PROF A B CHATTOPADHAYAY ALIAS A B CHATTOPADHYAY V. UNION OF INDIA THROUGH CBI

Cr.M.P./13/2022

AI Insights

The case involves multiple petitioners, including individuals and a company (JUSCO), accused of conspiring to award contracts for civil and electrical works at NIT, Jamshedpur, in violation of tendering norms and procedures. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) charged them under various sections of the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act, alleging that the accused manipulated the tender process to favor JUSCO, which was not the lowest bidder. The High Court's decision to discharge the accused was based on the lack of concrete evidence showing that the accused had a dishonest intention or that they personally benefited from the alleged conspiracy.

• Counselvise Citation: [2022] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 722030 (HC-JHARKHAND)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 18-08-2022
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: C.K. Jaffer Sharief v. State, M Naryanan Nambiar Vs State of Kerala, Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., State of M.P. v. Sheetla Sahai, L.K. Advani and others Vs Central Bureau of Investigation, Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, Century Spg. case, Muniswamy case, Rumi Dhar Vs State of WB
• Laws Referred To: Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Indian Penal Code
• Result in Favour of: Others
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: PRASHANT PALLAV; BAJRANG KUMAR
• Assessee Lawyers: SIDHARTHA LUTHRA; INDRAJIT SINHA; AJAY SAH; GANESH PATHAK; SIDHARTHA AGARWAL; GOPAL JAIN; DAYAN KRISHNAN; PANDEY RAI; ROHIT SINHA; AKCHANSH KISHORE
• Keywords: Civil and Electrical Works; Corruption; Criminal Revision Petition; Criminal Revision Petition; Discharge Petition; Tender process
• Section: 13(2); 13(1)(d); 239; 482; 420; 120B

Judgement Text

"IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr. RevisionNo.133 of 2020 ------ Sanjiv Paul .... .... …. Petitioner Versus Union of India through C.B.I. .... .... .... Opp. Party WITH Cr. RevisionNo.571 of 2019 ------ Kamal Kumar Ghosh .... .... …. Petitioner Versus Union of India represented through C.B.I. .... .... .... Opp. Party WITH Cr. RevisionNo.676 of 2019 ------ Jamshedpur Utilities and Services Company Limited through Mr. Jai Pushpit Pallav .... .... …. Petitioner Versus Union of India through C.B.I. .... .... .... Opp. Party WITH Cr. Revision No.690 of 2019 ------ K.N. Jha .... .... …. Petitioner Versus Union of India represented through C.B.I. .... .... .... Opp. Party WITH Cr. Revision No.764 of 2019 ------ Dr. Debashish Bhattacharya .... .... …. Petitioner Versus Union of India represented through C.B.I. .... .... .... Opp. Party WITH Cr.M.P. No.02 of 2022 ------ Prof. R. P. Singh @ Rakesh Pratap Singh .... .... …. Petitioner Versus Union of India through C.B.I. .... .... .... Opp. Party WITH Cr.M.P. No.03 of 2022 ------ Prof. A.K. Khan @ Prof. Ashok Kumar Khan .... .... …. Petitioner Versus Union of India through C.B.I. .... .... .... Opp. Party WITH Cr.M.P. No.13 of 2022 ------ Prof. A.B. Chattopadhyay @ A.B. Chattopadhyay .... .... …. Petitioner Versus Union of India through C.B.I. .... .... .... Opp. Party CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GAUTAM KUMAR CHOUDHARY 2 For the Petitioner : Mr. Sidhartha Luthra Sr. Advocate Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Ajay Kumar Sah, Advocate Mr. Ganesh Pathak, Advocate (Cr. Rev. 133/2020) Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Ajay Kumar Sah, Advocates (Cr. Rev. 571/2019) Mr. Sidhartha Agarwal, Sr. Advocate Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Ajay Kumar Sah, Advocate (Cr. Rev. 676/2019) Mr. Gopal Jain, Sr. Advocate Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Ajay Kumar Sah, Advocate (Cr. Rev. 690/2019) Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Sr. Advocate Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Ajay Kumar Sah, Advocate (Cr. Rev. 764/2019) Mr. Pandey Neeraj Rai, Mr. Rohit Ranjan Sinha Mr. Akchansh Kishore (Cr.M.P. 2/22, 3/22, 13/22) For the C.B.I. : Mr. Prashant Pallav, ASGI Mr. Bajrang Kumar, A.C. to ASGI C.A.V. ON 19.07. 2022 PRONOUNCED ON 18 /08/2022 1. These Criminal Revision Petitions arise out of order passed by the Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi in RC Case no. 4 (A)/2006 (R) registered under Sections 120B read with 420 IPC and Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 whereby and whereunder the discharge petition under Section 239 of Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioners /accused persons has been rejected. Since all the revision arise from the common order therefore they have been heard together and will be disposed by common order. 2. Cr. M.P. Nos. 2, 3 and 13 of 2022 were filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing of the order of cognizance and entire proceeding. This Court vide order dated 8.7.2022 permitted these cases to be heard analogous with the present revision petitions for the reason that earlier the revision petitions filed by these petitioners against the discharge petitions were permitted to be withdrawn for being heard in these criminal miscellaneous petitions. These petitions have been also been heard together and shall be disposed of by common order. PROSECUTION CASE 3. A First Information Report was registered by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, CBI, Ranchi P.S. on 30.03.2006 under Sections 120B read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) read 3 with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the following :- (i) A. K. Khan, Asst. Professor, National Institute of Technology, Jamshedpur. (ii) K. N. Jha, Chief (Planning, Engineering & Construction), M/s Jamshedpur Utilities & Service Company Limited. (iii) M/s Jamshedpur Utilities & Services Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as JUSCO) represented by Sri Sanjiv Paul, Managing Director. 4. As per the FIR the contract was awarded in favour of Jamshedpur Utility Services Company (hereinafter called JUSCO) under a criminal conspiracy joined by A.K. Khan, Assistant Professor, National Institute of Technology, K.N. Jha, Head of the TPE and Mr. Sanjeev Paul representing JUSCO deliberately ignoring offers of L-1 to L-8 parties thereby causing financial loss of Rs.162.68 lakh (Rs.700.48-Rs.537.80) to NIT. a. Sh A. K. Khan, the then Asst. Professor NIT, Jamshedpur, in the capacity of Chairman of Building Advisory Committee negotiated with L-6, to L-9 bidders instead of L-1 in the matter of appointment of Architect-cum-Consultant and dishonestly and fraudulently recommended the name of Town Planning Engineering (TPE) of Tata Steel for the appointment of Architect- cum- Consultant by ignoring offers of L-1 to L-8 T.P.E. was L-9 in the tender. b. Sh. K. N. Jha, as head of TPE (Tata Steel) and as a consultant got the work of Civil and electrical work contract awarded in favour of M/s. Jamshedpur Utilities & Service Company Ltd. (JUSCO) represented by its Managing Director, Shri Sanjiv Paul in spite of the fact that M/s JUSCO was not the L-1 bidder and also by ignoring the bid of M/s Adisons Constructions Ltd., Kolkata which was the L-1 party. M/s Adisons had quoted a rate of 537.80 lakhs, whereas, the work was awarded to M/s JUSCO for Rs.700.48 Lakhs and that too with a condition of rebate of 2.5% against grant of 10% interest free mobilization advance. c. M/s JUSCO was not eligible to purchase the tender documents as per the condition laid down in Notice Inviting Tender in absence 4 of requisite Income Tax Clearance Certificate and was also not registered with State Tax and Central Tax authorities at the time of submitting Tender documents. M/s JUSCO had not submitted requisite certificate (credential) at the time of submitting its tender for the said Civil and Electrical work. d. Erstwhile Town Division of Tata Steel later became JUSCO and Town Planning and Engineering was part of Town Division of M/s Tata Steel. TPE headed by K. N. Jha was selected as Architect cum Consultant and was associated with the Tendering process. It was TPE which had selected M/s JUSCO for award of the Civil & Electrical work Contract. Both TPE & M/s JUSCO were parts of Tata Steel only but they were single entity. Thus, K. N. Jha in fact selected M/s JUSCO for award of work in which he had natural interest. e. Thus, with the aforesaid facts as alleged a loss to the tune of Rs.162.68 Lakhs had been caused to N.I.T., Jamshedpur. 5. After investigation charge-sheet has been submitted on 29.05.2009 under sections 120 B IPC and Section 13 (2) and 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 1988. against 8 accused persons viz (i) Prof A.K. Khan the then Profession In-Charge, Civil Works, NIT, Jamshedpur (ii) K.N. Jha, Chief Planning Engineering and Construction, M/s JUSCO, Tata Steel, Jamshedpur (Private Person) (iii) M/s JUSCO represented by Sanjeev Paul, M.D. (iv) Dr. Debasis Bhattacharya, the then Director, NIT, Jamshedpur (v) Prof. A.B. Chattopadhyay, the then Prof. I/c EMR, NIT, Jamshedpur (vi) Prof. R.P. Singh, Assistant Professor, Civil Engineering Department, NIT, Jamshedpur (vii) Kamal Kumar Ghosh, Sr. Manager, Architecture and Consultancy Services, Town Division, Tata Steel (Private Person) (viii) Sanjeev Paul, M.D., M/s JUSCO, Tata Steel. 6. As per the Prosecution case criminal conspiracy was executed in multiple stages resulting in wrongful loss to NIT, Jamshedpur a fully funded institute of Government of India and wrongful gain to M/s JUSCO by ignoring the L-1 bidder M/s Adisons Constructions Limited which was the L-1 party. 7. In execution of this conspiracy Sri AK Khan assistant professor NIT while heading the Building Advisory Committee as chairman, in the 5 first stage appointed Sri K.N. Jha, Head of Town Planning and Engineering (hereinafter called TPE), Tata Steel and M/s Jamshedpur as Architect-cum-Consultant for construction and expansion of NIT by ignoring L-1 to L-5 and negotiating with L-6 to L-9 and finally awarded contract in favour of TPE which was L-9. In the second stage that TPE awarded the contract to M/s JUSCO by ignoring the L-1 bidder M/s Adisons Constructions Limited which was the L-1 party. The BAC comprised of A.K Khan as the chairman and Prof A.B. Chattopadyaya, Sh R.P. Singh and Sh Deepak Kumar, Asstt. Engineer who prepared a Tender as well as the Tender Opening-cum- Comparative statements which shortlisted L-6 to L-9 bidders including M/s TPE @ 4.9% of the total value proposed work for negotiation by ignoring L-1 namely, M/s S.P. Associates Patna @ 2.09 % on the pretext of observing the Handbook of Manual of Architecture, which was only optional as per the statement of PW sh Rajesh Kumar, Executive Engineer, CPWD. Thereafter, negotiation was held by the BAC comprising of Prof A.K. Khan, Sh R.P. Singh, Sh Deepak Kumar and Smt. Namrata Kumari, Lecturer Dept. of Elect Engineering NIT. On the recommendation of BAC approval was obtained from Building Works Committee (BWC) headed by Dr D. Bhattacharya and from the chairman BOG Sh Muthuraman and thereupon M/s TPE was awarded the consultancy on 30.12.2003 by NIT. 8. After the term of award of the work to M/s TPE, the consultant was authorised to invite, receive and analyses tenders; advise client on appointment of contractor. The consultant had also to prepare the estimates, design and drawings and architectural maps EDC relating to the said Civil and Electrical work. NIT published notice inviting tender for civil and Electrical works and the last date of purchase of tender documents was fixed on 23.01.04. Later by corrigendum dated 26.01. 04 the date of purchase of tender documents was extended up to 28. 01.04. For purchase of tender documents ₹ 20,000 was to be deposited by way of demand draft. But, M/s JUSCO, Jamshedpur was issued the tender documents after the last date of issue against the invalid demand draft of ₹ 20,000 dated 29.01.04. All four parties including JUSCO submitted their tenders. All these four parties were 6 scrutinised by the tender committee comprising of Sri KN Jha Head M/s TPE (chairman) and Prof A.K. Khan and Sh Kamal Kumar Ghosh and purportedly all the four parties were called for negotiation by the tender committee. However, no records were available to suggest that M/s Adisons Construction (L-1) was called for negotiation. The tender committee rejected the offer of M/s Adisons Construction on the ground that it was conditional which was mere assumption that could have been settled by negotiation. M/s JUSCO was given an interest-free mobilisation advance of Rs.70 lakhs by the aforesaid Tender Committee, this condition was not mentioned in the tender notice. After negotiations by the tender committee L-2 party represented by its MD Sanjiv Paul was recommended for award of civil and Electrical work for value of Rs.700 lakhs which was much higher than the offer of L-1 which stood at Rs.537 lakhs. On the recommendation of the tender committee Dr D Bhattacharya put his remarks that the offer of M/s Adisons was conditional and also that the party declined to withdraw the conditional offer and therefore the work order was placed on M/s JUSCO. The BWC and BOG approved the said one off work post facto. Thus a loss to the tune of Rs.162.768 lakhs was caused to NIT Jamshedpur. 9. The individual roles as per the charge sheet is against Prof. Ashok Kumar Khan, Sh. K. N. Jha, Head M/s TPE, M/s JUSCO represented by Sh. Sanjiv Paul, MD, Dr. D. Bhattacharya, Prof. A. B. Chattopadhyaya, Prof. R. P. Singh and Sh. Kamal Kumar Ghosh are as under :- I. Prof. A. K. Khan : (a)As Chairman, BAC, NIT, he dishonestly rejected the bids of L-1 to L-5 parties on the grounds of having quoted low rates and lack of requisite experience and negotiated with parties (L-6 to L-9) which were other than L-1 in violation of CPWD norm for appointment of Architect- cum- Consultant and thereupon, recommended the name of L-9 (M/s TPE) for award of consultancy. (b) As Chairman, BAC, Prof. A. K. Khan did not adopt two bid system namely, ‘Price bid’ and ‘Commercial bid’ for selection of Consultant for NIT, Jamshedpur. (c)As a member of Tender Committee for Civil Electrical works of 7 NIT (headed) by Sh. K. N. Jha, Head, M/s TPE), he negotiated with L-2 party instead of L-1 (M/s Adisons Constructions) in violation of CPWD/ CVC norms and thereupon, the name of M/s JUSCO (L-2), a non-eligible firm was recommended for award of Civil & Electrical work. (d) Illegally issued the Work Order to M/s JUSCO without the approval of BOG. (e)By the arbitrary and illegal award of consultancy to M/s TPE and thereafter by the award of Civil & Electrical works by M/s TPE to M/s JUSCO, a total loss of Rs.54,46,257/- has been caused to NIT, Jamshedpur. II.Sh. K. N. Jha (Pvt. Person): (a) Under his headship of M/s TPE and under his instruction, tender papers were dishonestly and fraudulently issued to M/s JUSCO after the expiry of the due date for sale of tender papers. M/s JUSCO was not eligible to purchase the tender documents since the party did not have the requisite instrument for purchase of tender documents and also did not have the other requisite eligibilities for purchase the same. (b) As Chairman of Tender Committee for Civil Electrical works of NIT he along with Prof. A. K. Khan and Kamal Kumar Ghosh (both as members) arbitrarily rejected the bid of L-1 (M/s Adisons Constructions) and negotiated with L-2 party (M/s JUSCO) instead of L-1 in violation of CPWD/ CVC norms and thereupon, the name of M/s JUSCO (L-2), a non-eligible firm was recommended for award of Civil & Electrical work by the said Tender Committee. M/s TPE was later merged with M/s JUSCO and hence, he as a consultant (As head of M/s TPE) recommended the award of work to a sister concern of M/s TATA STEEL, which he joined later. (c) During negotiation, as head of the tender committee he arbitrarily and selectively allowed 10% interest free mobilisation advance to M/s JUSCO and not to other bidders in order to extend undue favour to the party (M/s JUSCO). (d) As head of M/s TPE he got prepared the maps of NIT for Civil & Electrical Construction work even before appointment of a consultant or executor for NIT works which shows his prior meeting 8 of mind with NIT authorities. (e) By the receipt of consultancy by M/s TPE headed by Sh. K. N. Jha and thereafter, by the award of Civil & Electrical works by M/s TPE to M/s JUSCO, a total loss of Rs.54,46,257/- has been caused to NIT, Jamshedpur. III. M/s JUSCO represented by Sh. Sanjiv Paul, MD (Pvt.) : (a) M/s JUSCO has illegally purchased the tender documents on 29.01.04 i.e. after the expiry date for sale of tender papers. (b) M/s JUSCO was illegally awarded the Civil & Electrical construction work by other accused persons although, it was non- eligible firm in terms of its eligibility documents. (c) M/s JUSCO (Erstwhile M/s TPE) as a corporate legal body/ entity the firm is the beneficiary of the award of the Civil & Electrical construction work. As Consultant to NIT, Jamshedpur M/s TPE (Headed by Sh. K. N. Jha) awarded the said work to M/s JUSCO, its sister concern. (d) A loss of Rs.4,86,000/- to NIT, Jamshedpur has been caused by the award of consultancy to L-9 (M/s TPE) instead of L-1 (M/s S. P. Associates, Patna). And, another loss of Rs.49,60,257/- has been caused to NIT by the award of Civil & Electrical construction work to L-2 (M/s JUSCO) instead of L-1 (M/s Adisons Constructions). (e)By the award of consultancy by NIT to M/s TPE and thereafter, by the receipt of Civil & Electrical Works by M/s TPE to M/s JUSCO, a total loss of Rs.54,46,257/- has been caused to NIT, Jamshedpur and corresponding gain to M/s JUSCO and other accused persons. IV.Dr. D. Bhattacharya: (a) As director, NIT, Jamshdpur, he dishonestly approved the recommendation of the Building Advisory Committee (BAC), NIT, Jamshedpur dated 23.12.03 and M/s TPE (L-9) was selected as Architect-cum- Consultant for NIT works instead of M/s S. P. Associates, Patna (L-1) in violation of CPWD and CVC norms and that too before the approval of BOG. (b) Dishonestly termed the offers of M/s Adisons Constructions (L-1) as conditional’ on the basis of which the Civil & Electrical work was awarded to M/s JUSCO (L-2). On the other hand the offer of M/s JUSCO was not treated as conditional although, the party had 9 asked for 10% interest free mobilisation advance at the time of negotiation. (c) As Director, NIT he dishonestly approved the award of work to M/s JUSCO, an ineligible party before the approval of BOG, NIT as against the norms of its Memorandum of Association. (d) By the award of consultancy to M/s TPE and thereafter, by the award of Civil & Electrical works by M/s TPE to M/s JUSCO, a total loss of Rs.54,46,257/- has been caused to NIT, Jamshedpur. IV. Prof. A. B. Chattopadhyaya : (a) As a member of BAC or the Tender Committee he dishonestly short listed and recommended for negotiation with L-6 to L-9 instead of L-1 party in violation of CPWD/ CVC norms which resulted in award of consultancy to L-9 and thereby, NIT has sustained a loss of about Rs.4,86,000/-. VI. Prof. R. P. Singh : As a member of BAC or the Tender Committee he dishonestly short listed and recommended for negotiation with L-6 to L-9 instead of L- 1 party in violation of CPWD/ CVC norms which resulted in award of consultancy to L-9 and thereby NIT has sustained a loss of about Rs.4,86,000/- VII. Kamal Kumar Ghosh (Pvt. Person) : (a) As a member of Tender Committee for Civil Electrical works of NIT (Headed by Sh. K. N. Jha), he alongwith Prof. A. K. Khan processed the bids of 4 parties and dishonestly negotiated with party/ parties other than L-1 (M/s Adisons Constructions) in violation of CPWD/ CVC norms and thereupon, the name of M/s JUSCO (L-2), a non-eligible firm was recommended for award of Civil & Electrical work due to which NIT has incurred a loss of about Rs.49,60,257/-. (b)By the dishonest award of consultancy to M/s TPE and thereafter by the award of Civil & Electrical works by M/s TPE to M/s JUSCO, a total loss of Rs.54,46,257/- has been caused to NIT, Jamshedpur. 12 numbers of bidders responded to the tender notice. 10. Ld. Special Judge, CBI took cognizance of offences under Section 120B read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988 vide order dated 18.07.2009 and consequently summons were issued against the 10 accused persons including the petitioner. SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER- SANJIV PAUL 11. The petitioner challenged the order taking cognizance dated 18.07.2009 under the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C. This Court vide order dated 31.01.2013 in Cr.M.P. No.1582 /2009 was pleased to quash the order dated 18.07.2009, inter-alia for the following reasons:- “It appears that whatever allegations are there for securing award in favour of the Company, in spite of being ineligible to participate in the bid, it was upon the Company. Further it is the Company who is said to have gained benefit from the award. This petitioner has never been alleged to have gained any benefit out of the award or any allegation is there to the effect that at the behest of this petitioner M/s JUSCO was awarded with contract. In such situation, one is at loss to comprehend as to how offence is made out under Section 420 even with the aid of Section 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the petitioner in his personal capacity. Thus, I am constrained to hold that no offence is made out against the petitioner who is prosecuted in his personal capacity under which cognizance of the offence has been taken and thereby the order taking cognizance is hereby quashed so far the petitioner is concerned”. In the result, this application stands allowed”. 12. CBI being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Hon’ble High Court, preferred SLP (Crl.) No.9590 of 2013 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was allowed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its order dated 10.01.2017 observing as under :- On due consideration, we are of the view that the stage at which the High Court had quashed the proceedings was not appropriate. We, therefore, interfere with the order of the High Court but leave it open to the respondent- accused to seek discharge before the learned trial Court. All questions are left open to be urged before the learned trial Court.” 13. Pursuant to the above order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 10.01.2017, the petitioner appeared before the Trial Court on 11.04.2017 and thereafter filed a Discharge Petition under Section 11 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 before the Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi and contended that the charges leveled against the petitioner as emanating from the charge-sheet is without any materials on record and are completely baseless and imaginary and do not create any grounds for which charge can be framed against the petitioner. 14. The Ld. Special Judge, CBI vide its order dated 02.02.2019 was pleased to reject the discharge petition of all the accused persons. 15. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 02.02.2019 approached this Court by filing a criminal revision petition which was registered as Cr. Rev. No.552 of 2019. The said case was finally heard on 21.08.2019 and subsequent to the hearing, the learned Court was pleased to remand the matter to the learned Special Judge. The operative part of the order reads as under :- “(13) From perusal of the case diary, it appears that the further statement of Sanjiv Paul was recorded on 27.07.2006 and when he was confronted with the letter addressed to CFO, M/s JUSCO by Rituraj Sinha, he has admitted that he signed the letter on 28.01.2004. So it submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that JUSCO is a legal entity and is an accused and admittedly the petitioner was the Managing Director and material has come in the case diary that Ritu Raj Sinha has accepted that two persons were authorized to deal with the aforesaid tender. (14) Further allegation against the petitioner is that tender documents were purchased on 29.01.2004. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that witnesses have admitted that petitioner had merely endorsed OK on 28.01.2004 on the letter addressed to CFO, JUSCO before the last date and the petitioner has not purchased the tender document and so the petitioner cannot be fastened with any criminal liability. All these document and facts have not been considered by Learned Special Judge. (15) Learned Counsel for the CBI, on the other hand, submitted that in view of the material collected in the case diary, learned Special Judge has passed the order correctly and there is a scope for interference in the merit of the case. So, the criminal revision is liable to be dismissed. 12 (16) After hearing the parties and carefully examining the materials available on records, I find considerable force in the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner. It appears that petitioner had merely endorsed O. K. on 28.01.2004 for purchasing tender documents, but the petitioner was not involved in the process of purchasing the tender documents, which find support from the statement of the P.W.-47, Ritu Raj Sinha, but this fact has not been considered by learned Special Judge, CBI and he has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested upon him. So the impugned order dated 02.02.2019 passed by learned Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi in R.C. No.04(A)/2006 [R], so far as petitioner is concerned, is hereby set aside. (17) This criminal revision stands allowed. (18) The matter is remitted to court below with a direction to pass appropriate order preferably within 16 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the order after hearing the parties and giving due consideration to all the materials available on records and the points raised by the petitioner.” 16. It is submitted that the findings contained in the aforesaid order of the Hon’ble High Court has attained finality since neither the prosecution nor the petitioner challenged the aforesaid order before any competent forum. Accordingly, the Revision petition was remitted back to the Ld. Special Judge for hearing on the discharge petition of the petitioner. 17. The Ld. Special Judge, CBI vide its order dated 06.01.2020 has been pleased to reject the discharge petition and the Operative part of the order reads as under :- “However, this is the stage of framing of charge and the above materials surfaced during the investigation shows that the charge against the petitioner is not groundless. Thus, on the basis of above materials collected by the CBI during investigation this Court comes to the conclusion that there is sufficient material on record to presume that petitioner has committed the offence and accordingly the above discharge petition having no merit is hereby rejected”. 18. It is contended on behalf of petitioner that the Hon’ble High Court 13 while remitting the discharge application back to the Ld. Special Judge had directed the Ld. Special Judge to consider the materials available on records while deciding the discharge application. That even after such categoric directions and findings contained in the order dated 21.08.2019 of the Hon’ble High Court in Cr. Rev. No.552 of 2019, the Ld. Special Judge has failed to appreciate the facts on the basis of which the aforesaid Criminal Revision was remitted and has made observations which are contrary to the materials on record. 19. It is argued that the Ld. Special Judge has incorrectly found the criminal involvement of the petitioner by clearly over-reaching the findings recorded by the Hon’ble High Court and the materials on the record in the following manner :- (a) Town Division, Tata Steel Limited became JUSCO, which was headed by Mr. Sanjiv Paul (petitioner hereinafter). TPE headed by Mr. K. N. Jha was also a part of the Town Division. TPE thus had natural interest to award the civil and electrical contract in favour of JUSCO in spite of JUSCO was L-2 and had quoted more than Adisons Limited (L-1). (b) After the signature of the petitioner on 28.01.2004, the tender documents were purchased after the expiry of the date of purchase of tender documents. (c) Further, after the endorsement of ‘Ok” JUSCO’s participation in the tendering process was initiated despite the knowledge that JUSCO was not eligible for award of the tender. (d) Though, there is no direct evidence of involvement of the petitioner for the act of criminal conspiracy with other co-accused, but the circumstantial evidence collected during the investigation reveal the same as without having any essential requisite and bypassing L-1, JUSCO was awarded the contract work even after submitting the tender documents after the last date. (e) The petitioner played the most important role of endorsing ‘Ok’ as it was assured of the award of tender, which was also clear from maps in relation to 4 number of civil and electrical works which were prepared by TPE much prior to the award of the contract. 20. It is argued that solitary act of making one endorsement of ‘OK’ is not sufficient to impute criminality against the accused persons. Even 14 if the materials on record as collected by the prosecution during investigation are considered without any objections, yet these materials are grossly insufficient to warrant conviction, but shall only cause a protracted involvement in criminal proceedings. Further, neither such documentary evidence collected nor statements collected during investigation at all reveal that the petitioner had misrepresented any critical fact nor had suppressed any material fact. It is contended that for tendering of civil and electrical works was initiated by the publication of the notice inviting tender having the following dates: Event Original Dates Revised Dates Tender Document Purchase 23.01.2004 28.01.2004 Tender Document Submission 24.01.2004 29.01.2004 21. That Ld. Special Judge has held at page 11 of the impugned order that M/s JUSCO represented by the petitioner was not eligible to participate in the tender process and the petitioner by approving the purchase of the tender documents had caused an illegality. The petitioner being the Managing Director of M/s JUSCO was not involved in the day to day operations of the organization. Further, it is argued that the petitioner also denied that he had ever himself read the Notice Inviting Tender to comprehend the conditions contained therein. However, upon its recent careful perusal, the petitioner could only note the following condition as contained in the Notice Inviting Tender [D-23], which forms part of the police papers handed over to the Petitioner in terms of Section 207 and 208 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Party who has executed such civil and electrical job of Rs.10 crores or more in a single contract or having such experience experts under it or the Contractors enlisted with PWD, CPWD, MES, and any PSU and have executed such value of works in last 10 (ten) years may collect the Tender documents from the Consultant engaged for the above job by NIT from the office at Town Division, Tata Steel, Jamshedpur on payment of Rs.20,000/- non- 15 refundable towards cost of tender documents. 22. Further, the Notice Inviting Tender stipulated as follows: - The Institute/ Consultant reserves the right to reject any or all Tenders without any assigning any reason and also to deny issuance of Tender Documents if the Contractors fail to produce requisite experience, capability and other documents etc. Prior to the purchase of the Tender documents, the petitioner could at best be aware of the said stipulation. Since, the petitioner was heading M/s JUSCO as its Managing Director at the relevant time and since M/s JUSCO was formed out of Town Division, Tata Steel Limited, part of the Town Division, M/s JUSCO could comfortably meet with the requirements for purchase of the tender document. However, it will be significant to note that the prosecution had purposefully qualified the condition to read as ‘having executed work of more than Rs.10 crores in a year in a single contract’, while the condition only read, ‘having executed work of more than Rs.10 crores in a single contract.’ That the further allegation of the prosecution has been that M/s JUSCO represented by the petitioner could not have participated since it did not have the eligibility in terms of the following documents as per the requirements of the tender document (D-38); (a) JUSCO had no certificate for commencement of business (b) JUSCO has no contract labour licence (c) JUSCO had no Central Sales Tax and Jharkhand Sales Tax Certificate (d) JUSCO had no PAN card. 23. Further, prosecution has contended that clause 18 of the Tender Document was also not filled, which reads as follows :- The Contractor must produce Income Tax Clearance Certificate in the revised form before the tender papers can be sold to him. It is submitted that compliance of the said condition by the petitioner was impossible to be complied with it, because unless the tender document could be purchased one could not know about this condition. 24. To set up the charges of criminal conspiracy against the petitioner, the prosecution relies on 4 number of maps of civil and electrical which 16 were prepared by the TPE in the month of August, 2003, which was much before the award of tender. It is yet unclear to the petitioner as to how such facts are relevant to establish a charge of conspiracy against the petitioner. A careful perusal of the documents would show that on 04.06.2003 the Director of NIT namely Dr. A. Mishra wrote a letter to the M. D. Tata Steel & Chairman Board of Governors of NIT, Jamshedpur with a request to carry out the essential repairs of Hostels, face lifting of institute building and beautification of the campus. 25. It is submitted that the above document provides the necessary reasons for preparation of maps and sketches prior to the issuance of Notice Inviting Tender. The prior preparation of maps and sketches were carried out on valid documented instructions and the same was not at all carried out stealthily. The maps were prepared as per the request of the then Director in view of the urgent repairs to be carried out at NIT. This was done before Debashis Bhattacharya assumed office of Director NIT and the Building Advisory Committee was not even constituted, then how can these officers of the NIT be linked to it. If the then Director took an administrative decision to initiate construction work and got a map prepared to that end can it cannot lead to any criminality and to raise such suspicion will amount to paralyze the decision making body of public sector undertaking. 26. The price quoted by top two bidders was Rs.537.80 lakhs which also had the following conditions: (a) Price of cement was taken @ 135/- per bag. (b) Free supply of water and electricity. That the price quoted by M/s JUSCO was Rs.718.44 lakhs (price before considering the rebate), which was firm and unqualified. There cannot be any comparison between a qualified offer and a firm offer. Thus, computation of difference of price for such offers belies and logic and wisdom. By no stretch of prudence, the two rates can be treated alike, and their difference can be held to be the loss quotient. The factors of price of cement bags and value of water and electricity supply consumed in the process of fulfilling the tender obligations would certainly change the notion of loss which has been made by the prosecution in compelling circumstances only to bring about the 17 applicability of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to the entire transaction. This notional loss cannot be construed to be a pecuniary gain or advantage in favour of M/s JUSCO. 27. There is no investigation made by the prosecution in respect to whether the loss suffered was an actual loss or not. It is a settled principle of law that presumptive loss is no loss. It is trite that the damage suffered must be an actual damage and not mere presumptive. Apparently, it is very clear that the loss theory has been forcefully made, while the facts and circumstances of the said case did not actually put up a potential loss theory. Needless to state, that the petitioner personally could not be attributable for any loss which was never caused and even if the loss is somehow perceived, the petitioner has no liability for the same. 28. Submissions on behalf of A.K. Khan The main allegation against this petitioner is that he dishonestly rejected the bids of L1 to L5 parties on the ground of having quoted low rates and lack of requisite experience and negotiated with parties (L6 to L9) which were other than L-1 in violation of CPWD norm for appointment of architect-cum-consultant and thereupon, recommended the name of L-9 (M/s T.P.E) for award of consultancy. Further allegation against this petitioner is by being a member of tender committee of NI he negotiated with L-2 party instead of L-1 and issued work order in favour of L-2. It is submitted that there is no allegation or material to show that the above decision was made for any personal pecuniary or otherwise interest. The decision was not personal but collective which involved the committee comprising of members from CPWD. While selecting the consultant the shortlisting was made not only of L-9 (JUSCO) but also L-6 to L-8 for negotiation. The choice of L-9 was essentially based on its own merits on competitive consideration. The exclusion was based on the Handbook of Manual of Council of Architecture. According to CBI the said manual is not mandatory but is optional, but this shows that such a manual does exist operates in the field. Further considerations which weighed with the BAC in excluding the L-1 to L-5 parties were their respective credentials which stand reflected in the comparative chart. The work for which the 18 consultancy was intended included variety of other works, like electrical, public health engineering, water supply, building, roads, furniture is etc in which the excluded bidders lacked experience. it is also argued that the allegations are based on total misconstruction and misapplication of the norms. Specific reasons had been assigned for not accepting L-1 for awarding of contract which will be evident from the tender opening-cum-comparative statement dated 20.12.2003 by the BAC. The offer of L-1 included ₹ 1000 feet for each visit per person made the offer indeterminate and incapable of being quantified in monetary terms. Not being definite, bills could be raised under this head without any restriction and limits. The rate quotation was considered merely as one of the factor, to judge the possibility of quality of work that would follow. There is no material to show that TPE was selected with intention to ultimately select JUSCO. These facts cannot be the basis for imputing criminality on the part of petitioner and at most it can, be the case of codal violations which would be the basis for departmental action and not criminal action in the light of the ratio decided in C.K. Jaffer Sharief v. State, (2013) 1 SCC 205 : 16. A fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence with regard to the liability of an accused which may have application to the present case is to be found in the work Criminal Law by K.D. Gaur. The relevant passage from the above work may be extracted below: “Criminal guilt would attach to a man for violations of criminal law. However, the rule is not absolute and is subject to limitations indicated in the Latin maxim, actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. It signifies that there can be no crime without a guilty mind. To make a person criminally accountable, it must be proved that an act, which is forbidden by law, has been caused by his conduct, and that the conduct was accompanied by a legally blameworthy attitude of mind. Thus, there are two components of every crime, a physical element and a mental element, usually called actus reus and mens rea respectively.” 17. …………… If in the process, the rules or norms applicable were violated or the decision taken shows and extravagant display of redundance it is the conduct and action of appellant which may have 19 been improper or contrary to departmental norms. But to say that the same was actuated by a dishonest intention to obtain an undue pecuniary advantage will not be correct. The dishonest intention is the gist of offence under Section 13 (1) (d) is implicit in the words used ie corrupt and illegal means and abuse of position as public servant. A similar view has been taken by this Court in M Naryanan Nambiar Vs State of Kerala while considering the provision of Section 5 of the 1947 Act. It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 617 : What is significant to note is that even the High Level Committee had in its minutes noted that financial rating cannot be the sole criterion for taking the final decision. Moreover, in a commercial transaction of such a complex nature a lot of balancing work has to be done while weighing all the relevant factors and the final decision has to be taken after taking an overall view of the transaction. 29. Submissions on behalf of R.P. Singh The charge against this petitioner is akin to that against A.K Khan that he as a member of BAC or the tender committee which shortlisted and recommended for negotiation L-6 to L-9 instead of L- 1 party in violation of CPWD/CVC norms. The plea raised on his behalf is also somewhat similar and are not separately reproduced to avoid any repetition. On the requisite necessary condition for framing of charge reliance is placed on Satish Mehra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 13 SCC 614 : 19. The view expressed by this Court in Century Spg. case [(1972) 3 SCC 282 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 495 : AIR 1972 SC 545] and in L. Muniswamy case [(1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 : AIR 1977 SC 1489] to the effect that the framing of a charge against an accused substantially affects the person's liberty would require a reiteration at this stage. The apparent and close proximity between the framing of a charge in a criminal proceeding and the paramount rights of a person arrayed as an accused under Article 21 of the Constitution can be ignored only with peril. Any examination of the validity of a criminal charge framed against an accused cannot overlook the fundamental requirement laid down in the decisions 20 rendered in Century Spg. [(1972) 3 SCC 282 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 495 : AIR 1972 SC 545] and Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 : AIR 1977 SC 1489] . It is from the aforesaid perspective that we must proceed in the matter bearing in mind the cardinal principles of law that have developed over the years as fundamental to any examination of the issue as to whether the charges framed are justified or not. 21.A criminal trial cannot be allowed to assume the character of a fishing and roving enquiry. It would not be permissible in law to permit a prosecution to linger, limp and continue on the basis of a mere hope and expectation that in the trial some material may be found to implicate the accused. Such a course of action is not contemplated in the system of criminal jurisprudence that has been evolved by the courts over the years. A criminal trial, on the contrary, is contemplated only on definite allegations, prima facie, establishing the commission of an offence by the accused which fact has to be proved by leading unimpeachable and acceptable evidence in the course of the trial against the accused. L.K. Advani and others Vs Central Bureau of Investigation :1997 SCC On Line 382 “52. It is manifest from above that the charges can be framed against an accused person only in those discerning few cases where the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has shown a prima facie case against the accused and there is evidence before the Court which is capable of being converted into legal evidence later on during the subsequent proceedings after the framing of the charges. The matter with regard to the framing of the charges came up for consideration in a catena of authorities wherein time and again it was observed that the prosecution must show a prima facie case against the accused in order to enable the Court to frame a charge against him. If the evidence before the Court is of such type which if un-rebutted and un-challenged by way of cross- examination would not be sufficient enough to convict the accused ultimately then the Court would not be justified in framing the charge against the accused. The Court at that stage is under no obligation to make an elaborate enquiry by sifting and weighing the material to find out a case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt which 21 it is required to do at the time of the final hearing. The Judge at that preliminary stage is simply required to find out that there was material which may lead to the inference that the accused has committed an offence. Thus, the charge can be framed by the Court against an accused if the material placed before it raises a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence. In other words, the Court would be justified in framing the charges against an accused if the prosecution has sown the seed in the form of the incriminating material which has got the potential to develop itself into a full-fledged tree of conviction later on”. 30. SUBMISSIONS on behalf of K.N. Jha: TPE was awarded the work of Consultant-cum- Architect and its primary role was to advise NIT on the proposed tender for Civil and Electrical work. TPE was to act as nodal agency of tender papers and received the documents and submit the same to the Building Advisory Committee which was constituted by the NIT comprised of the teaching faculty of the NIT. There is no material to suggest that Mr K.N.Jha had instructed any person to hand over the tender papers after due date of sale of tender papers. Contrary to the allegations made, JUSCO was not ineligible. He was the head of TPE but was not the member of BAC which was to act as tender committee. Negotiations were held with all the bidders and PW 56 Mr Kashyap Ojha the project coordinator, Adison Constructions and in his statement has stated that he was called for negotiation on 4.2.2004. It is argued by Sri Gopal Jain Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of Dr K.N.Jha that there was a multilayer decision making comprising of Building Advisory Committee (BAC), BWC and finally Board of Governors which finally accorded approval to the selection of the Agency to execute the work. The role of Dr K.N. Jha as the head of TPE was limited to offer consultancy service and not take any final decision and when the decision was taken in a mechanism of multitier committees, Dr K.N. Jha cannot be held responsible when he was not the member of any of the committees. 31. Dr. Debashis Bhattacharya Submissions: Petitioner was not named in the FIR and his name has 22 come up during investigation. Merely because the petitioner was the head of the institution and had acted upon recommendations to approve the award of a tender, cannot in these facts or in law, be the basis to fasten criminal liability. The mere non-grant of tender to L-1 cannot be said to be illegal and therefore the basis for inferring criminal conspiracy. The petitioner was a member of Building Works Committee (BWC) where officers of the Central Public Works Department where present. It was a collective decision to approve the bid for which the petitioner cannot solely be held liable for criminal prosecution for a mere code violation. There is no allegation that there was a demand or request for a valuable thing a pecuniary advantage from the public servant which is the prerequisite to attract Section 13 (1) (d) of the PC Act,1988. Further, there is no clarity from either from the chargesheet or order framing charge as to which subsection of Section 13(1)(d) is being alleged against petitioner. This petitioner was not a part of the Building Advisory Committee (BAC). He was the ex-official chairman of BAC approved the appointment of M/s Town Planning and Engineering as the architect cum consultant on 29 December 2003 on the basis of the recommendation of BAC. The petitioner was not a part of, or a member of, the tender committee (TC) which comprised of K.N.Jha (A2), A.K.Khan (A1) and Kamal Kumar Ghose (A7). Approval to the appointment of JUSCO was based on the recommendation of the tender committee. A failure of the head of the Department by relying on junior officers cannot be the basis for initiating criminal prosecution as has been held in (2012)3 SCC64 and (2012) 9 SCC 257. Settled proposition of law is that non-grant of the tender to L1 will not of itself vitiate the tender process. There is no legal or vested right that inheres in the L-1 tenderer. Mere rejection of the L-1 tenderer, cannot be the basis of imputing criminal liability. The notice inviting tender itself contemplated in clause 11 and clause 16 of the bid that it would be at liberty to reject any tender, including that of L- 1. In the Building Works Committee (BWC) there were two representatives from the CPWD viz Satyendra Kumar and MK Malik who were present at the time when the tender was awarded to 23 JUSCO. These officers had not raised any objection regarding the violation of any CPWD guidelines. CBI has not made them accused although they stood on the similar footing of decision-making. If the award of tender is found to be tainted than all those involved in decision-making must be proceeded against and not selectively. Nothing beyond code violations has been imputed against the petitioner. 32. It is equally settled that an honest, though erroneous exercise of power by public servant does not constitute a dishonest intention for the purpose of criminal prosecution held in the following authorities: A. C.K. Jaffer Sharief Vs State (through CBI) (2013)1 SCC 205 B. 2014 SCC online Jhar 2622 C. (1977) 2 SCC 394 In order to attract offence under section 13(1)(d) of the PC act, it is required for the prosecution to at least allege that there was a demand or request for a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage from the public servant. The chargesheet does not make any such allegation against the petitioner. In the absence of any such demand offence will not be made out in view of the ratio decided in A.(2009) 6SCC 587 B. (2014) 13 SCC 55 C.(2016) 1 SCC 713 It has been held in Rumi Dhar Vs State of WB (2009) 6 SCC 364 that at the stage of charge, the trial Court as well as this Court is required to appreciate the details of the allegations made against each accused. There is a solemn duty cast upon the learned trial Court to apply itself to the materials and the allegations against the individual accused as held in A.(2005) 1 SCC 568 B.(2013) 11 SCC 476 C.(2010) 9 SCC 368 33. Submissions on behalf of JUSCO Offence under section 420 IPC will not be made out as nowhere the prosecution alleges that there was any falsity in the representation made by M/s JUSCO in its bid or by its officers. In the absence of any dishonest inducement the offence of cheating cannot be made 24 out. Archana Rana vs State of UP. M/s JUSCO cannot be charged substantively for offence under section 13(2) read with section13(1)(d) of the PC Act. Reliance is placed on State through CBI Vs Uttamchand Bohra, 2021 SCC On Line SC 1208. The extension of date was pursuant to a request from M/s Adisons Constructions. It was for this reason that date for both purchase of documents and submission were extended. It is not in dispute that JUSCO was given documents before the last date. Thus, mere condoning late payment would be an irregularity to facilitate greater competition in the tender process. Mere irregularity is insufficient to support serious allegations of criminality. It has been held in (2007) 14 SCC 517, “so long as a decision relating to award of contract is one of in public interest, court will not interfere by exercising power of judicial review even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to tenderer is made out”. Chargesheet enlists seven reasons why JUSCO was ineligible even to purchase the tender documents most of the allegations are imaginary since notice inviting tender nor the tender documents carry any condition that the applicant must have a PF Code, or Centre and sale tax license, or contract labour license. The 3 out of 7 alleged reasons were unfounded. Further that – these Ltd is an exempted establishment in terms of section 17 A of the employees Provident fund act 1952 and runs and administers its own trust for the purpose of compliance of the laws related to Provident fund. JUSCO has been allowed by the PF authorities to participate in the Tata steel limited PF trust and does not need PF code separately. The only condition that was part of the notice inviting tender was that prospective bidders were required to have experience of having executed work worth Rs. 10 crores. CBI altered the condition in the chargesheet, where it states that the requirement was to have executed such works in a single year. JUSCO relied upon the experience of the TPE division of Tata steel in support as ingenious from that division were absorbed into JUSCO. The notice inviting tender specified that an entity would be satisfying the criteria even if it could demonstrate experience in this manner. Further, it is settled law that a subsidiary 25 can rely upon the experience of the parent organisation for such contractual processes. Allegation made in para 15 of the chargesheet that L-1 bidder was not called for negotiations is refuted by the prosecution witness no.56 Kashyap Ojha in his statement dated 29.08.2006 wherein he states that he was present as a representative of M/s Adisons before the tender committee on 04.02.2004. Further, this party cannot be treated as L-1 bidder as it was conditional and therefore could not be taken forward. With regard to the charges of mobilisation advance it is submitted that it was a product of negotiations between parties. As per the prosecution case JUSCO was granted interest free advance of Rs. 70 lakhs, thereby causing a loss of interest amount of Rs. 700,002 and 90. But in view of the interest, there was a rebate negotiated with JUSCO which is 2.5% of the total of Rs. 700 crores which comes to Rs. 17.50 lakhs, which is more than the interest amount of Rs. 7 lakhs. This contrary to the prosecution story JUSCO did not get any monetary benefit by not paying interest on mobilisation advance. Furthermore, the decision of the tender committee was approved in two subsequent rounds of review by the building and works committee and the Board of Governors in their meetings dated 8.5.2004 and 30.5.2004. Mere irregularity is for non- compliance departmental codes, even if assumed would not be sufficient to warrant a court to completely ignore the multilayered process of review in the present case and question the award of tender. (2016) 12 SCC 273; (1996) 10 SCC 193;(2009) 8 SCC 617. As a matter of fact JUSCO had performed its contractual obligations and executed the works for which JUSCO has raised bail for the total amount of Rs. 5,24,40, out of which Rs2,74,65,989 is paid to JUSCO and the remaining payment of the executed work has been withheld by NIT due to registration of this case. 34. Kamal Kumar Ghosh (Pvt. Person) : It is submitted that this petitioner was not the member of building advisory committee of NIT. The BAC was referred to as the ‘Tender Committee’. The petitioner worked as an architect in TPE and when it was appointed as a consultant the role of this petitioner was to review the architectural plans, suggest modifications and get the maps prepared. He had no role to play at the time of the valuation 26 which was the work of the said tender committee or the BAC. Therefore, he was not involved in the decision-making. The prosecution has relied on comparative statement (D-49) which bears the signature of the petitioner but this document needs to be read with D – 14 it is the formal agreement between TPE, Tata steel limited and NIT this agreement indicates that TPE was appointed as a consultant to carry out the civil and Electrical works at NIT. The signature of the petitioner of the comparative statement was on account of his role as a representative of TPE while discharging the contractual obligations and documenting the outcome of tendering process. This document does not in any manner state that Mr Ghosh was part of the building advisory committee or the tender committee. 35. It is argued on behalf of the CBI by Shri Prashant Pallava Additional solicitor general of India that the present revision petitions are not maintainable either on fact or in law. It is argued while exercising revisional jurisdiction the revisional court cannot hold a mini trial and the scope of adjudication is confined to the correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned order. At the time of framing of charge the trial court has to ascertain as to whether there are sufficient grounds to make out a prima facie case against the accused and even grave suspicion will be sufficient for framing of charge. Different authorities have been relied in support of this proposition of law which does not need to be referred to as there cannot be two view on the legal position as stated above by the learned counsel regarding principles and powers to be exercised by revisional court and the material sufficiency for framing of charge. No detailed evaluation of the materials or probative value of evidence collected during investigation is to be entered into. Where material on record discloses offence, accused cannot be discharged. Nevertheless, the provision of discharge has been introduced in the criminal procedure code both in cases of magisterial trial as well as in sessions trial with a twofold object. First is that any one is not put up on trial without any material basis and he has to undergo the grinding process of protracted litigation before he can be acquitted of the charges levelled against him after trial. The second object behind this provision is to save valuable court hours from meritless litigations. Thus, the provision of 27 discharge on one hand is to safeguard individual interest and on the other the institutional interest to weed out cases in which trial is held on grounds which even if it is accepted cannot lead to conviction. 36. It is further submitted that under a conspiracy Prof. A.K. Khan of NIT with K.N. Jha head of Town Planning and Engineering (TPE) and Sanjiv Paul Managing Director JUSCO, first selected TPE as Architect-cum-consultant which on its part selected JUSCO for executing civil and electrical work. This was done bypassing the L1 bidder in complete violation of the CVC and CPWD guidelines which was obligatory for NIT to follow. On seventh July 2003 resolutions where passed that CPWD guidelines would be followed. CVC circular dated 18th of government 1998 makes it clear that no post tender negotiation can take place except with L-1. M/s Adisons Construction Limited (L1) had made a bid offer of Rs 537.80 crores while the bid offer of JUSCO was Rs.700.48 crores to NIR, Jamshedpur. The work was awarded with a condition that 2.5% rebate shall be offered with 10% as mobilization advance. This condition was not part of tender document but was added to favour JUSCO. It is further argued that JUSCO was not entitled to purchase tender documents as per NIT, however tender document illegally. D.D was dated 29th January 2004 ie after the last date of purchase of tender which was 28th of January 2004. JUSCO did not have a separate P.F. Code. No labour lincence and no central and State Tax Certificate. There is no record to show that L-1 i.e. Adisons Construction was called for negotiation. JUSCO failed to submit Income Tax Clearance certificate and did not had the requisite experience. 37. With regard to argument advanced on behalf of petitioner-accused, Kamal Kumar Ghosh that he was not member of either of the committees and without any material, implicated in the present case, learned ASGI draws a specific reference to document No.D/49 which bears the signatures of Mr. Ghosh. It is submitted that this document is a tabular comparative chart of the initial reports of the different bidders which was prepared by the members including this petitioner which goes to say that he was member of Tender Committee. It is further submitted that the constitution of building advisory committee 28 was provisional considering the urgency for opening of the tender document. 38. To sum up the main allegation is that under a conspiracy everything was orchestrated to favour JUSCO and get the contract for civil and electrical works awarded in its favour. At the first stage consultancy was awarded in favour of TPE by NIT and then in the next stage it was awarded to JUSCO for civil and electrical works which was a sister concern of TPE. Both these bids were awarded by excluding the lowest bidders thereby causing financial loss to NIT. The materials on which the accused persons are proposed to be put on trial is that in both the tenders, one for selection of architect-cum- consultant and the second for selecting the agency by the consultant, the contract was awarded disregard in the lowest bidder in violation of the CVC and CPWD norms without observing the CPWD and CVC norms. 39. In order to put any accused on trial there are two fundamental requirements. First, an offence took place and second there exists ground to warrant strong suspicion that accused was author or in any way involved in the commission of the offence. Criminal law can be set into motion on mere suspicion at the stage of FIR, but after the investigation is concluded and materials are brought on record, in order to put the accused on trial for the offence proposed to be charged, the law mandates that materials should raise grave suspicion of the complicity of the accused in the offence. It cannot be a ‘fishing expedition or roving inquiry’. There is difference between mere allegation and the ground or materials on the basis of which the charge is to be framed against the accused. The materials should be sufficient to warrant conviction if they remain unrebutted during trial. Without such material a trial can be an exercise in futility and abuse of process and wastage of valuable time of the Court . In Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547 the Hon’ble Apex Court followed and quoted with approval the principles laid down in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4: “10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge: 29 (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. (2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.” Law relating to framing of charge and discharge 15. We may profitably, in this regard, refer to the judgment of this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh [State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533 : AIR 1977 SC 2018] wherein this Court has laid down the principles relating to framing of charge and discharge as follows : (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4) “4. … Reading Sections 227 and 228 together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not.” 40. Following are the main materials on the basis of which the charge sheet has been filed under Sections 120B, 420 of IPC and Section 13 (2) r/w 13 (1) of the PC Act: I. Sri A.K. Khan Asst. Prof NIT, in the capacity of chairman, R.P.Singh, Prof AB Chattopadhyaya as member Building 30 Advisory Committee, recommended the name of TPE for appointment as Architect-cum-Consultant by ignoring L-1 to L- 8. II. Sri K.N. Jha as Head of TPE (Tata Steel) and consultant got the work of civil and electrical work awarded in favour of JUSCO for Rs.700.48 lakhs by ignoring the bid of Adisons Construction Limited, Kolkata which has quoted rate of Rs.537.80 lakhs with a condition of the rate of 2.5% against grant of 10% interest free mobilization service. III. M/s JUSCO was not eligible to purchase the tender documents as per the conditions down in NIT absence of requisite documents like IT clearance certificate etc. IV. Erstwhile Town Division of TATA Steel later became JUSCO and TPE was a part of town division of M/S TATA STEEL. V. On the basis of the approval given by Dr. D. Bhattacharya the BAC was formed comprising of Prof AK Khan, Prof RP Singh then Prof applied mechanics Prof AB Chattopadhyaya and, Sri Deepak Kumar Asst Engineer. VI. TPE was authorised to invite, receive and analyse tenders; advice land on appointment of contractor. VII. On the basis of an approval of Dr D Bhattacharya another notice inviting tender dated 16/18.01.04 was published by NIT Jamshedpur for civil and electrical works for an estimated cost of Rs. 5 41 lakhs and the last date of purchase of tender document was fixed on 23.01.04. Three parties namely HSCL, Ranchi, M/s Tarapore and Company, Jamshedpur, M/s Adisons Construction Kolkata responded and tender documents were issued to them by the due date i.e. 23.1.04. Later, by corrigendum dated 26.01.04 the last date of purchase of tender documents was extended up to 28.01.04. For purchase of tender documents Rs. 20,000 was to be deposited by way of demand draft. JUSCO was the fourth bidder which was issued the tender documents after the last date of issue of tender documents against the invalid demand draft for Rs. 20,000 dated 29.01.04. VIII. JUSCO was not eligible to purchase the tender documents as it failed to fulfil the laid down conditions detailed in para 14 of the 31 chargesheet. The tender documents were scrutinized by the tender committee comprising of Sri K N Jha, Prof AK Khan, Prof KK Ghosh. All the four parties L-1 to L-4 were called for negotiation in violation of the CVC circular and CPWD norms. But no records are available that M/s Adisons was called for negotiation. IX. Instead of settling certain assumptions in the bid offer of M/s Adisons the tender committee mentioned in their minutes that the offer of it was conditional and on that ground the offer of L- 1 was rejected. X. During negotiation against a rebate of 2.5% of the total offer JUSCO was given an interest free mobilization advance of ₹ 70 lakhs by the tender committee. On the recommendation of the tender committee Dr D Bhattacharya put his remarks that the offer of M/s Adisons was conditional and also that the party declined to withdraw conditional offer. XI. Work order was placed on M/s JUSCO by Prof AK Khan of NIT on 6.2. 2004 and thereupon an agreement dated 18.3.04 was signed between M/s represented by Sanjeev Paul and NIT represented by Prof AK Khan. The BWC and BG of an IT approved the said I was off work post fact on 85 2004 and 831 five 2004. 41. The main point for consideration is whether any offence was at all committed by not awarding contract to the L 1 bidders and if the petitioner accused person were complicit in the offence? Without going into the probative value of the materials collected during investigation, the matter for consideration is whether disregard of the lowest bidder and the relevant guidelines by the committee will lead to criminality? Whether materials are sufficient to put the accused persons on trial for the proposed charges under Section 120 B read with Section 420 of the IPC and Section 13(1) (d) of the PC Act? 42. There is considerable force in the argument on behalf of the petitioners that offence will not be made out merely because lowest bidder has been excluded and there has been codal or procedural violation. Reliance has been placed in this regard on the following authorities: 32 C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193 : 22. On a careful consideration of the material on the record, we are of the opinion that though the prosecution has established that the appellants have committed not only codal violations but also irregularities by ignoring various circulars and departmental orders issued from time to time in the matter of allotment of work of jungle clearance on nomination basis and have committed departmental lapse yet, none of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are of any conclusive nature and all the circumstances put together do not lead to the irresistible conclusion that the said circumstances are compatible only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the appellants and wholly incompatible with their innocence. In Abdulla Mohd. Pagarkar v. State (Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu) [(1980) 3 SCC 110 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 546] under somewhat similar circumstances this Court opined that mere disregard of relevant provisions of the Financial Code as well as ordinary norms of procedural behaviour of government officials and contractors, without conclusively establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, the guilt of the officials and contractors concerned, may give rise to a strong suspicion but that cannot be held to establish the guilt of the accused. That because of the actions of the appellants in breach of codal provisions, instructions and procedural safeguards, the State may have suffered financially, particularly by allotment of work on nomination basis without inviting tenders, but those acts of omission and commission by themselves do not establish the commission of criminal offences alleged against them. Asia Foundation & Construction Ltd. v. Trafalgar House Construction (I) Ltd., (1997) 1 SCC 738 at page 746 10. Therefore, though the principle of judicial review cannot be denied so far as exercise of contractual powers of government bodies are concerned, but it is intended to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism and it is exercised in the larger public interest or if it is brought to the notice of the court that in the matter of award of a contract power has been exercised for any collateral purpose……In the matter of a tender a lowest bidder may not claim an enforceable 33 right to get the contract though ordinarily the authorities concerned should accept the lowest bid. State of M.P. v. Sheetla Sahai, (2009) 8 SCC 617 : 51. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the tests for the purpose of framing of charge and the one for recording a judgment of conviction are different. A distinction must be borne in mind that whereas at the time of framing of the charge, the court may take into consideration the fact as to whether the accused might have committed the offence or not; at the time of recording a judgment of conviction, the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. 52. In this case, the probative value of the materials on record has not been gone into. The materials brought on record have been accepted as true at this stage. It is true that at this stage even a defence of an accused cannot be considered. But, we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the submission of Mr Tulsi that where the entire materials collected during investigation have been placed before the court as part of the chargesheet, the court at the time of framing of the charge could only look to those materials whereupon the prosecution intended to rely upon and ignore the others which are in favour of the accused. 53. The question as to whether the court should proceed on the basis as to whether the materials brought on record even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety disclose commission of an offence or not must be determined having regard to the entirety of materials brought on record by the prosecution and not on a part of it. If such a construction is made, sub-section (5) of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall become meaningless. 54. The prosecution, having regard to the right of an accused to have a fair investigation, fair inquiry and fair trial as adumbrated under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, cannot at any stage be deprived of taking advantage of the materials which the prosecution itself has placed on record. If upon perusal of the entire materials on record, the court arrives at an opinion that two views are possible, charges can be framed, but if only one and one view is 34 possible to be taken, the court shall not put the accused to harassment by asking him to face a trial. (See State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa [(1996) 4 SCC 659 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 820] .) 43. From the above authorities the ratio that can be culled out is that no right inheres in the lowest bidder for the award of the contract and the role of the Courts is limited and it cannot enter to the arena of domain expert to judge the bids and their suitability for the work. There are various technical aspects which is better left to the tenderer and unless there is manifest arbitrariness and bias in derogation of the settled procedure, it cannot warrant interference by the Court. Further, there is difference between unintentional error in the decision making while deciding over the tender and criminality in decision making. There is grain of truth in the submission advanced by Additional Solicitor General of India that tenders in many cases is the source of corruption and favouritism as noted in the central vigilance guidelines. But the Courts cannot start with a presumption of criminality and there need to be materials to raise suspicion over the dishonest intention to gain an undue advantage either directly or through someone to make out the ingredients of the proposed offence. 44. Matter for consideration whether the offence under Section 420 IPC is made out on the basis of materials brought on record? The answer to the question will lie in looking into the ingredients of the offence. Hon’ble Supreme Court succinctly put the ingredients of the offence in 2021 SCC On Line 1232 N. Raghvender Vs. State of A.P. 47. It is paramount that in order to attract the provisions of Section 420 IPC, the prosecution has to not only prove that the accused has cheated someone but also that by doing so, he has dishonestly induced the person who is cheated to deliver property. There are, thus, three components of this offence, i.e., (i) deception of any person, (ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to any person, and (iii) mens rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement. It goes without saying that for the offence of cheating, fraudulent and dishonest intention must exist from the inception when the promise or representation was made. 35 46. It is equally well-settled that the phrase ‘dishonestly’ emphasizes a deliberate intention to cause wrongful gain or wrongful loss, and when this is coupled with cheating and delivery of property, the offence becomes punishable under Section 420 IPC. Contrarily, the mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution under Section 420 unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction. It is equally important that for the purpose of holding a person guilty under Section 420, the evidence adduced must establish beyond reasonable doubt, mens rea on his part. 45. In the present case beyond allegation, there is no material from which a prima facie inference can be drawn that deception was practiced by the accused persons in the tender process. Both the tenders were open and the bids were selected under a multi-layered process by different committees. The bidder so selected was not a fake company but was a company of repute with record of quality work and of maintaining high degree of ethics in business practice. Mere elimination of lowest bidders without anything more, will not make out an offence under Section 420 if the materials do not disclose as to how the deception was practiced, what was the false representation made acting on which the person so deceived took decision detrimental to his interest. I am of the view that in the present case the grounds are not sufficient to make out an offence under Section 420 IPC. 46. In order to make out a case of criminal conspiracy there should be material to establish that there was an agreement between the persons who allegedly entered into the criminal conspiracy and that the said agreement should be for doing of an illegal act, or for doing by illegal means an act which may not itself be illegal. The agreement to do such an act is the gist of offence of criminal conspiracy. Such an agreement can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy by its very nature is shrouded in secrecy and therefore its existence need to be gathered from the attending circumstances. 47. I find force in the argument put forward by Mr. Pandey Niraj Rai, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, namely, Prof. A.K. Khan @ Prof. Ashok Kumar Khan in Cr. M.P. No. 03 of 2022 36 that the sequence of events do not disclose any such behind-the- scenes meeting of mind rather they show the contrary. Had there been any such pre-meditated plan, then JUSCO would have not submitted its bid at the last moment. It would have full knowledge about the forthcoming issue of tender notice and would have purchased the tender and filled up the same without leaving any lacuna to raise any doubt. In the first bid L-1 and L-5 were not called for, negotiation, for the reason that they were not qualified and also not deemed to be fit enough, therefore, L6 and L9 were called for and L6 to be treated in the present case. The Building Advisory Committee in its minutes on 20.12.2003 has assigned specific reason for exclusion of bidders for consultancy services to NIT who have been termed as L1 to L5 and L10 and this is the part of the statement recorded by Dr. N.K. Narayan (PW4). Despite these specific reasons assigned, the petitioner has been charged merely on the ground that CVC guidelines of negotiating with only L1 has been raised by the CBI. It is also argued that three petitioners who have been charge-sheeted for being member of BAC and that of Deepak Kumar, Assistant Engineer stood on same footing and, therefore, ought to have been proceeded against in the present case. 48. It is submitted that if conspiracy between JUSCO, TPE and NIT if had grain of truth then why should JUSCO participate in the tender at the last moment and not at the initial stage of bid. So far as unsuccessful bidder is concerned, none have come forwarded to challenge the award of contract in favour of TPE and JUSCO. It is further submitted that the involvement of petitioner Kamal Kumar Ghosh in the first tender is completely ruled out as because he came into picture only after TPE was selected as Architect cum Consultant. 49. The ineligibility of JUSCO has been explained to a large extent in the submission made on behalf of it, and criminality cannot be attached for not fulfilling any condition as such. 50. Having considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf of both the sides I’m of the view that the grounds are not sufficient for framing of charge and launch trial against the accused persons. As stated earlier in order to launch criminal trial there should be some 37 material to show that a crime has been committed and there are grounds to raise grave suspicion about the complicity of the accused in the said crime. I find that in the instant case that materials fail to disclose crime or criminality for the following reasons. Firstly, there is no allegation or any material to show that the accused persons stood personally to gain any advantage pecuniary or otherwise by awarding contract in favour of TPE or JUSCO. The offence under Section 13(1))(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not made out on the basis of materials on record, as there is no evidence against that the petitioners derived any advantage pecuniary or otherwise, in selecting TPE or JUSCO, excluding the lower bidders. Dishonest intention is the heart and soul of any criminal liability unless it is a case of strict liability where the intention is ruled out. It has been held in C.K Jaffer Sahreif case (supra) by Hon’ble Supreme Court if in the process, the rules or norms applicable were violated or the decision taken showed an extravagant display of redundance it is the conduct and action of appellant which may have been improper or contrary to departmental norms. But to say that the same was actuated by a dishonest intention to obtain an undue pecuniary advantage will not be correct. The dishonest intention is the gist of offence under Section 13 (1) (d) is implicit in the words used ie corrupt and illegal means and abuse of position as public servant. Intention being a state of mind is to be gathered from the act of the party. The common thread running through Section 13 (1) (d) (i-iii) is that the public servant ‘obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage’. Act of dishonesty need to be manifested in some advantage to oneself or some one else. Secondly, there is absolutely no material to draw primafacie case that the officers of NIT had personal pecuniary interest for awarding the contract for architecture and consultancy to TPE. It is argued on behalf of the CBI that definition of misconduct under Section 13 (1) (d) is wide enough to bring within its fold acts of public servant if by corrupt illegal means he obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. It is debatable whether in the present case the award of contract in favour of TPE and JUSCO 38 can really be called pecuniary advantage only because of the contract not awarded to the lowest bidder in financial terms. Even if it is accepted to be so, there is nothing to suggest that the persons sought to be charged had the prospect of deriving any benefit by the decision in favour of these companies. The definition of ‘misconduct’ has been cast wide to bring within fold public servants indulging in corrupt practices who in order to screen themselves from the charges, obtain the valuable thing or pecuniary advantage in name of some other person. In the present case there is no causal link to connect the officers of NIT that they gained any advantage directly or indirectly by the award of work contract in favour of these companies. Unless and until there is some link even tenuous one at this stage to raise suspicion that the accused persons derived any advantage by award of contract to any other ‘person’ (corporal or legal) criminality cannot be imputed. If the argument advanced on behalf of CBI is accepted, then in all cases where the contract is awarded by a government department to anyone, other than the lowest bidder, the officers involved in the decision, even if it is bona-fides, without any criminal intent and in the interest of the institution, can be hauled up in a criminal case. Such an inference will be incompatible with the settled law that lowest bidders do not have an inherent right to get the contract awarded in their favour. Raising such presumption of criminality, where and whenever the bids are not awarded in favour of the lowest bidder irrespective of their credentials and suitability, will lead to anomalous and commercially unviable decisions which could be counterproductive both financially and qualitatively in the long run. Neither the CBI, nor this Court can enter into the domain of decision-making of the tender committee which has to take into account various technical factors in the interest of the project, unless it is clouded with taint of extraneous consideration of deriving any advantage directly or indirectly raising grave suspicion. Thirdly, in the present case no one has come forward to challenge the bid awarded in favour of TPE or JUSCO. Fourthly, Adisons cannot be termed as L-1 for the reason that the rates quoted by it came with conditionality whereas the rates as quoted by JUSCO where not having such conditions. Adisons, had 39 quoted Rs.537.80 lakhs which also had the following conditions: (a) Price of cement was taken @ 135/- per bag. (b) Free supply of water and electricity. It was a conditional bid and therefore the committee did not prefer to select it as the contract was to be awarded in the interest of the project and merely because bidder has quoted a lower rate does not give it a right for selection. There cannot be any comparison between a qualified offer and a firm offer. Thus, computation of difference of price for such offers belies and logic and wisdom. By no stretch of prudence, the two rates can be treated alike, and their difference can be held to be the loss quotient. The factors of price of cement bags and value of water and electricity supply consumed in the process of fulfilling the tender obligations would certainly change the notion of loss which has been made by the prosecution in compelling circumstances only to bring about the applicability of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to the entire transaction. This notional loss cannot be construed to be a pecuniary gain or advantage in favour of M/s JUSCO. There is no investigation made by the prosecution in respect to whether the loss suffered was an actual loss or not. It is a settled principle of law that presumptive loss is no loss. It is trite that the damage suffered must be an actual damage and not mere presumptive. Apparently, it is very clear that the loss theory has been forcefully made, while the facts and circumstances of the said case did not actually put up a potential loss theory. Needless to state, that the petitioner personally could not be attributable for any loss which was never caused and even if the loss is somehow perceived, the petitioner has no liability for the same. Fifthly, in respect of the extension of date for purchase of tender document as well as submission, the prosecution material shows that on the request was from M/s Adisions constructions that the date for submission was extended[D – 24 letter dated 23.01.200 4] therefore it cannot be said that last date was extended solely to benefit JUSCO. Sixthly, memorandum was prepared by the Investigating Authority to verify whether the work was done as per the drawings /architectural design or not. The investigating authority concluded that the work was completed as per the drawings and no inconsistency could be 40 found. Thus, on the basis of the memorandum, the allegation leveled against the petitioner with regard to conspiracy and corruption ought to be brushed aside. Seventhly, had there been a criminal conspiracy and prior meeting of mind to extend undue benefit to JUSCO, they would have all prior information of tender and there would not have been last minute rush to obtain the tender documents and bid documents would have been tailored to the minutest details to raise any question of doubt. Eighthly, on the charge that TPE had not negotiated with L-1, reference is made to the statement of P.W. 56 Kashyap Ojha wherein he has said on record that on 04.02.2004 he was called for negotiation and he had also visited the office of TPE and he has stated that negotiation did take place. For the reasons as stated above, this Court is of the view that this is a fit case for interfering with the impugned order of framing of charge as the materials are not sufficient to raise grave suspicion that any offence was committed in the tender process and in the decision of awarding contract in favour of TPE and JUSCO. On the grounds on which the prosecution seeks trial of the accused petitioners are not sufficient for framing of charge under sections 420 and 120 B IPC read with sections 13(2) and 13 (1) (d) of the P.C. Act. Any trial on these grounds will be an exercise in futility as these materials do not make out the offence proposed to be charged and will consume valuable judicial time and also put the petitioner accused to grind of protracted litigation. The impugned order is set aside, accused persons are discharged of the offences. All the aforesaid petitions are allowed. I.A. Nos. 1461/20 & 5056/20 in Cr. Rev. 133/20, I.A. No. 2050/22 in Cr. Rev. 571/19, I.A. No. 2048/22 in Cr. Rev. 676/19, I.A. No. 2049/22 in Cr. Rev. 690/19 & I.A. No. 2051/22 in Cr. Rev. 764/19 stand disposed of. (Gautam Kumar Choudhary, J.) Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi Dated the 18th August, 2022 AFR / Anit "