE PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY. THE PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY EXAM INES THE DETAILS OF THE DATA AND THEN COMES TO A CONCLUSION. IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY AFTER EXAMINING THE CASE G RANTED THE APPROVAL AND THAT TOO W.E.F. 01/04/2006. NOW THE QU ESTION ARISES, THERE HAS TO BE AN ENQUIRY AS TO WHY THE PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY DID NOT GRANT THE APPROVAL FOR THE A.Y. 2005-06. THE AP PROVAL IS NOT A MERE FORMALITY. THE PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY HAS TO GO THROUGH THE ENTIRE DATA SUPPLIED BY THE ASSESSEE AND SATISFY HI MSELF. SINCE THERE HAS TO BE AN ENQUIRY INTO THE FACTS AS TO WHY THE PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY DID NOT GRANT APPROVAL FOR THE A.Y. 2005- 06, THEN THIS ADDITIONAL GROUND OF APPEAL CANNOT BE CALLED AS A L EGAL ISSUE. MOREOVER, IF THE ASSESSEE HAS ANY GRIEVANCE AGAINST THE APPROVAL GRANTED BY THE PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY FOR REDRESSAL O F THE GRIEVANCE. IN THE CASE OF CLARIS LIFE SCIENCE LTD., 112 ITD 30 7(AHD), THE ASSESSEE HAS TAKEN THE ORIGINAL GROUND OF APPEAL AR E DIFFERENT. IN THE ADDITIONAL GROUND OF APPEAL, THE ASSESSEE HAS T O MAKE OUT A CASE THAT IT IS CERTAINLY A LEGAL ISSUE. AS I HAVE ALREADY HELD THAT IT IS NOT A LEGAL ISSUE, THE ADDITIONAL GROUND OF APPEAL RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE IS DISMISSED. 19 WE FIND THE LD. CIT(A) HAS CORRECTLY ADJUDICATED THE ISSUE. EVEN BEFORE US, NO FURTHER EVIDENCE WAS FIL ED TO SUBSTANTIATE THE CLAIM OF THE ASSESSEE. THEREFORE W E CONFIRM THE ORDER OF LD. CIT(A). 20 IN THE RESULT, APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS PARTLY ALLOWED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON THIS 7.11.20 13 SD/- SD/- (SUSHMA CHOWLA) (T.R.SOOD) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMER DATED : 7/11/2013 SURESH COPY TO: THE APPELLANT/THE RESPONDENT /THE CIT/THE CIT(A)/THE DR 11