Sandeep Viswanadhapalli V. Union of India

WP/10454/2021

AI Insights

The case involves a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the disqualification of the petitioners as directors and the deactivation of their DINs by the respondents. The petitioners argued that their disqualification and the subsequent actions were based on a retrospective application of Section 164(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013, which was not legally permissible. The respondents, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, did not dispute the applicability of the common order from a previous case but defended the actions based on statutory provisions. The court examined the legislative intent and the specific provisions of the Companies Act, 2013, and the Companies (Appointment of Directors) Rules, 2014, to arrive at its decision.

• Counselvise Citation: [2021] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 734013 (HC-TELANGANA)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 18-07-2021
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (CENTRAL) vs. VATIKA TOWNSHIP PRIVATE LIMITED, YASHODHARA SHROFF vs. UNION OF INDIA, GAURANG BALVANTLAL SHAH S/O BALVANTLAL SHAH vs. UNION OF INDIA, BHAGAVAN DAS DHANANJAYA DAS vs. UNION OF INDIA
• Laws Referred To: Companies Act, 2013, Companies (Appointment of Directors) Rules, 2014, Constitution of India
• Result in Favour of: Applicant
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: NAMAVARAPU RAO
• Assessee Lawyers: MARIPATI VISWARAJ
• Keywords: Deactivation; Director Identification Number (DIN); Disqualification; Natural Justice; Retrospective effect
• Section: 248; 252; 164(2)(a)

Judgement Text

"H,GH COURI FOR THE ST r\",;;,\"i 615,;'j ]f,L#S,ili Ar HvDERABAD THURSDAY THE TU ,*o rno jdxi[TnB.coNDDA vor aeRrL PRESENT Between: ii?li* ji:is!,inl' *,3J r,J \" ,.ffi u'3,rl.Us,l?i:, rd*ftij [,TXSI: ...PETITIONER AND 1. 2 ..,RESPONDENTS Petition under Articre 226 of ffte constitution of rndia praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit fired therewith, the High court may be preased to issue a writ of r ,4andamus, or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, declaring the action of the respondents in deactivating the DrN No. 02782673, or the petitioner and making him disqualified as a Director, as illegal, arbitrary, without jurisdiction, contrary to the provisions of the companies Act, 2013 and Rule 11 of the companies (Appointment of Directors) Rules, 20i 4, violative of the principles of natural justice besides violating the petitioners rights guaranteed under Article 14 and Article 19(1 Xg) of the Constitution of lndia. lA NO: 1 OF 2021 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to grant interim direction directing the respondents to restore the DIN No. 02782673 of the petitioner, so as to enable the petitioner to discharge the functions as a Director in other companies, to incorporate new companies under the Companies Act, 20'13 and to get appoint as a Director in other companies including putting a digital signature, pending disposal of the above writ petition. Counsel for the Petitioner: SRI MARIPATI MAHARSHI VISWARAJ Counsel for the Respondents: SRI NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO, ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL ifl : [.:l,l\"t r!,il s:yr ll i,,\"dgsi:'fi \"|'filfu t #ll?;,.i n, stri B h awa n, R a j e n d ra The Resistrar of Comoinies tnocl, -r,ii'vi\";b;;:'EJ; the Stare of Tetanoana 2nd Ftoor, Corporate Bhawbn,' -cbr'p,irt,'ii\"gdr\",\"e;\"iiE;r\"d, nv\"i?rX;l;: I elangana - 500068, The Court made the following: ORDER THE HON,BLE SRI JUSTICE ABHINAND KUMAR SHAVILI wRtT PETtTtoN NO. 10454 0F 2021 ,/ THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE ABIIINAND KUMAR SHAVILI WRIT PETITION NO.10454 of 2021 ORDER: Aggrieved by the action of respondents in disqualifying the petitioner as Director under section 16a(2)(a) of the companies Act, 20L3 and in deactivating his Director ldentification Number (DlN), the present Writ Petition has been filed\" 2 Learned counsel appearing for petitioner contended that the /is in the present Writ Petition is squarely covered by the common order dated 1.8.07.2019 passed by this Court in W.P.No.5422 of 20L8 and batch, and 3. 5ri N. Rajeshwar Rao, learned Assistant Solicitor General, appearing for respondents, does not dispute the same. 4. The relevant portion of the order in W.p.No.5422of 2Otg and batch dated 18.07.2019, is as under: \"23. In uieu of tle aboue facts and ctrcumstances and. the ludgments refened to supra, as ttte impugned ord.ers tn present wit petitions disqualifuing the petitioners as dtrectors und.er Section 164(2)(a) of the Act, haue been passed cons{dering the peiod pior to 01.04.2014, the same cannot be sustatned. and are liable to be set aside to that extent. 30. In utetu of the aboue facts and circumstances and the judgment refened to supra, the deactiuation of the DINs of the petitioners for alleged uiolations under Section 164 of the Act, cannot be sustained. hence the same may accordingly be allowed. I . 31. For the foregoing llrit petitions ,. ,h.;;;;,re:sot1's' the impugned orders in the section 1 64p)[a) \"i *'i\"',rt of disqualtfging the petitioners under a.side,andth,u2n)r;r;;::::;:::::\":::::r:rX::j\":; t.he petitioners, enabling them to function as Directors other than in stike off companies. 32, h is macle clear th.at this ord.er will not preclude the 2^d respondent from taking appropiate action in accordance with laut for uiolations as enuisaged_ und\"er Section J6ap) oJ the Act, giuing the said proubion prospectiue effect from 01.04.2O14 and for necessary action against DIN in case of uiolations of Rute 1 1 of the Rules. Al[ the wit petitions are accordingLy allowed to the extent indtcated aboue.\" 5. ln view of the same and for the reasons alike, the present Writ petition is also allowed mutatis mutandis, in terms of the common order dated SD/.V.SUDHA ASSISTANT REQISTRAR / //rRUE coPY/, .EcIoN &/or* 1. The Secretary, Union of lndia,. tr/inistry ,91 q9'fPlut\" Affairs' A Wing' Shastri Bti;*;; R;jdndia Prasad Road New Delhi - 110001' 2. The Registrar of Comp#et triOii 'tttvOerabad',For the State of Telangana' 2nd Ftoor, corporare e'h\"ri);i]zsi'pijrtl r.r\"s\"t\", Bandlaguda Hyderabad. Telanoana - 500068 3 O;;'i6 i6 q, rr.llrri\"oati trrlaharshi Viswaraj' Advocate,[OPU[]to,. ounurur (OpUC) ;. 5;; aa i; 5r.i Namavarapu Raieshwar Rao' Assistz 5, Two CD CoPies Along with a Copy of the Common Order dated 18 07 2019 in W P No 5422 of 201 B and batch. To, N,lP 33. 1, rs also mode clear that if the petitioners are aggieued. bg tlte action of tl-te respondents in stiking off their companies under Section 248 of the Act, theA are at tibertA to auail altematiue remedy under Section 252 of the Act. 34. 18.07.2019 passed in W.P.No.5422 of 2018 and batch. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. .'-1',,*!,.''',,a& f- HIGH COURT DATED:2210412021 ORDER WP.No.10454 o12021 ALLOWING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS -*--,..-..,- 11 uay 2021 (, o ^t. l): .- a1l {'1 :r (: IA E H 1 < p 6 2 7 I D COMMON ORDER Since, the issue involved in all the writ petitions is one and the same, they are heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. The petitioners are the directors of the private companies, registered under the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013) (for short'the Act'). Some of the such companies are active, and some of them have been struck off from the register of companies under Section 248(1)( c ) of the Act, for not carrying on any business operation for the specified period mentioned in the said provision, and for not making any application within the specified period, for obtaining the status of a dormant company under Section 455 of the Act. 3. The petitioners, who were directors of the struck off companies, and who are presently directors of active companies, during the relevant period in ques on, failed to file financial statements or annual returns for a continuous period of three years. Therefore, the 2nd respondent passed the impugned order under Section rcaQ) ot the Act, disqualifying them as directors, and fufther making them ineligible to be re-appointed as directors of that company, or any other company, for a period of five years from the date on which the respective companies failed to do so. The Director Identification Numbers (DINs) of the petitioners were also deactivated. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petitions have been filed' 7 4 4 4 4 6 7 7 4 7 ) 4. This court granted interim orders in the writ petitions directing the 2nd respondent to activate DINs of the petitioners, to enable them to function other than in strike off companies' 5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in all the writpetitions,SriK.Lakshman,learnedAssistantSolicitorGeneralappearing for the respondents - Union of India' 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners, contend that before passing the impugned order, notices have not been issued, giving them opportunity' and thls amounts to vlolation of principles of natural justice, and on this ground alone, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 7. Learned counsel submits that Section L64(2)(a) of the Act empowers the authority to disqualify a person to be a director, provided he has not filed financial statements or annual returns of the company to which he is director, for any continuous period of three financial years. Learned counsel further submits that this provision came into force with effect from 1.4.2014, and prior thereto i.e., under Section 27 4(1)(g) of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), which is the analogous provision, there was no such requirement for the directors of the private companies. They contend that this provision under Act 18 of 2013, will have prospective operation and hence, if the directors of company fail to comply with the requirements mentioned in the said provision subsequent to the said date, the authority under the Act, is within its jurisdictlon to disqualify them. But in the present cases, the 2nd respondent, taking the period prior to 1.4.2OL4, i.e., giving the provislon retrospective effect, disqualified the petitioners as directors, which is illegal and a rbitra ry. 8. With regard to deactivation of DINs, learned counsel for the petitioners submit that the DINs, as contemplated under Rule 2(d) of the Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors), Rules, 2Ot4 (for 3 short'the Rules), are gran&d for tife timeto the i of the said Rures, and un\"\"u^ur,^_^\" ^.':. t\"^:\" appricants under Ru/e ro(6) :ancellation of the DIN can be made only for the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) under Rule 11 of the Rules. and the said grounds does not provide for deactivation for having become inerigibre for appointment as Directors of the company under section 164 of the Act. Learned counser further submits that as against the deactivation, no appear is provided under the Rures, and appear to the Tribunar under section 252 of the Act is provided only against the dissolution of the company under Section 248 of the Act. 9. Learned counsel further submits that 1't respondent - Government of India represented by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, has floated a scheme dated 29.12.20t7 viz., Condonation of Delay Scheme - 2018, wherein the directors, whose DINs have been deactivated by the 2nd respondent, allows the DINs of the Directors to be activated. However, such scheme is not applicable to the companies which are struck off under Section 248(5) of the Act. In case of active companies, they can make applicationtoNationalCompanyLawTribunalunderSection252oftheAct, Seekingforrestoration,andtheTribunalcanorderforreactivationofDlNof suchdirectors,whoseDlNaredeactivated'However,underSection252onlY the companies. which are carrying on the buslness' can approach the Tribunal and the companies, which have no business, cannot approach the Tribunal for restoration. They submit that since the penal provision is given retrospective operation, de hors the above scheme' they are entitled to invokethejur|sdictionofthiscourtunderArticle226oftheconstitutionof India. 10. With the above contentions, learned counsel sought to set aside the impugned orders and to allow the writ petitions' ll.ontheotherhandlearnedAssistantSolicitorGeneralsubmitsthat failure to file financial statements or annual returns for any continuous period 4 of three financial years, automatically entail their d isqua lification under Sectlon 164(2)(a) of the Act and the statute does not provide for issuance of any notice. Hence, the petitioners, who have failed statutory requirement under Sectlon 164 of the Act' violation of principles of natural justice, as it is a deeming provision' Learned counsel further submits that the petitioners have alternative remedy of appeal under Section entertained. 252 of the Act, and hence writ petitions may not be to comply with the cannot comPlain of 252, Appeal to Tribunal: (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Registrar, notifying a company as dissolved under Section 248, may flle an appeal to the Tribunal witnin a perioa of three years from the date of the order of the Registrar and if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the removal of the name of the company from the register of companies is not justified in view of the absence of any of the grounds on which the order was passed by the Registrar, it may order restoration of the name of the company in the register of com panies; Provided that before passing an order under this section, the Tribunal shall give a reasonable opportunity of making representations and of being heard to the Registrar, the company and all the persons concerned: Provided further that if the Registrar is satisfied, that the name of the company has been struck off from the register of companies either inadvertenUy or on basis of incorrect information furnished by the company or its directors, which requires restoration in the register of companies, he may within a period of three years _from the date of passing of the order dissolving the company under Section 248, file an application before the Tribunal seeking restoration of name of such company. (2) A copy of the order passed by the Tribunal shall be filed by the company with the Registrar within thirty days from the date of the order and on .ec\"ipt oi th\" order, the Registrar shall cause the name of the company to be restored in the register of companies and shall issue a fresh certificate of incorporation. (3) If a company, or any member or creditor or worker thereof feels aggrieved by the company having its name struck off from the regjster of companies, the Tribunal or an application made by the company, member, creditor or workman before the expiry of twenty years from the pubrication in the officiar Gazette of the notice under sub-section (5) of Section i48, if satisfied that the company was, at the time of its name being struck off, carrying on business or in operation-or otherwise it is just that the name of the company be restored to the register of companies, order the name of the company to be restored to the register of companies, and the Tribunal may, by the order, give such other directioni and make such provisions as deemed just for placjng the -ompany and all other persons in the same position as nearly as may be as lf the name oi the company iras not been struck off from the register of companies. t2. To consider the contention of the learned Assistant Solicitor General with regard to alternative remedy of appeal under Section 252 of the Act, the said provision is required to be considered, and the same is extracted as under for better appreciation: f A reading of above provision goes to show that if the company is dissolved under Section 248 of the Act, any person aggrieved by the same, can file an appeal. Thus the said provision provides the forum for redressal against the dissolution and striking off the company from the register of companies. It does not deal with the disq ua lification of the directors, and deactivation of their DINS. In the present case, the petitioners are only aggrieved by their disq ua lification as directors and deactivation of DINs, but not about striking off companies as such. Hence, Section 252 of the Act, cannot be an alternative remedy for seeking that relief, and the contention of the learned Assistant Solicitor General, in this regard, merits for rejectlon. 13. Under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act, if the Director of a company fails to file financial statements or annual returns for any continuous period of three financial years, he shall not be eligible to be re-appointed as a director of that company or appointed in other company for a perlod of five years from the date on which the said company fails to do so' The sald provision under the Act 18 of 2013, came into force with effect from ol.o4.2o:.4, and the petitioners are disqualified as directors under the said provision. At this stage, the issue that arises for consideration is - whether the disqualiflcation envisaged under section 164(2)(a) of the Act, which provision came into force with effect from 01.04'2014, can be made applicable with prospective effect, or has to be given retrospective operation? In other words. the issue would be, from which financial year, the default envisaged under section 16a(2)(a) of the Act, has to be calculated, to hold the director of the company liable? In this regard, the learned counsel brought to the notice of this court, the General circular No.08/14 dated 4.4.2OI4 issued by the Ministry of corporation affairs, which clarifies the applicability of the relevant financial years. The relevant portion of the said circu la r is as under: \"A number of provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 including those relating to maintenance of 6ooks of account, preparation, adoption and filing of financial statements (and documents required to be attached thereto), Auditors reports and it. soaro oi Directors report iBoard's report) have been brought into force with 6 effect from 1't April, 2014. Provisions of Schedule II (useful lives to compute depreciation) and Schedule III (format of financial statements) have also been brought into force from that date. The relevant Rules pertaining to these provisions have also been notified, placed on the website of the Ministry and have come into force from the same date. The Ministry has received requests for clarification with regard to the relevant financial years with effect from which such provisions of the new Act relating to maintenance of books of account, preparation, adoption and filing of financial statements (and attachments thereto), audators report and Board's report will be a p plica ble. Although the position in this behalf is quite clear, to make things absolutely clear it is hereby notified that the financial statements (and documents required to be attached thereto), auditors report and Board's report in respect of financial years that commenced earlier than 1't April shall be governed by the relevant provisions/schedules/rules of the Companies Act, 1956 and that in respect of financial years commencing on or after 1't April, 2014, the provisions of the new Act shall apply. \" A reading of the above circular makes it clear the flnancial statements and the documents required to be attached thereto, auditors report and Board's report in respect of financial years that commenced earlier than 01.04.2014, shall be governed by the provisions under the Companies Act, 1956 and in respect of financial years commencing on or after OL.O4.2014, the provisions of the new Act shall apply. t4. At this stage it is required to be noticed that the analogous provision to Section r6a(2)(a) of the Act 18 of 2013, is Section 27aQ)@) ot Act 1 of 1956. The said provision under Act 1 of 1956 is extracted as under for ready reference: (g) such person is already a director of a public company which, - (A) has not filed the annual accounts and annual returns for any continuous three financial years commencing on and after the first day of April, 1999; or (B) Provided that such person shall not be eligible to be appointed as a director of any other public company for a period of five years from the date on which such public company, in which he is a director, failed to file annual accounts and annual returns under sub-clause (A) or has failed to repay its deposits or interest or redeem its debentures on due date or pay divldend referred to in clause (B). A reading of the above provision under Act 1 of 1956, makes it clear that if a person capable of being appointed director of a company and such person is already a director of a public company, which has not filed annual accounts and annual returns for any continuous three financial years commencing on Section 274(1) A person shall not be capable of being appointed director of a company, if - 7 and after the first day of April 1999, shall not be eligible to be appointed as a director of any other public company for a period of five years from the date on which such public company, in which he is a director, failed to file annual accounts and annual returns. So the statutory requirement of filing annual accounts and annual returns, is placed on the directors of a 'public company'. There is no provision under the Act 1of 1956, which places similar obligations on the directors of a 'private company'. Therefore, non- filing of annual accounts and annual returns by the directors of the private company, will not disqualify them as directors under the provisions of Act 1 of 1956. 15. Under Section 16a(2) of the new legislation i'e', Act 18 of 2013, no such distinction between a 'private company' or a 'public company' is made and as per the said provision goes to show that no person who is or has been a director of a'company', fails to file financial statements or annual returns for any continuous period of three financial years, will not be eligible for appointment as a director of a company' As already noted above, the said provision, came into force with effect from 01-'04.2014. 16. Coming to the facts on hand, the 2nd respondent has disqualified the petitioners under section 164(2)(a) of the Act 18 of 2013, for not filing financial statements or annual returns, for period prior to 01.04.2014' The action of the 2nd respondent runs contrary to the circular issued by the Ministry of the corporate Affairs, and he has given the provisions of Act 18 of 2013, retrospective effect, which is impermissible. 17. The Apex Court in COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (CENTRAL)4, NEW DELHI v, VATIKA TOWNSHIP PRMTE LIMITEDI has dealt with the general principles concerning retrospectivity. The relevant portion of the judgment is thus: 27. A legislation, be it a statutory Act or a statutory Rule or a statutory Notification, may physically consists of words printed on papers However, ' (zo t s)r scc t 8 conceptually it is a great deal more than an ordinary prose. There is a special peculiarity in the mode of verbal communication by a legislation. A legislation is not just a series of statements, such as one finds in a work of fiction/non fiction or even in a judgment of a court of law. There is a technique required to draft a legislation as well as to understand a legislation. Former technique is known as legislative drafting and latter one is to be found in the various principles of'Interpretation of Statutes'. Vis-A-vis ordinary prose, a legislation differs in its provenance, lay-out and features as also in the implication as to its meaning that arises by presumptions as to the intent of the maker thereof. 28. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern current activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the past. If we do something today, we do it keeping in the law of today and in force and not tomorrow's backward adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the law is founded on the bed rock that every human being is entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law and should not find that his plans have been retrospectively upset. This principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit : law looks forward not backward. As was observed in Phillips vs. Eyre [(1870) LR 6 QB 1], a retrospective legislation is contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated when introduced for the first time to deal with future acts ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law. 29. The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity is the principle of 'fairness', which must be the basis of every legal rule as was observed in the decision reported in L'Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. [{1994) 1 Ac 486]. Thus, legislations which modified accrued rights or which impose obligations or impose new duties or attach a new disability have to be treated as prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain a former legislation. We need not note that cornucopia of case law available on the subject because aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the various decisions and this legal position was conceded by the counsel for the parties. In any case, we shall refer to few judgments containing this dicta, a little later. 30. We would also like to point out, for the sake of completeness, that where a benefit is conferred by a legislation, the rule against a retrospective construction is different. If a legislation confers a benefit on some persons but without inflicting a corresponding detriment on some other person or on the public Aenerally, and where to confer such benefit appears to have been the legislators object, then the presumption would be that such a legislation, giving it a purposive construction, would warrant it to be given a retrospective effect. This exactly is the justification to treat procedural provisions as retrospective. In Government of India & Ors. v. Indian Tobacco Association, t(2005) 7 SCC 3961, the doctrine of fairness was held to be relevant factor to construe a statute conferring a benefit, in the context of it to be given a retrospective operation. The same doctrine of fairness, to hold that a statute was retrospective in nature, was applied in the case of Vijay v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [(2006) 6 SCC 289]. It was held that where a law is enacted for the benefit of community as a whole, even in the absence of a provision the statute may be held to be retrospective in nature. However, we are (slc not) confronted with any such situation here. 31. In such cases, retrospectivity is attached to benefit the persons in contradistinction to the provision jmposing some burden or liability where the presumption attached towards prospectivity. In the instant case, the proviso added to Section 113 ofthe Act is not beneficial to the assessee. On the contrary, it is a provision which is onerous to the assessee. Therefore, in a case like this, we have to proceed with the normal rule of presumption against retrospective operation. Thus, the rule against retrospective operation is a fundamental rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. Dogmatically framed, the rule is no more than a presumption, and thus could be displaced by out weighing factors. 43. There is yet another very interesting piece of evidence that clarifies that provision beyond any pale of doubt viz., the understanding of CBDT itself regarding this provision. It is contained in CBDT Circular No.8 of 2002 dated 27.8.2002, with the subject \"Finance Act, 2002 - Explanatory Notes on provision relating to Direct Taxes\". This circular has been issued after the passing of the Finance Act, 2OO2,6y which amendment to section 113 was made. In this circular, various amendments to the Income tax Act are discussed amply demonstrating as to which amendments are clarificatory/retrospective in operation and which amendments are prospective. 9 For example. Explanation to section 158-BB is stated to be clarificatory in nature. Likewise, it is mentioned that amendments in Section 145 whereby provisions of that section are made applicabie to block assessments is made clarificatory and would take effect retrospectively from 1't day of July, 1995. When it comes to amendment to Section 113 of the Act, this very circular provides that the said amendment along with the amendments in Section 158-BE, would be prospective i.e., will take effect from 7.6.2002.\" 18. Thus, the Apex Court in the above judgment, has made it clear that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation has to be presumed to have prospective effect. A reading of Section 164 of the Act does not show that the legislation has any intention, to make the said provision applicable to past transactions. Further, the Apex Court In the above judgment at paragraph No.43, found that the circular issued by the authority after passing of the legislation, clarifying the position with regard to applicabillty of the provisions, has to be construed as an important piece of evidence, as it would clarify the provision beyond any pale of doubt. In the present case, as already noted above, the Ministry of corporation affairs has issued the circular No.08/2014 dated 4.4.2014 clarifying that financial statements commencing after 01.04.2014, shall be governed by Act 18 of 2013 i'e', new Act and in respect of financial years commencing earlier to 01.04.2014, shall be governed by Act 1 of 1956. At the cost of repetition, since in the present cases, as the 2nd respondent / competent authority, has disqualified the petitioners as directors under Section 16a(2)(a) of the Act 18 of 2013, by considerf ng the period prior to o1.o4.2o14, the same is contrary to the circular, and also contrary to the law laid down by Apex court in the above referred judgment. 19' If the said provision is given prospective effect, aS per the circular dated 4.4.2014 and the law laid down by the Apex court, as stated in the wrlt affldavits, the first financial year would be from 01-04-2014 to 31.03.2015 and the second and third years financial years would be for the years ending 31.03.2016 and 31.03.2017. The annual returns and financial statements are to be filed with Registrar of companies only after the conclusion of the annual general meeting of the company, and as per the first t0 proviso to Section 96(1) of the Act, annual general meeting for the year ending 31.03.2017 , can be held within six months from the closing of financial year i.e., by 30.09.2017. Further, the time limit for filing annual returns under Section 92@) ot the Act, is 60 days from annual general meeting, or the last date on which annual general meeting ought to have been held with normal fee, and within 270 days with additional fee as per the proviso to Section 403 of the Act. Learned counsel submit that if the said dates are calculated, the last date for filing the annual returns would be 3O.71.2Ot7, and the balance sheet was to be filed on 30.10.2017 with normal fee and with additional fee, the last date for filing annual returns is 27.O7.201a. In other words. the disq ua lification could get triggered only on or after 27.O7.2078. But the period considered by the 2nd respondent in the present writ petitions for clothing the petitioners with d isqua lification, peftains prior to 01.04.2014. Therefore, when the omission, which is now pointed out, was not envisaged as a ground for d isq ua lification prior to 1.4.2OL4, the petitioners cannot be disqualified on the said ground. This analogy is traceable to Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India, which states that \"No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence\". In view of the same, the ground on which the petitioners were disqualified, cannot stand to legal scrutiny, and the same is liable to be set aside. 20. A learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka in YASHODHARA SHROFF vs. UNION OF INDIA2 considering Section 164(2)(a) of the Act and other provisions of the Act, and various judgments, passed an elaborate order and held that the said provision has no retrospective operation. The observations of the learned Judge, pertaining to 'w.P.no.529l I of 20 l7 and barch dared 12.06.2019 private companies, which are relevant for the present purpose, are extracted as under: 208. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I have arrived at the following conclusions: (a) It is held that Section 16a(2)(a) of the Act is not u/tra v,Tus Article 14 of the Constitution. The said provision is not manifestly arbitrary and also does not fall within the scope of the doctrine of proportionality. Neither does the said provision violate Article 19(1)(9) of the Constitution as it is made in the interest of general public and a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the said right. The object and purpose of the said provision is to stipulate the consequence of a disqualification on account of the circumstances stated therein and the same is in order to achieve probity, accountability, and transparency in corporate 9OVernance. (b) That Article (sic,) Section 164(2) of the Act applies by operation of law on the basis of the circumstances stated therein, the said provision does not envisage any hearing, neither pre-disqualification nor post-disqualification and this is not in violation of the principles of natural justice, is nol ultra vlres Article 14 of the Constitution. (c) That Sectaon 764(2) ot the Act does not have retrospective operation and is therefore, neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, in view of the interpretation placed on the same. (d)... (e) Insofar as the private companies are concerned, disqualification on account of the circumstances stated under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act has been brought into force for the first time under the Act and the consequences of disqualification could not have been imposed on directors of private companies by taking into consideration any period prior to 01.04.2014 for the purpose of reckoning continuous period of three financial years under the said provision. The said conclusion is based on the principal drawn by way of analogy from Article 20(1) of the Constitution, as at no point of time prior to the enforcement of the Act, a disqualification based on the circumstances under Section 164(2) of the Act was ever envisaged under the 1956 Act vis-a-vis directors of private companies. Such a disqualification could visit a director of only a public company under Section 27aQ)@) of 1956 Act and never a director of a private company. Such disqualification of the petitioners who are directors of private companies is hence quashed. (D... (9) Consequently, where the disqualification under Section 164(2) ofthe Act is based '- on a continuous period of three financial years commencing from 01.04-2074, wherein financial statements or annual returns have not been flled by a public or private company, the directors of such a company stand disqualified and the consequences of the said disqualification would apply to them under the Act' 21. A learned Single of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in GAURANG BALVANTLALSHAH S/O BALVANTLALSHAH vs. UNION OF INDIA3 expressed similar view as that of the leaned single Judge of Hlgh Court of Karnataka (1 supra), and held that Section 164(2) of the Act of 2013, which had come into force with effect from 1.4.2014 would have prospective, and not retrospective effect and that the defaults contemplated under section 16a(2)(a) with regard to non-filing of financial statements or r r/Special Civil Application No.22435 of2017 aad batch dated 18.12.2018 ll 12 annual returns for any continuous period of three financial years would be the default to be counted from the flnancial year 2014-15 only and not 20t3-74. 22. A learned single Judge of the High Court of Madras in BHAGAVAN DAS DHANANJAYA DAS vs. IINION OF INDIA4 also expressed similar view. The relevant portion is as under: 29. In fine, (a) When the New Act 2013 came into effect from 1.4.2014, the second respondent herein has wrongly given retrospective effect and erroneously disqualified the petitioner - directors from 1.1.2016 itself before the deadline commenced wrongly fixing the first financial year from 7.4.2013 to 31.3.2014. (b) By virtue of the new Section 154(2)(a) of the 2013 Act using the expression 'for any continuous period of three financial year\" and in the light of section 2(41) defining \"financial year\" as well as their own General circular No.0B/14 dated 4.4.2ot4, the first financial year would be from 1.4.2074 to 31.3.2015, the second financial year would be from 1.4.2015 to 31.3.2016 and the third financial year would be from t.4,20t6 lo 31.3.2017, whereas the second respondent clearly admitted in paras 15 and 22 of the counter affidavit that the default of filing statutory returns for the final years commences from 2OL3-L4, 2014-15 and 2015-16 i.e, one year before the Act 2013 came into force. This is the basic incurable legal infirmity that vitiates the entire impugned proceed ings. 23. In view of the above facts and circumstances and the judgments referred to supra, as the impugned orders in present writ petitions disqualifying the petitioners as directors under Section 16a(2)(a) of the Act, have been passed considering the period prior to 01.04.2014, the same cannot be sustained, and are liable to be set aside to that extent. 24. As far as the contention regarding issuance of prior notice before disqualifying the petitioners as directors is concerned, Section 164(2)(a) is required to be notlced, and the same is extracted as under for ready reference: 164, Disqualification for appointment of director: n W.P.No.25455 of 2017 and batch date d 27 .O'7.20t8 l3 (2) No person who is or has been a director of a company which- (a) has not filed financial statements or annual returns for any continuous period of three financial years; or (b) Shall be eligible to be re-appointed as a director of that company or appointed in other companies for a period of five years from the date on which the said company fails to do so. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that it provides disq ua lification on happening of an event i.e., if a person who is or has been a director of a company has not filed financial statements or annual returns for any continuous period of three financial years, shall be ineligible to be re- appointed as a director of that company or appointed in any other company for a period of five years from the date on which the said company fails to do so. The provision does not provide for issuance of any prior notlce or hearing. A learned single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka in Yashodara Shroff v. Union of India (1 supra), as well as the learned single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Gaurang Balvantlal Shah s/o Balvantlal Shah vs. Union of India (2 supra), after analyzing various provisions of the Act and Rules framed thereunder, and by relying on various judgments of the Apex Court, held that Section 164(2)(a) of the Act applies by operation of law on the basis of the circumstances stated therein, the said provislon does not envisage any hearing, neither pre-d isq ua lification nor post-disq ua lification and this is not in violation of the principles of natural justice and hence, is not ultra vftes Article 14 of the Constitution. I concur with the said reasoning. 25. Thus, from the above, it is clear that Section 164(2)(a) of the Act is a deeming provision and the d isq ua lification envisaged under the said provision comes into force automatically by operation of law on default and Legislature did not provide for issuance of any prior notice, but the respondents notified disqualification even before it incurred, and deactivated DINs, whlch is illegal arbitrary and against provislons contained In Section 164(2)(a) of the Act. b) c) d) (a) (e) (0 l.+ 27. Rule 10 of the Rules provide for allotment of DIN and under sub rule (6) of Rule 10, lt is allotted for life time. Rule 11 provides for cancellation or deactivation. Rule 11, which is relevant for the present purpose, is extracted as under for ready reference: 11. cancellation or surrender or deactivation of DIN: The Central Government or Regional Director (Northern Region), Noida or any officer authorized by the Regional Director may, upon being satisfied on verification of particulars or documentary proof attached with the application received from any person, cancel or deactivate the DIN in case - the DIN is found to be duplicated in respect of the same person provided the data related to both the DIN shall be merged with the validly retained number; the DIN was obtained in a wrongful manner or by fraudulent means; of the death of the concerned individual; the concerned individual has been declared as a person of unsound mind by a competent Court; if the concerned individual has been adjudicated an insolvent; Provided that before cancellation or deactivation of DIN pursuant to clause (b), an opportunity of being heard shall be given to the concerned individual; on an application made in Form DIR-5 by the DIN holder to surrender his or her DIN along with declaration that he has never been appointed as director in any company and the said DIN has never been used for filing of any document with any authority, the Central Government may deactivate such DIN; Provided that before deactivation of any DIN in such case, the Central Government shall verify e-records. The terms \"wrongful manner\" means if the DIN is obtained on the strength of documents which are not legally valid or incomplete documents are furnished or on suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong certification or by making misleading or false information or by m isrepresentation; (ii) the term \"fraudulent means\" means if the DIN is obtained with an intent to deceive any other person or any authority including the Central Government. 28. Clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11, extracted above, provides for the circumstances under which the DIN can be cancelled or deactivated. The said grounds, are different from the ground envisaged under (i) 26. The next grievance of the petitioners is with regard to deactivation of their DINs. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that except for the grounds mentioned under Rule 11 (a) to (f) of the Rules, the DINs cannot be cancelled or deactivated, and the violation mentioned under Sectlon 164(2)(a) of the Act, is not one of the grounds mentioned under clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11, and hence for the alleged violation under Section 16a(2)(a) of the Act, DIN cannot be cancelled. Explanation: for the purposes of clause (b) - l5 Section 164(2)(a) of the Act. Therefore, for the alleged violation under Section 164 of the Act, DINs cannot be cancelled or deactivated, except in accordance with Rule 11 of the Rules. 29. Learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court in the decision cited 2 supra, held as under: 30, Rule 11 provides for cancellation or surrender or deactivation of DIN. Accordingly, the Central Government or Regional Director or any authorized officer of Regional Director may, on being satisfied on verification of particulars of documentary proof attached with an application from any person, cancel or deactivate the DIN on any of the grounds mentioned in Clause (a) to (f) thereof. The said Rule 11 does not contemplate any suo motu powers either with the Central Government or with the authorized officer or Regional Director to cancel or deactivate the DIN allotted to the Director, nor any of the clauses mentioned in the said Rules contemplates cancellation or deactivation of DIN of the Director of the \"struck off company\" or of the Director having become ineligible under Section 164 of the said Act. The reason appears to be that once an individual, who is intending to be the Director of a particular company is allotted DIN by the Central Government, such DIN would be valid for the life time of the applicant and on the basis of such DIN he could become Director in other companies also. Hence, if one of the companies in which he was Director, is \"struck off\", his DIN could not be cancelled or deactivated as that would run counter to the provisions contained in the Rule 11, which speciFically provides for the circumstances under which the DIN could be cancelled or deactivated. 31. In that view of the matter, the Court is of the opinion that the action of the respondents in deactivating the DINs of the petitioners - Directors along with the publication of the impugned list of Directors of \"struck off\" companies under Section 248, also was not legally tenable. Of course, as per Rule 12 of the said Rules, the individual who has been allotted the DIN, in the event of any change in his particulars stated in Form DIR -3 has to intimate such change to the Central Government within the prescribed time in Form DIR-6, however, if that is not done, the DIN could not be cancelled or deactivated. The cancellation or deactivation of the DIN could be resorted to by the concerned respondents only as per the provisions contained in the said Rules.\" 30. In view of the above facts and circumstances and the judgment referred to supra, the deactivation of the DINs of the petitloners for alleged violations under Section 164 of the Act, cannot be sustained. \"29. This takes the Court to the next question as to whether the respondents could have deactivated the DINS of the petitioner as a consequence of the impugned list? In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions contained in the Act and the said Rules. Section 153(3) provides that no person shall be appointed as a Director of a company, unless he has been allotted the Director Identification Number under Section 154. Section 153 requires every individual intending to be appointed as Director of a Company to make an application for allotment of DIN to the Central Government in such form and manner as may be prescribed. Section 154 states that the Central Government shall within one month from the receipt of the application under Section 153 allot a DIN to an applicant in such manner as may be prescribed. Section 155 prohibits any individual, who has already been allotted a DIN under Section 154 from applying for or obtaining or possessing another DIN. Rules 9 and 10 of the said Rules of 2014 prescribe the procedure for making application for allotment and for the allotment of DIN, and further provide that the DIN allotted by the Central Government under the said Rules would be valid for the life time of the applicant and shall not be allotted to any other person. l6 31. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned orders in the writ petitions to the extent of disqualifying the petitioners under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act and deactivatlon of their DINS, are set aside, and the 2nd respondent is directed to activate the DINS of the petitioners, enabling them to function as Directors other than in strike off companies. 32. It is made clear that this order will not preclude the 2nd respondent from taking appropriate action in accordance with law for violations as envisaged under Section t64(2) of the Act, giving the said provision prospective effect from Ot'O4.2Ot4 and for necessary action against DIN in case of violations of Rule 11 of the Rules' 33. It is also made clear that if the petitioners are aggrieved by the actlon of the respondents in striking off their companies under Section 248 of the Act, they are at liberty to avail alternative remedy under Section 252 of the Act. 34. All the writ petitions are accordingly allowed to the extent ind icated above. A.RAJASHEKER REDDY,J DATE: 18-07-2019 AVS 35. Interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. No order as to costs. "