VK;DJ VIHYH; VF/KDJ.K] T;IQJ U;K;IHB] T;IQJ IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, JAIPUR BENCH A , JAIPUR JH FOT; IKY JKO] U;KF;D LNL; ,OA JH FOE FLAG ;KNO] YS[KK LNL; DS LE{K BEFORE : SHRI VIJAY PAL RAO, JM & SHRI VIKRAM SINGH YADAV, AM MISC. APPLICATION NO. 41/JP/2019 (ARISING OUT OF VK;DJ VIHY LA-@ ITA NO. 407/JP/2017) FU/KZKJ.K O'K Z@ ASSESSMENT YEAR : 2009-10 SHRI BHAWANI SINGH S/O SHRI NAR SINGH VILLAGE: THADA, P.O. KHIJURIWAS, TEHSIL: TIJARA, ALWAR CUKE VS. THE ITO WARD - BHIWADI ALWAR LFKK;H YS[KK LA-@THVKBZVKJ LA-@ PAN/GIR NO .: CQVPS 2509 H VIHYKFKHZ@ APPELLANT IZR;FKHZ@ RESPONDENT FU/KZKFJRH DH VKSJ LS@ ASSESSEE BY : SHRI, KRANTI MEHTA,CA JKTLO DH VKSJ LS@ REVENUE BY: MS.CHANCHAL MEENA, JCIT-DR LQUOKBZ DH RKJH[K@ DATE OF HEARING : 20/12/2019 ?KKS'K .KK DH RKJH[K@ DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 30/12/2019 VKNS'K@ ORDER PER VIJAY PAL RAO, JM BY WAY OF THIS MISC. APPLICATION, THE ASSESSEE IS SEEKING RECALLING OF THE ORDER OF THIS TRIBUNAL DATED 13-09-2018 WHER EBY THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE WAS DECIDED EX-PARTE. THE MISC. APPLICATIO N OF THE ASSESSEE IS BELATED BY 50 DAYS. THEREFORE, THE QUESTION OF MAIN TAINABILITY OF MISC. APPLICATION OF THE ASSESSEE ARISES. 2.1 THE LD.AR OF THE ASSESSEE SUBMITTED THAT SINCE THE ASSESSEE IS RESIDING IN A REMOTE VILLAGE WHERE THE POSTAL SERV ICES IS VERY POOR, MA NO.41/JP/2019 SHRI BHAWANI SINGH VS ITO, WARD- BHIWADI, ALWAR 2 THEREFORE, THE ASSESSEE HAS GIVEN THE ADDRESS OF HI S AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE/CA IN FORM NO. 36 FOR THE PURPOSE OF NOTICE. THE LD.AR OF THE ASSESSEE FURTHER CONTENDED THAT SINCE THERE IS A CHANGE OF THE AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ASSESSEE AND THE N OTICE ISSUED BY THE TRIBUNAL AS WELL AS THE ORDER SENT BY THE TRIBUNAL TO THE EARLIER AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ASSESSEE WAS NOT RECEIVED BY THE ASSESSEE, THEREFORE, THERE IS A DELAY IN FILING THE PRESENT MISC. APPLIC ATION. THE LD.AR OF THE ASSESSEE SUBMITTED THAT THE ASSESSEE CAME TO KNOW A BOUT THE IMPUGNED ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL ONLY WHEN THE AO HAS RAISED T HE DEMAND. THUS THE LD.AR OF THE ASSESSEE SUBMITTED THAT DUE TO UNAVOID ABLE REASONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ASSESSEE COULD NOT FILE THE PRES ENT MISC. APPLICATION WITHIN A PERIOD OF LIMITATION PRESCRIBED U/S 254(2) OF THE ACT. THE LD.AR OF THE ASSESSEE THUS PLEADED THAT THE LIMITATION SH OULD BE COUNTED FROM THE DATE I.E. W.E.F. 10-04-2019 WHEN THE ASSESSEE R ECEIVED THE IMPUGNED ORDER FROM HIS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE. THE LD.AR OF THE ASSESSEE FURTHER PLEADED THAT THE DELAY IN FILING THE MISC. APPLICATION MAY BE CONDONED. 2.2 ON THE OTHER HAND, THE LD. DR HAS SUBMITTED THA T SINCE THE MISC. APPLICATION IS BARRED BY LIMITATION, THEREFORE, THE SAME IS NOT MAINTAINABLE AND LIABLE TO BE DISMISSED. MA NO.41/JP/2019 SHRI BHAWANI SINGH VS ITO, WARD- BHIWADI, ALWAR 3 2.3 WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE RIVAL SUBMISSIONS AS WEL L AS THE RELEVANT MATERIALS AVAILABLE ON RECORD. THE APPEAL OF THE AS SESSEE WAS DECIDED EX- PARTE VIDE ORDER DATED 13-09-2018 THOUGH ON THE MER ITS AFTER CONSIDERING THE WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS OF THE ASSESSEE. THE TRIBUN AL HAS GIVEN THE FACTS AS EMERGING FROM THE RECORD THAT DESPITE TAKING ADJ OURNMENTS OF HEARING FOR 7/8 OCCASIONS, THE ASSESSEE FINALLY STOPPED APP EARING IN THIS APPEAL. THESE FACTS ARE NARRATED IN PARA 2 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER AS UNDER:- 2. NONE HAS APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEE WHEN THIS APPEAL IS CALLED FOR HEARING. IT TRANSPIR ES FROM THE RECORD THAT ON LAST 7-8 OCCASIONS WHEN THIS APPEAL WAS LISTED FOR HEARING, THE ASSESSEE TOOK ADJOURNMENTS AND THE REAFTER THE ASSESSEE STOPPED APPEARING IN THIS APPEAL. AS N ONE HAD APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEE ON 11-07-2018, THE TRIBUNAL DIRECTED TO ISSUE FRESH NOTICE TO THE ASSE SSEE FOR HEARING ON 10-09-2018 I.E. TODAY. THE NOTICE ISSUED THROUGH RPAD HAS BEEN RECEIVED BACK UNSERVED WITH THE POSTA L REMARKS THAT THE RECIPIENT IS NOT AVAILABLE AT THE GIVEN ADDRESS. ACCORDINGLY, IN THESE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTAN CES OF THE CASE, WE PROPOSE TO HEAR AND DISPOSE OF THIS APPEAL EX-PARTE. THUS DESPITE EFFORTS MADE BY THE TRIBUNAL FOR APPEA RANCE OF THE ASSESSEE, THE ASSESSEE DID NOT BOTHER TO PROSECUTE HIS APPEAL AND CONSEQUENTLY THE SAME WAS DECIDED EX-PARTE AFTER CONSIDERING THE WRI TTEN SUBMISSIONS AVAILABLE ON RECORD. NOW THE ASSESSEE IN THE MISC. APPLICATION HAS TAKEN THE GROUND THAT DUE TO CHANGE OF AUTHORIZED REPRESE NTATIVE, THE ASSESSEE WAS NOT AWARE OF THE STATUS OF THE APPEAL AND ALSO NOT RECEIVED THE MA NO.41/JP/2019 SHRI BHAWANI SINGH VS ITO, WARD- BHIWADI, ALWAR 4 IMPUGNED ORDER. IT IS PERTINENT TO NOTE THAT ONCE T HE ASSESSEE HAS FILED THE APPEAL AND TOOK SEVERAL ADJOURNMENTS OF HEARING THE N THE ASSESSEE WAS SUPPOSED TO KNOW THE STATUS OF THE APPEAL. EVEN THE ASSESSEE DID NOT APPEAR ON THE DATE OF HEARING, THE ASSESSEE WAS REQ UIRED TO KNOW THE SUBSEQUENT DATE OF HEARING, IF ANY, OR THE PROCEEDI NGS, IF ANY, TAKEN PLACE ON SUCH DATE. THE ASSESSEE HIMSELF HAS GIVEN THE AD DRESS OF HIS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVICE OF NOTICE AND OTHER CORRESPONDENCE AND THEREFORE, IF THERE IS A CHANGE OF AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE IT WAS THE DUTY OF THE ASSESSEE OR H IS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE ALSO TO CHANGE THE ADDRESS FOR NOTIC E/ CORRESPONDENCE BY FILING AN AMENDED FORM NO. 36. NO SUCH STEPS WERE T AKEN BY THE ASSESSEE OR HIS AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE DESPITE TAKING SEV ERAL ADJOURNMENTS OF HEARING OF THE APPEAL. THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 13-09-2018 WAS DULY SENT TO THE ASSESSEE ON 28-09-2 018 THROUGH REGD. POST. WE HAVE ALSO VERIFIED THE DISPATCH REGISTER A S WELL AS POSTAL RECEIPT AND FOUND THAT THE ORDER WAS SENT TO THE ASSESSEE A T THE ADDRESS GIVEN IN FORM NO. 36. THEREFORE, ONCE THE ORDER WAS SENT TO THE ASSESSEE AT THE GIVEN ADDRESS THEN IT IS A PROPER SERVICE OF NOTICE . IT WAS FOR THE ASSESSEE TO KEEP THE TRACK OF HIS CASE AND TO RECEIVE THE OR DER OF THE TRIBUNAL IN TIME. THE IGNORANCE OF THE ASSESSEE AS WELL AS NEGL IGENCE ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE TO KEEP THE TRACK OF HIS CASE CANNOT B E AN EXCUSE FOR FILING MA NO.41/JP/2019 SHRI BHAWANI SINGH VS ITO, WARD- BHIWADI, ALWAR 5 THE MISC. APPLICATION AFTER THE PERIOD OF LIMITATIO N. SECTION 254 (2) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 PROVIDES THE LIMITATION FOR FI LING OF THE MISC. APPLICATION AS UNDER:- (2) THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MAY, AT ANY TIME WITHI N [SIX MONTHS FROM THE END OF THE MONTH IN WHICH THE ORDER WAS PASSED], WITH A VIEW TO RECTIFYING ANY MISTAKE APPARENT FROM THE RECORD, AMEND ANY ORDER PASSED BY IT UNDER SUB-SECTION (1), AND SHALL MAKE SUCH AMENDMENT IF THE MISTAKE IS BROUGHT TO ITS NOTICE B Y THE ASSESSEE OR THE [ASSESSING] OFFICER : THEREFORE, THE RECTIFICATION OF MISTAKE IN THE ORD ER OR AMENDMENT, IF ANY, IN THE ORDER CAN BE CARRIED OUT ONLY WHEN SUCH MIST AKE IS BROUGHT TO THE NOTICE OF THE TRIBUNAL WITHIN A PERIOD OF SIX MONTH S FROM THE END OF THE MONTH IN WHICH THE ORDER WAS PASSED. THEREFORE, SUF FICIENT PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS IS GRANTED TO THE PARTY FOR BRINGING ANY MIS TAKE IN THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL FOR RECTIFICATION. SINCE THE LIMITATION IS PROVIDED IN THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 ITSELF, THEREFORE, THE PROVISIONS OF GENERAL STATUTE BEING THE LIMITATION ACT WOULD NOT APPLY FOR THIS PURPOSE . SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT PROVIDES THE LIMITATION BUT THERE IS NO PROVISI ON FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING THE MISC. APPLICATION. WHEN THE LIM ITATION IS PROVIDED IN THE SPECIAL STATUTE AND NO PROVISION IS MADE FOR CO NDONATION OF DELAY THEN THE TRIBUNAL HAS NO POWER TO CONDONE THE DELAY IN FILING THE MISC. APPLICATION. IT IS PERTINENT TO NOTE THAT THIS TRI BUNAL HAS TAKEN A CONSISTENT VIEW IN A SERIES OF DECISION ON THE POIN T OF CONDONATION OF DELAY. IN THE CASE OF SHRI VINOD KUMAR VS ITO IN M. A. NO. 12/JP/18 MA NO.41/JP/2019 SHRI BHAWANI SINGH VS ITO, WARD- BHIWADI, ALWAR 6 (ARISING OUT OF ITA NO.454/JP/2015) FOR THE ASSESSM ENT YEAR 2010-11 VIDE ORDER DATED 6-2-2018, THIS TRIBUNAL HAS CONSID ERED THIS VIEW IN PARA 4 AS UNDER:- 4. HAVING CONSIDERED THE RIVAL SUBMISSIONS AS WELL AS RELEVANT MATERIAL ON RECORD WE NOTE THAT THE CERTIFI ED COPY OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER WAS ISSUED AND SEND TO THE ASSESSEE O N 21.04.2017. WE FURTHER NOTE THAT THE ASSESSEE PROVI DED ADDRESS FOR COMMUNICATION IN THE FORM NO. 36 AS THE ADDRESS OF THE COUNSEL WHO WAS AUTHORIZED AND REPRESENTING THE ASSES SEE IN THE APPEAL. THE ASSESSEE NOW COME UP WITH THE PLEA THAT TH E ASSESSEE HAS TAKEN THE CERTIFIED COPY ONLY ON 08.09 .2017 WHICH IS ONLY ANOTHER COPY OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER PROVIDED TO THE ASSESSEE ON HIS REQUEST. HOWEVER, ONCE THE ORDER WAS DULY SEND TO THE ASSESSEE AT THE GIVEN ADDRESS THEN, THIS PLE A OF THE ASSESSEE CANNOT BE ACCEPTED. UNDISPUTEDLY THE PRESE NT MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION HAS BEEN FILED BY THE ASS ESSEE BEYOND THE PERIOD OF 6 MONTHS FROM THE END OF THE MONTH IN WHICH THE IMPUGNED ORDER WAS PASSED. THUS, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROVISION U/S 254(2) OR ANY OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE INCOME TAX ACT TO CONDONE THE DELAY IN FILING THE MISCELLANEOU S APPLICATION WE DO NOT FIND ANY SUBSTANCE IN THE PLEA OF THE ASSE SSEE TO CONDONE THE DELY. THE COORDINATE BENCH OF THIS TRIBUN AL HAS CONSIDERED AN IDENTICAL ISSUE OF MAINTAINABILITY OF THE MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION FILED BEYOND THE PERIOD O F LIMITATION IN CASE OF ITO VS. SHRI RAM RATAN MODI IN MA NO. 93/JP/ 2017 VIDE ORDER DATED 27.12.2017 AS HAS IN PARA 3 AS UNDER:- 3. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE RIVAL SUBMISSIONS AS WELL AS RELEVANT MATERIAL ON RECORD. WE NOTE THAT THE PRESE NT MISCELLANEOUS PETITION WAS FILED BY THE REVENUE FOR RECALLING OF THE ORDER DATED 18.12.2015 AND THEREFORE, AS PER UN -AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT, THE LIMITA TION PERIOD PROVIDED FOR RECTIFICATION OF THE MISTAKE WAS 4 YEAR S FROM THE DATE OF ORDER. HOWEVER, THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 25 4(2) HAS BEEN AMENDED BY THE FINANCE ACT, 2016 W.E.F. 01.06.2 016 PROVIDING THE LIMITATION PERIOD FOR RECTIFICATION O F MISTAKE AS 6 MA NO.41/JP/2019 SHRI BHAWANI SINGH VS ITO, WARD- BHIWADI, ALWAR 7 MONTHS FROM THE END OF THE MONTH IN WHICH THE ORDER IS PASSED. FOR READY REFERENCE, WE QUOTE SECTION 254(2) AS UNDE R:- (2) THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MAY, AT ANY TIME WITHIN 72 [SIX MONTHS FROM THE END OF THE MONTH IN WHICH THE ORDER WAS PASS ED], WITH A VIEW TO RECTIFYING ANY MISTAKE APPARENT FROM THE R ECORD 73 , AMEND ANY ORDER PASSED BY IT UNDER SUB-SECTION (1), AND 73 SHALL MAKE SUCH AMENDMENT 73 IF THE MISTAKE IS BROUGHT TO ITS NOTICE BY THE ASSESSEE OR THE 74 [ASSESSING] OFFICER : PROVIDED THAT AN AMENDMENT WHICH HAS THE EFFECT OF ENHANCING AN ASSESSMENT OR REDUCING A REFUND OR OTHERWISE INCR EASING THE LIABILITY OF THE ASSESSEE, SHALL NOT BE MADE UNDER THIS SUB-SECTION UNLESS THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL HAS GIVEN NOTICE TO TH E ASSESSEE OF ITS INTENTION TO DO SO AND HAS ALLOWED THE ASSESSEE A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY OF BEING HEARD : 75 [ PROVIDED FURTHER THAT ANY APPLICATION FILED BY THE ASSESSEE IN THIS SUB-SECTION ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF OCTOBER , 1998, SHALL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A FEE OF FIFTY RUPEES.] 76 [(2A) IN EVERY APPEAL, THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE, MAY HEAR AND DECIDE SUCH APPEAL WITHIN A P ERIOD OF FOUR YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHI CH SUCH APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) 77 [OR SUB-SECTION (2)] 78 [***] OF SECTION 253 : 79 [ PROVIDED THAT THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MAY, AFTER CONSIDERING THE MERITS OF THE APPLICATION MADE BY THE ASSESSEE, PASS AN ORDER OF STAY IN ANY PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO AN APP EAL FILED UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION 253 , FOR A PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY DAYS FROM THE DATE OF SUCH ORDER AND THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL SHALL DISPOSE OF THE APPEAL WITHIN THE SAID PERIOD OF STAY SPECIFIED IN THAT ORDER: PROVIDED FURTHER THAT WHERE SUCH APPEAL IS NOT SO DISPOSED OF WITHIN THE SAID PERIOD OF STAY AS SPECIFIED IN THE O RDER OF STAY, THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MAY, ON AN APPLICATION MADE I N THIS BEHALF BY THE ASSESSEE AND ON BEING SATISFIED THAT THE DEL AY IN DISPOSING OF THE APPEAL IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ASSESSEE, EXTEND THE PERIOD OF STAY, OR PASS AN ORDER OF STAY FOR A FURT HER PERIOD OR MA NO.41/JP/2019 SHRI BHAWANI SINGH VS ITO, WARD- BHIWADI, ALWAR 8 PERIODS AS IT THINKS FIT; SO, HOWEVER, THAT THE AGGR EGATE OF THE PERIOD ORIGINALLY ALLOWED AND THE PERIOD OR PERIODS SO EXTENDED OR ALLOWED SHALL NOT, IN ANY CASE, EXCEED THREE HUND RED AND SIXTY-FIVE DAYS AND THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL SHALL DIS POSE OF THE APPEAL WITHIN THE PERIOD OR PERIODS OF STAY SO EXTEN DED OR ALLOWED: 80 [ PROVIDED ALSO THAT IF SUCH APPEAL IS NOT SO DISPOSED OF WITHIN THE PERIOD ALLOWED UNDER THE FIRST PROVISO OR THE PE RIOD OR PERIODS EXTENDED OR ALLOWED UNDER THE SECOND PROVISO , WHICH SHALL NOT, IN ANY CASE, EXCEED THREE HUNDRED AND SI XTY-FIVE DAYS, THE ORDER OF STAY SHALL STAND VACATED AFTER THE EXP IRY OF SUCH PERIOD OR PERIODS, EVEN IF THE DELAY IN DISPOSING O F THE APPEAL IS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE ASSESSEE.]] (2B) THE COST OF ANY APPEAL TO THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL SHALL BE AT THE DISCRETION OF THAT TRIBUNAL. THUS, BY VIRTUE THE AMENDMENT IN THE PROVISIONS OF S ECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT W.E.F. 01.06.2016 THE TIME PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE MISTAKE APPARENT FROM RECORD CAN BE RECTIFIED H AS BEEN REDUCED FROM 4 YEARS 6 MONTHS. THERE IS NO QUARREL ON THE POINT THAT THIS AMENDMENT IN SECTION 254(2) CANNOT BE GIV EN EFFECT RETROSPECTIVELY SO AS TO TAKE WAY OF RIGHT OF THE PA RTIES TO FILE THE APPLICATION OF RECTIFICATION. THE HONBLE M.P. HIGH COURT IN CASE OF DISTRICT CENTRAL COOPERATIVE BANK LTD. VS. UNION OF INDIA(SUPRA) HAS OBSERVED IN PARAS 9 AND 10 AS UNDER:- 09- THE AMENDMENT HAS BEEN MADE EFFECTIVE VIRTUAL LY IN CASE OF ASSESSEE WITH RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT THOUGH THE AMENDM ENT DOES NOT SHOW THAT IT IS APPLICABLE WITH RESPECTIVE EFFECT , HOWEVER, THE EXISTING RIGHT HAS BEEN EXTINGUISHED WITH RETROSPEC TIVE EFFECT IN CASE OF THE ASSESSEE. 10- IN THE CONSIDERED OPINION OF THIS COURT, THE LE GISLATURE SHOULD HAVE GRANTED SOME TIME TO THE ASSESSEES WHO COULD H AVE FILED AN APPEAL WITHIN A PERIOD OF FOURS AND THE SOME HAS NOT BEEN DONE TILL THE AMENDMENT CAME INTO FORCE EXTINGUISHI NG THE RIGHT TO FILE AN APPEAL. THEREFORE, THE HONBLE HIGH COURT HAS OBSERVED THAT THE AMENDMENT IN THE SAID PROVISIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE WITH MA NO.41/JP/2019 SHRI BHAWANI SINGH VS ITO, WARD- BHIWADI, ALWAR 9 RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT OTHERWISE IT WOULD EXTINGUISH TH E RIGHT OF THE APPLICANT WITH RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT. HENCE, TO THE E XTENT OF THE APPLICABILITY OF THE AMENDMENT PROSPECTIVELY WE DO A GREE WITH THE LD. DR, HOWEVER SINCE THE AMENDMENT CAME INTO FO RCED W.E.F. 01.06.2016 THEN AFTER THE SUBSTITUTION OF THE PROVI SION W.E.F. 01.06.2016 THE LIMITATION PERIOD FOR RECTIFICATION OF MISTAKE WOULD BE AVAILABLE ONLY UP TO 6 MONTHS FROM THE END OF TH E MONTH IN WHICH THE ORDER WAS PASSED. IN THE CASE IN HAND SINCE THE ORDER WAS PASSED PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT, THEREFORE, THE SA ID PERIOD OF LIMITATION WILL BE AVAILABLE TO THE ASSESSEE FROM TH E DATE OF AMENDMENT I.E. ON 01.06.2016 FOR A PERIOD 6 MONTHS. THUS, THE PRESENT MISCELLANEOUS PETITION FILED BY THE REVENUE ON 22.05.2017 IS BEYOND THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION WHICH HAS EXPIRED ON 30.11.2016. WE MAY CLARIFY THAT IN CASE THE IMPU GNED ORDER IS PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT W.E.F. 01.06.2016 THEN THE LI MITATION PERIOD OF 6 MONTHS WOULD RECKON FROM 01.06.2016 SO THAT THE RIGHT OF THE APPLICANT IS NOT CURTAIL BY THE SUBSEQ UENT AMENDMENT. WE FURTHER, NOTE THAT THE BANGALORE BENC HES OF THIS TRIBUNAL IN CASE OF SMT. PADMA K. BHAT VS. ACIT 166 ITD 172 HAD THE OCCASION TO CONSIDER AN IDENTICAL ISSUE AND ONE OF US THE JUDICIAL MEMBER IS PARTY TO THE SAID ORDER AND HELD IN PARAS 5 TO 8 AS UNDER:- 5. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE ABOVE SUBMISSIONS AND CAREF ULLY PERUSED THE RELEVANT RECORD. THE ASSESSEE HAS FILED THIS MISCELLANEOUS PETITION ON 10.03.2017 FOR RECALLING OF ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL DATED 04.01.2016. THE PROVISION OF RECTIFICA TION OF MISTAKE APPARENT FROM RECORD IS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 254( 2) AS UNDER: '254. (1) THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MAY, AFTER GIVING B OTH THE PARTIES TO THE APPEAL AN OPPORTUNITY OF BEING HEARD, PASS S UCH ORDERS THEREON AS IT THINKS FIT 46. (1A) 48[***] (2) THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MAY, AT ANY TIME WITHIN FOU R YEARS FROM THE DATE OF THE ORDER, WITH A VIEW TO RECTIFYING ANY MISTAKE APPARENT FROM THE RECORD, AMEND ANY ORDER PASSED BY IT UNDER SUB- MA NO.41/JP/2019 SHRI BHAWANI SINGH VS ITO, WARD- BHIWADI, ALWAR 10 SECTION (1), AND SHALL MAKE SUCH AMENDMENT IF THE M ISTAKE IS BROUGHT TO ITS NOTICE BY THE ASSESSEE OR THE [ASSES SING] OFFICER: PROVIDED THAT AN AMENDMENT WHICH HAS THE EFFECT OF ENHANCING AN ASSESSMENT OR REDUCING A REFUND OR OTHERWISE INCREAS ING THE LIABILITY OF THE ASSESSEE, SHALL NOT BE MADE UNDER THIS SUB-S ECTION UNLESS THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL HAS GIVEN NOTICE TO THE ASSESSEE OF ITS INTENTION TO DO SO AND HAS ALLOWED THE ASSESSEE A REASONABLE O PPORTUNITY OF BEING HEARD: [ PROVIDED FURTHER THAT ANY APPLICATION FILED BY THE ASSESSEE IN THIS SUB-SECTION ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF OCTOBER, 199 8, SHALL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A FEE OF FIFTY RUPEES.]' 6. THE TIME PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE MISTAKE APPARENT FR OM RECORD CAN BE RECTIFIED HAS BEEN REDUCED FROM 4 YEARS TO 6 MONTHS BY THE AMENDMENT VIDE FINANCE ACT, 2016 W.E.F. 01.06.2016. THUS AFTER THE SUBSTITUTION OF THIS PROVISION W.E.F. 01.06.2016 , THE LIMITATION PERIOD FOR RECTIFICATION OF MISTAKE APPARENT FROM R ECORD IS PROVIDED ONLY FOR 6 MONTHS FROM THE END OF THE MONTH IN WHIC H THE ORDER WAS PASSED. IN THE CASE IN HAND, THE IMPUGNED ORDER WAS PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL ON 04.01.2016 AND AFTER THE AMENDMEN T IN SECTION 254(4) W.E.F. 01.06.2016, THESE MISCELLANEOUS PETITI ON WAS REQUIRED TO BE FILED BEFORE 31.07.2016. PRIOR TO THE AMENDME NT, THE LIMITATION WAS PROVIDED AS 4 YEARS FOR RECTIFICATION OF MISTAKE APPARENT FROM RECORD AND THEREFORE THERE WAS NO PROV ISION IN THE INCOME-TAX ACT FOR CONDONATION OF ANY DELAY OF ANY PETITION FOR RECTIFICATION OF MISTAKE FILED AFTER THE SAID PERIO D OF 4 YEARS. EVEN OTHERWISE, THE LIMITATION OF 4 YEARS WAS MORE THAN TH E LIMITATION FOR FILING OF THE SUIT AND AS PER THE GENERAL STATUTE I .E., THE LIMITATION ACT WHERE THE LIMITATION FOR INSTITUTION OF SUIT IS PROVIDED AS 3 YEARS ONWARDS FROM THE DATE OF CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE AND T HEREFORE THERE WAS NO PROVISION EVEN IN THE LIMITATION ACT FOR COND ONATION OF DELAY IN RESPECT OF DELAY IN FILING THE SUIT. SINCE THE L IMITATION FOR RECTIFICATION OF MISTAKE IS PROVIDED IN THE INCOME- TAX ACT ITSELF, THEREFORE THE PROVISIONS OF LIMITATION ACT ARE NOT APPLICABLE SO FAR AS THE LIMITATION PROVIDED IN THE INCOME-TAX ACT. TH IS PRINCIPLE IS WELL SETTLED THAT WHEN THERE IS A PROVISION IN SPECIA L STATUTE, THEN MA NO.41/JP/2019 SHRI BHAWANI SINGH VS ITO, WARD- BHIWADI, ALWAR 11 THE GENERAL STATUTE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE EXTENT OF THE PROVISION PROVIDED IN THE SPECIAL STATUTE. WE FIND THAT PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT THE LIMITATION FOR RECTIFICATION OF MISTAKE WAS 4 YE ARS AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 254(2) AND THEREFORE THERE WAS NO QUES TION OF PROVIDING ANY PROVISION OR POWER TO THE INCOME TAX AP PELLATE TRIBUNAL TO CONDONE THE DELAY AFTER THE EXPIRY OF SU CH 4 YEARS OF LIMITATION. HOWEVER, IN THE AMENDED PROVISIONS OF TH E ACT UNDER SECTION 254(2), THE LIMITATION FOR RECTIFICATION OF MISTAKE APPARENT FROM THE RECORD HAS BEEN DRASTICALLY REDUCED FROM 4 YEARS TO 6 MONTHS AND IN CASE OF A DELAY IN APPLYING FOR RECTI FICATION OF MISTAKE APPARENT FROM RECORD, THE PARTY WHO IS AGGRIEVED BY THE ORDER OF THIS TRIBUNAL SUFFERING FROM MISTAKE WILL BE SUBJECT ED TO A GREAT HARDSHIP AND DEPRIVATION OF VALUABLE RIGHT OF PURSU ING THE APPEAL BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL. BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROVI SION GIVING POWER OR JURISDICTION TO THIS TRIBUNAL TO CONDONE THE DELAY IN FILING THE PETITION FOR RECTIFICATION OF THE MISTAKE APPAR ENT FROM THE RECORD, THE TRIBUNAL HAS NO OPTION BUT TO PROCEED ST RICTLY AS PER THE PROVISIONS AS PROVIDED IN THE STATUTE. 7. WE HAVE NO DOUBT IN OUR MIND THAT THERE IS AN APPA RENT MISTAKE IN THE ORDER DATED 04.01.2016 AS THE TRIBUNAL HAS NO T DECIDED THE APPEALS OF THE ASSESSEE ON MERIT BUT DISMISSED THE SAME IN LIMINE FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION. HOWEVER, THE QUESTION OF REC TIFICATION OF MISTAKE CANNOT BE ENTERTAINED UNTIL AND UNLESS THE MISCELLANEOUS PETITION FILED BY THE ASSESSEE IS FOUND TO BE MAINT AINABLE. THE MISCELLANEOUS PETITION FILED BY THE ASSESSEE IS BEY OND THE PERIOD OF 6 MONTHS FROM 04.01.2016 AND THEREFORE THE SAME IS BARRED BY LIMITATION. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROVISION TO COND ONE THE DELAY UNDER THE INCOME-TAX ACT, IT MAY BE A CASE OF OMISS ION IN THE PROVISION OF ACT WHICH CANNOT BE SUPPLIED BY US WHEN THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY IN THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 254(2) OF TH E ACT. THE HON'BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF BHARAT PETROLEUM C ORPN. LTD. V. ITAT [2013] 359 ITR 371/[2014] 42 TAXMANN.COM 25 , WHILE DEALING WITH AN IDENTICAL ISSUE HAS HELD IN PARAS 16 TO 18 AS UNDER: '16. IT WAS NEXT CONTENDED ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER TH AT THE POWER OF THE TRIBUNAL UNDER SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT IS O NLY TO RECTIFY MA NO.41/JP/2019 SHRI BHAWANI SINGH VS ITO, WARD- BHIWADI, ALWAR 12 AN ERROR APPARENT FROM THE RECORD. IT DOES NOT EMPO WER THE TRIBUNAL TO RECALL ITS EARLIER ORDER DATED DECEMBER 6, 2007, FOR WHICH THE MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION WAS FILED ON AUGU ST 6, 2012. IT WAS SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER THAT TH E APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 254(1) OF THE ACT WOULD BE THE ONLY PR OVISION UNDER WHICH AN APPLICATION COULD BE MADE FOR RECALL OF AN ORDER, AS UNDER SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT ONLY THE ORDER CAN BE RECTIFIED BUT CANNOT BE RECALLED. WE FIND THAT THERE IS AN ERROR APPARENT ON RECORD AND THE MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION IS TO CORR ECT TH E ERROR APPARENT FROM THE RECORD. THE CONSEQUENCE OF SUCH RE CTIFICATION APPLICATION BEING ALLOWED MAY LEAD TO A FRESH HEARIN G IN THE MATTER AFTER HAVING RECALLED THE ORIGINAL ORDER. HO WEVER, THE RECALL, IF ANY, IS ONLY AS A CONSEQUENCE OF RECTIFY ING THE OR IGINAL ORDER. IT IS PERTINENT TO NOTE THAT SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE RECALL OF AN ORDER. IN FACT THE PO WER/JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL TO RECALL AN ORDER ON RECTIFICATION APPLICATION MADE UNDER SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT IS NO LONGER RES IN TEGRA . THE ISSUE STANDS COVERED BY THE DECISION OF THE APEX COURT IN ASSTT. CIT V. SAURASHTRA KUTCH STOCK EXCHANGE LTD. [2008] 305 ITR 227 WHICH HELD THAT THOUGH TH E TRIBUNAL HAS NO POWER TO REVIEW ITS OWN ORDER, YET IT HAS JURISDICTION TO RECTIFY AN Y MISTAKE APPARENT ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD AND AS A CONSEQU ENCE, THEREFORE, THE TRIBUNAL CAN EVEN RECALL ITS ORDER. I N THE ABOVE CASE, BEFORE THE APEX COURT ON OCTOBER 27, 2000, THE TRIBUNAL DISMISSED THE APPEAL OF STOCK EXCHANGE HOLDING THAT IT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 11 READ WITH SEC TION 12 OF THE ACT. ON NOVEMBER 13, 2000, THE STOCK EXCHANGE FILED A RECTIFICATION APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL. THE TRIBUNAL BY ITS ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 5, 2001, ALLOWED THE APPLICATION AND HELD THAT THERE WAS A MIS TAKE APPARENT ON THE RECORD WHICH REQUIRED RECTIFICATION. ACCORDINGLY, THE TRIBUNAL RECALLED ITS ORDER DATED OCTOBER 27, 2 000, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL AFRESH. THE REVEN UE FILED A WRIT PETITION IN THE GUJARAT HIGH COURT CHALLENGING THE ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 5, 2001. THE ABOVE CHALLENGE BY THE REVENU E WAS MA NO.41/JP/2019 SHRI BHAWANI SINGH VS ITO, WARD- BHIWADI, ALWAR 13 TURNED DOWN BY THE GUJARAT HIGH COURT. THE REVENUE CA R RIED THE MATTER IN APPEAL TO THE APEX COURT WHICH ALSO DISMI SSED THE APPEAL OF THE REVENUE. THE APEX COURT OBSERVED THAT THE TRIBUNAL IN ITS ORIGINAL ORDER WHILE DISMISSING THE STOCK EXC HANGE (ASSESSEE'S) APPEAL OVERLOOKED THE BINDING DECISION S OF THE JURI SDICTIONAL HIGH COURT. THIS MISTAKE WAS CORRECTED BY THE TRIBUNAL UNDER SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT. THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT THE RECTIFICATION OF AN ORDER STANDS ON THE FU NDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE THAT JUSTICE IS ABOVE ALL AND UPHELD THE EXERCISE OF POWER UNDE R SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT BY THE TRIBUNAL IN RECAL LING ITS EARLIER ORDER DATED OCTOBER 27, 2000. THUS, RECALL OF AN ORDER IS NOT BARRED ON RECTIFICATION APPLICATION BEING MADE BY ONE OF THE PARTIES. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE APPLICATION WOU LD BE AN APP LICATION FOR RECTIFICATION OF THE ORDER DATED DECEM BER 6, 2007, AND WOULD STAND GOVERNED BY SECTION 254(2) OF THE AC T. 17. IN THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE THERE CAN BE NO DE NIAL THAT THE ORDER DATED DECEMBER 6, 2007, SUFFERS FROM AN ERROR APPARENT FROM THE RECORD. THE ERROR IS IN HAVING IGNORED THE MANDA TE OF RULE 24 OF THE TRIBUNAL RULES WHICH REQUIRED THE TRIBU NAL TO DISPOSE OF THE MATTER ON THE MERITS AFTER HEARING T HE RESPONDENTS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, AN APPLICATION FOR RECTIFICATION WOULD BE UND ER SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT. THE RECALL OF AN ORDER WOULD WELL BE A CONSEQUENCE OF RECTIFYING AN ORDER UNDER SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT. IN THESE CIRCUMSTA NCES, WE FIND NO REASON TO INTERFERE WITH THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL HOLDING THAT THE MISCELLANEOUS AP PLICATION FILED BY THE APPELLANT IS BARRED BY LIMITATION UNDER SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT AS IT WAS FILED BEYOND A PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS FROM THE ORDER SOUGHT TO BE RE CTIFIED. 18. BEFORE CONCLUDING, WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THA T AN ORDER PASSED IN B REACH OF RULE 24 OF THE TRIBUNAL RULES, IS AN IRREGU LAR ORDER AND NOT A VOID ORDER. HOWEVER, EVEN IF IT IS A SSUMED THAT THE ORDER IN BREACH OF RULE 24 OF THE TRIBUNAL RULES IS AN VOID ORDER, YET THE SAME WOULD CONTINUE TO BE BINDING TIL L IT IS SET ASIDE MA NO.41/JP/2019 SHRI BHAWANI SINGH VS ITO, WARD- BHIWADI, ALWAR 14 BY A COMPETENT TRIBUNAL. IN FACT, THE APEX COURT IN THE SULTAN SADIK V. SANJAY RAJ SUBBA REPORTED IN [2004] 2 SCC 377 OBSERVED AS UNDER: 'PATENT AND LATENT INVALIDITY IN A WELL KN OWN PASSAGE LORD RADCLIFFE SAID: 'AN ORDER, EVEN IF NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH, IS STILL AN ACT CAPABLE AT LEGAL CONSEQUENCES. IT BEAR S NO BRAND OF INVALIDITY UPON ITS FOREHEAD. UNLESS THE NECESSARY PROCEEDINGS ARE TAKEN AT LAW TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF INVALIDITY AN D TO GET IT QUASHED OR OTHERWISE UPSET, IT WILL REMAIN AS EFFECTI VE FOR ITS OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE AS THE MOST IMPECCABLE OF ORDERS .' THIS MUST BE EQUALLY TRUE EVEN WHERE THE 'BRAND OF INVALIDITY' IS PLAINLY VISIBLE: FOR THERE ALSO THE ORDER CAN EFFECTIVELY B E RESISTED IN LAW ONLY BY OBTAINING A DECISION OF THE COURT.' FURTHER , TH E SUPREME COURT IN SNEH GUPTA V. DEVI SARUP [2009] 16 SCC 194 HAS OBSERVED. 'WE ARE CONCERNED HEREIN WITH THE QUESTION OF LIMITATION. THE COMPROMISE DECREE, AS INDICATED HERE IN BEFORE, EVEN IF VOID WAS REQUIRED TO BE SET ASIDE. A CONSENT DECREE AS IS WELL KNOWN, IS AS GOOD AS A CONTESTED DECREE. SUCH A DECR EE MUST BE SET ASIDE IF IT HAS BEEN PASSED IN VIOLATIO N OF LAW. FOR THE SAID PURPOSE, THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE LIMIT ATION ACT, 1963, WOULD BE APPLICABLE. IT IS NOT THE LAW THAT WHERE THE DECREE IS VOID, NO PERIOD OF LIMITATION SHALL BE ATTRACTED AT ALL.' THEREFORE, IN THIS CASE ALSO THE PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS FROM THE DA TE OF ORDER SOUGHT TO BE RECTIFIED/RECALLED WILL APPLY AS PROVID ED IN SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT. THIS IS SO EVEN IF IT IS ASSUMED THA T THE ORDER DATED DECEMBER 6, 2006, IS A VOID ORDER. 19 WE SHAL L NOW ANSWER THE QUESTIONS ARISING IN THIS CASE AS RAISED BY US IN PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE AS UNDER : QUESTION (A) : NO. THE TRIBUNAL HAS NO POWER IN TERMS OF RULE 24 OF THE TRIBUNAL RULES TO DISMISS AN APPEAL BEFORE IT FOR NON - PROSECUTION. QUESTION (B) : THE MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION FOR REC ALL OF AN ORDER FALLS UNDER SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT AND NOT UNDER SECTION 254(1) OF THE ACT. MA NO.41/JP/2019 SHRI BHAWANI SINGH VS ITO, WARD- BHIWADI, ALWAR 15 QUESTION (C) : DOES NOT ARISE IN VIEW OF OUR RESPONS E TO QUERY (B) ABOVE. 20. IN VIEW OF THE REASONS GIVEN HEREINABOVE, WE FIND THE TRIBUNAL WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE MISCELLANEOUS APPLICAT ION BY ITS ORDER DATED APRIL 10, 2013, AS BEING BEYOND THE PER IOD OF FOUR YEARS AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT. 21. ACCORDINGLY, THE PETITION IS DISMISSED WITH NO ORDER AS TO COSTS.' 8. IN VIEW OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AS WELL AS THE DECISION OF THE HON'BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN TH E CASE OF BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPN. LTD. (SUPRA), WE HOLD THA T THE MISCELLANEOUS PETITION FILED BY THE ASSESSEE ARE BE YOND THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 254( 2) AND ARE NOT MAINTAINABLE. ACCORDINGLY THE SAME IS DISMISSED BEI NG BARRED BY LIMITATION. ACCORDINGLY, IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE FACTS AND CIRCUMST ANCES AS DISCUSSED IN FOREGOING PARAS AS WELL AS THE DECISION OF THE BANGALORE BENCHES OF THE TRIBUNAL (SUPRA) THE MISCEL LANEOUS PETITION FILED BY THE REVENUE ON 22.05.2017 IS BEYO ND THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION EXPIRED ON 30.11.2016 AND ACCORDING T HE SAME IS NOT MAINTAINABLE. ACCORDINGLY, IN VIEW OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE WHEN THE MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION IS BARRED BY LIMI TATION AND FOLLOWING THE EARLIER ORDER OF THIS TRIBUNAL IN CASE OF ITO VS. SHRI RAM RATAN MODI (SUPRA) WE DISMISSED THE MISCELLANEOU S APPLICATION AS NOT MAINTAINABLE BEING BARRED BY LIM ITATION. IN VIEW OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AS DISCUSSED ABOVE AS WELL AS MAINTAINING THE RULE OF CONSISTENCY, WE FOL LOW EARLIER ORDER OF THIS TRIBUNAL AND HOLD THAT THE MISC. APPLICATION FILED BY THE ASSESSEE AFTER MA NO.41/JP/2019 SHRI BHAWANI SINGH VS ITO, WARD- BHIWADI, ALWAR 16 THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION PROVIDED U/S 254(2) OF THE ACT IS NOT MAINTAINABLE BEING BARRED BY LIMITATION. THUS THE MISC. APPLICAT ION OF THE ASSESSEE IS DISMISSED. 3.0 IN THE RESULT, THE MISC. APPLICATION OF THE AS SESSEE IS DISMISSED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 30 /12 /2019. SD/- SD/- FOE FLAG ;KNO FOT; IKY JKO (VIKRAM SINGH YADAV) (VIJAY PAL RAO) YS[KK LNL;@ ACCOUNTANT MEMBER U;KF;D LNL;@ JUDICIAL MEMBER TK;IQJ@ JAIPUR FNUKAD@ DATED:- 30 /12/ 2019 *MISHRA VKNS'K DH IZFRFYFI VXZSFKR@ COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO: 1. VIHYKFKHZ@ THE APPELLANT- SHRI BHAWANI SINGH, ALWAR 2. IZR;FKHZ@ THE RESPONDENT- THE ITO,WARD- BHIWADI, ALWAR 3. VK;DJ VK;QDRVIHY ) @ CIT(A), 4. VK;DJ VK;QDR@ CIT, 5. FOHKKXH; IZFRFUF/K] VK;DJ VIHYH; VF/KDJ.K] T;IQJ@ DR, ITAT, JAIPUR 6. XKMZ QKBZY@ GUARD FILE (MA NO.41/JP/2019) VKNS'KKUQLKJ@ BY ORDER, LGK;D IATHDKJ@ ASSISTANT. REGISTRAR