" 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF NOVEMBER 2016 PRESENT THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE JAYANT PATEL AND THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE P S DINESH KUMAR ITA NO.577 OF 2016 BETWEEN: SHRI MUNINAGA REDDY AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS, S/O LATE MUNISWAMY REDDY, NO.45, 3RD B MAIN, 4TH CROSS, 3RD BLOCK, KALYAN NAGAR, BANGALORE-560 043 ... APPELLANT (BY SRI DINESHA P, ADVOCATE) AND: THE ASST. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX CIRCLE 6(1) INCOME-TAX OFFICES ROOM NO.732, BMTC BUILDING, 80FT ROAD, 6TH BLOCK KORAMANGALA BANGALORE-560 095 ...RESPONDENT (BY SRI K V ARAVIND, ADVOCATE) 2 THIS ITA IS FILED UNDER SEC.260-A OF INCOME TAX ACT 1961, ARISING OUT OF ORDER DATED:13/01/2015 PASSED IN ITA NO.860/BANG/2012, FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2007-2008 PRAYING TO FORMULATE THE SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW STATED ABOVE, ALLOW THE APPEAL BY DELETING THE PENALTY LEVIED U/S.271(1)(C) OF THE ACT OF RS.38,12,640/- FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2007-2008 AS CONFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL IN ITS ORDER IN ITA NO.860/BANG/2012 ARISING OUT OF COMMON ORDER IN ITA NOS. 859 & 860/BANG/2012 DT:13/01/2015 (ANNEXURE-A) AND PASS SUCH OTHER SUITABLE ORDERS AS THIS HON'BLE COURT DEEMS FIT TO GRANT IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY. THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY, JAYANT PATEL J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ORDER I.A.No.2/2016 is for condonation of delay of 543 days in preferring the appeal against the order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dated 13.01.2015, whereby the Tribunal had partly allowed the appeal as mentioned in the said order. 3 2. We have heard Mr.Dinesha P., learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr.K.V.Aravind, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent. 3. The delay is a long delay of more than 500 days and therefore cannot be leniently viewed. In the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, it has been stated by the applicant that since in the last portion the appeal was partly allowed for the assessment year 2007-2008 for statistical purposes, he misunderstood the same and did not prefer the appeal. It has been further stated that when the Assessing Officer called upon the appellant after the order passed by the High Court dated 21.09.2016, he has instructed his lawyer to file this appeal and hence, there is a delay in preferring the appeal of 543 days which may be condoned. 4 4. In our view, it is by now well settled that if the application for condonation of delay is not with any bona fide reason but is mala fide, the Court may not exercise the discretion for condonation of delay. Apart from the above when the delay is of a longer period, the Court would take a strict view of the matter in comparison to the lenient view which may be taken by the Court when the delay is for a shorter period. 5. The examination of the facts further shows that the present appeal is against the common order dated 13.01.2015 passed by the Tribunal which pertains to two assessment years, one of 2006-2007 and another for assessment year of 2007-2008. The impugned order is a common order for two assessment years and the applicant-assessee has preferred appeal bearing ITA Nos.251 and 390/2016 for the assessment year of 2006-2007 and the said appeals vide order dated 21.09.2016 passed by this Court have been allowed. 5 After having realized that the appeals for the assessment year of 2006-2007 have been allowed vide order dated 21.09.2016, the present appeal has been preferred on 05.11.2016. 6. The aforesaid shows that it is only after the decision of this Court, the applicant with a view to take undue benefit of the order dated 21.09.2016 in ITA Nos.251/2016 and 390/2016, wherein the very applicant was a party, has preferred this appeal. By applying reasonable prudence, it is unbelievable that if common order is passed in respect of the very assessee by the Tribunal, when the assessee has preferred the appeal in respect of assessment year of 2006-2007, he would not prefer the appeal for another assessment year of 2007-2008 had he been aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal at the relevant point of time. On the contrary, the conduct of the applicant shows that there is acquiescence by way of acceptance of the order of the 6 Tribunal, since the appeal was not preferred for the assessment year of 2007-2008. It is only after the view expressed by the Court in another appeal by the above referred order dated 21.09.2016, by way of an afterthought to take a chance that too on an ingenuine ground, the present appeal has been preferred. 7. The contention sought to be canvassed that the applicant has misunderstood the operation of the order of partly allowing the appeal, is not acceptable on the face of it because had it been a separate order, it may leave some room for misunderstanding, but when the order was common and the reasoning recorded is a part of the common order for partly allowing of the appeal, if the applicant was aggrieved by the said order to the extent it was not allowed, the appeal could not have been preferred well in time. 7 8. In our considered view, the ground of delay sought to be canvassed is not only an afterthought but is on an ingenuine ground and unbelievable grounds are sought to be canvassed for invoking the discretion of this Court for condonation of delay, that too, for such a long period of more than 500 days. Under the circumstances, we are not inclined to exercise the discretion for condonation of delay. 9. Hence, the application for condonation of delay is dismissed. Resultantly, the appeal in ITA No.577/2016 shall also stand disposed of. Sd/- JUDGE Sd/- JUDGE JT/- "