"Reserved Judgment IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Writ Petition (M/S) No.2233 of 2010 Weatherford Oil Tools M.E. Ltd. ……. Petitioner Versus Dy. Director of Income Tax & others …… Respondents Mr. P.R. Mullick, Adv. for the petitioner. Mr. H.M. Bhatia, Standing Counsel, for the Income Tax. Reserved on: 26.10.2017 Delivered on: 03.11.2017 Hon’ble Rajiv Sharma , J. Petitioner is a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and engaged in the business of providing services and facilities in connection with exploration and extraction of production of mineral oils. 2. The notice dated 31.3.2010 was issued by respondent no.1 u/s 148 of the Income Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). Petitioner vide letter dated 1.5.2010 requested that the return of income as originally filed on 31.10.2005 may be treated as return filed in pursuance of the notice u/s 148 of the Act. The reasons were assigned by the respondent no.2 for reopening of the assessment vide Annexure No.4. Petitioner filed objections against the same on 12.10.2010. Objections were disposed of by the respondent no.3 vide order dated 7.12.2010. 3. Petitioner, being a non-resident company, filed the return of income at Rs.30,626,953/- on 31.10.2005 u/s 44BB(1) of the Act by applying the deemed profit rate 2 of 10% on the gross contractual revenues. On 28.12.2007, the assessment was completed u/s 143(3) of the Act at the income of Rs.30,645,553/-. However, during the assessment years, petitioner-company had derived revenues for providing of rental of fishing tools/equipments etc. to ONGC Ltd., B.G. Exploration & Production India Ltd., Cairn Energy India Pvt. Ltd., Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Reliance Industries Ltd. Though the case of petitioner is that it was providing services in connection with exploration of mineral oils but it transpired that during the assessment year 2007-08, the Assessee was providing fishing tools/equipments etc. on rental basis. It is in these circumstances the notice was issued to the petitioner stating therein that the income earned by the assessee was covered u/s 9(1)(vi) and not u/s 44BB of the Act. 4. The income of the assessee was to be taxed at the rate of 10% instead 4.23 % of the gross revenue. The objections raised by the petitioner have been duly considered by the respondent no.3. It is not the case of mere change of opinion, as argued by Mr. P.R. Mullick, Advocate for the petitioner. It is a case based on surfacing of ‘tangible evidence’. The Assessing Officer has not taken any conscious decision on the facts. The Assessing Officer has not applied his mind whether the petitioner was to be taxed u/s 9(1)(vi) of the Act at all for providing of rental of fishing tools/equipments etc. Section 292(B) of the Act was not applicable in the present case. Moreover, Section 292(B) only provides for the return of income to be invalid by reason of any mistake defect or omission in such return of income. 5. Thus, according to the reasons assigned, there was tangible material for formation of belief by the Assessing Officer to reopen the assessment. It is in these 3 circumstances, the notice u/s 148 of the Act was issued to the petitioner company. The objections raised by the petitioner company to the reasons assigned for reopening of case have been discussed in length by the respondent no.1. The Assessing Officer is required to consider all possible angles of controversy. In the instant case, the tax has escaped assessment on account of failure of assessee to disclose true facts before the authority concerned. 6. Their Lordships of Hon. Supreme Court in (2010) 2 SCC 723 in the matter of ‘Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi v. Kelvinator of India Ltd.’ has held that after amendment of 1989, the A.O. can reopen assessment provided he has ‘reason to believe’ that income has escaped assessment based on tangible material. It was further held that mere ‘change of opinion’ does not empower the A.O. to review assessment in the garb of reassessment. Their Lordships have held as under: - “5. On going through the changes, quoted above, made to Section 147 of the Act, we find that, prior to the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, reopening could be done under the above two conditions and fulfilment of the said conditions alone conferred jurisdiction on the assessing officer to make a back assessment, but in Section 147 of the Act (with effect from 1-4-1989), they are given a go-by and only one condition has remained viz. that where the assessing officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. Therefore, post-1- 4-1989, power to reopen is much wider. However, one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words “reason to believe” failing which, we are afraid, Section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the assessing officer to reopen assessments on the basis of “mere change of opinion”, which cannot be per se reason to reopen. 6. We must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to reassess. The assessing officer has no power to review; he has the power to reassess. But reassessment has to be based on fulfilment of certain precondition and if the concept of “change of opinion” is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of reopening the assessment, review would take place. 77. One must treat the concept of “change of opinion” as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the assessing officer. Hence, after 1-4-1989, the assessing officer has power to reopen, provided there is “tangible material” to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. Our view gets support from the changes made to Section 147 of the Act, as quoted hereinabove. Under the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, Parliament not only deleted the words “reason to believe” but also inserted the word “opinion” in Section 147 of the Act. However, on receipt of representations from the companies against omission of the words “reason to believe”, Parliament reintroduced the said expression and deleted the 4 word “opinion” on the ground that it would vest arbitrary powers in the assessing officer. 8. We quote hereinbelow the relevant portion of Circular No. 549 dated 31-10-1989, which reads as follows: “7.2. Amendment made by the Amending Act, 1989, to reintroduce the expression ‘reason to believe’ in Section 147.—A number of representations were received against the omission of the words ‘reason to believe’ from Section 147 and their substitution by the ‘opinion’ of the Assessing Officer. It was pointed out that the meaning of the expression, ‘reason to believe’ had been explained in a number of court rulings in the past and was well settled and its omission from Section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to reopen past assessments on mere change of opinion. To allay these fears, the Amending Act, 1989, has again amended Section 147 to reintroduce the expression ‘has reason to believe’ in the place of the words ‘for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, is of the opinion’. Other provisions of the new Section 147, however, remain the same.” 7. Similarly, the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in (2006) 281 ITR 394 (Delhi) in the matter of ‘Consolidated Photo & Finvest Ltd. V. Asst. CIT (Delhi)’ has held that the Proviso to Section 147 envisages action in the ordinary course within a period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. That limitation does not, however, apply to cases where income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment on account, inter alia, of the failure of the assessed to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The argument that production of the account books and other documentary evidence relevant for assessment must imply a full and true disclosure of all material facts must be rejected out of hand in the light of the provisions of Explanation (1). The Division Bench further held that the there may be a presumption that the assessment proceedings have been regularly conducted, but there can be no presumption that even when the order of assessment was silent, all possible angles and aspects of a controversy had been examined and determined by the Assessing Officer. The principle that a mere change of opinion cannot be a basis for reopening computed assessments would be applicable only to situations where the assessing officer has applied his mind and taken a conscious decision on a particular 5 matter in issue. It would have no application where the order of assessment does not address itself to the aspect which was the basis for reopening of the assessment. Their Lordships in paragraph no.19 have held as under:- “19. In the light of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court referred to above, which are binding upon us and the observations made by the High Court of Gujarat with which we find ourselves in respectful agreement, the action initiated by the assessing officer for reopening the assessment cannot be said to be either incompetent or otherwise improper to call for interference by a writ court. The Assessing Officer has in the reasoned order passed by him indicated the basis on which income exigible to tax had in his opinion escaped assessment. The argument that the proposed reopening of assessment was based only upon a change of opinion has not impressed us. The assessment order did not admittedly address itself to the question which the assessing officer proposes to examine in the course of re-assessment proceedings. The submission of Mr. Vohra that even when the order of assessment did not record any explicit opinion on the aspects now sought to be examined, it must be presumed that those aspects were present to the mind of the assessing officer and had been held in favor of the assessed is too far fetched a proposition to merit acceptance. There may indeed be a presumption that the assessment proceedings have been regularly conducted, but there can be no presumption that even when the order of assessment is Page 436 silent, all possible angles and aspects of a controversy had been examined and determined by the assessing officer. It is trite that a matter in issue can be validly determined only upon application of mind by the authority determining the same. Application of mind is, in turn, best demonstrated by disclosure of mind, which is best done by giving reasons for the view which the authority is taking. In cases where the order passed by a statutory authority is silent as to the reasons for the conclusion it has drawn, it can well be said that the authority has not applied its mind to the issue before it nor formed any opinion. The principle that a mere change of opinion cannot be a basis for reopening computed assessments would be applicable only to situations where the assessing officer has applied his mind and taken a conscious decision on a particular matter in issue. It will have no application where the order of assessment does not address itself to the aspect which is the basis for reopening of the assessment, as is the position in the present case. It is in that view inconsequential whether or not the material necessary for taking a decision was available to the assessing officer either generally or in the form of a reply to the questionnaire served upon the assessed. What is important is whether the assessing officer had based on the material available to him taken a view. If he had not done so, the proposed reopening cannot be assailed on the ground that the same is based only on a change of opinion.” 8. It is thus, not the change of opinion but the reassessment has been ordered on the basis of the tangible material placed on record necessitating the reassessment. Sufficient reasons have been assigned for reopening of the assessment. The objections raised by 6 the petitioner company have been specifically dealt with by the respondent no.3. Impugned order passed by the respondent no.3 is detailed and reasoned and in conformity with the law laid down by their Lordships in the judgments cited hereinabove. 9. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition and the same is hereby dismissed. (Rajiv Sharma, J.) Rdang "