" -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF OCTOBER, 2020 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE R DEVDAS WRIT PETITION NO.11768 OF 2020( LB-ELE) BETWEEN: SMT JAYAMMA, W/O ANIL LAKSHMINARAYAN AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS R/AT # C-23, 7TH MAIN ROAD OPP 19TH CROSS CHURCH, B.T.M LAYOUT 2ND STAGE, BENGALURU-560 076. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. MADHUSUDAN R. NAIK, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. M. R. RAJAGOPAL, ADVOCATE) AND: 1 . THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU REGION, 2ND FLOOR BMTC COMPLEX, K. H. ROAD, SHANTHINGAR, BENGALURU-560 027. 2 . THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, BENGALURU RURAL ZILLA PANCHAYAT, K G ROAD, KALIDASA MARG, GANDHI NAGAR, BENGALURU- 560 009. 3 . SMT. RADHAMMA, W/O N. MUNIRAJU, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS R -2- R/O BIDALURU VILLAGE AND POST, DEVANAHALLI TALUK-562 110, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT 4 . SRI K. C. MANJUNATH, S/O K. CHANNAMARIYAPPA, AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, R/O KANNAMANGALA VILLAGE AND POST, DEVANAHALLI TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT-562 110. 5 . SMT. ANANTHAKUMARI P.N., W/O A. CHINNAPPA AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, R/O SONNENAHALLI VILLAGE, KUNDANA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT – 562 110. 6 . SRI G. LAKSHMINARAYANA, S/O GUNDAPPA, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS R/O BALEPURA REDDYHALLI POST CHANNARAYAPATNA HOBLI DEVANAHALLI TALUK BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT-562 110. 7 . SMT. KANYAKUMARI, W/O SRINIVAS, AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS R/O APPAKARNAHALLI VILLAGE HULIKUNTE POST, DODDABELAVANGALA HOBLI BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT – 561 203. 8 . SRI CHUNCHEGOWDA G., AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS R/O # 66/296, JODI THIMMASANDRA VILLAGE, KANNAMANGALA POST, MADHURE HOBLI, -3- DODDABALLAPUR TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT – 561 203. 9 . SMT. PADMAVATHI, W/O B. MUNEGOWDA AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, R/O KANNAMANGALAPALYA VILLAGE KUNDANA HOBLI, DEVANAHALLI TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT-562 110. 10 . SRI APPAIAHANNA H, AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS, R/O HADONAHALLI VILLAGE AND POST, TUBAGERE HOBLI, DODDABALLAPUR TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT – 561 203. 11 . SMT. ARUNA, W/O ANANDAKUMAR B. C., AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS, R/O JINKEBACHAHALLI VILLAGE, KASABA HOBLI, DODDATUMAKURU POST, DODDABALLAPUR TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT – 561 203. 12 . SMT RUPA, W/O R. MARIYAPPA AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS R/O SAMETHANAHALLI VILLAGE AND POST ANUGONDANAHALLI HOBLI HOSAKOTE TALUK BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT- 560 067. 13 . SRI K. KRISHNAMURTHY, S/O KEMPANNA, AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, R/O PUJENA AGRAHARA, DODDAGATTAGANABBE POST, -4- KASABA HOBLI, HOSAKOTE TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT – 560 067. 14 . SRI M. MANJUNATH (YSM), S/O MUNISHAMAPPA AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS R/O CHHIKKAHULLUR, KASABA HOBLI, HOSAKOTE TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT – 560 067. 15 . SRI V. PRASAD, S/O LATE Y VENKATAPPA AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS, R/O GIDDAPPANAHALLI VILLAGE SULIBELE POST, HOSAKOTE TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT- 560 067. 16 . SMT. JAYAKUMARI, W/O T. SONNAPPA, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS R/O KODIHALLI NADAVATTI POST, HOSAKOTE TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT – 560 067. 17 . SRI THIMMARAYAPPA T, S/O LATE THIMMAPPA AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS, R/O ADHRSHANAGARA, ARISHINAKUNTE, KASABA HOBLI, NELAMANGALA TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT – 562 123. 18 . SMT. PUSHPAVATHI, W/O PURUSHOTHAMA, AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS R/O TADASIGHATTA VILLAGE, DODDABELE POST, THYAMAGONDLU HOBLI, NELAMANGALA TALUK, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT - 562 123. …RESPONDENTS -5- (BY PROF. RAVI VARMA KUMAR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. S.N. BHAT, ADVOCATE FOR C/R15; BY SRI. K.R. NITHYANANDA, HCGP FOR R1) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DELACARE THAT RULE 3(2) OF THE KARNATAKA GRAMA SWARAJ AND PANCHAYAT RAJ (MOTION OF NO CONFIDENCE AGAINST ADHYAKSHA AND UPADHYAKSHA OF THE ZILLA PANCHAYAT) RULES, 2020 AS FRAMED UNDER THE NOTIFICATION DTD 15.09.2020 VIDE ANNEXURE-H, IS ULTRA VIRES AND INCONSISTENT WITH SECTION 180 OF THE KARNATAKA GRAMA SWARAJ AND PANCHAYAT RAJ ACT, 1993, BY ISSUING ANY APPROPRIATE WRIT I.E., CERTIORARI OR MANDAMUS AND ETC. THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 21.10.2020 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER, THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING: ORDER The petitioner who is the elected Adhayksha of Bangalore Rural Zilla Panchayat has called in question the meeting notice dated 14.10.2020 issued by the first respondent-Regional Commissioner, convening the meeting for consideration of the ‘Motion of No-Confidence’ against the petitioner on 27.10.2020. The petitioner has also sought a declaration that Rule 3(2) of the Karnataka Gram Swaraj and -6- Panchayat Raj (Motion of No-Confidence against Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat) Rules, 2020, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules, 2020 for short) are ultra vires and inconsistent with Section 180 of the Karnataka Gram Swaraj and Panchayat Raj, Act, 1993. A declaration is also sought that the amendment added to the first proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 179 of the Karnataka Gram Swaraj and Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1993 for short) is prospective in nature and the said provision has no application in interfering with the vested right of the petitioner as available prior to the amendment. A consequential declaration is also sought that respondents No.3 to 18 who are members of the Zilla Panchayat have no authority to move or tender a proposal of ‘Motion of No Confidence’ against the petitioner unless the petitioner completes thirty months in office from the date of her election as the Adyaksha of the Zilla Panchayat. 2. Learned Senior Counsel Sri Madhusudan R.Naik, appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was -7- elected as a Member of the Zilla Panchayat on 30.02.2016. Since the previous Adyaksha of the Zilla Panchayat, Sri V.Prasad, tendered his resignation to the office of the Adhyaksha, vacancy was notified by the Government in respect of the office of the Adhyaksha on 20.09.2018. In terms of sub-section (1) of Section 179 of the Act, 1993 on the Adhyaksha resigning from the office, the person succeeding to the office by filling up the casual vacancy shall hold office for the remainder of the period for which the Adhyaksha or the Upadhyaksha in whose place he or she has been elected would have held office if the vacancy had not occurred. It is submitted that sub-section (3) of Section 177 provides that the term of office of every Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha shall be five years from the date of his or her election. 3. The learned Senior Counsel submits that by way of an Ordinance, amendment is brought to some of the provisions of the Act, 1993. The Ordinance was notified on 31.03.2020. In terms of the Ordinance, the words “subject to such rules as may be prescribed” have been inserted at the -8- beginning of sub-section (3) of Section 179. In the first proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 179, the words “fifteen months” are substituted for the words “thirty months”. Similarly in the second proviso, the words “six months” are substituted to the words “two years”. Amendment is also brought to Section 180(6) empowering the Regional Commissioner or any other equivalent Officer authorized by the Government to preside over the meeting in which ‘No- Confidence Motion’ against the Adhyaksha or the Upadhyaksha is being considered. 4. The learned Senior Counsel submits that in terms of the unamended provision of Section 179, the members of the Zilla Panchayat were precluded from expressing want of confidence in the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha till completion of thirty months from the date of his or her election. It is submitted that since the petitioner was elected as the Adhyaksha of the Zilla Panchayat on 10.10.2018, she would continue as the Adhyaksha till 29.04.2021 when the five years term of the Zilla Panchayat comes to an end. It is -9- therefore submitted that the petitioner has a vested right to serve as the Adhyaksha till 29.04.2021. In terms of the unamended first proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 179, the members of the Zilla Panchayat are precluded from expressing want of confidence for a period of thirty months from the date of the petitioner’s election as Adhyaksha. 5. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits that the amendment brought to the provisions of the Act can only be prospective. To substantiate his argument, the learned Senior Counsel points out to the amendment sought to be brought to sub-section (3) of Section 177 where as per the unamended Act, the term of office of every Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha was ‘five years’ and by virtue of the amendment the same is sought to be reduced to ‘thirty months’. It is submitted that if the intention of the legislation was to give retrospective effect, then the term of all the elected Adhyakshas and Upadhyakshas who were elected immediately after the election of the members to the Zilla Panchayat in the month of January-February 2015 would -10- have come to an end during June-July 2017 and therefore fresh elections were required to be held to all the Offices. But since that was never the intention of the legislation and it was understood that the amended provisions will have prospective effect, no such fresh elections were declared in the State. To further buttress his arguments, the learned Senior Counsel places reliance on the following decisions of the Apex Court: 1. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi Vs. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd. (2015) 1 SCC 1. 2. Mithilesh Kumari and Another Vs. Prem Bihari Khare (1989) 2 SCC 95. 3. Chairman, Railway Board and Others Vs. C.R.Rangadhamaiah and Others (1997) 6 SCC 623. 6. These decisions are relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the proposition that normally all legislations are prospective in nature, unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a retrospective effect. The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity is the principle of -11- “fairness”, which must be the basis of every legal rule. It is submitted that this principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit. 7. As regards Rules 3 (1) and (2) of the Rules, 2020, it is submitted that it is inconsistent with the legislative enactment as provided in Section 180(2)(a) of the Act, inasmuch as the rule takes away the power vested with the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha of the Panchayat to decide the date of each ordinary meeting or special meeting. It is submitted that in the scheme of the Act, there is no scope for an unelected member to preside over any meeting except the Commissioner who is empowered to preside over the first meeting of the Zilla Panchayat, that too for the purpose of facilitating the election of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha. 8. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel Prof. Ravivarma Kumar, appearing on behalf of caveat respondent No.15 submits that the petitioner is guilty of gross misuse of the process of this Court. It is submitted that 17 members of the -12- 21 in the Zilla Panchayat made a requisition in writing on 23.09.2020 in the office of the Regional Commissioner, requesting for convening the meeting to express ‘No- Confidence’ against the petitioner. It is submitted that consequent to the amendment brought to the Act by notification dated 31.03.2020, the State Government notified the Rules, 2020 in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 the members were required to give a copy of the proposed motion to the Regional Commissioner. In terms of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3, the Regional Commissioner was required to convene the meeting within a period of 15 days for consideration of the ‘Motion of No-Confidence’. It is submitted that the petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.No.11243/2020 pressing into service the said requirement of the Regional Commissioner in convening the meeting within 15 days from the date of proposal. Consequently, this Court by order dated 13.10.2020 allowed the writ petition by holding that there is no compliance of the proviso of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 and therefore, quashed the meeting notice dated 29.09.2020 and -13- specifically granting liberty to the members of the Zilla Panchayat to move a fresh proposal and this Court further directed the Regional Commissioner that if such proposal is moved by the members of the Panchayat, strict compliance of the provisions of Rule 3 of Rules, 2020, shall be adhered to. 9. The learned Senior Counsel submits that consequently, respondents No.3 to 18 who are the members of the Zilla Panchayat once again made a proposal of expressing their No-confidence against the petitioner by a communication dated 13.10.2020. A copy of the same was submitted to the Regional Commissioner in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3. The Regional Commissioner issued a meeting notice dated 14.10.2020, scheduling the meeting of the members of the Zilla Panchayat for consideration of the ‘Motion of No-Confidence’ on 27.10.2020. 10. Prof. Ravivarma Kumar, learned Senior Counsel, while placing reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of I.L.Honnegouda Vs. The State of Karnataka & Others -14- reported in AIR 1978 SC 28, submits that if a person has taken advantage or benefit of a provision of law, he or she should not be permitted to raise a challenge to the very same provision under which the benefit was taken. It is submitted that this Court accepted the contention of the petitioner that the Regional Commissioner, under the new Rules was the competent authority to convene the meeting and that there was non-compliance of the proviso to sub-Rule (2) of Rule 3 inasmuch as failure to convene the meeting within the stipulated period of 15 days. On the strength of such contention, the petitioner was able to succeed to have the previous meeting notice quashed at the hands of this Court. This Court had specifically granted liberty to the members of the Zilla Panchayat to make a fresh proposal, if they so desired. This Court had further directed the Regional Commissioner to consider such fresh proposal in accordance with the new Rules, 2020. That being the case, the petitioner is estopped from raising a contention and seeking a -15- declaration that Rule 3(2) of the Rules, 2020 is ultra vires and inconsistent with Section 180 of the Act. 11. There is considerable force in the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel Prof.Ravivarma Kumar. It is time and again held that the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India invests this Court with vast powers, however, the discretion is required to be exercised for furtherance of justice. 12. It is profitable to notice series of declarations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court on “Rule of estoppel”. In the case of Nagubai Ammal Vs. B. Shama Rao, reported in AIR 1956 SC 593, it was held “it is clear from the above observations that the maxim that a person cannot ‘approbate and reprobate’ is only one application of the doctrine of election, and that its operation must be confined to reliefs claimed in respect of the same transaction and to the persons who are parties thereto.” In C.Beepathumma Vs. Velasari Shankaranarayana Kadambolithaya reported in AIR 1965 SC 241, the classic words of Maitland in Maitland’s Lectures on equity was -16- appreciatingly noticed- “That he who accepts a benefit under a deed or Will or other instrument must adopt the whole contents of that instrument, must conform to all its provisions and renounce all rights that are inconsistent with it.” Similarly, the same principle in White and Tudore’s Leading Cases in Equity, was noticed as follows; “Election is the obligation imposed upon a party by courts of equity to choose between two inconsistent or alternative rights or claims in cases where there is clear intentions of the person from whom he derives one that he should not enjoy both…. That he who accepts benefit under a deed or Will must adopt the whole contents of the instrument.” All the above decisions were authoritatively quoted in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Mastan and Another (2006) 2 SCC 641. It was held that “the “doctrine of election” is a branch of “rule of estoppel”, in terms whereof a person may be precluded by his action or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had. The doctrine of election postulates -17- that when two remedies are available for the same relief, the aggrieved party has the option to select either of them but not both. Although there are certain exceptions to the same rule but the same has no application in the instant case.” Their Lordships were dealing with the right of a person to claim compensation under two separate enactments. It was held that the person entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of one enactment, claim such compensation under either of those acts but not under both. 13. In the case of City Montessori School Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2009) 14 SCC 253, once again the decision in Nagubai Ammal Vs. B.Shama Rao (supra) was quoted to the effect that, “ when on the same facts, a person has right to claim one or two reliefs and with full knowledge he elects to claim one and obtains it, it is not open to him thereafter to go back on his election and claim the alternative relief.” While citing the decision in Union of India Vs. Krishan Lal Arneja (2004) 8 SCC 453, it was held that a party -18- consenting to an order cannot be permitted to resile therefrom while retaining the benefit obtained therefrom. 14. In Shyam Telelink Limited Vs. Union of India (2010) 10 SCC 165, while quoting the maxim “qui approbat non- reprobat” (one who approbates cannot reprobate), it was held that the said maxim is firmly embodied in English common law and often applied by Courts in this country. It is akin to the doctrine of benefits and burdens which at its most basic levels provides that a person taking advantage under an instrument which both grants a benefits and imposes a burden cannot take the former without complying with the latter. In the same decision, while noticing the decision in Verschures Creameries Ltd. Vs. Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd, according to Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th Edn., Vol.16: “ 1508. Examples of the common law principle of election- After taking an advantage under an order (for example for the payment of costs) a party may be precluded from saying that it is invalid and asking to set it aside.” was quoted -19- and thereafter held that this rule has to be applied to do equity and must not be applied in such a manner as to violate the principles of right and good conscious. 15. In State of Punjab and others Vs. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu (2014) 15 SCC 144, it was held as follows: “the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel, the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel) which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak from asserting a right which he would have otherwise had. The doctrine of “approbate and reprobate” is only a species of estoppel, it implies only to the conduct of the parties. As in the case of estoppel, it cannot operate against the provisions of statute. It is settled proposition of law that once an order has been passed, it is complied with accepted by other party and he derived the benefit out of it, he cannot challenge it on any ground.” -20- 16. No doubt, the petitioner herein had made an interlocutory application in W.P.No.11243/2020 with a prayer for amending the writ petition and raising grounds of challenge to the amendments to Sections 179 and 180 of the Act, and Rule 3(2) of the Rules, 2020. But, a submission was made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner does not press the said application. Liberty was sought to raise such grounds in any other proceedings and the same was granted by this Court. But, that by itself does not absolve the petitioner of the rigors of the principles of equitable estoppel as elucidated above, in the words of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. By her conduct, the petitioner has elected to take the benefit flowing out of Rule 3(2) of the new Rules, 2020. The petition was allowed and the meeting Notice dated 29.09.2020 was quashed and set aside. Having taken advantage of Rule 3(2) of the new Rules, 2020, the petitioner cannot be allowed to raise a challenge to the very same provision. -21- 17. In Ramesh Chandra Sankla and Others vs. Vikram Cement and Others, (2008) 14 SCC 58, it was held that “it is well settled that jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 is discretionary and equitable. The power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution conferred on every High Court over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which its exercises jurisdiction is very wide and discretionary in nature. It can be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to meet the ends of justice. It is equitable in nature. While exercising supervisory jurisdiction, a High Court not only acts as court of law but also as a court of equity. It is, therefore, within the power and also the duty of the Court to ensure that power of superintendence must “advance the ends of justice and uproot injustice…. Powers under Articles 226 and 227 are discretionary and equitable and are required to be exercised in the larger interest of justice. While granting relief in favour of the applicant, the Court must take into account the balancing of interests and equities. It can mould relief -22- considering the facts of the case. It can pass an appropriate order which justice may demand and equity may project. Court of equity must go much further both to give and refuse relief in furtherance of public interest. Granting or withholding of relief may properly be dependent upon consideration of justice, equity and good conscience.” 18. This Court does not hesitate to hold that the petitioner herein, by her conduct of election, has opted to take benefit of Rule 3(2) of the new Rules, 2020. The petitioner cannot now be permitted to turn around and raise a challenge to the very same provision under which she took relief at the hands of this Court. The respondents had accepted the order dated 13.10.2020. The respondents have acted in terms of the liberty granted by this Court in the order dated 13.10.2020, by making a fresh proposal to move a ‘Motion of No-confidence’ against the petitioner. The petitioner shall not be permitted to approbate and reprobate. 19. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition stands dismissed, with costs quantifiable at Rs.25,000/- payable to -23- the Advocate Clerks’ Benevolent Fund, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Ordered accordingly. SD/- JUDGE JT/DL "