MOHD YOUSAF AND ANOTHER V. UT OF J AND K TH COMMISSIONER SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT HOME DEPARTMENT AND OTHERS

LPA/69/2022

AI Insights

The case involves two appellants, Mohd. Yousuf and his brother Mohd. Aslam, who challenged the detention order issued against Mohd. Yousuf under the J&K Public Safety Act, 1978. The detention order was initially upheld by a Writ Court, which directed an investigation into how the appellants obtained the detention documents without execution. The appellants argued that the detention was arbitrary, based on outdated FIRs, and that the legal procedures for preventive detention were not followed. The High Court, referencing several Supreme Court judgments, found that the detention order was not justified and that the procedural lapses pointed out by the appellants were valid.

• Counselvise Citation: [2022] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 732526 (HC-MISC)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 26-12-2022
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Additional Chief Secretary to Govt. & Ors. Vs. Alka Subash Gadia & Ors., Deepak Bajaj vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr., Banka Sneha Sheela vs. The State of Telangana & ors, Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, Umesh Kumar v/s State of Andhra Pradesh, Magraj Patodia v. R.K.Birla & Ors., Pushpadevi M. Jatia vs. M.L.Wadhavan, & Ors
• Laws Referred To: J&K Public Safety Act, 1978
• Result in Favour of: Others
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: AMIT GUPTA
• Assessee Lawyers: P N RAINA; M A BHAT
• Keywords: Connivance of officials; Habeas Corpus; Preventive Detention; Writ of Certiorari; Quashment of detention order; Legitimate means
• Section: 8(1)(a)

Judgement Text

"P a g e | 1 HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT JAMMU LPA No. 69/2022 LPA No. 76/2022 Reserved on: 30.11.2022 Pronounced on: 26.12.2022 LPA No.69/2022 Mohd. Yousuf LPA NO.76/2022 Mohd. Aslam …Appellant(s) Through: Mr.P.N.Raina, Sr. Advocate with Mr. M.A. Bhat, Advocate Vs. Union Territory of J&K & Ors …Respondent(s) Through: Mr.Amit Gupta, AAG CORAM: HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE SINDHU SHARMA, JUDGE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M.A.CHOWDHARY, JUDGE JUDGMENT Per Chowdhary J. 1. The present appeals have been preferred by the appellants against the judgment dated: 12.07.2022 passed in WP (Crl) No. 02/2022 by Learned Single Judge. The facts and circumstances of the above said appeals are identical in nature, therefore, both are proposed to be disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Aggrieved of the order/judgment dated 12.07.2022 passed by the Writ Court ( hereinafter called „impugned Judgment‟) appellant Mohd. Yousuf and his brother Mohd. Aslam filed a joint Letters Patent Appeal (LPA No.69/2022) seeking setting aside the impugned judgment. However, later the appellant Mohd. Aslam P a g e | 2 moved an application ( CM No. 4389/2022) seeking withdrawal from the appeal and vide interim order dated: 25.7.2022 passed by this Bench the appeal to his extent, was dismissed as withdrawn on his behalf with liberty to file a separate fresh appeal after seeking leave of this Court to file the same. 3. In LPA No. 69/2022 it has been prayed to set aside the judgment dated 12.07.2022 passed by Learned Single Bench whereby petition for quashment of detention order was dismissed with a further direction to the Director Anti Corruption Bureau Union Territory of J&K to enquire into the matter for having obtained documents not by legitimate means. It has been further prayed to quash the detention order No. 02/2022 dated 11.01.2022 which was subject matter of writ petition. 4. In LPA No. 76/2022 the appellant seeks setting aside the directions passed by Learned Single Judge to the Anti Corruption Bureau of UT of J&K to enquire into the issue of procurement of the order of detention and communications addressed to the petitioner in the writ petition and to the Principal Secretary to Govt. Home Department with regard to alleged connivance of the officials of the respondents and the appellant who had filed the petition on behalf of his brother. It has been further prayed to set aside/expunge/remove the observations made in the judgment against the P a g e | 3 appellant, being unwarranted, unjustified and uncalled for and also being violative of principles of natural justice. 5. Factual Matrix of the case is that one Mohd. Yousuf @ Shama S/O Faqar Din R/O Village Narwal BalaJammu, ( hereinafter called appellant Mohd. Yousuf ) was ordered to be detained in terms of Section 8(1) (a) of J&K Public Safety Act, 1978, by the District Magistrate Jammu ( hereinafter called „Detaining Authority‟ for short) vide his Order No. 2 of 2022 dated 11.01.2022 (hereinafter called „detention order‟) . 6. Before the Order could be executed, the appellant Mohd. Yousuf filed criminal writ petition before this court through his brother namely Mohd. Aslam seeking quashment of the detention order passed by detaining authority. WP (Crl) No. 02/2022 was decided by the Writ Court vide judgment dated 12.07.2022 and rejected the plea raised by the appellant for quashment of the detention order mainly on the points that a person whose preventive detention has been ordered, without execution of the same, cannot file the petition that too through a stranger as he himself is required to file the same. The learned Single Judge held that the petition filed by the brother of the petitioner seeking „writ of certiorari‟ cannot be maintained on behalf of the person who has been ordered to be detained and who was P a g e | 4 evading the process of law, without being properly authorized. It was also observed by the writ Court that the detention order and communication dated 11.01.2022 addressed to the person whose detention ordered and the Principal Secretary to Govt. Home Department by the Detaining Authority had been placed on record by the brother of the petitioner and the Court is at a loss as to how the order of detention as also communication landed in the hands of the petitioner or his brother without there being any execution of the said detention order as there was no pleading with regard to the fact as to how the detention order and other communication were obtained by any legitimate means, such as, under Right to Information Act etc. The Writ Court observing that it was a serious matter as the same surely points to the connivance of the officials at the respondents‟ end, either with the petitioner or his brother and the Writ Court directed the Anti Corruption Bureau (ACB), Union Territory of J&K to enquire the issue with regard to the connivance of the officials of the respondents with regard to the fact as to how these documents landed with the petitioner or his brother without execution of the detention order and if prima- facie found to be involved in the acts of Omission/Commission amounting to offence, then to investigate by registering FIR against all the involved P a g e | 5 persons. Writ Court making elaborate discussion holding that the petition had no merit dismissed the same. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that writ petition has been dismissed mainly on the ground that the appellant Mohd Yousuf @ Shama had not filed the writ petition himself but through his brother appellant Mohd. Aslam without there being any proper authorization and that the appellant-petitioner is avoiding the process of law. The writ Court has completely erred in dismissing the writ petition on this ground. The Writ Court has completely skipped to note the facts of the case referred to in the judgment titled Additional Chief Secretary to Govt. & Ors. Vs. Alka Subash Gadia & Ors.wherein it has been held that the original writ petition before Hon‟ble High Court and the subsequent proceedings before Apex Court have all along been contested by the wife of the person against whom the order was passed because he was not available at the time of filing the writ petition. The facts of that case are similar to the present appeal(s) because writ petitioner was not available in the Union territory at the time of filing of the writ petition so the writ petition of the appellant Mohd. Yousuf could not have been dismissed on this ground and even in Habeas Corpus matters the law is very clear that the writ petition can P a g e | 6 be filed through any relative on behalf of the person against whom the order of detention was passed if the detenue is not available for signing the writ petition, Vakalatnama, or other proceedings thus the judgment impugned is liable to be set aside. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant(s) further submits that the impugned judgment is not sustainable on the touch stone of the established law on the maintainability of writ petition against the detention order at the pre-execution stage and also filing of the petition through next kith and kin and is thus liable to be set aside. It is further argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the observations made by learned Single Judge that since the appellant is avoiding process of law and that can be ground for declining for indulgence at this stage by this Hon‟ble Court is not only unreasonable but is also not in accordance of law. Challenging the detention order at the pre-execution stage is not alien to the judicial proceedings/writ petition. The law on the subject is very clear and even some of the judgments have been even discussed by the learned Single Judge, therefore, every person who is sought to be detained under any detention law, has a chance to challenge the same at the pre-execution stage of course on the limited grounds as enumerated by P a g e | 7 Hon‟ble Apex Court in various pronouncements and by the High Courts of the Country. 9. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant(s) that the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition has passed certain direction to the Anti Corruption Bureau J&K, on the issue of the availability of copy of the detention order to the appellants at pre- execution stage. The direction is unwarranted and beyond the scope and domain of the Court. The learned Single Judge has not sought any explanation/reply from the appellants herein as to how the copy of the order came in their possession. The learned Single Judge ought not to have made such directions, with serious criminal consequences against the appellants herein which, if allowed to stand, will result in harassment to them at the hands of the police and even the arrest for none of their fault or any such act which could be termed as criminal in nature. The case of the appellant was well within those grounds which have been enumerated by Hon‟ble Supreme Court for challenging a detention order at the pre-execution stage so his detention is totally unwarranted and uncalled for and the detention order is liable to be quashed. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the detention order has been passed on 11.01.2022 and the communication has also been addressed to the P a g e | 8 appellant Mohd. Yousuf on the same day but the said detention order has remained unserved and unexecuted up to 26th of January, 2022 when he had gone out of the Union Territory to Ajmer Sharief Dargah. There is no explanation on behalf of the respondent nos.2 & 3, as to why, the order was not executed from 11.01.2022 till 24th of January, 2022. The appellant Mohd. Yousuf had thereafter gone outside Union Territory and thus it cannot be said that he has been avoiding the process of law. The appellant Mohd. Aslam herein has filed the writ petition in good faith and on the legal advice of the counsel and got copies of detention order and other documents from the police personnel. The directions passed to the Anti Corruption Bureau are totally unwarranted and uncalled for, which may result into their harassment and even arrest though they have not committed any such act which could be an offence punishable under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 11. The case set up is that a bare perusal of the detention order impugned makes it clear that the same has been passed by the respondent no.2 in an unreasonable, arbitrary and malafide manner only with an intention to cause undue inconvenience and harassment to the petitioner-appellant. The detention order was issued on vague, extraneous and irrelevant P a g e | 9 grounds. It needs to be emphasized that the last FIR which was registered against the petitioner-appellant in the year 2018 i.e. more than three years back also stands stayed by this Hon‟ble Court, therefore, in the year 2022, petitioner cannot be booked under the J&K Public Safety Act, 1978. All the FIRs are old and have lost utility and cannot form basis of any order under the Public Safety Act. On this ground also, the order impugned requires to be quashed. 12. It is further argued that the respondent no.2 has failed to record its subjective satisfaction that the activities of the petitioner are prejudicial and detrimental to the maintenance of public order. The detention order suffers from non-application of mind and is liable to be quashed. 13. On the other hand, Mr. Amit Gupta, AAG learned counsel for the respondents made submissions at bar that the dossier was submitted by the respondent No.3 recommending the detention of the petitioner as he is a desperate character and is habitual of indulging in acts of violence, such as, attempt to murder, assault, land grabbing etc and is also a history sheeter in Bundle-A activities of serious and heinous in nature by using dangerous weapons over a period of time and has spread a reign of terror amongst the peace loving people of the area and his anti-social activities are prejudicial P a g e | 10 to the maintenance of public order. It is also stated that number of FIRs have been registered against the petitioner/appellant and he is indulging himself repeatedly in commission of offences, as substantive laws have not proved to prevent him, as such, the impugned order has been passed. It is further stated that the petitioner/appellant is an absconder, and he has been intentionally avoiding the execution of detention order. Learned Counsel for the respondents vehemently resisted the present appeals and submits that the order of detention cannot be interfered at pre- execution stage lightly and particularly when the petitioner- appellant has absconded. He also laid stress that the brother of the appellant No.1 has obtained the order of detention by illegal means and it clearly shows the clout of the appellant(s). 14. Heard and considered. 15. On perusal of the impugned judgment it is found that the Learned Single Judge has proceeded in the matter primarily on the two aspects of the case only, firstly that the petition was not a Habeas Corpus Petition as the person ordered to be detained was not in custody and instead of filing the petition himself, his brother filed a petition which was a Writ of Certiorari and secondly; that the documents placed on record having been issued from the office of detaining authority had not been P a g e | 11 procured by legitimate methods and there was connivance of the official of the detaining authority and the appellants herein. 16. The first contention with regard to the fact whether the brother of the person who was ordered to be detained can file a Habeas Corpus Petition on his behalf or not and whether a relief in the nature of writ of certiorari can be issued on a subject of Habeas Corpus. This aspect of the matter is no longer rest-integra as Hon‟ble Supreme Court has decided this issue in many of its judgment. 17. In a case titled “Additional Secretary to the Government of India & Ors. Vs. Smt. Alka Subash Gadia & Anr”, reported as 1992 SCC Supl.(1) 496 it was held that the powers under Articles 226 and 32 are wide and are untrammeled by any external restrictions and can reach any executive order resulting in civil or criminal consequences. However, the Courts have over the years evolved certain self-restraints for exercising these powers. They have done so in the interests of the administration of justice and for better and more efficient and informed exercise of the said powers. These self-imposed restraints are not confined to the review of the orders passed under detention law only. They extend to the orders passed and decisions made under all laws. It is in pursuance of this self-evolved judicial P a g e | 12 policy and in conformity with the self-imposed internal restrictions that the courts insist that the aggrieved person first allow the due operation and implementation of the concerned law and exhaust the remedies provided by it before approaching the High Court and this Court to invoke their discretionary extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 32 respectively. That jurisdiction by its very nature is to be used sparingly and in circumstances where no other efficacious remedy is available. If in every case a detenu is permitted to challenge and seek the stay of the operation of the order before it is executed, the very purpose of the order and of the law under which it is made will be frustrated since such orders are in operation only for a limited period. The courts have the necessary power to entertain grievances against any detention order prior to its execution and they have used it in proper cases, although such cases have been few and the grounds on which the courts have interfered with them are necessarily very limited in scope and number, viz., where the courts are prima facie satisfied (i) that the order is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed (ii) that it is sought to be executed against a wrong person. (iii) that is is passed for a wrong purpose (iv) that it is passed on vague, extraneous and irrelevant P a g e | 13 grounds or (v) that the authority which passed it had not authority to do so. It has been further held that it is always open for the detenu or anyone on his behalf to challenge the detention order by way of habeas corpus petition on any ground available to him. 18. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in case titled “Deepak Bajaj vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr.” reported as 2009 ALL SCR 105 with regard to challenge to the detention order before its execution held in para 28 as under : “Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that a writ of habeas corpus lies only when there is illegal detention, and in the present case since the petitioner has not yet been arrested, no writ of habeas corpus can be issued. We regret we cannot agree, and that for two reasons. Firstly, Article 226 and Article 32 of the Constitution permit the High Court and the Supreme Court to not only issue the writs which were traditionally issued by British Courts but these Articles give much wider powers to this Court and the High Court. This is because Article 32 and Article 226 state that the Supreme Court and High Court can issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, etc. and they can also issue orders and directions apart from issuing writs. The words 'in the nature of' imply that the powers of this Court or the High Court are not subject to the traditional restrictions on the powers of the British Courts to issue writs. Thus the powers of this Court and the High Court are much wider than those of the British Courts vide Dwarka Nath Vs. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, D Ward, Kanpur &Anr., AIR 1966 SC 81 (vide para 4), Shri. Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree MuktajeeVandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust &Ors. Vs. V. R. Rudani&Ors., AIR 1989 SC 1607 (vide para 16 to 18), etc. Secondly, what the petitioner really prays for is a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the impugned detention order and/or a writ in the nature of mandamus for restraining the respondents from arresting him. Hence even if the petitioner is not in detention a writ of certiorari and/or mandamus can issue.” 19. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforestated judgments, it can safely be held that P a g e | 14 the writ petition of Habeas Corpus, with prayer to issue Writ of Certiorari to quash the detention order before its execution and also filed through the brother of the person liable to be detained was competent and maintainable. 20. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in a case titled “Banka Sneha Sheela vs. The State of Telangana & ors” reported as (2021) 9 SCC 415 held with regard to the difference between public order and law and order. In paras 13 and 14 of the judgment which are reproduced as under : \"13.There can be no doubt that for „public order‟ to be disturbed, there must in turn be public disorder. Mere contravention of law such as indulging in cheating or criminal breach of trust certainly affects „law and order‟ but before it can be said to affect „public order‟, it must affect the community or the public at large. 14.There can be no doubt that what is alleged in the five FIRs pertain to the realm of „law and order‟ in that various acts of cheating are ascribed to the Detenu which are punishable under the three sections of the Indian Penal Code set out in the five FIRs. A close reading of the Detention Order would make it clear that the reason for the said Order is not any apprehension of widespread public harm, danger or alarm but is only because the Detenu was successful in obtaining anticipatory bail/bail from the Courts in each of the five FIRs. If a person is granted anticipatory bail/bail wrongly, there are well-known remedies in the ordinary law to take care of the situation. The State can always appeal against the bail order granted and/or apply for cancellation of bail. The mere successful obtaining of anticipatory bail/bail orders being the real ground for detaining the Detenu, there can be no doubt that the harm, danger or alarm or feeling of security among the general public spoken of in Section 2(a) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act is make believe and totally absent in the facts of the present case.” P a g e | 15 21. A three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in “Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, reported as (1984) 3 SCC 14 held in para 32, which reads as under: “It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant law. The law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinizing the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.” 22. Another three Judge Bench judgment of Hon‟ble Apex Court in “Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu”, reported as (2011) 5 SCC 244 dealt with interplay between Articles 21 and 22 as follows: “13.In our opinion, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India which permits preventive detention is only an exception to Article 21 of the Constitution. An exception is an exception, and cannot ordinarily nullify the full force of the main rule, which is the right to liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution. Fundamental rights are meant for protecting the civil liberties of the people, and not to put them in jail for a long period without recourse to a lawyer and without a trial. As observed in R. v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt., ex p Stafford [(1998) 1 WLR 503 (CA)] : (WLR p. 518 F-G) . The imposition of what is in effect a substantial term of imprisonment by the exercise of executive discretion, without trial, lies uneasily with ordinary concepts of the rule of law.Article 22, hence, cannot be read in isolation but must be read as an exception to Article 21. An exception can apply only in rare and exceptional cases, and it cannot override the main rule. 14. Article 21 is the most important of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution P a g e | 16 of India. Liberty of a citizen is a most important right won by our forefathers after long, historical and arduous struggles. Our Founding Fathers realized its value because they had seen during the freedom struggle civil liberties of our countrymen being trampled upon by foreigners, and that is why they were determined that the right to individual liberty would be placed on the highest pedestal along with the right to life as the basic right of the people of India.” 23. In view of the law laid down by Hon‟ble Apex Court in the aforesaid cases it is amply clear that there is no restriction for a person who has been ordered to be detained under the preventive detention to file the petition at his own, if he is not available, then the petition can be filed by any person on his behalf on the limited grounds available to him. It is an admitted case that the petitioner-appellant at the time of passing of detention order was out of UT of J&K and was not in a position to challenge the order himself. It is also respondents‟ case that the order of detention could not be executed for his non-availability at his place of residence. The writ petition filed by the appellant(s) had been classified as a Habeas Corpus Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of writ of certiorari seeking quashment of the detention order, therefore, the petition filed by the appellants was essentially a Habeas Corpus Petition dealing with the preventive detention. 24. The limited grounds of challenge as laid down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court have been pleaded and argued before the Single Bench as well as this Bench by the P a g e | 17 learned counsel for the appellants. The petitioner- appellant had been shown involved in some cases of not very serious nature and he was stated to have been bailed out in all those cases referred and relied upon for invoking the preventive detention by the detaining authority. Also these cases had no proximate link to the date of detention order, as all the FIRs right from 2008 to 2018 had been registered against the appellant- petitioner whereas the detention order was passed in the year 2022. The gap of three years from the last FIR registered in the year 2018 against the appellant- petitioner by no stretch of imagination can be said to be proximate to the detention order. It appears that the detaining authority has not applied its mind properly to the facts of the case so as to reach conclusion as to whether the preventive detention of the appellant was required or not. None of the offences, of which the appellant had been charged, were serious offences, which could by any means be said to have created any public order. The incidents of the crimes, to base the detention were also remotely connected, with no proximate link. 25. For what has been discussed, considered and analyzed hereinabove, we are of the opinion that the order of detention passed by the detaining authority was not inconformity with the law, violating constitutional P a g e | 18 provisions contained in Articles 21 & 22 of the Constitution of India. 26. Coming to the second aspect of the case that the documents placed on record and relied upon by the appellants having been issued from the office of detaining authority have not been legitimately received by the appellants, we are of the considered opinion that no serious view should have been taken in the matter as it was for the Writ Court to rely or not to rely on the documents produced but should not have gone into the aspect of the case, as to what was the source of receiving those documents. 27. Hon‟ble Apex Court in a case titled „Umesh Kumar v/s State of Andhra Pradesh’, reported as 2013 (10) SCC 591 has held in para 27,as under : “It is a settled legal proposition that even if a document is procured by improper or illegal means, there is no bar to its admissibility if it is relevant and its genuineness is proved. If the evidence is admissible, it does not matter, how it has been obtained. However, as a matter of caution, the court in exercise of its discretion may disallow certain evidence in a criminal case if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused. More so, the court must conclude that it is genuine and free from tampering or mutilation.” 28. A similar contention was raised before the Hon‟ble Delhi High Court that the writ petitioner was guilty of suppression of facts and had not approached that court P a g e | 19 with clean hands. Learned Single Judge observed that the writ petitioner had relied upon copies of some documents from the record of the first respondent without disclosing their source that the said documents were improperly and illegally obtained with the help of some unscrupulous employees of the first respondent. However, a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in case titled “Backbone Tarmat-Ng Jv vs. National Highways Authority of India, reported as 99 (2002) DLT 862 relying upon the Apex Court judgment passed in case titled “Magraj Patodia v. R.K.Birla & Ors.” [1971] 2 SCR held in para 84 as under : “ In any case having regard to the fact that the learned Single Judge went into the merit of the matter, heard the parties at great length, scanned the record produced by the respondent with a view to arrive at a decision on merits, we are of the opinion that the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed on this ground alone.” 29. Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the well- known case of Kuruma v. Reginam [1955] 1 All ER 236 held as under: “The test to be applied both in civil and in criminal cases, in considering whether evidence is admissible, is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the Court is not concerned with how it was obtained.” The House of Lords in a case reported as R.V.Sang [1979] 2 All ER 1222 observed that if it is admissible evidence probative of the accused‟s guilt it is no part P a g e | 20 of his judicial function to exclude it for this reason as to how documents were obtained held as under: “He has no discretion to refuse to admit relevant admissible evidence on the ground that it was obtained by improper or unfair means. The court is not concerned with how it was obtained.” 30. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in “Magraj Patodia v. R.K.Birla & Ors.” [1971] 2 SCR 118 held that the fact that a document which was procured by improper or even illegal means could not bar its admissibility provided its relevance and genuineness were proved. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in a case titled “Pushpadevi M. Jatia vs. M.L.Wadhavan, & Ors” reported as (1987) 3 SCC 367 relying upon its earlier judgments in Magraj Patodia v. R.K.Birla & Ors., [1971] 2 SCR 118 and R.M.Malkani v. State of Maharashtra [1973]2 SCR 417, held that there is a long line of authorities to support the opinion that the court is not concerned with how evidence is obtained. The rule is, however, subject to an exception. In R.K.Birla‟s case it has been held that a document which was procured by improper or even illegal means could not bar its admissibility provided its relevance and genuineness were proved. In R.M. Malkani‟s case it has been held that the court applying this principle allowed the tape-recorded conversation to be used as evidence in proof of a criminal charge. P a g e | 21 31. In view of the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court, that the court has to look into the veracity and admissibility of the documents produced and relied upon, instead of going into as to how they were procured, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the writ court was not the correct view to reject the petition on the ground, that the documents had not been legitimately obtained. Otherwise also these documents issued by a public servant are supposed to be in public domain. These documents were neither classified nor relating to official secrets. The view taken by the Writ Court is thus not sustainable. 32. For the foregoing reasons and observations made hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that the order impugned in the writ petition passed by the detaining authority was not inconformity with the provisions of law of preventive detention. We are of the opinion that the order impugned in the Writ Petition was liable to be quashed by the Writ Court. The impugned order passed by the Writ Court is thus set aside and appeals are allowed with the following directions: i/ The detention Order No. 02 of 2022 dated 11.01.2022 impugned in the writ petition, passed by the detaining authority is hereby quashed. P a g e | 22 ii/ Direction passed by the Writ Court to the Anti-Corruption Bureau to enquire into the matter is set aside. 33. Both the appeals are disposed of as allowed. Copies of the judgment be placed on each of the appeal file. (MA CHOWDHARY) ( SINDHU SHARMA) JUDGE JUDGE Jammu 26.12.2022 Mujtaba Whether the order is reportable: Yes / No P a g e | 23 "