PURNAGIRI RICE MILLS,SHAHJAHANPUR V. INCOME TAX OFFICER, SHAHJAHANPUR

ITA 251/LKW/2017

AI Insights

The case involves Purnagiri Rice Mills, which appealed against the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) - Bareilly, pertaining to the assessment year 2007-08. The primary contention was regarding the validity of the reopening of the assessment by the Income Tax Officer, which was challenged on grounds that it was based on a change of opinion rather than new material, and that the original assessment had been completed without any failure on the part of the assessee to disclose true and correct particulars of income. The Tribunal examined the reasons for reopening and found that the issues had been previously addressed in the original assessment, and no new facts had emerged to justify the reopening.

• Counselvise Citation: [2025] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 790091 (ITAT-LUCKNOW)
• Duration Of Justice: 55 year(s) 10 month(s) 24 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 26-11-2025
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Allowed
• Bench Allotted: B
• Assessment Year: misc
• Appeal Filed On: 01-01-1970
• Other Referred Cases: Bankipur Club Ltd vs CIT, CIT vs Kelvinator of India Ltd, Sesa Goa Ltd vs JCIT, Ananta Landmark Pvt. Ltd. vs DCIT & Others
• Laws Referred To: Income Tax Act, 1961
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: R.R.N. SHUKLA
• Assessee Lawyers: SAURABH GUPTA
• Keywords: Condonation of delay; Set aside; Difference of opinion; Change of opinion; Reasonable cause; Corroborative evidences; Reopening of assessment; Wrong claim; Assessment record; Reason to believe; Tangible material
• Section: 147; 148; 143(3); 142(1)

Judgement Text

"आयकर अपीलीय अधिकरण ‘बी’ न्यायपीठ, लखनऊ। IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL LUCKNOW BENCH “B”, LUCKNOW श्री क ुल भारत, उपाध्यक्ष एवं श्री ननखखल चौिरी, लेखा सदस्य क े समछ BEFORE SHRI KUL BHARAT, VICE PRESIDENT AND SHRI NIKHIL CHOUDHARY, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER आयकर अपील सं/ ITA No.251/LKW/2017 ननिाारण वर्ा/ Assessment Year: 2007-08 Purnagiri Rice Mills, Meeran Pur Katra, Shahajhanpur-242301. v. Income Tax Officer Range-1(5), Shahajhanpur-242301. PAN:AAHFP6663R अपीलार्थी/(Appellant) प्रत्यर्थी/(Respondent) अपीलार्थी कक और से/Appellant by: Shri Saurabh Gupta, CA प्रत्यर्थी कक और से /Respondent by: Shri R. R. N. Shukla, Addl. CIT(DR) सुनवाई कक तारीख / Date of hearing: 28 10 2025 घोर्णा कक तारीख/ Date of pronouncement: 26 11 2025 आदेश / O R D E R PER KUL BHARAT, VICE PRESIDENT.: This appeal, by the assessee, is directed against the order of the Learned Commissioner of Income tax (Appeals)-Bareilly dated 03.11.2016, pertaining to the assessment year 2007-08. The assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal: - “1. That the Id. CIT (A) has erred in law and on facts and on facts and circumstances of the case in holding that the reopening proceedings have been validity initiated in as much as no income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment within the meaning of sec. 147 of the Income Tax Act which renders the entire reopening and assessment bad in law. 2. That the Id. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts and circumstances of the case in not considering the fact that the original assessment this case was completed u/s 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and there was no failure on the part of the assessee so as to clothe the Assessing Officer with the powers of reopening of the assessment within the meaning of the Proviso to sec. 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 3. That in any view of the case the Id. CIT(A) has failed to appreciate that the reopening of assessment has been made without any new material on record on appraisal of the documents filed/explained during the course of Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.251/LKW/2017 Page 2 of 12 original assessment proceedings which tantamount to a change of opinion only and therefore the reopening of assessment was bad in law. 4. That without prejudice, the Id. CIT(A) has failed to appreciate that the details of entire purchase of paddy were duly maintained by the appellant in the excise register and the bonus on purchase of paddy is paid to farmers as per government notification and therefore the Assessing Officer was not justified in disallowing Rs. 2,75,939/for alleged unverifiable paddy purchases and Rs. 6,95,618/for alleged unverifiable bonus on paddy purchases which additions deserve to be deleted. 5. That the appellant craves leave to add, alter, amend or withdraw any or all of the grounds of appeal at any time before or during the hearing.” 2. During the course of hearing, it was noted that the appeal is barred by time for 63 days. The assessee has filed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing of this appeal. Ld. Counsel for the assessee reiterated the submissions as made in the application seeking condonation of delay. It is contended that the Ld. Authorized Representative of the assessee was unwell and therefore, the appeal could not be filed within the prescribed time. An affidavit to this effect has also been filed in support of the contention. It was further submitted that the assessee did not obtain any undue advantage for the delay in filing the present appeal. He submitted that in order to secure the interest of justice, the delay may be condoned and appeal may be admitted for adjudication. 3. On the other hand, the Ld. Departmental Representative for Revenue opposed the submissions of the assessee and contended that the delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of medical exigency. Therefore, he submitted that the appeal may be dismissed on the ground of limitation alone. 4. We have heard the rival contention and perused the material available on record. It is stated by the Ld. Authorized Representative for the assessee that the delay occurred in filing the present appeal due to a medical exigency, an affidavit is also filed in this regard. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.251/LKW/2017 Page 3 of 12 present case and the statement made on affidavit by the assessee, we are of the view that there was reasonable cause for the delay in filing the present appeal. We, therefore, respectfully following the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Land Acquisition Vs. MST. Katiji & Ors 167 ITR 471 (SC) hereby condone the delay and admit the appeal for hearing on merits. 5. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are that in this case, the assessment was completed u/s 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“Act”, for short) on 24.12.2009, assessing total income at Rs.46,460/-. Thereafter, the Assessing Officer (AO) re- opened the assessment after obtaining the requisite approval from the Ld. CIT, Bareilly. A notice u/s 148 of the Act dated 10.01.2014 was accordingly, issued to the assessee. The reasons recorded for re-opening the assessment are that certain expenses related to payment of bonus on paddy purchase and paddy purchase expenses amounting to Rs. 10,28,197/- did not pertain to A.Y. 2007-08, hence, as per the AO these expenses were liable to be disallowed. Thus, the Assessing Officer treated the same as income that had escaped assessment due to the alleged failure on the part of the assessee to disclose true and correct particulars of income. Thereafter, notices u/s 142(1) of the Act were issued on various dates to the assessee. In response to, notice dated 10.09.2014, Shri Neeraj Rastogi, the Ld. Authorized Representative of the assessee appeared and filed his power of attorney along with a written reply before AO who after considering the reply so filed passed the impugned assessment order, thereby by assessing the income at Rs.10,18,020/-. Thus, in the re-opened assessment, the AO made two disallowances of Rs.2,75,939/- and Rs.6,95,618/- being the unverifiable paddy purchase expenses and amount of bonus paid on paddy Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.251/LKW/2017 Page 4 of 12 purchases respectively. Aggrieved against this, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Ld. CIT(A), who sustained the additions. Now, the assessee is in appeal before this Tribunal. 6. Ground Nos. 1 to 3 are raised against the validity of re- opening of the assessment. The Ld. Counsel for the assessee vehemently argued that the Assessing Officer had thoroughly examined the issues related to purchases and payment of bonus on paddy purchase during the original assessment. After scrutinizing the expenses and the accounts of the assessee, the Assessing Officer, vide order dated 11.03.2015 had assessed the income at Rs. 46,460/-. He contended that there was no material before the Assessing Officer, in re-assessment proceedings other than which had not already been considered. He further contended that since more than four years had elapsed, the assessment ought not to have been re-opened without pointing out failure on the part of the assessee to disclose true and correct particulars. He drew our attention to page no. 3 of paper book to say that the error regarding incorrect assessment year had been duly explained before the Assessing Authority during the original assessment proceedings. The Ld. Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Bankipur Club Ltd vs CIT (1971) 82 ITR 831 (SC) and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of CIT vs Kelvinator of India Ltd (2010) 320 ITR 561 (SC) to buttress the contention that in the absence of any new material, the assessment could not have been re-opened u/s 147 of the Act. 7. On the other hand, the Ld. Departmental Representative (DR) for Revenue opposed these submissions and supported the order of lower authorities. He contended that there is no infirmity Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.251/LKW/2017 Page 5 of 12 in re-opening of the assessment since there was clearly wrong claim of the expenses by the assessee. 8. Heard, the Ld. Representatives of the parties and perused the material available on records. The objections of the assessee against re-opening of assessment are that one, there is no escapement of income, two, there is no failure on the part of the assessee in disclosing true and correct particulars of income and three, the re-opening ex facie is based on “change of opinion” which could not be done in the light of binding precedents. The Ld. Counsel for the assessee, in support of these objections, placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Bankipur Club vs. CIT (1971) 82 ITR 831 (SC), wherein it was held as under:– “8. Now coming to the question referred in respect of the assessment year 1956-57 and the second question referred in respect of the subsequent years the Income-tax Officer has not placed any material before the Tribunal to show that he received any fresh information either on questions of facts or on questions of law subsequent to the date he passed the original assessment orders. This court has repeatedly ruled that the information referred to in Section 34(1)(b) must be that the Income-tax Officer receives after he makes the original order of assessment. It must come to his knowledge subsequent to the assessment sought to be reopened. In these cases it is admitted that all the facts were placed before the Income-tax Officer when he passed the original orders of assesssment. The fact that the Club had received certain amounts as guests charges from its members had been placed before the Income-tax Officer. It is not the case of the Income-tax Officer that he did not come to know all the relevant facts when he made the original orders of assessment. It is also not his case that at the time he made those orders he was not aware of the true legal position. It was for the Income-tax Officer to show that he had received some information subsequent to his passing the original orders of assessment. No such material was placed before the Tribunal. That being so, the Tribunal, in our opinion was right in holding that the Income-tax Officer was incompetent to initiate proceedings under Section 34(1)(b). The High Court has given no reason to come to the conclusion that there was any subsequent information on the basis which the Income-tax Officer could have re-assessed the assessee under Section 34(1)(b). 9. For the reasons mentioned above, we allow Civil Appeal Nos. 1304, 1307 of 1971 to the extent mentioned above, discharge the answer given in respect of the question relating to the assessment year 1956 57 as well as the answer given to the second question relating to the subsequent years and answer those questions in favour of the assessee. The answer given by the High Court in respect of the first question relating to the assessment years 1957-58, 1958-59 and 1959-60 stands. The assessee is entitled to its coats in these appeals in this Court. Hearing fee one set.” Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.251/LKW/2017 Page 6 of 12 9. The reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Kelvinator of India Ltd (2010) 320 ITR 561 (SC) wherein it has been held as under: - “We must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to re-assess. The Assessing Officer has no power to review; he has the power to re-assess. But re-assessment has to be based on fulfillment of certain pre-condition and if the concept of \"change of opinion\" is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of re-opening the assessment, review would take place. One must treat the concept of \"change of opinion\" as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after 1st April, 1989, Assessing Officer has power to re-open, provided there is \"tangible material\" to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. Our view gets support from the changes made to Section 147 of the Act, as quoted hereinabove. Under the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, Parliament not only deleted the words \"reason to believe\" but also inserted the word \"opinion\" in Section 147 of the Act. However, on receipt of representations from the Companies against omission of the words \"reason to believe\", Parliament re-introduced the said expression and deleted the word \"opinion\" on the ground that it would vest arbitrary powers in the Assessing Officer. We quote hereinbelow the relevant portion of Circular No.549 dated 31st October, 1989, which reads as follows: \"7.2 Amendment made by the Amending Act, 1989, to reintroduce the expression `reason to believe' in Section 147.--A number of representations were received against the omission of the words `reason to believe' from Section 147 and their substitution by the `opinion' of the Assessing Officer. It was pointed out that the meaning of the expression, `reason to believe' had been explained in a number of court rulings in the past and was well settled and its omission from section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to reopen past assessments on mere change of opinion. To allay these fears, the Amending Act, 1989, has again amended section 147 to reintroduce the expression `has reason to believe' in place of the words `for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, is of the opinion'. Other provisions of the new section 147, however, remain the same.\" 10. The reliance is further placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Sesa Goa Ltd vs JCIT (2008) 168 Taxman 281 (Bom) wherein the Hon’ble High Court after elaborately examining the facts and law held as under: - “16. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in GKN Driveshafts India Ltd.'s case (supra) has been considered and explained by two Division Benches of this court in Caprihans India Ltd. v, Tarun Seem, Dy. CIT (2004) 266 ITR 566, and Ajanta Pharma Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [2004] 267 ITR 200. In the former decision, the Division Bench held that the petition which was filed by the assessee challenging the notice could not be dismissed as the reasons subsequently disclosed by the Assessing Officer show that there was no prima facie finding that the assessee had failed to Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.251/LKW/2017 Page 7 of 12 make true and full disclosure of all material facts. The Division Bench entertained the petition and quashed the notice. In the present case, the petitioner by his letter dated 28-62001, did request respondent No. 1 to inform him the reasons recorded under section 148(2). Despite this request the reasons were not furnished but on the other hand, notice under section 142 was issued on 24-72001. Though the writ petition was filed as early as 31-8-2001, reasons were disclosed for the first time on 172-2004, by annexing a copy of the reasons to the affidavit-in-reply sworn in by N.N. Murthy Naik. On account of the non-disclosure of the reasons, despite demand, there was no occasion for the petitioner to make a representation to the Assessing Officer and object to those reasons. Rule was issued by this court on the writ petition on 16-10-2001, and it would not be proper for use to dismiss the writ petition at this stage after a lapse of more than two and a half years on the ground that the petitioner, after the reasons are disclosed after two and a half years should now object to the reasons by filing objections before the Assessing Officer. Furthermore, we have held that the Assessing Officer had sought to reopen the assessment not on the ground of non-disclosure of the facts truly and fully but on the ground of change of opinion based upon the decision of this court in the case of K.K. Doshi & Co. (supra). As we have held earlier that change of opinion based upon a subsequent decision of a court is no ground of reopening of an assessment under section 147 of the Act after the expiry of a period of four years. Thus, in the present case, there is inherent lack of jurisdiction in the respondents to reopen the assessment.” 11. The assessee has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Ananta Landmark Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT & Others in Writ Petition No.2814 of 2019, wherein it has been held as under: – “17 We are satisfied that petitioner had truly and fully disclosed all material facts necessary for the purpose of assessment. Not only material facts were disclosed by petitioner truly and fully but they were carefully scrutinized and figures of income as well as deduction were reworked carefully by the Assessing Officer. In the reasons for reopening, the Assessing Officer has infact relied upon the audited accounts to say that the claim of deduction under Section 57 of the Act was not correct, the figures mentioned in the reason for reopening of assessment are also found in the audited accounts of petitioner. In the reasons for reopening, there is not even a whisper as to what was not disclosed. In the order rejecting the objections, the Assessing Officer admits that all details were fully disclosed. In our view, this is not a case where the assessment is sought to be reopened on the reasonable belief that income had escaped assessment on account of failure of the assessee to disclose truly and fully all material facts that were necessary for computation of income but this is a case wherein the assessment is sought to be reopened on account of change of opinion of the Assessing Officer about the manner of computation of the deduction under Section 57 of the Act. In a similar case where the notice to reopen the assessment was founded entirely on the assessment records and the entire basis for reopening the assessment was the disclosure which has been made by the assessee in the course of the assessment proceedings and where no material to which a reference was to be found, a Division Bench of this Court in 3i Infotech Limited V/s. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax 10 relied upon by Mr. Pardiwalla, in paragraph 12 held : 12. The record before the Court, to which a reference has been made earlier, is clearly reflective of the position that during the course of the assessment Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.251/LKW/2017 Page 8 of 12 proceedings the assessee had made a full and true disclosure of all material facts in relation to the assessment. As a matter of fact, it would be necessary to note that the notice to reopen the assessment on the first issue is founded entirely on the assessment records. There is no new material to which a reference is to be found and the entire basis for reopening the assessment is the disclosure which has been made by the assessee in the course of the assessment proceedings. In Cartini India Limited V/s. Additional Commissioner of Income Tax [(2009) 314 ITR 275 (Bom.)], a Division Bench of this Court has observed that where on consideration of material on record, one view is conclusively taken by the Assessing Officer, it would not be open to the Assessing Officer to reopen the assessment based on the very same material with a view to take another view. The principal which has been enunciated in Cartini must apply to the facts of a case such as the present. The assessee had during the course of the assessment proceedings made a complete disclosure of material facts. The Assessing Officer had called for a disclosure on which a specific disclosure on the issue in question was made. In such a case, it cannot be postulated that the condition precedent to the reopening of an assessment beyond a period of four years has been fulfilled. 18 It will be proper in the circumstances to quote a paragraph from the judgment of the Apex Court in Parashuram Pottery Works Co. Ltd. V/s. Income Tax Officer 11 (cited by Mr. Pardiwalla), and it reads as under : It has been said that the taxes are the price that we pay for civilization. If so, it is essential that those who are entrusted with the task of calculating and realising that price should familiarise themselves with the relevant provisions and become well versed with the law on the subject. Any remissness on their part can only be at the cost of the national exchequer and must necessarily result in loss of revenue. At the same time, we have to bear in mind that the policy of law is that there must be a point of finality in all legal proceedings, that state issues should not be reactivated beyond a particular stage and that lapse of time must induce repose in and set at rest judicial and quasi-judicial controversies as it must in other spheres of human activity. So far as income-tax assessment orders are concerned, they cannot be reopened on the scope of income escaping assessment under Section 147 of the Act of 1961 after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year unless there be omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment. As already mentioned, 'this cannot be said in the present case. The appeal is consequently allowed; the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the impugned notices are quashed. The parties in the circumstances shall bear their own costs throughout. 19 As already mentioned, it cannot be said in the present case that there was an omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment. It cannot be stated that the condition precedent to the reopening of an assessment beyond a period of four years has been fulfilled. The statement in the reasons for reopening “I have reasons to believe that income of Rs.7,66,66,663/- which was chargeable to tax has escaped assessment by reason of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all facts necessary …..” is clearly made only as an attempt to take the case out of the restrictions imposed by the proviso to Section 147 of the Act. As observed in Parashuram Pottery Works Co. Ltd. (Supra), it would be in the interest of citizens of India or we should say, civilization that those who are entrusted with the task of calculating and realising the price that we pay for the civilization should familiarise themselves with the relevant provisions and become well versed with the law on the subject. Any remissness on their part can only be at the cost of the national exchequer and must necessarily result in loss of revenue.” 12. Vide communication dated 23.01.2017, the Assessing Authority intimated the assessee regarding the reasons for reopening the assessment. For the sake of clarity, para no. 2 of the said letter dated 23.01.2017 is reproduced as under: Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.251/LKW/2017 Page 9 of 12 13. From the above reasons, it is evident that the basis for reopening of the assessment was the assessee’s claim of the aforesaid expenditure, which, according to the Assessing Authority, did not pertain to the assessment year under consideration. 14. Therefore, from the reasons recorded, it is evident that the basis for reopening the assessment is not the allowability of the expenditure per se, but the allegation that the expenditure was claimed in the wrong assessment year. The case of the Assessing Officer is that the expenditure does not pertain to the assessment year under consideration, i.e., A.Y. 2007–08. In the paper book, the assessee has enclosed a letter purportedly to have been written in response to the notice dated 10.09.2014 issued under section 142(1) of the Act. The relevant contents of the said letter are reproduced as under:– “1. That the error of dates in the manually prepared schedules of expenses is an inadvertent clerical slip causing the period to be misstated as April to December 2007 instead of 2006 and that of January to March 2007 to be stated as 2008. This error has occurred only in statements of Bonus and Paddy expenses. Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.251/LKW/2017 Page 10 of 12 2. That the error is only a clerical mistake is evident from the original books and documents which are produced for corroboration. We are making available the cash book, ledger, 9R,6R and Levy & Satti Reigister. It may be noted that the data in both is absolutely the same.” 15. However, the Assessing Officer made the impugned addition on the ground that the assessee failed to furnish supporting evidence relating to the bonus on paddy purchase amounting to Rs. 6,95,618/-. The addition was made as the bonus on paddy was treated as unverifiable for the relevant assessment year. It is noticed from the impugned orders of the lower authorities that no verification was carried out by them in this regard. The reopening was categorically based on the allegation that the assessee had claimed expenditure pertaining to another assessment year. The assessee explained before the Assessing Authority that, due to a clerical mistake, a wrong year was recorded in the accounts. However, the heading of the relevant page clearly states the period 01.04.2006 to 31.03.2007, which establishes that the expenditure was related to the financial year 2006–07 and was relevant to the assessment year 2007–08. It is also an undisputed fact that the issue relating to the allowance of expenditure was examined by the Assessing Authority in the original assessment proceedings. The lower authorities i.e. u/s 143(2) of the Act rejected the explanation offered by the assessee without adverting to the correctness of the audited accounts of the assessee. In the audited accounts, the assessee has shown payment of bonus on paddy amounting to Rs. 6,95,618/-, and goods expenses of Rs. 3,32,579.49/-, which the Assessing Authority has treated as paddy purchase expenses. Therefore, when the foundation for re-opening of the assessment is on incorrect facts, moreover, it is nothing but fresh looking to the same facts afresh. We find under these undisputed facts merit into the contention of the assessee that the re- opening of assessment u/s 147 of the Act tantamount to review Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.251/LKW/2017 Page 11 of 12 of the original assessment order. The AO has grossly failed to point out any new fact or material which came to his notice subsequent to the framing of assessment order. Therefore, respectfully following the binding precedents in the case of Bankipur Club vs. CIT (supra), CIT vs Kelvinator of India Ltd (supra), Sesa Goa Ltd vs JCIT (supra) and Ananta Landmark Pvt Ltd vs DCIT & others (supra), we hereby set aside the impugned assessment order being contrary to the settled principles of law. We hold accordingly. The ground nos. 1 to 3 are allowed. 16. Ground no. 4 is on the merit of disallowance of expenses. 17. Heard the Ld. Representatives of the parties on this issue. The assessee has successfully demonstrated that the amount pertains to the relevant year under appeal. Therefore, the finding of the Assessing Officer that such expenditure relate to the earlier assessment years is unsustainable and the addition made by the Assessing Officer on this misconceived fact also cannot be sustained. Therefore, we hereby direct the Assessing Officer to delete the disallowance. The ground no. 4 of the assessee’s appeal is allowed. 18. Ground no. 5 is general in nature and requires no adjudication. 19. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed. Order pronounced in the open Court on 26/11/2025. Sd/- [ननखखल चौिरी] Sd/- [क ुल भारत] [NIKHIL CHOUDHARY] [KUL BHARAT] लेखा सदस्य/ACCOUNTANT MEMBER उपाध्यक्ष/VICE PRESIDENT ददनांक/DATED: 26/11/2025 Vijay Pal Singh, (Sr. PS) Printed from counselvise.com ITA No.251/LKW/2017 Page 12 of 12 Copy forwarded to: 1. Appellant 2. Respondent 3. CIT 4. DR 5. Guard File By order Sr. Private Secretary // True Copy Printed from counselvise.com "