SAURASHTRA CRICKET ASSOCIATION V. INCOME TAX OFFICER

SCA/2323/2014

AI Insights

The case involves the Saurashtra Cricket Association challenging the notice issued by the Income Tax Officer under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for reopening the assessment for the assessment years 2009-10 and 2010-11. The primary contention was whether the income received by the Association from BCCI and other sources constituted income from a 'charitable purpose' or was it to be treated as income from trade, commerce, or business. The court examined the nature of the activities conducted by the Association and referenced several precedents to conclude that the Association's activities were charitable in nature and did not amount to trade or business.

• Counselvise Citation: [2020] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 750555 (HC-GUJARAT)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 21-01-2020
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Siddhi Vinayak Transport vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Transwind Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer, Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Kelvinator of India Ltd., Dharmaposhanam Co. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Cricket Association of Bengal vs. Income Tax Officer
• Laws Referred To: Income Tax Act, 1961
• Result in Favour of: Applicant
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: MAUNA BHATT
• Assessee Lawyers: TUSHAR HEMANI; VAIBHAVI PARIKH
• Keywords: Assessment Year; Charitable purpose; Income Tax; Reopening of assessment
• Section: 147; 148; 2(15); 143

Judgement Text

"C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2321 of 2014 With R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 2323 of 2014 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA and HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA ================================================================ 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? NO 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? NO 3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? NO 4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any order made thereunder ? NO ================================================================ SAURASHTRA CRICKET ASSOCIATION Versus INCOME TAX OFFICER ================================================================ Appearance: MR TUSHAR P HEMANI(2790) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1 MS VAIBHAVI K PARIKH(3238) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1 MRS MAUNA M BHATT(174) for the Respondent(s) No. 1 ================================================================ CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA and HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA Date : 21/01/2020 ORAL JUDGMENT (PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA) Page 1 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT 1. Both these petitions are filed challenging the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act, 1961') for reopening of the assessment year 2009­ 10 and assessment year 2010­11. Both these petitions were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. For sake of convenience, Special Civil Application No. 2321 of 2014 is treated as lead matter. 3. The petitioner has challenged the notice dated 08.01.2013 issued under Section 148 of the Act, 1961 by the respondent seeking to reopen the assessment for the A.Y. 2010­11 as well as assessment order dated 30.01.2013 passed by the respondent under Section 143 r/w. Section 147 of the Act, 1961, during the pendency of the petition before this Court. 4. The Coordinate Bench of this Court passed the common order dated 17.02.2014 in both the petitions, which read thus: 1. Heard, Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned Sr. Advocate with Mr. Tushar P. Hemani, learned Advocate for the appellant. 2. Learned Sr. Advocate moves a Draft Amendment, same is allowed. The amendment Page 2 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT shall be carried out during the course of the day. 3. The learned Sr. Advocate invited the attention of this Court to the averments made in Paragraph­2.10, which reads as under; 2.10 However, the Respondent, vide order dated 16.04.2013 disposed off the objections raised by the Petitioner and inter alia held that when the original assessment order is framed due to oversight and inadvertence or a mistake, the reopening is valid. A copy of the order dated 16.04.2013 passed by the Respondent is annexed herewith and marked hereto as Annexure K to this petition. 4. The learned Sr. Advocate, then, invited the attention of this Court to Paragraph­ 3.10, which reads as under; 3.10 The Petitioner further submits that whenever an assessment order is framed u/s 143(3) of the Act, the Assessing Officer builds an opinion about all the issues which are expressly and impliedly accepted by him. Under such circumstances, any variation from the opinion, already framed by the Assessing Officer in absence of any tangible material would amount he hierarchy in status of the Court in the country is not decisiveto change of opinion, and therefore, it is not open to the Respondent to now, change his opinion, and reopen the concluded assessment is sought to be done. 5. The learned Sr. Advocate placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the matter of SIDDHI VINAYAK TRANSPORT ASST. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, [2013] 35 taxmann.com 84(Gujarat). The learned Sr. Advocate invited the attention of this Court to Paragraphs­ 9 to 12, thereof; 09. It thus clearly emerges from the record that the Assessing Officer now wishes to Page 3 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT reexamine the petitioners claim of deduction on the premise that the earlier Assessing Officer made an error in limiting such allowance to 20% of the total expenditure. In his opinion, 100% disallowance was called for. To the extent that the Assessing Officer, in the scrutiny assessment, did not disallow 80% of the expenditure and limited the disallowance to 20%, had committed an error. 10. We are not examining the validity of the contention of the Assessing Officer, recorded in the form of reasons, for issuing the notice. We are limiting our observations to his assuming jurisdiction of reopening of the assessment on such basis. When the earlier Assessing Officer had framed scrutiny assessment and examined certain deductions thoroughly, it was, thereafter, simply not open to the latter Assessing Officer to reopen the assessment on the basis that the earlier Assessing Officer committed a legal error. Once the claim was examined, scrutiny assessment was framed and Assessing Officer came to the conclusion with or without recording reasons in the assessment order, such an assessment could not have been subjected to the process of reopening. This is not to suggest that the Revenue would be rendered without any remedy even in a case where the Assessing Officer committed a gross error in under assessing income chargeable to tax. 11. Section 263 of the Act, of course, when the requirements laid down in the provisions are satisfied, empowers the Commissioner to take such an order in revision. However, the succeeding Assessing Officer cannot doubt the legality of a conclusion recorded by the earlier Assessing Officer in his assessment order, which was framed after scrutiny. In same what similar circumstance, we had in our judgment dated 16.4.2013 passed in S.C.A. No. 357 of 2013 in Page 4 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT case of Transwind Infrastructure Pvt. Lid. Vs. Income Tax Officer, made following observations : 10. From the above, it can be seen that the Assessing Officer was acutely conscious about the petitioner not having deducted tax on labour payment charges of Rs. 3.05 crores and the petitioners contention that it was so done because provision for TDS was not applicable. He was not convinced by such explanation. He, however, for some strange reasons did not apply the provision of Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act instead made adhoc disallowance of Rs. 25,60,000/@ 8% of the total labour payment charges. 11.Whatever be the legality of such assessment, fact remains that, in the scrutiny assessment, the Assessing Officer had thoroughly and fully scrutinized the assessees claim of deduction of labour expenditure. To the extent he was inclined to disallow the same, he did so. By no stretch of imagination it can be stated that the issue was not at large before the Assessing Officer in the original scrutiny assessment. Any reexamination of such a question at this stage would only amount to change of opinion. Remedy of reopening the assessment, therefore, was simply not available. In the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Kelvinator of India Ltd. reported in [2010] 320 ITR 561 (SC) the Apex Court observed as under: On going through the changes, quoted above, made to Section 147 of the Act, we find that, prior to Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, reopening could be done under above two conditions and fulfillment of the said conditions alone conferred jurisdiction on the Assessing Officer to make a back assessment, but in section 147 of the Act [with effect from 1st April, 1989], they are given a goby and only one condition has Page 5 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT remained, viz., that where the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. Therefore, post 1st April, 1989, power to reopen is much wider. However, one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words reason to believe failing which, we are afraid, Section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to reopen assessments on the basis of mere change of opinion, which cannot be per se reason to reopen. We must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to reassess. The Assessing Officer has no power to review; he has the power to reassess. But reassessment has to be based on fulfillment of certain precondition and if the concept of change of opinion is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of reopening the assessment, review would take place. One must treat the concept of change of opinion as an inbuilt test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after 1st April, 1989, Assessing Officer has power to reopen, provided there is tangible material to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. Our view gets support from the changes made to Section 147 of the Act, as quoted hereinabove. Under the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, Parliament not only deleted the words reason to believe but also inserted the word opinion in Section 147 of the Act. However, on receipt of representations from the Companies against omission of the words reason to believe, Parliament reintroduced the said expression and deleted the word opinion on the ground that it would vest arbitrary powers in the Assessing Officer. 12. If the Revenue was of the opinion that the Assessing Officer erroneously and to the Page 6 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT prejudice of the interest of the Revenue allowed certain claim, in a given situation, it would have been open for the appropriate authority to exercise revisional powers. However, once the claim was fully examined, power of reopening was simply not available. 12. Such observations would apply in the present case also. We make it clear that it is not a case where the Assessing Officer, while framing original scrutiny assessment, did not examine the petitioners claim of deduction. He was acutely conscious of such a claim and was also of the opinion that the entire claim was not required to be granted. He called for explanation of the assessee and after taking into consideration the explanation, made disallowance to the extent he was convinced to do. If, in the process, he made a legal error, the succeeding Assessing Officer cannot correct such an error, through the process of reopening of the assessment. This is precisely, in the present case, what the respondent seeks to achieve. His reasons recorded clearly reflect such a state of affairs. He expresses his opinion that the disallowance which was limited to 20% of the expenditure was not justified in law and the entire expenditure should have been disallowed. We are afraid, this cannot be the basis for reopening of the assessment previously framed after scrutiny. 6. In view of the above, both the matters require consideration. Hence, RULE. 7. NOTICE as to interim relief, returnable on 3RD MARCH, 2014. Ad­interim­relief in terms of PARA­7(b), till then. Direct service is permitted. 5. The Assessing Officer has issued notice under Section 148 of the Act by recording the following reasons for reopening the assessment: Page 7 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT “REASONS FOR REOPENING THE ASSESSMENT In this case, the return of Income declaring total income of Rs.NIL has been filed by the assessee Trust. The said return was selected for scrutiny and assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act was finalized on 20.04.2012, determining total Income at Rs.NIL. 2. On scrutiny of the case records, it reveals that During the F.Y. 2009­10 relevant to AY 2010­11, the assessee­trust has received Rs.13.34 crore from BCCI being TV subsidy/subvention income i.e. sharing of TV broadcasting right income from BCCI. This amount has been credited to income and expenditure as income of the Trust. This income was received in lieu of various tournaments held by BCCI including the one­ day tournament held at Rajkot. It is also noticed that the assessee­trust had received TV subsidy of Rs.8.02 crore in AY 2007­08 & 13.81 crore during AY 2009­10. This indicates that the assessee­trust is in business of entertainment of public at large by arranging / hosting / managing cricket matches at national and international level and generate income out of such activity. 3. Secondly, the assessee­trust had also generated advertisement sales income of Rs.1,58,13,475/­ during the one day match held on 25.12.2009 at Rajkot. The assessee has raised bills on various parties for sales of advertisement during the year. 4. The above activity of the assessee is very much clear that the assessee had been carrying out the activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, the activity by the assessee was not to be treated as “charitable purpose” in view of amended provision of Section 2(15). 5. I have, therefore, reason to believe that Page 8 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT in this case income claimed as exempt is requires to be taxed. Thus, there is under assessment of income for A.Y. 2010­11. Accordingly, this is a fit case for reopening of the assessment u/s. 147 of the I.T. Act.” 6. It appears that the Assessing Officer has issued notice under Section 148 in view of the amended provision of Section 2(15) of the Act, 1961 and the sole objection for reopening is such amendment. 7. In view of the above, it is not necessary to advert to the facts of the case, as similar issue is considered by the Coordinate Bench including in case of the petitioner in Tax Appeal No. 268 of 2012 and other allied matters and has held in favour of the assessee, as under: “163. We sum up our final conclusions as under; (i) In carrying on the charitable activities, certain surplus may ensue. However, earning of surplus, itself, should not be construed as if the assessee existed for profit. The word “profit” means that the owners of the entity have a right to withdraw the surplus for any purpose including the personal purpose. (ii) It is not in dispute that the three Associations have not distributed any profits outside the organization. The profits, if any, are ploughed back into the very activities of promotion and development of the sport of cricket and, therefore, the assessees cannot be termed to be carrying out commercial activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business. Page 9 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT (iii) It is not correct to say that as the assessees received share of income from the BCCI, their activities could be said to be the activities of the BCCI. Undoubtedly, the activities of the BCCI are commercial in nature. The activities of the BCCI is in the form of exhibition of sports and earn profit out of it. However, if the Associations host any international match once in a year or two at the behest of the BCCI, then the income of the Associations from the sale of tickets etc., in such circumstances, would not portray the character of commercial nature. (iv) The State Cricket Associations and the BCCI are distinct taxable units and must be treated as such. It would not be correct to say that a member body can be held liable for taxation on account of the activities of the apex body. (v) Irrespective of the nature of the activities of the BCCI (commercial or charitable), what is pertinent for the purpose of determining the nature of the activities of the assessees, is the object and the activities of the assessees and not that of the BCCI. The nature of the activities of the assessee cannot take its colour from the nature of the activities of the donor. Discussion of case law: 164. We shall now proceed to deal with the decisions, upon which, strong reliance has been placed on behalf of the Revenue. 165. In the case of Truck Operators Association (supra), the assessee Truck Operators Association had filed an application in Form No.10A for registration of the Society under Section 12AA of the Act along with the certificate of registration granted by the Registrar of Societies and a copy of Memorandum and By­Laws of the Society. The Commissioner rejected the application holding that the Page 10 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT Association was not formed for advancement of object of general public utility within the meaning of Section 2(15) of the Act. The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal and directed the Commissioner to grant the registration under Section12AA to the assessee­ Society. The Revenue went in appeal before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. The High Court thought fit to allow the appeal, observing as under; “9. On examination of the objects and the purpose of the Association in the present case, it emerges that the respondent­Association is union of Truck Operators constituted for facilitating its members to carry on the trade of transportation and not to allow the outsider or non­member to undertake any business activity within the precincts of Hansi Town/village. The Association charges fees from its members before the transportation on the basis of the distance involved. The membership and payment of fees are mandatory and the element of voluntary contribution is missing. The association is vigorously pursuing transportation business by receiving freight charges on behalf of its members. The welfare activities adopted for the truck drivers, cleaners and mechanics of the truck owners are in the nature of staff welfare activities, as are common in other business organizations which cannot be termed for general public utility. 17. The assessee was a union of transport operators registered as a Trade Union under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926. On analysis of the objects of the union for which it was constituted, it was discerned that the surplus funds of the trade union could be distributed among the members at the time of its dissolution. In other words, Page 11 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT it was held that the rules and regulations do not impose a legal obligation on the assessee or its members to hold the income of the assessee only for charitable purposes and the element of private gain could not be excluded. The union was, thus, held not to be a Charitable Institution.” 166. Thus, on the facts of that case, the High Court took the view that the assessee was not carrying on the activities for charitable purposes and, therefore, was not entitled to the benefit of registration under Section 12AA of the Act. One important aspect which was noticed by the High Court was that the surplus funds of the Trade Union could be distributed among the members at the time of its dissolution. The High Court noticed that the rules and regulations did not impose a legal obligation on the assessee or its members to hold the income of the assessee only for charitable purposes and the element of private gain could not be excluded. This decision, in our opinion, is of no avail to the Revenue. 167. In National Institute of Aeronautical Engg. Educational Society (supra), the assessee was an educational society. It moved an application before the Commissioner for grant of registration under Section12AA of the Act. The Commissioner, after examining the record before him, concluded that the assessee was not carrying any charitable activity within the meaning of Section 2(15) as it was charging substantial fees from the students and making huge profits from that business. Consequently, the assessee's application was rejected. The Tribunal, however, allowed the appeal of the assessee. The Revenue went in appeal before the High Court of Uttarakhand. The High Court, while allowing the appeal preferred by the Revenue, observed as under; “10. Section 12AA of the Act provides the Page 12 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT procedure for registration. Clause (a) of sub Section (1) of Section 12AA empowers the CIT to call for such documents or information from the trust or institution as he thinks necessary in order to satisfy himself about the genuineness of the activities of the trust or institution and may also make such inquiries, as he may deem necessary in this behalf. Said provision in Section 12AA makes it clear that CIT is not supposed to allow registration with blind eyes. In the present case, CIT has considered the relevant papers before him, which included the income and expenditure accounts of the previous years after the society got registered with the Assistant Registrar Firms, Societies and Chits. The CIT, after considering the record before him, has observed that the society (present respondent) is charging substantial fees from the students and making huge profits. 11. After considering the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the view that mere imparting education for primary purpose of earning profits cannot be said to be a charitable activity. We are of the firm view that, in the expression 'charitable purpose', 'charity' is the soul of the expression. Mere trade or commerce in the name of education cannot be said to be a charitable purpose. And Commissioner Income Tax has to satisfy itself as provided under Section 12AA of the Act before allowing the registration. Question of law stands answered.“ 168. Thus, in the aforesaid case, the High Court took the view that as the Society was charging substantial fees from the students and making huge profits, it could not be said that the assessee was carrying on any charitable activity. This decision also is of no avail to the Revenue. 169. In Hyderabad Race Club (supra), the Page 13 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT assessee was a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the objects, for which, the assessee was established were specified in Para No.3 of the Memorandum of Association. The objects were to encourage, promote the scientific breeding and training of horses, ponies and mules and to carry on the business of a race club in all its branches etc. The ITO rejected the assessee's claim that it was a charitable institution and that its income was exempt under Section 11 on the ground that the assessee was carrying on a business by conducting races which was an activity for profit. On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal upheld the ITO's order. The matter was ultimately heard by a Full Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. While answering the substantial question of law in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee, the Full Bench observed as under; “9. It would thus be seen that the scientific breeding and training of horses and the imparting of instructions relating to horse breeding in all its aspects, is shown as an incidental or ancillary object in the memorandum of association of the assessee­company which was established in April 1971. Learned counsel submits that in the memorandum of association constituting the assessee as a company in April, 1971, carrying on the business of a race club in all its branches had to be specified as the main object in order to meet the requirements of the company law, although in point of fact the main object for which the assessee­company was established, was what was stated as an incidental or ancillary object against sl. no. 4 referred to above. It is pointed out that for the purpose of incorporating a company, the business which the company carries on has to be specified as the main object and all other objects have to be specified as incidental or ancillary objects, and this classification for the Page 14 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT limited purpose of the Companies Act should not, according to the learned counsel, be confused with the real object for which the assessee­company was established. According to the learned counsel, the basic or dominant object for which the assessee was established, whether as a society prior to April, 1971, or as a company from April, 1971, was to encourage and promote the scientific breeding and training of horses and to impart instructions in and to diffuse useful and scientific knowledge of horse breeding and to encourage horse breeding in all its aspects which, according to the learned counsel, are objects of general public utility. The other objects specified, whether in the memorandum of association relating to the assessee as a society or in the memorandum of association relating to the assessee as a company, are all subservient to the main object of \"scientific horse breeding\". Consequently, the doctrine of dominant or primary object should be invoked in the present case in order to examine whether the dominant or primary object for which the assessee is established, is charitable in character. 10. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel that the dominant or primary object for which the assessee is established either as a society or as a company, is the scientific breeding of horses, and not for the purpose of carrying on business in conducting races. Referring to the memorandum of association of the assessee as a society under the Societies Registration Act, we see no ground to regard the object specified in clause (c) of para 3 as a power conferred on the society to carry on the business to advance and promote the socalled main object of scientific breeding and training of horses. In the first place, paragraph 3 Page 15 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT specifically mention that carrying on the business of a race club is an object for which the society is established. It is not in the nature of a power conferred on the society. It is true that some of the objects specified in para 3 of the memorandum of association relate to powers conferred on the society and there is, to some extent, a mix­up of the objects and powers in pars. 3. We have, however, no difficulty in regarding the carrying on of the business by conducting races as being in the nature of an objects rather than a power. If any doubt in the above regard subsists as regards the memorandum of association of the society, that is clearly set at rest while setting out the objects for which the assessee was established as a company. As we have already referred to above, the memorandum of association of the assessee after its incorporation in April, 1971, as a company clearly states that the main object to be pursued by the assessee company on its incorporation, is to carry on the business of a race club in all its branches. Even when the assessee was a society, carrying on the business of a race club was obviously the main object although it was mixed up with other objects, as there was no statutory requirement that the main objects and ancillary objects should be separately specified in the case of society. We are unable to appreciate the learned counsel's contention that notwithstanding the memorandum of association specifying the carrying on of the business of a race club as the main object for which the assessee­company was incorporated, we should hold that the main object for the purpose of the Companies Act is the carrying on of the business of a race club, and the main object for the purpose of the I.T. Act is the scientific breeding of horses. We must reject the contention that the main objects for which Page 16 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT the assessee was established should be regarded differently for the purpose of the companies Act and the I.T. Act. The provision contained in the memorandum of association is unlearned counsel. We have, therefore, no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the main object for which the assessee was established whether as a society or as a company, was to carry on the business of a race club and all other objects are either incidental or ancillary to the above main object. Thus, even invoking the doctrine of dominant or primary object, we must hold that the assessee was established with the dominant or primary object of carrying on the business of a race club by conducting a races which, on the own admission of the learned counsel, is not charitable in character. This itself is sufficient to demolish the assessee's claim that it must be regarded as having been established for charitable purposes by invoking the doctrine of dominant or primary object.” 170. Thus, on the facts of that case, the Full Bench, ultimately, held that the assessee was established with the dominant or primary object of carrying on the business of a race club by conducting races which cannot be termed as charitable in character. This decision also is of no avail to the Revenue in the case at hand. 171. In Dharmaposhanam Co. (supra), the objects of the assessee Company were to raise funds by conducting kuries with Company as foreman, receiving donations and subscriptions by lending money on interest and by such other means as the Company would deem fit to do the needful for the promotion of charity, industries etc. The appellant derived income from the property, money lending and business in kuries or chit funds held under the trust and claimed exemption from tax in respect of the said income under Section 11. The Tribunal held that the assessee was not entitled to Page 17 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT exemption. The matter went right upto the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, while dismissing the appeal of the assessee, observed as under; “On a consideration of the rival contentions of the parties, the position appears to be this. The appellant can succeed in his claim to exemption under section 1 1 (1)(a) of the Act if the income from the business of conducting kuries and of money lending can be said to be income derived from property held under trust wholly for charitable purposes. It is well settled that business is \"property\" within the meaning of section 11(1)(e). C.I.T. v. Krishna Warrier, (1964) 53 ITR 176 (SC). That is also evident from the provisions of section 11 (4), and reference may be made also to section 13(1) (bb). Further, it is apparent from the terms of the Memorandum of Association and the Articles of Association that the business of conducting kuries and of money lending is held under trust. The question is: Is the business held under trust for charitable purposes ? There can be little doubt that when sub­clause (a) of clause 3 of the Memorandum says \"To raise funds by conducting kuries, with company as foreman, receiving donations and subscriptions by lending money on interest and by such other means as the company deem fit\". it refers to powers conferred on the appellant to raise money in aid of, and for the purpose of accomplishing, the objects mentioned in sub­ clause (b) of clause 3 of the Memorandum. Upto June 6, 1965 sub­clause (b) read : \"To do the needful for the promotion of charity, education, industries, etc. and public good\". Can all the purposes mentioned in sub­clause (b) be described as charitable purposes ? Section 2(15) of the Act defines the expression \"charitable purpose\" as including \"relief of the poor, education, medical relief and the Page 18 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT advancement of any other object of general public utility not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit.\" Two objects in sub­ clause (b) of clause (3) of the Memorandum need to be considered, \"industries\" and \"public good\". As regards the latter, the decision on what should be the \"purposes of common good\" was left to the general meeting by Article 58 of the Articles of Association. Having regard to the context in which these words appear in the Memorandum and the Articles, they must evidently be referred to the residue general head in the definition in section 2(15) of the Act, that is to say, \"the advancement of any other object of general public utility............ But this head is qualified by the restrictive words \"not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit.\" The operation of an industry ordinarily envisages a profit making activity, and so far as the advancement of public good is concerned, it is open to the appellant to pursue a profit making activity in the course of carrying out that purpose, which of course depends on the nature and purpose of the \"public good. Nowhere do we find in the material before us any limiting provision that if the appellant carries on any activity in the course of actually carrying out those purposes of the trust it should refrain from adopting and pursuing a profit making activity. In Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust v. Commissioner of Income­Tax, Mysore, (1975) 101 ITR 234, 243 (SC), Khanna and Gupta, JJ., dealing with a case in which the assessee carried on a business in the course of the actual carrying out of a primary purpose of the trust, rejected the claim to exemption and declared :­ \"The fact that the appellant trust is engaged in the business of printing and publication of newspaper and journals and the further fact that the aforesaid activity yields or is one likely to yield profit and there are no restrictions on the appellant­trust earning profits in the course of its business would go Page 19 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT to show that the purpose of the appellant­ trust does not satisfy the requirement that it should be one 'not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit........ Ordinarily profit is a normal incident of business activity and if the activity of a trust consists of carrying on of a business and there are no restrictions on its making profit, the Court would be well justified in assuming in the absence of some indication to the contrary that the object of the trust involves the carrying on of an activity for profit.\" Beg, J., in the same case, observed \"The deed puts no condition upon the conduct of the newspaper and publishing business from which we could infer that it was to be on \"no profit and no loss\" basis .... That character (i.e. of the deed) is determined far more certainly and convincingly by the absence of terms which could eliminate or prevent profit making from becoming the real or dominant purpose of the trust. It is what the provisions of the trust make possible or permit coupled with what had been actually done without any illegality in the ;Nay of profit making, in the case before us, under the cover of the provisions of the deed, which enable us to decipher the predominantly profit making character of the trust.\" In a subsequent case, Commissioner of Income­ Tax, Kerala v. Cochin Chamber of Commerce and Industry, (1975) 101 ITR 796 (SC), this Court extended the test to income derived from activities carried on in aid of, and incidental to, the primary object of the trust. We may note that no attempt has been made by the appellant before us to cast doubt on the validity of the observations made in those two cases, and we proceed on the footing that they convey the true content of the law. It is, therefore, apparent that among the objects contained in the original unamended Page 20 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT sub­clause (b) of clause (3) of the Memorandum are objects which, while referable to the residual general head in the definition of \"charitable purpose\" in section 2(15) of the Act, nonetheless do not satisfy the condition that they should not involve \"the carrying on of any activity for profit.\" The result is that the objects \"industries\" and \"common good\" cannot be described as \"charitable purposes\". What follows then is this, that the said sub­ clause (b) can be said to contain some objects which are charitable and others which are non­ charitable. They are all objects which appear to enjoy an equal status. It is open to the appellant, in its discretion, to apply the income derived from conducting kuries and from money lending, to any of the objects. No definite part of the business or of its income is related to charitable purposes only. Consequently, in view of Mohammed Ibrahim Raza v. Commissioner of Income­'Tax, (1930) LR 57 IA 260; AIR 1930 PC 226 and East India Industries (Madras) Private Limited v. Commissioner of Income­Tax, (1967) 65 ITR 611 (SC), , the entire claim to exemption must fail and it cannot be said that any part of the income under consideration is exempt from tax. That is the position in regard to the assessment years 1962­63 to 1965­66 before us” 172. Thus, in the facts of that case, the Supreme Court, ultimately, held that the objects “industries” and “common good” could not be described as “charitable purposes”. This decision also, in our opinion, is of no avail to the Revenue. 173. In the case of Sole Trustee Loka Shikshana Trust (supra), the appellant was the sole trusty of a trust. The object of the trust was to educate the people of India in general and of Karnataka in particular by (a) establishing, conducting and helping directly or indirectly institutions calculated to educate the people by spread of knowledge on all matters of general interest and welfare; (b) founding and Page 21 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT running reading rooms and libraries and keeping and conducting printing houses and publishing or aiding the publication of books, booklets, leaflets, pamphlets, magazines etc., in Kannada and other languages, all these activities being started, conducted and carried on with the object of educating the people; (c) supplying the Kannada speaking people with an organ or organs of educated public opinion and conducting journals in Kannada and other language for the dissemination of useful news and information and for the ventilation of public opinion on matters of general public utility; and (d) helping directly or indirectly societies and institutions which have all or any of the aforesaid objects in view. The High Court held that the income of the trust was not entitled to exemption under Section 11 read with Section 2(15) of the Act. The assessee, went in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, while dismissing the appeal of the assessee, observed as under; “In addition to the power which the sole trustee had to collect donations and subscriptions for the trust. he had all the powers which the sole manager of a business may have in order to carry it on profitably. He had the power of transferring trust properties and funds if he thought \"it expedient in the interest of the objects of the Trust, to transfer the assests and liabilities of this Trust to any other Charitable Trust or institution conducted by such Trust which in the opinion of the original Trustee or the Board of Trustee has objects similar to the objects of this Trust and is capable of carrying out the objects and purposes of this Trust either fully or partially\" (Paragraph 17 of the Trust deed). Although, the \"original trustee\" was not \"to take any remuneration\" for discharging his duties as a trustee, yet, he was not precluded \"from being paid out of the Trust fund such remuneration as may be deemed propellor carrying out any work and duty in connection with the conduct or management of Page 22 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT institutions of the Trust, or with the business of printing, publishing or other activities carried on by the Trust\". He was to be paid expenses incurred in travelling or otherwise in connection with his duties as a trustee (paragraph 16 of the Trust deed). The \"original trustee\" could invest trust monies and profits \"in any investment authorised by law for the investment of Trust funds or in shares, or securities or debentures of Limited Companies in India or outside\" (para 4 of the Trust deed). He had the \"power to mortgage, sell, transfer and give on lease or to otherwise deal with the Trust property or any portion thereof for the purpose of the Trust and to borrow monies or raise loans for the purpose of the Trust whenever he may deem it necessary to do so\" (para 8 of the Trust deed). Furthermore, the Trustee had the \"power and authority to spend and utilise the money and the property of the Trust for any of the purposes of this Trust in such manner as to him may appear proper\". It appears to us that, with this profit making background of the trust, its loosely stated objects the wide powers of the sole trustee, and the apparently profitable mode of conducting business, just like any commercial concern, disclosed not only by the terms of the trust but by the statement of total expenditure and income by the trustee it is very difficult to see what educational or other charitable purpose the trust was serving unless the dissemination of information and expression of opinions through the publications of the trust was in itself treated as the really educational and charitable purpose. In the trust deed before us, as we have already indicated, the trustee had not only wide powers of utilisation of trust funds for purposes of the trust but could divert its assets as well as any of the funds of the Trust to other institutions whose objects are \"similar to the Page 23 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT objects\" of the trust and of \"carrying out the objects and purposes of this trust either fully or partially\". The whole deed appears to me to be cleverly drafted so as to make the purpose of clause 2(c) resemble the one which was held to be protected from income­tax in the Tribune case (supra). Indeed the very language used by the Privy Council in the Tribune case (supra), for describing the objects of the Trust in that case, seems to have been kept in view by the draftsman of the trust deed before us. And, we find that the power of diverting the assets and income of the Trust although couched in language which seems designed to counsel their real effect is decisive on the question whether the trust is either wholly or predominantly for a charitable purpose or not. The trustees is given the power of deciding what 485 purpose is allowed to or like an object covered by the trust and how it is to be served by a diversion of trust properties and funds. If the trustee is given the power to determine the proportion of such diversion, as he is given here, the trust could not be said to be wholly charitable. He could divert as much as to make the charitable part or aspect, if any, purely illusory. Indeed, this was the law even before the qualifying words introduced by the 1961 Act. [See: East India Industries (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income­tax, Madras, (1967) 65 ITR 611 (SC), Commissioner of Income­ tax, Madras v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce, (1965) 55 ITR 722 (SC) and Md. Ibrahim Riza v. Commissioner of Income­tax, Nagpur, AIR 1930 PC 226. Such a \"trust\" would be of doubtful validity, but I refrain from further comment or any pronouncement upon the validity of such a trust as that was neither a question referred to the High Court in this case nor argued anywhere. “ 174. Thus, it appears that the Supreme Court looked into the trust deed of the trust in details and noticed that the sole trustee had not only wide powers of utilization of the trust funds for the purposes of the trust but Page 24 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT he could divert its assets as well as any of the funds of the trust, to the other institutions whose objects were “similar to the objects” of the trust and of “carrying out the objects and purposes of such trust either fully or partially.” The Supreme Court observed that the whole deed appeared to be very cleverly drafted so as to make the purpose of clause (2) (c) resemble the one which was held to be protected from income tax in the Tribune case (1939) 7 ITR 415. (PC). The Supreme Court observed that if the trustee is given the power to determine the proportion of such diversion, the trust could not be said to be wholly charitable. This decision also is of no avail to the Revenue in the case at hand. 175. In the case of Cricket Association of Bengal (supra), the assessee was an unregistered and unincorporated body. Its membership was open to the clubs, District Associations, Universities, Indian States, and subject to certain conditions, individuals. Its objects were roughly summarized as promotion of the game of cricket played in accordance with the highest standard. The Association received payments by way of subscriptions and donations. The ITO did not accept the plea of the assessee, seeking exemption. The ITO held that the object of the Association was merely the promotion of a game and could not be termed as pursuing a charitable object. The order of the ITO was upheld by the AAC as well as the Tribunal. The matter went in appeal before the High Court of Calcutta. The High Court, while rejecting the appeal of the assessee, observed as under; “12. The question we have to consider is whether promotion of cricket as a general purpose or more particularly promotion of cricket in the form in which the Association professes to promote it can at all be a charitable purpose. In England, it has repeatedly been held that no gift or bequest made merely for the promotion of some game or Page 25 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT pastime can be called a gift or bequest for a charitable purpose. An exception is to be found with respect to cases where provision is made for training in a game as a part of the education of youth. In those cases, the gift or bequest is regarded as charitable on the ground that it advances the cause of education. As instances of gifts or bequests for such purposes, I may refer to the case of In re, Mariette : Mariette v. Governing Body of Aldenham School, (1915) 2 Ch. 284, where a bequest was made to the Governing Body of a school for the purpose of building some squash racket courts and a further bequest was made to the Head Master for the time being upon trust to use the interest for providing a prize for some event in the school athletic sports every year. This bequest was upheld as charitable, because it was considered essential in a school of learning that there should be organised games as a part of the daily routine in order that the boys might not be left to themselves and that their bodily welfare might be promoted. Another instance is the case of Dupree's Deed Trusts, In re, Daley v. Lloyds Bank, Ltd., (1945) 114 LJ Ch L where a deed of gift, expressed to be for the encouragement of chess playing by holding an annual chess tournament limited to boys and, young­men under the age of 21 years resident in a particular area, was held to be a good gift for a charitable purpose. It appears that Vaisey, J. who decided the case had to struggle a good deal against his own inclinations in order to arrive at the conclusion which he ultimately reached, but he said that in view of the evidence before him that chess was included in the school curriculum and that according to the experience of the members of the teaching profession the game promoted concentration, selfreliance and reasoning, he would not condemn the gift as bad. The learned Judge, however, expressed the difficulty he felt in the following words : \"One feels perhaps that one is on rather a Page 26 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT slippery slope. It chess, why not draughts? if draughts, why not bezique? and so on, through to bridge, whist, and by another route, stamp collecting and the acquisition of birds' eggs?\" I need not, however, deal with this class of cases, because the gifts in them were not merely for the promotion of some game or sports, but they were for training of youth in some game of skill or in athletic sports as a part of their education. Where, however, a gift or bequest has been made solely for the promotion of a game or pastime, it has always been struck down as not charitable. To take the case of In re: Nottage: Jones v. Palmer, (1895) 2 Ch. 649 which is so often cited, the four Judges who decided it, one in the High Court and three in the Court of Appeal, all held that a bequest for the encouragement of yacht racing, although it might be beneficial to the public, could not be upheld as charitable, because it was a bequest for the encouragement of a mere sport. Lindley, L. J. in the Court of Appeal made an observation in the course of his judgment which is peculiarly appropriate to the present case, since it mentions encouragement of the game of cricket : \"Now, I should say\", observed the learned Judge, \"that every healthy sport is good for the nation—cricket, football, fencing, yachting, or any other healthy exercise and recreation; but if it had been the idea of lawyers that a gift for the encouragement of such exercises is therefore charitable, we should have heard of it before now.\" It will be noticed that the learned Lord Justice included cricket among the games in the illustrations he gave. The case was decided in 1895 and it may be said that ideas have since changed and that cricket has grown so much in popularity and the general public have come to be associated so much with the game that the observations made so long ago are no longer valid. Any such contention must be overruled Page 27 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT because even the recentmost cases have not expressed any dissent from the view taken in the Nottage case(1895­2 Ch. 649). It has often been cited and very recently it was cited in the case of Baddeley v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, (1953) 1 Ch 504 in the Court of Appeal and in the same case, Baddeley v. Inland Revenue Commra., (1955) AC 572 in the House of Lords. \"In re Nottage, 1895­2 Ch 649 was cited for the proposition\" observed Jenkins L. J. in the Court of Appeal. \"that the encouragement of mere sport is not a charitable purpose. With regard to this authority, I need only say that in my view, neither of the trust here in question is a trust for the encouragement of mere sport\". It is noticeable that the learned Lord Justice did not dissent from the decision cited before him. A more elaborate reference to the case was made in the House of Lords and among the other Lords, Lord Reid made comments on it. Referring to the view taken in the Court of Appeal of the Nottage case, 1895­2 Ch 649, Lord Reid observed as follows : \"In re Nottage, 1895­2 Ch 649 is clearly distinguishable : money was bequeathed to provide annually a cup for yacht racing, so the only possible beneficiaries were yacht owners who would be somewhat strange objects of charity. But what the appellants found on is the reasoning in the Court of Appeal to the effect that encouragement of a mere sport or game is not charitable though the sport or game may be beneficial to the public. No doubt that is true in the main, but it cannot apply to the provision or support of playing fields: yacht racing is far removed from the kind of recreation which Parliament has declared to be charitable. And a charitable purpose such as education may well be achieved in part at least by promoting. sport or games. The emphasis is on mere sport or games, and I cannot suppose that any of the learned Judges had in mind the Page 28 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT Acts of Parliament dealing­with recreation or would have denied that the encouragement of games, as a means to achieve a charitable purpose for those who took part in them, was quite a different matter.\" It will thus be seen that while promotion of games as a part of the education of those who participate in them may be a charitable purpose, the promotion of the practice of a game in general either for the entertainment of the public or for an advancement of. The game itself has never been held to be charitable. So far as cricket is concerned, I shall content myself with citing only one other case, In re Patten, Westminster Bank, Limited v. Carlyon, 1929­2 Ch. 276. A trust was created for the benefit of the Sussex County Cricket Club and in order to bring the trust within the statute of Elizabeth, it was said that the trust was \"for the supportation aid and help of young tradesmen handicraftsmen and persons decayed\". Really, however, it was a trust for the promotion of cricket among boys of the working and lower middle classes who might not be well off financially. Romer, J. who decided the case said that it might be that with the aid of the assistance provided from this trust, some boys would be enable to embark, upon life as professional cricketers, but he continued. To say : \"It is, I think, reasonably clear that the object of the fund is the encouragement of the game of cricket and nothing else, and it has been held by authorities that are binding upon me that such a bequest is not charitable.\" He then proceeded to refer to the case of In re Nottage, 1895­2 Ch 649 as laying down the proposition to which he was giving effect. 13. I do not think I should multiply citations in order to illustrate the point that a gift or bequest merely for the promotion of a game has never been considered charitable : Clifford, In re : Mallam v. McFie, (1911) 81 LJ Ch 220 was a case of angling; Trustees of Warnher's Charitable Trust v. Commissioners of Inland Page 29 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT Revenue, (1937) 21 Tax Cas 137, a case of playing fields. Scottish Flying Club, Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, (1936) 20 Tax. Cas 1, a case of an Aviation Club which held aerial pageants and charged fees for admission to the display and Inland Revenue Commissioners v. City of Glasgow Police Athletic Association, 1953 AC 380, a case of athletic sports of a police club. It is true that some of the decisions ultimately turned on the point that the beneficiary was not the public or a section of it, as understood in law, but incidentally observations were made in all of them as regards when promotion of a game can be a charitable purpose and when it cannot be. 14. The facts of the present case are that the assessee Association merely held certain demonstration or exhibition matches. It does not provide any training in the game of cricket to novices or any advanced training for persons who are already practiced players. Its activities outside the holding of the exhibition matches is limited entirely to its own members. The only contact it has with the public is by way of having them as spectators, on payment of a fee, of matches arranged by it. I find it impossible to hold that any benefit or entertainment which is thus paid for and which is availed of by only such members of the public as can or wish to pay for it can in any sense be a purpose of a charity. It is true that charity in the income­tax sense need not have any eleemosynary element in it and that an object of general public utility is under the income­tax law a charitable object. Indeed, if the objects professed by the Association, are to be treated as charitable objects at all, they can be so treated only if they can be regarded as objects of general public utility. I find it impossible to hold that there is any general public utility, so as to amount to a charity, in arranging for cricket matches which the public can see on payment. How untenable must be a contention that such an object is an object of general public utility and, Page 30 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT therefore, must be held to be charitable will appear if one considers certain parallel cases. Suppose a body of men bind themselves together into a club and collect annually some musicians from all parts of the country to give demonstrations for a number of days and suppose the public are admitted to such demonstrations on payment of a fee. If the contention of the Association in the present case is to be accepted, it must equally be held that the body of men in the hypothetical case I have mentioned who derive a large income by selling admission to the musical demonstrations organised by them, are also exercising themselves for a charitable purpose and that their earnings must be equally exempt from tax. 15. It was contended that the game of cricket had a place of its own among games and that it inculcated a spirit of fairness and an honourable conduct to such ah extent that the term 'cricket' had come to be a synonym for fairness and honour. That may be so, but I am unable to understand how fairness and honour can be inculcated by the game of cricket in any person other than those who actually take part in it. In the present case, we are not concerned with the players who play at the matches arranged by the Association, for they are members of the visiting teams or it might be local teams, but so far as the Association is concerned they are mostly outsiders. The Association is claiming to be advancing a charitable purpose only by providing an opportunity to the public to witness the games arranged by it. It can by no means be said that any spirit of fairness and honour is inculcated in the spectators of a game of cricket or perhaps any other game, played not by individuals but by teams. Indeed, there is a school of opinion, now growing in volume, which thinks that games played by rival teams drawn from different parts of the country or different countries and witnessed by multitudes do not serve any beneficial purpose, but, on the other hand cause a deterioration of the Page 31 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT mind by fostering fanatical partisanships or generating mass hatreds. This, however, is a matter of opinion. Whether this extreme view is right or wrong, I find it impossible to hold that any benefit of a public character is conferred on the society or a section of it merely by the arrangement of exhibition games of cricket or tournaments and the admission of the public thereto for a fee, on the basis of which the purpose of arranging for such matches can be said to be a charitable purpose. 16. There is another ground too upon which the Association's claim must fail. I have already hinted at it, but will now point it out specifically. Among the objects set out in the Rules is one which authorises the Association to carry out any other business or activity which may seem to the Association capable of being carried on in connection with the above. Section 4 (3) (I) (a) and (b) of the Act which I have already read contemplate either a business carried on in the course of the carrying out of a primary purpose of the Association or a business, the work in connection with which is mainly carried on by the beneficiaries. There is no question of the business of playing cricket here being carried on by the beneficiaries of the Association, because the games are mainly played by outsiders. But the authority which the Rules confer on the Association to carry out any other business \"in connection with the above,\" that is to say, in connection with the promotion of the objects set out earlier, does not seem to me to come within the terms of Section 4 (3) (i) (a) which requires the business to be carried on in the course of carrying out one of the primary purposes of the Association. If so, it appears to me that even assuming that there is a property and even assuming that the purpose of promoting the game of cricket is a charitable purpose, the property is here held not wholly for that purpose but it is held for other purposes as well.” Page 32 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT 176. The High Court, in the aforesaid case, took notice of the fact that the Association merely held certain demonstration or exhibition matches. It did not provide any training in the game of cricket to novices or any advanced training for the persons who were already practiced players. The High Court further noticed that the activities of the Association, outside the holding of the exhibition matches, was limited entirely to its own members. The High Court also noticed that the only contact the Association had with the public was by way of having them as spectators on payment of a fee of matches arranged by it. Thus, having regard to what has been referred to above, the High Court, ultimately, took the view that the Association was engaged in any charitable objects. The facts in the case on hand are altogether different. 177. In the case of N.N. Desai Charitable Trust (supra), this Court ruled that howsoever laudable the objects of the trust may be, and such objects may lead one to believe that the activities of the trust are charitable in nature, but for the purpose of seeking exemption under Section 11 of the Act, the actual activities are to be seen and not just the objects. There need not be any debate on this proposition of law. In the case on hand, after a detailed scrutiny of the various activities, the tribunal has recorded a finding of fact that the activities, in fact, are charitable in nature. 178. In such circumstances, referred to above, we are of the view that the Tribunal could be said to have taken a reasonable view of the matter, and having recorded a finding of fact based on the material on record, we should not disturb such finding of fact. 179. In the result, all the tax appeals fail and are hereby dismissed. The substantial questions of law, formulated in all the tax Page 33 of 34 C/SCA/2321/2014 JUDGMENT appeals, are answered in favour of the assessees and against the Revenue.” 8. In view of the aforesaid dictum of law, wherein, it is held that the activity of the petitioners cannot be said to be carrying on any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, so as to apply proviso to Section 2(15) which defines 'charitable purpose'. Therefore, the impugned notice as well as the assessment order passed by the respondent are required to be quashed and set aside. 9. The petitions, therefore, succeed and are accordingly allowed. The impugned notice dated 08.01.2013 issued by the respondent under Section 148 of the Act is therefore quashed and set aside, and consequentially, the impugned assessment order dated 30.01.2013 passed under Section 143 r/w. Section 147 of the Act is also quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs. (J. B. PARDIWALA, J) (BHARGAV D. KARIA, J) Pradhyuman Page 34 of 34 "