LAKSHMI DEVI P.N V. THE COMMISSIONER, GURUVAYUR DEVASWOM

WA/244/2014

AI Insights

The case revolves around a dispute concerning the promotion to the post of High School Assistant (Hindi) at Guruvayur Devaswom English Medium School. The appellant, Lakshmi Devi P.N., contested the promotion of the 4th respondent, K.P. Preethy, who was promoted in 1997. The appellant argued that her own promotion was unjustly delayed and that she was entitled to the position. The court examined the timelines of promotions, the legal principles governing administrative decisions, and the implications of long delays in challenging such promotions. The court ultimately upheld the promotion of the 4th respondent, emphasizing the importance of stability in administrative affairs and the application of the 'sit back theory'.

• Counselvise Citation: [2014] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 694729 (HC-KERALA)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 12-12-2014
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Rabindra Nath Bose and others v. Union of India and others, Sreedharan Pillai v. State of Kerala, Sajeev N.J. v. Union of India and others, Jayashree.V.V. v. State of Kerala & Ors., V.V.Prakasini v. K.P.S.C. and Ors., R.R.Verma & Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., State of Punjab v. Jagdip Singh, K.B. Sharma v. Transport Commissioner, M.P.Raghavan Nair v. State Insurance Officer and others
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: S P PILLAY; N SANTHA
• Assessee Lawyers: BABU KARUKAPADATH; M A BABU
• Keywords: Administrative decision; Leave without allowance; Probation; Promotion; Reversion; Writ Appeal; High School Assistant

Judgement Text

"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALEXANDER THOMAS FRIDAY, THE 12TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2014/21ST AGRAHAYANA, 1936 WA.No. 244 of 2014 () IN WP(C).3503/2011 ------------------------------------------ AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WP(C) 3503/2011 of HIGH COURT OF KERALA DATED 19.12.2013 APPELLANT(S)/PETITIONER: ------------------------------------------ LAKSHMI DEVI P.N W/O CHANDRASEKHARAN, MAKA NIVAS, MANCHIRA ROAD GURUVAYUR L.P.S.A GURUVAYUR DEVASWOM ENGLISH MEDIUM SCHOOL GURUVAYUR BY ADVS.SRI.BABU KARUKAPADATH SMT.M.A.VAHEEDA BABU SRI.K.A.NOUSHAD SRI.P.U.VINOD KUMAR SRI.KANDAMPULLY RAHUL SRI.MITHUN BABY JOHN SRI.J.RAMKUMAR RESPONDENTS/ RESPONDENTS: --------------------------------------------------- 1. THE COMMISSIONER, GURUVAYUR DEVASWOM GURUVAYUR DEVASWOM, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT THIRUVANANTHAPURAM 695001 2. THE GURUVAYUR DEVASWOM MANAGING COMMITTE, GURUVAYUR DEVASWOM, GURUVAYUR 680101 REPRESENTED BY ITS ADMINISTRATOR 3. THE ADMINISTRATOR, GURUVAYUR DEVASWOM, GURUYVAYUR 680101 4. K.P PREETHY, HIGH SCHOOL ASSISTANT (HINDI), GURUVAYUR DEVASWOM ENGLISH MEDIUM SCHOOL, GURUVAYUR 680101 R4 BY ADV. SRI.S.P.ARAVINDAKSHAN PILLAY R4 BY ADV. SMT.N.SANTHA R4 BY ADV. SRI.K.A.BALAN R4 BY ADV. SRI.PETER JOSE CHRISTO R4 BY ADV. SRI.S.A.ANAND R2 & 3 BY ADV. SRI.V.KRISHNA MENON SRI. BENNY GERVACIS SRI.P.GOPAL THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 20.6.2014, THE COURT ON 12.12.204 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ANTONY DOMINIC & ALEXANDER THOMAS, JJ. ================== W.A.No. 244 of 2014 [Arising out of impugned judgment in W.P.(C).No. 3503/2011] ================== Dated this the 12th day of December, 2014 J U D G M E N T ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. The judgment of the learned Single Judge rendered on 19.12.2013 in W.P.(C).No.3503/2011 is impugned in this intra court appeal by the unsuccessful writ petitioner therein. The Writ Petition (Civil) was instituted for a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned Ext.P-17 order dated 20.1.2011 passed by the 3rd respondent- Administrator, Guruvayur Devaswom, rejecting the request of the petitioner for promotion to the post of High School Assistant (Hindi) viz., [H.S.A. (Hindi)] in the Guruvayur Devaswom English Medium School and praying for a mandamus to direct the respondent- Guruvayur Devaswom authorities to reinstate/restore the petitioner as H.S.A. (Hindi) with continuity of service and full service benefits as H.S.A. (Hindi). The facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as follows: 2. The appellant and the contesting respondent No.4 (R-4 W.A.244/14 - : 2 :- for short) had applied for the post of Lower Primary (L.P) Hindi teacher in the above said school under the 2nd respondent Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee. These candidates were interviewed on 3.11.1995 and 4.11.1995 and on the basis of that selection, Ext.P-2 select list was published in pursuance of Ext.P-1 resolution. The candidates who were selected were issued Ext.P-3 appointment order, pursuant to which, R-4 joined duty on 18.11.1995 and the appellant/writ petitioner joined duty on 21.11.1995. R-4 completed the prescribed period of probation of one year within a continuous period of two years and was declared to have successfully completed the probation with effect from 18.11.1996 as per order dated 25.10.1997. The probation of the appellant was declared by Ext.P-4 order dated 9.2.1998, with effect from 9.4.1997, as the appellant had availed leave without allowances (L.W.A) from 1.11.1996 to 30.3.1997 before completion of the period of probation. The appellant was said to be on leave from 1.11.1997 to 1.2.1998 (maternity leave) and from 2.2.1998 to 1.6.1999 (leave without allowances said to have been taken in continuance of maternity leave). W.A.244/14 - : 3 :- 3. It is stated that the two posts of H.S.As., one in Physical Science and another in Hindi, were sanctioned to the above school on 24.10.1997. R-4 was promoted as H.S.A. (Hindi) on 25.11.1997. It is the case of the respondents that the appellant, who was on leave without allowance during the above period, was not qualified to be considered for promotion as she had not completed her probation in the lower feeder category post of L.P. Teacher. An incumbent who had availed leave without allowances without completing the probation, was said to be eligible only to rejoin duty in that post. 4. The appellant rejoined duty on 1.6.1999 and she raised claim for appointment as H.S.A (Hindi) for the first time only by Ext.P-5 representation dated 15.7.1999. Presumably she was waiting for getting her probation declared in the lower feeder category post of L.P. Teacher. But the fact remains that though R-4 was promoted as H.S.A (Hindi) as early as 25.11.1997, the appellant had objected to this promotion and raised her claim only as late as 15.7.1999 as evident from Ext.P-5 representation. Further it is evident from the pleadings on record that further steps were taken by the appellant on this issue only in 2003, ie., four years after W.A.244/14 - : 4 :- Ext.P-5 representation dated 1.6.1999. 5. The headmaster concerned reported that the appellant was eligible for promotion as H.S.A. (Hindi) and this, the respondents would now contend that, was done without considering the long delay and the crucial fact that the appellant was on leave without allowance during the relevant time. On the basis of the report of the headmaster, the 3rd respondent issued Ext.P-8 dated 5.6.2006 reverting R-4 and promoting the appellant as H.S.A. (Hindi). Ext.P-8 order of reversion issued on 5.6.2006 was rendered about nine long years after the promotion of R-4 effected as early as on 25.11.1997. Accordingly, R-4 challenged this order of reversion by filing W.P.(C).No.14982/2006, wherein this Court, as per Ext.P-11 judgment, rendered on 24.8.2006 found in para 6 of the judgment that the said impugned order of reversion issued after such a long period, appears to be arbitrary. However, this Court declined to interfere in the matter on the ground that the Writ Petition was not maintainable. The 4th respondent filed W.A.No.1602/2006 to impugn Ext.P-11 judgment. But the Writ Appeal was withdrawn as evident from Ext.P-12 judgment. The case of the 4th respondent is that the 1st respondent had taken action in W.A.244/14 - : 5 :- the meantime to reconsider the entire issue on the basis of the representation of R-4 and that is the reason for withdrawing the Writ Appeal. 6. A Sub Committee was ordered to be constituted by the 2nd respondent-Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee to examine the issue raised in the representation of the 4th respondent. Based on the report submitted by the said Sub Committee, the 2nd respondent, by resolution dated 15.9.2007, resolved to cancel Ext.P-8 order dated 5.6.2006 and to re-promote the 4th respondent as H.S.A. (Hindi) in the place of the appellant. Pursuant to the said decision, Ext.P-13 order dated 28.9.2007 was issued, whereby the earlier Ext.P-8 order dated 5.6.2006 was cancelled. The case of the respondents is that Ext.P-13 order was issued to cancel Ext.P-8 order in order to correct the mistake and error that occurred in the issuance of Ext.P-8 and to consequentially promote the 4th respondent in the place of the appellant. The aforementioned Ext.P- 13 order was challenged by the appellant in W.P.(C).No. 30837/2007 and one of the main grounds urged was that the said order was issued without an opportunity of hearing the appellant W.A.244/14 - : 6 :- herein. Thereupon, by Ext.P-15 judgment, this Court disposed of W.P.(C).No. 30837/2007 by directing reconsideration of the matter. In obedience to Ext.P-15 judgment rendered by this Court in W.P. (C).No.30837/2007, the official respondents issued the impugned Ext.P-17 order upholding the promotion given to the 4th respondent. It is challenging the said Ext.P-17 order that the instant Writ Petition was filed. The learned Single Judge as per the impugned judgment rendered on 19.12.2013 dismissed W.P.(C).No. 3530/2011 on the ground that the appellant's probation had not been declared at the time when the vacancy to H.S.A. (Hindi) was notified and filled up and therefore even though the appellant was senior to the 4th respondent, the appellant was not entitled to be promoted as H.S.A. (Hindi). As stated earlier, it is this judgment of the learned Single Judge dismissing W.P.(C).No. 3530/2011, that is impugned in this Writ Appeal. 7. Heard Smt.M.A.Vaheeda Babu, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Sri.V.Krishna Menon, the learned Standing Counsel for Guruvayur Devaswom, appearing for official respondents 1 to 3 and Sri.S.P.Aravindakshan Pillai, the learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent No.4. W.A.244/14 - : 7 :- 8. After extensively hearing the learned Advocates appearing on either sides, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge dismissing the W.P.(C). does not call for any interference. It is evident from the materials on record that the post of H.S.A. (Hindi) was sanctioned in the school on 24.10.1997 and further that the 4th respondent was promoted in that post as H.S.A. (Hindi) as early as on 25.11.1997. The appellant objected for the first time to the said promotion granted to the 4th respondent as early as on 25.11.1997, only by submitting Ext.P-5 representation as late as on 15.7.1999. But no steps were taken thereon upto 2003, ie., more than four years after the submission of Ext.P-5 representation dated 15.7.1999, as stated in para 5 of the counter affidavit of respondents 2 and 3 in this W.P.(C). The official respondents had thereupon issued the impugned order of reversion by Ext.P-8 only as late as on 5.6.2006. Therefore, the promotion granted to the 4th respondent as early as on 25.11.1997 was sought to be disturbed by the official respondent only as per Ext.P-8 order dated 5.6.2006, which is nine long years after the grant of the promotion to the 4th respondent. W.A.244/14 - : 8 :- 9. The 4th respondent has submitted that the appellant herein, who was on leave without allowances without medical certificate from 11.11.1996 to 30.3.1997, had rejoined duty on 31.3.1997 and later she was on maternity leave from 3.11.1997 to 30.3.1998 and had rejoined duty on 31.3.1998. That from 1.4.1998 to 31.5.1998, it was midsummer vacation for the school and the appellant rejoined duty on 1.6.1998 and from 2.6.1998 to 31.5.1999, she was on leave without allowances without medical certificate and she rejoined duty on 1.6.1999 and it is only thereafter, she raised objection to the promotion granted to the 4th respondent, effected on 25.11.1997, though she had earlier fully known about the promotion. That all throughout the appellant was aware of the 4th respondent's promotion as H.S.A.(Hindi) with effect from 25.11.1997, etc. Without going into these details, we are convinced that it cannot be said that the appellant was totally unaware about the promotion granted to her colleague (R-4) on 25.11.1997. At any rate, the appellant has submitted representation against this promotion only on 15.7.1999 and she has not taken any steps thereafter and even the official respondents have admitted that no steps were taken thereon upto 2003. Still further, Ext.P-8 W.A.244/14 - : 9 :- order of reversion was issued only much later on 5.6.2006. Therefore, the claim made by the appellant is barred by long delay, laches and acquiescence and should not have been entertained by the official respondents. At any rate, the official respondents have no justification to issue the order of reversion of the 4th respondent through Ext.P-8 order dated 5.6.2006, which is seen issued nine long years after the grant of promotion to the 4th respondent on 25.11.1997. 10. So the crucial question is as to whether it was lawful and proper for the official respondents to disturb the promotion granted to the 4th respondent on 25.11.1997 and the consequential seniority arising from such promotion, after such a long period of time. This issue is no longer res integra and the 4th respondent is certainly entitled to the benefit of the rule enunciated in various court rulings, which is well known as “sit back theory” as laid down in a series of decisions of the Apex Court and of various High Courts. In the case, Rabindra Nath Bose and others v. Union of India and others reported in AIR 1970 SC, 470 p. 478 the Apex Court has succinctly held as follows: “Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would W.A.244/14 - : 10 :- not be set aside after a lapse of a number of years.” The Full Bench of this Court in the case Sreedharan Pillai v. State of Kerala reported in 1973 KLT 151, held in page 177, para 47 thereof, held as follows : '47. The petitioners were duly qualified for inclusion in the 1962 list and they had been granted promotions to the upper division in the list for 1962. By virtue of that promotion they had acquired a right to have their ranks and seniority in that category reckoned on the basis of the principles laid down in Rule 27(a) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules. The position of the officers in relation to the promotions of 1961 and 1962 had become settled at least by the orders Exts.P1 and P2 passed in February, 1965. No statutory appeals or revision petitions are shown to have been filed against those orders and hence it must be taken that those lists had become final. It is not in the interests of the maintenance of the morale, efficiency and contentment in the service to disrupt after such long lapse of time matters pertaining to vital service conditions like seniority and rank which have already become settled. We may usefully refer in this context to the observations of the Supreme Court in Rabindra Nath Bose and others v. Union of India and others (AIR 1970 SC 470 at 478): “Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after a lapse of a number of years.” It will be neither just or equitable to deprive persons who have been promoted many years ago, of the rights that have accrued to them regarding their rank and seniority by purporting to conduct a review of promotions after the lapse of many years.' Later, the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case Sajeev N.J. v. Union of India and others reported in 2009 (4) ILR (Ker.) 469, has held in paragraph 19 thereof that the question revolves around the principle that the incumbents in the service are entitled, as of right, W.A.244/14 - : 11 :- to assume the prevalence of a state of affairs relating to their position in service, including inter se seniority amongst persons included in a cadre, and sit back with the belief that such state of affairs have assumed finality and should accordingly govern the parties. In Paragraphs 21 to 23 it has been held by the Full Bench in Sajeev's case (supra) as follows: '21. We consider it advantageous to extract the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Rabindra Nath v. Union of India. We note that the principles laid down therein have been almost unwaveringly quoted by the Supreme Court in the subsequent judgments. It was held as follows in paragraphs 34 and 35 of the judgment in Rabindra Nath v. Union of India (AIR 1970 SC 470). “34. The learned counsel for the petitioners strongly urges that the decision of this court in Trilokchand and Motichand's case, [(1969} 1 S.C.C.110] (supra) needs review. But after carefully considering the matter, we are of the view that no relief should be given to petitioners who without any reasonable explanation, approach this Court under Article of the Constitution after inordinate delay. The highest Court in this land has been given Original Jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. It could not have been the intention that this Court would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 35. We are not anxious to throw out petitions on this ground, but we must administer justice in accordance with law and principles of equity, justice and good conscience. It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years. It was on this ground that this Court in Jaisinghani's case, [1967-2 SCR 703=(AIR1967 SC 1427)] observed that the order in that case would not affect Class II officers who have been appointed permanently as Assistant Commissioners. In that case, the Court was only considering the challenge to appointments and promotions made after 1950. In this case we are asked to W.A.244/14 - : 12 :- consider the validity of appointments and promotions made during the periods of 1945 to 1950. If there was adequate reason in that case to leave out Class II officers, who had been appointed permanently Assistant Commissioners, there is much more reason in this case that the officers who are now permanent Assistant Commissioners of Income Tax and who were appointed and promoted to their original posts during 1945 to 1950, should be left alone.” 22. The theory of 'sit back' has been applied almost uniformly in the context of a contention of delay and laches on the part of any person, who makes an attempt to prosecute a claim, which, if accepted, would result inn a situation where inter se positions which have been settled over the years will have to be revised. These contentions have often been raised in proceedings under Articles 226 or 32 of the Constitution and therefore, the Supreme Court had taken note of the fact that though there is no statutory period of limitation applicable to proceedings under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution, where settled positions of seniority are sought to be questioned after a considerable lapse of time, the court would be inclined to decline jurisdiction in such cases, on the ground of delay and laches. The court would be loathe to interfere with settled affairs in matters of seniority and promotion effected in any cadre or service after a lapse of time. As observed by the Supreme Court in Rabindra Nath v. Union of India, though the courts would not be anxious to throw out petitions on the ground of delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching the court, justice will have to be administered in accordance with law and principles of equity, justice and good conscience. As the court observed in the said case, it would be unjust to deprive the respondents (in the said case) the rights which have accrued to them; “each person ought to be entitled to 'sit back' and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years. 23. The principles laid down in Rabindra Nath v. Union of India were followed in Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector of Central Excise. The Court again reiterated the position in R.S.Makashi v. I.M.Menon, and thereafter in K.R. Mudgal v. R.P.Singh.' 11. In paragraph 25, the Full Bench noted that though the theory of 'sit back' as such, was not referred to in Mudgal's case (AIR 1986 SC 2086), essentially the principle upheld therein by the Supreme Court was that settled positions of seniority should not be W.A.244/14 - : 13 :- permitted to be agitated again, after a reasonable lapse of time and the Apex court observed that it would not be in the interest of administrative efficiency to let disputes of seniority to be permitted to be raised and prosecuted several years after the seniority had been settled in the department in the ordinary course of business. Therefore, it is by now too well established that each person ought to be entitled to sit back and treat his appointment and promotion effected a long term ago could not be disturbed or unsettled after a lapse of number of years. 12. The above said principles have been followed by this Court subsequently in many decisions as in the case Jayasree.V.V. v. State of Kerala & Ors. reported in 2014 (4) ILR (Ker) 351, paragraphs 11 to 15. In this view of the matter, the cancellation of the promotion granted to the 4th respondent on 25.11.1997, by the issuance of Ext.P-8 reversion order dated 5.6.2006, is illegal and ultra vires and it was not within the competence of the authorities concerned to disturb the said promotion of R-4 and the consequential seniority arising therefrom, after such a long period of time. In the above said view of the matter, the impugned Ext.P-17 order restoring the earlier promotion granted to R-4 and W.A.244/14 - : 14 :- cancelling the earlier Ext.P-8 order dated 5.6.2006, can only be treated as an order to correct the mistake and error in the issuance of the reversion order as per Ext.P-8. This Court in the case V.V.Prakasini v. K.P.S.C. and Ors. reported in 1993 (1) KLJ 632, p.644-645, para 18, has held that reserve power to correct mistakes committed by the public authority itself has to be located in every public authority is in the interests of justice and to avoid arbitrariness. It was further held that it is not uncommon - in fact it is human failing - that errors are committed in the conduct of human affairs and infallibility is not a human virtue as that is a quality attributable only to the Almighty and that such a power to correct mistakes is therefore an absolute necessity and has to be found in every authority, even without a specific provision as held by this Court in the case Sasidharan v. Reserve Bank of India reported in 1990 (2) KLT 573, para 7, wherein reliance was placed on the decision in Karunakaran Nambiar v. D.P.I reported in 1966 KLT 290, etc. It would be profitable to quote para 18 of the aforementioned ruling of this Court in V.V.Prakashini's case supra, which reads as follows: '18. ........... Such a reserve power to correct mistakes committed by itself has to be located in every public authority in the interests of W.A.244/14 - : 15 :- justice and to avoid arbitrariness. It is not uncommon - in fact it is a human failing - that errors are committed in the conduct of human affairs. Infallibility is not a human virtue, that being a quality attributable only to the Almighty. Such a power to correct apparent mistakes is therefore an absolute necessity and has to be found in every authority, even without a specific provision as was held by me earlier in my decision in Sasidharan v. Reserve Bank of India, (1990 (2) KLT 573, paragraph, 7 relying on the decision in Karunakaran Nambiar v. Director of Public Instruction, 1966 KLT 290 and others. The observations of the Supreme Court in a slightly different context in State of Punjab v. Jagdip Singh, AIR 1964 SC 521 are apposite in this context. “The question then is as to the effect of a void order of confirmation. When an order is void on the ground that the authority which made it had no power to make it cannot give rise to any legal rights, and as suggested by the learned Advocate- General, any person could have challenged the status of the respondents as Tahsildars by instituting proceedings for the issue of a writ of quo warrant under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Had such proceedings been taken it would not have been possible for the respondents to justify their status as permanent Tahsildars and the High Court would have issued a writ of quo warranto depriving the respondents of their status as permanent Tahsildars. Now, where the Government itself realises that an order made by an authority under the Government is void, is it powerless to do anything in the matter? Is it bound to give effect to a void order and treat as confirmed Tahsildars persons who have no legal right to be treated as confirmed Tahsildars? Is it not open to the Government to treat the confirmation as void and notify the persons affected and the public in general of the fact of its having done so by issuing a notification of the kind it made on October 31, 1957? In our opinion where a Government servant has no right to a post or to a particular status, though an authority under the government acting beyond its competence had purported to give that person a status which it was not entitled to give he will not in law to be deemed to have been validly appointed to the post or given the particular status.” Equally if the higher ranking given to the petitioner could have been successfully challenged as patently erroneous, why not the same result be achieved by the Commission itself rectifying what otherwise was an obvious mistake committed by it ?.............' 13. A similar issue regarding the power to correct mistakes and errors has been considered in a earlier decision of this W.A.244/14 - : 16 :- Court in the case Sasidharan v. Reserve Bank of India reported in 1990 (2) KLT 573, wherein this Court in paras 7 to 10 thereof has held as follows: '7. The power is inherent in any administrative authority to correct accidental mistakes committed by it, in ignorance of, or overlooking the facts. Indeed such power should be exercised, where rights of third parties have been affected by the mistaken proceedings, without their knowledge, and without their being heard, resulting in miscarriage of justice. If the power to correct inadvertent mistakes is not recognised and accepted, it may lead to perpetuation of injustice and to undesirable consequences. A person whose rights are so affected by an illegal order passed behind his back need not be compelled to rush to court to get it set aside, on pain of its being held binding otherwise. The authority concerned can itself remedy the mischief, on its being apprised of its mistake and the injustice flowing therefrom. (See in this connection Karunakaran Nambiar v. Director of Public Instruction 1966 KLT 290). Such an order does not affect any rights of the party benefiting by the mistake, as no rights legally inhered in him by virtue of the mistaken order. Wade in his Administrative Law (Fifth Edition, page 226) points out that even where such powers are not (expressly) conferred, statutory tribunals would have power, to correct accidental mistakes, and to review a decision when facts subsequently discovered have revealed a miscarriage of justice. The same rules must apply to non-statutory action by administrative authorities as well. 8. The Supreme Court was concerned with a similar matter in State of Punjab v. Jagdip Singh, AIR 1964 SC 521. The respondents in that case, who were officiating Tahsildars in the State of Pepsu were confirmed in the posts with immediate effect by an order of the Financial Commissioner dated October 23,1956. No posts were however, available at that time, in which they could be confirmed. The matter was reconsidered by the State of Punjab on October 31,1957, after the State of Pepsu merged in it on November 1, 1956, and a notification “deconfirming the respondents was issued. Respondents successfully challenged the “deconfirmation in the High Court, inter alia as a reduction in rank which could not be effected without complying with the requirements of Art.311(2) of the Constitution. On appeal by the State, the Supreme Court ruled that the order of confirmation passed by the Financial Commissioner on October 23,1956 had no legal foundation, and W.A.244/14 - : 17 :- was wholly void, as there were “no vacancies in which the confirmations could take place”. The court then posed the following questions as arising for consideration, (vide para.8). “Now, where the Government itself realises that an order made by an authority under the Government is void, is it powerless to do anything in the matter? Is it bound to give effect to a void order and treat as confirmed Tahsildars persons who have no legal right to be treated as confirmed Tahsildars? Is it not open to the Government to treat the confirmation as void and notify the persons affected and the public in general of the feet of its having done so by issuing a notification of the kind it made on October 31,1957?” The questions were answered in the affirmative with the following observations: “In our opinion where a Government servant has no right to a post or to a particular status, though an authority under the Government acting beyond its competence had purported to give that person a status which it was not entitled to give he will not in law be deemed to have been validly appointed to the post or given the particular status. No doubt, the Government has used the expression “de- confirming” in its notification which may be susceptible of the meaning that it purported to undo an act which was therefore valid. We must, however, interpret the expression in the light of actual facts which led up to the notification. Those facts, clearly show that the so called confirmation by the Financial Commissioner of Pepsu was no confirmation at all and was thus invalid. In view of this, the notification of October 31,1957 could be interpreted to mean that the Government did not accept the validity of the confirmation of the respondents and other persons who were confirmed as Tahsildars by the Financial Commissioner, Pepsu.” The court thus upheld the power of Government to undo the mischief of an earlier . mistaken order, which was otherwise void, conferring an undue and unmerited benefit on some of the employees. 9. Similar is the ratio in K.B. Sharma v. Transport Commissioner, AIR 1968 A11.276. The learned Single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad was dealing with a case where a junior officiating Head Clerk was mistakenly confirmed in that post while senior officiating Head Clerks remained to be confirmed. These latter, though confirmed subsequently were treated as senior in the seniority list. The question was if they could be treated as senior, despite their confirmation being subsequent. It was the State’s case that the earlier confirmation of the junior was by mistake. The court upheld the Government’s power to correct the mistake, observing “an order of confirmation if passed under some mistake can certainly be revised with a view to correct the mistake, such an order being an administrative order.” 10. In passing the order Ext. P3, what the first respondent W.A.244/14 - : 18 :- has done is only to rectify a patent error on their part, in overlooking the terms of the petitioners’ appointment and the rights of the senior employees working in the lower categories. An employer is not entitled to act arbitrarily, or to confer an undue and unfair advantage on some employees to the detriment of their seniors, without any reason whatsoever. In fact, the confirmation of the petitioners as Statistical Assistants was unreasonable, and plainly violative of the fundamental rights of the seniors in service, guaranteed under Art.14 and 16 of the Constitution. The respondents had acted by mistake, and affected the rights of other senior employees without reason, and without hearing them. The respondents were therefore, entitled, and indeed were bound, to undo the mischief caused by their mistaken action. That is what they did by Ext.P3. Petitioners cannot take advantage of the mistake and contend that the mistake should be perpetuated to the prejudice of the affected seniors.' The Apex Court in the case R.R.Verma & Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in (1980) 3 SCC 402, has considered the issue and has held that the principle that the power to review must be conferred by the statute either specifically or by necessary implication is applicable only where the authority exercises quasi-judicial powers vested in it by statute and not purely administrative decisions and that the public authority must be free to alter its decision or policy in administrative matters and cannot be hidebound by the rules and restrictions of judicial procedure, though of course they are bound to obey all statutory requirements and observe the principles of natural justice where the rights of the parties may be affected, etc. In R.R.Verma's case supra, Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer, speaking on W.A.244/14 - : 19 :- behalf of a Bench consisting of His Lordship and Justice O.Chinnappa Reddy, has held in para 5 thereof as follows: “5. The last point raised by Shri Garg was that the Central Government had no power to review its earlier orders as the rules do not vest the government with any such power. Shri Garg relied on certain decisions of this Court in support of his submission: Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji [(1971) 3 SCC 844]; D.N. Roy v. State of Bihar [(1970) 3 SCC 119] and State of Assam v. J.N. Roy Biswas [(1976) 1 SCC 234] All the cases cited by Shri Garg are cases where the government was exercising quasi-judicial power vested in them by statute. We do not think that the principle that the power to review must be conferred by statute either specifically or by necessary implication is applicable to decisions purely of an administrative nature. To extend the principle to pure administrative decisions would indeed lead to untoward and startling results. Surely, any government must be free to alter its policy or its decision in administrative matters. If they are to carry on their daily administration they cannot be hidebound by the rules and restrictions of judicial procedure though of course they are bound to obey all statutory requirements and also observe the principles of natural justice where rights of parties may be affected. Here again, we emphasise that if administrative decisions are reviewed, the decisions taken after review are subject to judicial review on all grounds on which an administrative decision may be questioned in a court. We see no force in this submission of the learned Counsel. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.” (emphasis supplied) It is also to be noted that the learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the Division Bench decisions of this Court in Guruvayoor Prathikarana Vedi v. Secretary to Government reported in 2005 (1) KLT 19, para 10, and that of the Apex Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi and Ors. v. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji reported in 1971 (3) SCC 844 and M/s.Mehar Singh Nanak Chand v. Shri Naunihal W.A.244/14 - : 20 :- Thakar Das and Ors. reported in (1973) 3 SCC 731, to contend that the power to review can be exercised only if such power has been explicitly conferred on the authority. It is to be noted that the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Guruvayoor Prathikarana Vedi's case supra was dealing with the issue arising out of the power of review exercised in relation to disciplinary proceedings, which are quasi-judicial in nature and are regulated by rules and regulations prescribing specific remedies in the case of imposition of punishment. The Apex Court in the case Patel Narshi Thakershi's case supra was dealing with the quasi-judicial proceedings that emanated from the Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, wherein the State Government had taken considered decision as per the specific power conferred under the provisions of the Act and thereafter, the delegate of the Government while exercising the power of the Government, reviewed the said decision taken under the statute by the Government. The Apex Court in M/s.Mehar Singh Nanak Chand's case supra was also dealing with the power of review purportedly exercised by the statutory competent officer conferred with quasi-judicial powers as per the Evacuee Interest (Separation) W.A.244/14 - : 21 :- Act, 1951, considered therein. These rulings have no applicability in the facts of this case as the same were concerning power of review purportedly exercised in quasi-judicial proceedings regulated by the specific provisions. Whereas the Apex Court in R.R.Verma's case supra has clearly held that the principle that power to review conferred by the statute either explicitly or by necessary implication is applicable only where the authority exercises quasi-judicial powers vested in it by statute and not purely administrative decisions. Whereas the instant case involves only the impugned administrative decision on issues merely relating to seniority and promotion. 14. It can be seen from the decision of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Jagdip Singh, reported in AIR 1964 SC 521, quoted in V.V.Prakasini's case supra and Sasidharan's case supra that the Apex Court has held that where an employee has no right to a post or to a particular status, though an authority acting beyond its competence had purported to give that person a status to which that person was not entitled to give, he will not in law be deemed to have been validly appointed to the post or given the W.A.244/14 - : 22 :- particular status, etc. The aforementioned decisions of the official respondents in this case, as in Exts.P-8 and P-17 are purely administrative orders on the issues of seniority and promotion etc. and are not quasi-judicial proceedings. Therefore, the legal principles laid down by this Court in V.V.Prakashini's case supra and Sasidharan's case supra and by the Apex Court in Jagdip Singh's case supra and R.R.Verma's case supra, will be squarely applicable in the facts of this case. Hence, the error and mistake that occurred in the issuance of Ext.P-8 reversion order, which led to the reversion of the 4th respondent and the promotion of the appellant in that post, etc. could be corrected by the respondent authority concerned. We fully approve the above stated legal principles laid down by the learned Single Judge (T.L.Viswanatha Iyer, J.) of this Court in paragraph 18 of the V.V.Prakashini's case supra and in paragraphs 7 to 10 of Sasidharan's case supra. Therefore, the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment was fully right in concluding in para 18 of the impugned judgment that the respondent authority in the instant case was well within its powers to undo the wrong and mistake committed by them in earlier issuing the order of reversion of the 4th respondent as per Ext.P-8 W.A.244/14 - : 23 :- and the thus correcting the mistake in ordering the wrongful promotion granted to the appellant. Thus it can be seen that the impugned Ext.P-17 interfering with Ext.P-8 and upholding the promotion granted to the 4th respondent does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity, as it has been done only to undo the mistake and wrong committed in the issuance of Ext.P-8. 15. The appellant has a contention that she had completed her period of probation in the category of L.P. Teacher as per Ext.P-4 order dated 9.2.1998 is w.e.f 9.4.1997 and that her notional assignment of completion of probation with effect from 9.4.1997 is before the date of occurrence of the vacancy of H.S.A. (Hindi) on 24.10.1997 and that hence the promotion granted to the 4th respondent on 25.11.1997 is illegal, etc. The 4th respondent has a case that the provisions of the Kerala Education Rules would be applicable to the school in view of Ext.R-4(a) proceedings and she has accordingly, pressed into service the provisions in Rule 37 of Chapter XIV-A of the KER. The learned counsel for the 4th respondent would also contend that the respondent-school is affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) as one W.A.244/14 - : 24 :- of its recognized school and that the school is bound by the mandate of the CBSE Regulations and Rules, that the school shall be governed by the corresponding State rules regulating educational institutions. Accordingly it is contended that the school is regulated by the provisions of the Kerala Education Rules (KER), from the inception of its affiliation to the CBSE. On this basis also, it is contended that on the basis of Rule 37 of Chapter XIV-A KER, the 4th respondent had a superior claim in the matter of seniority and promotion at the time of occurrence of the vacancy of H.S.A. (Hindi) on 24.10.1997. We are of the view that it is not necessary to adjudicate on these rival pleas of the appellant and the 4th respondent on these issues, in view of our considered opinion that the promotion granted to the 4th respondent on 25.11.1997 could not have been lawfully disturbed by the issuance of Ext.P-8 order dated 5.6.2006, which is nine long years after the said promotion. This Court in Ext.P-11 judgment has held that the above said order of reversion inflicted on the 4th respondent after nine long years is arbitrary. Though it is observed in Ext.P-11 judgment that Writ Petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable, the said judgment as per Ext.P-11 does not in any way preclude the W.A.244/14 - : 25 :- respondent Devaswom authorities from correcting mistake in the issuance of Ext.P-8 order of reversion. We have already held that the 4th respondent is entitled for the benefit of “sit back theory” as far as the issuance of Ext.P-8 order is concerned and that the respondent authorities have the power to correct the said mistake through the issuance of impugned Ext.P-17. Moreover, the learned Single Judge in the judgment impugned herein has clearly held in paragraph 9 thereof that as the respondent school is a CBSC school and it is owned and managed by the Guruvayur Devaswom, which is a statutory authority and that hence respondents 1 to 3 herein are amenable to writ jurisdiction and that Writ Petition is maintainable. We are in full agreement with the said views rendered by the learned Single Judge in the judgment impugned herein on that aspect of the matter. 16. More crucially it is to be noted that the 4th respondent was promoted as Higher Secondary School Teacher (HSST) on 1.6.2000 and was sanctioned higher grade on completion of eight years of service as HSST with effect from 1.7.2008 and she was holding charge of the post of Principal with effect from 29.12.2012. W.A.244/14 - : 26 :- The appellant has never challenged the appointment of the 4th respondent as HSST at any point of time. Even in the instant Writ Petition there is no whisper of a challenge against the appointment of the 4th respondent as HSST or her further appointment to the higher grade in the post of HSST or in the order putting her in charge in the post of Principal. It is further pointed out that the 4th respondent has thereafter been provisionally promoted as Principal of the School. It is to be noted that the method of appointment from the post of H.S.A to the post of HSST is by the method of appointment by transfer. Hence in the absence of any challenge within time in regard to the appointment of the 4th respondent to the post of HSST, even if the prayers in in the Writ Petition were to be granted to the appellant, she could not have sought any appointment to the post of HSST held by the 4th respondent. We have no hesitation to hold that the 4th respondent is entitled to the benefit of the “doctrine of sit back” to repel any claim of the appellant to the post of HSST and its higher posts held by the 4th respondent. It is to be noted that the Full Bench of this Court in the case, M.P.Raghavan Nair v. State Insurance Officer and others reported in 1971 KLT 583, has held that seniority in the lower W.A.244/14 - : 27 :- category is by no means the same as promotion to the higher category the moment a vacancy occurs in the latter, even if it be that promotion is governed by the pre-determined fact of seniority and that there would still have to be the conferment of the promotion by the appointing authority and that the promotion would no more follow automatically from a declaration of seniority than would possession from the hands of trespasser follow automatically from a decree merely declaring title. The higher appointment of the 4th respondent as HSST and the higher grade promotion secured in that post and further provisional promotion granted to her to the post of Principal of the Higher Secondary School, etc. cannot be disturbed at the instance of the appellant, as the same has remained unchallenged for the last more than 14½ long years. Undoubtedly the appellant is also barred and estopped by long delay, laches and acquiescence, in even attempting to make any challenge against the continuance of the 4th respondent in these higher posts. For these reasons, we hold that the learned Single Judge was right and justified in dismissing the Writ Petition (Civil) as per the W.A.244/14 - : 28 :- impugned judgment. The Writ Appeal lacks merits and is accordingly, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Sd/- ANTONY DOMINIC, JUDGE Sd/- sdk+ ALEXANDER THOMAS, JUDGE ///True copy/// P.S. to Judge "