KETAN VINOD SHAH,MUMBAI V. INCOME TAX OFFICER WARD 19(2)(4), MUMBAI

ITA 9138/MUM/2025

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The case involves Ketan Vinod Shah, the appellant, who challenged the order of the Ld. Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) / National Faceless Appeal Centre, Delhi, concerning the assessment year 2018-19. The primary contention was the delay of 478 days in filing the appeal, which the Ld. CIT(A) declined to condone, leading to the dismissal of the appeal without adjudicating on the merits. The appellant argued that the delay was due to technical issues in the electronic filing system, which prevented the proper submission of an affidavit explaining the delay. The Tribunal found merit in the appellant's argument and allowed the appeal for statistical purposes, emphasizing the need for substantial justice and the statutory right of appeal.

• Counselvise Citation: [2026] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 847082 (ITAT-MUMBAI)
• Duration Of Justice: 3 month(s) 2 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 27-03-2026
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Allowed
• Bench Allotted: Mumbai
• Assessment Year: 2018-2019
• Appeal Filed On: 25-12-2025
• Other Referred Cases: Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village v. Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs, Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.
• Laws Referred To: Income-tax Act, 1961
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: RITESH MISRA
• Assessee Lawyers: KUNAL ATUL MODY
• Keywords: Condonation of delay; Additional evidence; Reassessment proceedings; Tax effect; Period of limitation; Right to appeal; Time period of passing order
• Section: 147; 148

Judgement Text

"IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MUMBAI BENCH “E” MUMBAI BEFORE SHRI OM PRAKASH KANT (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER) & SHRI SANDEEP KARHAIL (JUDICIAL MEMBER) ITA No. 9138/MUM/2025 Assessment Year: 2018-19 Ketan Vinod Shah 8 LNHNO Bldg, no. 1, 7 K. M Munshi Marg, Mumbai – 400 007. Vs. ITO, ward 19(2)(4) Piramal Chambers, Lalbaug, Mumbai – 400012. PAN No. AMRPS1037P Appellant Respondent Assessee by : Shri Kunal Atul Mody, CA Revenue by : Shri Ritesh Misra, CIT-DR Date of Hearing : 24/03/2026 Date of pronouncement : 27/03/2026 ORDER PER OM PRAKASH KANT, AM This appeal by the assessee is directed against order dated 11.11.2025 passed by the Ld. Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) / National Faceless Appeal Centre, Delhi [in short ‘the Ld. CIT(A)’] for assessment year 2018-19. The assessee has raised multiple grounds challenging, inter-alia, the validity of reassessment proceedings under sections 147 of income-tax Act, 1961(in short the Act), including jurisdictional objections and limitation. However, at the threshold, the Printed from counselvise.com controversy pertains to the action o appeal on account of delay in filing, without adjudicating the issues on merits.The grounds raised by the assessee are reproduced as under: GROUND 1. Whether the tax effect exceeds this mandatory limit of ₹60 lakh, the Department is not forced to file an appeal; it must still decide based on the merits of the case. GROUND 2. Whether, Action u/s. 148 not justified when material found during search of another person is sole basis for reopening of another person, the appropri under Section 153C, and not under Section 148. Accordingly, reassessment proceedings u/s. 147 quashed. Additional ground. Since the ground raised being purely of legal nature and challenging the jurisdiction which goes to and no investigation GROUND 3. Whether, without dispute is Undated reasons recorded basis the Ld. A.Ο issue notice section 148 Act and the reopening of and passed reassessment order u/s 147 Act its shall considered invalid, addition initio. GROUND-4 Notice u/s 148 of the Act for pertaining A.Y. 2013 time barred on 27/03/2021 as per limitation period prescribed section 149(1)(b) of the Act therefore this proceeding barred of limitation hence, C GROUND 5. The appellant craves leave to add, amend, alter and/or withdraw any of the grounds of appeal at the time of hearing. 2. The outset, Ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that the Ld. CIT(A) declined to condone a delay of 478 days in filing the appeal, holding that the assessee had failed to demonstrate Ketan Vinod Shah ITA Nos. controversy pertains to the action of the Ld. CIT(A) in dismissing the appeal on account of delay in filing, without adjudicating the issues The grounds raised by the assessee are reproduced GROUND 1. Whether the tax effect exceeds this mandatory limit of partment is not forced to file an appeal; it must still decide based on the merits of the case. GROUND 2. Whether, Action u/s. 148 not justified when material found during search of another person is sole basis for reopening of another person, the appropriate course of action is to proceed under Section 153C, and not under Section 148. Accordingly, reassessment proceedings u/s. 147 quashed. Additional ground. Since the ground raised being purely of legal nature and challenging the jurisdiction which goes to root of the assessment and no investigation GROUND 3. Whether, without dispute is Undated reasons recorded basis the Ld. A.Ο issue notice section 148 Act and the reopening of and passed reassessment order u/s 147 Act its shall considered invalid, addition to be deleted and proceedings void ab 4 Notice u/s 148 of the Act for pertaining A.Y. 2013 time barred on 27/03/2021 as per limitation period prescribed section 149(1)(b) of the Act therefore this proceeding barred of limitation hence, Consequential proceeding void ab-initio GROUND 5. The appellant craves leave to add, amend, alter and/or withdraw any of the grounds of appeal at the time of he outset, Ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that the Ld. CIT(A) declined to condone a delay of 478 days in filing the appeal, holding that the assessee had failed to demonstrate Ketan Vinod Shah., 2 ITA Nos. 9138/MUM/2025 f the Ld. CIT(A) in dismissing the appeal on account of delay in filing, without adjudicating the issues The grounds raised by the assessee are reproduced GROUND 1. Whether the tax effect exceeds this mandatory limit of partment is not forced to file an appeal; it must GROUND 2. Whether, Action u/s. 148 not justified when material found during search of another person is sole basis for reopening ate course of action is to proceed under Section 153C, and not under Section 148. Accordingly, reassessment proceedings u/s. 147 quashed. Additional ground. Since the ground raised being purely of legal nature and root of the assessment GROUND 3. Whether, without dispute is Undated reasons recorded basis the Ld. A.Ο issue notice section 148 Act and the reopening of and passed reassessment order u/s 147 Act its shall to be deleted and proceedings void ab 4 Notice u/s 148 of the Act for pertaining A.Y. 2013-14 time barred on 27/03/2021 as per limitation period prescribed section 149(1)(b) of the Act therefore this proceeding barred of initio GROUND 5. The appellant craves leave to add, amend, alter and/or withdraw any of the grounds of appeal at the time of he outset, Ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that the Ld. CIT(A) declined to condone a delay of 478 days in filing the appeal, holding that the assessee had failed to demonstrate Printed from counselvise.com “sufficient cause” within the meaning of section 249(3) of the Act. It was observed that no documentary evidence or affidavit substantiating the reasons for delay had been furnished, and that condonation cannot be granted in the absence of a bona fide and reasonable explanation. Relying upon settled judicial principles governing limitation, the Ld. CIT(A) concluded that the delay attributable to inaction and negligence and, accordingly, dismissed the appeal in limine. T reproduced as under: 7. Decision: 2 In this regard the reason for delay had been provided by the appellant, which is \"Please find attached herewith an affidavit duly affirmed by the appellant providing a detailed explanation of the circumstances and bona fide reasons which led to the delay in filing the appeal within the prescribed time limit The said uploaded under Serial Number 12 of Form 35 in the Additional Evidence section However due to a technical issue on the portal the affidavit is not reflecting or is being automatically removed from the system despite being uploaded It that the affidavit may kindly be taken on record\". The contention of the appellant perused that the appellant has not filed any documentary evidences and not filed any affidavit, the appellant failed to substantiate the genuine reas filing of appeal. Therefore the contention of the appellant is not acceptable. The appellant has failed to furnish a valid reason for not filling appeal in time. When an appeal is filed beyond the statutory time limit, the Appellant need to or demonstrate exceptional circumstances for the delay. The appellant must be able to demonstrate that there was \"sufficient Ketan Vinod Shah ITA Nos. “sufficient cause” within the meaning of section 249(3) of the Act. It was observed that no documentary evidence or affidavit ubstantiating the reasons for delay had been furnished, and that condonation cannot be granted in the absence of a bona fide and reasonable explanation. Relying upon settled judicial principles governing limitation, the Ld. CIT(A) concluded that the delay attributable to inaction and negligence and, accordingly, dismissed The relevant finding of the Ld. CIT(A) is reproduced as under: 2 In this regard the reason for delay had been provided by the appellant, which is reproduced as below: \"Please find attached herewith an affidavit duly affirmed by the appellant providing a detailed explanation of the circumstances and bona fide reasons which led to the delay in filing the appeal within the prescribed time limit The said affidavit has also been uploaded under Serial Number 12 of Form 35 in the Additional Evidence section However due to a technical issue on the portal the affidavit is not reflecting or is being automatically removed from the system despite being uploaded It is therefore requested that the affidavit may kindly be taken on record\". The contention of the appellant perused that the appellant has not filed any documentary evidences and not filed any affidavit, the appellant failed to substantiate the genuine reason for delay in filing of appeal. Therefore the contention of the appellant is not acceptable. The appellant has failed to furnish a valid reason for not filling appeal in time. When an appeal is filed beyond the statutory time limit, the Appellant need to provide a valid reason or demonstrate exceptional circumstances for the delay. The appellant must be able to demonstrate that there was \"sufficient Ketan Vinod Shah., 3 ITA Nos. 9138/MUM/2025 “sufficient cause” within the meaning of section 249(3) of the Act. It was observed that no documentary evidence or affidavit ubstantiating the reasons for delay had been furnished, and that condonation cannot be granted in the absence of a bona fide and reasonable explanation. Relying upon settled judicial principles governing limitation, the Ld. CIT(A) concluded that the delay was attributable to inaction and negligence and, accordingly, dismissed he relevant finding of the Ld. CIT(A) is 2 In this regard the reason for delay had been provided by the \"Please find attached herewith an affidavit duly affirmed by the appellant providing a detailed explanation of the circumstances and bona fide reasons which led to the delay in filing the appeal affidavit has also been uploaded under Serial Number 12 of Form 35 in the Additional Evidence section However due to a technical issue on the portal the affidavit is not reflecting or is being automatically removed is therefore requested The contention of the appellant perused that the appellant has not filed any documentary evidences and not filed any affidavit, the on for delay in filing of appeal. Therefore the contention of the appellant is not acceptable. The appellant has failed to furnish a valid reason for not filling appeal in time. When an appeal is filed beyond the provide a valid reason or demonstrate exceptional circumstances for the delay. The appellant must be able to demonstrate that there was \"sufficient Printed from counselvise.com cause\" which obstructed his action to file Appeal beyond the prescribed time limit. Thus, the condonation o automatic but is based upon on the facts of the case. The sufficient cause within the contemplation of the limitation provision must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the provisions The appellant ought t time limit of 30 days from date of service as per section 249(2) of the Act and any delay therein may be condoned only subject to the satisfaction that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period, as evident from the plain language of section 249 extracted as under: \"249(2) the appeal shall be presented within thirty days of the following date, that is to say, (a) Where the appeal is under section 248, the date of payment of the tax, or (b) Where the appeal relates to any assessment or penalty, the date of service of the notice of demand relating to the assessment or penalty: Provided that, where an application has been made under section 146 for reopening an assessment, the perio which the application is made to the date on which the order passed on the application is served on the assessee shall be excluded: Provided further that where an application has been made under sub- beginning from the date on which the application is made, to the date on which the order rejecting the application is served on the assessee, shall be excluded, or (1) In any other case, the date on which intimation of the order sought to be appealed (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub an order has been made under section 201 on or after the 1st day Ketan Vinod Shah ITA Nos. cause\" which obstructed his action to file Appeal beyond the prescribed time limit. Thus, the condonation of delay is not automatic but is based upon on the facts of the case. cause within the contemplation of the limitation provision must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the provisions The appellant ought to have filed the appeal within the prescribed time limit of 30 days from date of service as per section 249(2) of the Act and any delay therein may be condoned only subject to the satisfaction that the appellant had sufficient cause for not ithin that period, as evident from the plain language of section 249 extracted as under: \"249(2) the appeal shall be presented within thirty days of the following date, that is to say,- (a) Where the appeal is under section 248, the date of payment of (b) Where the appeal relates to any assessment or penalty, the date of service of the notice of demand relating to the assessment Provided that, where an application has been made under section 146 for reopening an assessment, the period from the date on which the application is made to the date on which the order passed on the application is served on the assessee shall be excluded: Provided further that where an application has been - section (1) of section 270AA, the per beginning from the date on which the application is made, to the date on which the order rejecting the application is served on the assessee, shall be excluded, or (1) In any other case, the date on which intimation of the order sought to be appealed against is served. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), where an order has been made under section 201 on or after the 1st day Ketan Vinod Shah., 4 ITA Nos. 9138/MUM/2025 cause\" which obstructed his action to file Appeal beyond the f delay is not cause within the contemplation of the limitation provision must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party o have filed the appeal within the prescribed time limit of 30 days from date of service as per section 249(2) of the Act and any delay therein may be condoned only subject to the satisfaction that the appellant had sufficient cause for not ithin that period, as evident from the plain \"249(2) the appeal shall be presented within thirty days of the (a) Where the appeal is under section 248, the date of payment of (b) Where the appeal relates to any assessment or penalty, the date of service of the notice of demand relating to the assessment Provided that, where an application has been made under section d from the date on which the application is made to the date on which the order passed on the application is served on the assessee shall be excluded: Provided further that where an application has been section (1) of section 270AA, the period beginning from the date on which the application is made, to the date on which the order rejecting the application is served on the (1) In any other case, the date on which intimation of the order section (2), where an order has been made under section 201 on or after the 1st day Printed from counselvise.com of October, 1998 but before the 1st day of June, 2000 and the assessee in default has not presented any app specified in that sub the 1st day of July, 2000. (3) The Commissioner (Appeals) may admit an appeal after the expiration of the said period if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period.\" It is pertinent to note that the delay may be condoned and the appeal may be admitted u/s249(3) only if the appellant could successfully demonstrate that it had presenting the appeal of discretion in condonation of delay in matters of limitation, such as in the present case u/s 249(3) of the Income Tax Act. 1961 has to be carried out within the meaning of \"Sufficient Cause\" as envisaged in Section 5 of Limitation Act. Hence, the general rule of law of limitation is that an extension shall not be granted under Section 5 if there is no sufficient cause or cogent ground for the condonation of delay, the onus of proving which lies on the appellant/applicant as clearly laid down in the judicial pronouncements by the Highest Courts of Law. In the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village v. Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs, (2008)8 SCC 321, It was observed by the Hon'ble Court that: \"13... The words \"sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation\" should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words \"sufficient cause\" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.\" (Emphasis supplied)\". Ketan Vinod Shah ITA Nos. of October, 1998 but before the 1st day of June, 2000 and the assessee in default has not presented any appeal within the time specified in that sub-section, he may present such appeal before the 1st day of July, 2000. (3) The Commissioner (Appeals) may admit an appeal after the expiration of the said period if he is satisfied that the appellant cause for not presenting it within that period.\" It is pertinent to note that the delay may be condoned and the appeal may be admitted u/s249(3) only if the appellant could successfully demonstrate that it had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the period of 30 days. The exercise of discretion in condonation of delay in matters of limitation, such as in the present case u/s 249(3) of the Income Tax Act. 1961 has to be carried out within the meaning of \"Sufficient Cause\" as ction 5 of Limitation Act. Hence, the general rule of law of limitation is that an extension shall not be granted under Section 5 if there is no sufficient cause or cogent ground for the condonation of delay, the onus of proving which lies on the /applicant as clearly laid down in the judicial pronouncements by the Highest Courts of Law. In the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village v. Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs, (2008)8 SCC 321, It was observed by the Hon'ble Court that: words \"sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation\" should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the The words \"sufficient cause\" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or the part of the appellant.\" (Emphasis supplied)\". Ketan Vinod Shah., 5 ITA Nos. 9138/MUM/2025 of October, 1998 but before the 1st day of June, 2000 and the eal within the time section, he may present such appeal before (3) The Commissioner (Appeals) may admit an appeal after the expiration of the said period if he is satisfied that the appellant cause for not presenting it within that period.\" It is pertinent to note that the delay may be condoned and the appeal may be admitted u/s249(3) only if the appellant could sufficient cause for not within the period of 30 days. The exercise of discretion in condonation of delay in matters of limitation, such as in the present case u/s 249(3) of the Income Tax Act. 1961 has to be carried out within the meaning of \"Sufficient Cause\" as ction 5 of Limitation Act. Hence, the general rule of law of limitation is that an extension shall not be granted under Section 5 if there is no sufficient cause or cogent ground for the condonation of delay, the onus of proving which lies on the /applicant as clearly laid down in the judicial In the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village v. Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs, (2008)8 SCC 321, It was observed words \"sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation\" should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the The words \"sufficient cause\" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or the part of the appellant.\" (Emphasis supplied)\". Printed from counselvise.com The aforesaid view was reiterated in the case of Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685, where in the Court held that: \"25. We may state that even if the term \"sufficient cause\" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of \"reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.\" The Courts in the abovementioned cases, highlighted upon the importance introdu giving the clause \"sufficient cause\" a liberal interpretation. In furtherance of the same, the Courts has cautioned regarding the necessity of distinguishing cases where delay is of few days, as against the cases where the delay is inordinate as it might accrue to the prejudice of the rights of the other party. In such cases, where there exists inordinate delay and the same is attributable to the party's inaction and negligence, the Courts have to take a strict approach so as to protect the substantial rights of the parties. Ketan Vinod Shah ITA Nos. The aforesaid view was reiterated in the case of Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685, where in the Court \"25. We may state that even if the term \"sufficient cause\" has to ive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of \"reasonableness” as it is its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly lementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.\" The Courts in the abovementioned cases, highlighted upon the introducing the concept of \"reasonableness\" while giving the clause \"sufficient cause\" a liberal interpretation. In furtherance of the same, the Courts has cautioned regarding the necessity of distinguishing cases where delay is of few days, as where the delay is inordinate as it might accrue to the prejudice of the rights of the other party. In such cases, where there exists inordinate delay and the same is attributable to the party's inaction and negligence, the Courts have to take a roach so as to protect the substantial rights of the Ketan Vinod Shah., 6 ITA Nos. 9138/MUM/2025 The aforesaid view was reiterated in the case of Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685, where in the Court \"25. We may state that even if the term \"sufficient cause\" has to ive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of \"reasonableness” as it is its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly lementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.\" The Courts in the abovementioned cases, highlighted upon the cing the concept of \"reasonableness\" while giving the clause \"sufficient cause\" a liberal interpretation. In furtherance of the same, the Courts has cautioned regarding the necessity of distinguishing cases where delay is of few days, as where the delay is inordinate as it might accrue to the prejudice of the rights of the other party. In such cases, where there exists inordinate delay and the same is attributable to the party's inaction and negligence, the Courts have to take a roach so as to protect the substantial rights of the Printed from counselvise.com Apart from the above there are various judgments laying down such position of rejection, which are brought out in following paragraphs. The delay should not be condoned simply because the appell case is hard and calls for sympathy or merely out of benevolence to the party seeking relief. In granting the indulgence and condoning the delay it must be proved beyond the shadow of doubt that the appellant was diligent and was not guilty of negligence whatsoever. The sufficient cause within the contemplation of the limitation provision must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the provisions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361 has held that the cause for the delay in filing the appeal which by due care and attention could have been avoided cannot be a sufficient cause within the meaning of the limitation provision. Where no negligence, nor inaction, or want of b liberal construction of the provisions has to be made in order to advance substantial justice. Seekers of justice must come with clean hands. [JCIT Vs Tractors & Farm Equipment Ltd. (ITAT, Chennai) 104 ITD 149 fo Thus, there exists no sufficient and good reason for the delay of 478 Days. Such delay cannot be condoned as condonation in the present case would not be in accordance with the exposition emanating out of the Hon'ble apex Court and Hon'ble juris High Court decisions. It will rather be grave prejudice to the Department I therefore decline to condone the delay of 478 Days, and dismiss this appeal of the appellant as barred by limitation. In view of the above discussion appeal is rendered inadmissible. Hence stand dismissed. 3. Before us, the learned counsel for the assessee submitted that an affidavit explaining the delay had, in fact, been filed but was Ketan Vinod Shah ITA Nos. Apart from the above there are various judgments laying down such position of rejection, which are brought out in following The delay should not be condoned simply because the appell case is hard and calls for sympathy or merely out of benevolence to the party seeking relief. In granting the indulgence and condoning the delay it must be proved beyond the shadow of doubt that the appellant was diligent and was not guilty of ence whatsoever. The sufficient cause within the contemplation of the limitation provision must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the provisions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramlal vs. Rewa AIR 1962 SC 361 has held that the cause for the delay in filing the appeal which by due care and attention could have been avoided cannot be a sufficient cause within the meaning of the limitation provision. Where no negligence, nor inaction, or want of bona fides can be imputed to the appellant a liberal construction of the provisions has to be made in order to advance substantial justice. Seekers of justice must come with clean hands. [JCIT Vs Tractors & Farm Equipment Ltd. (ITAT, Chennai) 104 ITD 149 followed). / Thus, there exists no sufficient and good reason for the delay of 478 Days. Such delay cannot be condoned as condonation in the present case would not be in accordance with the exposition emanating out of the Hon'ble apex Court and Hon'ble juris High Court decisions. It will rather be grave prejudice to the I therefore decline to condone the delay of 478 Days, and dismiss this appeal of the appellant as barred by limitation. In view of the above discussion appeal is rendered inadmissible. Hence stand dismissed. Before us, the learned counsel for the assessee submitted that an affidavit explaining the delay had, in fact, been filed but was Ketan Vinod Shah., 7 ITA Nos. 9138/MUM/2025 Apart from the above there are various judgments laying down such position of rejection, which are brought out in following The delay should not be condoned simply because the appellant's case is hard and calls for sympathy or merely out of benevolence to the party seeking relief. In granting the indulgence and condoning the delay it must be proved beyond the shadow of doubt that the appellant was diligent and was not guilty of ence whatsoever. The sufficient cause within the contemplation of the limitation provision must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the provisions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramlal vs. Rewa AIR 1962 SC 361 has held that the cause for the delay in filing the appeal which by due care and attention could have been avoided cannot be a sufficient cause within the meaning of the limitation provision. Where no negligence, nor ona fides can be imputed to the appellant a liberal construction of the provisions has to be made in order to advance substantial justice. Seekers of justice must come with clean hands. [JCIT Vs Tractors & Farm Equipment Ltd. (ITAT, Thus, there exists no sufficient and good reason for the delay of 478 Days. Such delay cannot be condoned as condonation in the present case would not be in accordance with the exposition emanating out of the Hon'ble apex Court and Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court decisions. It will rather be grave prejudice to the I therefore decline to condone the delay of 478 Days, and dismiss In view of the above discussion appeal is rendered as Before us, the learned counsel for the assessee submitted that an affidavit explaining the delay had, in fact, been filed but was Printed from counselvise.com not considered by the Ld. CIT(A), allegedly due to technical issues on the portal. It was thus urged that, in the interest of substantial justice, the assessee be granted one more opportunity to place the affidavit and supporting material on record, and that the matter be restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication 4. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. It is well expression “sufficient cause” employed in section 249(3) of the Act must receive a liberal and pragmatic construction so as to adv substantial justice, particularly where no mala fide or deliberate negligence is attributable to the appellant. At the same time, such discretion is not to be exercised mechanically and must be founded upon a satisfactory explanation supported by mate the present case, the grievance of the assessee is that the affidavit explaining the delay was not taken into consideration by the Ld. CIT(A), allegedly on account of technical deficiencies in the electronic filing system. This assertion before us. In such circumstances, denial of an opportunity to substantiate the cause for delay would result in foreclosure of the assessee’s statutory right of appeal without adjudication on merits. 5. In our considered view, the served by affording the assessee one more opportunity to place on record the affidavit and relevant material explaining the delay. The Ketan Vinod Shah ITA Nos. not considered by the Ld. CIT(A), allegedly due to technical issues It was thus urged that, in the interest of substantial justice, the assessee be granted one more opportunity to place the affidavit and supporting material on record, and that the matter be restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication We have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. It is well-settled that the expression “sufficient cause” employed in section 249(3) of the Act must receive a liberal and pragmatic construction so as to adv substantial justice, particularly where no mala fide or deliberate negligence is attributable to the appellant. At the same time, such discretion is not to be exercised mechanically and must be founded upon a satisfactory explanation supported by material on record. In the present case, the grievance of the assessee is that the affidavit explaining the delay was not taken into consideration by the Ld. CIT(A), allegedly on account of technical deficiencies in the electronic filing system. This assertion has not been controverted before us. In such circumstances, denial of an opportunity to substantiate the cause for delay would result in foreclosure of the assessee’s statutory right of appeal without adjudication on merits. In our considered view, the ends of justice would be best served by affording the assessee one more opportunity to place on record the affidavit and relevant material explaining the delay. The Ketan Vinod Shah., 8 ITA Nos. 9138/MUM/2025 not considered by the Ld. CIT(A), allegedly due to technical issues It was thus urged that, in the interest of substantial justice, the assessee be granted one more opportunity to place the affidavit and supporting material on record, and that the matter be restored to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and settled that the expression “sufficient cause” employed in section 249(3) of the Act must receive a liberal and pragmatic construction so as to advance substantial justice, particularly where no mala fide or deliberate negligence is attributable to the appellant. At the same time, such discretion is not to be exercised mechanically and must be founded rial on record. In the present case, the grievance of the assessee is that the affidavit explaining the delay was not taken into consideration by the Ld. CIT(A), allegedly on account of technical deficiencies in the has not been controverted before us. In such circumstances, denial of an opportunity to substantiate the cause for delay would result in foreclosure of the assessee’s statutory right of appeal without adjudication on merits. ends of justice would be best served by affording the assessee one more opportunity to place on record the affidavit and relevant material explaining the delay. The Printed from counselvise.com Ld. CIT(A) shall thereafter examine the issue of condonation of delay afresh, in accordance with law, and upon being satisfied as to the existence of sufficient cause, proceed to adjudicate the appeal on merits. We may clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the additions or the legal grounds raised by the assessee, which shall remain open for consideration. 6. In the result the appeal filed by the assessee allowed for statistical purposes Order pronounced in the open Court on Sd/- (SANDEEP SINGH KARHAIL JUDICIAL MEMBER Mumbai; Dated: 27/03/2026 KRK, SR. PS Copy of the Order forwarded to 1. The Appellant 2. The Respondent. 3. CIT 4. DR, ITAT, Mumbai 5. Guard file. //True Copy// Ketan Vinod Shah ITA Nos. Ld. CIT(A) shall thereafter examine the issue of condonation of delay e with law, and upon being satisfied as to the existence of sufficient cause, proceed to adjudicate the appeal on merits. We may clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the additions or the legal grounds raised by the h shall remain open for consideration. In the result the appeal filed by the assessee allowed for ounced in the open Court on 27/03/2026. Sd/- SINGH KARHAIL) (OM PRAKASH KANT JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Copy of the Order forwarded to : BY ORDER, (Assistant Registrar) ITAT, Mumbai Ketan Vinod Shah., 9 ITA Nos. 9138/MUM/2025 Ld. CIT(A) shall thereafter examine the issue of condonation of delay e with law, and upon being satisfied as to the existence of sufficient cause, proceed to adjudicate the appeal on merits. We may clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the additions or the legal grounds raised by the In the result the appeal filed by the assessee allowed for /2026. - OM PRAKASH KANT) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER (Assistant Registrar) ITAT, Mumbai Printed from counselvise.com "