"IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL “B” BENCH, MUMBAI BEFORE SHRI BR BASKARAN, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER SHRI SANDEEP SINGH KARHAIL, JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA No.6307/MUM/2024 (Assessment Year 2017-18) New Shobhna Co-Op. Housing Society Ltd., Plot No.44, Shobhana Apartments, Saratchandra Chatterji Road Santacruz, West Mumbai – 400054 PAN : AAAAN1828L ............... Appellant v/s ITO – 22(3)(4), Mumbai ……………… Respondent Assessee by : Shri Bhupendra Shah Revenue by : Ms. Monika H. Pande, Sr. AR Date of Hearing – 28/01/2025 Date of Order - 01/04/2025 O R D E R PER SANDEEP SINGH KARHAIL, J.M. The assessee has filed the present appeal against the impugned order dated 22/04/2022, passed under section 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) by the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre, Delhi [“learned CIT(A)”], for the assessment year 2017-18. ITA No.6307/Mum/2024 (A.Y. 2017-18) 2 2. The present appeal is delayed by 893 days. Along with the appeal, the assessee has filed an affidavit of the Chairman of the society, wherein it is submitted that the copy of the impugned order passed by the learned CIT(A) was served on 22/04/2022 through email, and therefore, the appeal was required to be filed before the Tribunal on or before 21/06/2022. However, the same was filed on 30/11/2024 after a delay of 893 days. In the affidavit, it has been submitted that there is no full-time accountant to look after the tax and litigation matters of the assessee, and therefore, the delay was not intentional, and the late filing of the appeal was due to reasons totally beyond its control. Accordingly, the assessee has prayed for a lenient view and for condonation of the delay in filing the present appeal. We find that apart from the aforementioned reasons, no other reason has been stated in the affidavit, except placing reliance upon various decisions supporting its prayer. 3. During the hearing, the learned Authorised Representative reiterated the submissions made in the affidavit seeking condonation of the delay of 893 days in filing the present appeal before the Tribunal. From the record, it is further evident that the learned CIT(A) also dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee on the ground of delay, as the learned CIT(A) was not satisfied with the reasons stated by the assessee for seeking condonation of delay. 4. We find that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in its judgment rendered in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v/s The Special Deputy Collector (LA), reported in [2024] 4 S.C.R. 241 / 2024 INSC 286, very lucidly explained the law of limitation pertaining to the condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 casts an ITA No.6307/Mum/2024 (A.Y. 2017-18) 3 obligation upon the court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the courts are conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed period, provided the proposed appellant is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it within time. It is further held that the said power to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon various factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence, etc. After considering a host of decisions on this subject, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para-26 of its judgment observed as follows: – “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice- oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; ITA No.6307/Mum/2024 (A.Y. 2017-18) 4 (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 5. In the present case, from the submissions made in the affidavit, as noted in the foregoing paragraphs, it is evident that the assessee has not even proved the existence of sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the limitation period, and the inordinate delay of 893 days appears to be completely due to negligence and want of due diligence on the part of the assessee. We find that even after the dismissal of its appeal by the learned CIT(A) on the grounds of delay and receipt of the impugned order dated 22/05/2022 on the same date, the assessee appears to have not taken any serious steps for avoiding any delay in filing the further appeal before the Tribunal. At this stage, it is also pertinent to note that its appeal before the learned CIT(A) was delayed by only 66 days, however, the present appeal is delayed by as much as 893 days. We are of the considered view that the mere fact that the assessee does not have any full-time accountant does not in any manner absolve the assessee, being an appellant, from taking the necessary steps for filing the appeal within the prescribed limitation period before the Tribunal. 6. Therefore, having considered the facts and circumstances of the present case in light of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cited supra, we do not find any merit in the submissions of the assessee in seeking condonation of the delay of 893 days in filing the present appeal. Accordingly, the same is ITA No.6307/Mum/2024 (A.Y. 2017-18) 5 dismissed as being barred by limitation. As we are dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay, the issues raised in the grounds of appeal are kept open for adjudication, if they arise in assessee’s case in future. 7. In the result, the appeal by the assessee is dismissed. Order pronounced in the open Court on 01/04/2025 Sd/- BR BASKARAN ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Sd/- SANDEEP SINGH KARHAIL JUDICIAL MEMBER MUMBAI, DATED: 01/04/2025 Prabhat Copy of the order forwarded to: (1) The Assessee; (2) The Revenue; (3) The PCIT / CIT (Judicial); (4) The DR, ITAT, Mumbai; and (5) Guard file. By Order Assistant Registrar ITAT, Mumbai "