Ramachandra Reddy Obilipapannagari V. Union of India

WP/24573/2020

AI Insights

The case revolves around the disqualification of Ramachandra Reddy Obilipapannagari from holding directorships in companies due to alleged defaults in filing financial statements and annual returns for three consecutive years. This disqualification was enforced under Section 164(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013, which came into effect on April 1, 2014. The petitioner challenged the disqualification and the subsequent deactivation of his DIN, arguing that the actions taken were retrospective and thus illegal. The court examined whether the disqualification could be applied retrospectively and found that it could not, leading to the setting aside of the disqualification and the reactivation of the DIN.

• Counselvise Citation: [2021] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 677401 (HC-TELANGANA)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 04-01-2021
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (CENTRAL) v. VATIKA TOWNSHIP PRIVATE LIMITED, YASHODHARA SHROFF vs. UNION OF INDIA, GAURANG BALVANTLAL SHAH S/O BALVANTLAL SHAH VS. UNION OF INDIA
• Laws Referred To: Companies Act, 2013, Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors) Rules, 2014, Constitution of India
• Result in Favour of: Others
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: NAMAVARAPU RAO
• Assessee Lawyers: M S MANO RANJANI CS
• Keywords: Director Identification Number; Disqualification; Natural Justice; Writ of Mandamus
• Section: 226; 248; 252; 164(2)(a)

Judgement Text

"HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD (Special Original Jurisdiction) I IONDAY, THE FOURTH DAY OF JANUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY ONE PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM WRIT PETITION NO: 24573 OF 2020 Between: Ramachandra Reddy Obilipapannagari, S/o. lVr Tirupal Reddy Obilipapannagari, Aged about 55 years, Occupation Business Resident of Hal 202, Pamidi Towers Plot 25,a 261a, Jai Hind Enclave, Karvy Road, Madhapur, Hyderabad Telangana 500081 . ...PETITIONER AND 1. Union of lndia, Represented by its tr/inistry of Corporate Affairs, Shastri Bhawan, Dr, Rajender Prasad Road, New Delhi - 110001 2. The Registrar of Companies, Telangana 2nd Floor, Corporate Bhawan, Thattiannaram, G.S.l. Post, Bandlaguda, Nagole, Hyderabad 500068. ...RESPONDENTS Petition under Adicle 226 of the Constitution of lndia praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to issue a Writ Order or Direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of lVandamus declaring the action of the Respondents in so far as deactivating the Director ldentification Number of Petitioners, (Ramachandra Reddy Obilipapannagari DIN#00494915) (deactivation with the effect from 0111112016 1o 3111012021) and listing the name as Disqualified Director and thereby restricting the Petitioner to continue as Director of the Companies andior get appoint or reappointed as Director of any Company and file statutory returns i.e., annual returns and financial statements of the companies in which they are Director as arbitrary, illegal without jurisdiction contrary to the provision of the Companles Act, 2013 and Rule 11 of the Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors) Rules 2014 violation of the principles of natural justices besides violating the petitioner rights guaranteed under Adicle 14 and Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of lndia. fA NO: 1 OF 2020 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to direct the Respondent to stay the disabling and restore the Director ldentification Number of Petitioners, (Ramachand raReddy Obilipapannagari DIN#00494915) (deactivation with the effect from 01/1 112016 lo 3111012021) so as to enable them to continue as Director of the Companies and/or get appoint or reappointed as Director of any Company and file statutory returns ie ' annual returns and financial statements of the active companies in which they are the directors without any interference and earn remuneration for their live hood by serving the company as Director' Counsel for the Petitioner: M/S' MANO RANJANI C'S' Counsel for the Respondents: SRI NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO' .. NSSISTIUT SOLICITOR GENERAL The Court made the following: ORDER THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM WRIT PETITION No\" 24573 of 2O2O ORDER: The petitioner challenges his disqualification lrom Directorship unde r Section 16aQJ of the Companies Act, 20.l 3, for the alleged delault in liling financial statement/Annual Returns, ard consequently seek restoration of his Director Identification Number (DIN) viz., 00494915. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the issue raised in the present Wril. Petition is squarely covered by the common order dateci lB.A7 .2019 in W.P.No.5422 of 2018 ancl ba Lch. Lc:irned Assistanr SolicLror General appearing for the 2n.r :-r:sponcle nt. - Ilcg:srrar of Con-rpanies does nor dispute the aforesaid subrrrssior-r. Operative porlion of the aforesaid order reads as under: \"For the foregoing reasons, the impugned orders in the writ petitions to the extent of disqualifying the petitioners under Section l6a?l@) of the Act and deactivation of their DINS, are set aside, and the 2\"d respondent is directed to activate the DINs of the petitioners, enabling them to function as Directors other thau in strike off companies. It is made clear that this order will not preclude the 2\"d respondent from taking appropriate action in accordance with law for violations as envisaged under Section L64l2l of the Act, giving the said provision prospective effect from O1.O4,2O14 and for necessary action against DIN in case of violations of Rule 11 of the Rules. It is also made clear that if the petitioners are aggrieved by the action of the respondents In striking off their companies under Section 248 of the Act, they are at , liberty to avail alternative remedy under Section 252 of the Act. All the writ petitiols are accordilgly allowed to the extent indicated above.\" In view of the said Order dated lB.O7 2019 and for the reasons recorded therein, this Writ Petition is also allowed in lerms thereof. No costs To, 5. Two CD CoPies CHR Miscellaneous Petitions, if an1, pending, shal1 stand closc:d. SD/.CH.VENKATESWARU LU ASSISTANTBEGISTRAR //TRUE coPY/ t secrr3$orrrcrn 1 The lvlinistrv of Corporate Affairs, Union of lndia' Shastri Bhawan' Dr' Rajender PrisaO Roid, New Delhi - 110001 2. The Reqistrar of Companiet, fli'ngan' 2nd FIoor'. Coroorate Bhawan' rhauian-naram, o. s. r. posi-sa i;u;;i; N;s\"l\" rivo\"iaoao 500068 3. o;;id'i;' Mll mino nunpni c s lAdvocate.[oPUCl 4. One CC to Sri r.lurn\"ur|\"lJI'n;\"\".Ii;;iR;. Aisistarit Solicitor General IOPUCI (Along with a copy of order in W P No'5422 of 2018 and batch' dated 18 07 '241s I HIGH COURT DATED:0410112021 ORDER W.P.No.24573 of 2020 ALLOWING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS 12 lAN2t2l * o O 7^ a -A PA,TC 14 S E H ( );-r t- ), i b THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAJASHEKER REDDY W.P.NOs.5422. 12184. 13520. 13783. 13855. 14166. 24051,30993. AND 40953 0F 2018.5547, 5582. 5669, 5687. 5785, 6047. 6087, 6140.6484. 6753. 6858. 6958.6981. 7OO1, 7OO8,7Q14, 7046. 7p69. 7073. 7]-O5. 7432. 7454. 7572. 7595. 7732, 7765. 776A. 7424, 7974. 8111.8223.8s86, 8590, 9333.9340, 9381. 9468' 9563. 9s84' 9623. 9726. 9737, LOO5A. tOO99, Lt20A, LL223, 1L239. Lr263, LLAAg. LL99t. t20LA. L2036. 12040. L2069. l2LOa. L2t44. 12LA6, L2194. 1 2200. 1 22r]9- 12215. t2) 1'' . 122 3. 122 o. 7a262. 1228 1)?4). 4 12350. 124L7. L2432. 12472. 1249a. 12506. L2574. 1259A. L2621. 12702, 2735. L2740. L284s. 12850. 128 s. 12866. 13013 13518. 7 7 1 1 4 74 I t43 14409. t4sa2 AND 14597 oF 2019 Since, the issue involved ln all the writ petitions is one and the same, they are heard together and are being disposed of by this common order' 2. The petitioners are the directors of the private companies, registered under the companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013) (for short'the Act'). Some of the such companies are active, and some of them have been struck off from the register of companies under section 248(1)( c ) of the Act, for not carrying on any business operation for the specified period mentioned in the said provision, and for not making any application within the specified period, for obtaining the status of a dormant company under section 455 of the Act. 3. The petitioners, who were directors of the struck off companies, and who are presently directors of actlve companies, during the relevant period in question, failed to file financial statements or annual returns for a continuous period of three years. Therefore, the 2'd respondent passed the impugnedorderunderSectionT6aQ)ottheAct,disqualifyingthemas directors, and further making them ineligible to be re-appointed as directors of that company, or any other company, for a period of five years from the date on which the respective companies failed to do so' The Director IdentificationNUmbers(DINs)ofthepetitionersWerealsodeactivated, Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petitions have been filed' COMMON ORDER 1 4. This court qranted interim orders in the writ petitions directing the 2nd respondent to activate DINs of the petitioners, to enable them to function other than in strike off companies. 5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in all the writ petitions, Sri K.Lakshman, learned Assistant Solicitor General appearing for the respondents - Union of India. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners, contend that before passing the impugned order, notices have not been issued, giving them opportunity, and this amounts to violation of principles of natural justice, and on this ground alone, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 7. Learned counsel submits that Section 16a(2)(a) of the Act empowers the authority to disqualify a person to be a director, provided he has not filed financial statements or annual returns of the company to which he is director, for any continuous period of three financial years. Learned counsel further submits that this provision came into force with effect from L4.2O14, and prior thereto i.e., under Section Zl+(t)(g) of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), which is the analogous provision, there was no such requirement for the directors of the private companies. They contend that this provision under Act 18 of 2013, will have prospective operation and hence, if the directors of company fail to comply with the requirements mentioned in the said provision subsequent to the said date, the authority under the Act, is within its jurisdiction to disqualify them. But in the present cases, the 2nd respondent, taking the period prior to 1.4.2074, i.e., giving the provision retrospective effect, disqualified the petitioners as directors, which is illegal and a rbitrary. B. With regard to deactivation of DINs, learned counsel for the petitioners submit that the DINs, as contemplated under Rule 2(d) of the Companies (Appointment and Qualification of Directors), Rules, 2014 (for 3 short'th: Rures), are granted for riFe time to the appricants under Rure 10(6) of the sard Rules, and cancellation of the DIN can be made only for the grounds m€r'tioned in clauses (a) to (f) under Rule 11 0f the Rules, and the said grounds loes not provide for deactivation for having become ineligible for appointmer{ as Directors of the company under section 164 of the Act. Learned cotrnsel ri.rrther submits that as against the deactivation, no appeal is provided under ti.:e Rules, and appeal to the Tribunal under Section 252 of the Act is provide,l only against the dissolution of the company under Section 248 of the Act. 9. Learned counsel further submits that 1't respondent - Government of India represented by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, has floated a scheme dated 29.72.2017 viz., Condonation of Delay Scheme - 2018, wherein the directors, whose DINs have been deactivated by the 2nd respondent, allows the DINs of the Directors to be activated. However, such scheme is not applicable to the companies whi,ch are struck off under Section 2aB(5) of the Act. In case of active companies, they can make application to National Company Law Tribunal under Sectlon 252 of the Act, seeking for restoration, and the Tribunal can order for reactivation of DIN of such directors, whose DIN are deactivated. However, under Section 252 only the Companies, which are carrying on the business, can approach the Tribunal and the companies, which have no business, cannot approach the Tribunal for restoration. They submit that since the penal provision is given retrospective operation, de hors the above scheme, they are entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 10, With the above contentions. learned counsel sought to set aside the impugned orders and to allow the writ petitions. 11. on the other hand learned Assistant Solicitor General submits that failure to file financial statements or annual returns for any continuous period 4 of three financial years, automatically entail their disqualifica-tibn under Section 164(2)(a) oF the Act and the statute does not provide for issuance of / any notice. Hence, the petitioners, who have failed to coryply with the statutory requirement under Section 164 of the Act, can n rit complain of violation of principles of natural justice, as it is a deeming pibvision' Learned counsel further submits that the petitioners have altgil'native remedy of ,i appeal under Section 252 of the Act, and hence writ pieUtions may not be entertained. / 12. To consider the contention of the arned Assistant Solicitor Generat with regard to alternatlve remedy,of appeal under section 252 of the Act, the said provision is required to bil considered, and the same is extracted as under for better appreciation: 252. Appeal to Tribunal: (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Registrar, notifying a company as dissoived under Section 248, $aY file an appeal to the Tribunal within a period of three years from the date of the order of the Registrar and if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the removal of the name of the company from the register of companies is not justified in view of the absence of any of the grounds on which the order was passed by the Registrar, it may order restoration of the name of the company in the register of companles; Provided that before passing an order under this section, the Tribunal shall give a reasonable opportunity of making representations and of being heard to the Registrar, the company and all the persons concerned: Provided further that if tl'le Registrar is satisfied, that the name of the company has been struck off from the register of companies either inadvertently or on bas,s of incorrect information furnished by the company or its directors, which requires restoration in the register of companies, he may within a period of three years from the date of passing of the order dissolving the company under Section 248, file an application before the Tribunal seeking restoration of name of such com pany, (2) A copy of the order passed by the Tribunal shall be filed by the company with the Registrar within thirty days from the date of the order and on receipt of the order, the Registrar shall cause the name of the company to be restored in the register of companies and shall issue a fresh certificate of incorporation. (3) If a company, oT any member or creditor oT worker thereof feels aggrieved by the company having its name struck off from the register of companies, the Tribunal or an application made by the companyf nlernber, creditor or woTkman before the expiry of twenty years from the publication in the Offic al Gazette of the notice under sub-section (5) of Section 248, if satisfied that the cornpany was, at the time of its name being struck off, carrying on business or in operation or otherwise it is just that the name of the company be restored to the register of companies, order the name of the company to be restored to the register of companies, and the Tribunal may, by the order, give such other directions arld make such provisions as deemed just for p acing the company and all other persons in the same position as nearly as may be as if the name of the company has not been struck off from the register of companies. -i A reading of above provision goes to show that if the company is dissolved under Section 248 of the Act, any person aggrieved by the same, can file an appeal, Thus the said provision provides the forum for redressal against the dissolution and striking off the company from the register of companies. It does not deal with the disq ua lificatio n of the directors, and deactivation of their DINs. In the present case, the petitioners are only aggrieved by their disqualification as directors and deactivation of DINs, but not about striking off companies as such. Hence, Section 252 of the Act, cannot be an alternative remedy for seeking that relief, and the contention of the learned Assistant Solicitor General, in this regard, merits for rejection. 13. Under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act, if the Director of a company fails to file financlal statements or annual returns for any continuous period of three flnancial years, he shall not be eligible to be re-appointed as a director of that company or appointed in other company for a period of five years from the date on which the said company fails to do so. The said provision under the Act 18 of 2013, came into force with eFfect from 0L.O4.2014, and the petitioners are disqualified as directors under the said provision. At this stage, the issue that arises for consideration is - whether the disqualification envisaged under Section 16a(2)(a) of the Act, which provision came into force with effect from 0t.04.2OL4, can be made applicable with prospective effect, or has to be given retrospective operation? In other words, the issue would be, from which financial year, the default envisaged under section 164(2)(a) of the Act, has to be calculated, to hold the director of the company liable? In this regard, the learned counsel brought to the notice of this court, the General circular No.08/14 dated 4.4,201'4 issued by the Ministry of corporation affairs, which clarifies the applicability of the relevant financial years. The relevant portion of the said circu la r is as u nde r: \"A number of provisions of the Companies Act, 20l3 including those relating to maintenance of 6ooks of account, preparation, adoption and filing of financial statements (and documents required to be attached thereto), Auditors reports and ine aoaro oi Directors report (Board's report) have been brought into force with 6 effect from 15t April, 2014. Provisions of Schedule II (useful lives to compute depreciation) and Schedule III (format of financial statements) have also been brought into force from that date. The relevant Rules pertaining to these provisions havJalso been notified, placed on the website of the Ministry and have come into force from the same date. The Ministry has received requests for clarification with regard to the relevarlt financial years with effect from which such provisions of the new Act relatinq to maintenance of books of account, preparation, adoption and filing of financial statements (and attachments thereto), auditors report and Board's repoft will be applicable. Although the position in this behalf is quite clear, to make things absolutely clear it is hereby notified that the financial statements (and documents required to he attached thereto), auditors report and Board's report in respect of financial years that commenced earlier than 1't April shall be governed by the relevant provisions/schedules/rules of the Companies Act, 1956 and that in respect of financial years commencing on or after 1st April, 2014, the provisions of the new Act shall apply. \" A reading of the above circular makes it clear the financial statements and the documents required to be attached thereto, auditors report and Board's report in respect of financial years that commenced earlier than O1.O4,2074, shall be governed by the provisions under the Companies Act, 1956 and in respect of financial years commencing on or after 01,.O4.2OL4, the provisions of the new Act shall apply. L4. At this stage it is required to be noticed that the analogous provision to Section 16a(2)(a) of the Act 18 of 2013, is Section 27aQ)@) of Act 1 of 1956. The said provision under Act 1 of 1956 is extracted as under for ready reference: Section 274f11 A person shall not be capable of being appointed director of a company, if - (q) such person is already a director of a public company which, - (A) has not filed the annual accounts and annual returns for any continuous three financial years commencing on and after the first day of April, 1999; or (B) Provided that such person shall not be eligible to be appointed as a director of any other public company for a period of five years from the date on which such public company, in which he is a director, failed to file annual accounts and annual returns under sub-clause (A) or has failed to repay its deposits or interest or redeem its debentures on due date or pay dividend referred to in clause (B). A reading of the above provision under Act 1 of 1956, makes it clear that iF a person capable of being appointed director of a company and such person is already a director of a public company. which has not filed annual accounts and annual returns for any continuous three financial years commencing on and after the first day of Aprir 1999, shal not be erigible to be appointed as a director of any other public company for a period of five years from the date on which such public company, in which he is a director, failed to file annual accounts and annual returns. so the statutory requirement of filing annual accounts and annual returns, is placed on the directors of a 'public company'. There is no provision under the Act 1of 1956, which places similar obligations on the directors of a 'private company,. Therefore, non- filing of annual accounts and annual returns by the directors of the private company, will not disqualify them as directors under the provisions of Act 1 of 1956. 16. Coming to the facts on hand, the 2nd respondent has disqualified the petitioners under Section 76aQ)@) of the Act 18 of 2013, for not filing financial statements or annual returns, for period prior to 01.04.2014. The act;on of the 2nd respondent runs contrary to the circular issued by the Ministry of the Corporate Affairs, and he has given the provisions ofAct 1B of 2013, retrospective effect, which is impermissible. 77. The Apex Court in COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (CENTRAL).L NEW DELHI v, VATIKA TOWNSHIP PRIVATE LIMITED, has dealt with the general principles concerning retrospectivity. The relevant portion of the judgment is thus: 27. A legislation, be it a statutory Act or a statutory Rule or a statutory Notification, may physically consists of words printed on papers. However, ' 1:o r51r scc r 7 15. Under Section t64(2) of the new legislation i.e., Act 18 of 2013, no such distinction between a 'private company' or a 'public company' is made and as per the said provision goes to show that no person who is or has been a director of a 'company', fails to file financial statements or annual returns for any continuous period of three financial years, will not be eligible for appointment as a director of a company. As already noted above, the said provision, came into force with effect from 07.04.2074. conceptually it is a great deal more than an ordinary prose There is a special ^.\",ir,.it, rn the morj! of verbal communication by a legislation. A legislation is not i;;;:;;i.; ;i ;tatements, such as one finds in a work of fiction/non fiction or even i;; ;r;;r;\"i ;.;';;\"rt ;; iaw. rhere is a technique required to draft a lesislation u, ,iufi -ur to understand a legislation. Former technique is known as legislative iiuiirg uni rutt\"r one is to be found in tl.re various principles of'Interpretation of itututJa'. Vis-e-vis ordinary prose, a Iegislation differs ;n its provenance' lay-out \"na fuutr1-\"= as also in the implication as io its meaning that arises by presumptions as to the intent of the maker thereof. 28. of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted' one established rule is that unless a contary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation The idea behind the rule is tnit i currqt law should govern curTent activities. Law passed today cannot apply io tiu \"uanL of the past. If we do something today, we do it keeping in the- law.of iooay ana in force and not tomorrow's backwird adjustment of it Our belief in the niirl\" or the Iaw is founded on the bed rock that every human being is entitled to \"i.*g\" Li. iffairs oy relying on the existing law and should not find that his plans nur\" ir\"un retrospeciively upset. This principle of law is known as lex prospicit non ;;rpl;,l\"; looks forward not backward' As was observed in Phillips vs Eyre iii6zol Ln 6 QB 11, a retrospective iegislation is contrary to the general prlnciple itui r\"6itrution oy *ni.r, tn\" conduct oflnankind is to be regulated when introduced ioiir.,\" firti tir\"'to deal with future acts ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law' 29. The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity is the principle.of 'faiiness;, which must be the basis oi e'ery legal rule as was observed in l'le O\"ii.ion '.\"po.t\"a in L'Office Cherifien des Phosphates v Yamash ita-Shinnihon Sieamsnip bo. ftO. [{lg9+) 1 Ac 486] Thus, legislations which modified accrued righlt ;r'*ni.n impo; obligations or. impose new duties or attach a new disabilitv hive to be t.eated as prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the \"nuitn-''unr a retrospeciive effect; unless the legislation is for purpose of supplying in obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain a foTmer legislation. we need not note that cornucopia of caie law available on the subject because aforesaid teq6l position clearly emerges from the various decisions and this legal position was .o-ni\"ieo by the counsei for the parties ln any case, we shall refer to few judgments containing this dicta, a little later. 30. We would also like to point out, for the sake of completeness, that where a Oenefit is tonferred by a legisiation, the rule against a retrospective construction is Oitf\"r\"nt. lf a legislaiion confers a benefit on some persons but without inflicting a corresponding deiriment on some other person or on the public generally' and where to confer suth benefit appears to have been the legislators object' then the pi\"surption would be that sucll a legislation, giving it a purposive construction' would warrant it to be given a retrospective effect This exactly is the Justification to treat procedural provisions as retrospective, ln Govemment of India & Ors v indian Tobacco Association, t(2005) 7 SCC 3961, the doctrine of fairness was held to be relevant factor to construe a statute conferring a benefit, in the context of it to be given a retrospective operation The same doctrine of fairness, to hold that a itutrtu *u, reirospective in nature, was applied in the case of Vljay v State of ruranirasntra & ors., [(2006) 6 SCC 289]. It was held that where a taw is enacted for the benefit of community as a whole, even in the absence of a provision the ,iutut\" .uy be held to be retrospective in nature However, we are (s/c not) confronted with any such situation here. 31. In such cases, retrospectivity is attached to benefit the persons in contradistinction to the provision imposing some burden or llability where the pi\"=urnptio\" \"ttu.hed towards prospectivity. In the instant case, the proviso added io Sectibn 113 of the Act is noi beneficial to the assessee on the contrary' it is a provision which is onerous to the assessee. Therefore, in a case like this' we have io proceeO with the normal rule of presumption against retrospective operation' inus, ttre rule against retrospective operation is a fundamental ruie of law that no statuie shall bJ construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a ionstruction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and Oistinct impticaiion. Dogmatically framed, the rule is no more than a presumption' and thus could be displaced by out weighing factors' 43. There is yet another very interesting piece of evide-nce that clarifies that prori=ion beyond any pale of doubt viz., the understanding- -of CBDT itself regarding in['pi\"\"iri\"i. it is containea in CBDT circular No.8 of 2002 dated 27 8'2002' with inu iuotu.t \"Finance Act, 2OO2 - Explanatory Notes on provision relating to Direct Taxes,,. This circular has been issued after the passing of the Finance Act, 2002, by which amendment to section 113 WaS made. ln this circular, VarioUS amendments to the Income tax Act are discussed amply demonstrating as to which amendments iie clarificatory/retrospective in operation and which arnendments are prospective' 8 9 For example, Explanation to section 158-BB is stated to be clarificatory in nature. Likewise, it is mentioned that amendments in Section 145 whereby provisions of that section are made applicable to block assessments is made clarificatory and would take effect retrospectively from 1st day of July, 1995. When it comes to amendment to Sectlon 113 of the Act, this very circular provides that the said amendment along wth the amendments in Section 158-BE, would be prospective i.e., will take effect from 1.6.2002.\" 18. Thus, the Apex Court in the above judgment, has made it clear that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation has to be presumed to have prospective effect. A reading of Section 164 of the Act does not show that the legislation has any intention, to make the said provision applicable to past transactions. Further, the Apex Court in the above judgment at paragraph No.43, found that the circular issued by the authority after passing of the legislation, clarifying the position with regard to applicability of the provisions, has to be construed as an important piece of evidence, as it would clarify the provision beyond any pale of doubt. In the present case, as already noted above, the Ministry of Corporation affairs has issued the circular No.0B/2014 dated 4.4.20!4 clarifying that financial statements commencing after 01.04.2014, shall be governed by Act 1B of 2013 i.e., new Act and in respect of financial years commencing earlier to 01.04.2014, shall be governed by Act 1 of 1956. At the cost of repetition, since in the present cases, as the 2nd respondent / competent authority, has disqualified the petitioners as directors under Section l6aQ)@) of the Act 18 of 2013, by considering the period prior to 07.O4.2074, the same is contrary to the circular, and also contrary to the law laid down by Apex Court in the above referred judgment. 19. If the said provision is given prospective effect, as per the circular dated 4.4.2074 and the law laid down by the Apex Court, as stated in the writ affidavits, the first financial year would be from 01-04-2014 to 31.03.2015 and the second and third years financial years would be for the years ending 31.03.2016 and 31.03.2017. rhe annual returns and financial statements are to be filed with Registrar of Companies only after the conclusion of the annual general meeting of the company, and as per the first proviso to Section 96(1) of the Act, annual general meeting for the year ending 31.03.20!7, can be held within six months from the closing of financial year i.e., by 30,09.2017' Further, the time limit for filing annual returns under section 92$) of the Act, is 60 days from annual general meeting, or the last date on which annual general meeting ought to have been held With normal fee, and Within 270 days with additional fee as per the provisotosection403oftheAct.Learnedcounse|submitthatifthesaid dates are calculated, the last date for filing the annual returns would be 30.11.2017 , and the balance sheet was to be filed on 30' 10'2017 with normalfeeandwithadditionalfee,thelastdateforfilingannualreturnsis 27.O7 .2OLB. In other words, the disq u alification could get triggered only on or after 27.07.207a. But the period considered by the 2\"d respondent in the present writ petitions for clothing the petitioners with d isqua lification, pertainspriortoOL.O4,2OT4.Therefore,whentheomission,whichisnow pointed out, was not envisaged as a ground for disqualification prior to t.4.2Ot4, the petitioners cannot be disqualified on the said ground This analogy is traceable to Article 2o(1) of the constitution of India, which states that ',tvo person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in farce at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence\"' in view of the same, the ground on which the petitioners were disqualified, cannot stand to tegal scrutiny, and the same is liable to be set aside' 20. A learned Single Judge of the High YASHODHARA SHROFF vs. UNION OF Court of Karnataka in INDIA2 considering Sectionl64(2)(a)oftheActandotherprovisionsoFtheACt,andvarious judgments, passed an elaborate order and held that the said provision has no retrospective operation. The observations of the learned Judge, pertaining to ']tv.P.No.529l I of 2017 and batcir dated 12.06.2019 l0 11 private companies, which are relevant for the present purpose, are extracted as under: 208. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I have arrived at the following conclusions: (a) It is held that Section 164(2)(a) of the Act is not u/tra virus Article t4 of the Constitution. The said provision is not manifestly arbitrary and also does not fall within the scope of the doctrine of proportionality. Neither does the said provision violate Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as it is made in the interest of generat public and a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the said right. The object and purpose of the said provision is to stipulate the consequence of a disqualiflcation on account of the cjrcumstances stated therein and the same is in order to achieve probity, accountability, and transparency in corporate governance. (b) That Article fslc) Section 164(2) of the Act applies by operation of taw on the basis of the circumstances stated therein, the said provision does not envisage any hearing, neither pre-disqualification nor post-disqualification and this is not in violation of the principles of natural justice, is not ultra ylres Article 14 of the Constitution. (c) That Section 164(2) ol the Act does not have retrospective operation and is therefore, neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, in view of the interpretation placed on the same. (d) (e) Insofar as the private companies are concerned, disqualification on account of the circumstances stated under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act has been brought into force for the first time under the Act and the consequences of disqualification could not have been imposed on directors of private companies by taking into consideration any period prior to 01.04.2014 for the purpose of reckoning continuous period of three financial years under the said provision. The said conclusion is based on the principal drawn by way of analogy from Article 20(1) of the Constitution, as at no point of time prior to the enforcement of the Act, a disqualification based on the circumstances under Section 764(2) ot the Act was ever envisaged under the 1956 Act vis-e-vis directors of private companies. Such a disqualification could visit a director of only a public company under Section 2l+(t)(9) of 1956 Act and never a director of a private company. Such disqualification of the petitioners who are directors of private companies is hence quashed. (f) (g) Consequently, where the disqualification under Section l6aQ) of the Act is based on a continuous period of three financial yeaTs commencing from 01.04.2014, wherein financjal statements or annual returns have not been filed by a public or private company, the directors of such a company stand disqualified and the consequences of the said disqualification would apply to them under the Act. 27. A learned Single of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in GAURANG BALVANTLAL SHAH S/O BALVANTLAL SHAH VS, UNION OF INDIA3 expressed similar view as that of the leaned single Judge of High Court of Karnataka (1 supra), and held that Section 164(2) of the Act of 2013, which had come into force with effect frcm 1.4.2074 would have prospective, and not retrospective effect and that the defaults contemplated under Section 764(2)(a) with regard to non-filing of financial statements or r r/Special Civil Application No.22435 of 2017 and batch daled 18.12 201 8 12 annual returns for any continuous period of three financial years would be the default to be counted from the financial year 2014-15 only and not 2073-L4 22. A learned single ludge of the High Court of Madras in BHAGAVAN DAS DHANANIAyA DAS vs, uNION OF INDIA4 also expressed similar view. The relevant portion is as under: 29. In fine, (a) (b) 23. In view of the above facts and circumstances dnd the judgments referredtosupra,astheimpugnedordersinpresentwritpetitions disqualifying the petitioners as directors under Sectlon 164(2)(a) of the Act, have been passed considering the period prior to 01'04'2014, the same cannot be sustained, and are liable to be set aside to that extent' 24. As far as the contention regarding issuance of prior notice before disqualifying the petitioners as directors is concerned, Section 16a(2)(a) is be noticed, and the same is extracted as under for ready 164. Disqualification for appointment of director: When the New Act 2013 came into effect from 1'4 2014, the second responderlt herein has wrongly given retrospective effect and erroneously disqualified the petitioner - directors from 1.1.2016 itself before ihe deadline comnrenced wrongly Fixing ihe first financial year from f .4.2013 to 31..3.2014' By virtue of the new Section 164(2)(a) of the 2013 Act using lhe expression'for any continuous period of three financial year\" and in ine tigfrt of section 2(41) defining \"financial year\" as well as their own Ge-neral circular No.08/14 dated 4.4 2014, the first financial year would be from 1.4.2014 to 31.3.2015, the second financial year would be from 1.4.2015 to 31.3.2016 and the third financial year would be from l'4.2016 to 31.3.2017, whereas the second iespondent clearly admitted in paras 15 and 22 of the counler affidavit that the default of filing statutory returns for the final years commences from 2013-74, 2014-75 and 2015-16 ie, one year before the Act 2013 came into force This is the basic incurable legal infirmity that vitiates the entire impugned proceedings. required to reference: o W.P.No.25455 of 2017 and batch dated 27 07.201 lt 1J (2) No person who is or has been a director of a company which- (a) has not filed financial statements or annual returns for any continuous period of three financial years; or (b) Shall be eligible to be re-appointed as a director of that company or appointed in other companies for a period of five years from the date on which the said company fails to do so. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that it provides d isq ua lification on happening of an event i.e., if a person who is or has been a director of a company has not filed financial statements or annual returns for any continuous period of three financial years, shall be ineligible to be re- appointed as a director of that company or appointed in any other company for a period of five years from the date on which the said company fails to do so. The provision does not provide for issuance of any prior notice or hearing. A learned single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka in Yashodara Shroff v. Union of India (1 supra), as well as the learned single ludge of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Gaurang Balvantlal Shah s/o Balvantlal Shah vs. Union of India (2 supra), after analyzing various provisions of the Act and Rules framed thereunder, and by relying on various judgments of the Apex Court, held that Section rcaQ)G) of the Act applies by operation of law on the basis of the circumstances stated therein, the said provlsion does not envisage any hearing, neither p re-disq ua lification nor post-disqualification and this is not in violation of the principles of natural justice and hence, is not ultra vr?es Article 14 of the constitution. I concur with the said reasoning. 25. Thus, from the above, it is clear that Section 16a(2)(a) of the Act is a deeming provision and the disqualification envisaged under the said provisioncomesintoforceautomaticallybyoperationoflawondefaultand Legislature did not provide for issuance of any prior notice, but the respondents notified disqualification even before it incurred, and deactivated DlNs,whichisillegalarbltraryandagainstprovisionscontainedin Section 16a(2)(a) of the Act. b) c) d) (a) (e) (0 (i) l+ 26,Thenextgrievanceofthepetitionersiswithregardtodeactivation of their DINS. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that except for the grounds mentioned under Rule 11 (a) to (f) of the Rules, the DINs cannot be cancelled or deactivated, and the violation mentioned under Section 164(2)(a) of the Act, is not one of the grounds mentioned under clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11, and hence for the alleged violation under Section 16a(2)(a) of the Act, DIN cannot be cancelled' 27. Rule 10 of the Rules provide for allotment of DIN and under sub rule (6) of Rule 10, it is allotted for life time. Rule 11 provides for cancellation or deactivation. Rule 11, which is relevant for the present purposef is extracted as under for ready reference: 11. Cancellation or surrender or deactivation of DIN: The Central Government or Regional Director (Northern Region), Noida or any officer authorized by the Regional Director may, upon being satisfied on verification of particulars or documentary proof attached with the application received from any person, cancel or deactivate the DIN in case - the DIN is found to be duplicated in respect of the same person provided the data related to both the DIN shall be merged with the validly retained number; the DIN was obtained in a wrongful manneT or by fraudulent means; of the death of the concerned individual; the concerned individual has been declared as a person of unsound mind by a competent Court; if the concerned individual has been adjudicated an insolvent; Provided that before cancellation or deactivation of DIN pursuant to clause (b), an opportunity of being heard shall be given to the concerned individual; on an application made in Form DIR-s by the DIN holder to surrender his or her DIN along with declaration that he has never been appointed as director in any company and the said OIN has never been used for filing of any document with any authority, the Central Government may deactivate such DIN; Provided that before deactivation of any DIN in such case, the Central Government shall verify e-records. Explanation: for the purposes of clause (b) - The terms \"wrongful manner\" means if the DIN is obtained on the strength of documents which are not legally valid or incomplete documents are furnished or on suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong certification or by making misleading or false information or by misrepresentation; (ii) the term \"fraudulent means\" means if the DIN is obtained with an intent to deceive any other person or any authority including the Central Govern ment. 28. Clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11, extracted above, provides for the circumstances under which the DIN can be cancelled or deactivated. The said grounds, are different from the ground envisaged under t5 Section 16a(2)(a) of the Act. Therefore, for the alleged violation under Section 164 of the Act, DINS cannot be cancelled or deactivated, except in accordance with Rule 11 of the Rules. 29. Learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court in the decision cited 2 supra, held as under: \"29. This takes the Court to the next question as to whether the respondents could have deactivated the DINS of the petitioner as a consequence of the impugned listT In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions contained in the Act and the said Rules. Section 153(3) provides that no person shall be appointed as a Director of a company, unless he has been allotted the Director Identification Number under Section 154. Section 153 requires every individual intending to be appointed as Director of a Company to make an application for allotment of DIN to the Central Government in such form and manneT as may be prescribed. Section 154 states that the Central Government shall wjthin one month from the receipt of the application under Section 153 allot a DIN to an applicant in such manner as may be prescribed. Section 155 prohibits any individual, who has already been allotted a DIN under Section 154 from applying for or obtaining or possessing another DIN. Rules 9 and 10 of the said Rules of 2014 prescribe the procedure for making application for allotment and for the allotment of DIN, and further provide that the DIN allotted by the Central GoveTnment under the said Rules would be valid for the life time of the applicant and shall not be allotted to any other person. 30, Rule 11 provides for cancellation or surrender or deactivation of DIN. Accordingly, the Central Government or Regional Director or any authorized officer of Regional Director may, on being satisfied on verification of particulars of documintary proof attached with an application from any person, cancel or deactivate the DIN on any of the grounds mentioned in Clause (a) to (f) thereof. The said Rule 11 does not contemplate any suo motu powers either with the Central Government or with the authorized officer or Regional Director to cancel or deactivate the DIN allotted to the Director, nor any of the clauses mentioned in the said Rules contemplates cancellation or deactivation of DIN of the Director of the \"struck off company\" or of the Director havinq become ineligible under Section 164 of the said Act. The reason appears to be that once an individual, who is intending to be the Director of a particular company is allotted DIN by the Central Government, such DIN would be valid for the life time of the applicant and on the basis of such DIN he could become Director in other companies also Hence, if one of the companies in which he was Director, is \"struck off\", his DIN could not be cancelled or deactivated as that would run counter to the provisaons contained in the Rule 11, which specifically provides for the circumstances under which the DIN could be cancelled or deactivated. 31. In that view of the matter, the Court is of the opinion that the action of the respondents in deactivating the DINs of the petitioners - Directors along with the publication of the impug;ed list of Directors of \"struck off\" companies under lection 248, also was not legally tenable. of course, as per Rule 12 of the said Rules, the individual who has been allotted the DIN, in the event of any change in his particuiars stated in Form DIR -3 has to intimate such change to the Central GovernmentwithintheprescribedtimeinFormDlR-6,however,ifthatisnotdone' the DIN could not be cancelled or deactivated. The cancellation or deactivation of the DIN could be resorted to by the concerned respondents only as per the provisions contained in the said Rules,\" 30. In view of the above facts and circumstances and the judgment referred to supra, the deactivation of the DINs of the petitioners for alleged violations under Section 164 of the Act, cannot be sustained' l6 31. For 'the foregoing reasons, the impugned orders in the writ petitions to the extent of disqualifying the petitioners under Section 16+(2)(a) of the Act and deactivation of their DINs, are set aside, and the 2nd respondent is directed to activate the DINs of the petitioners, enabling them to function as Directors other than in strike off companies. 32. It is made clear that this order will not preclude tlre 2nd respondent from taking appropriate action in accordance with law for viotations as envisaged under Section 164(2) of the Act, giving the said provision prospective effect from 07.04'2014 and for necessary action against DIN in case of violations of Rule 11 of the Rules. 33. It is also made clear that if the petitioners are aggrieved by the action of the respondents in striking ofF their companies under Section 248 of the Act, they are at liberty to avail alternative remedy under Section 252 of the Act. 34. All the writ petitions aTe accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above. 35. Interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. No order as to costs. A,RAJASHEKER REDDY,J DATE:18-07-2019 AVS "